Badiou and Derrida (Politics, Events and Their Time) - Antonio Calcagno

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Antonio Calcagno

Badiou and Derrida

Politics, Events and their Time

C O N T I N U U M S T U D I E S I N C O N T I N E N T A L P H I L O S O P H Y



B A D I O U A N D D E N U D A



Also available from Con tinuum :

Deconstruction and Democracy, Alex Thom son

Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy o f History, J a y L a m p e rt Deleuze andthe Meaning o f Life, Claire Colebrook

Derrida and Disinterest, Sean Gaston

Husserl’s Phenomenology, K evin Hermberg

New Heidegger, M iguel de Beistegui

Sartre’s Ethics o f Engagement, T. Storm H eter

Wittgenstein and Gadamer, Chris Law n

Deleuze and the Unconscious, C hristian Kerslake

Sartre’s Phenomenology, D avid Reisman



B A D I O U A N D D E R R I D A

P O L I T I C S , E V E N T S A N D T H E I R T I M E

A N T O N I O C A L C A G N O

continuum



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© Antonio Calcagno 2007

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted inany form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,

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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

EISBN9780826496171

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Calcagno, Antonio, 1969-Badiou and Derrida : politics, events, and their time I by Antonio Calcagno.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references.

EISBN9780826496171

1. Political science-Philosophy. 2. Badio u, Alain. 3. Derrida, Jacques. I. Title.JA71.C28 2007320.092'2-dc22

2^^34646

Ty pese by Aarontype Limited, Easton, Bristol



For Fadi Abou-Rihan

. . . tuo



Contents

P a r t O n e

Introdu ction: time and politics 1

P a r t T w o

D errida and the dem ocracy to come 11

P ^ r t T h re e

Badiou, time an d politics 60

C o n c l u s i o n

Filling out the ap oria th a t is politics 98

Notes 110

Select bibliog raph y 124

Index 131



Acknowledgements

Th is book would n ot have been possible without the careful an d pa tient n ur

turing o f my philosophical teachers: Ja y L am pert and Caroline Ba yard.

I th ank them for their generosity a nd am grateful for their gifts o fspirit. I amalso indebted to my friends Camilla Mryglod and Kathy Daymond for

helping me w rite and produce this text. T he U niversities of G uelph and

Scranton are to be thanked for their invaluable intellectual and material

suppo rt. Roy, Assunta, Daniel and L ucia have always encouraged m e and

have grea tly assisted in sustaining m y own re search over the years. I wo uld

also like to th an k C ontinuu m for agreeing to take on this project. I am for

ever grateful for the kind an d loving encouragem ent of Fadi Ab ou-Rihan.

He watched this text grow into being, providing invaluable commentary

and assistance.

Finally, I w ould like to acknow ledge the kind perm ission of the following

journals for allowin g m e to reproduce in p a r t some o f m y previo usly pu b

lished articles.

'jacq ue s De rrida and Alain Badiou: Is there a R elation Between Politics and

Time?',PhilosophyandSociaICriticism, vol. 30, no. 7, 2004, 799-815.

‘C an A lain B adiou’s N otion o f Tim e Ac coun t for Political E vents?’, Internna-

tionalStudiesinPhilosophy, vol. X X X V II/2, 2005, 1-14.



P a r t O n e

Introduction: time and politics

From its beginnings to its mo re recen t incarnations, ph ilosophy has sought

to think throug h the natu re of and the relationship between time an d poli

tics. Fo r exam ple, P lato ’s political writings place a heav y em phasis on time,

especially tim e ete rna l. T h e good society, th at is, the good polis, will be fash

ioned and modelled according to the permanent and unchanging true

na ture of the etern al forms. Etern ity plays two fund am ental roles in P lato’s

poli tical vision. First, it is offered as th e key to guaranteeing perm anence

and unch ang eab ility, especially in light of the restless and relentlessly ch an

ging political world th at Plato lived throug h - a w orld m arred by the abuse

o f the th irty ty rants, sophistic po liticians (as opposed to m en of politics) and

the unjust execution of his teache r Socrates. E ternity, and the conco m itant

perm anence and unchangeabil ity th a t com e w ith it , are seen as an a lte rna

tive to the everyday po liticking and scheming that, according to Plato, cor

ru pte d A then ian politics du ring his lifetime. Second, eternity, understood as

infinite time, ensures the possibility that there would one day come a time

w hen P lato’s prescriptions could come abo ut. Plato w rites,

Accordingly, if ever in th e infinity o f time, past or future, or even to day in

some foreign region far b eyo nd ou r horizon, m en of the highest gifts for

philoso phy are constrained to take charge of a com m onwealth , we are

ready to maintain that, then and there, the constitution we have

described has been realised, or will be realised w he n once th e p hilosophic

muse becomes mistress of a state. F or tha t m ight happen. O u r pla n is dif

ficult - we have adm itted as m uch - bu t not impossible. 1

Em erging French thoug ht of the last decade o r so is no strang er to the

debates on the n atu re o f and relationship betw een politics and time. T his

w ork will have as its focus an exa m ination of recen t developm ents in

F ren ch thou gh t as m aking significant con tributions to the pe renn ial philo

sophical problem of the n atu re o f an d re lation between politics an d time.

Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou have devoted significant consideration

to the prob lem o f time an d politics, especially in their m ore rece nt works.



2 Badiou aand D ^ M a

This book tries to achieve tw o things. First, it makes a co ntributio n to con

tem porary C ontine ntal ph ilosophy as this is the first book, to my knowledge

anyway, tha t tries to bring togethe r in a scholarly w ay the m ore recent work

on politics by D errida an d B adiou. T he la tte r is slowly em erging as a centralfigure in F rench philosophy as well as in Anglo-A m erican philosophy. W ith

the rece nt pub lication (2006) o f his Logiques des monies (Logics o f the World)

Badiou has amplified and amended various claims made in his great opus

Being and the Event. D errida, prior to his de ath, was developing and ex pan d

ing his idea o f the dem ocrac y to com e as a political expression of his decon-

structive programme. Both thinkers have devoted a substantial amount

o f their oeuv re to politics and the question o f the na ture o f the political.

M y w ork wou ld be a first in th at i t will comprehensively show how the two philosophers’ po li tical views diverge an d converge, thereby providing a

com prehen sive exp osition o f their resp ective political systems.

Second, and most importantly, my work advances a theory about the

relationship between political events and time that can account for both

political undecidabili ty and decid abili ty . Both Badio u and D errida give

the event a central role in structuring politics and political thinking. For

Badiou, events m ake politics possible an d thinkable. T he y give bo th a decid-

able an d intelligible struc ture to politics while still accou nting for ind eter

minacy and multiplicity. Derrida, unlike Badiou, believes that events

themselves are stru ctu red by the do uble b ind o f possibility and impossibil

ity, radica lly calling into question the very n am ing o f events or even giving

them any definite or set me aning as does Badiou. I argue th at Badiou can

overcome the D erride an a po ria of the double bind. C entral in this overcom

ing is the n otion of time as a subjective intervention. D erridea n time as tem

porally and spatia lly differen tia ting cannot suffic iently account for the

fidelity to an d legacy o f events as tem pora lly rup turin g despite D errid a’s

claims to the con trary as proposed in his notion o f ‘he ritage ’. Thou gh

Badiou can be employed to overcome Derrida’s political aporia, Badiou

himself has to accou nt for an app rop riate o r strategic pre-political t ime

th a t allows him to form ulate his view of time as a subjectivating interve n

tion. I argue tha t an amplified an d developed notion o f the Greek idea of

the kairos as the ‘ap p rop riate tim e to a c t’ cou ld serve as the needed tool

that could help us navigate the conflicts created by political decidability

and u ndecidability.

Tim e an d politics ca n be viewed as related in two ways, each represented

by one o f the aforem entioned th in kers . I begin my in vestigation w ith an

analysis o f the w ork o fJacq ues D errida, especially his notion of the d emoc

racy to com e. D em ocracy to come is to be th ou gh t w ithin the ru bric of diifer-

ante, an d h ence m ust be conceived of as temporizing, th at is, as deferring and



Introduction: time andpolitics 3

as differentializing in an arch-structural way. There are two key compo

nents that must be analysed in the dem ocracy to come. W ha t does D errida

entail by ‘democracy’ and what does it mean to say that it is ‘to come’?

In short, for Derrida, politics is conditioned and structured by the archstructure of temp orization th at is differance and the promise, and this tem po

rally structured and universal politics is called the democracy to come.

Politics and time are related in th at time structures the unde cidable shape

th a t politics is to take.

The democracy that Derrida advocates is not to be conceived as the

popu lar dem ocracy of present-day consensus-buildin g or m ajo rity-rule gov

ernm ents th at are typical of W estern societies. I f differance exists an d if it

arch -structures reality, as D errid a claims, then h um an beings relate to oneanother in a unique way, for they are ‘delayed’ and ‘differentiated’ from

one an othe r. O u r subjectivity, then, is not to be thou ght o f in terms o f a

m etaphysics of presence in th at we can not and oug ht no t identify ou r per

sons with being definitively a certain way. Differance colours the way we

organize ourselves as a political society. Derrida chooses the term democ

racy because its root sense conveys a rule by all people. Each individual

must participate in the political process. Democracy, then, is globally

encom passing an d defies the political divisions (e.g., electorate an d elected

individuals) and boundaries already established by various governments

an d n ations, for all people are to be viewed as involve d in politics. But this

universal involveme nt, because it is arch-structured by differance, calls us to

be m in dfu l o f th e delay and differentiation th a t is th e spatio -tem porization

o f differance. Ifw e are to be truly dem ocratic, and ifw e are to acknowledge

the po litical role of all individuals, th en we mu st realize th at no individ uals

m ay be reduced to political identities typical o f a m etaphysics of presence.

Hence, we ca nn ot speak o f absolutely defining roles, duties, boun daries,

limits, powers, etc. The relation that exists between those engaged in a

Derridean democracy would be undecidable at best. Individuals are un

decidable because they can never be fully present as the non-originary

origin can neve r come to the fore. W ha t does come to the fore is an ever-

disap pea ring trace th at in no certain terms can be fixed to an individual.

O the r individuals are delayed for us because their no n-originary origin

ca n nev er be m ade present to us, for, as D er rida ’s treatm en t of Hu sserlian

intersubjectivity in La voix et le pkinomene demonstrates, it is impossible to

claim th at the oth er is presentified to us as ‘living prese nt’. M oreo ver, ind i

viduals are constantly being differentiated from one another within the

‘economic m ov em ent’ D errid a calls différance. This m eans th a t there is a con

stant p luralization th at happens, and if democracy is to rem ain truly dem o

cratic, it m ust perm it this constan t pluralization of differentiations to play



4 Badiou and Derrida

itself o u t. N ot only are there m any d ifferent individuals bu t they also

continue to differentiate w ithin themselves. T he newness a nd repe tition o f

differance irreducibly gu aran tee this for us. U ltim ately, dem ocracy in De rri

d a ’s philosophy has thre e constitutive traits. F irst, it entails a u niversal pa rticipation in all forms of political organ ization. Second, dem ocracy has to

take into account the differance that structures all human relations and

objects. Hence, all subjects must be viewed as ‘being subject’ to the spatio-

temporization that is differance. Finally, the con stant differentiation th at is

differance results in a constant pluralization of difference am ong subjects bu t

also w ithin subjects. W ithin this plura lization of difference it becomes h ard

even to speak of w ha t a subject, person or individual is. E ven thoug h we use

these terms, we use them w ithin the con text ofD erride an u ndecida bility andw ith full knowledge of the delay and differentiation they ‘con tain’.

T he ‘to com e’ of the D erridean dem ocracy to come intuitively invokes a

certain anticipation or futurity, but this anticipation and futurity are not

what Derrida wishes to convey by the to come. Rather, the to come refers

to that horizon, that is, that simultaneous opening and closing of the

dou ble bin d o f possibility and impossibility th at conditions or structure s all

things. D errid a employs the mod el of the promise to explain this dou ble bind

o f possibility an d impossibility o f the to com e.2

W hen one m akes a promise, one articulates the possibility o f a future ha p

penin g or event com in g to be. A pro m ise b rings to th e fore o f consciousness a

poss ib ility th a t is u ttered in the now and yet can only be realized in the

fu tu re. Yet, the now or the presen t in which the future is prom ised is never

actually present, it is always past, it is an already having been. This is so

because th e origin al sense o f w hat is try ing to be present here and now is

already d elayed and differentiated. W ha t is present is not an exact rep eti

tion of the original bu t something altered in time. D errid a’s H eideggerian-

inspired critiq ue o f presence, e specially as it app lies to the im possibility of

the Hu sserlian notion of the living prese nt being un derstoo d as presentifica-

tion (Vergegenwàrtigung), could be read as justifying the D erridean claim of

the impossibility of experiencing the present. T he present is experienced

only as differentialized a nd as deferred. Hence, a promise is som ething tha t

poin ts to the future bu t is u tte red fro m th e standpoin t o fhaving already been

(the past) , a h aving been th at does not end ure, because the now can only be

understood truly as having been. E ven this having b een can never be made

present, and we are left w ith a self-effacing trace o f the past.

D errid a describes this tem pora l dyn am ic of the prom ise as a ‘to com e’ as

opposed to the gram m atical nam e of the future an terior.3 T he future ante

rior tense is com posed o f the fu ture tense of the a ux iliary verbs ‘to be’ or ‘to

hav e’ along w ith the pa st participle of the verb in question. For example,





6 Badiou and D e rd a

W ith th e to com e the do ub le bind of possibility an d im possibility is

introduced . T aking w ha t was said ab out dem ocracy and synthesizing it with

w hat D errida says abo ut the to come, we understand dem ocracy to come

as an arc h-stru ctu re (non-originary origin) or ‘transc en den tal’ conditionthat structures political life and political decision-making in general.

T he dem ocracy to come shows the inher ent unde cidability o f politics qua

poli tical decisio n-m akin g and political subjectivity. A univ ersal o r dem o

cratic politics m indful of the te m po ral force o f the prom ise or differance must

be structured to reflect th is dynam ic . I f politics has as its content certa in

decisions tha t need to be m ade, then such decisions are structured tem po

rally. Being structured temporally, political decision-making is coloured

by th e possib ility and im possibility discussed above. Likew ise, ju stice m usthave injustice folded in to it, responsibility irresponsibility, and hosp itality

inhospitality.

A second way to think o f the relation betw een time an d po litics is to think

of time as a certain intervention, a p eculiarly decisive an d subjective inte r

vention. W hen this decisive interve ntion hap pens and when one is faithful

(fidi/ili) to this intervention and its senses, an event (Nvenernment) comes to

be. This event is distinguished from b u t dependent upon a m ultiplicity o f

situational happe nings or givens.5 A lain Ba diou is the au tho r of this view.

Events are ruptures in our everyday existence and they are paradigmatic

m arkers of an ontological fullness/emptiness. Po litics reveals itself as bo th

partly b u t not e ntir ely present th rough such interventio ns. H ere, a profound

sense of subjective tim e emerges with B adiou ’s account. F urth erm ore , poli

tics is a con dition throu gh w hich philosophy is to ap pe ar.6

Exam ples o f political events for Badiou include such events as the Frenc h

Rev olution, M ay 1968 an d the fall of M arxism. T hese are not merely casual

happenings, for they reveal something a bou t hu m ank ind’s subjectivity in its

being and in its em ptin ess.7 T o thin k th rough th e fall o f com m unism as a

political event is to realize th a t comm unism has not really been thought

throug h in its fullness; it has never been achieved nor really tried. W ha t

truly died w ith the supposed death of comm unism is not a certain kind of

poli tical th inkin g, b u t th e very poss ib ility o f a ‘we’ o r the very possibility

of comm unity. 8 T he interventions tha t w ere decisively c arried ou t by sub

je c ts (and w hic h subje ctivated subjects) th a t gave us the event nam ed ‘T he

Fall of M arxism’ announced the death of an a ttem pt to be comm unal. This

is what Badiou claims is the significance of the event he calls ‘The Fall of

M arxism ’. The sense of time tha t we g ather from such events comes abou t

in the form o f interventions tha t we decisively ma ke in orde r to brin g a bo ut a

certain funda m enta l manifestation o f being. In o ther words, people con

sciously a nd decisively interven ed to bring abo ut the even t called ‘T he Fall



Introduction: time and politics 7

of M arxism’ . ‘T he Fall ofM arx ism ’ has its ow n tim e a nd place a nd it is irre

ducible to the time a nd p lace of any o the r political event. T he tim e th a t is

‘T he Fall of M arxism’ is not the tim e of the French Rev olution. T im e results

from the separation o r ga p between events, always m ediated by the generalsituation. Such events allow us think throug h the n atu re o f politics. These

events continue to hold m eaning (sens) for us insofar as we con tinually an d

faithfully refer to them as pa rad igm atic events.9 F or Badiou, po litics shows

itself thro ug h a decisive tem po ral interv en tion in the (pre-political) givens

of history. T he intervention launches the event (dégage i’évenement ) 10 and is a

doub le act. First, it is a r up ture from the gen eral happen ings o f the every

day, from the pre-political. Second, the temporal intervention and the

consistency an d fidelity to such ev ents m ak e politics possible. P olitics, then ,concerns itself w ith think ing throug h the singular event a nd remaining

faithful to such an event - an event th at is ultimately a p ar t of being a sub

je c t. T o th ink poli tics is to giv e consis tency to an event, to th ink faithfu lly

throug h this event in its truth. T im e, throu gh interventions, allows politics

to be realized as a pa rticular thoug ht in its interiority a t a certain tim e and

p lace11 - a thin king th rough w hic h i n philosophy becom es de-sutured fro m

politics and is allowed to show it self as philosophy. Politics, then, also

becomes a condition for doin g philosophy as philosophy. 12

Politics (la politique) is not to be confused or identified with politicking

(Iepolitique) or wh at I term p olitical economy, tha t is, the m anagem ent of a

ce rtain social sta te o f affairs. Political think ing is not n ecessarily confined to

m anag ing, devising an d disassembling various pa rtisan public policies. I ti s

not m erely a pragm atic endeavour to m anage the economy ofth e s tate or of

a collective. Politics, in this work, refers to th at pe cu liar bra nd of thinking,

the kind o f thinking tha t has traditiona lly fallen u nd er the ru bric o f political

philosophy. I t is concern ed m ore w ith the m eta -structures o r m eta -poli tic s

th at m ake such politicking o r the decisions of political econom y a nd public

policy possible. Politics, in th is work , m ust be understo od in a transcenden

tal sense, as the co nd ition for the possibility of lepolitique. 13 O ne of the ques

tions th at arises from the abo ve-m entioned distinction is how the tw o views

of politics relate, especially given w ha t ou r Fren ch thinkers say ab ou t poli

tics as a kind of philosophical thou ght. M ore specifically, how ca n a ny co n

crete political action com e out o f such thinking, given th a t it is simply

thought? These questions be dea lt w ith later in ou r work.

H avin g sketched the g eneral views of ou r philosophers in question,

let us move on to the more specific argument I wish to engage. Though

D errida an d Badiou pu t forth relevant argum ents for the relations between

time an d politics being conceived o f in the w ay they d o, I argu e the follow

ing. If the D erridean co nception o f tem porization is correct an d if the



8 Badiouou, aand D e ^ e r

tem porization of differance, and therefore of the dem ocracy to com e, brings to

light th e ‘dou ble b ind ’ of possibility and impossibility of po litical think ing

and political decision-making, the n we are left w ith a politics conditioned

by undecidabil ity . G iv en the im possibility o f the present o r the now evercoming to any kind o f m etaphysical presence other th an th a t of a h aun ting

or a self-effacing trace , how can po litics eve r be decisive, especially wh en it is

called up on to be so in times o f crisis an d violence? T he fu ture 'to com e’, as

developed in the m odel of the prom ise th at D errida speaks of, renders poli

tics neve r fully present. Political decisions becom e con stan dy defe rred an d

differentialized, thereby challenging an y possibility of political thin king , let

alon e po litical discourse. Ho w ca n on e speak o f heritag e, 14 a p olitical he ri

tage, as does Derr ida w hen aU is ultim ately conceived as und ecidable?

D errida speaks o f a h eritage as decisive in th a t he painstaking ly and bril-

liantiy reads defining texts im po rtan t for the heritage of W estern philoso

phy. H e reads texts th a t we decisively a ttribu te to specific au thors and as

belongin g to the canon o f philosophy. His deconstructio n shows the unde

cidability of the m any meanings interlaced th roug hou t texts. D errida delib

erately an d decisively reads Rousseau, H usserl, Heidegger, Plato an d oth er

gre at figures of the W estern canon . H e m akes deliberate an d decisive use of

the texts to dem on strate the viab ility ofdec onstruction . I t would be prob le

m atic to claim th at D errida could have articulated w ha t he did had he not

stood on the shoulders of the inhe rited legacy ofH eideg ger, de Sau ssure and

Husserl. Moreover, and more importandy, on the political front, Derrida

mak es definite a nd decisive decisions on ce rtain key po litical issues. H e vig

orously cam paigns ag ainst the de ath pen alty. H e definitely praises the p oli

tical work o f Nelson M and ela in his struggle a gainst apartheid. D errida is

ceaseless in his cam pa ign a ga inst racism, po litical persecution an d injustice

as evidenced by his call for the establishment of villes-refuges. These are all

decisive political stands th a t seem to c on tradic t his claim of unde cidability.

Does Derrida contradict himself? No. Rather, Derrida has unveiled an

apo ria or paradox tha t m ust be further investigated.

The aporia that is manifest in the lapsus that exists between the philoso

pher o f undecidability and the engaged m an o f decisive polit ic al stances on

very crucial political issues brings to light an im po rtant reality. T h a t reality

is the fact tha t in the m idst of the undec idability a nd the double bind ofpos-

sibility an d impossibility th a t is contained in the dem ocracy to come, con

crete po litical decisions are m ade, an d m ore im po rtandy , have to be made.

D errid a’s philosophy ca nn ot sufficiendy acco unt for this fact, nam ely, th at

we do m ake p olitical decisions an d think po litically in a decisive an d delib

erate fashion, and m ore im po rtandy , th at w e have to be decisive alongside

the pressures a nd force of D errid ea n po litical und ecid ability. 15 I see



Introduction: time and politics 9

Badiou’s philosophy as deepening the D erridea n a poria in th a t Badiou, who

also acknowledges possibility and impossibility, presence and absence as

central in his philosophy, gives a philosophical account of the singular

events that come about through subjective and temporal interventions.T he re are events that rup ture and tha t can be distinguished from the m ulti

plicity o f th e situational th a t is m arked by im possib il ity and possibility,

app earan ce an d nothingness/emptiness. I f unde cidability flows from the

arch -structure o f D erridean temporization, then everything is undecidable.

T he meaning of the French Revo lution is undecidable jus t as the m eaning

o f the Ru ssian Revo lution is undecidable. A l o f these events are arch

structure d by un decidability. But there m ust be something th at allows the

French R evolution to stand ou t as ruptu ring from the everyday or the situational. I see in Badiou the possibility for m aintain ing th e un decidab ility th a t

comes ab ou t in th e D erridean double bind while sti ll m aintaining the possi

bili ty of events and th e subjectivatio n th a t ensues from such in terventio ns

th at are po litical. In fact, for Badiou, u ndec idability forces or pushes the

subject to make a decisive political intervention. The Derrida who takes

decisive political stances within the framew ork of unde cidability can also

be consid ere d a B adiouan subj ect. T his r equires the in tr oduction o f a subj ec-

tive time that is the intervention that gives us events. Badiou, then, in his

philosophy gives us a fuller understandin g of th e ap o ria th a t D errida

brin gs to th e fore , b u t th is aporia is n o t to be conceived as a n ea t reconcilia

tion. R ath er it brings to light the tension and pa rado x tha t are contained in

the natu re o f time an d politics and the relation th at exists betw een them .

Finally, I agree w ith Badiou th a t tim e as intervention gives a ce rtain sense

to the being o f events, events that are the obj ect of political thinking. T em

poral interventions are both poli tical and subjectivating. But w h at m oti

vates a decision and what marks it as decisively intervening? In other

wo rds, are events purely subjective? Political events, Badiou m ain tain s, are

also depen den t on w hat he calls the p re-political, wh ich is not wholly sub

jective. I wish to m ain tain th a t th e pre-polit ical in fluences th e te m poral

intervention in that it makes apparent a timely occasion, namely, the

kaiTOS, to which the subject can respond. The pre-political also has a sense

of time , n am ely, a kairological sense of time, tha t, in conjunction w ith the

decisive temporal intervention, are folded into political events. In adding

this kairological temporal dimension to the pre-political, I hope to fill out

Badiou’s acco unt o f the rela tion between th e p re-political an d the political.

Hence, I agree that interventions are subjective and subjectivating, b ut they

are also dependent on the pre-political and its accompanying kairological

time. For example, it is true that the French Revolution is an event that

cam e a bou t throu gh the decisive tem poral interventions of certain subjects.



10 Badiou and D m e r

Yet, the p re-po litical situation , especially the abuses, violence an d excesses

of aristo cra ts a nd ruling classes, can be seen to hav e elicited a subjective

response at a certain time (1789). Likewise, the interventions that led to

the even t of M ay ’68 could no t hav e hap pened w ithout a sense of a t imelyoccasion to act. T ha t op portune time to act was m ade evident by the pre

poli tical kairos m arked by the perceived elitism a nd auth oritarian natu re of

business, univ ers ity and so cie ta l leaders and structures. Ju s t as th e poli tical

requires the pre-political an d the subject requires the extra-sub jective (i.e.,

the m ultiplicity o f the situation ), so too does the tem pora l interve ntion th at

produces events require a pre-tim e, an eliciting tim e I call the kairos.



P a r t T w o

Derrida and the democracy to come

La démocratie à venir: i lfau t que ça donne le temps q u 'l n’y a pas.

—Jacques D errida, Voyous1

In Voyous and Spectres de M arx Jacqu es D errida makes the connection

betw een deconstructio n and poli tics.2 Politics fo r D errida has as one o f its

p rincipal goa ls j ustice, a j ust ice th a t does not shy away fro m a n inju nc tion

to resp onsibility.3 Ju stice is ch arac terized as the und eco nstructible con di

tion o f all dec on struc tion. Dif'rance is described as irreducib le. It can be

viewed as th a t undeco nstructible condition of all decon struction. Justice

can be unde rstood as the injunction to uph old the irreducibility of the

arch-structure th at is diffbatue.4 Ce rtainly, the connection between decon

struction a nd politics has been a n emerging theme in the recent w ritings of

D errida.5 W ith this in m ind, we have to ask: w hat does De rrida m ean w hen

he re fers to politics?

Following the logic of D err ida ’s early w riting, one could nev er answer

such a qu estion direc tly a nd absolutely. R ath er, it w ould be best to say tha t

poli tics for D errida has m any senses o r m eanings. For in sta nce, poli tics is a

form o f hosp itality. In his Cosmopolites de tous les pays: Encore un efort!, Derrid a

advo cates the fo un da tion o f cities of refuge wh ere peop le, especially writers,

could com e to think freely. T hese villes-refuges would give asylum to people

who are con strained by circum stances and situations in the ir own pl aces of

residence —places an d situations th a t inh ibit freedom o f expression an d

freedom of thought.6 Democracy becomes another theme through which

poli tics becomes articu lated . R ead ing P lato’s Menexenes and various texts

of Aristotle, D errida a ttem pts to think th roug h the claim th at friendship is

related to dem ocracy. 7 Th is po int is concretized wh en D errida refers to C arl

Sch m itt’s definition o f the political as emerging th roug h th e relationship of

friend and enemy.

T h e view o f politics I wish to investigate in this wo rk is expressed by the

Derridean phrase, ‘the democracy to come’. Simon Critchley remarks,

‘Derrida associates the injunction of differance, or the injunction of M arx,

w ith his no tion of dem ocracy to come (la démocratie a venir), which has




been an increasingly persistent them e in D errida’s recent w ork (SdM 110-

11/64—5) .’8 I have decided to focus on this par tic u la r Abschattung of D err i

d a ’s views on the p olitical because i t is the one m ost closely re lated to time,

the p rim ary lens throug h w hich ou r work is focused. C ritchley goes on to bring ou t th e rele vance o f th e connectio n of politics and time:

O nce again, D errida is anxious to distinguish la démocratie à venir from any

idea of afuture democracy, where the future wo uld be a m odality of the

lebendige Gegenwart, nam ely the n ot-y et present. D er rid a’s discourse is full

of negations a t this point: dem ocracy is not to be confused w ith th e living

present o f liberal dem ocra cy, lauded as the end o f histo ry by Fukuyam a,

neither is it a regulative idea o r an idea in the K an tian sense, nor even autop ia, insofar as all these conceptions un derstan d the future as a m oda l

ity of presence (SdM 110/65). It is a question here oflinking lademocratieà

venir to differance understood in the above-m entioned sense as l’ici mainte

nant sans presence, as an experience o f the impossible w ithout w hich justice

wo uld be m eaningless. In this sense, Lademocratie à venir does not m ean that

tomorrow (and tomorrow and tomorrow) democracy will be realized,

b u t ra th e r th a t th e experience ofjustice as the m aintaining-now of the

relation to an absolute sin gularity is the à venir of democracy, the tem por

ality of dem ocrac y is advent, it is arriv al ha ppe ning now .9

T he ‘to come’ of dem ocracy is given a unique force in D erridean thou gh t -

a force th at is concretized in the m odel of the prom ise.

T hou gh Critchley successfully highlights the tem pora l aspect th at is con

tained in D errida ’s dem ocracy to come, he does not give us a detailed an a

lysis o f the relation ship be twee n time an d p olitics. R ath er , C ritchley wishes

to em phasize the possibility o f D erride an ethics, especially as rela ted to

Levinas’ claim th at e thics is first philo sop hy .10 I t is the in ten tion o f this

work to fil in a nd exp and w ha t Critchley has pointed out. But Critchley is

not alo ne in n ot fully developing this connec tion betw een D erridea n politics

and temporality. Admittedly, the democracy to come is a later develop

ment in Derrida’s thought, though it recapitulates elemental concepts in

D e rrid a ’s early ph ilosophy. Scho lars like C ap uto 11 an d Be rnascon i12 have

m ade reference to the dem ocracy to come, b u t they h ave no t focused largely

on the no tion.

M uch has b een m ade of D errida as a thinker o f difference, especially in

relatio n to th e politics o f difference a nd respo nsibility.13 Scho larship to

da te has n o t focused on the re lation between tim e a nd po litics, especially as

it is understood w ithin the framew ork of the dem ocracy to come. Drucilla

Cornell has m ade use of D er rid a’s philosophy to challenge notions ofsexual



D e rd a and the (democracy to come 13

difference. ‘D errida argues th at the very slippage o flangua ge, which breaks

up the coherence o f gende r identity, m akes it possible for us to un derm ine

the rigid gender divide th at has m ade dialogue between men a nd women

impossible a nd the a cceptan ce o f violence tow ard w om en no t onl y inevita ble , b u t also not “ serious” .’14 C ornell has em plo yed D errida’s thought to

challenge various legal and philosophical positions. H er principa l con tribu

tion has been he r tireless effort to apply D erridea n insights to contem porary

legal an d po litical issues. M y p roject is different from C orn ell’s in th at I wish

to bring to the fore the role o f time in the a po ria of undec idability, a them e

which C ornell does not address extensively. I also wish to extend th e D erri

dean apo ria throu gh the thoug ht of A lain Badiou, which to m y knowledge

has not been attem pted in the past.The most explicit work to date on the Derridean relationship between

politics and tim e was w ritten by R ichard B eardsw orth.15 This book is re le

va n t because Beardsw orth astutely makes use of the D erridean apo ria tha t

ens ues with D errid a’s concep tion of time. Beardsworth links bo th D erridean

différante and the promise with temporality. He sees the ultimate political

consequences o fD e rr id a ’s philosophy as an a ttac k on a politics steeped in

metaphysics. And though this is correct, Beardsworth does not concentrate

on the und ecidability tha t arises from a D erridean a ccoun t of time a nd

politics a nd how th is undecidabil ity comes to structure all poli tical decis ion

m aking . M oreover, Beardsworth reads De rrida thro ug h Levinas, H eideg

ger, Hegel and K afka, and thou gh he ably brings out the relevance of each

o f these thinkers, D err ida himself is obscured. For exam ple, the con clusion

of Beardsw orth’s work focuses on the q uestion o f technicity, and draw ing

from Heidegger, he tries to address ‘right-wing’ and ‘left-wing’ Derrideans.

Th e bo ok ends m ore as a H eidegge rian analysis of pol itics thro ug h D errida

tha n a n analysis o fD err ida ’s philosophy in se.

Ultimately, I see my work as distinguishing itselffrom Beardsworth’s in

three fun dam ental ways. First, ra the r tha n placing an excessive emphasis

on th e apo ria of tim e und erstood as an a ttack on m etaphysical politics, I

wish to em phasize the a rch-structu ring force of undec idability. Second,

I wish to argue tha t the apo ria ofD erride an politics is mad e m o re compli

cated by D err ida ’s personal political com m itments in th at they seem to run

cou nter to the po litical und ecid ability De rrida sees as flowing from the rela

tionship between time and politics. I see Badiou as accounting for both

decidab ility an d unde cidability, an d hence B adiou’s though t can be seen

as extending D errida ’s thou ght. Finally, rath er than focus on L evinas and

H eidegger as the m edia th roug h wh ich D errida comes to (dis) app ear, I

hav e decide d to try to mak e D errid a speak m ore or less in his own voice, if

this is possible at all. Let us recall that not all Derrida’s texts are mere



14 Badiou andDemrida

textual read ings of authors. H is ow n ideas are o ften a rticula ted in ‘his ow n’

voice, albe it in a very o blique fashion.

T o this end, four questions need to be addressed: W ha t does D errid a m ean

by tim e w ithin th e context o f this investigatio n? W hat exactly does poli ticsas dem ocracy to come mean? H ow d o politics an d tim e relate? Is this a valid

app roach or a re there lim itations to D errida’ s approach?

U ltim ately , I wish to show tha t D er rid a’s notions of time expose critical

structures. These inc lude the im possibility offull presence, the need for rad i

cal absence as articulated by the spatio-temporizing structure of differance

understood as delay an d d ifferentiation, and the sim ultaneous impossibility

and po ssibility tha t are folded into the ‘to come’ o f the promise. S uch tem

poral structures re veal an undecidability th a t ir reducibly conditions all o freality, including writing, speech and all experience. Politics and political

events have to take such undecida bility into ac cou nt an d p olitical decision

m aking m ust strive to give account of its own undecida bility. Th e un decid

ability that structures and haunts politics and political decision-making,

then, is undecidab le because o f the double bin d of the to come in the m odel

of the promise and the spatio-tem porizing tha t is differance.16 T his tem po ral

und ecidability that structures politics is what D errida tries to com m unicate

by his expression, 'd em ocracy to com e’.

Politics, understood as De rridean dem ocracy, will be structu red by u nd e

cidability because the very claims it makes reg arding justice, hosp itality and

friendship will have to include elements that inh erently ne ga te any kind of

dem ocratic politics traditionally rooted in justice, friendship a nd hosp ital

ity. T h at is, as I will late r dem onstrate, in ord er for justice, friendship an d

hospitality to be truly differentiated from one an oth er bu t also from them

selves, a ra dic al absence in the forms o f injustice, inh osp itality an d the

enemy will have to be allowed to come to the fore. T he a po ria of und ecid

ability means th at w hat is ‘pre sen t’ or possible irreduc ibly a nd sim ulta

neously requires that which is radically absent and imposable. Before we

can explore the D erridean ap oria o f undecidab ility th at is the dem ocracy

to come, let us analyse w ha t D errida m eans by the terms ‘tim e’ (in pa rticu

lar, différance and the to com e of the promise) an d ‘politics’ (i.e., dem ocrac y).

Let us tu rn to the first question con cerning the na tu re o f time. Tim e, like

politics, has m any senses. T im e can refe r to sim ple c hronolo gies and to his

tory. O ne of the clearest deconstructive readings o f time is D er rida ’s reading

in Spectres de M arx of H am let’s insight that the tim e is ‘out o fjo in t’. I wish,

how ever, to focus on two of D errid a’s par ticu lar views of time, nam ely, the

tem porization th at is differance an d the mod el of the promise. It is these two

senses oftim e that a re most intimately connected w ith the D erridean notion

ofde m ocracy to come, and hence are most releva nt for m y project.



D w era and the demodemocracy to come 15

'La diflerance’

I n Spectres de M arx, D errida claims th at the dem ocracy to come is an injunc

tion. This injunction commands something to come that will never cometo full presence, including the equa lity of all, even thou gh such equ ality is

infinite an d inde term inable b y ina de qu ate p olitical conventions. 17 D errida

describes the dem ocracy to come as a promise that is to come - a promise

that is untenable because it is undecidable.18 It is Derrida’s claiming to

m ake som ething come to full presence that c an neve r come to presence th at

makes us t ^ n to his no t ion of differance, w hich echoes the claim of the impos

sibility o f presence due to the spa tio-tem porizing tha t constantly defers/

delays an d differentiates. Ifw e a re to consider, then, the natu re ofth e D erri

dean democracy to come, we must investigate what Derrida means by the

impossibility of full presence as articu lated by his notion of différance.

In order to uncover w hat Derr ida means by the t e ^ differance, I turn

to D er rid a’s essay, ‘La differance\ W h at follows is a close reading o f the eâ y.

D errid a m aintains tha t there are tw o senses tha t différanceconveys. F irst, it is

temporizing and second, it is differentiating. The first sense of differance

as temporization stems from the Latin verb differre, which translates into

English as to defer.19 T he temp orizing th a t occurs with différance is one of

delay, representation, a de tour th at suspends the acco m plishm ent of desire

or o f will. T h e delay consists in the claim tha t the full sense or m ean ing o f

a sign or tex t ca n nev er com e to full presence because the irredu cible non -

originary o rigin th at differentiates meanings is alway s deferred because o f

the erasu re th a t is imp licit in iterability. T he no n-originary o rigin, if there

is to be a full presenc e of m eanin g, w ould nece ssarily have to show itself

as it is the irred uc ibly constituent m om ent of a full mean ing. T his revelation

of the non -originary origin is continually suspended with every atte m pt to

articu late m eaning, as we shall see late r wh en we discuss repe tition an d the

second sense of différance as differen tiation. As time flows, the n on -origin ary

origin th at is différance is always held back, neve r ca pa ble of showing itself

fully although it operates continually on meanings. Temporally, there is

a genera l time flow an d m eanin gs unfold in this time flow. W ithin this time

flow the non-originary origin (différance) that is delayed and that delays

meanings can never come to full presence although we see it operating

upon m eanings in the tim e flow; it is tem porally retard ed and retarding.

This delay ensures that meanings will always be undecidable as they can

never com e to full presence.

T he second sense of différance is the m ore comm on one and can be under

stood as differentiation.20 Here, the emphasis is on one term not being the

same as another, that is, on a term being other. In order for terms to be



16 Badiou and D erd o.

different one from the othe r, D errid a says, there has to be repe tition, inte r

val, distance and spacing.21 Ultimately, it is these two senses that have

pushed D errida to change th e spelling of the word ‘differe nce’ because the

French '’différence’’ does not communicate the double sense that Derridawishes to com m unicate.

Derrida thinks of différance with in the fram ew ork of a classic Saussurian

semiology where terms are differentiated from one another.22 He admits

tha t there is something original or found ational a bo ut différance, b u t he also

distinguishes it from a m ere re-a pp rop riatio n o f the classical use of the term

‘differe nce’. D er rida asks how différance can be understood as tem porization

and spacing. D econstruction is parasitic; it draws up on a he ritage o f texts in

order to show how différance operates. D errid a reads texts to show how theyare m etaphysical insofar as they are read as m aking present definitive m ean

ings. U ltim ately, he will show how such texts are in ade qu ate in th at they fail

to m ake fully present their meanings. R ath er, their meanings become unde

cidable and iterable. In ‘La &fférance\ Derrida first shows how Saussurian

semiology m akes the c laim th at linguistic signs can fully signify or m ake p re

sent that w hich they claim to represent.

