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Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017
● StartinginJune2016,broadbandconnectionsweresuspendedfrom7pmto1aminadaily“internetcurfew”inthebesiegedtownofDiraz,hometothepersecutedShiiteclericIsaQassim(seeRestrictions on Connectivity).
● Popularamonglocaldissidents,securecommunicationsappTelegramwaspermanentlyblockedthatsamemonth(seeBlocking and Filtering).
● Thewebsitesofprominentpoliticalandreligioussocietiesbelongingtothecountry’smarginalizedShiitemajoritywereblocked(seeBlocking and Filtering).
● Bahrain’sonlyindependentnewspaper,al-Wasat,wasbannedfromusingelectronicmediaforthreedaysinJanuaryandlatersuspendedaltogetherforitscriticalreporting(seeContent Removal).
● TheMinistryofInformationAffair issuedadecreetorestrictnewsoutletsfromsupplementingtheironlinereportingthroughuser-generatedlivevideo(seeMedia,Diversity, and Content Manipulation).
● FromJune2016toMay2017,atleast12internetusersreceivedprisonsentencesthatamountedtoacombinedtotalof148months.Manymorewerearrestedorinterrogatedforinsultingthekingordefamingthegovernment(seeProsecutions and Detentionsfor Online Activities).
Bahrain2016 2017
Internet Freedom Status Not Free
Not Free
ObstaclestoAccess(0-25) 10 11
LimitsonContent(0-35) 27 27
ViolationsofUserRights(0-40) 34 34
TOTAL* (0-100) 71 72
* 0=mostfree,100=leastfree
Population: 1.4 million
Internet Penetration 2016 (ITU): 98 percent
Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes
Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes
Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes
Press Freedom 2017 Status: Not Free
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IntroductionInternetfreedomremained“NotFree”in2017asauthoritiesrestrictedinternetconnectionsinDiraz,censoredoppositionwebsites,anddetaineddozensofactivistsforsocialmediaposts.
AlthoughBahrainhassomeofthebestinternetpenetrationandspeedsintheworld,onlinefreedomshavesuffere fromgovernmentmovestoquellunrest.InJune2016,thegovernmentreneweditswidespreadcrackdownonShiiteleadersandthepoliticalopposition,intensifyingcensorship.1AuthoritiesshutdownShiitereligiousorganizationsaccusedofillegalfundraising.Acourtalsoshutteredal-Wefaq,thekingdom’sprimarypoliticaloppositiongroup.
Bahrain’sleadingShiiteclericIsaQassimwasstrippedofcitizenshipfor“servingforeigninterests”and“promotingsectarianismandviolence.”Inabidtopreventhisarrest,supportersgatheredaroundQassim’shomeinthetownofDiraz.Authoritiesestablishedcheckpointstorestrictaccesstothetownandimplementedadaily“internetcurfew,”disruptingbroadbandconnectivitybetween7pmand1am.Qassimwasgivenasuspendedprisonsentenceforillegalfundraisingandmoneylaundering,andsecurityforcesforciblydispersedhissupportersinDirazonMay23,2017,leavingatleastfiv deadanddozensinjured.
ThesecuremessagingappTelegram—popularamongthecountry’sdissidents—wasblockednationwideinJune2016andremainedinaccessibleinmid-2017.AuthoritiesblacklistedthewebsitesofShiite-ledorganizations,whichjoinedhundredsofoppositionoutletsandforumsblockedsinceprodemocracyprotestsescalatedin2011.ThosedemonstrationscalledforgreaterrepresentationofthemajorityShiitepopulationinthecountry’sSunni-ledgovernment,butwereviolentlydisbandedbymilitaryforcesfromneighboringSaudiArabia.
Bahrainisstillusesocialmediatoorganizefurtherprotestsandcallattentiontorampantabusebysecurityforces,butthegovernmenthasseverelyrestrictedrelatednewscoverage.Newsoutletshavebeenbannedfromembeddinguser-generatedvideos,andtheireditoriallineisvigorouslypoliced.Al-Wasat,theonlyindependentnewspaperinthecountry,wasbannedfromusingelectronicmediainJanuaryafteritpostedarticlesrelatedtoaviolentuprisinginthetownofA’aliandthecontroversialexecutionofthreeShiitemeninthefirs useofthedeathpenaltysince2010.2AcourtsuspendedthenewspaperentirelyinJuneafteroneofitsarticlesreferredtothe“legitimategrievances”ofprotestorsinMorocco.
Whilesocialmediahasprovenhardertocensor,authoritiesoftenusesocialmediapostsasevidenceinordertointerrogateorjailprominentoppositionleaders.FromJune2016toMay2017,148monthsofprisonsentenceswerecollectivelypassedincasesinvolving12internetusers.Manymorehavebeenarrestedorinterrogatedonchargessuchasinsultingthekingordefamingthegovernmentunderthecountry’sharshpenalcode.Humanrightsgroupshavedocumentedwidespreadaccountsoftorture,includingtoextractconfessionsofwrongdoing.
1 ForamorecompleteoverviewofdevelopmentsinBahrainrelatedtopoliticalrightsandcivilliberties,pleasesee“Bahrain,”Freedom in the World,FreedomHouse,2017,https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/bahrain.2 BenHubbard,“BahrainExecutes3ShiitesConvictedinDeadlyAttackonPolice,”The New York Times,January15,2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/world/bahrain-shiites-executions.html?_r=0.
Introduction
Obstacles to Access
Availability and Ease of Access
Restrictions on Connectivity
ICT Market
Regulatory Bodies
Limits on Content
Blocking and Filtering
Content Removal
Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation
Digital Activism
Violations of User Rights
Legal Environment
Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities
Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity
Intimidation and Violence
Technical Attacks
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Obstacles to AccessBahrain is one of the most highly connected countries in the world. Competitive prices for broadband data services have led to high levels of mobile internet penetration. However, a partial internet shutdown has been ongoing since June 2016 in Diraz, and the regulator has ignored calls to resolve the situation.
Availability and Ease of Access
Key Access Indicators
Internet penetration (ITU)a 2016 98.0%2015 93.5%2011 77.0%
Mobile penetration (ITU)b 2016 217%2015 185%2011 131%
Average connection speeds (Akamai)c 2017(Q1) 7.9 Mbps2016(Q1) 5.2 Mbps
aInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“PercentageofIndividualsUsingtheInternet,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.bInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“Mobile-CellularTelephoneSubscriptions,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.cAkamai,“StateoftheInternet-ConnectivityReport,Q12017,”https://goo.gl/TQH7L7.
BahrainhasrisenrapidlyintheInternationalTelecommunicationUnion’s(ITU)ICTDevelopmentIndex(IDI),3andrankedfirs intheArabregionin2016.4Bahrainhad2.67millionmobilesubscriptionsbymid-2017,representingapenetrationrateof184percent.Broadbandpenetrationwasat166percentor2.4millionsubscriptions,ofwhich93percentconsistedofmobilebroadband,asopposedtofixe broadband.5
Pricesformobilebroadbandareamongthelowestintheregion.6Fixed-linebroadbandsubscriptionscostBHD20(US$26),lessthanonepercentoftheaveragemonthlyincome,fora20Mbpsconnection,withsimilarpricesformobileinternet.7Speedshavealsoincreased,andtheportionofsubscriberswithspeedsof10Mbpsorabovehasgrownsignificantly accordingtoa2016reportbythenationalregulator.8Anauditindicatedthat100percentofthepopulationarewithinreachof3Gand4Gmobilenetworks.9Batelco,astate-controlledinternetserviceprovider(ISP)
3 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU),ITU releases annual global ICT data and ICT Development Index country rankings,2015https://goo.gl/doJ1Ic.4 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“MeasuringtheInformationSocietyReport2016”,http://bit.ly/2f1vtSK.5 TelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthorityofBahrain,“QuarterlyMarketIndicators–Q22017,”October17,2017,http://www.tra.org.bh/media/document/MCD%2010%2017%20097%20Quarterly%20Market%20Indicators%20Q2%202017%20public.pdf.6 TRA,“Bahraincomparedwellwithdevelopedcountriesinthetelecomprices”,December28,2015,http://bit.ly/1PyGTWT.7 SeeBatelco,“MobileInternetPackages,”accessedMarch14,2017http://batelco.com/internet/mobile/packages/#1460968152589-bf57c4c1-aacc,andBatelco,“HomeInternetPackages,”accessedMarch14,2017http://batelco.com/internet/home/packages/#1456127273735-02d47f66-4418.8 TRA,TelecommunicationsMarketIndicatorsintheKingdomofBahrain,February2016,slide30http://goo.gl/XfzgpZ.9 TRA,“4GDownloadSpeedincreasesto23%Comparedto2014AccordingtoTRA’slatestKingdom-wideMobileAuditReports,”December19,2016,http://bit.ly/2hQEwo1
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beganofferin “superfast”500Mbpsspeedstoresidentialsubscribersin2016,10while4GLTEmobilesubscriptionshavebeenavailablesince2013.