D errida presents tw o descriptions ofho w différance ope rates. First, there is

his treatm en t of signs. Second, there is an argu m en t tha t emphasizes time

flow and iterability. L et us now tu rn to the first description. D errid a returns

to writing an d the use of the sign to m ake his point. In classical semiology,

the sign stand s in for or substitutes for the referen t or the ‘thing pre sen t’. T he

sign re-presents the thin g in its absence. T he sign itself is pre sen t because it

com m unicates w hat the object it represents ‘is’ or means. F or exam ple, the

word ‘ca r’ stand s in for an d m akes present o r signifies a four-whe eled vehicle

used for transp orting goods and people from poin t A to point B. Th e w ord

‘car’ makes present an absent and actual car. In classical semiology, a

system of langua ge consists of a series of differen tiated signs. But these

signs, claims Derrida, are not static in sense. Signs or words play in a lan

guage. If signs are constan tly differentiating themselves, som ething

‘causes’ them to di ffere ntia te.23

If we are to claim tha t the m eaning or sense of a sign is fully present,

the origin of the play that is differentiation would have to be present also.

In other words, a traditional metaphysical explanation of the foundation

would have to be given. But D errida claims th at th ere is no such thin g as an

origin in the traditional metaphysical sense. Différance operates on signs

in order to differentiate their meanings, but it operates as non-originary

‘or ig in’ th a t is not full. The origin ho lds itself back; it reserves itself, bu t

it also operates on meanings. When we treat repetition and intervals, we

shall see how this happens. The non-originary origin is constantly delayed



Dérid a and tke <^mocracy to come 17

an d in its delay, it delays m eanings eve r being able to come fully to presence.

M eanings will never be full, and any attem pt to fix th e m eaning o f tex t will

result in a metaphysics ofpresence. T exts a nd m eanings will always be open-

ended or un decidab le because of this ‘originary’ delay. O ne can conceive ofthis de lay as tem po ral beca use m eanings will con tinue to unfold the ir senses

in time, b ut we will never be able to know a m eaning presently at a given

m om ent because o f the con stant delay of its constitutive non-originary

origin. In other words, when we read a text or experience the world in

consciousness, w ha t we re ad or expe rience is cons tan tly being tem porally

deferred. Meaning is always ‘to come’, although it will never be realized

fully in the prese nt hic et nunc.

Two consequences follow from the foregoing analysis. First, one can nolonger understand différance under the rubric o f a sign, which always m ean t

the rep rese ntatio n o f a presence. Saussure’s analysis o f differen tiating signs

is eclipsed, Derrida maintains, because there is an ‘original’ possibility that

makes the sign appear as different. The differentiating does not happen

because of th e relation o f the signs, th a t is, one sign showin g the diffe rence

of the other. Another structure is playing itself out here, namely, différance.

Second, D e rrid a’s semiological analysis calls in to qu estion the w hole struc

ture of presence itself and its direct op posite, name ly, absence or th at w hich

is missing (le manque). M ore am ply, the whole tradition o f conceiving of

bein g w ith in the fram ework o f absence and presence. com es in to question,

there by bring ing to the fore the questions o f the limits ofbeing .

If we concede tha t there is a delay or tem porization that comes to the fore

in signs, th en there is som ething th at is pec uliar a bo ut th e sign itself an d how

it operates. T he sign cann ot be absolutely de pen den t on presence itself to

op erate because the orig inal presence of the referen t is lost thro ug h the

sign. De rrida argues th ere is som ething ‘origina l’ th at is no t de pe nd en t

upo n presence itself — une différante originaire.24

Ultimately, Derrida makes three important points. First, the traditional

or on totheological category of presence or being as presence cann ot be

used to un derstand fully w ha t he means by différance. Second, any attem pt to

expose what différance ‘is’ will result in a co ns tan t disa pp earing . F inally,

though there is a constant disappearing, diijforance still manages to hold

som ething bac k or reserve som ething ofitself.

Let us now turn to the second type of argu m ent for differance, namely, dif

férance understood w ithin the framew ork of time flow and iterability. R epe

tition has folded within its structure an elusiveness or transcendence.

D ifferentiating objects of consciousness are n ot exa ctly iden tical to the way

we perceive them to be because time flow continually alters the repetitive

instants constitutive o f ou r differentiated experience. H ence, the ob ject we




have before us in consciousness, o r the speech we he ar, o r the words we read ,

transcend us, especially in communication. The speaker utters a certain

ph rase a t a certain in stant, b u t the hea rer hears otherwise because th e

speech is delayed and differentiated for the hearer. Repeating the same phrase, the very ph rase becom es im bibed w ith new senses. T h e phra se

escapes the hearer just as words escape the author once another person

reads the author’s work or once they are written.25 Hence, meaning or

sense cannot survive a second time because it cannot survive a second

saying. The sense continues to be differentiated as it is passed along in the

ch ain of com m unication. A nd this has to be because the sense can no longer

be com m unic able unless it is differe n tiate d. In a very profound sense, then,

to say wh at an objec t truly is becomes un decida ble, o r be tter still, it is imp ossible to em ploy tra dition al metaphysics, especially w ith its no tion of pre

sence, in ord er to un de rstan d fully the o bjects before us in consciousness or

in w ords rea d o r spoken.

Any significative communication, that is, any communication that uses

phonemes or graphem es (speech and writ in g) and th a t keeps his to rically

referring ba ck to them (renvois), w ill nev er be ab le to express fully its m ean

ings because the sign is o f a different ord er than th a t which it tries to rep re

sent.26 W h at is rep eate d in the sign is tem pora lly delayed vis^-vis its ‘origin ’

and it is different from its referen t an d o the r signs as the sign and the referent

can ne ver be identical. T he ‘orig in’ can ne ver come to presence throu gh the

sign. It is this delay and differentiation th at D errid a calls différance.

Différance makes the m ove m ent o f signification possible only if each ele

m ent of a significative ch ain said to be ‘pre sen t’, tha t is, ap pe arin g on the

scene as ‘present’, relates to something other than itself. But each element

has to keep the m ark o f the p ast elemen t while sim ultaneously letting itself

be hollowed out by its ra p p o rt to the future ele m ent. T h ere is, however, a

m ark of that p resent now p ast in th a t the sign still can refer to the past refer

ent but is in no way identical w ith tha t past referent. In any comm unication,

if it is to h ave any kind o f sense, th ere h as to be a co nnec tion o f the various

elements th a t constitute the linguistic flow. T he m eaning o f a sentence

depends on each element referring to each other without each element

bein g id entical to each o ther. For exam ple, and th is is o u r exam ple and not

D er rid a’s, let us consider th e sentence, ‘T he cat is on th e ro of ’. In orde r for

me to un de rstan d w h at ‘the ’ refers to, there has to be an an ticip atio n of its

future referent, namely, the cat , bu t th e c a t , in order to be the c a ta n d n o t ‘a ’

cat, needs somehow to be ar the m ark o f a past element, nam ely, the article

'the ’. But in ord er for me to und erstand the various elements and the sense of

the sentence, differentiating in tervals are necessary betw een wo rds in order

th a t the ir respective differences can com e to th e fore.



D e r d a a nd the democracy to come 19

D errid a’s description o f past an d futu re m arks relies heavily on p resence

or w ha t we say is ‘pre sen t’. In m an y ways, it still dra ws on Sa ussure’s classi

cal semiology. W hat, then , if an yth ing, m akes D er rid a’s analysis different?

T ho ug h there is a co nstant referring that is deferring and differentiating an dthough there a re future an d past marks th at are connected to the elements

said to be ‘present’, Derrida maintains that there is something more that

happens through w ha t he calls the trace.27 T he elements th a t refer to one

another a re m arked by a certain passivity and futurity tha t D errida consid

ers to be m odifications of the present. Both past a nd future m arks work on

the assumption tha t something is originally present. But ifw ha t is originally

present is t ru ly past as in the case of a sign th a t is secondary and pro vis io nal,

then it mu st not refer to th at w hich is originally present. T h a t is, in orderfor there to be a true differentiation o f one element from a noth er, there

has to be a complete rup ture o r interval betw een the various elements tha t

does not m ake the elements identical to one an other. If the elemen ts refer

to one an oth er solely as modifications of the allegedly original present, be it

as past or future marks, then we end up constantly referring to the same

thing. Each word would end up referring and being identical with the

same thin g th at was allegedly origina lly present. T he imp lication for lan

guage and communication is that meaning would be absolute and literal.

H ence , the sentence, ‘T he c a t is on the ro o f’, always w ould have to refer to

the literal c at o n the roof; th e c at is assumed to be fully presen t, as is the roof,

as is the m ean ing of the copu la ‘is’. But lang ua ge does no t only ope rate on

this level. L angu age an d all com m unication, for Derrida, is polysemantic

and open-ended.

Words and speech can m ean m any th ings and ca n say more than what

they literally mean . In order to accou nt for this reality, D errida posits tha t

in add ition to the traditional future a nd p ast m arks, one also needs a trace, a

trace that neither relates to the past nor relates to the future. Furthe rm ore,

the ‘present’ is constituted by som ething th a t is no t the sam e as the p resent

or m odifications o f the present such as the future and past. A n interva l ru p

tures the elemen ts of significative exch ange, allowing th a t com plete alterity,

w hich is described as a rad ical absence,28 to artic ula te itself as no t identical

to itself an d as somehow ‘being p resent’. I t is th at rup turin g o r intervalling

ofelem ents in ord er tha t they ap pe ar as truly different and not as modifica

tions ofa n originally pre sen t referent th at is the con dition of the possibility of

any com m unication. Intervalling allows for a p lurality of differentiated

meanings th at can su pplem ent the literal and supposedly fixed m eanings of

language, w hich simply confine themselves to a lang uage of past a nd future

marks or modifications of the metaphysical present. This intervalling is

spatio-temp orizing. It is this spatio-tem porizing th a t D errida calls différance.



20 Badiott and D e rd a

But meanings are not fully present; there are meanings that completely

evade and transcend the text as well, as evidenc ed by D err ida ’s read ing of

Plato’s pharmakon an d othe r precise readings ofm an y classic texts. M eanings

are polysemantic and open-ended. If this is the case, then there has to besome drastic rupture or cleavage, namely the interval, that would allow

the elements of linguistic com m unication to not simply refer to the origin

ally present. By having this completely different possibility, words and

speech need not have a literal me aning in th at they c an con tinue to differ

entiate freely w ithou t havin g to refer con stantly to the ‘living prese nt’ or

modifications thereof. We are left with a double bind situation. Meanings

are possible, but they can never be fixed. Hence, they are simultaneously

possible b u t im possible. M eanin gs, in sofa r as th ey are conditioned by thespatio-tempo rizing th at is différance, a re ultimately u ndec idable.29

U nde cidab ility colours D errid a’s notion of différmce in two senses. First,

it colours the very possibility of describing w h at différance is because the

very n atu re of the qu estion implies the langu age of presence, th at is, we

are trying to articu late in w ords how som ething is present before us. Différ

ance, th en , becomes derivative o f som ething bein g present (l’étant-présent ) . 30

D errida is aw are o f this difficulty an d he tries to overcom e this problem by

con tinually re ferring to the classical semiology ofSau ssure while at th e sam e

tim e trying to distance him selffrom it. I n employing th e texts ofhis ‘epo ch’,

D errida gives us a framew ork to work with. H e quickly distances and sub

verts, however, the philosophical heritage employed, ultimately giving a

different readin g of the text in question.

W hat makes his reading of différance undecidable is the fact tha t D errida

will simultaneously use the concepts of phenom enology (proten tion, reten

tion), psychoanalysis (Bahnung und Spur) and Saussurian semiology (différ

ence, langue, parole), claiming that différance can be seen in all of these

fou nd ation al concepts, bu t he also says that différance is no t to b e associated

w ith the aforementioned concepts because they are inadequa te. T he u nde-

cidab iiity consists in the fact tha t D errid a will make use o fin ad eq ua te con

cepts, which do no t convey the sense of w h at he takes différance to ‘b e ’, ye t he

wishes to su bvert the sense of such concepts. If the concepts o f the e poch are

inadeq uate, why use them a t all? Why no t try to make a clean break? But

this is the peculiarity of deconstruction. It draw s up on a heritage o f texts

and ideas in order to demonstrate how within such texts there is more at

play than we have trad itionally found in th e texts.

For example, by showing in La voix et le phinomenem that Husserl’s claim

regarding the making present als lebendige Gegenwart o f the alter ego of inter

subjectivity and all Vergegenwiirtigungen in gen eral is impossible, De rrida

achieves two things. First, he shows how Husserl falls in to the tra d itio n of a



D m e r and the (democracy to c ^ 21

m etaphysics of presence. But there is more at play in H usserl’s texts th an

am ply o ntotheology . D errida reads H usserl’s no tion of the sign to show

how presence is really impossible, for it is always de layed a nd differen tiating

in consciousness. Ju st as the sign is delay ed an d differentiating, so too is theexperience of the other. W ha t is presentified to u s in H usse rl’s Analogieschluj

acts no differently than any other represented sign. The other that is re

presented to m e is a delayed sign o f th e orig in al o ther th a t is constantly being

differen tiated in its being experienced in m y own ego consciousness. He re,

we see différance operating as delaying an d differentiating, but all within

the simultaneously inadeq uate and adeq uate texts of Husserl. O ne can no t

decisively reject Husserl, for he is necessary to show the playing out of

diffirmce. Likewise, one ca n reject Hu sserl’s claim of the possibility of thelebendige Gegenwart, which is so central to Husserl’s phenomenological

project. In la te r D erridean te rm s, there is a double bind of possib ili ty and

impossibility that haunts the whole deconstructive project: in Derrida’s

rea din g o f Hu sserl, H usserl’s whole pro jec t is shown to be impossible

because it cannot ever m ake present th rough representa tions th a t which it

claims it ca n m ake living present. But a t the sam e time, the impossibility of

repre sen tations to b ring th e a lter ego to full presence also brings ou t the pos

sibility o f différance playing itself ou t throu gh representation s.

Th is different reading brings us to the second point con cerning De rridean

un dec idab ility. N ot only is the ‘exp osition’ of the te rm différance undecid

able, but also différance, understood in its spatio-temporizing sense as an

arch -structu re, structures all tha t is as un decid able, especially if we take

seriously D er rida ’s claim th at all is text. W ha t does this m ean? T he sp atio-

temporizing tha t is différance s tructures all of reality in such a m ann er th at

rea lity is un dec idab le because th at w hich is originally present is con stantly

deferring itself and con stantly d ifferen tiating itself. W ha t we possess is a

heritage o f traces th a t are co nstantly erasing themselves or a reality th at is

somehow reserving itself b u t sim ultaneously exceeding itself. T his double

m ovem ent is possible, th at is, it makes reality po ssble. T he m eanings, how

ever, ofsu ch a rea lity ca n nev er be fixed. N ot only is full presen ce impossible,

b u t w hat is before us as e xperience is u ndecidable . W e cannot say w hat it is

or w ha t it was fully, an d u ltim ately, we can no t even speak of it in the terms

ju s t em plo yed. I f there is no th in g outs id e the text, as D errida cla im s, then

poli tics too m ust be considered a text. I f w h at we experience poli tically is

con stantly d ifferentiating itself an d constan tly deferring itself, then all poli

tical action an d all political decision-making become coloured by the un de

cidability th at the arch -structure called différance brings to the fore. We a re

nev er ab le to b ring p olitical decisions, processes, conven tions, laws, m ove

m ents, etc. to a ny kind o f full presence.




T i m e a s th e t o c o m e o f th e p r o m i se

Having examined the first temporal model of différance, I now move to

ano ther tem poral model. T he second temp oral model th at D errida developsin orde r to explain and articulate w hat he conceives o f non-originary origin

ary time to ‘be’ is tha t of the promise. T he model of the promise is a later

development in D errida’s thought. K ey in this m etaphor is the notion of

the ‘to com e’. In Frenc h, the to come translates l’à-venir, which also means

the future {l’avenir). T he to come, how ever, is no t to be un derstood as simple

proten tion or futurity , for it h as w ith in its s tructure the double bind o f being

hau nted b y a past th at ha d already been an d the present tha t never comes to

present itself fully. 31 T he to com e conta in s w ith in it selfboth th e possibility ofan open-ended tem poral horizon a nd the impossibility of anything coming

to presence in such a horizon. T he promise, the n, is th at m odel which con

cretizes the tem porization o f the doub le bind o f the possible a nd the impos

sible, ultim ately yielding D errid ean und ecidab ili ty.32 W hen on e ma kes a

pro m ise, one promises to do som eth in g in the futu re - a te m poral horizon

is op en ed . T he spo ken prom ise is a sign. W ha t is prom ised is never fuUy pre

sent exce pt thro ug h its signs and repre senta tions in consciousness. W ha t is

pro mised is c ontinually dela yed and differentia ted. As time flows and as dif-

firraance plays itself out, the m eaning of w ha t was promised continues to be

differentiated and deferred. The meaning that is anticipated will never

come to fulfilm ent as initially spoken or heard bec ause tem poriz a tion alters

an d delays the senses or m eanings of wh a t w as i niti ally spoken or hea rd.

W h at w as pro^mised in the beg inn ing will acqu i re differe nt senses as time

flows. When Derrida says that a promise is undecidable, he wishes to cap

ture th at ever-changing flow ofmeaning s that com e to trace a nd erase them

selves thro ug h différance. M ean ing is never fixed or absolute.

D errida m akes explicit th e connec tion between the to come an d the pro

mise.33 T he ‘yes’ th a t D er rid a describes the to come as be ing is a consent, a

consent to the c ondition for the possibility of the tem po ral horizon, a n h or

izon o ffu tu rity .34 F utur i ty is a possibility, a possibility tha t som ething migh t

actua lly come abo ut. As we saw earlier, for there to be a ny kind o f move

m ent or flow th a t is com m unication, experience or w ri ting, there has to be

repetition. T he promise needs th a t iterab ility if it is to co ntinu e to flow as a

pro mise. T h a t is, some k ind o f tem poral exte nsio n o r horizon has to be given

if the promise is to be articu late d ‘ag ain an d a ga in ’ as a prom ise tha t

requires an e xtended or future time in o rder to be fulfilled. T his repe tition

is interva lling a nd d ifferentia ting such th at in ord er for the prom ise to be

a prom ise it has to d ifferentiate itself radicaUy from itself, thereb y b ring

ing to the fore the need for the possibility o f the ra dica l absence t h at is the



Derrida and the thmcracy w come 23

unfulfilled or b roken promise. T he prom ise is ‘broke n’ because tem poriza-

tion inevitably changes the m eaning o f the initial spoken promise. T he p ro

mise as initially spoken can n ever be fulfilled as initially m eant. T h e do uble

b ind o f poss ib ility o f the prom ise and im possib il ity th a t is the broken promise are folded into the conc ept o f the to come.

Pe rm it me to give a concrete exam ple of the double b ind o f the to come

tha t is the promise. W hen Geo rge W. Bush promises to punish and bring to

ju stice the terro ris ts responsib le for 9/1 1, we are confronted w ith th e unde

cidab ility of the doub le b ind. Bush’s feelings o f ange r, hu rt, responsibility

and ou trage are expressed in his prom ise to brin g the terrorists to justice.

T h e pro m ise is a sign o f Bush’s feelings. ^ b e feelings are th er e ab initio, bu t

are o nly expressed th rou gh delayed signs, inc lud ing pub lic speeches, promises, com forting others, etc. Bush ca n neve r brin g to full presence his feel

ings except throug h the signs of speech or body lang uag e or w ritten texts.

In making his promise, Bush opens up a temporal horizon. In the future,

Bush will deploy all available resources to eliminate the ‘axis of evil’ that

carried o ut the grave injustice of 9/11. W hen Bush m ade tha t promise, he

could no t know w hat the fulfilled prom ise would look like. I t w as impossible

to do so from his presen t viewpo int. H e could co njecture, bu t th a t is not a

fulfilment of the prom ise. As time flows, and as we hav e seen w ith the dep loy

m ent of Am erican troops in Ira q , the m eanings of retributivejustice begin to

take on different meanings. At the beginning, Bush promised to go to all

possible le ngth s to bring th e te rrorists to justice. Now as A m eric an troops

are being slowly exe cuted in Ira q , the sense of Bush’s initia l prom ise is tem

pered. T he question now arises: should Bush go to th e length s and extrem es

initially promised to b ring terrorists un der control, especially if it m eans

guerrilla warfare and the slow and psychologically devastating execution

ofA m erica n troops? T he sense ofB ush’s initial promise is being altered a nd

differentiated as time flows. W ha t was initially prom ised c ann ot be fulfilled

because the sense o f the orig inal promise has c hanged, especia lly concern in g

the length an d m eans ofb ringing terrorists tojustice.

But possibility and impossibility play themselves out in different ways

as well. W he n Bush m ade his prom ise, to w hom did he m ake his promise?

He m ade his promise to the dead victim s.35 Bush w an tedju stice in the na m e

of the innocen t dead. In u ttering his promise, an horizon was opened th at

w ould perm it him to carry ou t his plan o f retributivejustice, b ut his promise

wiU never be f i l l e d in tha t i t is impossible to bringjustice to the dead. Th e

dead cann ot speak nor ca n they hear. Justice has no sense for them. Borrow

ing from H eideg ger, the dea d are ‘noth ing ’ because th eir being is now

impossible. F urthe rm ore, when Bush mak es his promise to his fellow Am er

icans in the nam e of the dea d, th ere is a deferral. T he dead cann ot speak.



24 Badiou andDerrrida

Bush speaks as the ir repre sen tative, th eir sign. As time flows, the m eaning of

the otherness of the de ad will take on different senses. T oda y, they are vic

tims, tom orrow m artyrs an d m aybe ju st num bers in the future. As their

meanings differentiate in time, the dead are not the same as when Bushspoke of them in the past, for their meanings have been altered. For exam

ple , in th e wake o f Afghanis ta n and Iraq , there is v ery li tt le ta lk o f the v ic

tims o f 9 / ll . Bush’s prom ise to the de ad opens the possibility ofjustice, bu t

this ve ry same possibility is laced w ith impossibility in th a t the in itial pro

mise will never come to full presence as its sense is co ns tan tly bein g altered in

the iterable tim e flow o f différance.

Derrida describes the to come as possessing three traits. First, it is not

fully kn ow able (conmissahle) as the to com e. Second, i t is to be seen as messianic (distinguished from messianism). Finally, the to come functions

within an injunction. Metaphysically, the simple future, understood as

l’avenir, can be recognized and can be progno sticated upon. O ne can predict

and estimate w ha t the future will bring and w hen things will happ en in the

future. The to come, however, is open-ended, and though it contains possi

bili ty, its im poss ib ility, understo od as radical absence (différance), makes it

undecidable. W hen I say th at Jo h n promises tha t he will come for a visit

next Tuesday, i t is a statement marked by a futurity. One knows when

something is to happen and one can begin to see its realization or non

rea lizatio n given one’s fam iliarity with h abits/custom s of visiting and the

future Tuesday fast approaching. The Derridean to come is much more

open-ended. O ne can say th at there is a promise th at Jo h n is to come.

W hen Joh n makes tha t promise an d w hen we hea r that promise, Jo h n ’s

initial desire to promise something is already symbolized in words as a

delayed sign. It only comes to presence as a sign and never as pure desire

itself. As time flows and as T uesd ay a pproa ches, the m eanings o fJ oh n’s pro

mise are n ot iden tical with his initial prom ise spoken the week before. Even

the initial promise as utte red b y Jo h n h ad no absolute sense. Jo h n ’s articu la

tion o f his very prom ise is alread y d elayed an d differen tiated in sense.

As time flows, Jo h n w ill have exp erienced m ore a nd different things, he

will have aged, he will hav e revised his thoughts, e tc. Jo h n will not be

exactly the same person as he was when he made that promise the week

befo re . S o ,Jo h n m ay come on T uesday , and though he init ia lly prom ised a

casual visit, the visit on Tuesday acquires a different sense in thatJohn has

experienced m ore and different things. The casual visit m ay ha pp en a nd we

meet on Tuesday, but the meaning of the visit is altered from its initial

meaning. With temporization, differentiated meanings accrue experien

tially. It is on this level of m eanings t h a t differentiation h app ens. It is

poss ib le th a tJo h n m ay com e on T uesday, bu t it is impossible th a tJo h n will



D& era and the dmwdmwcracy Ie come 25

have the fixed identical meaning th at he had last week when he m ade the

pro m ise to visit. T he vis it it self wil l have dif ferent m eaning as well. In this

sense, the promise as initially spoken is never fulfilled because the meaning

of w ha t was initially prom ised, i.e., the initial senses o fJo h n and the visit,has been altered by the temporizing of différance. When Joh n m ade tha t

pro m ise, we could never know in w h a t sense J o h n would ‘present’ himself.

T he sense of Jo hn rem ains unde cidable. I t is always to come in th at the delay

and differentiation of tim e m ake the m eaning of any future anticipation

unkn ow able and the meaning of any present meeting delayed. W ha t is

‘orig ina l’ ab o ut the m ean ing o fJo h n can nev er come to full presence. It is

only represented th roug h delayed signs of com m unication.36 T he to come

as not knowable/recognizable or as not made to come is described as aneven t. Bo th Badiou and D errida will em ploy this term. Fo r Badiou, the event

is not a to come, but is brou ght abo ut or m ade a pp aren t in being through

an interven tion.37

T he second trait o ft h e to come is tha t it is described as messianic. I t is

not, how ever, to be associated with a ny form o f messianism. M essianism,

be it in the form o fJu d aism , Christian ity , etc ., m akes explicit and present

its saviour. Both Je w s and Ch ristians have definitive albeit v aried views of

what the Messiah will do and how he will save his people. The notion of

the m essianic th at D errid a wishes to convey is the very sense of to com e th at

was discussed above. T he messianic is a prom ise, a promise th a t is structu red

by th e double bind of p oss ib ility and im possibility. In a m eta physical or

onto theo logica l messianism, though the M essiah will save in the future, we

have the gu ara nte e th at he will save, that is, when he comes. He will redeem

his people once and for all. In the m essianic, the re is a possibility ofre de m p-

tion. And for that very possibility to exist as a possibility, it must contain

w ithin itselfits very im possibility. It c an only a pp ea r insofar as it is impossi

ble fo r it to appear. T he m eaning of w hat is prom ised can never be known

from the start because the horizon is open-ended. One can anticipate, but

the anticip ation is not the fulfilment of the promise. But the prom ise of a

M essiah is also impossible because the m eanings o f what it m eans to be

saved are consta ntly differen tiating themselves as time flows. In Ju da ism ,

depe nding on the times, there are various senses of who th e M essiah is to

be , inclu ding a g re a tru le r, m ilitary leader, p rophet, e tc . But eventhese sym

bols are am biguous. As time flows the m eaning o fw h a t it m eans to be saved

changes a nd is different from the ‘initia l’ notion o f who o r w ha t the M essiah

is. As meanings change, the ‘initial’ promise can never be fulfilled because

the ‘initia l’ m eaning is erased. But even the ‘in itia l’ m ean ing itselfis delayed ,

for the ‘original’ conscious experience of the Messiah can only be repre

sented thro ug h signs, images and words in consciousness.38



26 Badiou and Dertà a

Again, un dec idab ility comes to the fore because of the playing out of the

double bind and différance. T he choice of the term messianic is vital bec ause

D errida adm its tha t there is something restorative abo ut his deconstructive

pro ject. But th e restoration o r salvation that D errida invokes is n o t that of atradition al parousia. R ath er, any kind o f healing tha t is promised in the to

come of the m essianic is the irred ucib ility of the un dec idab le t h at comes to

the fore throug h the play of the double b ind an d différance. Restoration con

sists in rup turing with a m etaphysics ofpresence, ultima tely acknowledging

the irreducibility of the undecidab le tha t hau nts an d arch -structures all of

hu m an experience. It m akes ‘out o fjo in t’ the ‘na tu ra l’ time of the m eta

physics o f presence.39 We shall see how the restorativ e ele m ent o f the mes

sianic comes to articulate itself when we exam ine the re lation of justicean d injustice.

Finally, we turn to the third trait. D errida situates the no tion ofinjunc -

tion (injonction) within the structu re o f the to co m e.40 Etym ologically,

Derrida notes that the Greek word archi has a do ub le sense. It can m ean

a begin ning an d it can also signify a c om m and m ent.41 T he to come, insofar

as it mimics the temporizing structure of différance, understôod as arch

structu ring, can be re ad as possessing the double sense o f the G reek w ord

archi. T he injunc tion can be though t of as a beginning, b ut also as a non-

origina ry origin. W hen D errida speaks ofinjunc tion, he speaks of com m and.

But the injunction in Derridean thoug ht is not a com m and in the traditional

m etaphysical sense. For, following the play o f différance, it is not c aug ht up

w ithin the logic of presence because wh at is com m ande d, the com m andee

and the com m ande r need not be present. In fact, as in speech, w riting and

experience, they ca nn ot be fully kno w able (as they are rad ically absent) in

orde r for the injunction to act as an injunction an d they are subject to the

same logic of trace a nd erasu re discussed earlier. Yet, an injun ction has

force, nam ely, it elicits a c ertain responsibility in D erride an thou gh t. It is a

m otivationa l force.42 T he force of the preposition à o f the à venir (to come)

conveys tha t notion offorce or injunction or obligation. For exam ple, il reste

àfaire, it rem ains to be done. T he re is a force in this statem en t th at bespeaks

a kind of com m and or necessity of something being accom plished o r striven

for w ithout the injunction being articu lated by any one person. It is im per

sonal yet binding.

W hence the force of the injunction? A gain, repe tition is necessary for

there to be anythin g like com m unication or experience. E lements constitu

tive of experience or com m unication h ave to be said again a nd again. T he

radica l differentiation tha t happ ens between elements throug h the interval

is not dew ex ^ 1T lIJChina. Rather, the elements themselves harbour their own

differen tiating force in that they space themselves, playin g ou t the force of



D e rd a and the democracy to come 27

the double bind an d the spatio-temp orizing th at is différance. O ne element in

ord er to ‘be’ that very elem ent has to differen tiate or space itself radically

from itself thro ug h its own absence/impo ssibility. I terabili ty gu aran tees

that the differentiated element will be repeated but never in the sameway, an d hence, th e defe rral from the orig in th a t is the de lay o f difirance.

But in its very differentiation, th e element itself is conditioned by bo th

its ow n possibility an d impossibility, its own delaye d an d differentia ted

spatio-tem porizing. In ord er for an elem ent to be, it has to respond to the

absence th at is ‘w ithin ’ in orde r th a t it ca n be w ha t it is, th a t is, always

deferre d a nd differen tiate d . T his responding 43 of elemen ts to the absence

th a t is necessary for th eir ow n possibility is con stitutive o f responsibility.

Responsibility is th a t response to the injunction o r force th a t is the double b ind and différance.

If there is an in junction th at is op erating w ithin the structu re of the to

come that is the promise, then what makes it undecidable is the radical

absence (différance)44 of th at very sam e inj unction . T he re is a rad ica l disj unc

tion that operates in the injunction; the double bind is that disjunction45

tha t operates within the injunction and w hich ultima tely laces it with un de

cidability. T he inj un ction c ontinua lly undoes the traces of itself, thereby

com pleting th e ‘economic m ovem ent’ o f self-reservation an d excess that we

described e arlier. A t the sam e time, the inj un ction also calls som ething for

w ard, th a t is, it calls for a response. I n tthis calling for a response a tem po ral

ho rizon o f poæ ibility is opened .

In sum, D errida thro ug h the m odel of the promise brings to the fore

the play ing ou t of the to come. T h e to com e adds new senses to the spatio-

tem po rizing ofdiJlirance an d the double bin d of possibility and im po îb ility

that already ‘play within’ the promise. The new senses uncovered with the

D erride an to come include the prom ise’s unkno w ability, its messianic struc

ture and its appe al in the form o f an injunc tion. E ven w ith all these new

senses continually unfolding and playing themselves out, undecidability

continue s to be the irreducible consequence o fD er rid a’s analysis.

A t this point, it wo uld be wise to pause and reflect up on some o fD e rrid a ’s

claims. I f som ething is radically impossible, it is no thing; it is th at rad ical

absence of différance. T he no thingness o f impossibility ha s such force th at it

is hard to see how possibility can coincide with impossibility in the Derri

de an accou nt. I f there is such a thing as i terability an d if we assume th at it

pla ys i tse lfo u tb y sim ultaneously appealing to possib ility and im poss ib ility,

delay an d d ifferentiation, the n would n ot impoæ ibility simply stop the repe

tition, thereby stopping both différance and the double bind from playing

themselves out? In o the r words, if we are to have a rad ical differentiation

o f elements, as D err ida calls for, the n the rad ical absence is nec esa ry. But



28 Badiou and Demda.

ifi t is to be a radical absence, the n it has to be nothing o r annihilating. H ow

can repetition survive this nothing or this annihilation such that it could

con tinue to iterate?

Derrida could respond to such a challenge by saying that we are stillope rating within a framew ork o f presence insofar as we think th at the ann i

hilation op erates on an elem ent tha t is somehow fully present ab initio. The

delay or deferral (temporization) ensures tha t the elem ent is never fully pre

sent from the beginning. Furthermore, the nothing, the radical absence

or the impossibility that is the intervalling (spacing), never annihilates

th a t irreducible non-originary origin th at is con stantly delaying and defer

ring itself. T he no thing allows new senses to emerge a nd the delay con tinues

to defer those senses. The non-originary origin continues to repeat itself,even though its deferred and differentiated repetitions are continually

annihilated by the radical absence of différance and the imp ossibility of the

double bind.

Fu rtherm ore, we must address unde cidability. If the temp orization of

différaance and the to come of the promise gen erate und ecid ability, then how

can D errid a affirm the irreduc ibility o f the tem po ral structures described?

Do we n ot lapse into a m etaphysics of presence when we claim tha t un decid

ability is an irreducible effect of the temporal arch-structure Derrida

describes? Yes. The very undecidability we claim as Derridean, then, has

to ‘be ’ open-ended, an d this open-ende d decidability of calling ou r ex peri

ence o f reality u nde cidab le, th at is, th at ‘de cida ble’ und ecid ability has to

be qualified as uncertain. The claim ofirreducib ility is also u ncertain , unde

cidable. The radica l project of decon struction m ust no t stop a t the present

claim of unde cidab ility; it must extend th a t claim to itself. D errida realizes

this, especially given his opening remarks in his essay ‘La differance’. He is

hesitant and reluctant to ‘expose’, to ‘name’, and he often will qualify

descriptions he gives by making them hypothetical statements. When he

says something, he will often qualify the statement by rejoining with an

‘ “ if ” we can eve n speak in such term s’.46 U nd ecid ab ility is interlac ed w ith

a profound u nc ertain ty. The question we have to ask D err ida is one which

oth er philosophers like Wi ttgens tein a nd Augustine have raised w hen they

have found themselves before the und ecidable an d the unce rtain: would it

no t be b ette r to rem ai n silent or invoke the A ugu stinian ‘ Tacite!’ ra th er

tha n continue w riting an d speaking?

O ne co uld defend D er rid a’s herita ge b y stating t h a t silence itselfis subject

to the same undec idability and unc ertainty as all other com m unication or

experience because silence too is significa tive an d c om m un ica tive .47 Silence

can sigmfy and continue to signify a pleth ora o f open-end ed senses. M ore

over, if true silence is to d ifferentiate itself as silence an d no t som ething else,



Derrida and the democracy to come 29

it m ust be mindful o fits neg ation or its a bsence, nam ely, voice or sound. Th e

silence of H usserlian consciousness is anim ate d by the ‘inn er voice’ of

the m ono logue , as D err ida shows in La voixet lephinomene. W hethe r one stays

silent or speaks, writes or com m unicates, one can nev er escape the un de cidability an d u nce rtain ty th at result from D errid a’s claims ab ou t time a nd the

fact that we are always in media resfluxarum or that we are always ‘within'.

U ltim ately, if we push the D erridean logic further, D errid a’s own claims

become undecidable and uncertain . T he D erridean aporia, th en, is distin

guished from the traditional Greek aporia in that not only are we faced

with und ecidability and unc ertainty, but the very a poria itself is undecid

able or uncertain. That is, we are neither certain nor are we able to decide

w heth er what we are e xperiencing, if we can even speak of exp erience, isan aporia.

T i m e a n d t h e d e m o c ra c y to c o m e

Before proceeding to make explicit the relationship between time and

democracy in Derridean thought, we must ask ourselves two fundamental

questions : w ha t does D errida m ean by dem ocrac y and why the selec ti on of

dem ocracy as the political form o f deconstruction? In o ther w ords, why n ot

a comm unism to com e or a liberalism to come?

Let us proceed to the first question. Intuitively, we understand democ

racy to m ean rule by the people, bu t there are m any forms of political rule

that are dem ocratic, including the Marxist, the liberal dem ocratic and the

A thenian d em ocratic modes of rule. D em ocracy should not be thoug ht o f in

terms o f present-day Wes tern parliam entary/rep ublican systems o f govern

m en t. For D errid a, dem ocra cy as the form of politics is a logical choice.

First, given his view of the im po rtan ce o f differen tiation con tained w ithin

the logic o f différance, he would have to view human persons as continually

differentiating from each other. M oreover, ou r conscious experience of ou r

selves an d others is delaye d an d differen tiated. W e are radica lly delayed a nd

differentiated, temp orizing/temp oralized, spacing/spaced beings. The poli

tical thinking th at extends from hum an existence will be structured by the

force of hu m an experience. Any attem pt to rule ourselves will have to be

conscious of this df fere ntia ted and delayed existence we call hu m an and

poli tical. Dem ocra cy, w ith its em phasis on people and with its herita ge of

an ‘individualized’ or differentiated political base, could be seen as

accomm odating D err idean différance.

In Voyous, Derrida lists the five foyers that belong to ‘the democracy to

come ’ ; the lan gu age here is very definitive and iden tificatory: (1) a m ilitan t



30 Badiou and Dm ida

poli tical critique w ithout end; (2) an advent th a t will never com e to show

itself fully (the promise); (3) a m oving beyo nd bo rders a nd citizenship to

an intern ation al no tion o f sovereignty th a t differentiates itself an d shares

new things (nouveauxpartages); (4) ajustice; and (5) an unc onditional injunc tion ( Ff!)'ous, 126 -35). I w ould like to ex pa nd , alb eit in a differen t or d er th an

that proposed by D errida abo ve, on the constitutive elements of the dem oc

racy to come. Speak ing at an intern ationa l philosophy colloquium in April

1968, Derrida maintains that democracy is the fo^rm. that such colloquia

should take. H e also ma intains th a t the form o f dem ocracy should be the

poli tical form o f organ iz atio n of socie ty .48

Fo r society to have a dem ocra tic political form, it m ust m eet two fund a

m ental conditions. First, for an ide ntity to exist dem ocratically, a ll tha t isnon -identical mu st come to have a voice; it must be represented in the po li

tically tem pora lized sense. All diversity m ust be allowed to artic ula te itself

within a dem ocracy, problem atic as tha t m ay be. U ntil the fullness ofdive r-

sity is articu lated , a tr ue d em ocratic form o f political organ ization is not

able to realize itself fully. But, at th e same time, the differen tiation an d

delay of différance w ill ensure th at differences can ne ver come to full artic ula

tion. I see in this first condition a n intim ation o f the to come. W hy? D errida

wants diversity to com e a nd ar ticu late itself, bu t if we tak e seriously his

claim ab ou t spatio-tem porization an d the force of the to come, this demo

cratic artic ula tion o f fullness will ne ver com e to an y kind o f full presence.

Moreover, it is undecidable at best and uncertain. Yet, the injunction of

the to com e as assured by iterab ility m eans th a t any political discourse or

experience will requ ire a con tinual playing ou t of différance and the double

bin d. H ence, différance will m ake possible a con tinual differentiation w hile

constantly ensuring that this very differentiation can never come to any

kind o f m etaph ysical presence.49 Bu t ou r failure to achieve this full de m o

cratic articula tion ofind ividu al differences appeals o r calls us to responsibly

try a nd m ake it ‘pres ent’ aga in a nd again. 50

Co ncretely, the unfulfilled desire to a rticulate all differences in D errid ean

democracy is problematic on two accounts. First, on the most pragmatic

level, one needs language to be able to articulate this diversity, but some

times th e un av ailab ility of suitable expressions or the repression o f free

speech will m ake suc h diversity inexpressible. But the challeng e to p olitical

language brought on by Derridean deconstruction is much deeper than

simply not finding the righ tw o rd s to express diversity. D econstruction ch al

lenges the possibility o f lang ua ge ever bringing any kind o f diversity to

full presence. Fully expressing difference in lang uag e rem ains impossible.

T he dou ble b ind structures the linguistic expression of political diversity as

undecidable. If we are go ing to develop a dec onstructive form o f political




com m unication, we have to avoid using a languag e of presence and we

should also preface ou r political discourse w ith phrases th at co nstan tly show

the doub le bind at w ork. W e will have to use the languag e o f the promise,

which speaks of things as possibly ha ppe ning bu t never ac tually coming totheir full realizatio n. Différance will bring into play the excess of m eanings of

political la nguage th a t a language o f a m etaphysics of p resence can never

possibly contain. An exam ple of how D errida deconstructs language can

be seen a t the opening ofh is essay, ‘Signature Evénem ent C onte xte ’.

Derrida begins his essay by raising a question concerning communica

tion.51 D errida adm its th a t even his definition or use o f the term com m uni

cation in his que stion draws from a sense of com m unication as a vehicle

or m eans o f transmission. 52 D errida is a w are tha t co m m unication is a poly sem antic term th a t is also conditioned b y c ontext. T here are times when

com m unication does not even involve phen om ena o f m eaning o r significa

tion. T his view of com m unication m akes evident the difficulty of speaking

abou t co m m unication because D errida limits the m eaning of the term

com m unication as th at vehicle of transmission while simultaneously affirm

ing the impossibility o f limiting the definition o f the term com m unication

to the sense he wishes to employ. In o the r words, D errid a is aw are o f the

double bind of possibility a nd impossibility th at colours his use of the term

com m unication. H e gives a possible definition of the term com m unication

as a vehicle, but at the same time he knows that this meaning alone can

nev er possibly give an adeq uate account o f w hat c om m unication is —an

impossibility. Political discourse, understoo d as a species ofco m m un ication ,

m ust be neither equivocal no r univo cal for D errida . W e shall see how D er

rid a allows deconstructive political discourse to play itself ou t w hen w e

exam ine later the notions offriendship a ndjustice.

Differences need to be articu lated , a nd sometimes this is impossible to do

given certain pre-existing political structures. Moreover, within the rubric

of D erridean time, the un certainty and undecidability that structure any

poli tical rea lity will only render m ore com ple x a ny kin d of poli tical c om m u

nication. D erride an un de cida bility makes way for three possibilities. First,

we ca n rejec t it and we con tinue to live w ithin the confines o f a m etaphysics

of presence. Second, we can simply despair and re m ain frustrated by D erri

dean undecidability. We become overwhelmed by the fact that ultimately

all that is to come is unde cidab le an d unc ertain. A feeling of paralysis

ensues in that one ultimately realizes that reality and any decisions we

m ake ab ou t reality, especially political ones, w ill ne ve r come to presence

and will con tinue to undo themselves as they atte m p t to come to some kind

of presence. W hy bo ther doing any thing or why respond politically when

undecidability becomes so arch-structuring? Third, we can continually




allow un dec idab ility to play itself out, w hich m ean s th a t we will be con

stantly ‘m ov ing’ to articu late differences tha t will neve r come to full pr e

sence. We continue to try, knowing that any advancements we make will

always be ina deq uate , bu t th at we ca n do m ore an d do a gain in ord er to tryand fulfil this never realizable goal. To use a m ediaev al turn o f phrase, we

are p olitically semper tendens.

Second, and again on a more pragmatic level, the unfulfilled desire to

articulate all differences in Derridean democracy is problematic because

there may be tension between divergen t individuals or groups, all attem pt

ing to articulate or give voice to their own difference. Derrida is acutely

aw are o f the violence th at m ay ensue from the artic ula tion of difference(s),

but this should not be a d eterren t to their eventual ‘representation’ or playing o u ti n a dem ocratic society.53 In oth er words, the critique s of hu m an

nature as offered by thinkers like Hobbes and Nietzsche all suggest that

human nature is such that different individuals will naturally oppress

others in orde r th at their own individ uality or difference comes to the fore.

T he sheer force o f brute political will or br ute political d om ination wiU

make the whole D erridean dem ocratic project o fth e articulation of differ

ences qu ite impossible. D errid a w ould acknowledge this possibility as it is a

poss ib ility rooted in the decis ion to revert to a metaphysic s of presence.

T ho ug h D errida articulates his position, he knows that the very natu re of

undec idability a nd the fact th at he m akes use of the heritage o f ou r epoch,

wh ich includes the possibility o f the use o f sheer bru tal force for political

ends,54 ren de r the possibility of lapsing into a m etaphy sical politics con

crete. Th is is especially true given th at he adm its th at co ntem porary dem oc

racy continues to be dom inate d by a metaph ysics of presence. We shall

discuss prese nt-day dem ocra cy’s failings later in this chap ter.

O ne o f the D erridean con ditions for democracy is tha t all nationa list poli

tical platforms ought to be dropped. We see in this condition the emphasis

on each person’s differences, each differentiating person articulating her

own self. Yet, a t the same time, such differences are n eve r absolu te. I f we

line up each o f these conditions an d have them sta nd together, they form

an antinom ous notion of dem ocratic nationhood. O n one hand, a demo

cra tic natio n can only be dem ocra tic if it allows all diversity to come to the

fore. O n the othe r han d, while it simu ltaneously aUows all diversity to come

to the fore, it mu st not nation alize such diversity. A na tion is only de m oc ra

tically national when it cultivates diversity and yet makes no claim to

national identity based on such diversity. This sentiment is echoed in

Voyous, where D errida acknowledges tha t nations m ay have a national iden

tity insofar as all reference to national sovereignty must not be abolished.

Th is is so because th e articu lation o f a nation al sovereignty may very well



D e r d a and the democracy to come 33

be th e articu la tion o fa diffe rence. A t the sam e tim e, however, a new diffe r

en tiating in tern atio na l political space mu st be prov ided. This is necessary in

orde r to keep d ifferentiation from being nationalized .55

G iven the analysis above, one could see dem ocracy within thefram ew orkof dijJirance. Dem ocrac y has as its en actin g sub ject th at in div idu al person

tha t comes to differentiate he rself from the o ther,56 and yet w ho, a t the

same tim e, m akes no c laim to possess th a t difference. W h at is ‘pre sen t',

then, is the individ ual as an erasing trace, w hich me ans th at p olitical orga

nization must be organized around this logic o f trace an d erasure. Th e ph i

losophical subject can never ‘be ’ fully pre sen t to herself. M oreo ver, h er

decisions, conventions and political opinions are all signs operated upon

by a non-orig inary orig in th a t is delayed an d delaying. I t would seem th a t

D errida is adv ocating having an id en tity an d simultaneously losing it. How

is this possible?

D errida notes tha t it is not so much abo ut losing an ide ntity or no t having

an identity, which would be non-sensical. Rather, he wishes us to have a

subjective identity that is rooted in non-identity.57 Non-identity does not

necessarily me an an ide ntity o f ‘no-thingness’, nor does it m ean an iden tity

ofap oph asis. R ath er , id en tity refers to one ’s no t reducin g on e’s difference to

being fu lly present. T o have ou r subje ctivity rooted in non-identity is to be

constantly vigilant to ensure th at we are never reduced to an x, y or z th at is

present a t hand . For exam ple , when we id entify people and ourselves by

w ha t they/we do, the re is a proclivity to see tha t person as an x, to identify

th a t person w ith x. But the person is always more and always less th an w ha t

x represents, for the person, following Derrida’s early semiology, is never

present to himself o r ano ther originaliter. We can view Derrida’s claim as

favou ring the excess who is the person, ultim ate ly und erstood thro ug h dijJir-

ance. T he m om ent a difference is asserted (possibility), it mu st be allowed to

be asserted, b u t one m ust no t reduce one’s identity to a specific difference.

This m akes provision for th e excess who is (not) the person (impossibility) -

that is, we must always leave space (as long as there is repetition) for the

promise o f th e person th a t ‘is’ ‘to com e’. Such is the n a tu re o f the d em ocratic

subject who belongs to a dem ocratic culture.

If the em phasis is on differences a nd the excess of such differences an d

the subjectivity of non-iden tity, then how ca n we have a nything tha t has a

social structure o r comm unalizing structure - structures that have folded

into themselves some kind o f rela tion of identity? By answ ering this ques

tion we hope to return to the second of ou r earlier questions concerning

D errid a’s preference o f dem ocracy over oth er forms of political org aniza

tion. D errida has always been wa ry of speaking in terms o f com m unity or

sociality. For D errida, any notions of com m unity tend to fuse individuals



and individual differences. W ith grea t antipa thy, D errida speaks ofcomm u-

nity as creating fu sions identijicatoires.’58 C om m unity, as the nam e suggests,

bespeaks a unity , a oneness of m ind. F or exam ple , G erm an socio logical/

philosophic al models of com m unity of the early tw entieth century spoke ofthe defining features of com m unity as Vereinigung, ineinandergreifen or as M it-

sein. For D errida, com m unity is not the consum m ate social relation. R athe r,

it is one type o f social relation —a relation th at tends to env elop differences

in a fused hotchpotch called unity, which is ultimately ontotheological.

Human relations between differentiated subjects exist, but they exist in a

unique way. They exist as structured through differance, possibility and

impossibility. D errida gives two p rim e forms o f dem ocratic sociality wh en

he speaks of friendship an d hospitality, tw o them es we will re tu rn to ingre ater detail later in the text.

G iven the description ofD erride an dem ocratic proposed

above, a dem ocratic sociality or hu m an intersubj ectivity w ould have to take

on the form of a simultaneous m ovem ent of m axim izing differences, allow

ing them to come to the fore and allow ing them to con tinue to thrive, while

at th e same tim e no t abso lutely fixing such differences or ascribin g them to

the identity of a p articular group. If this is the case, how then ca n we pra g

matically make any common decisions to deal with pressing common pro

blem s? D errida does not m ain tain th a t différance necessarily excludes any

kind of com m onality between subjects, especially abo ut un dertak ing c er

tain p ressing issues and m aking critical decisions a bo ut pressing questions

ofjustice and injustice in the w orld. Yet, this is w here the ap oria o f D erri

dean undecida bility comes to show itself . Th ere m ay be agreem ent a bou t

the need for vittes-refuges, for example, but how is this agreement possible

when there is a con stant differentiation and delay? M oreove r, if und ecid

ability comes to structure all texts, including political texts, we can never

fully agre e on any thing in comm on. As we shall see late r in our treatm en t

of justice, hospitality and friendship, the injunc tion o f the promise m ay

m ake room for the irreducible and com m on necessity of responding to cer

tain political crises, b ut the force ofD errid ea n und ecidab ility m itigates the

impact of the injunction. T he force of D erridean undec idability, however,

would either seem to contradict Derrida’s stand or open the possibility of

an ap oria. A political decision in the m idst of un de cida bility is, for Bad iou,

a possibility. De rrida’s thou ght, then , makes ap pa ren t the apo ria of an

interven ing decision coinciding with un decidab ility. Th is will be taken up

later in ou r t reatm ent ofBadiou.

We now come to the question of why D errida chooses democracy

as opposed to any o ther form of po litical orga nization. T he answ er is

two-fold. First, dem ocrac y m akes possible the m aximizing of differences,




Derrida and tke democracy to come 35

especially individua l differences, more tha n any o ther form ofsocial organ i

zation.60 One could argue that radical individualism would do the same.

Y et, a rad ica l individualism w ould be hard-pressed to acco un t for a flow or

iterable movement as described above that gives us communication and poli tical experiences generaliter. R ath er, the logical consequence of radical

individualism is simply atom ism, t h a t is, the person conceived of as an

atom - no relation al flow of elements or people could be accoun ted for.

W ithou t the i terabili ty th at m akes différance and the promise possible, all

we would have is one individual element. Concretely, we all experience

a flow and we all experience difference. Even the metaphysical traditions

attest to their possibility, albeit in a perfunctory manner, according to

D errida . Second, a dem ocracy rooted in a subjectivity of non-iden titywould be a n excellent proph ylactic again st any fusional models of political

organization for which other forms o f political organ ization would hav e a

proclivity. I t would allow or make room for th e prim ary preservation o f

non -identity, th ereby ensuring everyone a voice. Most o ther forms of gov

ernm ent would have a unified central body ofpow er tha t would eventually

result in th e subsum ption of its individu al, different mem bers. T he d em o

cratic m odel would leave structure an d organization in the hands of its dif

ferentiated mem bers. P arliam en t claims to make the voice ofm an y different

people ‘p resent’. U ltim ately , this im plies th a t representational models o f

gov ernm ent, especially parliam entary democracies, ideally could achieve

what they desire to achieve as they tend to fuse all individual members

w ith their representatives, a relation which is too identificatory. P arliam ent

becom es id entif ie d as the people . U ltim ately, a D erridean dem ocratic vis ion

would call for the dism antling o f present-da y forms o f identificatory, re pre

sentation al structures ofp olitical organ ization. This theme will be taken up

late r on as well, as we uncove r further w ha t the relationship between tem -

poralized poli tic al form s a n d dem ocracy m eans.

Following the temporizing and spacing logic of différance, the opening of

horizons anno unc ed by the m etap ho r of the promise,61 and the un decida bil

ity they b ring into play, tw o questions need to be asked: w ha t kind o f politi

cal organ ization can th ere be given the structure o fdem oc ratic subjects and

culture? And w h at kind ofethos are these subjects to inc arna te, if they a re to

stay tru e to their subjectivity of non-ide ntity?

W ith regard s to the first question, three points need to be clarified. First,

w ha t is w rong w ith con temp orary d em ocratic forms of political organiza

tion, that is, democratic governments? Answering this question will allow

us to lay the g round w ork accounting for a new concept of politics un de r

stood in the D erridean framew ork of democracy. Second, w ha t is the tem

porizing fo rm o f dem ocracy th a t D errida speaks o f as the dem ocracy to




come? Th ird, w hat is the tem poralized form o f dem ocracy to come, if any?

With regards to the second question, the ethos that Derrida wishes us to

incarn ate as dem ocratic is rooted in the heritage of Greek democracy,

namely, friendship and hospitality. Ultimately, we have to ask how timecon ditions bo th friendship and hosp itality, especially thro ug h the tem po ral

structure of the promise.

Le t us proc eed to the clarification of the first point co ncerning the neces

sity of rethinking d em ocracy today. It is ban al to say tha t curr en t forms

of dem ocracy are in crisis. People have lost faith o r are in the throes o f

losing faith in re presen tative dem ocracy. R ocked by abuses of public trust,

be they p oli tical, econom ic or social, W estern dem ocracy is constantly b eing

challeng ed b y h uge c orp ora te pow er structu res a nd a loss of political will.62Derrida has taken up this political challenge and has tried to offer some

kind o f rethinking of w hat i t means to be dem ocratic. P art o f his thinking

involves the deco nstructive critique of representative democracies.

In his small essay, La démocratie ajournée,63 D err ida m aintains that there

are three reasons why representative/parliamentary democracies think

tha t they ha ve to m ain tain or safeguard their own legitimacy. All of these

reasons are roo ted in a m anip ulated sense of public opinion and the am bi

guities that arise therefrom. On the one hand, public opinion opposes

non-democratic powers. On the other, it also opposes its own proper

political representation .64 T h e first reason why dem ocra cy th in ks it has to

legitim ize itselfis tha t th ere is a fear th at public opinion is volatile an d chan

ging, and hence will not yield sober thought on grave political matters of

interest to the people. I f gov ernm ent were simply to yield to public opinion

as it changes willy-nilly, one cou ld foreseeably end up in a ‘tyrann y of move

m ents of opinions. ,65 But fear of acting on a whim and flying w here the

poli tical w in ds blow, even to ou r own detrim ent, coexists sim ultaneously

with another view o f public opinion, namely, tha t o f its supposedly legiti

m ate use. M an y leaders have invoked public opinion in ord er to legitimize

certain political stances. Parliamentary democracy today, as informed by

public opin io n, is haun ted by th is am biguity o f the public to re-‘present’

itself ade qu ately or consistently.66 O n the one hand , p arliam en tary dem oc

racy is fearful of the volatility ofits own people. O n the other, p arliam en tary

democracies use public op inion of their people to invoke the legitimac y of

certain political stances.

Pa rliam en tary d em ocrac y an d its efforts to rep resen t its people reflect the

double bind struc ture o fim possibility and possibility, of différance. W hile it is

true th at there is a delay of the origin posed by the represen tative type of

dem ocracy 67 here in question, the differen tiation o f such po litical forms

does no t allow for differences to come leg itima tely to the fore. In bo th cases



D & ^te andd the ( democracy to ctome 37

of the use ofp ub lic opinion, differences ar e skewed. In dismissing pub lic opi

nion as volatile and potentially tyrannical, legitimate differences articu

lated b y the vo ting public ma y be dismissed. In em ploying public opinion

as a voice (i.e., sign) o f the pe ople ‘pres ent’, the re is a tenden cy to absolutizeor possess the different voters as a fused block o f un ity - a red uction of the

irreducible. Given this violence against political differentiation, that is,

po li tical spacin g, p arliam en tary dem ocracies do not leg it im ate ly te m pora-

lize themselves. T hey do n ot h ea r the force of the injunction of the prom ise to

let différance play itself ou t as delaying and differentiating.

The second reason why representative democracies have to safeguard

their own legitimac y is th a t with the rise of the force, pervasiveness and

expansiveness of m edia, public op inion is m ore a pt to be m anip ulated inthe same two-fold fashion m entioned abo ve. Pu blic opinion, as represented

in the m edia, is seen by D errida to be an extension of the peop le’sjudg em en t,

th at is, the people’s political voice. T he re is a p olitical au tho rity beh ind such

judgem en t. Public opin ion is the m eans th rough w hich parliam en tary

dem ocracies articulate their ow n political po w er.68 T he voice of public

dem ocratic pow er or of public opinion needs a medium throug h which it

can be disseminated or diffused. T he m edia, always functioning und er the

rubric of the sign, serve th a t function, especially the daily new spapers. Bu t

newspapers and o ther m edia no t only represe nt public opinion, they h elp

shape it and inform it.69 Polls also fall into the same (in/re)formative

dynam ic as the m edia. T he representation o f the presence th at polls and

media claim to articulate is abused. T hey take ad vantage of the temporiza-

tion of the delay and the differentiation of the spacing th at m akes their very

articulation possible. T he intervals of the delay m ay be ruptured and an

artificial ‘newness’ is w ittingly an d u nw ittingly introd uc ed into th e differen

tiated in terv al.70 So ra th er tha n rep ort y esterday’s events as undecida ble,

th a t is, articulate the temp oralized series ofevents appearing in the tem por

izing economic movem ent of différance, an artificial newness is introjected

into the ch ain o f com m unication. I tera bility or repetition is interrup ted

and a difference is inserted th at does n ot stem from the original flow o f ele

ments. A kind ofartificial cu t and paste sense of time and flow emerges, one

m anipulated by the pow er an d force ofm edia. T he flow of differences is arti

ficially m anip ulated , the reby resulting in misrepresentation as opposed to

representation - propaganda.

For exam ple, various m edia representations of various political stances as

clear-cut, definite or p resent do n o t do justice to the und ecidability tha t

hau nts a ll political stances. T h e seemingly two-fold division betw een Ira q

and the U SA is no t clearly two-fold as there a re m any diverse positions tha t

underlie each of the se two general N orth A m erican m edia representat ions .




T hink o f exiled Ira qis and Iraqis in I ra q w ho supp ort the US invasion no t so

much because they support US democratic ideals but as a means to oust

H ussein. Furtherm ore, th ere are A m ericans who disagreed w ith Bush’s m ili

tary intervention as the chosen m eans o f ousting H ussein. M oreover, if oneexam ines the seeming division between Ira q and the USA in term s of m oti

vation, it is evident tha t attack ing I ra q is m otivated by a p letho ra ofreasons,

each o f wh ich can b e described as legitimate and illegitim ate or, a t best,

as undecidable. W hat is represented as clear-cut by m edia representatives

like C N N as the ‘A m eric a-Ir aq ’ w ar or as the ‘W ar on Ir a q ’, a seemingly

twofold split, is not simply a twofold split. For example, the tendency to

identify Fran ce w ith Ira q in A m erican med ia representations is a sign o f

further co^fosion of the U S A -Iraq split. T he French have decided to counter this A m erican media depiction by setting up a w atchdog ag ency th at will

m onitor Am erican m edia depictions of any thing French with the aim of

correcting American media excesses and falsehoods. Some would accuse

Fran ce of fighting fire w ith fire, distorting Fren ch depictions of any thing

Am erican. R ath er, it is a polysem antic split w ith a vast a rra y o f splits

or differences that do not necessarily follow the commonly represented

‘U S A -Ira q ’ divide.

T h e final reason why representative democracies have to safeguard their

own legitim acy is because o f a tem po ral consideration. T he (mis/re)presen-

tation o f the public voice or political organization in pa rliam entary dem oc

racies is articulated at a certain rate or at a certain time, namely, daily

(quotidien). T he m edia give us accounts of political events on a d aily basis.

Tim e becomes pu nctu ated by ‘daily’ m easurements of t ime. T o think the

tim e of parliam entary democracies in d aily term s is to exclude the force o f

history and , ultimately, w ha t D err ida calls ou r heritag e. T his is so because

daily m edia news representations m ake ‘pres ent’ elements o f tod ay ’s events

without necessarily accounting for the undecidability that structures and

makes possible the daily flow ofexp erience a nd the larger th an ‘daily’ tim e

flow th a t is giv en in repetition . In essence, th e da ily becom es absolu tized as

the pre sent now d espite the fact th at it is no t pres en t an d n ev er can be .71

Re call th at h eritage refers to th a t element th a t is self-reserving in the play

o f dijfêr<ance. T he history o f public op inion itself is con ditioned by a history

th at continues to colour its very possibility of expression today.

Restricting the time of pa rliam en tary democ racies within daily intervals

of time m easurement results in an oblivion of the pas t —a pa st th at in D erri

d a ’s ‘semiology’ leaves a trac e of its havin g been , alth ou gh it is an erasing

an d rep eating trace. F urthe rm ore , the righ t to express one’s op inion freely

and publicly, an d therefore dem ocratically, is gu arantee d by law and has

only com e abo ut throug h law. T he undecidable apo ria is this: on the one



D&ride and the democracy to come 39

hand, one claims to have independent public opinion. On the other, this

indepen denc e a nd freedom o f expression is mad e possible by law. H ow free

an d inde pen de nt is som ething if its very c ondition o f possibility has to be

gu ara nte ed by som ething else? Th e ra dical absence th a t is required for differen tiation does not com e into play. Freedom an d expression of public op i

nion are c onting ent up on laws th a t preserve the ir possibility. In a daily time

frame, no possibility exists for the to come or the past as described above.

Moreover, presence is seen to be presence at hand. The French word for

news, ‘actualités’, (actualities, that is, things that happen actually today)

be tray s th is em phasis on th e present day as the living presen t (lebendige

Gegenwart) - a present th at con tradicts the logic of différance. The flow that

is described as temp orizing m ay beco m e atom ic an d is reduce d to a serieso f unconn ected an d uncom m unicative elements if we continue to think o f

dem ocracy in daily terms. W e think in an atom ically particu larized fashion

w ithout giving a n account of the structures th at m ake this same thinking

(im)possible. U ltim ately, in daily thinking we have no acco un t of the eco

nom ic m ovem ent or flow tha t D errida calls différance.

T he fact tha t parliam en tary democracies, in their present form, betray

the temporizing and spacing movement of différance has pushed D errida to

offer a new form o fdem oc racy th a t is conscious ofth e tem porizing structures

o f différance an d the m etap ho r of the promise. H e calls this the dem ocracy to

come. D em ocracy to come is no t to be understood as a form o f representative

governm ental organ ization. Th e bu reau cratic force and structures o f Ie poli

tique is not what democracy to come is. We saw earlier that Derridean

democracy referred to a type of political s tructure tha t ha d a c ertain sub

jective struc tu re o f the double bin d, th a t is, a subjective struc tu re where

one could maximize one’s differences while not claiming one’s differences

as identical to oneself. Differences are to be maximized and not possessed

an d absolutized.

D em ocracy to come und erstood as a cond ition for the possibility of poli

tics consists o f tw o com pon ents. F irst, a d em ocratic subjec tivity, as outline d

above, has to be allow ed to ‘let hap pe n’. Second, this can only be achieved

through the temp orizat ion o f différance and through the to come o f the pro

mise. T he simultaneous a^ ^m atio n and erasure o f difference as one’s own

happen s not because we will it bu t because it simply is, esgibt. I t is some thing

th at is given (doinati-on). 72 T h e m om ent we tr y to de -structu re this irreducible

structure of différance is the m om en t we fall into the trap s o f a po litical think

ing which is satu rated by a m etaphysics of presence o r prop agan da, und er

stood in the sense discussed above.

The letting happen that is referred to in the preceding paragraph must

no t be tho u gh t of in strict passive terms. R ath er , the letting hap pe n refers




to the inevitability or irreduc ibility of différance. Because it is irreducible, it

will always ha un t us. B ut tha t differance will alw ays play itself ou t is no gu ar

antee that we will structure our politics such that we will not lapse into

ontotheological political thinking and doing. I t is something th a t we m ustw ork to achieve. In othe r words, we have to be politically engaged in order

to prev en t an d decon struct the tra ditio n o f m etaphysical politics. In this

way , D errida sees his notion ofth e d em ocracy to come as a ‘m ilitant political

critique w itho ut en d’.73 D er rid a’s lang uag e is very assertive here. H e iden

tifies explicitly, and with very metaphysical language, the democracy to

come with a militant political critique. Derrida does not qualify his lan

guage. H e does no t say ‘pe rha ps’ and he does no t decon struct his language.

This is very significant because it opens up the aporia that we wish toinvestigate w ith regards to Badiou. D errida does execute a decisive ac tion in

describing the dem ocracy to come as a critique. T he d em ocracy to come is

certainly ab ou t undecidability, b u tth er e are also incongruencies in th at cer

tain decisive interventions are m ade on the pa rt ofD errida , as evidenced by

his descriptive m ilitant language. W e shall return to this them e later w hen

we trea t Badiou.

Not on ly is deconstruction a poli tical prophylactic, but it also wishes

to establish structures an d take on po litical stances th a t will allow justice to

come to the fore. Justice, in the D erridea n sense, would entail the creation

and e stablishm ent ofpo litical structures th at would allow undecid ability to

play it self out, m in dfu l of the te m poral models o f the prom ise and différance.

For example, Derrida’s call for the establishment of villes-refuges could be

read as an attem pt to cr ea teju st political structures. D errid a’s work onju s-

tice, as we shall see later w hen we analyse cap ital punishm ent, serves to con

firm w h at a concrete D erridea n politics w ould look like.

If the present will never com e to presence an d if there is a dyna m ic of pos

sibility an d impossibility th a t conditions la politique, then temporalized poli

tical m atters (lepolitique) must reflect an d articu late the De rridean a po ria of

undecidability. We come now to the question concerning the relationship

betw een te m porizin g poli tics (i .e ., dem ocracy to come) and tem poraliz ed

polit ic al econom y (le politique) . How can there be such a thing as an irredu

cible politica l voice (i.e., decon struction/justice) w hen the voice itself is

subject to erasure and undecidabil ity? And can there be any enduring f o ^

of political (dem ocratic) subjectivity, given the force of the no thing con

taine d in the impo ssibility of rad ical absence a nd the newness suggested

by repeti tion?

Ifw e w ere to ac cep t Der rid a’s ‘semiology’, it wou ld be impossible to claim

that anything comes to presence fully. Politically, our laws, government

structures, means o f decision-making an d pu blic representation are all




signs, and are therefore delayed and deferred. Th ey a re undecidab le. Yet,

these structures are w ha t ‘the people ’ desire, w ha t the people deem to be o f

p r e s e n t concern tôday (le quotidien). In m aking such a cla im , we lose sight

o f the differentiation a nd de lay th at is truly hap pen ing and th at is containedin the horizon of the promise. T he classic exam ple o f this is th e silencing of

m inority grou ps th at occurs on a d aily basis because the y are too small or

powerless to have a n y real diff erentiate d voice in the sense o f D erridean

dem ocratic subjectivity.

At the same time, D errida wishes to m ainta in tha t there is a heritage, a

heritage th a t belongs to the realm of politics as well. W hence this heritage?

Tru e, it is simply given and no one can den y this. We hav e a legacy o f poli

tical th ou gh t, o f poli tico-economic m anag em ent of worldly affairs. Bu t howdo we perceive this heritage? Is it n ot subj ec t to the tem porizing an d spac ing

structures m ention ed above? Th e heritag e D errid a speaks of is impossible to

perceive because o f th e logic o f tra ce and erasure and its already havin g

been. Does it sim ply h au n t us or is it present a t hand? D errida would argue

for the h au n ting presence of heritag e as it is conditioned by the do uble

b ind . Again , the nothing of the im possib ility makes the perception of,

and therefore interaction with, a heritage tenuous and truly not a thing,

th at is, nothing. Yet, if this is the case, then how can D errida have an y

force or call for the end o f perceived injustice, e.g., cap ital pu nishm ent,

when the presen t o f the inj us tice or i ts h eri tage is dubio us an d und ecidab le

given the force of the nothingness of impossibility a nd the powerlessness of

possibility to gu aran tee any actuality?75

T he frustration o f the aporia o f D erridean undecidability radically

underm ines the way we think politically and the way w e are to concretize

poli tical decisio n-m akin g and poli tical structures and conventions. The

m om ent we try to take a poli tical stand, the m om ent we try to mak e a poli

tic al intervention, such stands and interventions are h au nted by the unde-

cidabili ty o f the prom ise a nd différance. Fru stration is evident because wha t

one tries to b ring to concrete presence will be eventually und one an d will

never come to any poli tical presence. But the frustration inhere nt in the D er

ridean aporia may also be viewed as a tension between the possible and

impossible th a t con ti nually forces us to a ct thro ug h the injun ction o f the p ro

mise, always striving to make present politically that which we desire to

make present. And though our political desires (read le vouloir-dire o f différ

ance) w ill be stymied, the stym ieing itself will a ct as a m otiv ato r o r force for

us to continu e to try an d achieve it once ag ain . We shall develop this furth er

when we tre at hospi tali ty, fri end ship an djustice. If any thing, the D erridean

apo ria of unde cidability could be read as a m oto r tha t pushes us to continue

to strive to ‘conc retize’ po litical ‘goals’. Y et, we are m indful th a t s uch ‘go als’




op erate within the resfiuxarum and are always inadeq uate. Such inadequ acy

can p ush us to try to m ake o ur po litical goals, decisions, interven tions, m ore

adequate (and also more inadequate, depending on our political desires).

Yet, ‘adeq uacy ’ will be undo ne by the very impossibility ofsuch an attem pt,ultima tely allow ing the un decidab ility of the double bind to op erate. D erri

d a ’s treatm ents o ffriendship, h ospitality and respon sibility in his later work

are atte m pts to streng then his political vision. He views friendship, hospital

ity an d responsibility as cen tral to the political, bu t he recognizes th a t these

poli tical desires are subje ct to undecidabili ty as well. But the imposs ib ility or

rad ical absence of inhospitality, the enem y and irresponsibility are m otors

that, as we will prove, show forth the ina deq uacie s of ou r presen t political

atte m pts to realize friendship, hosp itality and responsibility, there by callingus or ordering us throu gh the injunc tion of the promise to respond to this

inad equ acy by m akin g friendship, hospitality, an d responsibility ‘to come ’

again. L et us exam ine the dem ocracy to come and its relationship to friend

ship, hospitality an d responsibility. In a deep sense, D erride an un decid abil

ity can force us, if we agree with D errida, to make co ntinually better th at

which is politically revealed as continually inadequate, mindful that the

desire to ameliorate politically and ethically any situation will always be

interru pted . D errida can be th ou gh t of as offering us a repe ating p olitical

corre ctive th a t will always be in ne ed o f corre cting itself.

Democracy to come: the double bind offriendship and hospitality

Classically, for Plato a nd A ristotle, dem ocracy has been conceived as op er

ating w ithin the framew ork o f friendship and hospitality. Friendship and

hospitality were seen as forming a vital ethos th a t perm itted dem ocracy to

function relatively well. D err ida draw s upo n this he ritag e an d does not shy

away from employing both friendship and hospitality to understand the

dem ocrac y to corned6 H ospitality an d de m ocrac y are difficult for D errida

because o f th e d ouble b ind structure understood w ith in the rubric o f time. 77

E arlier we spoke o f a dem ocratic ‘subjectivity’ eme rging from D errida ’s

earlier thought. In his work over the lastd eca de or so this kind ofdem ocratic

sub jectivity is recas t as friendship . In Politiquej de / ’amitié D er rid a explores

the thought of Nietzsche and C arl Schm itt, am ong others, on the n ature of

friendship because both a uthors note th at friendship ca nn ot be conceived in

absolute terms. T he y see friendship in relation to the enem y. F or D errida,

on e is a friend insofar as one is also not an enemy. T h e absence tha t is the

enem y is con tained in the n otion o f friendship. T he enemy (the in-ami of

the i^m ica l) represents the disproportion that has to exist iffriend ship is to



D er^fa and the demomMrMjt to c<ome 43

differe ntiate itself as a political reality. T he enemy is the absence in the sig

nificative ch ain th a t pushes friend ship to differen tiate itself as friendship.

In oth er words, in o rde r for there to be friendship, one needs both presence

an d absence, possibility an d im possibility.78F or S chm itt, as ou tlined in his famous work, Der Begriffdes Politiscken, pol

itics begins when there is a conflicting relation between friend and enemy.

D errid a distinguishes himself from S chm itt, m aintain ing th at politics does

no t nece ssarily arise from this conflicting relationsh ip of m utu ally exclusive

opposites.79 R ath er, the d oub le b ind o f possibility a nd impossibility o f différ

ance conditions this relationship itself. That is, friend and enemy are not

mutually exclusive opposites. Rather, one contains the other and one is

necessary for the o th e r to ‘be ’ w ha t it ‘is’ a n d vice versa. H ow do possibilityan d impossibility structure friendship, unde rstood as the ethos of the demos

of dem ocracy? I n order for me to have any kind offriendship or sociality in a

dem oc ratic sense (possibility), the oth er has to be before me. I presuppose

the other. Like the iterability that is necessary for speech/writing/experi

ence, a repe tition is necessary for an y kind o f sociality. A nd y et the very

statem en t of m y presupposition simultaneously distances me from th e othe r

(impossibility). There is a double distancing that occurs. First, there is a

delay (temporization) because my very presupposition presupposes an

answ er to the q uestion, ‘A re you there?’ In oth er words, the presence of the

oth er is not necessarily a presence a t han d. T he other is not given originally

as gegenwartig, as in the H usserlian account ofintersubjectivity. T he other is

delayed because the other is only represented to me in my own conscious

experience. T ha t representation is only a simulacrum of the o ther in my

ow n consciousness an d is no t the ot he r in propria persona. Second, the oth er is

delay ed insofar as the oth er is not me, th at is, the o the r is differentiated from

me. T he oth er is no t only a represen tation th at is delayed from its origin, a n

origin (the othe r) tha t is not pre sen t to itself, a non-o riginary origin, bu t is

also not ide ntica l to me. I can only be ‘m e’ in a r ad ical sense if I co nta in

w ithin me th at wh ich is othe r than me. T he o ther than me has to be radically

absen t, there by allowing m e ‘to be ’ me. T he oth er is distanced from me in

tha t she is not me. T here is an interv al t h at ruptu res or distinguishes me from

the o ther, allowing m e to be m e an d no one else, even if th a t sense of me is

polysem antic , delayed and differentiated. H ere, we see th e in terplay o f dif

feren tiation and delay tha t conditions the relationship offriends. M oreover,

the h orizon of the to come, implicit in the no tion of the dem ocracy to come,

opens the h orizon in w hich such a friendship is to take place.80 T he o the r can

come only as delayed or deferred and differentiated in a twofold manner:

the o the r is differentiated from herse lf an d the o ther is differentiated and

deferred from the other. If the othe r comes to me as my friend, the absence




(not friend) is necessary in order that friendship can distinguish itself as

friendsh ip in the significative ch ain o f com m un ication . T he ‘no t friend ’ is

the ‘in-ami’ or the enemy. The stronger the friendship is, the stronger the

absence of the co-constitutive enem y. Likewise, the stronger the e nm ity is,the stronge r the absence of the co-constitutive friendship ( phil ia ). In both

cases the absence conditions the trace ofpresence and vice versa. R ep etition

ensures its con tinual trace and erasure.

T he abov e-m entioned d escription of friendship leads us to ask: if friend

ship is struc ture d like dem ocra tic subjectivity by possibility and impo ssibil

ity, why draw up on the heritag e of friendship? W hy not simply call for a

democratic subjectivity? Friendship, philia or amicitia, was considered to be

a form of love am ong citizens. D em ocratic subjectivity does no t really capture th a t sense and neither does ou r abo ve-m entioned d escription of friend

ship as structured by possibility and impossibility. In other words, what

makes De rridean friendship unique am ong h um an social relations? We sug

gest three com ponents, all three being structured by im possibility a nd pos

sibility as well: hospitality, respon sibility an dju stice .

A bsolute hosp itality ca n be seen to be a qua lity o f friendship. A gain,

draw ing from the Greek political heritag e o f ho spitality, this is the case

because hospitality is defined as cedin g one’s place to the anonym ous

oth er.81 Rec all th a t the foreigner in Athens was exten de d hosp itality in

th a t he was always politically (that is, by the laws o f the po lis) entitled to a

trial. This showed a respect for the difference of the anon ym ous othe r.

He re, ag ain, we see th e need for the rad ical absence discussed ea rlier. T his

radical hospitality can be seen as a means to allow differences to articu

late themselves without any one ‘subject’ claiming that difference as their

own. M etap hys ically speaking, if hosp itality is shown only to friends who

are n ot anonymous, then hospitality lapses into presence because w ha t is

exten ded is more of the self; the oth er is redu ced to a ho spitality t h a t is

presently defined by th e self. T he other is no t allowed to enter as tr uly

oth er or different bec ause the self sets the term s with w hich to be h ospitable.

The terms become clear-cut and present and are merely an extension of

the self insofar as hosp itality is shown to th e o the r if the o the r conforms

to the presen t desires o f the self extending ho spitality. F or ho spitality to be

absolute it needs to be able to be hospitable to th a t w hich is its impossibility

or absence, nam ely, inhospitality - the inhospitality of the enemy. D erri

da’s claim is radical because the hospitality imposed by friendship calls

for a radical ceding of place to the other and vice versa, the anonym ous and

unknown other, the other that is radically not me. Traditionally, fr iend

ships arise out o f a m utua l sym pathy between individuals. A strong

m utu al liking or shared interests will foster a friendship. Likewise, an tipa thy



D m ida and the dwocracy to c< ^ 45

prevents friendship . I see D errida, however, call in g for an unconditional

universal friendship not rooted in the opposition o fsym pathy a nd antipa thy

or the friendship tradition ally seen as a negotium o r commercium. H ow so?