Internetaccessiswidelyavailableinschools,universities,shoppingmalls,andcoffe shops,whereBahrainisoftengatherforworkandstudy.Adultliteracywasatnearly95percentandBahrainispossessahighlevelofEnglish-languageproficienc .11Thegovernmentprovidesfreecomputertrainingprograms,whichhadserved15,000citizensbyNovember2015.12
Restrictions on Connectivity
SinceJune23,2016,authoritieshaveimplementedan“internetcurfew”intownofDiraz.Thecurfewwasimplementedassecurityforcesplacedthetownundersiegewhenprotestorsstagedasit-inaroundthehouseofShiiteclericIssaQassem,accordingtoAmnestyInternational.13Mobiledataconnectionsweredisabledandfixed-lin connectedheavilydisruptedeverydayfromthehoursof7pmto1am.14ISPsinitiallyclaimedthedisruptionswereduetoatechnicalerror,althoughlaterinformedcustomerstocontacttheTRA.15OnereportestimatedthatresidentsspentoverUS$570,000ontelecommunicationsservicesthattheyneverreceivedovereightmonthsofdailyinternetshutdowns.16Thereportdidnotcalculatetheadditionalimpactonsmallbusinesseswhichcannotprocesspaymentsduringthehourswhenserviceisshutdown.17NoactionhasbeentakenbytheTRAtoaddressconsumercomplaintsabouttheshutdowns,despitewidespreadcriticismfromthemedia,18nongovernmentalorganizations,19andindividuals.20
OnMay23,2017,authoritiesstagedaviolentcrackdownonthesit-in,21leavingatleastfiv dead
10 “BatelcoFirstandOnlyTelecomtoProvideSuperfastFibreInternet500Mbps,”BizBahrain,August2,2016, http://bit.ly/2qsjMVY 11 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU),Measuring The Information Society,2014http://bit.ly/1xrVMi8.12 Bahraine-government,“QuduratTrainingProgram”,accessedJuly31,2015,http://bit.ly/1IQ1YMIand“E-government:wetrained15thousandcitizensoncomputers,”[inArabic]Alwasat,November30,2015,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1051215.html.13 “Bahrain:atleastonedeadandhundredsinjuredasgovernmentviolentlycracksdownonopposition,”AmnestyInternational,May23,2017,https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2017/05/bahrain-at-least-one-dead-and-hundreds-injured-as-government-violently-cracks-down-on-opposition/.14 PressRelease,“NewInvestigationFindsBahrainISPsImposing“InternetCurfew”inProtestArea,”BahrainWatch,August4,2016,http://bit.ly/2s6xIX6,andFatenBushehri,“OngoingInternetCurfewinDirazformorethan100Days,”BahrainWatch,October7,2016,http://bit.ly/2s0huiX.15 “TheTRAandthetelecommunicationscompaniesclaimthatthereisadefectinthenetworktocovertheisolationofDirazbyauthorities,”[inArabic]BahrainMirror,July12,2016,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/32464.html16 BahrainWatch,“250DaysofInternetShutdownCostsResidentsOver$500,000”,AccessedMay10,2017http://bit.ly/2lbhDjJ17 “ShuttingdowntheInternetfromNorthwestBahrainisdamagingBahrain’sdrivetowardsaknowledgeeconomy,”[inArabic]Alwasat,July4,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1133752.html18 “ShuttingdowntheInternetfromNorthwestBahrainisdamagingBahrain’sdrivetowardsaknowledgeeconomy,”[inArabic]Alwasat,July4,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1133752.html19 BahrainWatch,“CoalitionofNGOssignaLetterDemandingInternetRestorationinDiraz,”August28,2016,http://bit.ly/2r82pxI20 “TelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthorityReceives7ComplaintsaboutInternetCutoffinDiraz,”BahrainMirror,November3,2016,http://bahrainmirror.org/en/news/34545.html21 “SecuritydevelopmentsinAl-Darazandtheclosureofroadsleadingtothearea,”[inArabic]Alwasat,May23,2017,http://bit.ly/2rLlbJg
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anddozensinjured.22Theshutdownswereongoingthroughthecoverageperiod,andreportedlycametoahaltinJuly.23
AlthoughthereisnocentralizedinternetbackboneinBahrain,allISPsareindirectlycontrolledbythegovernmentthroughordersfromtheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(TRA).ServiceprovidersconnecttonumerousinternationalcablesandgatewaysprovidedbyTata,Flag,SaudiTelecom,EtisalatandQatarTelecom,amongothers,makingthecountrymoreresilienttounintentionalinternetoutages.24InApril2017,thechairpersonoftheTRAboardannouncedaplantoestablishanationalfiber-opti broadbandnetwork,allowingallserviceproviderstosharefiberopticinfrastructurebuiltbyBatelco.25
ICT Market
Batelco,Zain,andVIVAarethethreemobilephoneoperatorsinthecountry,andalsoserveasitsmaininternetservicesproviders(ISPs),alongwithMenatelecom,thefourthlargestISP.Intotal,around12ISPswereinbusinessasof2016.26ThegovernmenthasacontrollingstakeinthelargestISP,Batelco,whileotherISPsareownedbyinvestorsfromtheprivatesector,includingnon-Bahrainiinvestors.
Regulatory Bodies
MobilephoneservicesandISPsareregulatedbytheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(TRA)underthe2002TelecommunicationsLaw.TheTRAisresponsibleforlicensingtelecommunicationprovidersandfordeveloping“acompetitionledmarketfortheprovisionofinnovativecommunicationsservices,availabletoall.”27AlthoughtheTRAistheoreticallyanindependentorganization,inpracticeitsmembersareappointedbythegovernmentanditschairmanreportstotheMinisterofStateforTelecommunications.TheInformationAffair Authority,whichregulatespressandpublications,28mergedwiththeMinistryofInformationAffair (MIA)inDecember2016.29InAugust2016,theTRAissuedadecisionorderingalltelecommunicationcompaniesinBahraintopurchaseanduseaunifie technicalsystemforblockingwebsites(seeBlockingandFiltering).
TherehavebeennoreportedinstancesofISPsbeingdeniedregistrationpermits.However,inearly2015theTRArevokedthelicensesof14smallinformationandcommunicationtechnology(ICT)companies,includingsomethatvoluntarilyrequestedthecancellation.InFebruary2016,theTRArevokedthelicenseofthesmallmobileandfixed-lin provider2Connect.30Amongotherissues,the
22 “5killed,286heldinBahrainraidonShiitecleric’stown,”ABCNews,May23,2017,http://abcn.ws/2qYDBry23 LuaLuaTV,Twitterpost,May25,2017https://twitter.com/LuaLuaEnglish/status/86769892322964684824 TRA,Renesys Internet Ecosystem Report (December 2012),http://bit.ly/2qsaPwd25 “TechnicalcommitteesfromBatelcoandtheTelecommunicationsAuthorityinpreparationfortheliberationoftheterrestrialnetwork,”[inArabic]Alwasat,April7,2017,www.alwasatnews.com/news/1227945.html26 TRA,Telecommunications Market Indicators in the Kingdom of Bahrain,slide6https://goo.gl/05CDuh27 TRA,“Vision&Mission,”accessedMarch30,2014,http://tra.org.bh/en/about-us/vision-mission.html.28 InJune2013,Mohamedal-RumaihiwasnamedPresidentoftheIAA,replacingFawazal-KhalifawhoremainedMinisterofStateforTelecom.29 “RoyaldecreeregulatingtheMinistryofInformationAffairs, [inArabic]Alwasatnewspaper,December1,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1186132.html30 TRA,“RevocationoftelecommunicationlicensesgrantedbytheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority,”pressrelease,February25,2016,http://goo.gl/ZRgbnY.
Introduction
Obstacles to Access
Availability and Ease of Access
Restrictions on Connectivity
ICT Market
Regulatory Bodies
Limits on Content
Blocking and Filtering
Content Removal
Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation
Digital Activism
Violations of User Rights
Legal Environment
Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities
Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity
Intimidation and Violence
Technical Attacks
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companyhadfailedto“providealawfulaccesscapabilityplan”31whichwouldallowsecurityunitstoaccessmetadataaboutcommunicationssentoveritsnetwork.32
Limits on ContentExpanding a crackdown on the opposition, authorities blocked the websites of two of the country’s largest Shiite political and religious organizations and closed down the only independent news outlet in the country. Telegram, an encrypted messaging app used by the political opposition and human rights community, was also blocked. Meanwhile, the government undertook moves to centralize web filtering, ordering all ISPs to install new equipment. Self-censorship is rife, particularly on issues related to the monarchy, religion, and relations with the neighboring countries of the Arabian Peninsula.
Blocking and Filtering
NewcensorshipincidentsweredocumentedinresponsetorecentpoliticaldevelopmentsinBahrainandneighboringcountries.Politicalcontentiswidelyblocked,andauthoritiesrampedupcensorshipafterthe2011protests,inwhichonlinemediaplayedadecisiverole.