Given th at we a re unkn ow n to ourselves and to others insofar as we haveno way o fpre sen ting our o riginal selves to ourselves and the original oth er to

ourselves as living present, here and now, today, everyone is unknown,

anonym ous in a certain sense. Fo r the tem porizing delay and impossibility

contained in différance an d in the openness of the horizon of the prom ise make

possible th is univ ersal anonym ity or unknowableness of all hum an beings.

Friendship requires the ceding of place to all unkn ow able and anonymous

subjects. T he very possibility of ou r being friends is relian t up on the im pos

sibility that makes hospitality absolutely possible. There is an antinomousstructure op erating in hospitality - the antinom y imposed by the force of

the double bind.

If the hos pitality of friendship is to be considered un iversal (i.e., dem o

cratic), th en ho w do we deal w ith those who a re hostile or inim ical to our

hospitality, w ho w ou ld violate hospitality? D errida is aw are o f this possibi

lity an d draw s his rea de rs’ atte ntio n to the roo t sense ofhosp itality. H e notes

tha t hospitality comes from the L atin hospes (guests). The Latin word for

enem y is hostes. Enemy and guest have a common root. The etymology of

the w ord hosp itality is telling for D errid a b ecause it shows the impossibility

con tained w ithin the very structures o f hosp itality itself, even thou gh he

claims it is an a bsolute injun ction of friendship. The possibility of the

destruction, the inhospitable stance an d violence o f the enem y always

hau nts the structu re ofho spitality. T he re is no gu aran tee th at inhospitality

will seek to destroy an d v iolate ho spitality. B ut in o rde r for ho spitality to ‘be’

radically differentiated from itself such th a t it is hospitality a nd n o t some

thing else, it has to allow for th at risk of being v iolated, of being red uced to

nothing - the impossibility contained w ithin the structure of the possibility

ofho spitality. W e are hospitable while simultaneously knowing th at we are82 i · ,

also faced with the inhosp itality of the enem y. T he double bind of possibi

lity an d impossibility ofh osp itality is tem porizing because o f the op ening of

the horizo n offriendsh ip th at one offers to ano ther.83 W hile tha t tem poral

ho rizon is open , it is simu ltaneously being closed by the futu re possibility of

the im possibility offriend ship, namely, the inhosp itable.84

W ha t are the po litical consequences of D erridea n h ospitality, especially

as it is structu red b y the und ecidab ility of time? Th e do uble bind comes to

reite rate itself.85 As we saw e arlier, D er rid a describes hosp itality as a letting

ha pp en . Passivity is ‘pres en t’ as un de cid ab ility plays itself out. 86 T his u nde

cidab ility plays itself ou t politically in th at D errida is calling for a radica l

openness. It wou ld dem and th at ev ery single person be involved in political




life an d th at a ll differences have space to articu late themselves. T h e simul

taneous tensions that would ensue from such a differentiation would not

only be difficult, but it would be truly politically Derridean in that we

would have to find ways to maximize such differences. Furthermore, adeco nstructive politics would h ave nothing like present-day codes o f belong

ing or m em bership guidelines. For example, pre sent-day m em bership in a

poli tic al party , if one can even s peak o f political parti es w ith in a D erridean

framework, would be non-existent. Anyone could be a member, including

those comp letely antithe tical to the party , nam ely, the enemy o f the party.

In fact, the ‘pa rty ’ w ould have to include its ow n enemies as co-constitutive

o f the ‘p a rty ’ itetself. But the D er ridea n m od el o f ho spita lity has a lso severe

consequences for citizenship. T he p resent-da y rules and guidelines wherebyeach n ation establishes crite ria for belonging to and iden^ fying as a par ticu

lar na tional citizenship would have to come down. D erridean political hos

p itality would m ean the deconstru ction of present-day countrie s like the

U nited States and Iraq, and other countries for th at m atter. But i t is not

simply a m atte r of passively resigning one ’s natio na l citizenship, for it

becom es necessary to do so if o ne wishes to fo llow th e D erridean political

mod el. A final im plication o f D erride an hosp itality is the elim ination of all

borders th a t absolu te ly define, confine, exclude and inclu de nations in re lation to one another. I f we are to have ‘bo rde rs’, the n they are to be m ore

fluid an d n ot so exclusive and absolutizing. E limin ating abso lute borders

and , for examp le, havin g an ‘A m erican ’ be th e ‘absolutely oth er’ guest in

the household of an ‘Iraq i’ means tha t this kind o f political hospitality

gives way to a new kind o f com portmen t, w here persons are no longer

identified or presented as solely Ira qi o r Am erican, b u t as not possibly being

able to co ntain a nd express the pleth ora o f senses or m eanings they em body.

In short, D errida is advocating a new kind of intern atio na ljuridic alo rde r.87

D errida is not sim ply advocating a complete and tota l abolishment o f all

claims to national sovereignty. He recognizes the need for a new interna

tional space th at w ould be beyond the claims of countries to the ir own

national sovereignty a nd to their own na tional identities, b u t a t the same

time he recognizes th at there is a place for natio na l identities a nd claims of

nation al sovereignty. T he double bind structure tha t is the m ark o f D erri

dean philosophy comes to the fore again. Practically, w ha t does this mean?

It means that we create a space where we try to eliminate metaphysical

differences tha t exist amon g and divide nations w hile a t the same time cre at

ing a universal, and therefore international space, where differences can

continue to defer and differentiate themselves, including national ones.

W e will never be able to m ake this state fully present, b u t we keep trying

know ing th at w e will never m ake it fully present. It is a futu re possibility



Derrida and thedemocracy to come 47

th a t will never come to be fully present. D errida has no pretension ofclaim -

ing that his political vision is easy to accommodate and implement. One

only has to look at any one o f the h und reds o f w orld conflicts tha t revolve

arou nd claims o f sovereignty and nation al iden tity to see how difficult D errid a’s plan is. T he conflicts betw een P alestine and Israel, N o rth an d S outh

K orea, the situations in C olumbia a nd the C ongo are jus t bu t a few exam

ples w here D errida ’s political vision would seem just as diff icult as a ny o ther

proposed pla ns. In pa rt, th is is due to th e fact th a t these conflicts do no t

remain localized. Everyone has to become involved in order to make the

universalizable democracy to come function. To convince all nations to

become involved in conflicts so seemingly far rem oved and irrelevant is a

huge task. Let us call to m ind the m an y conflicts th a t rage in Africa, including the bloodshed in Nigeria, Sudan and the Ivory Coast. Many Western

countries have only a passing interest in such conflicts and Western media

coverag e ra re ly focuses on the bloodshed.

Co uld the double bind structure tha t D errida advocates result in some

kind of political peace if the w orld w ere to em brac e w ha t he is calling for?

Yes and no. The re w ould be a k ind of internationa l cosmopolitanism th at

w ould ensue, bu t th a t cosmp olitanism w ould n ot result in a p eace o f stasis

or c alm.88 T here w ould be the constant tension of the double bind and theattem pt to make come th at wh ich will neve r come. T he p eace tha t would

result w ould be m arke d by the flow o f itera bility an d diferaance. I f an yth ing ,

the p eace w ould be one of tension as opposed to a h arm on y or stasis.89 T he

tension of the double bind and the tension betwee n the pu sh for a new in ter

natio nal space a nd various claims to nation al state sovereignties w ould be

critical for ensuring tha t a f low rem ains and tha t the D erridean dem ocracy

to come con tinues to unfold.

A no ther co m pone nt offriendship is responsibility.90 T he horizon op ened

up by th e time struc ture o f the promise creates a p lace where responsibility

opens u p. But the h orizon itself does n ot produce responsibility understood

as a call or a response. R ath er, when one calls to the othe r dem ocratically,

th a t is to say, in such a fashion tha t one asserts on e’s difference while dispos

sessing it, this app eal of one to the oth er issues forth in a response ofo ne to the

othe r and vice versa - response-ability. T he h orizon allows friends to differ

entiate themselves one from the other throug h the repe tition th a t is neces

sary for any communication or experience in general. The simultaneous

m axim ization and dispossession of difference th at is constitutive o f each

dem ocratic subject or friend elicits a call of one friend to respo nd to the exi

gencies of such a ‘subjec tive’ con stitution. In oth er words, in ord er to allow

differences between friends to be simultaneously maximized and dispos

sessed, friends owe it to each o the r to allow this simultaneo us m ove m ent to



48 Badiou and Dmmida

hap pen in ord er th at the y ca n ‘be’ friends. T o ‘be ’ friends is to ad m it sim ul

taneou sly the impossibility of friendship, th at is, the inh osp itality of the

enemy. This is so because one is a friend insofar as the radical absence of a

friend ( nam ely, enemy) allows the friend to be differentiate d as a friend. T heenem y figures in the co nstitutio n of friendship as its neg ating possibility,

its ‘ou ter lim it’. I f we were to posit such a thing as absolu te friendsh ip, th e

absoluteness of such a friend ship wo uld h ave to include necessarily all th a t

is inimical to friendship. T h a t very inclusion shows th at for friendship to

continue to differentiate itself, it has to continue to include all that is

inimical (read absent) to the friendship. Friendship can continue to persist

as friendship only if it adm its tha t it has to include constantly tha t w hich

is antithetical to it, namely, the enemy. Without the radical absence ofthe inhospitable enemy, friendship would fall into a metaphysical logic

of presence. T o issue the call for a response, t h a t is, to be respon sible for

the other, m eans th at one is also cogn izant of the temp orized an d spacing

arc h-s truc ture of diferance and th e doub le b ind t h a t it presents. F riendsh ip is

struc ture d b y b oth of these. Friend ship con tains w ithin itself the possibility

(hospitality) a n d impossibility (inhospitality) o f respo nding a nd being

responded to.91

The tem poralization of responsibility is such tha t it is ha un ted by a dis

sym m etry, the dissym metry of the do ub le bind th at structures friendship

an d ho spitality. This dissymm etry is anterio r ju st as the n on-originary

origin is an terio r. In c oncrete term s, a friend responds to an oth er friend for

whatever reason. But a friend’s responsibility for that friend will always

hav e to m ake room for the fulfilling and po tential failure of the carryin g

th ro ugh of such res ponsibili ty (irresponsibili ty) as ‘orig inally ’ inte nd ed .

As the senses of tha t friends hip differen tiate an d as th e ‘origin al’ sense o f

th a t fri endship is delayed because it can neve r com e to full presence, the

tem porization of difirance renders the m eaning of friendship und ecidable.

M oreover, the double bind of possi bility and impossibility of the promise

make evident a temporal horizon that has to include both the opening of

the h orizon of friendship an d its simultaneous closure in th e inhospitable

enemy. T em porizing and the un certainty of the future of the promise bring

to the fore the d isjunction o f responsibility and irresponsibility.

T he final con stitutive elem ent of friendship is justic e.92 Ju stice , for

D err ida , was defined earlie r as the irred uc ible u nd ec ida bility of diferrance.

Justice too is structured by the aporia of the double bind. It too is seen

as an inj unc tion t h at is linked w ith th e dem ocra cy to com e.93 D errid a

adm its th a t the possibility ofjustice and its impossibility, nam ely, injustice,

coincide. Hen ce, for the inj un ction to be jus t, it m ust be a rticulated only in

an oblique fashion.94 T h e discussion of justice in D err ida ’s tho u gh t is as



Derida and the (democracy to come 49

imm ense as it is com plex. W e ca nn ot carry out a full discussion ofjustice h ere

du e to space limitation. R ath er, we prefer to focus on justice a n d its relation

to time. T he doub le bin d structure of the delay and differentiation o f dijfb-

ance lays open the relation between justice and injustice an d how they areexperienced temporally.

In I.e siècle et le pardon,95 Derrida addresses the question ofjustice and its

impossibility. Specifically, he looks at various political events in order to

determ ine wh ether the act of political pardonin g can ever bring a bo ut

justice. D errida describes him self as ‘partage’ because he realizes th a t he

is subject to the d oub le bind. 9e O n the one h and , he recognizes th at in asking

for pard on and the pardon ing of certain crimes against hum anity there

is an atte m p t to make ju st am ends for destructive crimes. O n the other,an injustice is folded into such an atte m p t a t justice. Such crimes rem ain

impossible to pard on , especially since most of the victims have been m ur

dered and cann ot pardo n directly. Being pardo ned by a third p arty is no t

pardoning, fo r i t does not perm it th e v ictim to pardon directly. M ore over,

if pardon is truly to be pardoning it must be an unconditional or abso

lute pardoning. It would be illogical to claim that one is half-pardoned

for one’s crime. Yet, absolute pardon becomes impossible because it is

alway s conditional on the othe r. Som eone at a certain p oin t in tim e has to

pardon som eone else. T he pardoning th a t is to be uncondit ional is condi

tional on the person or pa rty pa rdon ing.97

A ttem pts to bring a bo ut a ju st po litical resolution to a situation m ay

involve an act o f pard on . Tem porally, the double bind described abo ve is

com plica ted by the d ifferentiatio n and dela ying o f sense o f dijferaance. The

original justice an d injustice of any political situation is always delaye d

because it only comes to consciousness as a delayed sign. T h e orig in it self

can never be immediately seized in consciousness. Iterability ensures that

the original moment is continually delayed and differentiated. Hence, the

m ean ing or sense of a po litical situa tion change s and , conseq uently, so too

do any attem pts to bring abo utjustice. D errida himselfgives a concrete tem

poral exam ple o f this dela y and differentiation o f sense w hen he speaks o f

Algeria an d the crimes of the French in Algeria.98

D errida recognizes th a t und ecidability comes to structure justice.

Fu rtherm ore, we see how tem porality m utates the senses ofp olitical events

and any attem pts to bring justice to a given political situation. But the ‘p ar a

dox or a po ria’ of the double bind does n ot only result in und ecidability.

There are two moments that emerge as completely decisive in Derrida’s

exam ple. F irst, there is the decisiveness o f D err ida ’s lang uag e ab o u t the

irredu cibility o f un dec idab ility itself. One is never sure th a t one h as m ade

the ju st choice. Second, D errida gives us a specific insta nt o r tim e wh en




the re-evaluation o f a situation mu st hap pen . Decisions canno t wa it and the

luxu ry o f infinite deliberation is not present. If undecida bility is arc h

structuring , the n w ha t prevents these two seemingly decisive mom ents from

being deconstructed? W hy do they a p p ear as ir re ducible? T his is w herewe see the a poria of the double bind opening even further. In add ition to

undecidability, a certain decidability emerges, namely, a time for deci

sions and a time w ithou t the lux ury of infinite deliberation. W e will use

the tho ug ht ofB ad iou to exp lain late r how this is possible.

Given that there is this constant and simultaneous disjunction between

ju stice and in ju st ice, w hat prevents us fro m sim ply viewing cla ims ofju stice

and injustice as related but mutually undoing, and therefore ultimately

anarc hic? In oth er words, is there a possibility to redress rea l injustice w ithou t i t being necessarily and com pletely undone? D errida would say yes and

his own struggles to address certain injustices be they racism, sexism or

chauvinism are a testam ent to his sense of engage m ent. But how do we p hi

losophically account for such a possibility that necessarily comes undone

w ith its own impossibility an d the force of its ow n un decidability? If the

doub le bind tru ly structures all of reality, then w ar crimes, holocaust,

m urde r and ra pe rem ain ult im ately undecidable.

Derrida would respond to such charges, namely, to the impotence of

dec ons truction to enga ge serious social and p olitical questions, by claim ing

th a t the time structure of the prom ise, especially as it is conceived in the

dem ocracy to come, w ould give a space and tim e fram ework in which to

keep dem and ing justice even in the wake of its possible impossibility. T he

justice dem anded is th a t o f the irreducib ility of differance. Hence, there is

the dem and to reject the metaphy sical presence contained in the crimes of

rape, murder, the holocaust, etc. Such crimes reduced their victims to an

abso lute difference. Victim s ofN az i aggression were ju st ‘Je w s’, ‘hom osex

uals’, ‘gypsies’, etc. T he differen tiation an d delay of the senses of their pe r

sons were bru tally exterminated.99 T he to come of the prom ise opens up an

horizo n, a nd inso far as th at ho rizon is opened, th ere is always the possibility

ofdem anding th at jus t ice be done.

In this sense, the in junc tion of justice to be semper reformanda would

necessarily hav e to m ake roo m for the possibility of justice w hile con

com itantly m aking us responsible for the absence of justice, nam ely,

injustice. U ltim ately, one can read a D erridea n sense of oblique justice as

th at call for a c on tinual responsibility to be ju st. Y et, it is the very no n

achievement or imperfection ofjustice (i.e., injustice) that serves to moti

vate us or call us to act even m ore justly . W e are called to respon d by its

very ina ch iev em en t.100



D e rd a and the democracy to come 51

Concluding remarks: pragmatic possibilities

Th is chap ter attem pted to sketch w hat De rrida means by time understood

as tempo rization an d promise. I t also tr ied to present a reading o f w hat therelationship betw een time a nd p olitics would look like in term s of a dem oc

racy to come. W ithin the framew ork o f a dem ocracy to come, we have seen

tha t tem porization and spacing reveal a d ouble bind structure o f possibility

and impossibility th at is arch -structu ral in tha t it irreducibly leads to politi

cal und ecidability.

R ich ard R o rty sees politics as a series of sho rt-term compromises.

H e remarks,

I see rom antic a nd uto pia n hopes of the sort developed in the ‘T he Politics

ofFrien dship’ as a contribution to D errida’s private fashioning . . . [b]ut I

do no t see texts such as th e ‘Politics ofF rien dsh ip’ as contribu tions to poli

tical though t. Politics . . . is a m atter o fprag m atic short-term reforms and

compromises . . . Political thought centres on the attempt to formulate

some hypotheses about how, and under what conditions, such reforms

m ight be effected. 101

If D err ida ’s thesis is true ab ou t the na ture o f time as irreducibly bringing

un dec idab ility into p lay, the effectiveness of sho rt-term ‘dea ls’ an d p olitical

compromises comes into question. The short-term or brief, efficient and

‘cash-value’ pragmatism that Rorty advocates does not undermine Derri

d a ’s insights. T ho ug h R o rty criticizes D errid a for be ing too ‘sen tim enta l’ 102

an d though R orty claims that D errid a longs for m etaphysical explanations

th at D errid a him self adm its are impossible, D err ida ’s accoun ts must not be

understood as metaphysics. R athe r, D errida is giving an accoun t ofhow we

experience, com m unica te and write the way we do, w hich is not fixed, abso

lute and unmoving. Indeed, human experience generaliter is cons tan tly dif

fere ntia ting itself and is ultim ate ly unde cidab le. P olitics, insofar as it is p a rt

of hum an experience generaliter, is irreducibly structured by the temporal

models discussed. T he pra gm atic app roa ch to politics, if any thing , still

claims to make things present, albeit for the short term. The Rortyan

short-term view o f tem pora lity is useful in tha t it does not fix m atters as

abso lute an d univ ersa l, sub specie aeternnitatis. Yet, it m ay give the false im pres

sion th at the b est th at politics can d o for the sho rt term is a short-term series

of comprom ises an d reforms. This excludes the possibility th at long-term

solutions m ay be m ore feasible and it tries to m ake p resent the most useful

or effective short-term solution, which may ultimately eclipse the force of




undecidability that haunts even short-term compromises and reforms.

In short, R orty ’s pragm atic ap pro ach absolutizes short-term compromise

and reform, m aking it present - a presence tha t Derrid a claims is impossible

given the tem po ral struc tures discussed above. If un dec idab ility is eclipsedw ithin the model ofsh ort-term prag m atic compromises and reforms, wh at is

to preve nt sho rt-term political absolutes and sh ort-term totalitarianism ?

R orty believes tha t political thinking, in pa rt, is constituted by hyp oth

eses. D err ida ’s dem ocrac y to come can only be und erstood in term s of an

hypothesis, tha t is, as som ething tha t is both possible b u t un ce rtain or p er

haps impossible. With this in mind, what can the double bind structure of

the dem ocracy to come co ntribute to political thinking generaliter? We ven

ture two m ain contributions. First, the double bind conditions the way weview decision-making, for decidability and undecidability become para

mount in the political decision-making process. Second, it would allow for

a radically pluralist democracy, a d em ocracy tha t w ould provide space and

time for all different individuals to articulate their own differences while

simultaneo usly allow ing such differen tiation n ot to silence or do violence to

the othe r by not a bsolutizing differences. T he dem ocracy to come could be a

useful proph ylactic ag ainst the tendency ofdem ocracies to lapse into a tota

litarianism of the masses, including a blind m ajority rule.

Le t us turn to the first con tribution. F o r D errida, th e doub le bind struc

tures all political decisions in th at b oth d ecidability and und ecidab ility are

'irredu cib le’ in all responsible decisions. 103 Decisions on ly arise o r hav e to be

m ade w hen som ething presents itself as und ecidab le and wh en th ere is a call

for such u ndec idability to be m ade decisive. T he openness of the tem poral

horizon of the promise along w ith the delay of temp orization ensure that

such decisions are nev er fully present, and hence the need to rethin k co n

stantly the decision th at is always eliciting a response.

Conflicts o f du ty - an d there is only du ty in conflict - are interminable

and even when I take my decision and do something, undecidability is

not an end. I know that I hav e not done enough and it is in this way that

m orality continues, tha t history and politics con tinue. T he re is politicisa

tion because undecidability is not simply a m om ent to be overcom e by the

occu rrence of the decision. U nd ecidab ility continues to inh ab it the deci

sion and the latte r does not close itself off from the form er. T he relation

to the other does not close itself off, and it is because of this that there is

his tory and one tries to act po litically . *04

Political decision-ma king is possible only b ecau se o f its ow n imp os

sibility. Its ow n imp ossibility creates a need for the decision to be m ade . T his



D er^L · and the (democracy to coome 53

decision-m aking is never fully present and continues to be hau nted by its

own impossibility. Pragmatically, this means that any political decision

should never be conceived as absolute. A nd more im po rtantly, all political

decisions must somehow make space for that ambiguity that arises fromthe structure of the double bind enacting itself. Dem ocracy to com e con tri

butes to our recogniz in g the poli tical lim its im posed on us by the structure o f

the doub le bind. T he ‘constitutive outside’ th at M ouffe speaks about, tha t

is, the do uble bind of possibility a nd impossibility, and decidab ility and

und ecidab ility, can aid us in structuring ou r polis and the laws and p olitical

decisions we make. ‘ . . . [A ]ny social objectivity is con stituted thro ug h acts

of power. T his m eans th at any social objectivity is ultim ately political and

has to show the traces o f the acts of exclusion wh ich govern its con stitution; what following Derrida, can be referred to as its “constitutive out

side” .’105 How does dem ocrac y to com e s truc ture ou r social objectivities?

Negatively , there is an inju nction not to reduce social objectivit ie s and

decision-m aking to a m atte r of full presence. In oth er words, we should

avoid onto-theological thinking. Positively, we should structure our laws,

conventions a nd institutions as undecidable.

T he classic example of an app lication of this doub le bind structu re would

be to capital punishm ent. D errida has been an advocate o f banning the

de ath pena lty in the U nited States. Sentencing a criminal to die is a poli

tical act. I t is political beca use citizens consent to a system th at w ill ha nd ou t

the d ea th p ena lty as pun ishm ent for the violation o f ce rtain legal and social

norms of the polis. T he sentence o fd ea th is absolute. It m aintains th at one is

guilty of on e’s crim e a nd therefore is subject to de ath , w hich ca n be said to be

absolute because, as He idegg er notes, dea th in itself contains no oth er possi

bili ty , it is th a t radic al im possib ility tha t is das Nichts. T he sentence is a deci

sion th a t reduces the pe rson to an object o f prese nce.107 T he person is

identified w ith his crime and is redu ced to it, whereas a D erridean d em o

cratic subjectivity would suggest that the person is larger than his crime.

T he demo cracy to come would br ing intop lay the un decidabili ty that s truc

tures the present and guilty verdict that bears the absolute punishment of

dea th. If this is the case, then we hav e a responsibility to let all the person al

differences come to th e fore as opposed to lim iting the pe rson to on e differ

ence, namely, his crime. The person is more than his crime, and as such

should be responsible for his crime but should also be allowed to maximize

all ofhis o the r differences as well. He nce, the decision to execute is a decision

of full presence th at ignores the u nd ecid ability th a t is articu latin g itself.

T he re still arises the u nde cida bility of person al differences th a t exceed the

fixed sense of the jud ge m en t ‘guilty crim ina l’. M oreo ver, the decision to exe

cute can no t po îbly account for the im ^^ sib ili ty of responsibili ty th at




hau nts the decision o f the crim inal’s responsibility. O ne aspect o fth is is th at

though a criminal may be responsible for his crime, he may not be solely

responsible. Th ere are innum erable social, genetic and en vironm ental rea

sons why the person may have comm itted a crime - a crime he may havenever had full control over although it may ap pea r that w ay. M oreover, the

gross num ber o f ‘judicial errors’ in w rongly co ndem ning to dea th innocent

people shows forth , for D errida, th e dynam ic of undecidability and should

seriously call into question any atte m p t to reduce the ‘crim ina l’ to an object

ofpresence by reducing h im /her to h is/her crime, especially wh en the pu n

ishment is de ath . 108 G iven this un dec idab ility and given the un dec idab ility

of differences th at is the person sentenced to death, it would be a m atte r of

D erridea nju stice to avoid lapsing into a metaphysics of presence by enforcing the full an d absolute presence o f a de ath sentence.

But the p ragm atist would respond, and justly so, th at if undecidability

structures all political acts, then any jud icia l sentence cou ld be seen as

‘m etaphysically prese nt’ becau se the crim inal is always redu ced to or iden

tified with his or he r crime. T his re duc tion seriously challenges any possibi

lity o f ha nd ing o ut sentences for w hat the state considers to be criminal.

D erridea n unde cidability seemingly precludes any possibility o f han ding

out definitive crim inal sentences. A D erride an m ay respon d by saying tha t

the death penalty is not like any other sentence because it is so absolute

and extreme. In executing a crim inal, repetition an d the ho rizon of the

prom ise are absolute ly and unil a terally closed. T h a t is, th e possib il ity of the

double bind that is undecidability is wilfully and politically eliminated

absolutely and for ever. One could certainly give sentences, for that is

always a possibility, but such sentences w ou ld ha ve to ensure th at the crim

inal is never reduce d abso lutely and c on stan tly to his criminality, especially,

ofcourse, if the crim inal decides to reform his or he r ways. Practically, and

this is our own conclusion, this means that criminal records should not

perpetually defin e a person. Second, and m ore concre tely , th e re w ould be

a responsibility, if we believe in D erridea n de m ocracy to come, to help

reform the crim inal, to help the crim inal differentiate herself or himself

such that the crim inal is not reduce d to an identity of criminal. In other

words, we would try and help the person’s diversity and differences ‘to

come’ to the fore.

T he second contribu tion of a dem ocrac y to com e is its radically

plurali st vision. W hy p luralism ? A pluralistic d em ocracy w ould be d esirable

because it would m ake space for th e m axim ization o f th e na tu ra lly occur

ring differences of each individual. T he corollary of such a plu ralism is

the injunction to not abs olutize or totalize, to use a Le vinasian expression,

such differences as one’s own or those of the other. This double bind of



D e rd a and the (democracy to c< ^ 55

dem ocra tic subjectivity w ould result in a n ethos o f responsibility be nt on

simultaneously maximizing and preserving differences, thereby avoiding

the p otential of a dem ocratic totalita rian state. 109 G iven that w e are a nth ro

pologically arch-structured as d iffere nt, and undecidably so, such a poli ticalstructu re o f pluralistic dem ocracy w ould best suit this anthropo logical rea

lity. 110 P rag m atically sp eaking, a political struc ture works best if it a pp rox

ima tes the needs an d existential reality o f its subjects, w hich in toda y’s

N orth A m erican conte xt is pluralistic . A D errid ean , however, unlike the

pragm atist, takes in to account the differen tiation and erasure of senses o f

those differences. A pra gm atist w ould no t necessarily conce de this differen

tiation of sense. O n a fundam ental level, both the D erridean a nd the prag

matist can agree that difference is relevant to democracy, but the waydifference operates would ce rtainly be a point o f contention for bo th parties.

D e r r i d e a n li m i ta ti o n s?

If one is to keep within the sp irit ofde con struction, D errida m ust show forth

his own limits and inadequacies. There are three limitations that can be

touche d upon. First, if politics is really undecidable, then wh y both er eng a

ging in politics, for the end result will always be irreducibly undecidable?

Ifw e k now the conclusion, w hy bother a t tem pting to b r ing abou t concrete

and pragmatic political solutions? Derrida would argue that the absences

tha t come to the fore in iterab le differentiation m ake a ce rtain ‘dem and’

up on us in th at the re is an injunc tion co ntaine d in such absences. 111 But

given the dyn am ic of hu m an freedom, one could simply reject and refuse

the injunction. There can never be a guarantee that an absence will be

filled, but even a shrewd pragmatist philosopher, or any political philoso

pher for th a t m a tter, will have to concede th a t there are no guarantees

when it comes to human political action, despite one’s best intentions.

A p ragm atist can plan and m ake short-term concessions and reforms, and

yet people can still refuse to pa rticipate an d follow the p lan de spite every

on e’s good intention s.

Pragm atist and util i tarian thinkers always look to the ach ievem ent of a

m aximu m end. U ndecidab ility must not be read in the language o f teleol

ogy, tha t is, as something tha t m anifestly an d clearly always hap pens in the

end. T he undecidability ofw hich D errida speaks is not simply to be un der

stood as brute impossibility, but as both possible and impossible. Again,

how ever, one wonders wh ether the force o f the noth ing or rad ical absence

con tained in impossibility results in a kind of stopping o f the flow th at

is diffirrnce .



56 Badiou and Deririda,

D er rid a can take definitive political stands on issues like cap ital pu nish

m ent because capital pu nishm ent is manifestly m etaphysical, an d because

capital punishment ignores the call for the undecidability of différance and

the promise. But the stand tha t De rrida takes is tha t ofunde cidability. Andthis is where the ap oria begins. A t a ce rtain poin t in tim e, D errida m ade a

decisive interv en tion in the history of philosophy with his writings on différ

ence and de con struction. Also, Derr ida recognizes the ‘fragility’ an d p rec ar

iousness of the de m ocrac y to come. 112 H e c om m itted to this po litical p oin t of

view a nd has rema ined faithful, althou gh he did not have to. Likewise, a t a

ce rtain p oin t in one’s life, one m ay choose to becom e a dec on struction ist or

one may choose consciously to adopt a deconstructionist political stance.

One chooses Derridean undecidability as one’s political way and one alsocom mits to it. It is this initial a nd decisive interv en tion, the interv en tion of

deco nstruction over any oth er political way, th at is fund am ental for Badiou.

D errida has no ac cou nt for this decisive and singu lar interven tion o f decon

struction and for his rema ining faithful to decon struction over an oth er poli

tical way. In other words, w hy is deco nstruction a textual interven tion tha t

is irreducibly undeconstructible?

T he second lim itation can be addressed by the following question: how

could D errid a’s political philosophy give any concrete account o f the singu

larity o f political events w hen they seem to be irreducibly arch-structured

by th e tw o models o f tem porality discussed above? In other word s, all poli

tical events suffer from the same irreducible logic of the do uble bind, m aking

all political events ultimately un decidab le. O n D errid a’s view, the singular

ity or un icity o f an y political event, including the g rea t political events

tha t have shaped our con temp orary wo rld, namely, the Am erican, French,

and Ru ssian Revolutions, and the fall of the old Soviet U nion , wou ld be

undecidable.

J . C laude Evans discusses this problem in analysing D errid a’s read ing of

the D eclara tion of Indepe ndence. Evan s recap itulates D errid a’s thesis:

Ag ainst this back groun d, D errida states th e pra gra m m a tological thesis:

‘O ne ca nn ot decide - an d th a t’s the interesting thing, the force of such a

dec larative act - wh ether indep endence is stated or produce d by this

u tte ra n ce .’ This unde cid ab ility is ‘necessary ’ an d ‘essential’: ‘Is it tha t

the good people hav e a lready freed themselves in fact an d a re only stating

the fact of this em ancipation in [par] the D eclaration? O r is i t ra th er th at

they free themselves at the instan t o f an d by [par] the sign ature o f this

D eclaration?’ One can alread y suspect th at the answer will be ‘neither’

an d ‘bo th ’. ‘T his obsc urity, this und ecidab ility . . . is required in ord er to

produce the sought-after-effect.’ 114




Evans notes th at D errida names and refers to the D eclaration o f Indep en

dence (4 Ju ly 1776) as the act by w hich the colonies moved to sep arate

themselves from Great Britain. This is mistaken, as the actual decision to

separate from G rea t Britain happen ed two days earlier in the Resolution ofInde pe nd enc e.115 Evans shows th a t ‘[t]he und ecidab ility which [De rrida]

claims to find a t work in the D eclaration is read into, no t out o f the text

and con text o f the D ec lar ation .’116 Evans wishes to show how decisive the

situation was that led up to the American Revolution, whereas he reads

D errida as forcing undecidability into the situation. In other words, De rrida

is accused of m aking the A m erican decision to sep arate from Britain fit his

own arch-structu re o f unde cidability as opposed to showing how un decid

ab ility plays itself ou t in the situation.Evans dem onstrates how D errida’s interpretation o fJeffer son ’s signature

shows the playing o ut o f the delay and differentiation of difference. W e end

up not really know ing who speaks for w hom thro ug h Jefferson ’s signa

tu re .117 Bo th Evans an d D err ida m ake rele va nt points. D er rid a’s analysis

of Jefferso n’s signature as represe ntativ e o f the A m erican colonies does

indeed show the undec idability of the claim of represe ntation it tries to

make. But E van s’ po int is also very strong. T he re was a decisive historical

situation tha t forced certain decisions to be m ade th at w ere not undecidable,

culminating in the decision to rupture with Britain. For example, the

Declaration of Independence lists twenty-seven reasons for separation,

including the K ing ’s failure to pass laws for the ac com m oda tion oflarg e dis

tricts ofp eop le, the K ing ’s refusal to assent to laws th at are jud ge d ‘whole

some and necessary for the pu bic good ’ an d ‘for imposing taxes . . . w ithou t

our c onsen t’. 118 U ltim ate ly, however, Evans fails to refute com pletely D er

rid a’s claim. R ath er, we see in Eva ns’ critiqu e a nd D er rid a’s analysis an

articula tion o f the thesis guiding this work. T he un decida bility ofsituations

is concomitant with the need for decisive interventions like the American

decision to bre ak from B ritain.

The D erridean analysis of the D eclaration oflndep end enc e dem onstrates

the tension ofpossibility an d im possibility com ing into play. D err ida wishes

to show the rich possibility o f m eanings o f the d eclaration. For example,

Derrida questions whether the people the Declaration refers to, i.e.,

‘people’ und erstood as a political entity, existed before the signing o f the

D eclaration or cam e into existence after the signing of the De claration. D er

rida shows how the D ec laration is ina de qu ate to itself because the sense of

the languag e of past present is referred to in the presen t future. D errida

says the D ec lara tion is an ‘alr ea dy’ past even though it tries to decla re a

future possibility of an achiev em ent of a new form of governm ent. He also

shows how the signature is both legitimate and illegitimate insofar as the



58 5αώο« and D erre r

origin of the leg itima cy o f the sig na ture lies outside itself. m But, if we were

to push the logic of D err ide an u nd ecid ab ility to its fuller consequences, we

would have to declare that such events as the American Revolution ‘may

have ha pp en ed ’, for we can never say tha t it did h app en. T o say that something definitively ha pp en ed w ould resu lt in a m etaphy sical or ontotheologi-

cal claim. T he force of the h istorical con text a nd people’s living throug h

various concrete political situations, as both Badiou and Evans note,

cann ot be so easily called undecidable. It w ould seem th at D err ida ’s an a

lyses of the D eclaration oflnd ep en de nc e an d his trea tm en t of the question

of pard on ing Nazi crimes again st hu m an ity in Fo i et savoir rely on the fact

th a t something like a H olocaust and an A m erican Rev olution definitively

happ ened , bu t tha t the ir senses cann ot be fully known. But D erridean u nde cidability would have to tu rn bac k and even ha un t the claim of the very hap

penin g of such m ajor poli tical events . T he fam ous D erridean caveat ‘as i f ’

(comme si) or ‘m ay be ’ (peut-itre) would come to inhab it the very happening

of such political events. W e w ould th ink o f the Am erican Rev olution as

having ‘m ayb e’ happ ene d or ‘as i f ’ it happ ene d. In oth er words, to speak of

certain p olitical events an d crises, as D errida does, acknowledges tha t these

events and crises are definitively an d decisively hap pen ing, even if they are

not metaphysically present. O ne cann ot simply defer and delay m eanings ofthese events, for one would h ave to also defer an d delay their happe ning,

wh ich would result in a gross questioning of conc rete a nd decisive po litical

facta. T he D er rid ea n use o f he rita ge brings tthiss que stion to the fore. *20 D er

rida m akes definite use o fa legacy of gre at texts in o rder to carry o ut decon

struction. G ran ted, the m eanings of the tex t can be constantly differentiated

an d their origin is delay ed, b u t the her itag e o f the text itselfis ‘un de nia ble ’ as

a specific interv en tion in history. As we saw ear lier, there is an herita ge o f

poli tical events and texts , b u t their senses o r m eanings keep being deferred

or delayed. But how c an w e even claim that such events and texts exist if we

concede D erride an un decidability? B adiou, in this pa rticu lar case, could be

seen as filling the D erride an lac un a. A lain Badiou has rem arked in his work

th at there is a fidelity to such political events in th at w e keep referring to

such events, and they are singular even thoug h their mu ltiple and un dec id

able m eanings keep cha ng ing thro ug h time. 121

Finally, return ing to ou r third c ritique , is D errid a’s whole pro ject unne

cessarily frustrating, endlessly and ‘metaphysicaUy’ or ‘romantically’, to

borrow fro m R orty, raising points th a t in th e end will yie ld no definite or

decisive results, wh ich ar e nec essary if we a re to do an d thin k politics?

D er rid a’s pro ject is frustrating , bu t this is the n at u re o f reality. R eality is

constantly in flux and we find ourselves ‘w ithin’ such flux. Both the p ra ^ n a -

tist and the deconstructionist can agree on this point. W ha t D errid a tries to



D e r d a and the democracy to come 59

do is to be faithful to the force o f such flux by trying to give a n a cc ou nt of it

a n d b y trying to urge us to structure o ur lives and politics ‘w ithin’ the flux by

recognizing its undecidable structuring force. We live in this flux by not

claiming t h at it is fully present and accessible to us. T he D erride an injunction ofjustice calls us to responsibility. We a re c alled to try to m ake present

tha t which can never be made present. Th ou gh u ndec idability is frustrating,

this does not m ean th at we need stop trying to intervene to brin g a bo utjus-

tice, even thou gh it is undecidable.



P a r t T h r e e

Badiou, time and politics

Alain B adiou is one o f a growing nu m ber o f philosophers w ho has expressed

his con cern ab ou t the ev er-increasing eco nom ization o f politics : T he po li

tical penu ry th at has resulted from the economics-focused governm ents ofthe West has made politics a truly rare phenomenon. We have become

obsessed w ith m anag ing the affairs of state, a nd this m anag erial m odel

has stymied political th i nking. Th inkin g politics has becom e ‘unnec essary ’,

a frivolity.2

Give n this crisis of co nte m po rary p olitical th ou gh t, Badiou proposes a

re thin king o f poli tics. Th e con cepts o f tim e as ‘in terv en tion ’ and ‘fidelity’

as temporal ordering (ordination temporelle) are key to Badiou’s project of

re thi nking politics. Like D errid a, Badiou sketches the theory or m eans to

achieve a pa rtic ula r politics, or m ore precisely, how to th ink or philosophize

poli tically . D errida has shown th a t tim e is arch-structurin g, th a t is, the

movem ent of différance or tem poriz ation is ce ntra l to thinking politics as the

dem ocracy to come. T he double b ind structure of politics reveals an arch

structuring undecidabili ty. T he simultaneous playing ou t of possibility an d

impossibility m akes impossible the absolute perd urab ility o f any one pa rti

cular object.

T he re is com pelling force in D er rid a ’s analysis. Possibility and impossibil

ity, presence and absence, these all condition and structure the way we

experience things in consciousness, the way we speak, the w ay we w rite, an d

the w ay we com m unicate. Th e m odel of the promise brings this ou t de arly.

Likewise, Badiou sees absence and presence, possibility and impossibility

as cen tral to his onto logy. T he presence o f the one (Z'un) is impossible.

H e believes th at all o f reality is inheren tly m ul ti ple. A ny oneness th a t we m ay

perceiv e o r th a t is m ade present to us is m ade present th rough m ultiplici ty

itself. The one thing that we perceive is not an inherent unity, rather it is

understood as appearing as one or singular (prise comme un ). T he nothing or em p

tiness (rim/vide), w hich ca n be understood as an absence and which is never

m ade ap pa ren t to us, conditions the presence of singular perceived objects.

Unlike Derrida, Badiou believes that singular objects, which in Derri

dean term s could be thou gh t of as differance, c an c om e to som e f o ^ o f



Badiou, time and politics 61

‘presence’ in th a t they appear as a singular object and can faithfully and logi

cally be referred to, thereby ma king them accessible to thou ght. W ha t

comes to ap pe ar, ho wev er, is not to be confused wi th the being o f the ob ject

itself. B adiou, like D errida , is leery o f an y claim to m ake objects metap hysically present. In this way, politics need n ot be tho ug ht o f as too overly struc

tured by the n othing ofim possibility, an impossibility th at is made absolute

by the em erg i ng new ness a nd erasure th a t is p a r t and parcel o f th e o peratio n

o f diferance. Focusing on politics, Bad iou argu es th a t time , understoo d as

interve ntion , gives us events. E vents ca n be tho ug ht thro ug h an d their sig

nificance exam ined an d studied. Politics is the thinking throu gh of political

events. By decisively interven ing a t a given point, we transform the every-

d ay hap penings o f na ture and his tory (situation) into an even t (l’événement ).In nam ing these events, they become thinkable , especially in terms o f their

con tinue d, infinite poli tic al relevance .4

In thinking through political events, Badiou believes that philosophy

begins to em erg e. But philoso phy is not some th in g th a t is done purely in

itself. Rather, it is something that appears when one engages what he calls

the four tradition al concerns of philosophy itself. W hen we think throug h

poli tical events , m ath em atics, love and poetry, then a nd only then, d oes ph i

losophy begin to em erge. Th e events o f such dom ains rup ture the general

situation an d m ake possible a philosophical discourse on the m ultiple m ean

ings of such events. Bad iou nam es some examp les of the con crete events th at

rupture the general situation, including th e encou nter of A belard and

Heloise and the groun d-break ing discoveries of Galileo.5

Philosophy app ears, h ow ever, on the condi tion th a t these four allegedly

traditiona l dom ains are engaged a nd brough t to some form o f app earance as

singular, yet also multiple and undecidable, through the intervention of

events. Philosophy m ust neve r be sutured to its dom ains, says Ba diou. This

means that philosophy must never become identical with love, mathe

matics, poli tics and poetry. If philosophy becomes iden tical w ith political

events, for example, philosophy becomes objectified. The French Revolu

tion itselfis no t philosophy, bu t one can philosophize a bou t the event. F or

Badiou, philosophy is not a n obj ect ofen quiry. R ath er, i t can be described as

a m ultiplicity o f thoughts o r m editations, to borrow an expression from

L'etre et l’evenement, th at come to app ear throug h the event. If philosophy

becomes a ttached to its conditio n or to specific events in th e dom ain , then

philosophy becomes li mi ted in w h a t it can th ink about and w hat it can

make ap pea r in thought.

Badiou recognizes the force of the D erridea n insight concerning th e und e -

cid ability o f the dou ble bind struc ture of possibility and impossibility t h at

temporization makes evident. I see in Badiou, however, an expansion of



62 Badiou an d D rn L ·

the force of the nothing or void (le vide) o f imp ossibility an d th e flux posed

by D erridean thin kin g. In Logiques des r r n ^ s , Badiou recognizes his deb t to

D errida, even changing the spelling of the Frenc h irnxistetence to inexistance, by

adm itting tha t there is a constant an d structu ring impossibility or point de fu ite th a t can n eve r be ac cou nted for.6 By mak ing possibility and im possibil

ity, a pp eara nc e a nd emptiness, aspects of his ontology, he exp ands the

D errid ea n a po ria of time. As we shall see later, B adiou ascribes tim e to sub

jective interventions and tem poral ordering becomes seen as a fid eli ty to

the event. W ith this new concept of time , events can b e taken as both singu

lar/unique and undecidable, filling out the Derridean aporetic reading of

events as und ecid able. Political events to which we are faithful can be fru it

ful means to think th rou gh the na ture of the political. Fidelity in Badiou perm its a consis tent ‘coun ting for o ne’ (compterpourun). A fidelity to th e sin

gu lar in D erridea n th ou gh t will have ultimately to un do itself as the imp os

sibility of the double bind comes to structure its very possibility, whereas

impossibility an d u nde cida bility, for Badiou, m ake possible a fidelity and a

singularity that does not necessarily undo/erase itself. A logical consistency

m ay ensue.

H ow can this Ba diouan structure be app lied to Derrida? A t one point in

time, Derrida did make an intervention in that he chose to challenge the

ontotheological trad ition o f philosophy by articulating an alternative,

nam ely, deconstruction. O ve r the past forty years, he has remaine d consis

ten t a nd faithhful to his project. Deco nstruction has its ow n tim e, especially if

understood as a movement in philosophy. It entered at a certain point in

time an d continues to have a n influence. No t only do esit colour contem por

ary thinking, but also it has attem pted to reread the heritage ofW estern phi

losophy, ultim ately showing the richneæ of possible meanings tha t can

emerge from re-examining the philosophical tradition. Furthermore, the

poli tical stances th a t D errida takes on concre te social and polit ic al issues

can be interp reted as extensions o f his arch-choice to articula te an d ap ply

deconstruction to all texts, including politics. Though deconstruction tries

to bring o ut the force of the unde cidability o f meanings, one can nam e

(though n ot in any absolute m anne r) o r ‘coun t as on e’, to borrow a n expres

sion from B adiou, D er rid a’s singu lar or un ique legacy. W ha t emerges is this:

on the one ha nd , D errida claims undec idability as an irreducible tem poral

structure. O n the other, we can po int to the singularity of deconstruction

as a p olitical stance, especially if we look at D er rid a’s taking a side on

ce rtain key political issues, including racism, sexism an d the dea th penalty.

W hen D errida renders a tex t undecidable, we know th at this is the unique

or singular task of deconstruction. How do we accou nt for this seeming




con tradiction o f a nam eable an d coun table singularity called deconstruc

tion and the undecida bility it maintains?

Let us proceed to uncover Badiou’s philosophy in order to see how he

further expands the D erridean aporia that is the relationship between timeand politics. I should like to note that because Badiou’s metaphysics is

immensely huge and complex, I can in no way present its full systematic

exposition here within the limits of this work. Given these limits, I shall

focus on the q uestion o f time a nd politics, m aking c ertain to explain key

metaphysical axiomata when necessary. I will proceed in the following

m ann er. First, I will present wh at Badiou m eans by being and the event.

Th is will lea d in to a discussion of time . S econd , I shall look a t Bad iou’s

acc ou nt of the political. I shall then discuss the relatio n betw een time an d poli tics. In conclu sion, I will concentra te on the re la tion betw een the

thou ght o f Badiou an d D errida w ith specific regard to time and politics.

U ltim ately, I will show th a t the D erridea n a po ria of t ime a nd politics is

further com plicated by the tho ug ht o f Badiou. Badiou shows how unique

subjective interventions give us time, e.g., the time of decon struction as a

philosophical/poli tical m ovem ent, and how, as subjects , w e can m ake deci

sive interventions tha t a re bo th und ecidable an d yet decisively singular or

able to be ‘counted as one.’

B a d io u o n B a n g a n d t h e E v e n t

Ba diou’s m ajor ph ilosophical w ork bears th e title, L ’être et I’evernmmt. I t is in

this work th at Badiou claims to think the m eaning of being qua being.

T ho ug h his work is highly theo retical a nd sometimes inconsistent, Badiou

recognizes that his thought is in progress and prone to shortcomings.8

For Badiou, mathematics makes sayable (dicible) ontological truths. The

discourse about being qua being is expressible through mathematical dis

courses. B ut this is no t to say th at B adiou sees ontology a nd m athem atics as

identical, for ontology does not consist of m ath em atica l objectivities as it

does for the Pythagoreans.9 Ontology is mathematical, that is , i t can

employ the discourse of mathematics to express certain key ontological

truths. F or examp le, Badiou em ploys set theory to help explain how being

is essentially multiple and undecidable; the multiple can be made both

consistent and inconsistent depending on the way the sets are arranged.

Mathematics, however, is not the only discourse that can be employed to

speak about being. Badiou’s philosophy is not to be conceived purely as a



64 Badiou and

discussion o f m ath em atics. In fact, h e sees his works, L’être et l'evênement

and Logiques des mondes, in a T rin ita ria n fashion. 10 Badiou is trying to present

an on tology an d he tries to acco unt ph ilosophically for his views by em ploy

ing thre e types of m ed itation. First, the re is the pu rely concep tual discoursein which concepts and structures are employed to present certain key ele

ments. Second, there ar e textual m editations on the giants of the history of

philosophy, in clu ding Spin oza, Pla to, Hegel, Rousseau, Descartes, L acan,

etc. Finally, there is the discourse on mathematics, especially set theory.

All three types of m editation, an d D escartes certain ly lies beh ind B adiou’s

chosen form o f philosophizing, can be read ap ar t or together. T his is im por

tan t to keep in mind because this will have im p or ta nt consequences for

B ad iou ’s politics.Badiou’s politics rarely employ mathematical meditations in order to

ground their philosophical force. The matheme is its own domain as is

politics , and each has its own peculiar conte nt. It is im po rtan t to stress

tha t politics is not the m athe m e because the recent tran slatio n o f B adiou ’s

Manifes to /or Philosophy may give the imp ression th at m athem atics is ontol

ogy and that Badiou’s ontological politics necessarily has to revert to his

m athe m atical m editation s.11 Hence, in orde r to preve nt the reduction of

Badiouan politics to mathem atics, we have chosen to point ou t the Trin itar

ian structure of B adiou’s fund am ental work, L’être et I’bmenement. Badiou’s

tho ug ht is.not to be red uc ed exclusively to set theo ry. Because our w ork is

focused on the relatio n betw een politics an d time a nd because Badiou does

not employ set theory to discuss politics and time, we have decided to

bracket th e discussion o f set th eory.

In ord er to und erstand w hat Badiou means when he claims tha t time is an

intervention a nd tha t fidelity is to be understood as a tem poral ordering, we

m ust first un de rstan d w ha t he intends by the tw o key poles ofhis work: being

an d even t. L et us begin with being. W e shall focus on the categ ory o f being

Badiou calls mu ltiplicity. It is the m ost releva nt cate go ry for ou r discussion

of time an d tem po ral ordering. Being is not a thing. In fact, its pro pe r nam e

is emptiness or the void (Ie mvide). 12 In ord er to see wha t B adiou m eans by

nam ing being as emptiness, we m ust first turn to a description of the ca te

gory of the m ultiple. T radition ally, the history of W estern philosophy has

always had the relation between the one and the m any as one o f its central

themes ofspecu lation. Badiou begins his philosophy here, very m uch roo ted

in this perenn ial problem. But Badiou begins with a fun dam ental decision,

an d he re is w here on e sees the force ofhis no tion o f the decisive interve ntion

that will appear later in L’être et l'evenement. Badiou decides to reject the

notion ofbe ing as one. Th e one does not exist; it is an op eration an d counting

as one is the function of suc h an operation. 13




Th is decisive ac tion is releva nt because it is very m uch a decision th at lies

at the core o f Ba diou’s ontology. Decisive interv ention s, very m uch like the

one Badiou has und ertak en in proclaim ing the non -being of the one, give us

events and they a re described as tem po ral. I shall discuss this late r in gre ate r detail. But w ha t is also relevan t here a re the echoes of the H eidegg erian/

D erridean critique of onto theological m etaphysics. T he one o r the unity

th a t is being and th a t metaphysics claims to m ake present abrogate as one is

an im possibility for Badiou. Being is not one. Yet, hu m an subjects ha ve the

ability to count and to engage in m athematics. T he m ultiple can be counted

as one. On e is a nu m ber and can be seen to operate as a nu m ber when we

think about and discuss the multiple. One does not appear as one being,

rath er it s imply results from a m athem atical operation o f num ber, tha t is,14

counting.

But is Badiou simply a volun tarist insofar as he simply can decide th at

being is no t o ne an d so i t is? Yes and no. T here is a fundam ental subje ctive

decision that takes place and that decision will give us certain events to

w hich we c an refer. In this case, we can definitely refer to Badiou as the th in

ker who chose to be a thinker of the multiple. But i t is n o tjus t a m atter of a

decision. T he re is som ething th a t presents itself to us or makes its app ea r

ance know n to us. T he m ultiple presents itself to us in our thou ght an d in

ou r consciousness. 15 T he m ultiplicity o f rea lity m akes e vide nt B adiou ’s deci

sion to claim th a t being is not one .16

O n the one han d, the no tion o f presen tation as m ultiple makes sense.

If one thinks ab ou t Badiou’s claim abo ut th e m ultiplicity of reality and

what appears to one’s subjectivity, one could say that a multiplicity of

things presen ts itself to us. For exam ple, consciousness is always a w are o f

a m ultiplicity of percep tions th at ap pe ar sim ultaneously to consciousness.

M y consciousness of the ga rde n necessarily includes a m ultiplicity ofobjects.

Ba diou uses the term situation to describe th at which presents itself to us

as m ultiple. A ll presente d m ultiplicities a re ca lled situations b y B adio u.17

T he m ultiplicity can only be read retroactively an d therefore counted as

one. In this retroactive reading or thinking ab ou t a situation one can begin

to count things as one in the m ultiplicity, bu t one can also coun t the situa

tion as one as well. O ne can co unt the p resentation o f the g arde n as one an d

one can c oun t one tree, one flower, one garag e, one basil plan t, etc. within

the m ultiplicity. Th is kind of counting, th at is achieved only in retroactive

app rehen sion, results from the m ultiplicity itself an d is no t to be confused

w ith th e be ing one o f the situ atio n itself. 18

In Book III o f Logiques des mondes, B adiou identifies an object as the g eneric

form of the appe aring o fa m ultiple determined by ce rtain relations that aid

in constituting its world. When objects appear as determined in a specific



66 Badiou aand Derrida

world, they come to objectivize themselves much like the subject, who

through her interventions, comes to subjectivize herself. The object is

indexed to what Badiou calls the transcendental, namely, the constitutive

capacity o f each w orld to attri bu te to its various constituents variableintensities ofid en tity an d difference. In this text, wh ich Bad iou sees as a con

tinuation o f Being andtheEvent, he makes explicit th at w hich was already inti

m ated in his earlier work. T h e w orld is not a p rojection of ou r subjective

wills or a m ere object of a transce nd en tal consciousness. Th e world is com

posed o f a m ultiplic ity o f objects th a t a re axiom atically giv en for Badiou.

I t is ourjob , in retrospective apprehension, to m ake senseo fcertain arran ge

men ts of objects in o ur counting of them . Badiou affirms, the re a re w orlds

and there are objects that app ear in them . Th is is a given, and certainly, itechoes back to the givenness of the world of phenom enology.

Inconsistent and consistent multiplicity describe the ways situations

appear to us. The inconsistent multiplicity is that general multiplicity

which presents itself. T he m ultiplicity is inconsistent because it does not of

itselfund ergo the subjective ‘m aking consistent’ th at an operation of m ind

can pro du ce in a retrospective ‘cou nting as one’. W e realize th a t it is there

because we retroactively apprehended it th rough the counting as one th a t

ap pe ars to us in consciousness. A consistent m ultiplicity is described as a neffect o f the structure of the m ultiplicity. T h e inconsistent m ultiplicity p re

sents itself as being able to b e cou nted as one. T he actual counting as one

th a t we accom plish in consciousness is a coun ting o f m em bers o f the m ulti

plicity. T he counting o f one as the m ultiplicity is describ ed as consis te nt pre

cisely because we can count it. We can count it because it appears as

composed of elements (une multiplicité de composition).

Badiou’s descriptions raise m any problems. Gen erally, we are no t sure

why presentation is so central. Also, what is being presented to whom?

In Logiques tles mantles, Bad iou takes o n such questions. P resentation has a

dou ble sense. First, it refers to ap pe ara nc e an d, secondly, it refers to the p re

sent. The former refers to multiplicities that appear in worlds or that are

localized as bein g-the re (ifre-la). T h e la tte r designates a set of consequences

in the world stem m ing from an even em ental site, which surroun ds an event.

These consequences result from the ope ration o f fidelity carried ou t by a

subject localized as a bod y throug h and with points of relations. A nothe r

way of und erstand ing this distinction is to consider the form er as designating

a gen eral w orld of objects th a t ap pea r, wh ereas the latte r refers to those spe

cific things arrange d in a certain way that are m ade present by their being

operated upon by subjects. Appearance allows things to show themselves,

wh ereas when so m ething is prese nt it is as the resu lt of a subjective ope ration



Badiou, time aand politics 67

of fidelity. T his b eing said, pre sentation is central in ord er to acco unt for

why ab initio there is som ething rath e r tha n no thing, and to acco unt for the

rea l distin ction o f objects existing as pure m ultiplicities an d objects th at

are arran ged in specific m eaningful sets by coun ting in retrospective ap pre hension. Though this distinction seems logical and commonsensical, is

it too generic a description as one could argue tha t both app earance and

the present can only be mediated by a singular consciousness that has its

own uniq ue ways of being an d thinking, who m ay nev er see the wo rld as

bo th sheer m ultip licity and a set o fp resen t m ult iplicities? In o ther word s,

an d this is a psychological critiqu e o f Ba diou’s position, is his desc rip

tion too universalistic, thereby neg ating the role o f individu al pe rsonality

or consciousness?T here are othe r questions that come to the fore. First, why can the m ulti

ple not be an operation as well? In other word s, how can we say th a t the

presentation /situation is m ultiple and no t one? Second, it could be argued

that the p resentation, especially in retrospective apprehension, is und ecid

able. D erridean différance applied to retrospective app rehension w ould show

tha t w ha t is seized is both and neither one and /or m ultiple. Bad iou would

respond to such a charge by claiming tha t thou gh mu ltiplicity and counting

as one are categories o f being, they are no t to be confused w ith being itself.

M oreover, the m ultiplicity th at presents itself as the situation is not the

being o f th e s ituation itself; it is th e régime of the presentation. T he m ultipli

city is a regim e th a t regimen ts how the situation presents itself.19 T he m ulti

ple is th e regim e o f the m ultiple o r how it regim ents presentation itself,

whereas the counting as one is an operation that happens in retrospective

apprehension. This being said, one is never quite sure why the one is an

operation and the multiple is a regime. Moreover, one is never quite sure,

conceptually speaking, that the one cannot be a regime and the multiple

an operation of counting tha t is done in retrospective ap prehension. O ne

could sim ply say th a t this is B ad iou’s decision, his m ed itation. O r, on e

could continue to accept these Bad iouan axiom ata an d see how they play

themselves out when we deal with politics. When we do this, we shall see

how Ba diou’s conc eptual axioms can become m ore concrete. T he m ultiple

of political events will translate into the un decidab ility of m eanings th at

con tinue to flow from events, especially if we re m ain faithful to them when

we think about them in time. We will later discuss Badiou’s project with

regards to Derridean undecidability. We do not wish to become stuck in

Badiou’s conceptual scheme at this point as this will distract us from our

real focus, which is the notion o f the ap oria of time and politics. U ltim ately,

Badiou posits two theses necessary for an y on tology:



68 Badiou and D m ida

1. T he m ultiple, which ontology makes a situation, can only be com

posed o f m ult ip licities. T here is no one. O r, all m ultiplic ity is a m ultiple

ofmultiples.

2. T he cou ntin g as one is bu t the system of conditions thro ug h which them ultiple lets itselfbe recognised as m ultiple.2°

Th us far, Badiou has posited situations, which are m ultiplicities th at pr e

sent themselves. Anything th at presents itself is a situation. It contains

w ithin itself an unde cidable a rray of elements. For exam ple, the conscious

ness of any ga rd en or of any text contains a m ultiplicity of elements. Ju st as a

set contains various elements con stitutive o f tha t sam e set, so too situations

can be described as sets tha t con tain elements belong ing to th at set. T he set‘gard en’ has elem ents like ‘flowers’, ‘stones’, ‘rocks’, etc. ‘G ard en ’ ca n also

hav e an infinite nu m ber ofelements belonging to it, excluding the aforem en

tioned elements. The elements belonging to a set need not be fixed nor do

they need to be closed and, hence, are undecidable. But the multiplicity

that is the situation and its presentation are not being. Rather, being is the

em ptiness against w hich such situations prese nt themselves.

Emptiness (vide) is the prop er nam e ofb eing .2 1W ha t does this m ean and

how does Badiou justify this claim? T he term emp tiness means th at in a

situatio n th at is m ultiple, the very pre sen tation o f th at m ultiplicity implies

the u npresentable (l’imprésentable).22 T he Fou rth M editation of V être et l’évé

nement bears the title, Le vide: nom propre de l’être. In Logiques des mondes, the

category ofemptiness is further defined as the inexistant, tha t w hich literally

is a place ho lder for m ultiplicity, a kind of null-poin t. I t nev er appea rs

although it is described as being-there itself. Emptiness is being and the

inex istant is associated w ith the b eing -there o f a specific world a nd with

the objects in tha t wo rld. -

I f we a cce pt B ad iou’s decision to claim th at one is not being, it follows, for

Badiou, th at we have to accept the pre sentation of the situation as inh er

ently m ultiple. An y situatio n consists of a va riety o f variab le elements that

belo ng to that particu lar situation. Again , recall the e xam ple of the garden.

L ate r, we shall see how B adiou speaks of political even ts like the F rench

Re volution containing a variety of elements that belong to th at nam e,

including les sans-culottes, thehermidor, Ie roi, etc. Bad iou recalls th a t a situatio n,

though m ultiple, has a stru cture in tha t it can be counte d as one; it is regi

mented as being counted as one. For example, there is only one French

Revolution of 1789. Because a situation is multiple yet always presented

un der the regime ofb ein g co un ted as one, a situ atio n is always split. 23

Th e split of a situa tion causes certa in que stions to arise: if all th at is pre

sented in m ultiplicity always presents itself as being cou nted as one, un der




the regim e of the one, then how d o we even no tice a split in the first place?

How do we notice the emptiness against which the situation stands out?

Badiou recognizes this problem an d concedes th a t, following his argu m en ta

tion, one would have to conclude th at th e one, understood as being countedas one, is. Reca ll th a t if we say th a t som ething is, we say th at it is not present

or em pty.24 But this is w here Bad iou remarks th a t the inconsistent or pure

m ultiple or emptiness can be deduced. Recall th at the situation can only be

counted as one in retrospective apprehension. The counting as one is an

operation that we perform and the mu ltiplicity th at is presented as a situa

tion is presented in a regim ented fashion. Ifw e can only coun t as one retro

spectively as a logical ope ration o f mind, then w e have to ask w hether there

is something that is prior that precedes retrospection? Can we deducesom ething th at is not presen t in the being coun ted as one of the situation,

indeed som ething th at m akes the coun ting as one possible? It is this em pti

ness/nothing or what Badiou names being that is not presentable in the

situatio n an d wh ich makes the situation sp lit.25

W ithin a situation, a nd th at is all tha t is presentable to hu m an beings for

Badiou, we have a m ultiplicity th at presents itself un der a regim e o f being

counted as one. This is retrospectively apprehended as an operation, and

this retrospective ap prehension po ints to something th at is not presentable

w ithin the very imm anen ce of this situation, n am ely, the un prese ntable. It is

unp resentab le, so claims Badiou, be cause it is no t subject to be ing counted;

it resists the op eratio n ofb eing co unted as one.26 If the unp resentab le ca nno t

be counted as one, it does not fall under th e regim e o f th e one; it is not

one. It simply is not. It is nothing or it is empty. Badiou calls this being.

He emphasizes the emptiness tha t is con tained in the ‘n ot’ o r the neg ation

o f the o ne.27 His deduc tion of the un presentable or the p u re m ultiple th at

is being presents various problems, problems that could be resolved per

haps through a phenom enology of w hat Badiou means by presentation and

how hu m an subjects becom e conscious ofpres entation s. T his epistemologi-

cal lacuna hau nts B adiou’s philosophy. H ere, we are not qu ite sure why the

bein g counted as one cannot be seized im m ediate ly b u t only in retrospectiv e

apprehension. P erhaps it ca nno t be seized imm ediately because the one is an

ope ration o f composition. T he one does not exist as its ow n prop erty o r as

a thing in itself, and hence cannot be seized immediately. Rather, it is a

seconda ry op era tion th at brings consistency to the inconsistent m ultiplicity

of the situation.

Furthermore, why does Badiou name the unpresentable ‘nothing’,

‘inconsistent’, the ‘pu re m ultiple’ o r being? And w hy even call it impresenta-

6le? It would seem th a t the force of D err ida ’s und ecid able w ould be m ore

acc urate in th at we know that something is there, b ut we are ju st not




sure wh at it is. It should be rem arked th at one o f the othe r descriptors

Badiou attaches to the unpresentable that is named being is that it is

undecidable or indécidable. There is an undecidability in every situation

because we are not sure w hat lies ‘beh ind’ the operation of the counting as28one. W e are no t sure w hat being is, altho ug h it somehow shows itself

as und ecidab le in situations. D errida claims tha t any situation is ultim ately

undecidable. Badiou would acknowledge this, in part, but presentations

ofsituations can also be counted as one throug h a n o peration of mind.

A strict D erride an w ould question the possibility of cou nting as one as an

op eration of the subjective m ind, given the u nde cidab ility o f the promise

and différance. B ut D errida h imself can be seen as counting as one, an d faith

ful to Ba diou’sinsigh t. For example, D errida articu lates the cen tral tenet ofdifférante in Marges. H e shows how to read texts decon structively. H e has a

legacy of texts th a t ca n be cou nted as one in th at they a re deconstructionist

texts. Co unting as one does not exclude mu ltiplicity o f m eanings an d senses.

W ithin each D erride an text there exists a m ultiplicity of texts, yet we can

count them all as ‘one’ insofar as they are all deconstructive. Again, for

example, in Voyous, he counts the five foyers that belong to the democracy

to come, w hich are recapitulations o f themes articulated in ea rlier texts.

T he lan gua ge is very definite an d identifica tory. D errida announces th at

his no tion o f the dem ocracy to come consists of: (1) a m ilitant political cri

tique w ithou t end; (2) a n ad ve nt tha t will never come to show itself fully

(read promise); (3) m oving beyo nd borde rs an d citizenship to an in terna

tional no tion o f sovereignty th at co ntinues to differentiate itself an d share

new things (nouveaux partages); (4) justice; and (5) unc onditional injunc-

tion.29 O ne c an c ou nt D errid a’s w ork ‘as on e’ an d still recognize th a t there

is some thing distinctly un decida ble a bo ut his philosophy.

T hu s far, Bad iou ha s presented us w ith a situational ontology. Situations

present themselves as m ult ip licit ie s th a t are countable as one. A t the same

time, these situations also show forth an undecidable and unpresentable

something th a t is not being, a n em ptiness tha t B adiou calls being. T his is a

general structure for Badiou. T he undecidable a nd unpresentable emptiness

th at is being is an a ttem p t to express a large r reality that conditions the

m ind ’s cou nting as o ne a nd yet w hich is no t reduc ible to the very same

operation o f m ind. T he fact tha t we can only cou nt as one in retrospective

apprehension implies that there is som ething prio r to ou r being able to coun t

as one, yet this is never presen t.3° In ad dition to the totalizing structu re of

the being c ounted as one ofsituations, Badiou acknowledges there a re things

that a re m ore than one (Vultra un), w hich ruptu re situations. In a situation,

one posits th at there is some thing undecidable a nd unprese ntable, bu t one

ca n never encou nter it ; one can never enco unter the em ptiness th at is being.



Badiou, time andpolitics 71

Events, however, make such an encounter possible because they take us

beyond th e norm al operation o f counting as one. T hey present us w ith

w ha t is singular and the emptiness th at can simultaneously tear itself away

or m ake itself discernible from (décelable) the situation, although nev er annihilating the situation completely.

Let us now move on to discuss what Badiou entails by the term event.

Events are subjective interventions that both subjectivate the subject and

show forth the singularity of situations. T hey u ltim ately m ake ap pa ren t

the undecidability that is the emptiness of being. A subject becomes fuller

as a subject (subjectivation) by intervening in certain situations. T he interven

tions on the p ar t of the subject give gre ater sense to the subject. For exam ple,

the interventions of Ro bespierre an d the E ncyclopaedists, etc. resulted inthe historical subjectivity o f each of these figures be ing associated w ith the

French Enlightenmen t. M ore meanings become identifiable and attachab le

to subjects as they make further interventions in situations.32 Events are

localized in historical situations.33 Ev ents a re no long er sim ply coun ted as

one, for they exceed the normal regime of presentation of the multiple.

The being that was deduced in the general situation in retrospective

appreh ension is now m ade m ore app are n t throug h events. It is experienced

as undecidable, but this undecidability is described as an excess (l’excès).

T he excess of being th a t is shown thro ug h events is sim ilar to othe r philoso

phical descrip tions o f the richness of being th a t exceeds th e capacity of

hu m an description. O ne can see in Badiou a rec ap itulation of the old

m etaphysical descriptions of being as a plenitudo omnitudinis or classic phe

nom enolog ical descriptions, includ ing H eide gg er’s exstasis, Husserl’s ‘preg

nan t sense’ or Jea n-L uc M ario n’s notion of the ‘surcroît'. When a subject

decides to make a peculiar intervention in any given situation, the event

th a t ensues is singular o r un ique becau se it is no t reducible to the general

m ultiplicity of the situation . It is an exce ptional m ultiplicity.34 But the deci

sion to intervene is m otivated, in pa rt, by the very undec idability th a t is con

tained in the general situation. For Badiou, this is axiomatic because

situations a re folded into events. M ore will be said ab ou t this late r when we

exam ine B adiou’s politics and the pre-p olitical.

In Logiques des mondes, Bad iou further clarifies wh at he m eans by an event.

He introduces another descriptor for events, namely, strong singularities

(singularités fortes). He emphasizes that events bring about real, concrete

changes such that there is a m axim al intensity th at comes to bear on exis

tence. M oreover, w ith an e vent the inex istant of the wo rld th at is described

as bein g-the re becomes m ore intensely, t h at is, tha t which is und escribable

or undecidab le, becomes m ore intensely. Practically speaking, this means

th at every event singularizes itself an d brings ab ou t a drastic chan ge such




that not only worlds and the objects therein are rearranged and radically

altered, but even the inexistant or empty being-there is modified as well.

T he ev ent changes th a t w hich is presentable and unpresentable.

W ha t Badiou m eans by events may app ear conceptually abstract, bu twhen he gives concrete exam ples of various events in history, his con

ceptual scheme begins to take on more poignancy. In Manifeste pour la

philosophie, Badiou m aintains that the great events of recent m athem atics

include C an tor ’s interventions on the natu re of infini ty a nd und ecida

bili ty . In poetry, R im baud and Pessoa are offered as examples of poets

who have de-objectified poetry. In politics, Badiou points to the Russian

Re volu tion and th e M aoist Revolution as key events of the tw entieth cen

tu ry th at have rupture d the general m ultiplicity of situations because they

have g iven us nov el ways o f thinkin g an d doin g politics. Finally, L aca n is

cred ited w ith giving us a new ev ent in love. L ac an ’s m aster-signifier allows

love to be absent while being somehow communicated and represented.

Like poetry, love is not objectified and not necessarily exclusively sub

je ctif ie d. W hat makes the events of m athem atic s, poetry, politics and love

singular is th a t they have rup tured the m ultipli city of the general situa

tion; eac h o f these events is a singu lar historical occurrence th a t continues to

have meaning for us today, especially when we think and rethink such

events. E ach o f these events is singular because they a re n ot irreducible

to other events. For example, the Russian Revolution is not the French

Revolution. But more imp ortan tly, they exceed the regime ofbeing counted

as one.

This means that though such events are singular and unique, the polys

em y of m eanings tha t is attach ed to such events continues to m ultiply.

As the senses multiply and deepen, so too do the subjective meanings of

the su bject-interve nor as well as the being -there o f the worlds a nd its objects.

The more we reflect, think, and perhaps even imitate Pessoa, the more

m eaningful, the rich er, the subject of Pessoa becomes. In the even t, we

engage the un decid able in th at we come face to face w ith the force of the

undecid able excess of m eanings th a t can be attach ed to any given event.

A t the same time, we see th at this excess is em pty. B ut em pty here should n ot

be taken to m ean th a t there is noth in g of u ltim ate m eaning. R ath er, th e

excess of senses tha t accrue to a pa rtic ula r event can never be abso lutized

an d fixed to a pa rticu lar event. T he add ition o f new senses shows forth an

emptiness th at can continually be add ed to; the em ptiness is th at w hich can

con tain the excess o f meanings as they continue to accrue w ithout ever

exhaus ti ng them . W he n we exam ine the them e of Ba diou an politics more

closely, we shall see in gre ate r deta il how interven tions come into p lay.



Badiou, ttime and politics 73

Badiou on time

Inter ve ntio ns a re subjective decisions tha t give us events. But intervention s,

for Badiou, are temporal.35 Badiou identifies time with an intervention, b u t tim e is also given a pecu liar sense. T im e as in tervention is a diagonal.

Following this an alogy o f the diag on al, time has two senses. First, it sepa

rates one event from a nothe r. A tem poral interve ntion gives us events th at

contain their own singularity. For example, the peculiar intervention of

N apoleon can be tem porally separated from th e tem poral in te rvention of

Ro besp ierre because we can iden tity or ‘cou nt as one’ the time of N apo leon

and the time ofR obespierre, each coloured by the central subjects ofN apo -

leon and Robespierre. Napoleon is not reducible to Robespierre and each bears a singularity th a t does not reduce th em to id entic al subjects. R obe

spierre’s time is the time o f the gre at te rror an d the time o f N apoleon is the

tim e ofhegem ony. W hen an event such as Napoleonic hegemony happens,

the general situation is rup tured such tha t one can say there is a tim e or tem

poral perio d th a t is uniquely N apole onic . W h at m akes the time ofN apoleon

his own a nd no t someone else’s is th a t ce rtain elem ents th a t come to define

the ‘T im e o f N apo leon’ consistently rem ain attach ed to the time fram e of

N apole on. This is achieved in fidelity , w hich will be discussed later. Fid elity

wo uld ensure th at th ere is consistency to the eleme nts of N apo leonic time,

not confusing them w ith the tim e of interven tion th a t gives us the time of

the French R evo lution, w hich includes all of its cons tituting elemen ts like

the sans-culottes, Robespierre, la guillotine, etc. It should also be rem arked

that because there is such a thing as a singular Napoleonic time, this does

not m ean th at the re can be no other singular mom ents within such a time.

Fo r exam ple, the singularity of W ellington’s intervention at W aterloo in

1815 coincided w ith the hegem onic time of N ap oleo n. Second, time is the

intervention itself, that is, it is that which makes the multiple recognizable

as an event. It is the co ndition for the possibility of an ev ent bein g nam ed.

T o n am e, for Badiou, is a wa y to refer to the even t and the process of fidelity

that is integral to the even t if i t is to con tinue to h ave meanings th at are both

singular and un decidable, th at is, m ultiple.36 Fo r exam ple, the intervention

of students, intellectuals and factory w orkers in F ranc e in M ay ’68 produced

a time referred to as 'M ay ’68’.

T he first sense of the time of interven tion c an be co m pared to D errid a’s

notion o f temporization th at gives us an economic m ovem ent of dijfbance.

A n interv en tion gives us the possibility of som ething un dec idab le being

both not absolu te ly ‘p resent’ a nd em pty (i .e ., D erridean rad ical absence).

An intervention gives us a multiple that is simultaneously decidable and

undecidable, possible and impossible, present and unpresentable. This is



74 Badiou and D w ^L ·

w ha t D errida says the op eratio n37 o f differance does. S econd, ju st as différance

spaces as it temporizes, so too does tim e in the Bad iou an sense in th a t it gives

us more tha n one event by sep arati ng the time o f one event from the time of

ano ther. W ith this doub le sense of time, Bad iou proclaim s th e exigencyof the Deux (Tw o). W hy the s tress for the need ofTw o?

Bad iou needs the T w o for two reasons. Firs t, he has to distinguish the sin

gu larity of the event from no t simply being seen and reduced to the being

counted as one of the m ultiplicity o f the situation. T he compter-pour-un is

folded into the m ultiple, and if the ev ent is m erely counte d as one, there

is no thing uniqu e in the ev ent itself th a t helps distinguish it from the situa

tion. Th e ev ent is reduced to the situation. It becomes pa rt of the state

(étatique) o f the situ ation an d there is nothin g o f the e ven t itself th a t candistinguish it from its situation .

Second, Badiou h as to give an a cco unt o f how events are to be distin

guished from one an othe r. U ltim ately, we could simply call all tha t is pre

sented, one event. In o rd er to preserve the radicality o f the polysemantic

nam ing o f events and the m ultiplicity th at is the eve nt, insofar as the event

risks being subsumed into one large or supra-event that we can call , for

example, being, Badiou has to give an accou nt of something th at makes

events separable. Th e diag onalizing effect o f tim e does tha t. T his diagon a-

lizing or literally the m aking of two (dia) th a t is time, understood as an in ter

ven tion, preserves the rad ical uniqueness of events. H ence, the F rench

Revolution is considered unique as an event and preserves the uniqueness

o fits name. It occurred a t a specific time, w hich is no t the time o f the R us

sian Rev olution . It does n o t simply fall into the global flow of all mu ltiplici

ties. Fo r examp le, we cou ldju st think o f the F rench R evo lution as one series

of m ultiple hap pening s tha t coincides with other events, including the fall

of Ro m e, the conversion a t M ilvian Bridge, the signing of the T rea ty of

Versailles - all o f these happenings could simply be p a rt o f global hum an

history. Separating events from one another temporally preserves their

uniqueness and acts as a prophylactic against reducing them to a larger,

more homogenizing structure such as the universal or millennial readings

o f history tend ed to d o.38 W e m ust also consider the co rollary view o f

events as micro events. Not only does time as a localized intervention

divide one event from one another, there has to be som ething to divide the

m ini mom ents of events from one another. How do w edivide the event ofthe

storming o f the Bastil le from the m om ent o f the execution of the K ing from

the Reign o fTerror , which are al l mom ents of the event nam ed, ‘T he French

R ev olution ’? E ach o f those mini m om ents are m ini interventions, an d each

bespeaks a certain tim ing in th a t th ey flow in a given sequence. T h e ir loca-

lizability lets us know their temporal ordering. First comes the storming,




then the execution an d then the reign of terror. T here is a tem poral ordering

of events th a t flows from interven tions being localized in a specific tem pora l

sequence (historical/na tural situation) of, for exam ple, prior and posterior.