AcrackdownonShiitegroupswasfeltonline.InJune2016,acourtsuspendedthecountry’smainShiiteoppositiongroup,al-WefaqNationalIslamicSociety,anddissolveditaltogetherinSeptember,rulingitwas“harboringterrorism,”incitingviolence,andfomentingsectarianstrife.33ThegovernmentalsoorderedtheclosureoftheIslamicEnlightenmentSociety(al-Taweya),aprominentShiitereligiousorganizationaccusedof“illegalfundraising.”34Thewebsitesofboththeorganizationswereblocked.35Accountsbelongingtoal-WefaqonTwitter,36Instagram,andFacebookpostsalsostoppedposting.37
AlsoinJune,authoritiesblockedthecommunicationsappTelegram,whichwaspopularamongindependentmedia,politicalopposition,andprotestgroupsinBahrain.38LualuaTV,anoppositionnewsoutletbasedoverseas,hadfourassociatedwebsitesblockedwithinoneweek.39
InMay2017,authoritiesblockedanumberofQatarimediawebsites,includingal-Jazeera,al-Sharq,andRaya.40ThemovecoincidedwithadiplomaticcrisisbetweenQatarandseveralMiddleEasterncountriesafterhackerspostedafakereportontheQatarNewsAgencywebsiteandsocialmediaaccounts,inwhichtheemirofQatarappearedtoadmitprovidingsupporttogroupswhooppose
31 TRA,Article35OrderNo.2of20162Connect’sbreachofArticle24(b),53and78oftheTelecommunicationsLaw,February4,2016,http://bit.ly/2bldqnG.32 TRA,LawfulAccessRegulation,accessedAugust14,2016,http://bit.ly/2b5Xyb3.33 “BahraincourtupholdsdissolutionofmainShiiteoppositiongroupal-Wefaq,”DeutscheWelle,September22,2016,http://www.dw.com/en/bahrain-court-upholds-dissolution-of-main-shiite-opposition-group-al-wefaq/a-19568009.34 BahrainCenterforHumanRights,“Bahrain:AuthoritiesEscalateCrackdownonShiaClericsandFreedomofReligion,”June17,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/791435 “BlockingthewebsiteofAlwefaqSociety,”[inArabic]Alayamnewspaper,June14,2016,http://www.alayam.com/online/local/584797/Index.html36 TheTwitteraccountofAlwefaqSociety,accessedMay25,2017https://twitter.com/ALWEFAQ37 TheFacebookaccountofAlwefaqSociety,accessedMay25,2017https://web.facebook.com/AlwefaqNews38 BahrainWatch,“LeadingBahrainiISPsareBlockingTelegramTraffic June28,2016,http://bit.ly/2qpuw8l.39 LuaLuaTV,Twitterpost[inArabic],“TheBahrainiauthoritiesblocksLuaLuaTVwebsiteforthefourthtimeinaweek,”June30,2016,https://twitter.com/LuaLuaTV/status/74864622397282714140 “BahrainFollowsSuitafterUAEandSaudiArabia,BlocksQatariMediaOutlets,”BahrainMirror,May25,2017, http://bahrainmirror.org/en/news/38932.html
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otherleadersintheregion.SeveralcountriescutoffdiplomaticrelationswithQatarfollowingtheincident.41
YouTube,Facebook,Twitter,andinternationalblog-hostingservicesarefreelyavailable.However,severallivestreamingservicesremainblocked,42suchasPalTalkandMatam.tv,whichhavebeen
usedtoconductpoliticalseminars43andbroadcastShiitereligiousceremonies,respectively.44ThelivestreamingservicePeriscopewasstillavailableinmid-2017.Acrowdsourcedlistof367blockedwebsitesindicatedthat39percentofsitesblockedasofMay2017wererelatedtopolitics,while23percentrelatedtotheuseofvariousinternettools,suchasanonymizersandwebproxies.45
OtherblockedwebsitesincludeBahrainOnline,aprominentonlineforum;46theArabNetworkforHumanRightsInformation(ANHRI);theBahrainCenterforHumanRights(BCHR);Bahrain Mirror, apopularnewssite;andal-Quds al-Araby,aLondon-basednewspaper.47AreportfromNovember2015indicatedthatmorethan85percentofBahrainiwebsitesarehostedoutsideofthecountry,48despiteexcellentinfrastructure.Eveniftheyareblocked,websiteshostedoverseasarelessliabletobeingremovedbylocalhostingprovidersincomplianceofgovernmentordersandremainaccessibletoBahrainiswithaccesstocensorshipcircumventiontools.
Multiplestateorganizations,includingtheMinistryofInformationAffair (MIA)andtheMinistryofInterior,canordertheblockingofawebsitewithoutacourtorder.TheMIAblockswebsitesthatviolateArticles19and20ofthecountry’sPressRulesandRegulations,whichincludematerialjudgedas“instigatinghatredofthepoliticalregime,encroachingonthestate’soffici religion,breachingethics,encroachingonreligionsandjeopardizingpublicpeaceorraisingissueswhosepublicationisprohibitedbytheprovisionsofthislaw.”49Thus,anysitethatcriticizesthegovernment,therulingfamily,orthecountry’sstatusquoissubjecttoblocking.AnupdatedlistofblockedwebsitesisregularlysenttoISPs,whichareinstructedto“prohibitanymeansthatallowaccesstositesblocked.”50LicensesofISPsmayberevokedbytheTRAforfailingtocooperationwiththeMIA’sblockingorders.51
InAugust2016,theTRAorderedalltelecommunicationscompaniestoemployacentralizedsystemforblockingwebsitesmanagedbytheTRA.52TheordermayrelatetoaUS$1.2millioncontract
41 KarenDeYoungandEllenNakashima,“UAEorchestratedhackingofQatarigovernmentsites,sparkingregionalupheaval,accordingtoU.S.intelligenceofficials Washington Post,July16,2017,http://wapo.st/2yRxjiX.42 Thesesitesincludebambuser.com,ustream.tv,andotherwebsitesthatstreamdirectlytoTwitterliketwitcasting.tv,see,Bahrain Freedom Index(blog),http://bit.ly/2b8aYNJ.43 ReportersWithoutBorders,“CrackdowncontinuesinBahrain,BloggersgoontrialinEmirates,”June16,2011,http://bit.ly/1OUSoae.44 BCHR,“Bahrain:The“CyberSafetyDirectorate”MonitorsInternetActivityInStyleSimilartoBigBrother,”November25,2013,http://bit.ly/1FleBho.45 “AtaGlance:Bahrain,”Herdict,accessedonFebruary22,2015,http://www.herdict.org/explore/indepth?fc=BH.46 BenBirnbaum,“BahraincontinuescrackdownonShi’iteopposition,”The Washington Times,September14,2010,http://bit.ly/1JQCXLs.
“WebStatsDomian-Mail.bahrainonline.org,”WebStatsDomain,accessedMarch19,2013,http://bit.ly/1L7Fyla.47 BahrainCenterforHumanRights,“ANHRIcondemnsblockingAl-QudsAl-Arabinewspaperwebsite,”May24,2011,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/412648 AhmedAlDosari,“Bahrainiwebsitesmigratefromtheirhomeland...Willtheycomebackoneday?,”[inArabic](blog),November21,2015,http://bit.ly/2bSztUN.49 Decree—by—LawNo.47Regardingorganizingthepress,printingandpublishing,October23,2002,http://bit.ly/2blcAaB.50 ReportersWithoutBorders,“AuthoritiesStepUpOffensiv AgainstJournalistsandWebsites,”May14,2009,http://bit.ly/1hDJh2l.51 ReportersWithoutBorders,“AuthoritiesStepUpOffensiv AgainstJournalistsandWebsites.”52 TRA,ResolutionNo.(12)of2016PromulgatingtheInternetSafetyRegulation,accessedMay25,2017http://bit.ly/2r6vqbf.
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awardedearlierintheyeartoCanadiancompanyNetsweepertoprovidea“nationalwebsitefilterin solution.”53Netsweeperhassincebeenidentifie onnineISPsinthecountry,andfilter politicalcontentonatleastone.54Itwasnotclearifthenewtechnologywillincreasetheamountofcontentsubjecttoblocking,orjustchangethemechanismsinvolved.
Thedecision-makingprocessandgovernmentpoliciesbehindtheblockingofwebsitesarenottransparent.Thelistofallblockedwebsitesisnotavailabletothepublic.Inaddition,webmastersdonotreceivenotification orexplanationswhentheirwebsitesarebanned.Whentryingtoaccessablockedsite,usersareonlyinformedthatthewebsitehasbeen“blockedforviolatingregulationsandlawsofKingdomofBahrain.”Althoughthelawdoestechnicallyallowaffecte individualstoappealablockwithin15days,nosuchcasehasyetbeenadjudicated.
Content Removal
Websiteadministratorsareheldlegallyresponsibleforcontentpostedontheirplatforms,includinglibel.InFebruary2016,theinteriorministrystatedthatWhatsAppgroupadministratorsmaybeheldliableforspreadingfalsenewsiftheyfailtoreportincidentsthatoccurintheirgroup.55Spreadingfalsenewsisacriminaloffense Inaddition,newsemergedinApril2015ofplanstocreateaBahraininationalsearchenginewiththehelpofRussiantechnologyexperts,basedonRussia’s“Sputnik”searchengine.ThemovewouldenableauthoritiestoeasilyremoveunwantedsearchresultswithouttheneedtosecurecooperationfromU.S.-basedsearchengines,suchasGoogle.56
InJanuary2017,thegovernmentclaimedthatithadmetwithFacebook,Twitter,andSnapchattoremoveunidentifie “inappropriatecontent.”Accordingtotransparencyreports,neitherGoogle,Facebook,Twitter,norSnapchatremovedanycontentbasedonrequestsfromtheBahrainiauthorities.Twitterdidreceivetworemovalrequestsinthefirs halfof2017,butdidnotwithholdanycontent.57Indeed,localobserverscomplainedthatinappropriatecontentcontinuedtobewidelyavailableonsocialmedia.58
Authoritiesalsouseextralegalmeasurestoforciblyremoveonlinecontent.Througharrests,59prosecutions,60andtorture,61securityforceshavecoercedmanyonlineforummoderatorsto
53 BahrainTenderBoard,“AwardedTendersMonthlyReportFrom1/1/2016to1/31/2016,”page5,[inArabic]http://goo.gl/ilUJIF.54 CitizenLab,“TenderConfirmed RightsAtRisk:VerifyingNetsweeperinBahrain,”September21,2016,http://bit.ly/2cCUQVO.55 “InteriorMinistry:GroupAdmininBahrain,isresponsibletotheauthoritiesforeverythingpublished,”[inArabic]LualuaTV,February19,2016,http://lualuatv.com/?p=33529.56 “RussiacouldhelpBahraininestablishinganationalsearchengine”,UNLOCKPWD,July30,2015,http://bit.ly/1LNLSRJ.57 “Bahrain,”Transparency Report,Twitter,https://transparency.twitter.com/en/countries/bh.html.58 “Culturallyinappropriatecontentonsocialmediablocked,”BahrainNewsAgency,January3,2017,https://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/764204andiProtestbh,Twitterpost,January13,2017,11:45AMhttps://twitter.com/iprotestbh/status/81999377515823104159 Nonexhaustivelistofforummoderatorswhoweresubjecttoarrestfoundat:http://bit.ly/1He9SYQ;accessedvia:BCHR,
“Bahrain:Afterdestructionoftheactualprotestingsiteat“thePearl,”thegovernmentshiftstoeliminatevirtualprotests,”May17,2011,http://bit.ly/1LmOd7Y.60 BahrainGatewayfarewelltweet,accessedAugust14,2016,https://twitter.com/b4bhcom/status/622400160346341376.61 MonaKareem,“Bahrain:TwitterUserJailedfor66DaysforTweeting,“Global Voices,December5,2011http://bit.ly/1JXimWe.