W hile c om m enting upon and reversing wh at D eleuze defines as an event,Ba diou fu rth er refines w h at he conceives of time as be ing.39 H e con tinues to

situate time w ithin the context of the event. An event canno t be tho ug ht of as

a p ast inseparab le from the future no r can it be conceived o f as being eter

nally past o f the future. H e argues, on the contrary, tha t the event is a dis

appearing separator, an un-temporal instant that separates an anterior

state (a site) of an object from a future state. It would app ear th a t Badiou

has shifted from describing an event bro ug ht abo ut by a specific interven

tion as completely temporal to un-temporal (intemporel). But, to argue thiswou ld be to fail to see tha t this un-tem pora l separation o f one state from

an oth er is merely a m om ent of differentiation. T h e tim e of events, as is the

case for D errid a, differentiates as is the case w ith th e Deux, b u t in his new

text it is described as a negation of time - a separation withou t time. N one

theless, a n even t also extracts time from a no ther time. T his extraction ofon e

time from an oth er tim e is described as a new time or w ha t Badiou caUs a new

present. T he event is neither future no r past; it is never to come. R ath er, it

‘m akes p rese nt th e p rese nt .’4O Like in Being and the Event, events give us time

and they subjectivate subjects, bu t they also give us a new time - a time th at

separates one state from another, b ut also makes being-there o f certain

worlds present in a mo re intense degree. Like D errida, B adiou admits tha t

there is und ecidability, bu t unlike D errida, Badiou m aintains th at time and

events can m ake objects, worlds, subjects present and cou ntable.

B adiou ’s notion o f time pushes one to ask: is time th e only thin g th at ind i

viduates events in the d iagonalizing fashion th at B adiou claims? Cou ld no t

space, politics or personal relations, etc. help distinguish one event from

ano ther event? For example, could not the French R evolution be individu

ated and singularized sim ply by the unique personalities th at played p arts in

the Revolution? There is only one Louis XVI, one Robespierre and one

Sa int-Just. W e can po stulate two reasons wh y Badiou would o bject to the

preceding questions. Fir st, and this is a philosophico-m eth odolo gic al con

sideratio n, Badiou wishes to be faithful to the legacy of Heidegg er, wh om

he names as the last philosopher to think seriously abo ut being. If Badiou

wishes to remain faithful to Heidegger, then temporality becomes key to

understanding one’s being in the world. Second, and more importantly,

time is bo th general and specific enough to incorp orate all of the elements

peculiar to an event, where as o ther in d ividuating and singularizin g reali ties

w ould not be sim ultaneously general an d specific enough to acco unt for the

com plexity o f events. Re turning to ou r previous exam ple of personalities, it




could be argued that events are larger than personalities themselves. The

French Revolution is not merely defined by certain key players like the

K ing and revolutionaries. O ne has to take into acco unt place, history and

economic changes, which in many ways are not identical with the key players in the event. For e xam ple , one h as to ta ke in to account o ther revolu

tionary movements that were inspirational for the French, especially the

American Revolution. Hunger, unemployment and a wretched standard

of living for huge sectors of the F renc h po pu lation also fed the R evo lution.

T im e is general enou gh th at one could include all of these factors, yet speci

fic enough tha t we can distinguish, for exam ple, the French Re volution from

the A m erican Rev olution. Simultaneous revolutions could be distinguished

by th e specific elem ents belo ngin g to the specific tim e o f the specific revolution. Each revolution has its own time a nd the elements th at belong to both

the ev ent an d the time o f the event are singu lar as well as gene ral.

Subjects carry out the interventions that give us events. The subject is

conceived as a localized, finite instanc e th at m akes interv en ing decisions.41

This ra dical form o f subjectivity an d the very becom ing of subjectivity are

challenging because B adiou recognizes in th at v ery becom ing ofth e subject,

the subject’s freedom to mak e events happ en. M oreover, events, when they

are named, are multiple in meaning although there has to be a coherency

and consistency in the naming as we saw earlier. In order to preserve the

consistency and coherency of the para dox ical m ultiple th at is undec idable

in its very nature and in order to give it a decidable naming as an event

(a nam ing th a t is also un na m ea ble - innomahéle - because of the emptiness

th a t is constitutive of its bein g), the subjective interv en tion needs to be dis

ciplined. F idelity has to e m erge.42

Fidelity could be tho ug ht o f in fou r sen se s/3 First, as the decision to be

consistent w ith the elements th at constitute the name of a ce rtain event.

Second, as new events arise, fidelity m eans th a t we preserve an d m aintain

the un icity of each event, m indful of the risk of easily subsuming each event

into other events and/or reducing events, especially through forgetting

(l’oubli), to the multiple th at is the situation. In oth er words, one must not

trea t events merely as situations. Fo r example, the even t nam ed the French

R evo lution is distinguished from a given gen eral situation . Fidelity, in this

case, would m ean b eing consistent w ith the various elements tha t are folded

into the regulative structure of the event.H W hen we refer to the nam ed

even t in history or in discussion, we have to be disciplined eno ugh o r faithful

enough to the event itself to recall th at Robespierre, Louis X V I, Saint-Just,

etc. are all elements th a t belon g to the e ven t itself. F idelity disciplines us to

see and think throu gh the singularity o f events. Likewise, ifw e are faithful,

it prohibits us from subsuming Marx, Hegel and Lenin within the same




revolutiona ry event. M arx and Len in were not present in th e situa tion (i. e.,

history) ou t of which the F rench R evolution came to appe ar as an interven

tion. Yet, this does not m ean th at events do n ot influence and co ndition one

ano ther. M arxists reread the history of the French Re volution along M arxist lines, especially with reference to feudal and bourgeois property. But the

und ecid able senses of the R ev olution itself and the fact tha t the R evo lution

itself draws from an historical situation that precedes M arx and Lenin

wo uld ensure tha t the French Revolution does not only become a m atter of

being faithfu l to th e M arxist readin g of his to ry . T he singula rity of th e

French Re volution is preserved while the re-ap prop riating of its m ultiple

senses continues to unfold. Also, following the second sense of the meaning

of fidelity ou tlined above, fidelity wou ld allow us to preserve the force of theDeux. Fidelity allows us to preserve the ra dica l un icity of the e vent nam ed

the French R evolution an d the radical unicity of the event th at is the Rus

sian Rev olution.

Third, fidelity has a temporal implication. Badiou calls fidelity a tem

poral orde ring (ordination temporelle). This m eans th a t w hen one thinks of

events and their con stitutive elements, one has to be fai thful to the se pa ra

tions that demarcate and distinguish one event from another. The second

sense of fidelity em phasized the singularity o f ea ch ev ent becau se the con

sistency ofelem ents belonging to th at eve nt was preserved. T he th ird sense,

thou gh dee ply conn ected to the second sense, wishes to emp hasize the dis

tinction or separation between events. This occurs because the separa

tion that time brings to each event allows each event to be singular unto

itself an d not reducible to oth er events. Fidelity to the tem po ral sepa ra

tion of events allows us to preserve the tru th of the singu larity of eac h po liti

cal event.

Finally, fidelity means a radical change in the way we lead our lives.

A truly singular event will affect and transform the way we lead our

lives in the gen eral situation. For exam ple, the events of the Am erican an d

Fren ch Re volutions m ake it unlikely for us to u nd erstan d a nd desire livi ng

un der an absolute m onarch, p referring to live by more contem porary dem o

cratic ideals. One of the signs that an event has truly distinguished itself

or ruptured from the general situation is its impact, the transformative

‘rew orkin g’ of ou r lives ‘ acco rd ing’ to the e vent itself.

Bad iou ’s use of the term fidelity is po ign an t because it recalls bo th a

fragility and a disciplined urgency. Th e tem poral orde ring of events by

the subject can become disordered and can be easily manipulated for the

sake of ulter ior motives that have no thing to do w ith the tru th o f the

situation . T he tru th o f a situa tion arises, according to Badiou, w hen we

make the decision to be faithful to an event. Given that history and nature



78 Badiou and Dem da

are situational for Badiou, both history and nature present themselves as

regim ented by the cou nting as one. T he consistency that is ascribed to situa

tions is also folded in to events, even th oug h even ts also exceed th e cou nting

as one in their un dec idab ility. Ea ch event an d the situatio n tha t is folded inthe event can be counted as a set ofm ultiples th at con tain pecu liar elements

th at define the set. O ne w ay to tell if an event is untrue is to detect w hethe r

certain elements belong to the event or not. Th e na tura l or historical situa

tion out o f which the event appears can help us to decide whether such

elements are prope r to the event or not. H ence, the event of C ana dian Con

federa tion has folded w ithin it an historical situation th a t is not redu cible to

or identical with the historical situation o f the Athe nian Golden Age. T he

question, however, still remains: who determines what belongs and whatdoes not belong to a set? One can easily make the claim that democracy

in the A thenian Go lden Age is key to C ana dian dem ocratic ideals found in

the event of C an ad ian Con federation. It could be described as an histori

cal unfolding of W estern democracy. Inter pre tation app ears to be key in

nam ing w hat elements belong to an event and w hich ones do not belong to

the event. There will always be ambiguity and undecidability that come

tostru cture our interpretation a nd understanding ofevents. Fidelity is a tool

th at we can use, but depen ding on who is interpre ting w ha t it m eans to befaithful to events and their constitutive elements, there is always the risk of

misinterpretation, abuse and being unfaithful to both the event and the

situation folded into the event.

This inh eren t weakness in the Bad iouan on tology is not to be inte rpre ted

as a con cep tual flaw. R at he r, the fragility of fidelity is pres en t because it

recognizes the perennial human tendency to be unfaithful to events and

their singularity. W e ca n easily reduce all various revolutions an d uprisings

to one category. Revolutionaries and liberators can be seen as enemies o f the

state. All revolutions o f w hatever ilk can be viewed as situations a nd m erely

as things tha t have to be dea lt with. T he ir force an d unicity ca n be un de r

mined. Fo r example, it could be argued th a t present-day China is slowly for

ge tting its M aoist an d agricultural revolutionary foundations. Some w ould

argue that China is not being faithful to the event that marked its radical

transformation unde r M ao because it has chosen to become m ore capitalist.

Furthermore, i t has moved away from a common property model to the

model o f indiv idua l pro pe rty ow nership. O thers, o f course, wo uld claim

th a t it is the n ext stage of the M aoist Revolution, an d hence, C hina is being

faithful to the consequences of its M aoist origins. T he term fidelity is an

interesting choice because fidelity is a virtue, a choice we make as subjects

in response to ce rta in events. W e can be un faithful ju st as we can be faithful,

if we choose to subj ectiva te ourselves in such a m ann er.



Badwu, time and politics 79

B adiou ’s notion o f fidelity raises the following question: ca n on e be fa ith

ful if one rejects pa st decisions or in tervention s th a t are considered to be

errors? W e believe th at one ca n be faithful in not sticking to pa st decisions.

How is this possible? A past intervention and its relevant senses may be judged to be irrelevant o r con trad ictory to present-day valu es and conven

tions. A new even t ma y alte r the w ay we view an old decision, an d fidelity to

the new ev en t would logically en tail th e rejection of a pas t decision.

Because fidelity is roo ted in subjective choice and because it is a term tha t

is associated with virtue, one wonders whether Badiou’s ontology leads to

ethics. If this is the case, ho w does one grou nd an ethics based on the subjec

tivating decision th a t is the tem po ral intervention? In o ther w ords, if it is all

ab ou t subjective decisions, the catego ries offidelity and unfaithfulness, goodand evil, seem superfluous. B adiou co uld be seen as moralizing, which seems

to coun teract the centrality o fthe subjectivating decision. T he crude im pli

cation o f a b rute un derstand ing o f the subjectivating interve ntion is ethical

relativism. Fidelity and unfaithfulness are categories that are determined

and interpreted by subjects alone. There is no objective or exterior world

to which one can app eal for some kind of ethical m easure. Bad iou’s volun

tarism could b e read as a lapsing into a Nietzschean W ill-to-Power. W e shall

deal with this charge later, but we do wish to note that the Badiouan subject

does not ac t alone. Th e subject is part of the w orld an d the na tural and his

torica l situation o f the w orld a re folded into subjectivating events. As we

shaU see later, historical an d na tura l situations hav e a limiting effect on th e

force ofsub jectivating interventions.

De spite the in here nt frag ility o f fidelity, th ere is a disciplining elem ent

th a t is presen t in Badiou’s concep t of fidelity or faithfulness. In ord er for

trut h to em erge, th a t is, the truth o f the situation, we have to be faithful to

the time th at is the event. Th e time th at is the interve ntion and the time tha t

makes one even t distinct from an oth er even t urges us to recognize the ele

m ents tha t are p rop er to the even t itself. T he ev ent th at gives us the time

called the Frenc h Re volution would m ake little sense if we spoke of it in

terms o f hav ing the following elements: the ru le of A lexander the G rea t

represented in Van Gogh’s Potato Eaters as somehow being central to the

excesses ofL ou is X V I. T he event itself imposes a fidelity (tem poral o rde r

in g - ordination temporelle) to its elements and to its general name. The

Fren ch R evo lution does hav e specific elem ents th at belong to it (e.g., Louis

X V I, B astille, etc .). I t has a specific tim e that can be linked to these elem ents

( 1789-92). These v ery elements distinguish the tim e o f the Frenc h Re volu

tion from the R ussian R evolution as two d istinct events.

O ne w onders whether or not D errida’s arch-structural undecidability of

all eve nts stymies th e possibility of acknow ledging the u nicity of political



80 Badiou and D e r L ·

events a nd being faithful to such events. T he simu ltaneous atte m pt to come

to presence bu t nev er being a ble to do so fully yields a n und ecid ab ility a bou t

events, bu t can one ever be faithful to an ything un ique in De rridean thou ght

oth er th an to unde cida bility itself, th at is, to dec on struction itself? In D errida’s text, Une certaine possibilité imposable de dire l’évenement, D errid a analyses

various events, inclu ding the events of gift-giving, pa rd on and confessing

one ’s crime. All events are ch ara cterize d by the do uble b ind of possibility

and impossibility. They are inherently undecidable, yet what is singular

about the gift, pardon or the criminal owning up to her crimes does not

come to the fore. Is there anything that can stand out or be counted ‘as

one’/ultr a ‘one’ aga inst this logic of un dec idab ility th a t D er rid a sees as

arch-structural?45 M aybe . T he only answer tha t can em erge is tha t ofund e-cidability. W e are n ot sure w ha t emerges or ifsom ething em erges as unique.

I f it is un iqu e or singular, it w ould hav e to posit its own absence, which

makes it impossible as well. D errid ea n dec idability w ill not allow any thing

to be coun ted as one or uniqu e. Yet, in term s of political events, it wo uld be

difficult to deny the u niqu e place th a t events such as the R ussian Re volution

and the Fall of Com munism occupy w ithin the scope ofhum an political rea

lity, esp ecially for those who hav e lived ‘acco rding to ’ (selon) such events.

Moreover, Derrida has made decisive political interventions that would

entail questioning the double bind logic that he sees as arch-structuring,

including his commitment to deconstruction, his call for the end of the

death pena lty, etc. T hese decisions are hardly unde cidable for D errida, for

they do not necessarily ad m it their own impossibility. W e shall re tur n to this

in m ore deta il later. Y et, such imp ossibility is vita l for Derr ida .46 D errid ean

events are sim ultaneously possible and impossible, so m uc h so, th at one is

no t even sure tha t one c an speak of events as happen ing in the first place.

A Derridean, however, could maintain that the undecidability bespeaks

the singularity. In other words, that which is undecidable, including the

event, is undecidable because its singularity cannot possibly contain all

the meanings that are proper to the event itself. In a way, the singularity

of the even t resists being fixed, absolutized o r being b rou gh t to presence

because we wish it to preserv e its ite rab le singularity or its excess, in

Badiouan terms. Badiou w ould agree w ith D errida, and Badiou’s notion of

the undecidable tries to account for that desire to resist ontotheology. For

Badiou, events rup ture and they emerge o u t of certain tem poral decisions

called interventions. T ho ug h their meanings m ay be m ultiple and undecid

able or absolutely ûnfixable, one can still be faithful to events because

they are singularized and separated by the time that is the intervention.

D errida decisively intervened . to read, always in an undec idable fashion,

the singular philosopher-event nam ed M arx in Spectres de Marx. Moreover,




one can nam e such events. If the D erridean erasure of the trace tha t is the

event is to somehow show itself, one w ond ers w hethe r one ca n even nam e it

or ifone can ever be faithful to it. D eco nstruction can be named and D errida

has been faithful to this singu lar ‘tru th ’. Derrid a even claim s th at différance is irreducible as an arch-structure. Again, we are left with an aporia: the

undecidability of D errida and B adiou points to the co ncom itant need to

acc ou nt for the sin gu larity of events like decon struction, an d o ne ’s fidelity

to deco nstruction an d its very nam eability or its cap acity to be counted as

on e/ultra one.

H aving discussed the no tion of time as interven tion an d the fidelity th at is

req uired in orde r to have a consistent ordering of the event thro ug h time an d

through human history, let us now give a concrete example in order todem on strate w ha t Badiou means when he speaks of intervention and fide

lity. B adiou gives the exa m ple of Rousseau.

In exa m ining R ou sseau’s political texts, especially Lecontratsocial, Badiou

applies me taphysical catego ries to the text. Badiou begins by referring to the

famous opening statement of the Social Contract: ‘M an is born free an d ev ery

where he is in chain s.’ H e rem arks that the goal of Rousseau is to exam ine

the conceptual requirements of politics, to think the being of politics.47

Badiou sees in Rousseau a thinker who has recognized that political think

ing, th at is, thinking a bo ut the being of politics, is not depe nde nt upon the

legitim ate sovereignty or the good civil ord er of a state. T he vast m ajority of

states are a-political, claims Badiou, a nd he sees in R ousseau the means o f

articu lating this position. Fo r Badiou, the social co ntra ct has been broken .

Politics has become truly rare.48 Badiou reads Rousseau as affirming that

politics is a procedure th a t has its o rigin s in an event.49

The social contract is not an attestable fact. Rousseau’s classical refer

ences to Greece and Rome are simply ornamental, so claims Badiou.5O

Prior to the an nou nce m ent of a social contrac t, there is a na tura l state

where individuals are dispersed. In such a natural state, that is, before the

social con tract, there are m any pa rticu lar wills. M ter the social con tract,

the re is one com m on will tha t emerges. T h e co n trac t itself articulates the

subm ission of the pa rtic ula r wills to the one general w ill. W ith th e event of

the social con tra ct the general will emerges as does the bo dy po litic.51

Badiou’s reading shows us how he would interpret the appearance of

poli tics th rough the work o f R ousseau. T he le gis la to r is seen as the subject

who ca rries ou t the interven tion. T h e legislator is present bu t she is also not

present. T h e le gisla tor makes l aw s, and as such, she is present as th e in te r

vening subject tha t brings ou t the event in a certain time and space. She is

not present in that the law is not reducible to the legislator. The legislator

is no t the law stricto sensu. Tim e an d space, here, refer to the diagona lizing of



82 Badiou aand D m ida

the Deux;. In passing legislation tha t m akes the p ac t artic ula te itself as an

event, the legislator separates th e event from o ther events (e.g., the time o f

the M agna C arta) and yields a space w herein the uniqueness of the event

can come to the fore. Also, there is a marked change in the way we areto lead our lives. W e no longer live in the time o f the reign of Louis XV I.

W e have th e tim e of the social con tract ofR ousse au a s a singular event in

the chronological situation th a t is hu m an history. Badiou sees Rousseau as

offering tho ug ht abou t the natu re ofw hat i t m eans to be a peo pleengaged in

political th in king, th a t is, the in dividual wills deciding to subsum e th em

selves as a b ody politic und er a general will throu gh the in terven tion o f the

signers of the c on tract. Finally, one can b e faithful to the tem pora l ordering

of the social co ntrac t by recognizing its co nstituent elements and recognizing its unique time in the gen eral chronology of the situation. T h e social

con tract is not the same as mo narch ical rule. Being faithful to the elements

th at constitute rule by the social co ntrac t mean s tha t the legislator has to

upho ld th e principles and aims of the social co ntra ct, en suring tha t it does

not slip into a n absolute monarchy. T he decision to let the event be sub

t rac ted (soustraire) from the undecidable multiple that is the situation is

described by Badiou as trans-being (trans-etre). But trans-being does not

m ean tha t the event completely transcends the m ultiple and the situational

th at are folded into the be ing o f the event as conditions of its being sub

tracted uniquely unto itself. Trans-being refers to the doubleness of the

event. O n one han d, it has as a condition of its being, the m ultiple situation

(i.e. , m ultiple wills in natu re). O n the o ther h and, there is a uniqueness of

the event th at is p ro pe r to it.52

Given Badiou’s position, a question arises: since the social contract is

signed by m ost of us only tacitly and not a t a pa rticu lar tim e in ou r lives,

does not the social contract becom e an atem pora l event? Yes and no. Th e

event o f the social con tract is an terior, b u t it is also future. L ater we shall

see how Badiou speaks of the time o f politics as the future anterior. I f we

are conscious of the past ev ent th at is the social contra ct and if we choose to

rem ain faithful to its implications, th en w e carry the p ast event with us into

our p resent lives and into a ny fu ture political and social decisions we make.

O ur governm ent structures an d conventions are attem pts to be faithful to

the im plications o f the social contract. O n the ta cit leve l or the unconscious

level, we may live our lives in a social and political context without being

aw are of the p ast event called the social contract. W e simply take it for

gra nted . In this case, one wonders whethe r we are eng aging in politics at

all in the Badioua n sense, which will be discussed in the ne x t section. O n e

can , how ever, be faithful to th e social co ntrac t by engaging in a specific pol

itics th at could be seen as faithful to the social co ntr ac t and still be un aw are




o f the even t called the social co ntr ac t. In this sense, one cou ld be seen as

atemporally subscribing to the ideals of the social contract because one is

oblivious to th at foun dationa l event. But such a lack o f political conscious

ness m ay lead to a forgetting o f the im pac t o f the past event of the socialcon tract. This forgetting an d unconscious fidelity to the p ast ideals of the

social contract in the present and in the future may weaken fidelity to

the event an d all tha t implies. W itho ut an explicit consciousness o f the poli

tical event nam ed ‘social co ntra ct’, one could conceivably m an ipu late the

m ultiplicity of elements th at belong to the set t h a t is the social contract,

thereby introducing elements that may be antithetical to the social con

tract, including oligarchic an d an ti-dem ocratic po litical elements th at may

belong to ano the r tim e, in clu din g the tim e o f th e Sun K ing.Bad iou believes th at politics, conceived as a think ing o f the being o f the

poli tical, is ra re .53 Lik e R ousseau’s text, all o f the classic te xts o f politics,

including the texts of Plato, A ristotle, H egel an d Sch m itt, to na m e ju st a

few, are ahistorical in the sense that they are not merely historical facts;

they are events. W e still eng age these texts in o rd er to seek ou t th eir political

relevance, th eir political being. W hen B adiou reads R ousseau in the way he

does, that is, throu gh th e optic ofh is own on tology o f the eve nt, he succeeds

in bringing o ut one of the m ultiple senses th at are folded into the po litical

thinking of Rousseau. D errida does the same w hen he reads texts. Badiou

demonstrates how we are to think through the political that is folded into54

certa in events.

B a d i o u o n p o l it ic s

Up until this point, we have tried to sketch what Badiou means when he

identifies time as an interv en tion an d when he says tha t fidelity is a tem pora l

ordering. We would like to turn our attention now to an examination of

what Badiou means by the term politics. Although we have anticipated

some of this discussion in the foregoing trea tm en t o f Badiou, we w ould like

now to bring o ut its fuller sense. Follow ing P lato, B adiou sees the role of po l

itics as establishing new way s to beg in politics.55 U ltim ate ly, Ba diou wishes

to think the new category of the tru th ofpolitics, which w ould requ ire him to

be faithfu l to the events o f po litics. H e wishes to th ink th rough the singula r

ity of events. T he q ue stion for Badiou, th en, is w ha t is politics?

Badiou conceives o f politics in term s of the possible an d the im pos

sibility of tota lity.56 W h at he wishes to m ake possible is the tru th o f politics

contained in events. T he possibility o f articu lating the sing ularity of truth

th at is present in a situated event has folded into its stru ctu re the impossible




or the un decidab le of the situation. A ccordingly, B adiou remarks, ‘ .. .jepose

expressément que la politique est l’art de l’impossible'. 57 T he un dec idab le th at is the

multiple can become decidable or possible and, ultimately, interpretable,

alb eit m ultiply so.58With the publication of Peut-on penser la politique? (1985), Badiou con

ceived of all interv ention s as political. In his m ore rec ent wo rk, Abrégé de

métapolitique (1998), B adiou fills ou t the m ean ing of a p olitical eve nt by

articulatin g certain conditions th at m ake an e vent political. By employing

both th e earlie r and later texts of Badiou, I hope to provide a m ore com

plete sketc h of w hat B adio u understands by calling events poli tical. In his

earlier writings of 1985, Badiou distinguishes be tw een the pre-p olitical and

the po litical. T he pre-political is wh at Ba diou describes late r in L ’être et l’événement as natur e. In the e arly text, Peut-onpenser lapolitique?, the pre-political

is a com plex of facts and pron oun cem ents. Still faithful to his M arxist roots,

Badiou wishes to confine these pre-political facts to ‘working-class’ and

‘popular’ singularities ( singularités ouvrières etpopulaires). 59 H ence , any p op u

la r collectivity of wo rkers, for exam ple, would be co nsidered pre-political.

T he political is defined as th a t which establishes in the regim e of the in ter

vention the consistency o f the event and the propa gation above and beyond

the pre-political situation. F idelity is the po litical orga niza tion, th a t is, thecollective pro du ct o f consistency abov e a nd beyon d the im m ediate sphere.60

Badiou gives an e xam ple of w ha t he takes the po litical to be when he

employs the example o f the T alb ot F actory in F ranc e.61

T w o m ajo r changes oc cur in B adiou’s progressive refinements of his posi

tion. First, the explicitly Marxist language found in his earlier text slowly

falls into the bac kgrou nd, albeit never disappearing com pletely. This coin

cides w ith the dissolution of the old US SR . H ence, the pre-p olitical is not

necessarily confined to ‘worker’ and ‘popular’ movements. Badiou main

tains, as we shall see shortly, th a t a collec tivity of subjects is necessary for

the p olitical. T he collectivity need n ot be a collectivity of workers or a po p

ul ar collectivity. It could be a collectivity o f subjects no t necessarily belong

ing to the workers’ class. T he notion ofthe p op ular w orker movem ents ofthe

pre-p olit ic al is repla ced by th e collectivity of th e poli tical. Second, in

Badiou’s earlier w ork a n intervention is not thou ght o f in tem pora l terms.

R ath er , it is solely inte rpre tative .

In Badiou’s later work, three conditions m ust be m et if an event is to

be consid ered poli tical. I will m ention them briefly here, bu t th ey will

be further develo ped as th e chap ter develops. F ir st, an event is considered

poli tical if the m aterial o f the event is collectiv e.62 Second, th e collective

ch ara cter of a political event must affect present-day poli tics and the c ha r

ac te r of situa tions.63 Finally, politics emerges when a relatio nsh ip exists



between the event and the S tate (l'Etat). In asking ab ou t such a relation,

one brings to the fore the possibility of m easuring state po w er (puissance éta

tique). Politics em erges wh en the even t is rela ted to the excessive force o f the

State im posing its power on the inh ab itants o f the State.64Th e em phasis on the collectivity is an extension o f Ba diou’s no tion o f

the m ultiple an d the being cou nted as one th at is folded into the m ultiple.

This, however, does not mean that the multiplicity is reducible to one of

its parts. In this emphasis on collectivity, politics is seen as an extension

ofBadiou’s ontology.

It should be rem arked th at there is a tem poral qua lification of the politi

cal tha t is not to be exclusively identified with the time th a t is the interv en

tion. Fo r something to be considered political, it has to somehow be releva ntto politics today , the gene ral (situationa l) politics of the day. W hy does

Badiou m ake this claim? If something is not releva nt for the politics of the

day , for the politics o f the tem po rally present, it would simply be a fact

am ong facts th a t could easily exist w ithin the dom ains of na ture an d history

(situation); it would lapse into the general m ultiplicity of the situation and

it could neve r take o n the status of an in terve ntion . If we follow Ba diou ’s

cond ition ofp resen t political relevance, political thinking becom es attache d

to the rup tur ing of the event a nd the faithful reworking of the event in ourda ily lives.

T o co ntinue with the example ofM ay ’68, w hat relevance do the events of

M ay ’68 have for us today politically in ligh t of the situation we find ou r

selves in at the moment? Badiou says that today’s situation is marked by

the gen eral excesses of capitalism, glob al econ om ization and the p ractical

non-existence of political thou gh t th at has been replaced by the economic

m ana gem ent o f state affairs. If M ay *68 was truly a po litical intervention,

it was a decision to act. T his decision, ifi t is to be releva nt, m ust no t merely

be thought, b u t it m ust be thought w ith in th e context o f our present-day

situatedness. If there is no present-day relevance, the n the ev ent of M ay

1968 falls into the factua lity o f na ture or history. T he event m erely becomes

an historica l fact th a t scholars ca n de bate an d clarify. Being faithful to the

Sp irit of M ay ’68, political action could con ceivably consist in tryin g to

resist an d c han ge the abo ve-m en tione d excesses.

T he claim of B adiou’s emphasis on co ntem po rary relevance is tha t an

event is political only if it is relevant. T his leads to th e p roblem atic question:

can an ev ent be political a nd not explicitly releva nt to the ge nera l political

situation hie et nunc? Yes and no. By definition an event would rupture the

gene ral political state of affairs an d w ould m ark a ch ang e in the lives of

subjects here an d now . By definition, then, it wou ld be releva nt to the lives

ofindividuals. But one could also envision political events th at m ay be tacit

Badiou, time and polities 85



86 Badiou and D w ^L ·

and implicit w ithin a situation. T he m arked change is delayed or felt much

later th an the actual event. In other words, an event occurring at t ime x may

only introd uce rad ical cha ng e a t the later time y. T he force of the event is

delayed, w hich mean s th a t there is a split betwe en the actu al occurrence ofthe event and its political relevance. If this is the case, then how do we

ac co un t for this split, especially if the in terv en tion itself is supposed to

be te m pora l? W e see B adio u countering such a charge by sa yin g th a t

tho ug h this split m ay go un notice d a t the very insta nt the event occurs, one

could poten tially see the con nection th rou gh the ope ration of fidelity.

O ne could, in retrospective appreh ension , for exam ple, seize the connection

betw een a la ter effect and a n earlie r in te rvention. Fid eli ty , in th is case,

would consist of ensuring tha t the elements of the event are p rope rly madetem po rally con sistent wi th the even t itself. So, the delaye d effect of po liti

cal relevance must be attached to its antecedent, i.e., the intervention.

But the re is no gu ara nte e th a t this split will be m ade consistent. T he re is also

the risk that no faithful connection is made, in which case contemporary

relevance wo uld ap pe ar not to be a condition for the political.

Moreover, the link to present political thinking and acting bears rele

vance for subjectivation, tha t process o f becom ing a subject. Th e po pu lar

emph asis on th e to-day o r th e possibility of the p resen t is severely criticized

by D errida in L ’autre cap. For Badiou, the present or the to-day is vital. If a

subject only becom es a subject thro ug h acts of intervention, then there is a

need to give som e ac co un t of the s ituatio n o f the subject, which is necessary

for the interv en tion to take place. By atta ch ing politics to the present-day

situation o f politics, Badiou is be ing consistent. H e is mindful of the condi

tions necessary for subjectivation to take place. Political interventions are

dou ble in th at they have a n existence th at is pro per to themselves, bu t they

are also relia nt up on the m ultiple situations which are folded into interv en

tions and wh ich m ake them possible. T he time o f M ay ’68 could not have

happened without the general political s ituation that came before it and

the situation tha t em erged after ’68. T he political and econom ic structures

that w ere present an d w ere seen to be insufferable were rejected throug h the

interve ntion of ’68. But tha t event, thou gh it is unique as a political event,

could not have hap pen ed unless the situation o f political malaise and discon

tent antic ipa ted it. M oreover, if we are to rem ain faithful to the event of

’68, it mu st be th ou gh t of as somehow releva nt to the situation o f today

while a t the same time preserv ing the singularity th at is unique to the event

o f ’68 as well. T he event o f’68 m ay be thought ab ou t and m ay be recalled

in ou r present-day protests an d de m onstrations against the growing world

ord er o f economics, which tends to be systematically an d violently orga

nized in such a fashion to preserve and promote Western interests. The




situation ofhegemony that caused subjects to intervene in ’68 still lingers,

an d if we are faithful to ’68, we can con tinue to decide to en act ou r subjec

tivity even further by co ntinuing to pro test th e injustices an d excesses o f an

economic elite in W esternsociety, e.g., W estern oil interests, ultim ately ca lling for m ajor econom ic and p olitical change.

O u r becom ing subjects is dep end ent up on the doubleness of events.

O n th e one hand, our interventions are depe nden t upon the general political

situation we find ourselves in. O n the othe r, if we are to rem ain faithful

to events or if we are to enac t new events, then we h ave to intervene some

how in the situation a nd rup ture it, thereby creating a new window for poli

tical thinking a nd political activity. O u r subjectivity can only subjectivate,

acco rding to Badiou, within this con text ofinterventions. B ut this intervention is alwa ys a choice, for we ca n alway s choose to rem ain w ithin th e realms

ofhistory an d natu re as well. Historically, we can do w ha t Laz arus suggests

we do in his nominal thinking. Naturally, we can do what science does

insofar as it presents a series o f exp lanations a nd aetiologies th a t are to be

interpreted as facts about our existence. In either case, our subjectivity is

stymied. In the case o f the former, we become a creature of m ere reflection,

a th ird p arty ob server. In the case of the latter, we are reduced to facts about

ourselves, which are essentially depersonalized and desubjectivized in the

sense th at they are presented in the th ird p erson or in an objective sense.

T he final cond ition t h a t Badiou lays o ut as essential for politics is th at pol

itics m akes visible the invisible an d excessive force o f the S tate. Bad iou says

th a t politics, if it is to be politics, will give us a gene ral state o f affairs. But

poli tics a lso has a unique functio n in th a t i t should serve to m easure th e tan

gible and excessive force that is the State. The State is a ruling power and

comes to show itselfnegatively in its ability to abuse its pow er over its citi

zens. Obvio usly, for Badiou, the S tate is conceived as excessive. H e has no

gre at attac hm en t to the State a nd sees its very organiza tion as limiting to

subjectivity because it reduces the collectivity to an objec t and subjects are

ultim ate ly defined by the sta te (etat) o f the S tate (l’£ tat) . It is excessive

because it is seen as lim it in g and repress in g possibilities for in terventio ns to

take place , a nd , hence, for subjects to subjectivate themselves.

H ow does the S tate give us a state o f excessive an d crushing force, and how

does politics help us mea sure a nd m ake visible tha t crushing force? Again,

let us turn to the time o f M ay ’68. In p articular, let us focus on the Fren ch/

Italia n universities. State-sanctioned laws an d conventions m ade possible

structures th at were auto cratic, elitist and m arginalizing, thereb y excluding

Fren ch studen ts from accessing fully their rights to a state-funde d educa tion.

In Italy, universities we re structured in a sim ilar m an ne r, w here professors

an d certain key adm inistrative figures controlled m ost of the pow er and



88 Badioum and D e r d a

decided w ha t was suitable and valid w ithin the curriculum and w ithin the

various institutes o f the u niversity. All studen ts claimed the r igh t to study 65

and did not conceive of a university as a privilege. Kn ow ledge was to be

m ade accessible, a nd henc e the proposals to restrict the num ber o f studentsatte nd ing ce rtain classes (the fam ous numerus clausus pe titions) were seen as

unacceptable. T he stifl ing atmo sphere o f academ ic life an d its heavily bou r

geois undertones provoke d M arxist-inspired protests a nd rallies, culm inat

ing in the seizure ofvarious classrooms and the disruption of academ ic life by

ce rtain professors an d students.

T he tension between a n old gu ard an d an avan t-garde was the general

state o f affairs. Th e event of M ay ’68, throug h rallies, dem onstrations and

protests , b rough t to ligh t the excessive forc e o f the S tate in its sanctio nedregula tions concerning th e stru ctu re of the university. In this profound

sense, the even t of M ay ’68 n ot only m ad e visible the excesses o f the Sta te

an d its bo urge ois un iversity adm inistra tors, it was also successful in effecting

radical change in the way university students in France and Italy are edu

cated today. W ith this last condition we see again how Bad iou wishes to

m ake politics active a nd forceful within the context o f his thou ght. Badiou,

how ever, sees politics not m erely as thou gh t thinking itselfin its singularity

or in its interiority.

Ad m ittedly, our analysis of M ay ’68 m ay be re ad as naïve, for it does not

take into accou nt m ore c ritical views of M ay ’68, including those of A lain

Finkielkraut66 and Luc Ferry67. Both Ferry and Finkielkraut see May ’68

as a failure. C ritics of M ay ’68 ma y even question wh ether M ay ’68 was

truly an e vent orju st an exagge ration on the pa rt ofleft-leaning intellectuals

an d un ion leaders. A m ore detailed an d h istorical analysis of M ay ’68 is

necessary in o rde r to p rob e deeply the critiques o f Finkielkraut and Ferry,

especially in relation to the claims ofB adiou . W e do no t prete nd to take on

this analysis here. O u r intention here is to give an exam ple of w hat B adiou

considers a po litical event. T he de ba te over the validity of evenem ental

status of M ay ’68 continues. If anything, the continued deb ate over M ay

’68 may be re ad as be ing faithful to the ev en t itself because thinkers an d

critics are trying to tease out the various meanings of the elements th at a re

constitutive of M ay ’68. In fact, th e continued d ebates are w hat Badiou

desires, in pa rt, because these debates are a constan t rethinking ofw ha t po l

itics is a nd w ha t it entails.

Ultimately, politics for Badiou must be considered an intervention, as

shown by Bad iou’s ea rly work. P olitics m ust also m eet th e three con ditions

discussed above, as articu lated in his more recen t work. O ne of the cen tral

proble m s th a t emerges from B adiou’s though t is th a t tim e, poli tics and

intervention are all synonymous words. This problem must be addressed,




and I see the nex t section o f m y work as doing just tha t. I will exam ine how

the Ba dioua n concepts of intervention, t ime and polit ics are re la ted bu t

distinct. W e shall also try to give an exam ple of how time, politics an d inte r-

vention function, de m on strating their relation b ut also the ir distinction.

T im e a n d p o li t ic s in B a d i o u ’s t h o u g h t

Let us proceed to clarify the relationship between intervention, t ime and

poli tics. Needless to say, B adiou’s clarification o f these concepts is ongoing.

In an interview included in the English t ransla t ion of his e thical work

en titled Ethics, B adiou ann ou nce d a revision o f some of his ideas.68 Politicsis that thinking and acting that comes to appear as singular within the

m ultiplicity of the situa tion thro ug h a n interven tion. Politics comes ab ou t

through the intervention that temporal ly punctuates the prepoli t ical .

Politics does so throu gh the procedu re of interventions th at bring a bo ut69

an event.

T he re is a ru ptu re o f the prepo litical, and w ith this rup ture one begins

to see a distinction betw een the prep olitical and the explicitly political as

w ith the ex amp le o f M ay ’68. T he future o f the event, especially if oneis faithful to the tem po ral orde ring th at is implied in an ev ent in its future

signif icance, will continue to be interpreted in a m ea n in ^ u l mann er .

There is an anter ior i ty and a futur i ty to the event that br ing to l ight the

polit ical. A ccordin gly, Badiou speaks o f the re a l t im e o f poli tics as a fu tu re* · · ... 70a n t e n o n t y .