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permanentlyshutdowntheirwebsites.62AfterbeinginterrogatedbysecurityforcesonMay24,2017,activistAdela-MarzooqdeletedallthecontenthepostedonTwitterbetweenMarchandMay2017.HehadreportedextensivelyonadeadlycrackdownonprotestorsinDiraz(seeRestrictionsonConnectivity).63AccountsoperatedbytheoppositioncanalsobetemporarilyshutdownonTwitterbecausegovernmentsupportersorganizetoreportthemforviolatingtheplatform’spolicies.64
Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation
Decree68/2016,passedbytheMIAinJuly2016,restricteduseofelectronicmediabypressoutlets.NewspapersmustnowobtainlicensesfromBahrain’smassmediadirectorateinordertodisseminateelectronicmediaonwebsitesorsocialmedia.65Thelawdoesnotdetailwhatcriteriawouldbeusedtoprovideorrenewtheone-yearlicense.Additionally,newspapersmaynotpostvideosovertwominutesinlengthandareforbiddenfromlive-streamingvideo.Thelawalsostipulatesthatelectronicmediamustreflec thesamecontentastheirprintedcounterparts,effectivel limitingothermultimediacontent.Furthermore,outletsmustprovidealistoftheirsocialmediaaccountsandwebsiteaddresses,aswellasthenamesofthosewhooverseethemaspartofthelicenseapplication,exposingemployeestopossiblemonitoringandcoercion.Undertheexistingpresslaw,mediaprofessionalsfacesixmonths’imprisonmentand/orafin ofBHD5,000(US$13,260)forpublishingwithoutalicense.
Pressurealsomountedonal-Wasat,Bahrain’sonlyindependentnewspaper,whichwasseparatelybannedfromsharingYouTubecontentinearly2016.66InJanuary2017,theMIAtemporarilybarredal-Wasatfromusingelectronicmediatools,effectivel shuttingdownitswebsiteandsocialmediaaccountsforthreedays.67Themoveoccurredonedayafteral-Wasatpublishedaheadlinestoryabouttheexecutionofthreepoliticalprisoners.Theministryclaimedtheoutletwas“incitingaspiritofdivisionandharmingnationalunity.”TheMIAorderedtheindefinit suspensionoftheentirepublicationinJune.68
Theauthoritiesareknowntomanipulateonlinecontentinordertofabricategreaterpublicsupportforgovernmentpolicies.AccordingtothewatchdoggroupBahrainWatch,thegovernmenthashired18publicrelations(PR)firm forpromotionalcampaignssinceFebruary2011,representingatleastUS$32millionincontracts.69AtleastonePRagencywascontractedtoprovide“weboptimizationandblogging”services,70whileotherswerehiredforonlinereputationmanagement.71
62 ModeratoroftheAlDairForumtalksabouthisdetention,sayinghewasforcedtoshowtheinterrogationoffic howtoclosethewebsite:“Ahmedal-DairiModeratorofAlDairForumsinthefirs episodeofhistestimony:thuseasedvoiceofZakariaAlAsheeriforever,”[inArabic]Bahrain Mirror,January4,2012,http://bahrainmirror.com/article.php?id=2678&cid=117.63 iProtestbh,Twitterpost,May26,2017,04:49AMhttps://twitter.com/iprotestbh/status/86807151066109542464 BahrainDetainees,Twitterpost,May12,2015,8:23AM,Atweetmentioningoneoppositionaccountsthathasbeensuspendedduetoreports,accessedJuly31,2015https://twitter.com/BH14Detainees/status/598146464934547456.65 “InformationMinisterissuesedict68/2016,”BahrainNewsAgency,July16,2016,http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/73610666 “IAApreventsAlwasatfromusing“Video”andYouTube,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January25,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1072283.html.67 “TheMinistryofInformationAffair decidedtostopthecirculationanduseofAl-Wasatnewspaperforelectronicmediaimmediately..,”[inArabic]Bahrain News Agency,January16,2017,http://bna.bh/portal/news/76601768 “Bahrain:OnlyIndependentNewspaperShutDown,”HumanRightsWatch,June18,2017,https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/18/bahrain-only-independent-newspaper-shut-down.69 BahrainWatch,“PRWatch–keepinganeyeontheKingdom’sPR,”http://bahrainwatch.org/pr/.70 “Trippi&AssociatesManipulateInternetContentonBehalfofBahrainGovernment,”Bahrain Freedom Index(blog),July20,2011,http://bit.ly/1L7nCqT.71 MarcusBaram,“LobbyistsJumpShipinWakeofMideastUnrest,”Huffington Post,March25,2011,http://huff.to/1ePbiw .
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InOctober2014,oneofthesePRcompaniestriedtoforceThe Huffington PostnottowriteabouttheUnitedKingdom’sinvestigationoftortureallegationsagainsttheBahrainiking’sson.72ProgovernmentblogslikeCitizens of Bahrainalsospreadpropaganda.73Authoritieshaveurgedprogovernmentuserstopostaboutcertaintopics,sometimeswithunintendedconsequences.74InJanuary2014,theprimeministerandtheministeroftelecommunicationsheldseveralpublicmeetingswithprogovernmentuserstoencouragethemto“defendBahrain’srulingsystem.”75
Similarly,an“armyoftrolls”hasbeenactiveonTwittersinceFebruary2011,76whenhundredsofaccountssuddenlyemergedtocollectivelyharassandintimidateonlineactivists,77commentators,andjournalistswhovoicedsupportforprotestsandhumanrights.78Theprogovernmenttrollshavebeenmoderatelyeffectiv insilencingorreducingtheactivityofoppositionvoicesbothinsideBahrain79andabroad.80Thetrollshavealsoplayedavitalroleinspreadinginformationthatiscontroversial,offensive orfalse,81inordertodistorttheimageofprotesters,spreadhateandconflict ordiscreditinformationpostedonsocialnetworks.82Thesetrollaccountsusuallyhavefewornofollowersandtendtoappearanddisappearincoordinationwithoneanother.Inonerecentincident,trollssprangintoactioninJune2016afteradecisiontorevokethenationalityofIsaQassim,theforemostShiitereligiousauthorityinBahrain.Researcherssaid50percentoftweetsdistributedwiththe#Bahrainhashtagderivedfrombotsandtrollstweetinganti-Shiitemessages.Inaperiodof12hoursonJune22,over5,000sectariantweetswereregisteredonthehashtag.83Twittersuspended1,800botaccountsrelatedtothemanipulationcampaign.84
InAugust2013,BahrainWatchrevealedevidenceofconnectionsbetweentheBahrainigovernmentand“extremist”accountsonTwitterandFacebook,whichadvocatedviolenceagainstboththegovernmentandprotesters.85Itwasalsorevealedthatthegovernmentimpersonatesopposition
72 JamesDorsey,“BahrainrattledbyUKcourt’sopeningofdoortoinvestigationoftortureallegations,”The World Post,October21,2014,http://huff.to/10vInw .73 CitizensforBahrainwebsite,accessedMay26,2017,https://www.citizensforbahrain.com74 “Bahrain’sInteriorMinisterLaunchedHateCampaign..SectarianTakfir DiscourseReturnedUnderHashtag#No_to_Iranian_Intervention,”Bahrain Mirror,August22,2015,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/25858.html.75 “HRHPremiercallsfortheneedtousesocialnetworkstodefendthenation,”Bahrain News Agency, January14,2014,http://bit.ly/1L7p6S3.76 BobHooker,“Bahrain’sTrollArmy,”Web 3.0 Lab(blog),February17,2011,http://bit.ly/1W8HJN3.77 SeeBrianDooley,“NoStampRequired:AllTooEasyfor#BahrainTwitterTrolls,”Huffingt Post,September25,2015http://huff.to/1WmSue ,andBrianDooley,“‘Troll’Attackson#BahrainTweetsShowDepthofGovernmentAttemptstoSilenceDissent,”The World Post, November17,2011,http://huff.to/1i mxf9.78 J.DavidGoodman,“‘TwitterTrolls’HauntDiscussionsofBahrainOnline,”The Lede (blog),The New York Times,October11,2011,http://nyti.ms/1NBl3Sv.79 iManamaa,Twitterpost,May13,2011,7:39am,http://bit.ly/1iCuvtJ;Sultanal-Qassemi,“PioneerBloggersintheGulfArabStates,”Jadaliyya,December20,2011,http://bit.ly/1k4jzR5;BobHooker,“DisturbingDropinTweetinginBahrain,”Web 3.0 Lab (blog), March22,2011,http://bit.ly/1OcDDik.80 “TwitterTrollingasPropagandaTactic:BahrainandSyria,”Jillian C. York (blog),December10,2011,http://bit.ly/1hXiMFN.81 “SoManyTrollsbutsoFewLeaders:TheInformationWarinBahrain,” Marc Owen Jones,March14,2011,http://bit.ly/1V0gq5c;HusseinIbish,The Bahrain Uprising: Towards Confrontation or Accommodation?,TheHenryJacksonSociety,November2011,9,http://bit.ly/1P8SNpf.82 DavidWheeler,“IntheArabSpring’sWake,TwitterTrollsandFacebookSpies,”The Chronicle of Higher Education (blog),November29,2011,http://bit.ly/1Kx8zdJ.83 MarcOwenJones,“TheAutomationofSectarianism:AreTwitterBotsSpreadingSectarianismintheGulf?,”June21,2016,http://bit.ly/28TOtwt,andMarcOwenJones,“Around51%ofTweetson#BahrainHashtagCreatedbyAutomatedSectarianBots,”June22,2016,http://bit.ly/2s0Jcfm.84 MarcOwenJones,“NewSectarianBotsStillFloodingTwitterwithAnti-ShiaHateSpeech,”June28,2016,http://bit.ly/2qYtiUsandVideobyErinKilbride,Twitterpost,July4,2016,14:20PMhttps://twitter.com/neo_chlo/status/75007692884615987285 BillMarczak,“IsBahrain’sGovernmentrunningextremistaccounts?”BahrainWatch,August5,2013,http://bit.ly/1UpiYil.
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figure onsocialmediainordertosendmaliciouslinks,suchasIPtrackers,toanonymousgovernmentcriticsthatcanbeusedtoidentifyandprosecutethem.86
Thestatealsoissuesoffici statementswarningagainstthediscussionofcertainsubjectsandthe“misuse”ofsocialmedia.87OnJanuary3,2016,theinteriorministrythreatenedtotakeactionagainstanyinsultor“negativediscussion”oftheSaudiexecutionsofNimral-Nimr,aprominentShiitecleric,and42othermen.88OnMarch26,2015,theinteriorministryalsoissuedawarningthatitwouldtakestepsagainstanyoneexpressingopinionsagainstBahrain’sinvolvementintheSaudi-ledcoalitionconductingairstrikesinYemen89(seeProsecutionsandDetentionsforOnlineActivities).
Therearesomegovernmentrestrictionsononlineadvertising,butmanyoppositionwebsitescontinuetooperatenonetheless.Whileitisdifficu forblockedwebsitestosecureadvertising,popularsitessuchasBahrain Mirror(390,000viewsmonthly)havenotfacedsignifican financia pressures.ThisisduetothefactthatmostBahrainioppositionwebsitesarerunwithlimitedresources,andareoftenself-funded.Furthermore,thewebsitescontinuetoreceivelargeamountsoftrafficfromuserswithinBahrainthroughtheuseofproxyservices,dynamicIPaddresses,andvirtualprivatenetwork(VPN)applications.Whilethegovernmentdoesblockaccesstocircumventiontools,includingworkaroundssuchasGooglePageTranslate,Googlecachedpages,andonlinemobileemulators,internetsavvyBahrainistendtobypasstherestrictions.
TheinternetremainsthemainsourceofinformationandnewsformanyBahrainis,particularlythoseactiveonTwitterandFacebook.90However,internetusersexerciseahigherdegreeofself-censorship,particularlyasinvestigationsofusers’onlineactivitieshavebeenlaunchedatworkplacesanduniversities.91OnTwitter,onlineforums,andcommentsections,mostpeopleusepseudonymsduetothefearofbeingtargetedbytheauthorities.92Manysharecontentprivatelyonsocialmediainsteadofpublicly.AtleastsomehavetemporarilywithdrawnfromTwitterafterreceivingthreatstotheirpersonalsafety.93
Digital Activism
Activistsrelyondigitaltoolstobringattentiontoprotestsandhumanrightsviolations,givenrestrictionsonpressfreedomandthelackofinternationalmediacoverage,whichiscompoundedbythefactthatmanyprominentjournalistsarebarredfromthecountry.9495Onlinecampaignswere
86 BillMarczak,“BahrainGovtusingfakeTwitteraccountstotrackonlinecritics,”BahrainWatch,pressrelease,July31,2013,http://bit.ly/1hXjfrJ.87 “MOI:legalactionagainstanyonewhoabusestheuseofsocialmediaandraisessectarianstrife,”[inArabic]Alwasat,June27,2015,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1003344.html.88 “MinistryofInterior(MOI):legalactionsagainstanymisuseorabuseontheimplementationoftheSaudijudicialrulings,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January3,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1063913.html.89 “MOIwarnsagainstdivision,sedition,”March26,2015,Bahrain News Agency,http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/660794.90 “Twomillionand200KaccountsinthesocialnetworksinBahrainin2015,”[inArabic]Alwasat,December15,2015http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1057013.html.91 SimeonKerr,“Manamafight backincyberspace,”Financial Times,May23,2011,http://on.ft.com/maUYxm.92 NancyMessieh,“Onlineanonymity:Agatewaytofreedomorabuse?”The Next Web,August14,2011,http://bit.ly/1PNCI8x.93 “Bahraindoctor@BAHRAINDOCTORthreatenedwitharrestbecauseofhertweets,”Bahrain Freedom Index (blog), accessedJuly31,2015,http://bit.ly/1DhPISu.94 “AccessDenied,”aprojectoftheindependentresearchandadvocacyorganizationBahrainWatch,chroniclesthemanyjournalists,researchers,academics,andNGOworkersthatwereexpelledfromordeniedaccesstoBahrainfromthe2011uprisinguntilnow.See,http://bahrainwatch.org/access/.95 AmiraalHussaini,“Bahrain:TweetingAppallingConditionsatJawPrison,”Global Voices,July19,2012,http://bit.ly/1ikgVuE.
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pickedupbyinternationalmediainthepastyear.Overtenthousandstweetswerepostedwiththe#save_Bahrain_prisonershashtag,resultinginaBBCreportonprisonconditionsinthecountry.96Over40,000tweetshavebeenpostedunderanotherhashtag,#Diraz,ascitizenjournalistscoveredlocalviolencein2017.97Socialmediapostswereusedbyexpertstoidentifythetypesofweaponsusedbysecurityforcesagainsttheprotestors.98
Inaddition,the“CoalitionofFebruary14Youth”protestmovementcontinuestousesocialnetworks99toorganizeprotestsandbringinternationalattentiontolocalcauses.100YouTubevideosareuploadedtodocumentpoliceattacksonciviliansandtorturetestimonies,101andrelativesorfriendsofdetaineesregularlyuseTwittertocampaignfortheirreleaseandtoprovideupdatesaboutprisonconditions.102
Violations of User RightsViolations of user rights in Bahrain were rampant, with at least 18 users arrested, detained, or prosecuted over the coverage period. Collectively, 148 months of prison sentences were passed down to 12 users, while others remain on trial or in arbitrarily detention for charges like insulting the king or defaming the government. Bahraini law does not contain adequate protections for free speech, given provisions that ban criticism of the royal family, the spread of false news, or insults to foreign nations. A new law was passed to allow for the trial of civilians in military tribunals.
Legal Environment
Bahrain’slegalenvironmentpresentsmanyobstaclestointernetfreedom.AccordingtoArticle23oftheconstitution,freedomofexpressionisguaranteed,“providedthatthefundamentalbeliefsofIslamicdoctrinearenotinfringed,theunityofthepeopleisnotprejudiced,anddiscordorsectarianismisnotaroused.”103Article26statesthatallwritten,telephonic,andelectroniccommunications“shallnotbecensoredortheirconfidentialit bebreachedexceptinexigenciesspecifie bylawandinaccordancewithproceduresandunderguaranteesprescribedbythelaw.”104
ThePressandPublicationsLawof2002promisesfreeaccesstoinformation“withoutprejudicetotherequirementsofnationalsecurityanddefendingthehomeland.”Bahrainijournalistshavearguedthatthesequalifyingstatementsandloosely-wordedclausesallowforarbitraryinterpretationand,inpractice,thenegationofthemanyrightstheyseektouphold.105
96 “BBCTrend,”[inArabic]BBC,June12,2016http://www.bbc.com/arabic/blogs/2016/06/160612_social_media_12_june?ocid=socialflow_twitte .97 “#Diraz:Bahrainiangeronsocialnetworkingsites,”[inArabic]BBC,January27,2017,http://www.bbc.com/arabic/trending-38771006?ocid=socialflow_twitte .98 BahrainWatch,“CriticalInjuryasArmedMenFire9mmRoundsandShotgunsatCiviliansinDiraz,”January26,2017,http://bit.ly/2n9Cnpe.99 Coalition14Feb,TwitterAccount,https://twitter.com/COALITION14.100 TobyC.JonesandAla’aShehabi,“Bahrain’srevolutionaries,”Foreign Policy,January2,2012,http://atfp.co/1JBnf7R;U.S.EmbassyBahrain,“DemonstrationNotice3–January17,2013,“newsrelease,January17,2013,http://1.usa.gov/1JDUPMH.101 BCHR,“BlockingtheDocumentary‘SystematicTortureinBahrain’onYouTube,”February8,2011,http://bit.ly/1NBlaO4.102 BahrainDetainees,TwitterAccount,https://twitter.com/FreedomPrayers/lists/bahraindetainees.103 ConstitutionoftheKingdomofBahrain,art.23,http://www.shura.bh/en/LegislativeResource/Constitution/Pages/default.aspx.104 ConstitutionoftheKingdomofBahrain,art.26.105 IREX,“Bahrain,”Media Sustainability Index 2008, 2009,https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/MSIMENA08_Bahrain.pd .
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InApril2017,thekingapprovedaconstitutionalamendmenttoallowforthetrialofciviliansinmilitarycourts.106Whenmilitarycourtslastoperatedinthismannerduringastateofemergencyin2011,judgespassedlongsentencesof15yearsandlifeimprisonmenttobloggers.Inaddition,thepublicprosecutorhasbeguntousealegalprovisionthatcallsfortheprosecutionofteenagers’parentswhentheirchildrenarearrestedforcriminalactivities,suchas“misusingsocialmedia.”107
Onlinecensorshipandcriminalpenaltiesforonlinespeecharecurrentlyenforcedunderthe2002PressandPublicationsLaw,108whichdoesnotspecificall mentiononlineactivitiesbutwasextendedtomobilephonesin2010.109Thelawallowsforprisonsentencesfromsixmonthstofiv yearsforrepeatoffenders forpublishingmaterialthatcriticizesIslam,itsfollowers,ortheking,aswellascontentthatinstigatesviolentcrimesortheoverthrowofthegovernment.110Inaddition,the2002TelecommunicationsLawcontainspenaltiesforseveralonlineactivities,suchasthetransmissionofmessagesthatareoffensiv topublicpolicyormorals.111However,sentencescanbelongerifusersaretriedunderthepenalcodeorterrorismlaws,especiallywhenitcomestosocialmediacases,wherethecurrentpressandpublicationlawisnotused.112Forinstance,underthepenalcode,anyuserwho“deliberatelydisseminatesafalsestatement”thatmaybedamagingtonationalsecurityorpublicordermaybeimprisonedforuptotwoyears.113UnderArticle309ofthePenalCode,any
“expressionagainstoneoftherecognizedreligioussects”orridiculeoftheirritualsmaybepunishedbyafin ofBHD100(US$266)orprisontermofoneyear.Thegovernmenthasusedthesevagueclausestointerrogateandprosecuteseveralbloggersandonlinecommentators.
Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities
BetweenJune2016andMay2017,atleast22individualswerearrested,detained,orprosecutedfortheironlineactivities.114WhilemanywerestillontrialasofMay2017,148monthsofprisonsentenceswerecollectivelypasseddownon12Bahrainiusersduringthecoverageperiod.
TheElectronicCrimesDirectoratepublishesoffici statisticsofcybercrimecaseseachyear,althoughitisdifficu todeterminewhichcasesarerelatedtopolitical,social,orreligiousspeechthatisprotectedunderinternationalnorms.Atotalof682caseswerenotedin2016,including73casesofdefamation,57casesof“insultingastatutorybody,”9casesof“incitinghatredagainsttheregime,”7casesof“disseminationoffalsenews,”3casesof“insultingaforeigncountry,”and339casesof
106 “BahrainKingapprovesmilitarytrialsforcivilians,”TheHindu,April3,2017,http://bit.ly/2r8qggR.107 “MOI:arrestofnumberofthosewhoabusedsocialmedia,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January4,2016,http://bit.ly/2b9ULdQ.108 Forcaseswheretheauthoritieshaveusedthe2002presslawtocensoronlinewebsites,seeBCHR,“Websiteaccusedofviolatingpresscode,BCHRconcernedthatmoveisaimedatsilencingcriticalvoices,”October1,2008,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/2446;
“Closingablowtofreedomofopinionandexpression,”[inArabic] Alwasat,April25,2010,http://bit.ly/1JQ3ahA;“Blockingusers‘Twitter’causedbyaviolationoftheCopyrightAct,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January3,2010,http://bit.ly/1JQ3ahA.109 HabibToumi,“BahrainimposesblackoutonBlackBerrynewssharing,”Habib Toumi (blog),April8,2010,http://bit.ly/1IBqlM4.110 PressandPublicationsLawof2002oftheKingdomofBahrain(No.47of2002).111 TheTelecommunicationsLawOfTheKingdomOfBahrain,LegislativeDecree48.112 “Alhammadi:Noderelictionindealingwiththecomplaintsofthemisuseofsocialmedia,”[inArabic]Alwasat,August4,2015,http://bit.ly/2bqEFfV.113 BahrainPenalcode,1976,art.168,http://bahrainrights.org/BCHR/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Bahrain-Penal-Code.doc.114 Listofprosecutedonlineusers2016-2017:http://bit.ly/2rrAWYQ,accessedviabahrainrights.org.
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“misuseofelectronicdevices.”Additionally,therewere54casesof“hacking.”115Multipleusershavealsobeenarrestedforcallingfor“illegalassemblies”.116
Severalpeoplewereprosecutedfor“insultingtheking”overthecoverageperiod:
● Soccerplayer Mohammadal-Alawiyat wasarrestedonJune9,2016forhistweets.117HewasheldinpretrialdetentionuntilSeptember2016.Atrialhadnotbeenpubliclyreportedbymid-2017.
● OnJune27,2016,BahrainiartistKhalilal-MadhoonwasarrestedinrelationtoacontroversialInstagramcommentonwhethertheword“majesty”appliesbettertoGodortheking.118Hewasreleasedonemonthlater.
● OnAugust31,2016,twouserswhotweetedunderpseudonymsweresentencedunderArticle214ofthePenalCode.119TaibaIsmaeel,whowasarrestedon26June2016,receivedaone-yearprisonsentenceandafin ofBHD1,000(US$2,650).HameedKhatam,whowasarrestedonJuly25,2016,receivedasentenceoftwoyearsinprison.120ThesentencewaslaterreducedbyoneyearinNovember.121
● OnFebruary9,2017,Younisal-Shakouriwassentencedtooneyearinprisonforatweet.HehadbeenarrestedonJuly25,2016.
Otherswereprosecutedforcriticizingthegovernment:
● OnJune8,2016,KhalidAbdulaal, aformermemberofparliament,wassentencedtooneyearinprisonfor“insultingtheministryofinterior”onTwitterin2014.Hehadreceivedanearlierone-yearsentenceinMay2015fordenouncingtheuseoftorturetoextractconfessions.AsanMP,hewasimmunefromprosecutionatthetimehepublishedthestatements.122
● OnJune16,2016,HabeebJaafarAhmed,a45-year-oldmilitaryoffice wassentencedtothreemonthsinprisonfor“incitinghatredagainsttheregimeandsecurityforces”onTwitterandFacebook.123HehadbeenarrestedonApril10,2016.
115 “Combatingcybercrimeattendsto682reportsin2016,halfofwhicharemisuseofcommunicationsdevices,”[inArabic]Alayam,February26,2017,http://www.alayam.com/alayam/Variety/634778/News.html116 “InteriorMinistry:thearrestofpeoplewhopostedinflammator materialtocallforunauthorizedsit-insthroughthemeansofcommunication,”[inArabic]Alwasat,July26,2016http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1141385.html.117 “BahrainiAuthoritiesChargeFootballPlayerover“InsultingBahrain’sKing”,”BahrainMirror,June10,2016,http://bit.ly/2rISlfn.118 “OnEveofUNResolutionforInternetFreedom:Websitesblocked,InternetDisrupted,andSocialMediaPostsContinuetoLeadtoArrestsinBahrain,”BCHR,July3,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/7969.119 Article214proscribes“apunishmentofimprisonmentforaperiodofnolessthanoneyearandnomorethansevenyearsandafin ofnolessthanBD1,000andnomorethanBD10,000willbeinflicte uponanypersonwhooffend inpublictheMonarchoftheKingdomofBahrain,thefla orthenationalemblem.”BCHR,“BahrainKing:Upto7YearsImprisonmentifYouInsultMe!,”February9,2014,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/6747.120 “BahrainiAuthoritiesSentenceMoreActiviststoPrisonTermsforCriticisingtheKing,”BCHR,September9,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8148121 “HameedKhatam’sprisonsentencereducedfromtwoyearstooneyearonchargesof“insultingtheking”,”[inArabic]ManamaPost,November17,2016,http://www.manamapost.com/news.php?name=2016041622122 “MorearrestsandjailsentencesinBahrainoversocialmediaposts,”BCHR,June20,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7919123 “MorearrestsandjailsentencesinBahrainoversocialmediaposts,”BCHR,June20,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7919
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● OnNovember10,2016,humanrightslawyerMohamedal-Tajerwaschargedwith“insultinggovernmentinstitutions,incitinghatredofareligioussect,andmisusingatelecommunicationsdevice”underArticles172,216,290ofthepenalcode.HehadsentaprivatevoicemessageoverWhatsAppstating“It’sclearthatthereisateaminthepublicprosecutionandcybercrimesdivisionwhoseonlyjobistositatcomputersandintercepteverywordaboutSunnis,SaudiArabia,hatredoftheregime,orinsultsagainsttheking.”Additionally,hewasinterrogatedoveratweetthatsaid,inEnglish,“Historytellsstoriesoffallingdictators,butthelessonisneverlearnt#bahrain”andforretweetingapostthatreferredtothegovernmentas“theregimeofprohibition.”124
● OnJanuary15,2017,thesamedayBahrainexecutedthreepoliticalprisoners,125oppositionleaderEbrahimSharifwasinterrogatedforcriticizingtheexecutionsonTwitter.126OnMarch20,hewaschargedwith“incitinghatred”againsttheregime(Article165ofthepenalcode)andagainst“factionsofsociety”(Article172),127overaseparateTwitterpostwhichcriticizedtheauthoritiesfordissolvingpoliticaloppositionsocieties.Hehadalsosharedinformationabouthumanrightsviolations.128
● InFebruary2017,aclericwasfine BHD50(US$133)forinsultingparliamentonInstagram.129Hehadcalledtheinstitution“ajoke.”
Severalindividualshavebeenarrestedorfine fordefaminglocalfigure andinstitutions:
● InJuly2016,aboardmemberofBahrain’sChamberofCommerceandIndustrylodgedacomplaintagainsttheboard’schairpersonoveramessagesentoveraWhatsAppgroupdedicatedtoboardmembers.Theboardchairwasorderedtopayafin ofBHD50(US$133)inOctober.130Separately,Mohamedal-Aradi,abusinessmanactiveonTwitterwassummonedtwiceinFebruaryandMarch2017,131forallegedlydefamingthesameChamber.132
● On15August2016,policearrestedGhadaJamsheer,ahumanrightsdefenderandblogger,whenshereturnedtoBahrainfromoverseas.133Despiteillhealth,shewasrequiredtoservepartofa10-monthprisonsentencehandeddowninrelationtoallegationsaboutcorrupt
124 “Bahrain:HumanRightsLawyerCharged,”HRW,December1,2016,https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/01/bahrain-human-rights-lawyer-charged125 “BahrainExecutesthreeStatelessTortureVictimsFollowingKingHamad’sAuthorisation,”BCHR,January15,2017,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8434126 BahrainMirror,Twitterpost,January15,2017,09:36AMhttps://twitter.com/BahrainmirrorEN/status/820686137807306752andoriginaltweet,EbrahimSharif,Twitterpost[inArabic],January14,2017,07:45AMhttps://twitter.com/ebrahimsharif/status/820295702878134272127 “BAHRAIN:PoliticalOppositionLeaderEbrahimSharifChargedWith“IncitingHatred”,”BCHR,March20,2017,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8611128 “AuthoritiesreleaseEbrahimSharifafterquestioninghimabouthistweetsonmartyrAbdullahAl-Ajouz,”[inArabic]BahrainMirror,March20,2017,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/37311.html.129 “TheclericBasharal-Aliwasfine 50dinarsforinsultingtheHouseofRepresentatives,”[inArabic]Alwasat,February8,2017,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1208401.html.130 “TheformerchiefexecutiveoftheChamberofCommercewasconvictedofinsultingoverWhatsapp,”[inArabic]BahrainMirror,October2,2016,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/33983.html.131 MohamedAlAradi,Twitterpost[inArabic],March22,2017,https://twitter.com/mohamedaradi/status/844480302504464384132 “TweetingleadstheActivistAlAraditotheprosecution,”[inArabic]Alwasat,May12,2017,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1212841.html.133 “BCHRCondemnsImprisonmentofWomen’sRightsDefenderGhadaJamsheer,”BCHR,October7,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8232.