L et us give a concrete exam ple of how tim e and politics relate. W e have

previously discussed the even t o f M ay ’68. T h ere was a prepolitical sta te

o f affairs tha t was anterior to the interven tion th a t was M ay ’68. In this prepolitical s tate, the S ta te was seen as showin g its excessive fo rce by its

bourgeois restrictions an d elite hierarchies. B oth w orker and studen t w ere

subject to w hat was then perceived by some of them to be unjust work and

study conditions. The stormings, protests and seizures ofvarious key politi-

cal and acad em ic insti tut ions were the ev ent tha t rup ture d the s ta te of the

prepolitical. In th a t very event th a t cam e abou t by the decis ive action o f

a collectivity o f subjects to bring ab ou t singular, ‘cou ntab le’ and un ique

change, politics becomes apparent for Badiou. The political comes to the

fore in three ways because three co nditions have been m et. First, a collectiv-

ity acted, second, there was a definite relation to the politics of the day as

evidenced by the rupture and violence against established French institu-

tions an d conv entions. Fina lly, the force an d violence o fth e pro tests as acts

of civil disobedience showed the m easure o f State p ow er over the state of



90 Badiou and Derid a

affairs in which students and workers found themselves at that point in

t im e. In o the r words, the violent react ion on the pa r t of s tudents and work-

ers was a response in kind or in the same m easure to the violence th at the

State w as exerting on the ev eryday state of affairs o f the prepolitical situa-tion. The interventions that brought about the event named May ’68 re-

p u n c tu a ted the everyday chronic le o f the everyday state o f affair s. R ad ica l

changes were mad e in the w ay peop le l ived th eir lives and in th e way stu-

dents studied at French universities. Fidelity to the event consists in

m aking sure tha t the tem po ral order ing (counting) o f the ev ent is preserved

along w ith the singularity of the ev ent an d all the elements th at i t contains

w i th in the context of a present th inking ab ou t the event th a t took p lace

almo st forty years ago. H ence, w hen B adiou reflects on M ay ’68 w ithin thecontext o f the present day, in th e real pol it ical t im e o f the future a nter ior ,

there a re restr ic t ions imposed by the being of the event i tself on their think-

ing. O ne ca nn ot exclusively think thro ug h th e political consequences ofsuch

an event wi th in the f ram ework of the A m er ican R evolution or w i th in the

framew ork o f free A m erican Blacks fighting for the freedom of all black

slaves du r ing the A m erican Civil W ar. W ithin the context of th e French un i-

versity today, one could certainly draw upon May ’68 for clarif ication of

ce r ta in policies and structures th at are c urre ntly in place , especial ly con-cerning the s tudy of philosophy. F or exam ple , Jean Lu c M ar ion’s recent

call for a re tur n to the m etaph ysical giants o f philosophy (Aristotle,

Thom as A quinas and K an t) and the desi re to res t ric t the s tudy o f contem -

p o ra ry trends in philosophy, a p a r t from M a rio n ’s ow n phenom enological

thoug ht , ironically enough, can be seen as an a t tem pt to push back French

academ ic philosophy to a cano n tha t was in place pr ior to the event of M ay

’68 .71 Th is calls into question the b reak thro ug hs tha t M ay ’68 achieved,

including the necessi ty of reading con tem po rary, radical tho ugh t , whichsome wo uld jud ge to be m argin al, especially if it is antime taphy sical. Fide -

lity to the events of M ay ’68 w ithin the s tructures o f the F rench universi ty,

some could say, will ensure th at the pu sh by conservat ives like M arion com e

into quest ion w ithin the framew ork of the event nam ed M ay ’68.

T he events tha tB ad iou refers to, be i t M ay ’68, the Fren ch R evolut ion, or

the R uss ian R evolution , a re a l l co llec tive events th a t hap pe n on a g rand

scale. But wh at a bo ut sub jectivating events th at can be ju st as political and

ju s t as collective, b u t n o t on the scale th a t Badiou discusses? F o r exam ple,there is the case of the dea th of a b eloved family m em ber . Th is may change

family poli tics and m ay even chang e the w ay cer ta in family memb ers do

politics an d experie nce poli tic s to day . F o r exam ple , th e d ea th o f a lo ved

one because of an incom petent m edical proced ure m ay cause family m em -

bers to lo se fa ith in th e m ed ical system a n d th e polit ics o f h ea lth ca re th a t



Bodiou, time m d politics 91

p u n c tu a te the news chronic les of con tem p o rary socie ty . As a sm aller collec-

tivity, the family can intervene to petition for changes in the delivery of

hea lth care. Faithfulness to this event could co nceivably en tail the family

advocating a reform of the health care system or even a subversion of thehea lth care system for othe r poten tial patients. W ithin the description tha t

Badiou gives o f events, could there be a distinction betw een m icro and

macro events? We think that Badiou would make space for such micro

events w ithin the framew ork o f his ontology, b u t we are pressed to f ind con-

crete examples of such micro events playing themselves ou t, altho ug h he

does me ntion in passing, as we saw earlier , the love of a cou ple as being an

event. All events open the emptiness w here events com e to ar t icula te them -

selves, be they m icro or ma cro events. Even ts need no t be exclusively m acroevents. I t sho uld also be rem ark ed th at the events th at Bad iou focuses on

tend to be male and W estern, except with reference to the M aoist Revo lu-

tion. O ne wonders w hether focusing on w om en’s em ancip at ion in E urop e or

N o rth A m erica, for exam ple , as a po litical event, w ould hav e h ad any

im pac t on the way we view events an d think politics. C ertainly, the singu-

lari ty of such an event would have b een unique, a nd hence one can assume

tha t the theory of Badiou could accom m odate such a n event as the Su ffra-

gette M ovem ent in Can ada , e tc . But one has to ask w hether nam ing no sin-gu lar female and no significant non Eu rope an event w ith the ex ception of

the Chinese Revolution does not betray some political blindness on the

p a r t ofB adio u.

Finally, if politics m ust be collective, an d if sub jectivating only occurs

w ithin the framewo rk o f events, can a subject exist th at subjectivates itself

outside o f a collectivity? A nd can no t a collectivity stif le an d stymie subjec-

tivity in its singularity? In other words, how can Badiou simultaneously

claim the unicity o f a sub ject that em erges from a n in terve ntion o f a p olitical

even t and the necessity for political events to be collective? I t w ould a p pe ar

tha t the singu larity o f sub jectivity, in a p olitical sense, can o nly come to the

fore as a collectivity. The radical individuality that is the human person,

especia lly the embodied hu m an person, can n ever come to the fore through

poli tics. T h e unique indiv idual an d personality o f th e subject a re subsum ed

in to the collectivity th at is con dition al for politics to emerge.

W e m ainta in tha t Badiou could respond to such a chal leng e by arguing

th a t a collectivity is to be distinguished from a n identity. T ho ug h a collec-

tivi ty is necessary, a col lectivity d ^ ^ no t work as a hom ogeneous, ^d f ie d

blo ck. T h e m ultip le can never be r edu ced to o r collapsed to th e overarch ing

one o f iden tity. M oreover, the interv en tion g ua ran tees tha t the Deux* is

always present an d preven ts a collapse into the one. A collectivity is a collec-

tion or a m ultiplicity of those who can be c ou nted as one, whose subjectivity




p ro perly em erges as un ique th ro u gh events. E ach subjectiv e s ingu larity is

affected by an ev ent, bu t each singu larity requires the force of the com m on-

ality o f a collectivity in ord er th at intervention s ma y truly subjectivate sub-

jec ts th rou g h the events they b rin g about.T he unicity of subjectivity can only come ab ou t th rou gh the collectivity

and the shared decision to intervene w ithin the realm o f the m ultiple in

order to b ring ab ou t singular events th at are subjectively singularizing as

they are sing ularly tem po ral. In this view of sub jectivity, B adiou follows

the view of thinkers like H eidegg er an d E dith Stein, who believe th a t there

is no such thing as a pure subject or ind ividua lity o r oneness. T he subject is

un ique insofar as it is con ditioned by the m ultiple. Badiou ca n be seen as

sha ring in the view of subjectivity o f H eidegg er a nd his no tion o f Mitseinand Stein’s notion of the person as multiple (Vielkeit von Personen) in the

sense th at Badiou too advocates a view ofsubjectivity th at is simultaneou sly

mult iple and made singular through the subject ivat ion that is brought

abo ut by events , bu t tha t proprium or unicity th at belongs to events is no t to

be c onceived as a s im ple one o r u n ity . U ltim a te ly , the oneness th a t is presen t

in B adiou’s tho ug ht is not th e one of iden tity b u t th e ‘one ’ of a collective.

T o even speak of th eo n e for Badiou is a m isnomer in itself, an d so , we should

speak more o f s ingulari ties o r being cou nted as one/u l tra one b u t not of thereductive one ofide ntity.

B a d io u a n d D e r r id a

T hu s far , I have tr ied to show two things. First, th at recent thou gh t em er-

ging in France over the last ten years has had something significant to say

abo ut the relationship betw een tim e and politics. Second, I hav e also tried

to offer a critique of the aforementioned emerging thought, weaving

together an accoun t of how t ime and poli tics re la te . M y acco unt , however ,

up un ti l this point , remains incomplete , for I have m erely given the raw

m ater ia l extracted f rom the r ich mines o f philosophical th ou gh t within the

philosophical te rra ins o fJacq u es D errid a and A lain Badiou. In general, th e

two philosop hers covered do no t view politics in terms o f a social consensus

build ing to b ring ab o u t ce rta in decis io ns (lepolitique). R ather , they a l l are

critical o f this com m on co ncep tion o f politics as politicking or as m an age -

m ent o f a poli t ical economy. T hey wish to create a t imespace where a gen-

uine possibili ty exists for political think ing o utside the presen tday m odel o f

doin g politics. In oth er wo rds, the y wish to offer a new possibility for think -

ing po litics as po litical philosop hy (La po litique ).




F o r D errida, this possibility of politics becomes structured by th e und e

cidabili ty of the tem porizing double bind s truc ture o f possibili ty a nd impos-

sibility that is the democracy to come. For Badiou, politics essentially

becom es a m eans for th e subject to sub jectivate herself . T his is achievedthrou gh the decisive interven tion th at is conceived as time.

O ne of the m ajor p roblems w ith the views presented is their very connec-

tivity, especially since the two think ers have diverg ent no tions of t im e. H ow

can the various conceptions of t ime relate to one a no ther? A nd how does this

em erging larg er acco un t of t im e affect the political vision tha t these two

thinkers wish to advance? In short, it is incum ben t up on m e at this po int to

offer some kind of gen eral accou nt in which these two thinkers can a rticu -

late themselves in term s o f the relatio nsh ip b etw een ti me an d p olitics. It isthis gen eral acco un t th a t seeks to give acco un t o f how tim e an d politics

relate aporetically.

L et us firs t tum our a t tent ion to t ime. Tim e, for D err ida , m ust be con-

ceived in two modes: temporizat ion and temp oral izat ion. T he form er can

be th o u g h t o f in term s o f a n onorig inary o rig in th a t structures o r condi-

tions, b u t which c an never be fuüy present. Th e latte r sense of t im e refers to

that t ime that we commonly understand as the present , past and future .

Tim e, in this sense, has various tenses, to borrow a g ram m atical category.Th ese tw o mod es o f t ime d o not s tand in a causal rela tionship in the sense

tha t on e m ust f irs t have tem poriza tion before one can have tem poraliza-

tion. R athe r , both temp orization and tem poral ization ope rate together and

simultaneously. The delay and differentiation (dijfrance) that is spatio

tem po rizatio n simultaneou sly struc ture tem poralized realities such tha t

exp erience d tem po ralized realities m anifest them selves in consciousness as

delayed and dif ferentia ted.

T he problem w ith the De rr idean concept of t im e is tha t reali ty, whenstruc tured by the do uble b ind structu re o f possibili ty an d impossibili ty,

becom es undecidable. T he pecu liar a n d tem porized po litical a rticu la tio n o f

this un de cidab ility is the dem ocracy to come. O n o ne ha nd , D errid a’s insigh t

is correc t . Th e no ng ua rantee o f the future, prese nt an d pa st coming to fuU

presence c o n ta ined ‘in ’ the m odel o f the p rom ise d em o n stra te h ow situations

rem ain un decidab le or o pen ende d, es pecially politically. Th ejus tice, hospi-

ta lity and responsibility th a t D errida sees as pecu liar to the dem ocracy he

advo cates m ust simul taneously include the articu lation o f their very impos-

sibility, n am e ly, i nj ustice, inh osp itality an d irrespo nsibility.

O n the o ther han d, i f m at te rs rem ain undec idable , then how do we make

any c on crete, an d co nsequ ently lim ited, decisions, especially w hen the

pressing violence or i nju stice o f a s ituation ca lls us to act? I f u nd ec idability

emerges as a concrete result from the tem poral s tructure of the dem ocracy to




come, the n any kind of tem po ralized politics will con com itantly suffer from

this un dec idability. W hy b oth er acting when things will ultimately rem ain

openended and unresolved? Th ou gh this is problem atic for D errida, we can

turn to his own adamant political temporalized decisions and choices.D errida makes a con crete decision to oppose cap ital punishm ent, to lobby

for the necessity of the strang er in the E urop ean U nion , and h e calls for the

establishment of villes-rifuges where all can come to find refuge regardless

of their citizenship o r lack thereof. U ltim ately, and infine Derridean fash-

ion, we are left w ith an ap oria. W e have, on one ha nd , the undecidab ility of

tem poralized reality tha t surges w ith the tem porizing tha t is the demo cracy

to come. Ifw e do no t adm it this und ecidability, we auto m atically lapse into

a m etaphysics of presence a m etaphysics that D errida sees as totalizingand against which he has devoted his whole career . On the other hand,

co nco m itant with this undec idability, D errida m akes very definite and sin-

gular decisions, which seem to lie in opposition to the very undecidability

tha t D err ida sees as emerging f rom the archstructur ing o f différance and the

dem ocracy to come. P rim ary am ong D errid a’s decisions is his decision to

con tinue to choose de con struction as his sing ular political intervention.

It is this apo ria tha t pushes us to look to Badiou. A ristotle claimed tha t

philo sophy begin s in w onder, and th e apo ria w as cen tra l as th a t g a p th a t pushed philosophy to th in k th rough the n a tu re o f this very sam e gap.

Badiou can be seen as following this tradition. Badiou, in agreement with

D errida, acknowledges the presence of the doub le bind structu re ofpossibi

lity an d impo ssibility. B adiou acknow ledges the impossibility of a full

presence o f being as ad v o ca ted by the m etaphysic ians o f presence. Both

think ers take seriously an d are faithful to He idegg er’s insights abo ut the tra -

dition of W estern philosophy as a m etaphysics of presence. B adiou’s notion

of time as intervention can be employed to give an account ofhow concrete ,nam eable an d sing ular political decisions can be m ade alongside the un de-

cidability tha t em erges from the temp orizing structure th at D errida sees as

the dem ocracy to come.

Fo r D errida, tem po rization gives us an ‘econom ic’ m ovem ent he calls dif

fi rance. T his econ om ic m ov em ent is a flow of repetitions, newness and traces.

All ‘beings’ are stru ctured by this arch structure, and following the D erri-

dean logic, D errida renders all ph eno m ena o f consciousness, ‘f lat phenom -

en a’, to b orrow an expression from Jea n L uc M arion .72 T hey are f lat

because they are all s truc tu red the sam e way; they are all a rchstructured

by delay an d d ifferentiation . T his is a to ta liz ing claim , and D errida him self

calls his c laim irred uc ible. 73

For Badiou, there is a singu larity tha t is nam eable that coincides with the

undecidable o f the m ult ipl ic ity o f the s i tuat ion. T hro ug h decisive, temporal



Badiou, iiwe andpolitics 95

interventions, subjects an d events stand ou t as coun table as on e or as exces-

sively s ingular within the arch structur ing tem poriz ing flow that renders a l l

reality and all beings und ecidab le. Fo r Badiou, un decid ability is not arc h -

structur ing and irreducible . For D err ida , the cou nting and the nam ing alsorem ain undecidable . T he dif ferentia tion th at is contained w ithin différance

and the demo cracy to come allows for a differentiation o f one being from

an other. Yet, th a t differentiation ju st m akes one different insofar as one

can never be the same as the other, for the difference can nev er be repea ted

in the same way. B ut this difference can n ever be cou nted as on e/u ltra one

since it is also subject to a n erasure precisely be cause it can neve r survive a

second repetition. H ence, w e are not even sure w ha t the difference is or can

be. W e can n o t even nam e it . P erh ap s it once was? R esponsib ility calls us toensure th at the difference is allow ed to co ntinu e to articu late itself, bu t w ha t

is singular ab ou t this one differentiated individu al or this one m om ent in the

econom ic m ovem ent is un dec idable at best, or accessible b ut only as an eras-

ing trace , a t worst. Yet , there is the D err ida w ho is adam antly cognizant of

the singularity of the hu m an subject as evidenced by his impassioned plea for

the abolishm ent of capital p un ishm en t and his ceaseless advo cating on

behalf o f the m arginalized an d th ose w ho do no t yet have a strong voice o r

those who ha ve been silenced by b ru tal regimes.If we exam ine the heritage before us, to b orrow an expression from

Derrida, there are unique events and unique subjects/beings to which we

attach a singular or unique heritage. In Badiou’s terms, we count them as

having a sing ular heritag e, even thoug h un dec idab ility and em ptiness struc-

ture them . Badiou recognizes this ontolog ical given wh en he speaks ofevents

and subjects subjectivating themselves through these events that come

abo ut through decisive tem poral interventions. T hese interventions pun c-

tuate the general f low of tim e, w hich Badiou calls chronology. M oreover,such subjectivating events can be political and can give us a new sense of

poli tics. T h ey can also giv e us new possib ilit ies o f th in k in g th ro ug h the

na ture of politics.

T he uniqueness o f the French, A m erican or R ussian R evolut ions is given.

Th ey have changed the courseo fhu m an his tory , and a re unique . M oreover,

thou gh w e can claim tha t we are all alike because we are different insofar as

we are all irreducibly archstructured by différance, we must also concede

that within this structure there is concealed a uniqueness that can be dis-

closed when a rup ture h appens. T h at rup ture is the intervening event .

Politically, there is a uniqueness th at is pro pe r to various events and sub-

jects, b u t th a t uniqueness is in no w ay m etaphysically present. It m anifests

itse lfb ut n ot wholly. W e saw this in Badiou ’s ontology. O ne ca n count, b u t

never com plete ly enum erate , the var ious uniqu e or s ingular senses of M arx



96 Badiou aand D e rd a

as a p hilosophersubject thro ug h the p olitical ch anges he inspired. Good

and bad, these changes are p ar t an d pa rcel of his singularity as a subject

an d his legac y has help ed m an y subj ects subjectivate, tha t is, becom e m ore

fully subjects, counting and accruing various meanings through variousdecisive interventions. Fo r exam ple, think of the M arxist inspired legacy o f

stud en ts’ revolts that caused significant changes w orldwide, co ntrib utin g to

an expanded and changed sense of how higher education proceeds and

oug ht to proceed. Th ink of the worldwide imp act o f M arxist thought on

trade unions. B oth thinkers recognize th eir h uge deb t to M arx.

T ho ug h D err ida w ould wish to acknowledge the dif ferentia t ion of one

event from ano the r an d one subject from ano ther, this difference rem ains

two dimen sional. D epth c an be adde d by trying to fish throu gh the singu lar-ity th at is con tained w ithin th at difference, even tho ug h it is conditioned by

the double b ind in th at it can never be fully present. Ba diou’s thou gh t can be

seen as addin g th at dimension o fde pth in tha t Badiou creates an ontological

and tem poral space w he re subjects a nd events ca n differentiate themselves.

Badiou introdu ces into the D erridean con ception of t im e, a subj ective time,

tha t is connected an d d raws up on the possibility and impossibili ty th at is

tem porization, b ut at the same time claims for i tself a u nici ty th at is prop er

to the subj ect herself.Th oug h Badiou adds a dimension of depth to the apo ria tha t De rr ida

unveils w hen we thin k o f the relationsh ip betw een time and politics, one

wonders w heth er Badiou m ay overly emph asize the subjective/subjectivat

ing n atu re o f the po litical. T ho ug h he wo uld concede tha t the prepolitical is

necessary and given, one is not sure w hat its role is o r w hat the n atu re o f the

rela t ionship is between the prepolit ical chronology and the p unc tuat ing

and subjectivating temporal intervention that gives us events. We know

the prep olitical is inh eren tly m ultiple. It wo uld seem th at B adiou sees thesubject as rupturing the prepolitical in order to give it a political sense

through a decisive political intervention. But what motivates the subject?

Is the sub ject her ow n m otivator? D oes the desire o f the subj ec t solely m oti-

vate the subject or is there something other that motivates the subject as

well? W e see Badiou placing a gre at emph asis on the sub jectivating n ature

of interventions, especially in light of the fact that the prepolitical is

described as multiple and chronological, that is, flowing. It is a kind of

p rim em atte r th a t only ta kes political fo rm w hen activ ated by th e t em p o ra l

decisions of the intervening subject. What is to prevent the subject from

acting com pletely vo luntaristically? H ow can B adiou fend off the charge

tha t politics th en is simply an extension ofsubjective decisions, mere expres-

sions o f the s ubjec t’s will to po w er o r libido dominandi?




U ltimately, one can nev er preven t this f rom happen ing. In a p rofound

sense, Badiou is correct, the subject does act alone in making a temporal

intervention. She a lone can do this . But the tem po ral source of her m otiva-

tion for doing so is no t only h er desire and does not on ly stem from he r will.She is also mo tivated by the externa l or extrasubjective w orld. Badiou has

to give some account of the temporal force of the multiplicity of the pre-

political and the chronologie s th a t a re enfold ed therein . A t th is poin t, we

wo uld like to offer a possible explan ation o f the tem po rality o f the p re-

political th a t lies outs id e, a lb eit no t com plete ly , the subject, nam ely, the

kairos. T h e kairos can be viewed as an ap pro pria te o r strategic tim e o f doing

things, of m aking p olitical interventions. I t does not stem from the subject

alone throu gh the actualizatio n of h er decisive po litical interventions. Thisstrategic time stems from the state o f affairs of the w orld (situation) tha t

presents the subje ct w ith op portune occasio ns to m ake an in terven tion .

O ur question becomes: can w e speak of a sense o f t im e th at belongs to the

m ultiplicity o f situations themselves as well as subjec tivating time?



C o n c l u s i o n

Filling out the aporia that is politics

T h e kairos

In her monumental s tudy of the kairos Monique Trédé lays out in greatdetail the various senses of the term kairos that emerge f rom the t ime of

H om er to end o f the fourth century B C.1She carefully analyses the political

sense o f the kairos, pointing ou t th at i t was conceived o f as signitying a str at-

egy that was to be em ployed for the arts of w ar and medicine. T h at strategy

was coloured by a tem po ral sense in th at i t was conceived o f as a timely or

appropriate strategy to be taken at a specific t ime, given certain circum-

stances. T réd é sees Th ucy dide s as crucial for intro du cing the political sense

of the kairos insofar as T hu cyd ides con nected the kairos wi th war . Th e kairos

was the sign th a t signalled the strategic tim e to act (strategichi tichne) .2 T ré d é

notes tha t the kairos is occasional. It presen ts mo men ts or timely occasions

th at c an b e recognized as valuab le or po tentially significant, bu t also occa -

sions th a t can b e lost an d u nus ed.3 As we saw earlier , when B adiou speaks

o f a situa tion, i t too is m ultiple; i t is bo th consistent and inconsistent. Th e

kairos could b e viewed w ithin the fram ew ork o f B adiou’s description of

the situation or the prepolitical. It is multiple insofar as many occasions

present th em selv es. T hey can be seized and actualized , in w hich case th ey

can be counted as one and can be considered consistent. The unused or

ignored k airological occasions can be p ar t o f the ge neral m ultiplicity o f the

situation, which Badiou calls inconsistent. Again, they are inconsistent

because they a re u nab le to be counted as one by the subje ct; they do not

app ear except throug h re trospective apprehension.

T rédé a lso notes th at the w ay one knows w hich c ircumstances are p oten-

tially adv antage ous o r strategic for political action is thro ug h the cu ltiva-

tion of hab its and psychology.4 If one knows an d und erstands h abits an d

psycholo gy, one can an tic ip ate ways o f behaviour th a t can be cu ltivated o r

rejected. One could also organize one’s political strategy around human

habits an d psychology. For exam ple, political rhe toric is one w ay tha t we

can create opp ortun e mom ents. I f a pa rty claims a certain position, they

can a nticip ate a certain response by an oppo sing party. Th is is a stand ard



Filling out the aporia that is politics 99

po litical habitus. N o rth K o rea ’s announcem ent o f its political decision to

build a n uclear storehouse w ill cause unease am ong ce rta in natio ns. N o rth

Korea uses its rhetoric for ulterior ends, namely, food and supplies for its

econo m ically rava ged citizens. T h e tim ely occasion of using nu clear rhe to-ric in a tim e of grow ing n uclear intoleran ce serves to achieve ce rtain N orth

K ore an political ends, nam ely, inte rna l political stability achieved throu gh

the delivery o f m uch needed food an d supplies for i ts citizens. In tern al poli-

tical stability allows present North Korean political leaders to maintain

the ir poli tica l ru le . I fN o r th K orea had m ade the same ann ouncem ent in a

time o fwo rldw ide nuclear prol ifera tion, N orth K orea ’s dem and would not

have been very forceful. T h e occasion th a t the N orth K orean s chose to speak

had to be t im ely or s tra tegic in orde r to achieve cer ta in polit ical and m ate-rial ends.

But knowing habits and psychology are not enough, for they a lone

cannot guarantee that a kairological opportunity wil l present i tse lf . The

kairos, understood as that opportune time to act or make political deci-

sions, consists in bo th the p erceiving an d the seizing of an occasion tha t p re-

sents itself. G iven th a t the kairos is m ultiple an d th a t m any occasions prese nt

themselves, how do we know w hich tim ely occasion is m ore adv antag eou s

politically? N o h a rd an d fast calculus can p red ic t o r m axim ize the bestkairological opportunity, especially given the undecidability in Badiou’s

ontology. G ood judge m ent or prac t ica l wisdom acquired through experi-

ence can b e ce ntral in the recog nition of the kairos. In hin dsigh t, post event,

one can re troac tive ly examine w hethe r an in te rvent ion would hav e been

m ore ap pro pria te a t a no the r kairological time. Th is kind o f reflection can

give us more experience and more practical wisdom, especially when it

comes to future interventions.

Kenneth Dorter , in his ar t ic le ent i t led ‘PhilosopherRulers: How Con-templation Becomes Action’, notes that political techné, the a r t of rul ing,

entails a n u nd erstan din g o f the timely (kairos) th at is necessary in o rde r to

know when to apply techné. But this techné is not merely conceived as a

doing. Practice gives the rhe torician a n un derstan ding of wh en it is timely

(kairos) to speak and w hen to stop, and wh ich of the va rious techniqu es of

speaking to employ w hen they are tim ely (eukairian) and w hen they are

untimely (akairirian). The same thing is true of the philosophers’ techné o f

rul ing in the Republic. T he ir f if teenyear app renticeship is necessary not in

order to reach n ew precepts bu t so ' tha t they w on ’t lag behind th e others

in exp erien ce’. T h eir a bility to discern the good in sensible things is dev el-

oped in terms o f a concept th at te lls them w hat to look for. T hey have come

to un de rstand the good i tse lf through years o f contem plat ion, bu t only

through an add it ion al lengthy con tact with pract ical exper ience can a kind




of thinking which concludes in forms be applied effectively to things.

Th e k ind of experience gained throu gh app renticeship is indispensable

to th e p rac tical side of techne. W hat the Statesman add s to this, or at least

presents m ore explicit ly , is t h a t w h a t is gained by th a t experience is the ab il-ity to discern the good as a mean between excess and deficiency in the

realm of the greater and lesser.5

D orter points out tha t pract ical wisdom acq uired through pract ice helps

the political leader in making astute political decisions, which includes a

recognition of the kairological reality. The notions of the Platonic good

would no t fit w ithin the f ramew ork ofD err idea n and Bad iouan philosophy

because Plato is seen as onto theological. B ut th e cu ltiv atio n o f astu te politi-

cal jud ge m en t can be a philosophical unde rtaking. Philosophers can beseen as offering us ways to think ab ou t and cultivate political jud ge m en t

rooted in exper ience. An other way to cul t ivate exper ience and ju dg e-

m ent is throug h the study ofhistory. L earning an d ap plying, and sometimes

not applying, w hat others before us have achieved m ay be a concrete way to

respond to certain situations and the timely occasions they present. Need-

less to say, there is a ple thora of ways to cultivate exp erience a nd jud ge m en t,

and thoug h this cul t ivation m ay n ot provide us with an infal lible way of

recognizing kairological opportunities, they may present us with a pos-sibility of recognizing and actualizing some of the multiple kairological

m om ents th at p resent themselves.

In Badiou’s thought, the emphasis certainly is on seizing the moment

insofar as the subject subjectivates herself tem po rally thro ug h interven tions

that yie ld events . W hat T rédé and D orter point out through their reading of

the kairoi is th a t the w orld in wh ich the subjec t finds hers elf man ifests ce rtain

p erceiv ab le conditions th a t entice a political leader to act. In a sim ilar fa sh-

ion, the Badiouan subject can be seen to be affected by the prepolitical

w orld in wh ich she finds herself dw elling.

T he temp oral intervention that the subject enacts can not only be a deci-

sion prop er and uniqu e to the subject herself O ntologically, the subject is

related and belongs to the situatio na l mu ltiplicity th at is all of reality,

including the collectivity. Badiou also calls this multiple situation the

world. As p ar t of the m ultiplicity of a situation, thou gh the subject has a

unicity that is proper to herself, the subject must also make room for the

artic ula tion of the m ultiplicity of the p repo litical in which she finds herself.

T h e m ultiplicity of the prep olitical, thou gh it is m erely chro nolo gical, has

w ithin i t a t t imes the potentia li ty to signal or m ake ap pa ren t an ap prop ria te

time for the subject to act. T he injustice of the prepo litical situatio n tha t

was preM ay ’68 was n ot m erely a chronological flow o f events . T h e o ppres-

sion of the State was becoming more and more evident, and there was an



Fitting out the aporia that is politics 101

urgency th at stemm ed from the state of affairs prior to M ay ’68 th at preci-

p ita ted a decis iv e in terven tion on th e p a r t o f students and work ers . T he

chronological unfolding of events prior to M ay ’68 presented an occasion

for a decisive interven tion, a nd this occasion resulted in an interven tion ata certain po int in time, th at is, the chronological flow was pu nc tuated by the

event called M ay ’68. T he event has its own singu larity a nd it is sim ulta-

neously m ultiple. I t draw s upon the m ultiple in ord er to articulate its ow n

singularity. Th e even t is alway s Deux, an d as such m anifests i ts own singu-

larity o r unicity in its very m ultiplicity. G iving an acco un t of the necessity of

the m ultiple th at is the prepolitical is requ ired lest the event bro ug ht on by

a decisive political interve ntion lapse into a hom ogeneous unity. T he m ulti-

ple th a t is the p repo litica l is no t m erely th ere as a s tatic som ething, b u tmakes ap pa ren t timely oppo rtunit ies to act as s i tuat ions change. Th e sub -

je c t m ay o r m ay not ch oose to take advan tage o f the o pp o rtu ne tim e o f the

kairos in ord er to articu late h erself throu gh the interve ntion th at gives us the

events . T he G reek concep t of the kairos lends to the prepo litical a tem poral

force that presents an oppo rtunity, which could m otivate subjective inter-

ventions by presenting favourable circum stances for political interventions.

Both sub ject and kairos must work together in ord er to bring a bo ut the inte r-

ven tion th at w ill give us events.Given the sing ularity of each ev ent and given the gen erality of the m ulti-

plicity o f the s itu a tio n , it w ould be dif ficult to giv e an exact account o f

the favourable conditions that make the kairological explicitly strategic.

W e ca n, how ever, posit three general g uiding principles. First, there m ust be

some advantage or potential gain, which a specific prepolitical situation

presents , th a t would facilita te th e achievem ent o f the subje ctive in te rv en-

tion. In oth er words, the kairological t ime o f the prepolitical w ould have

to m ake p resent cer ta in conditions tha t would a id or con tr ibute to the execu-

tion of the subjective intervention. A po tential adv an tage in achieving the

interven tion would m otivate the subject. Hen ce, the prepolitical could be

seen as mo tivational. T he strength o f the m otivationa l force is depen den t on

the singular interven tion an d the situation in general. Seco nd, as we shall see

later, the kairos m ust be viewed, b u t n ot absolutely so, w ithin the subjective

sphere. I t is subjective because it is relian t up on subjective jud gem ent and

interp retatio n in ord er for i t to be recognized as adv antage ous for the execu-

tion of the subjective interven tion th at gives us events. T his means th at the

prepolitical is not m erely an extension o f the s itu atio n o f th e w orld ; it is not

m erely a passive given. I t c an also be something th at the subject can p lan an d

organize. Like any strategy, the subject can lay the ground w ork for a pre -

political situation th a t will bring ab ou t a spec ific event a t a la te r time.

Finally, because the kairos itself is und erstoo d as hav ing a strateg ic sense, it




can be investigated and studied. In oth er words, we can investigate the p re-

po litical to f in d o u t w hen th e op tim um tim e o ccurs in o rd er to m ake a n in te r-

vention. Bad iou speaks of the ru ptu re of political events and the changes they

cause. But the ru ptu re o f an ev ent need n ot be spontaneous and t im e need no t be confin ed sole ly to a spontaneous gen era tion 7 th a t is co n co m itan t w ith

interventions. T he prepolit ical can be planned and organized; a s tra tegy

can develop. This prepolitical strategizing can be made more effective if

one investigates the timely conditions that would ensure a more effective

result, nam ely, th e political interv en tion itself.

The category of the prepoli t ical in Badiou’s thought remains highly

undeveloped. Yet , i t provides interesting room for tho ug ht in that one w on-

ders wh ether i t is truly necessary. In the case of the exam ple given above onecould con ceivably say tha t the prepolitical ‘conditions’ leading up to M ay

’68 were really p a rt o f the cond itions Badiou lays out for the p olitical to

com e to the fore. If we recall the third con dition, nam ely, the oppressive

force of state po wer, one could see the unjust laws an d structu res p re M ay

’68 as belon ging to th at oppressive force th at is a c on dition o f the po litical.

B ut , a t the same t ime, an d h ere is w he re Badiou is am biguous, the th ird con-

ditio n ten ds to focus on rea ctin g to excessive state force an d violence. It is

th a t react ion tha t m otivates, in p ar t , the polit ical intervention th at gives usM ay ’68. T he prep olitical situation o f M ay ’68 does no t exclusively m oti-

va te an event , b u t i t begins to m ake evident cer ta in cond itions tha t would

faci li ta te the event. H ere , we are faced with an am bigu ity. H ow do w e know

the d istinct ion b etween th e prepoli tical and the poli tical? T he t im e o f the

po litical is sig nalled w ith an even t th a t rad ica lly in te rru p ts a n d changes the

w ay w e lead ou r lives. But how does the p repo litical f it into this tem po ral

model? Is th e prepo litical simply a p a rt of the situation? Is the prepolitical

s imply an oth er nam e for the polit ical si tuat ion? T he answer to the p recedingquestions is un ce rtain as Badiou h imself is un clear on this p oint. Because

Badiou has prom ised to rework the notion o f s i tuat ion and a l l tha t i t implies

w ithout m entioning the prepolit ical , one can int im ate that the prepolit ical

and the s i tuat ion a re two distinct notions. U lt im ately, we are no t cer ta in.

I t is this unc er ta inty th at m otivates us to offer a read ing of the prepolit ical

as having i ts ow n t ime, n am ely, the kairological . I t should b e rem arked tha t

the k airological is ou r ow n pec uliar interv en tion a nd is not Ba diou ’s term.

T he w orld th a t lies outside the sub ject is also com posed o f a series of past

events, to which we can be faithful. Multiple prepolitical situations can

interact with the subject insofar as they are ‘ implied’ in the subjective,

thereby making possible t imely or s tra tegic interventions. In Dorter’s

words, ‘there is a leng thy add itional con tact w ith p ract ica l exper ience’

w ith wh ich the subject finds herself confronted. T h at leng thy pract ical




experience can be tho ug ht o f as the prepolitical. E vents, then, can be

thoug ht o f as coming a bo ut through the re la tion o f the prepolit ical and

the political, the time of the kairos tha t elicits the subject an d the subjective

time that is the interven tion.W ha t makes the kairological strategic, especially w ithin a Badiouan

context? Perhaps w e could answer this question by c la im ing that the pre-

political brings to ligh t evid ence o f ce rta in advan tageo us circum stances

tha t w ould ultimately assist the articulation of the three cond itions th at

Bad iou sees as cruc ial for the po litical to com e to the fore. T h e prep olitical

kairological t ime m akes ready a ce rtain time fram e in which the conditions

for politics can com e to articu late themselves. T he kairos makes app aren t the

coming together of these political conditions and in turn may provide anadvantageous opportunity for the subject’s decisive intervention. Hence,

the abuse o f workers by ce rtain ind ustrial entreprene urs, the excess an d

negligence of bourgeois university adm inistrators an d the au tocra tic con-

ventions an d political structures po stW orld W ar II showed the excess of

sta te ly power , which, in turn, made apparent the t imely opportunity for

the interv en tion called M ay ’68. All of these abuses of state force allowed

the collectivity to see the n eed for a radica l political chan ge. T h e strategic

time to act was M ay ’68 because the conditions o f the political had beenm ade clear and they pushed a decision, an event.

M oreover, i f we look a t the e lements tha t con st itute the events of

M ay ’68, all of the elements can b e seen as kairolog ically draw ing u po n one

an othe r. Th e tim ing of protests and classroom seizures by students pre -

sented a timely occasion for factory w orkers to protest, wh ich in tu rn occa-

sioned others to act against perceived state repression. The elements that

con stitute M ay ’68 did no t all come together simultaneously as one ho m o-

geneous block. R ath er, events unfolded, and the timing o f one event occa-

sioned or made apparent the opportunity for others to make their own

interventions. In other w ords, given th at s tudents began p rotest ing in M ay

’68, this presented the kairological occasion for workers to strike and

demand bet ter wages and w orking condit ions. Oth ers joined the mo m en-

tum that was growing as time unfolded. If the workers did not str ike in

M ay ’68 and instead chose to str ike in M ay ’96, wo uld they hav e achieved

the advances they did? Th is is contestable, bu t one could say th at the tim ing

o f the gen eral revo lutiona ry call for chang es in M ay ’68 lent to the w orkers a

strategic op po rtunity to be pa rt o f a larg er collectivity with m ore force,

w hich ul t im ately called for greater reform and which u l timately changed

the w ay p eople lived their lives in Fran ce.

If the subject alone is responsible for interventions that give us events,

the n the m ultiplicity th at B adiou claims is situated in th e singularity of the



104 Badiou aand D w ^L ·

even t has no significant role w ithin th e being o f the event oth er tha n simply

being giv en to us, w hich B adiou explic itly denies. T h e u ndec idab ility o f

the situation does have a force of i ts own in that i t may push for a deci-

sion, bu t we see the force o f th at possibility as roo ted in time, as roo ted inthe kairological. To attr ib u te the p oten tial ofkairolog ical significance to the

prepo litical w ould serv e as a possib le b ridg e to the m ultip le th a t B adiou

claims is included in the situation, which is part and parcel of the event.

U ltima tely, the kairological extends time from the pu rely subjective realm

to the w orldly realm .