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managementatKingHamadUniversityHospitalthatshepublishedonTwitterin2014.134InDecember2016shewasreleasedandgivenagovernmentjobinlieuoftheremainderofhersentence.
● OnNovember29,2016,SocialmediaactivistFaisalHayyatwassentencedtothreemonthsinprison135overatweetdeemedto“insultasectandareligiousfigure. 136LocalNGOsspeculatedthattherealreasonforhisarrestmayhavebeenhispublishingofalettertotheministerofinterioroverFacebook,137inwhichheclaimedhehadbeentorturedbysecurityforcesin2011.138
NabeelRajab,oneofBahrain’smostprominenthumanrightsdefendersandTwitterusers,139hasbeeninandoutofprisonsince2012forvariouscaseslinkedtoonlinespeech.140RajabisthepresidentoftheBahrainCenterforHumanRights,anongovernmentalorganizationthatremainsactivedespitea2004governmentordertocloseit.141AsofMay2017,hehadbeeninpretrialdetentionforalmostayear,142andhadundergone13hearingsonchargesincluding“spreadingfalsenewsduringatimeofwar”and“insultingastatutorybody.”143ThechargeswerebasedonTwitterpostsabouttheSaudi-ledcoalitionairstrikesinYemenandtheallegedtortureofdetaineesatJawprison.144InJuly,hewassentencedto2yearsinprisonfor““fordisseminatingfalsenews,statementsandrumorsabouttheinternalsituationinthekingdomthatwouldundermineitsprestigeandstatus,”andremainsdetainedashisappealhasbeenrepeatedlydelayed.145
Atleasteightotherinternetusersarestillservingprisonsentencesfrompreviousyears,including
134 “Bahrain:HumanrightsdefenderGhadaJamsheerfreedfromprison,allowedtoworkoffremainderofhersentence,”GCHR,December12,2016,http://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/1448.135 “Theimprisonmentofthemediaactivist«FaisalHayat»3monthswitheffect, [inArabic]ManamaPost,November29,2016,http://bit.ly/2rJ721S.136 “JournalistFaisalHayyatFacingPrisonfor“Defamatory”Tweets,”BCHR,November3,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8292.137 FaisalHayyat,Facebookpostoflettertotheministerofinterior[inArabic],October1,2016,https://www.facebook.com/faisal.hayyat.16/posts/10154731342476162.138 “JournalistandSocialMediaActivistArrestedafterWritingCriticalLettertoMinisterofInterioraboutTortureSuffere in2011,”BCHR,October10,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8238.139 Rajabwasrankedthe“mostconnected”TwitteruserinBahrainaccordingtoasurvey,withover260,000followersasofMay2015.See:Wamda,How the Middle East Tweets: Bahrain’s Most Connected ReportDecember3,2012,http://bit.ly/1Jf8vdo.140 NabeelRajabwasfirs arrestedonMay5,2012andheldforoverthreeweeksfor“insultingastatutorybody”inrelationtoacriticismdirectedattheMinistryofInterioroverTwitter.OnJune9,2012,hewasarrestedagainaftertweetingabouttheunpopularityofthePrimeMinister(alsoamemberoftheroyalfamily)inthecityofAl-Muharraq,followingthesheikh’svisitthere.AgroupofcitizensfromthecitypromptlysuedRajabforlibelinashowofobediencetotheroyalfamily.OnJune28,2012,hewasconvictedofchargesrelatedtohisfirs arrestandorderedtopayafin ofBHD300($800).Shortlyafterhewasreleasedonbail,hewasre-arrestedonJuly9,2012afteracourtsentencedhimtothreemonthsimprisonmentfortheAl-Muharraqincident.ThecourtofappealslateracquittedRajab,althoughhehadalreadyservedmostofhissentence.HewaskeptinprisonuntilMay2014toservetwo-yearsentencefor“callingforillegalgatheringsoversocialnetworks.”HewasthenarrestedandimprisonedfromApril2,2015toJuly13,2015aspartofasix-monthsentenceonchargesofinsultingpublicinstitutionsunderarticle216ofthepenalcodeforatweetinwhichhequestionedwhetherBahrainisecurityinstitutionsare
“ideologicalincubators”fortheso-called“IslamicState”terroristgroup.HewasreleasedthatJulyforhealthreasonsbutplacedonatravelban.141 BCHR,“AboutBCHR,”http://bahrainrights.org/en/about-us.142 “Updates:ArrestandDetentionofBCHR’sPresidentNabeelRajab,”BCHR,accessedMay26,2017,http://bit.ly/28MiH7o143 Nabeel.Rajab,Instagrampost,August2015,https://instagram.com/p/5aXYEGyGET/.144 BCHR,“NabeelRajab’scaseupdate,”May6,2015,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7517.145 JoeStork,“BahrainiRightsCriticImprisonedforYemenTweets,”HumanRightsWatch,September28,2017,https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/28/bahraini-rights-critic-imprisoned-yemen-tweets.
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AhmedHumaidan,HussainHubail,SayedAhmedal-Mousawi,146FadhelAbbas,147HussainKhamis,Yousifal-Amm,148andAbduljalilal-Singace.Al-Singace,aprominenthumanrightsdefenderandblogger,hasbeenservingalifesentencesince2011onchargesofpossessinglinkstoaterroristorganizationaimingtooverthrowthegovernment,149disseminatingfalsenews,andincitingprotestsagainstthegovernment.150
Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity
Severalreportshavedocumentedtheuseofspywarebythegovernmentagainstdissidents.InNovember2015,newevidenceshowedthatBahrainhadusedRemoteControlSystem(RCS)fromItaliancybersecurityfir HackingTeam.Thespywareallowsremotemonitoring,includingrecordingphonecalls,loggingkeystrokes,takingscreenshots,andactivatingcameras,amongotherfunctions.151MaliciouslinksareoftensentfromTwitterandFacebookaccountsimpersonatingwell-knownoppositionfigures friends,152orevenaccountsofarrestedusers.153InOctober2015,atleastfourcaseswererecordedinwhichoppositionmembersreceivedemailscontainingmaliciousspyware.154
Giventhattheauthoritieshavebeenquicktoidentifysocialmediauserswhooperateunderapseudonym,manyusersareconcernedaboutrestrictionsontheabilitytouseICTsanonymously.TheTRArequiresuserstoprovideidentificatio whenusingWi-FiandWiMaxconnections,andthegovernmentprohibitsthesaleoruseofunregisteredprepaidmobileSIMcards.155FurtherrestrictionsonthesaleofSIMcardswereintroducedinDecember2015.TheTRAissuedaregulationthatlimitsindividualsfrompurchasingnomorethan10pre-paidSIMcardsfromasingleserviceprovider.IndividualsmustbephysicallypresentwhenregisteringSIMcardsandprovidersmustverifytheidentityofallsubscribersonanannualbasis,includingthroughfingerprintin .156Additionally,SIMcardsareonlyavailablefromserviceproviders,notthirdparties.157ThemovecameaftertherecentprosecutionofindividualsaccusedofusingSIMcardstocarryoutbombattacks.158
InJanuary2017,thegovernmentratifie theArabTreatyonCombatingCybercrime,asetof
146 ForfurtherdetailsrefertoFOTN2016Report.147 “AmendmentofthepenaltyofformerWahdawiFadhilAbbastothreeyears,”[inArabic]Alwasat,October27,2016,http://bit.ly/2e0aldp.148 “3yearsinsteadof5fortwitteraccountownerof«HajiAhmed»,”[inArabic]Alayam,November12,2016http://bit.ly/2s1fnvd.149 ReportersWithoutBorders,“DetainedbloggerAbduljalilAl-Singaceonhungerstrike,”September6,2011,http://bit.ly/1N5BjuP.150 ReportersWithoutBorders,“DetainedbloggerAbduljalilAl-Singaceonhungerstrike.”151 BahrainWatch,“HowTheGovernmentofBahrainAcquiredHackingTeam’sSpyware,”November13,2015,http://bit.ly/2bVNSQ5.152 BahrainWatch,“TheIPSpyFiles:HowBahrain’sGovernmentSilencesAnonymousOnlineDissent”,May15,2013,accessedMarch31,2014,https://bahrainwatch.org/ipspy/viewreport.php.153 BahrainWatch,TwitterPost,March13,2015,12:28PM,https://twitter.com/BHWatch/status/576464787422339072.154 BahrainWatch,“UrgentSecurityAlertforBahrainiActivists,”October18,2015,http://bit.ly/2ba422J.155 Geoffre Bew,“TechnologyBillRapped,”Gulf Daily News,July20,2006,http://bit.ly/1UduN5E.156 “Adoptionoftheuseoffingerprin torecordphonechip,”[inArabic]Alayam,July28,2016,http://goo.gl/ytz8Zu.157 TRA,“TRAissuesSIM-CardEnabledTelecommunicationsServicesRegistrationRegulation,”February7,2016,http://bit.ly/1Q1eK8l.andTRA,“ResolutionNo.(13)of2015,PromulgatingtheSIM-CardEnabledTelecommunicationsServicesRegistrationRegulation,”accessedAugust14,2016,http://bit.ly/2bv8bmV.158 “7and3yearsimprisonmentforthreeBahrainiswhohaveregisteredphonechipsinthenamesofAsians,”[inArabic]Alayam,November9,2015,http://goo.gl/hHqupc.
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standardsdevelopedseveralyearsagotostemthemisuseoftelecommunicationsdevices,financia fraud,thepromotionofterrorism,andaccesstopornographiccontentonline.WhileBahrainalreadypassedacomputercrimeslawcontainingmanyoftheprovisionsin2014,thetreatyestablishesnewrulesontheretentionofuserdataandreal-timemonitoringofactivities,aswellasamechanismforsharinginformationbetweensignatoriestohelpcombattransnationalcrime.Thelackofstronghumanrightsstandardsinthetreatymayincreasethescopeforprivacyinfractionsonceitistransposedintolocallaw.159
SinceMarch2009,theTRAhasmandatedthatalltelecommunicationscompanieskeeparecordofcustomers’phonecalls,emails,andwebsitevisitsforuptothreeyears.Thecompaniesarealsoobligedtoprovidethesecurityserviceswithaccesstosubscriberdatauponrequestfromthepublicprosecution,whiletheprovisionofthedatacontentrequiresacourtorder.160
Cybercafesarealsosubjecttoincreasingsurveillance.Oversightoftheiroperationsiscoordinatedbyacommissionconsistingofmembersfromfourministries,whoworktoensurestrictcompliancewithrulesthatprohibitaccessforminorsandrequirethatallcomputerterminalsarefullyvisibletoobservers.161
ACyberSafetyDirectorateattheMinistryofStateforTelecommunicationsAffair waslaunchedinNovember2013tomonitorwebsitesandsocialmedianetworks,ostensiblyto“ensuretheyarenotusedtoinstigateviolenceorterrorismanddisseminateliesandfallaciesthatposeathreattothekingdom’ssecurityandstability.”162Officia hadearliercreatedaunittomonitorsocialmediaandforeignnewswebsitesto“respondtofalseinformationthatsomechannelsbroadcast”in2011.163
A2014computercrimeslaw(60/2014)criminalizestheillegalaccessofinformationsystems,illegaleavesdroppingovertransmission,andtheaccessandpossessionofpornographicelectronicmaterials.164Italsocriminalizestheencryptionofdatawithcriminalintentionsatatimewhenexpressionisoftenconsideredacriminalact.
Intimidation and Violence
Typically,arrestsofBahrainiusersinvolveextralegalmethodsofintimidation,suchasphysicalviolenceandtorture.165InApril2017,thefamilyNajahHabeebreportedthatshewassubjectedtobeatingandsexualharassmentinordertoextractconfessionsonchargesincluding“runningaccountsonTwitterandTelegram”thatsheusedfor“insultingtheking”andspreading“hatredoftheregime.”Asofmid-2017,shewasstillinpretrialdetention.
RightsactivistEbtisamal-Saegh,whowith theadvocacygroupSalam forDemocracyandHuman
159 “LawNo.(2)of2017ontheratificatio oftheArabConventiontocombattechnicalcrimesofinformation,”[inArabic]Offici Gazette,January26,2017,http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K0217.pd .160 Geoffre Bew,“BigBrother’MoveRapped,”Gulf Daily News,March25,2009,http://bit.ly/1MULfsL.161 ReportersWithoutBorders,“CountriesUnderSurveillance:Bahrain.”162 “ShaikhFawazpraisesCyberSafetyDirectorate”,Bahrain News Agency,November18,2013http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/588716.163 AndySambridge,“Bahrainsetsupnewunitstomonitormediaoutput,”Arabian Business,May18,2011,http://bit.ly/1JmHKqP.164 GeneralDirectorateofAnti-Corruption&Economic&ElectronicSecurity,LawNo.(60)fortheyear2014oninformationtechnologycrimes,[inArabic]accessedJuly31,2015,http://bit.ly/1QMpBFD.165 “People&Power–Bahrain:Fightingforchange,”YouTubevideo,24:30,postedbyAlJazeeraEnglish,March9,2011,http://bit.ly/1Flun6y.
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Rightsdocumentstortureandotherrightsabusescommitteebyauthorities,hasrecentlyencounteredsevere reprisals forherwork. Following sustained legalandotherharassment in connectionwithmaterialshetweeted,inMay,al-SaeghreceivedasummonsfromBahrain’sNationalSecurityAgency(NSA).Uponpresentingherselfatitsoffice shewasblindfolded,beaten,andsexuallyassaulted;herattackersalsointerrogatedheraboutotherrightsactivistsandherassociationwiththeUNHumanRightsCouncil,andattemptedtocoercehertouseherTwitteraccounttoannounceherretirementasarightsactivist.166Instead,inJuly,sheusedherTwitteraccounttodenounceabuseofwomenbyNSAagentsandtocriticizeBahrain’sking.167Hourslater,plainclothesoffice actingwithoutawarrantraidedherhome,confiscate al-Saegh’sphoneandnationalIDcard,andtookherintocustody.ShewasreleasedinOctober,butnowfacesterrorismchargesinconnectionwithherJulytweets.168
InaseparatecaseonApril2,MahmoodAbdulhameedsaidsecurityforceshadbeatenhim,lefthiminacoldroom,andthreatenedtoassaulthiswifeandsister,whiletheywereholdinghimindetentionoveraWhatsAppmessage.169Othergovernmentcriticsreportedbeingsubjecttoabuseinsimilarcases,includingTaibaIsameel,whosaidshewasarrestedat3:15amonJune26,2016andsubjecttopsychologicalpressure.170HabeebAhmedwasarrestedinApril2016andheldincommunicadoforthreedays.Hesaidsecurityforcesthreatenedtoarresthisparentsandbrothersifherefusedtoconfess.171SaidYousifal-Muhafda,wholivesinexileafterbeingdetainedinrelationtoonlinespeechinthepast,saidthatamemberofBahrain’sNSAcontactedhimonInstagramwithathreattohurthisbrothersifhedidnotstoptweeting.172
Othershavebeensubjecttoharassmentandsocialsanctions.Progovernmentinternetuserspostphotosofprotestorsonsocialmediainordertoidentityandpunishthemin“electronicwitchhunts.”Governmentservicesandhousingcanbewithheldfromthoseaccusedofparticipatinginprotests,andsomehavebeenfire .173
Technical Attacks
CyberattacksagainstbothoppositionandgovernmentsupportersarecommoninBahrain.OppositionnewssitesBahrain MirrorandBahrain al-Youm cameunderattackinAugust2016174
166 PeterBeaumont,“ActivistwhoaccusedBahrainisecurityservicesofsexualassaultisrearrested,”Guardian,July6,2017,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/06/activist-rearrested-bahrain-risk-torture-amnesty-international-ebtisam-al-saegh;“Ebtisamal-Saeghtorturedandsexuallyassaulted,”FrontlineDefenders,June1,2017,https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/ebtisam-al-saegh-tortured-and-sexually-assaulted,andpleaseseePDFdownloadhere:https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde11/6392/2017/en/.167 “Bahrain:Womanhumanrightsdefenderathighriskoftorture,includingsexualassault,”AmnestyInternational,July4,2017,https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/bahrain-woman-human-rights-defender-at-high-risk-of-torture-including-sexual-assault/.168 “Bahraintemporarilyfreesfemaleactivist,”Middle East Online,October23,2017,http://middle-east-online.com/english/?id=85545.169 BahrainPressAssociation,Facebookpost[inArabic],April21,2017,https://www.facebook.com/BahrainPA/posts/1431092103622587.170 “OnEveofUNResolutionforInternetFreedom:Websitesblocked,InternetDisrupted,andSocialMediaPostsContinuetoLeadtoArrestsinBahrain,”BCHR,July3,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/7969.171 “MorearrestsandjailsentencesinBahrainoversocialmediaposts,”BCHR,June20,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7919.172 “Bahraintargetsfamiliesofhumanrightsdefenderstointimidatethem,”BCHR,March10,2017,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8583.173 BCHR,“ReturnofElectronicWitchHuntinBahrainLeadstoArrestofAliAbdulraheem,”July14,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/8008.174 BahrainMirror,Twitterpost,August12,2016,https://twitter.com/BahrainmirrorEN/status/764125566329126916.
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andJanuary2017,respectively,inreprisalfortheircoverageofpoliticalevents.175InApril2017,thewebsiteoftheonlyremainingpoliticaloppositionparty,theNationalDemocraticAction(WADD),cameunderrepeatedattack.176
Institutionsarealsotargeted.Authoritiesobservedaround167,000hackingattemptsand107millionmaliciousemailsongovernmentsystemsin2016.177InApril2017,thewebsiteoftheBahrainiFootballAssociationwascompromisedbyaPalestinianhackerwhocriticizedBahrainforhostingarepresentativefromIsraelduringtheFIFAcongressinMay2017.178
175 “Websiteof(BahrainToday)issubjecttoafailedhackingattemptoriginatedfromtheUAE,”[inArabic]BahrainAlyoum,January24,2017,https://www.bahrainalyoum.co.uk/?p=79059.176 “TheelectronicattacksonWAAD’swebsitearebeingrenewedforthesecondtimeinaweek,”[inArabic]LualuaTV,April9,2017,http://lualuatv.com/?p=52867and“WAAD:Ourwebsitewashackedandunknownarenowincontrol,”[inArabic]Alwasat,April2,2017,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1226155.html.177 “E-Government:morethan107millionharmfulemailswerehandledin2016,”[inArabic]Alwasat,May12,2017,http://bit.ly/2rrqcK5.178 “Video:PalestinianhackerpenetratesthesiteoftheFIFAtoprotestBahrainhostingoftheIsraelidelegationintheFIFACongress,”[inArabic]Alwasat,May12,2017,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1227500.html.
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