Q u e s t i o n i n g t h e v i a b i li ty o f t h e k a i ro l o g i c a l

M y proposa l o f the kairos presents certain challenges w ithin the fram ew ork

of Ba dioua n ontology. Tw o questions need to be addressed. First , wh at

lends to a general s i tuat ion tha t sense of appropria teness o r s tra tegic ‘r ight-

ness’ th at elicits the subject? T o as cribe a kairo log ical sense of tim e to the

p re po litica l is to giv e to the situ a tion an o rd erin g , consistency o r ab ility to

count itself as one without the seeming necessity of an intelligent sub-

jec t. T h is w ould m ean th a t the rad ical und ecid ab ility o f the inconsistentm ultiplicity o f the situation is com prom ised because the situation itself is

selfordering its own ap pe aran ce to us. In sho rt, a trad ition ally objectivist

ontology seems to rear i ts head within a Badiouan ontology that resists

trad ition al ob jectivist accounts.

T his pro blem raised by positing th e need for a prepolitical kairological

time fu rthe r pushes us to clarify w ha t we m ean by the term ‘kairological’.

T h e prepolit ical for Badiou is rooted in the s ituat ion, b u ti t i s no tsole ly con-

fined to the situation. I t also forms an im m ane nt p ar t of the po litical eventitself. In a sense the pre po litical can be described as presubjective, bu t this

presub jective s ta te alw ays im plies the subject. T h e subject, how ever, has

no t fully m ad e a decision to interven e. R ath er, subjective prepolitical ele-

m ents app ear to the subject, wh ich e l ic i t a response a t a cer ta in m om ent. For

exam ple, the injustices p rio r to M ay ’68, relevant to the subjective and

belong ing to th e a tu a tio n , e licit a ce rta in subje ctive response, w hich was

m ade evident in the decisive intervention of M ay ’68.

T he kairological as belonging to the prepolitical is not a realm th a t lies

com pletely outside of the subjective. I t is attach ed to the subject as the p re-

po litica l is a tta ch ed to a political event, b u t it is n o t identical w ith the event

itself. The kairos must not be interpreted as having an exclusively objective

rea l ity . Th e kairos m ust be un derstood as presubjective.




If the kairos is presub jective, an d this brings us to m y second q uestion ,

how can it l imit the excessive and wilful decisive interventions that I

c la imed that the kairos could do, especially since it still is connected to the

subjective? Badiou does not believe in a n ob jective tru th to wh ich the su bjectconforms her interventions. Every political intervention is decisive and

therefore wilful. One cannot presume to eliminate the wilful and decisive

force behind what Badiou describes as political events. This will appear

troubling to t radi t ional l iberals and pragm atis ts who see reason as capita l

in structu ring a ju st society. Badiou w ould n ot wish to dismiss the liberal or

p rag m a tis t cla im s o u trig h t. R a th e r , b o th lib e ra l an d p ra g m a tis t are p a r t o f

the m ult ipl ic ity ju st as any o ther po li tical form of poli tical order . In o rder

for the pragmatis t or the l iberal to achieve their reasoncentred socie ty,there have to be direct political interventions. In other words, decisive

and wilful political actions hav e to be execu ted in orde r for th a t l iberal or

p rag m a tis t socie ty to com e ab o u t. R eason itse lf will n o t b rin g it in to any

form o f concretion.

O ur q uest ion, then, is not a quest ion concerning th e e l iminat ion o f deci-

sive interventions or their subject ion to the guidance or s tructur ing laws of

reason. R ath er, we m ust ask how we can ensu re th at such decisive political

intervention s are no t misdirected or evil.8 In o the r words, is there any w ay ofensuring th at political interventions are ethical? G iven the force of the tem -

p o ra l in terven tions th a t b r in g ab o u t po litical events , how can the kairos,

un derstood as prepolitical t ime, con tribute to the lim iting of po tentially

m isdirected wilful interventions?

In orde r to answer the aforemen tioned quest ion we must examine wh at

Badiou understands by truth. In his work, E th ic s, Badiou defines t ru th as a

real process of f idelity th a t is prod uce d in a situation. H e gives the exam ple

o f the F rench M aoists between 1966 and 1976, who tr ied to think an d pra c-

tice a fidelity to tw o intertwine d events, nam ely, the C ultu ral R evo lution in

Ch ina and M ay ’68 in France.9 B adiou goes on fur ther to describe wh at he

sees as the 'ethic o f a tru th ’.10

Events ruptu re the s i tuat ion and take us beyond a s i tuation; they are s in-

gular, or more precisely, they are what Badiou calls in more recent texts,

an gu lar ly universal (as opposed to the imm ediate ly unive rsal) .u Th e sub-

jectiv e tim e they m ake a p p a ren t b o th in th e p o litica l an d kairo logical p re-

politic al realm s is subject to the ethic o f tru th o r to w hat Badio u calls in L i t r e

et l ’é v fa ^m t , the generic proce du re of truth . T ru th consists in being faithful

to an event, rethink ing its consequences, always m indful o f the original sub-

jec tiv e m otivations beh ind the event. T h e event, in such situations, will

come to h ave m ultiple senses.




If a po litical decision is to be ethical, i t m ust m eet the following con dition.

It m ust no t igno re the force of the prepolitical and the kairological t im e

tha t comes with the p oli tical s i tuat ion. So, one ough t not to ignore or take

for gran ted prepolitical signs th a t call for decisive po litical intervention.C ertain injustices, certain violations o r abuses, m ay be telltale signs of the

need for an ap pro pria te or s tra tegic response or intervention. Ju st as one is

faithful to the event, there m ust be fidelity to th e prepo litical th at shows

itself or th a t m ay be trying to elicit a con crete political response. T he

notion ofB ad iou an fidelity to events m eans th at w e do not confuse the ele-

m ents belonging to a p ar t icular even t with other events . I t is incum ben t

upon subjects to preserve the consistent multiplicity that temporal inter-

ventions mak e ap pa ren t. T he re is f idelity when we preserve the connectionof elements th at belong to the singu lar political event, w hich is con stitutive

of the ev ent itself . Th is m eans th at w hen w e consider political events like the

Am erican, French and Ru ssian revolutions, they are not a l l the same simply

because th ey a re revolutions. T h e singularity o f each m ust be preserved

when thinking about them. Each revolution, for example, is composed of

its own elements that permit that event to be counted as one or singular.

T h e t imes of each R evo lut ion are s ingular and f ideli ty would en ta i l the p re-

servation o f such a tem po ral ordering. Likewise, we should be faithful to the p repo litical in d icato rs an d the kairo logical ‘ap p ropria teness’ they dem on-

stra te . Hence, the prepoli t ical th at m arks each singular revolut ion m ust be

preserved a n d referred to as such. T h e p repo litical sig ns o fth e in terven tions

tha t decisively produced a t tha t t im e and tha t place the French R evolut ion

will no t be th e same for all revo lutions g^w aliter. Also, universally speaking ,

the sense of kairological t im e o f the prepo litical o r th e p resubjective will

n o t be the sam e or eq uiv alen t for all revolu tions generaliter. Fidelity, as

inscribed in the ethic o f tru th, w ill allow for a consistency th at can a t leastserve to limit the potentially lethal excesses or force of the wiü that l ies

beh ind h u m an in terventions. T his fid eli ty calls for a recognition o f the sin -

gu lar th at is m ade ev ident in the t ime o f subject ivat ing events and the kair-

ological t ime of the prepolitical.

A p rag m atic po litical possibili ty th at ensues from extend ing the subjec-

tive time ofinterve ntion s to include the kairological t ime ofth e prepo litical

includes the following limiting effect. T he ensuing generic tru th of politics

becom es ev iden t th rou g h events . T h e tru th o f politics d epends on a fideli ty ,albeit an admittedly fragile f idelity, to the consistency and connection

betw een ele m ents o f b o th the po litical events an d the prepolitical. Political

lies, deceptions and misappropriations become evident when we purpose-

fully m an ipu late the tem po ral consistency o f the m ultiplicity o f a p olitical

event, giving to political events elements and understandings that do not




necessarily belon g to them. Nox ious political prop ag an da, if we are faithful

to the truth of po litical events, m ay be limited. For ex amp le, to exploit past

po litical revo lutions, like the dem ocratic freetrade revo lu tio n or the R us-

sian Revolution, by exclusively applying their respective elements to the p resen tday U S I r a q situa tio n m ay lead to u n tru th s , resulting in uneth ical

actions an d situations.

In an age rife w ith po litical cynicism, Badiou gives his readers the pos-

sibility o fexpressin g philosophically the m ultiplicity o f seemingly ou tdated

notions like tru th , fidelity, consistency, evil an d collective activity. H e gives

us a theoretical framework through which we can think what i t is to act

collectively an d po litically. In a profo und sense, Badiou wishes to restore to

poli tics n o t on ly its em phasis on a c tio n b u t also its need to h av e some kindof thought behind its actions. Badiou constantly laments the presentday

p en u ry th a t p lagues politic s insofa r as it does no t allow philosophy to com e

to the fo re.12 Po litics is des cribed as a co nd ition th rou gh w hich p hilosophy

comes to the fore, an d Badiou certainly dem onstrates in his own thinking

how political events reveal the on tology th at politics makes ap pa ren t.

Before we conclude, there is one last question that must be consid-

ered: how w ould both D er r ida and Badiou respond to our in t roduc t ion of

the kairos? Fo r D err ida , the add ition o f the kairos w ould be superfluous. T hekairos i tselfwou ld not escape the archstructu ring temp oral force ofun decid

ability. T he questions o f delay, d ifferentiation a nd the ina bility o f the

strategic tim e of the prepo litical to become fully present w ould ren de r the

kairosjust as undecidab le as an ything else political. W e wou ld have to bo th

agree an d d isagree wi th D er r ida . As both B adiou and D er r ida h ave pointed

out, th ere is an u nd ecid ab ility tha t structures or, for Badiou, is ontolog ically

con stitutive of, all ofreality. O ur acco unt would hav e to mak e room for such

a reality. Perhaps that possibili ty can be accounted for by claiming that

there is n ev er ju st one kairos, bu t many tha t m ay be counted as one , which

are never one. M oreover, the sense o f each of these kairia can never be abso-

lutely fixed as one.

Yet, and this is wh ere we have to turn to the ga p in the D erridea n ap oria

o f political un dec idab ility, the re are still those decisive po litical events th at

have folded in them singular and decisive interventions th at are n am eable

an d coun table . A gain, for exam ple , D err ida has the nam e ofdecon struct ion

irreduc ibly a t tach ed to a l l ofhis poli tical and socia l interventions. T he arch -

interven tion caUed dec on struction h as to be acco un ted for, especially since

it is singularly identifiable or ‘countable as one* when contrasted with the

tradition o r h eritage o f m etaphysical a nd ontotheological texts. Given this

gap in his own th ^to n g , and by def init ion, deco nstruct ion adm its these gaps

no t as co ntradiction s bu t as pa rt o f the apo ria of texts themselves, Derrida




opens the possibility o f a Bad iouan response to the abo vem entioned gap.

I f we concede th at interven tions are possible and th at they coincide with

po litical undecidab ility , th en perh ap s w e can also concede th a t there m ay

be room for the kairo logical as fill ing a g ap in B adiou’s political onto lo gy.Ju st as the u nd ecidab ility shows forth the need for decisive interventions, so

too can the prepolitical show the need for the kairological. Ultimately,

how ever, to read the kairological into a D erridea n fram ew ork is que stion-

able, a t best. T h e kairological m ay only fit if we exp and the D erridean

ap oria o f politics and time by turn ing to Badiou. H en ce, the k airological

m ay w ork in a larger co ntext of this work, but not in a D err idean f r amew ork

stricto semu.

W e turn now to a con sideration o f Badiou. G iven Badiou ’s fram ew ork,could the kairos f ind a place within his tempopoli t ical f ramework? The

am bigui ty and incompleteness ofB adiou ’s thou gh t m ay cast d oub t on our

p ro ject, b u t th is incom plete ness opens u p a space o f po ssibil ity . W e see our

co ntribu tion as f ill ing out the ap oria o f the time of the prepolitical t h at

Badiou him selfleaves incom plete. G iven the intim ate relations hip be tween

the m ultiple situation and the singu larity of the subjectivating e ven t, and

given the uniqu ely tem po ral definition Badiou gives to events, one wo nders

why time does not im pa ct the prepolitical situation as well? T he tem po ralforce ofpreeven ts and the prepolitical app ea r vital in th a t events like M ay

’68 or the Fren ch R evo lution could only have unfolded given the tem po ral

unfolding o f the s i tuat ion p r ior to the event. M oreover , it was not jus t a

simple chronological u nfolding of the si tua tion presenting itself as co untable

as one. Th ere w ere specific prepo litical elements o f the situation th at were

necessary for the event. Fo r exam ple, M ay ’68 needed the intolerable con di-

tions ofw orkers in ord er to hap pe n. If we are to be faithful to such events and

their prepolitical elements, then we hav e to give an acco unt o f t ime tha tw ill include a time o fth e preinterve ntion , name ly, the time o fth e kairos.

C o n c l u d in g r e m a rk s

Ifw e examine the re la t ion of t im e and poli tics th at has em erged in French

thought over the last four decades or so, we ul t imately end up with an

apo ria. Y et, this apo ria is no t to b e dismissed, for w ithin its d yna m i c struc-

ture one can see the playing ou t of bo th the paradox ical and v ery hum an

realities of und ecidab ility an d concrete, subj ec tive d ecisionm aking /inter-

ventions. In other wo rds, one can see the intersection of the irreducible

archstructur ing tem porizat ion, which belongs to a l l of reali ty, and the sub-

jec tiv e tim e th a t e m erges w ith th e in terventions th a t g ive us events . O n e can



Filling out the aporia that ispolitics 109

nev er escape tim e, an d it colours bo th the possibility of po litical philos-

ophy as poli tical thinking a nd the app licat ion of such thinking to the tem-

poralized , subj ective w orld . D e rrid ean tim e gives us an a rch stru c tu re

that yields a d oub le b ind, w hich results in a state of undecid abili ty, openended ness a nd unfinis hedness, to bo rrow a te rm from N ancy . 13 Yet, d espite

this tem po ral fram ew ork, we m ake co ncrete an d decisive decisions, wh ich

are never metaphysically present but which nonetheless manifest them-

selves and w hich call us to be faithful to the develop ing po litical sense tha t

emerges from such decisions. T he decisions we ma ke, esp ecially the poli tical

decisions th at give us political events, do s tan d o ut in the econo mic m ove -

m ent D errid a calls différance, albei t nev er as unities of full presence. R ath er,

they are inheren tly mu ltiple a nd replete w ith a m ultiplicity o f meanings.O u r responsibility is never to isolate such mean ings or m ake such m ean-

ings of political even ts alldefining.

U l tima tely, tem poriza tion and the subj ec tive tim e th at colour reality and

give it i ts m ultip le senses reveal t h a t poli tics is not an objec t or a co nc ep t. It is

an a po ria. W ithin this apo ria, politics as the dem ocracy to come reveals an

inherent and ir reducible undecidabil i ty about our poli t ical thinking and

our p olitical actions. Y et, the apo ria does not only lie in the fact of undecid

abili ty. Th e ap oria shows its gre ater d epth t hrou gh Bad iou’s i nsight into thesubjectivating i nterve ntions th at give us events. In the m idst of the tim e o f

tem po rization , a no the r sense of t im e em erges tha t is subjective an d decisive

and which also draws on the sense ofkairological t im e tha t is in the wo rld of

the subject. Politics as defined by B adiou becomes coloured by the time th at

is the intervention an d the kairos to w hich the su bject finds herse lf respond

ing. Badiou gives us the m etaacco un t or the ph ilosophical accou nt of the

ontology o fo u r subjective, political decisions, which in and ofitselfis m ulti-

ple in m eaning an d sense.



Notes

P a r t O n e

I n t r o d u c t i o n : t im e a n d p o l it ic s

1. Plato, n e Republic of Plato. Translation and Introduction by F. M. Cornford(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), 499cd, p. 208.

2. The promise that Derrida speaks of is also called the messianic. See JacquesDerrida, Foi etsavoir (Paris: Seuil, 1996), pp. 301. In the promise and in the act of

pardon, there is something that exceeds these acts themselves. Such is also the casewith politics. See so Le siecleetlepartln (2000) p. 129. These themes will be further

elaborated in the chapter devoted to Derrida’s thinking. More references to the promise and democracy to come can be found in: Jacques Derrida, Du droit àlaphi

losophic (Paris: Galilée, 1990), pp. 701; Saufle mm (Paris: Galilee, 1993), p. 108;Spectres de Marx (Paris: Galilée, 1993), pp. 124-7; Voyous (Paris: Galilee, 2003),

pp. 4665,95135.3. Jacques Derrida, Force de /oi (Paris: Galilée, 1994), p. 88. By contrast, the future

anterior is the time of political interventions for Badiou because they draw fromthe having been of a situation and, through the operation of fidelity, one can referto such interventions in a multiplicity of senses in the future. More will be said

about later.4. Jacques Deerda, Le de l'autre ou la protlUse de l 'wigw (Paris: Galilée,

1996), p. 42. Translations are mine unless otherwise specified.5. Badiou refers to the ily a (there is) o f the situation. Alain Badiou, Peut-on penser la

politique? (Paris: Seuil, 1985), p. 67.6. It appears as both present and nonpresent. Presence is not understood as absolute

presence but as a relationship between presence and nonpresence or what Badioucalls le vide, emptiness or nothing.

7. ‘O n dira aussi qu’il faut délivrer la politique de tyrannie de l’histoire, pour larendre à l’événement. II faut avoir l’audace de poser que, du point de la politique,l’histoire comme sens n’existe pas, mais seulement l’occurrence périodisée des a

priori du hasard.’Alain Badiou, Peuto(}npenserlapolitique? (Paris: Seuil, 1985), p. 18.

8. Alain Badiou, D’un disastre obscur: Sur la fin de la vente d'etat (La Tourd’Aigues:

L’Aube, 1998), pp. 7ft , 21ff



Notes 111

9. 'J’appelle politique ce qui établit au régime de l’intervention la consistance de l’évé-

nement, et Je propage audelà de la situation prépolitique. Cette propogation n’est jamais une répétition. Elle est un effet de sujet, une consistance.’Peut-on penser la politique?,

p. 77.10. Ibid.

11. ‘On dira aussi que la philosophie est désignée comme le lieu où la politique est pensée. O r la politique est un lieu de pensée. Et il n’est pas même correct de direque la philosophie est pensée de cette pensée, car les grands textes des politiques,de SaintJust a U nine ou a Mao, ont précisément pour enjeu la politique

c^^Mpensée de de lapenséepolifyue. Ce rapport, interne à la politique comme procédure singulière, entre pensée et pensée de la pensée, n’est nullement identiqueau rapport de la politique à la philosophie. Il constitue, comme le montre

aujourd’hui avec une force toute particulière l’oeuvre de Sylvain Lazarus, la ten-sion intime de toute procédure de vérité.’Alain Badiou, Coondi tions (Paris: Seuil, 1992), p. 223.

12. Alain Badiou, Manifeste pour la philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 1989), pp. 15ff. A moredetailed analysis of Badiou’s notion of being and the event as developed in his L’être et l’i v ^ ^ w t wül be discussed in the chapter devoted to Badiou’s thought.

13. Fabio Ciaramelli, Jacques D rn er tunJ d J Saup/ ement des Uri^ran£i’, in EwaLte des D ^ ^ m : Zur P^hsophie vm Jacques D ^ ^ fa , Hrsg. H.D. Gondek, B. Waldenfels(Frankfurt am M.: Suhrkamp, 1997), pp. 124ft:

14 ‘D’un discours à venir sans héritage et posâbilité de répétition. Axiome: nulavenirsans héritage et possibilité de répéter. Nulàvenir sans quelque itirabiliti, au moinssous la forme de l’alliance à soi et de la du oui originaire.’Jacques Derrida, Foiet savoir, p. 72. Here, we see the echoes ofMerieauPonty’s useofBqa^mg.

15. Indeed, Derrida would have to say that such insufficiency is one of the ‘aims’ ofdeconstruction.

P a r t T w o

D e r rid a a n d th e d e m o c r a cy t o co m e

1. (Paris: Galilée, 2003), p. 19.2. Derrida also makes Ais connection in other texts, which we will discuss later.3. ‘Ici s’annoncerait toujours la déconstruction comme pensée du don et de l’indécon-

structible justice, la condition indéconstructible de toute déconstruction, certes,

mais une condition qui est ellemême en decons/ruciion et reste, et doit rester, c’estl’injonction, dans la disjointure de l’UnFug.’Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx (Paris: Galilée, 1993), p. 56. Other texts like Force

de loi and Pour Nelson Mandela amply make this point as well.4. We shall discuss later what means exactly. For now, it is important to note that

justice, understood as differance, is that injunction to recognize that differance condi-tions and structures a l ofreality.Justice means tha t one has to recognize and allow



112 Notes

for différance to play itself out, ultimately letting undecidability articulate itself andavoiding a reversion to a metaphysics of presence.

5. Jacques Derrida, Fichus (Paris: Galilée, 2002) and Voyous.

6. Jacques Derrida, Cosmopolites de tous lespays: Encore un effort! (Paris: Galilée, 1997).

7. Jacques Derrida, Politiques de /’amitié (Paris: Galilée, 1994), pp. 121 ff.8. Simon Critchley, ‘Derrida’sSpecters o f Marx', in Philosophy and Social Criticism, 1995,

vol. 21, no. 3, p. II.9. Ibid. pp. 11 12. See also Derrida’s L ’autrecap ( Paris : Minuit, 1990), pp. 76-9.

10. Simon CritcWey, The Ethics o/Deconstructim (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992). See alsoLawrence Burns, ‘Derrida and the Promise of Community’, in Philosophy and Social

Criticism, 2001, vol. 21, n. 6, 4353. Here, Burns examines the ethics of the Derri-dean promise and its relation to the possibility of a community.

11. Caputo, J . D., ‘Who is Derrida’s Zarathrustra? O f Fraternity, Friendship and aDemocracy to Come’, in Research in Ph^^^rnlo gy, 1999, vol. 29, 18498. Here,Caputo is more concerned with the double bind of fri endship that is developed inDerrida’s Politiques de [’amitie. Actually, in &is article the democracy to come isgiven passing references, bu t is never fully explicated. Lately, Caputo has focusedon the question ofD errida’s thought on religion.

12. Bernasconi, R., ‘Different Styles of Eschatology: Derrida’s Take on Levinas’ Poli-tical Messianism’, in Research in Phenomenology, 1998, 28: 319 and ‘Levinas andDerrida: The Question of the Closure of Metaphysics’, in Face io Face with(ed.) R. Cohen, (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1985). Bernasconi, like Critchley, has con-

centrated on Derrida’s ethics, especially in relation to Levinas’ thought. Anotherexample of bringing Derrida into dialogue with Levinas ethics is JohnLlewlyn, Appositions o f Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 2002). Though this is a more recent work, little attention is paidto politics. Pages 22930 are devoted to politics, focusing on the theme ofan after- politics, but no connection between time and politics is elaborated.

13. Seyla Benhabib, ‘Democracy and Difference: Reflections on the Metapolitics of

Lyotard and Derrida’, in The Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 2, n. I, 1994,123; Morag Patrick, Derrida, Responsibility andPolitics, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997).

14. Drucilla Cornell, ‘Civil Disobedience and Deconstruction’, in Fe^Mst Interpréta-tions f Jacques Derrida (ed.) Nancy Holland (University Park, PA: The Pennsylva-nia State University Press, X997), p.152.

15. Derida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996).16. See Vqyous, pp. 606. Derrida recapitul ates the deferral and differen tia tion ofdiJfir-

ance as spatiotemporizing. In this text, for the first time, Derrida introduces a new

synonym for the double bind, namely, the autoimmune process {Ie processus auto- iT^mmunitaire]. Like the double bind, autoimmunity implies the possibility of healingand ' protecting the body by building antibodies that may be noxious to the body,which would normally make life impossible if unchecked.

17. The injunction of the command will be addressed later.18. Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx, p. 111.19. Marges, p. 8.



Notes 113

20. Ibid.

21. These notions will be discussed later in greater detail.22. Marges, p. 9.

23. Ibid., p. 12.24. Ibid.

25. ‘To put it more simply and more concretely: at the very moment (assuming thatthis moment itself might be full and selfidentical, identifiable for the problem ofidealization and iterability is already posed here, in the structure of temporaliza

tion), at the very moment when someone would like to say or write, “On the twen-tieth ... etc.,” the very factor that will permit the mark (be it psychic, oral,graphic) to function beyond this moment namely the possibility of its beingrepeated ano^^ time breaches, divides, expropriates the “ideal” plenitude or

selfpresence of intention, of meaning (to say) and, a fortiori, of all adequation between meaning and saying. Iterability alters, contaminating parasitically whatit identifies and enables to repeat “ itself” ; it leaves us no choice but to mean (to say)something other than what we say sand would have wanted to say, to understand

something other than .... etc.’Jacques Derrida, .Limited, Inc. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,1988), pp. 612.

26. ‘Retenant au moins le schéma sinon le contenu de l’exigence formulé par Saussure,

nous désignerons pardifflrance

le mouvement selon lequel la langue, ou tout code,tout système de renvois en général se constitute “historiquement” comme tissu dedifferences.’

Marges, pp. 1213.

27. Ibid. pp. 1314.28. ‘La différance, l’absence irroouctible de l’intention ou de l’assistance à l’énoncé

performatif, l’énoncé le plus “événementiel” qui soit, c’est ce qui m’autorise,compte tenu des prédicats quej’ai rappeles tout à l’heure, à poser la structure gra phématique générale de toute “communication” . Je n’en tirerai surtout pas

comme conséquence qu’iI n’y a aucune spécificité relative des effets de conscience,des effets de parole (par opposition a l’écriture au sens traditionnel), qu’il n y a

aucun effet de performatif, aucun effet de language ordinaire, aucun effet de pré-sence et d’événement discursif [speech act). Simplement, ces effets n’excluent pasce qu’en général on leur oppose terme a terme, le présupposent au contraire defaçon dissymétrique, comme l’espace général de leur possibilité.’Jacques Derrida, ‘Stgnatvre Contexte’, in Marges de la philosophU (Paris:Galilée, 1972), p. 390.

29. This undecidability is articulated clearly when Derrida considers thew orkofFreudin his essay, ‘La difflrmce’. ‘Nous touchons ici au point de la plus grande obscurité, àl’énigme même de la différance, à ce qui en divise justement le concept par unétrange partage. II ne faut pas se hâter de décider. Comment penser Ii lafois 1a dif-férance comme détour économique qui, dans l'élément du même, vise toujours àretrouver le plaisir où la présence difterée par calcul (conscient ou inconscient) etd’autre part la difIerance comme rapport à 1a présence impossible, comme dépense



114 Notes

sans reserve, comme perte irréparable de la présence, usure irréversible del’énergie, voire comme pulsion de mort et rapport au toutautre interrompant en

apparence toute économie? II est evident c’est I’évidence même qu’on ne peut

penserensemble

l’économique et le nonéconomique, le même et le toutautre, etc.Si la difierance est ce impensable, peutêtre ne fautil pas se hâter de la porter àl’évidence ...’

Marges, p. 20.30. Ibid., p. 15.

31. Spectres tit Marx, p. 115.32. Silvano Petrosino, Jacques D n rer e ltJ legge delpossibile: Un’introduzione (Milano:

Jaca, 1997), p. 221.33. Jacques Derrida, Malrfarchive (Paris: Galilée, 1995), p. 109.

34. The ‘yes' is also described as an original ‘yes’ in Ulysses Gramoplwne.

35. This promise echoes th e claim of Holocaust survivors to bring to justice those whocommitted the horrific crimes of the Holocaust. See I.esitcle et lepardon (Paris: Seuil,2000), pp. 104ff.

36. Mal rfarchive, p. 114. See also Polü^rns tit l’amitu, pp. 867.37. More ^ü l he said about events when we come to the treatment ofBadi ou’s philoso-

phy.38. Mal rfarchive, p. 114.39. Spectres tit Marx, p. 60.40. 'L ’avenir de la démocratie, c’est aussi, quoique sans présence, le hie et nunc de

l’urgence, de l’injonction comme urgence absolue.’Jacques Derrida, Vtryous (Paris: Galilée, 2003), p. 53.

41. Malrfarchive,p. 11.

42. Mal rfarchive, p. 126.43. Responsibility stems from the Latin root respondto, respondere, which translates the

verb ‘to respond’.44. Marges, pp. 3756.

45. Jacques Derrida, Politiques tit / ’aamili (Paris: Galilee, 1994), p. 58.46. ‘ Ladiffirance’ in Marges, pp. 1-7. Derrida also speaks ofthe ‘peut-etre’. See Politiques de

l’amili, pp. 43ff.47. See Derrida’s ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, in Dnrida aand Negative Theology,

(eds) H. Coward and T. Foshay (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992).48. Marges, p. 134.49. To claim to achieve something and to achieve it fully is to make a metaphysical

claim for Derrida.50. We shall see a more concrete example of this when we treat Derrideanjustice.

51. ‘SignatureEvm^rnit Contexte i n Marges, p.367.52. Ibid.

53. See Voyous, pp . 12635.54. There is always the risk, and this applies to deconstruction as well, tha t people may

choose to live in metaphysics of presence, and they may choose to do this violentlyand brutally. The twentieth century is replete with examples that testify to the



Notes 115

sheer force ofviolence and power. Derrida’s Force de Wi addresses this problem andtries to propose a deconstructive reading of the force oflaw, opposing it to justiceand showing the radical absence that it contains, that is, its inadequacy and theimpotence ofits own force.

55. Voyous, p. 127.

56. Jacques Derrida, L’autrecap (Paris: Minuit, 1990), p. 16.57. L’autre cap, p. 16. The work ofJean Luc Nancy resonates with similar themes. See

his La commuwuti désoeuvrée and L’e x p ^ ^ e de la liberti.58. Saufle 110m, p. 38.59. Though Derrida is reticent to speak ofsubjectivity because of the legacy of presence

attached to it, we use the term democratic subjectivity to refer to that subjectivitythat attempts to make itself present, but never be able to do so.

60. Voyous, p. 127. I t is universalizing in that it encompasses all differentiation, includ-ing that of political subjects. Yet, it is also fragile because differences can be easily

obliterated either by force, will or ignorance, etc.61. L’autre cap, p. 76.62. See Rosanvallon’s impressive study: Pierre Rosanvallon, La côcratie inachevée:

Histoire de la souveraituté du peuple en Frame (Paaris: Gallimard, 2020). In this study,there is an analysis of the decline of political will, which Rosanvallon sees as epi-demic. See pp. 39Of

63. In L ’autre cap, pp. 103ff.64. La <ôcrrtie ajournée, p. 104.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., pp. 1056.

67. Recall that in ou r treatment ofD errida’s essay ‘La différance', political representa-tion functions like a sign.

68. La d m w r ^ ajournée, pp. 11 Of.69. Ibid., p. 106.70. Ibid., p. 107. See also Voyous, pp. 626. The artificial and unwitting introduction of

‘newness’ is to be understôod as ontotheology. This is to be distinguished from the‘genuine’ newness ofrepetition.

71. Today, information on webs and news channels is updated instantaneously andconstantly. The ‘daily’ that Derrida refers to can also extend to the ‘instant’, forthe ‘instant’ claims to make present the here and now. But, for Derrida, even theinstant is subject to the delay and differentiation that is ffiraru:e.

72. Spectres de Marx, p. 56.73. Voyous, p. 126.74. Spectres de Marx, p. 269.75. Ibid., p. 151.76. Politiques del’amitié, pp. 2234. See also Saufle nom, p. 39 and Foyeous, pp. 12831.77. Jacques Derrida, De l’hospitalité (Paris: CalmannLevy, 1997), p. 113. Here,

Derrida refers to the difficulties of speaking about hospitality and its relation to the‘becomingtime of time’. Concerning friendship, the poîble and the impossible,see Politiques de l’amitié, pp. 46, 1989. See also Voyous, pp. 95ff.



116 Notes

78. Politiques de l’amitii, p. 197.79. For a more detailed analysis ofSchm itt’s work, see Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and

AuifoniarcrianLiberalism (Cardiff: University ofWales Press, 1998).

80. Politiques de I’amitu,

p. 198.81. De I’lwjpi’ialiti, p. 29.

82. Ibid., p. 119.83. Ibid., p. 113.84. ‘ Une torsion temporelle nouerait ainsi la proposition predicative (“il n’y a nul

amy” ) à l’intérieur de l’apostrophe (“Ο mes amis”). La torsion de cette dissymetrie envelopperait le constat théorique ou la connaissance dans la performativitéd’une prière qu’il n’épuiseraitjamais.’Politiques deVamiti, p. 280.

85. De l’hospitalité, p. 111.86. See also E. E. Beirns, ‘Decision, Hegemony an d Law: Derrida and Laclau’, in

Philosophyand Social Criticum, vol. 22, n. 4, pp. 725.87. Voyous, p. 127.88. Ibid., p. 134.89. Ibid., p. 128. Derrida speaks of rethinking the traditional notion ofjustice (dike),

understood as harmony, as being out ofjoint (desajointement). Here, Derrida isrecapitulating themes already elaborated in Spectres de Marx.

90. Politiques de l'amiti, p. 263.

91. /bid., p. 282.92. /bid., p. 309.93. VIryoUS, p. 128.94. Jacques Derrida, Force de Loi, p. 26.95. Jacques Derrida, Le nècleetIepardon in Foietsavoir (Paris: Seuil, 2000).96. Ibid. 127.97. /bid., pp. 11920.98. Ibid., p. 130.

99. Force deLoi, pp. 601.100. Jay Lamport in his article, ‘Gadamer and CrossCultural Hermeneutics’, argues

that ‘ . . . the most fundamental cases of culture conflict are essential to crosscultural interpretation, and that it is in the dispute over what it means to havea history that a truly universal history can become possible for the first time.’Philosophical FoTUTl, Vols. X XVIII No. 4, Summer 1997/XXIX No. I, Fall, 1997,35168. In a way, Lampert recognizes the deep need for tension and struggle ifanything possible is to emerge. Derrida would acknowledge such a tension, but

for Derrida, this tension is undecidability itself.101. Richard Rorty, ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism', in Deconstruction

andP r^^^ ism (ed.) Chantai Mouffe (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 17.102. Jacques Derrida, tibid., p. 77.103. Jacques Derrida, ibid., p. 86.104. Jacques Derrida, ibid., p. 87. See also, Chantai Mouffe, ‘Conclusion’, in Decon-

struction and Praâti™ , p. 136.



Notes 117

105. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 21. (London: Verso, 2000).106. M. AbuJamal, En direct ducouloir de la^rnt (tr.) J . M. St. Upéry avec un preface de

Jacques Derrida (Paris: La Decouverte, 1999). See also Derrida’s speech ofacceptance of the Adorno Peace Prize in Ficlws (Paris: Galilée, 2002). This speech indi-cates a definitive commitment on the part ofDerrida to peace. His stance againstcapital punishment and his commitment to peace along with his commitment tothe uilles-refuges indicate Derrida’s taking on of a definite or decisive political posi-

tion, especially in terms of social justice. Such decisive actions, however, seem to be disjointed from Derridean undecidability.

107. ‘Si on pouvait parler ici d’architectonique et d’édification, la peine de mort seraitune clé de voûte . . . de l’ontothéologicopolitique . . . ’Jacques Derrida et Elisabeth Roudinesco, A (quai, . . . DDUdotgue (Paris:

Fayard/Galilée, 2001 ), p. 240.l OS. A quoi t tkmain. . . DDialogue, p. 251.109. A democratic totalitarian state is possible when a ruling party controls all levels

and branches of government. The old Soviet Union could be interpreted as an

example of this kind of state. One wonders whether the Derridean approach, because ofits universal (irreducible) applicability (that is, the democratic injunc-tion), could be seen as applicable to the globalizing world, especially when itcomes to the question ofindividual human rights. Specifically, how can an emer-ging global and cosmopolitan political culture make room for individual rights?D ^ the individual risk being absorbed into the Iargerglobal structure? See Caro-line Bayard, ‘Droitstwmainset in Carrefom 2000 22(1), pp. 2948.

110. ‘Derrida has repeatedly insisted that, without taking a rigorous account ofundecidability, it is impossible to think of the concepts of political decision andethical responsibility.’ Chantal Mouffe, TThe Democratic Paradox, p. 135.

111. SeeJacques Derrida, Foiet savoir (Paris: Seuil, 2000).112. Vôus, p. 127.113. ‘Deconstructing the Declaration: A Case Study in Pragrammatology’, in Man

World. 23, 1990, pp. 17590. Evans is citing from Derrida’s deconstructive readingof the Declaration of Independence.

114. Evans, p. 177.

l IS. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia first introduced to the Second ContinentalCongress the resolution calling for independence from Great Britain. This resolu-tion was ^ ^ ^ d on 2 July, 1776. The Declaration of Independence, as drafted

by Thomas Jefferson, was debated one day later and was adopted formallyon 4 July, 1776. See L. P. Todd and M. Curti, 'The Rise o f tIu A iw ^ m N ^w n

(Orlando, FL: Harcourt BraceJovanovich, 1982), p. 118.

116. Evans, p. 177.117. Evans, pp. 1S57.118. From the American Declaration oflndependence as found in The Rise oftIu Amer

ican Nation, pp. 1201.119. Jacques Derrida, ‘Dklaratitions d'InJip^^mce’, in OctoHograpfas: Uensdgm^mt de

Nietzsche etla politique du nompropre (Paris: Galilée, 1984), pp. 1332.



118 Notes

120. Derrida ‘confesses’ that democracy has a heritage that is undeniable, which meansit ‘exists’ even though its senses are many and differentiated. ‘Au bout du compte,si nous tentons de revenir a l’origine, nous ne savons pas encore ce qu’aura voulu

dire démocratie, ni ce que c’est que la démocratie. Car la démocratie ne se pré-sente pas, elle ne s’est pas encore présentée, mais ça va venir. En attendant, ne

renonçons pas à nous servir d’un mot dont I’héritage est indéniable mais le sensencore obscuri, offusque, réservé.’Voyoous, p. 28.

121. See Alain Badiou’s treatment of the event and the temporal intervention requiredto bring about such events in L’être et l’évm^rnit (Paris: Seuil, 1988).

P a r t T h r e e

B a d i o u , t im e a n d p o l it ic s

1. Alain Badiou, L’éthique: essai sur la conscience dumal (Caen: NOUS, 2003), pp. 489.2. L'etltique, p. 49.3. We shall unpack later in greater detail Badiou’s ontology.4. Badiou is developing and changing his ideas on the naming that happens in an

event. He remarks, ‘Tod ay I can no longer maintain th at the only trace left byan event in the situation it affects is the name given to that event. This idea

presumed, in effect, th at there were two events rather than one (the eventeventand the eventnaming), and likewise two subjects rather than one (the subjectwho names the events, and the subj ect who is faithful to ^ s na rang) . So nowI posit that an event is implicative, in the sense that it enables the detachmentof a statement which wiU suteist as such once the event itself has disappeared.This statement is previously undecided, or of an uncertain value.’Taken from the English translation o f L’éthique. Here, the translator, Peter Hal

ward, interviews Badiou. EMcs (London: Verso, 200 I), pp. lvilvii.5. Alain Badiou, L’éthique (Caen: NOUS, 2003), p. 61.

6. Badiou, Lo^giquesdest^^ks (Paris: Seuil, 2006), pp . 5701.7. Jacques Derrida, ‘Une c^taW possibilité impossible de dire l’évéM^^% in Dire l’évene-

imentl, est-ce posdble? SimiFlire de Montréalpour Jacqques D & ter (Montréal: L’Harmattan, 2001), pp. 79112.

8. See Badiou’s interview with Peter Hallward in the English translation of L ’ét ty w .

9. Alain Badiou, L’être et (Paris: Seuil, 1988), p. 14.10. Ibid., pp. 25ff.

11. See Norman Madarasz’s I nt^riuction to the English translation of Alain Badiou’s MtmifesUifor Phihsoophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999), pp. 1418. Madarasz, inemphasizing Badiouan set theory, may give the impression that mathematics isontology and that politics, love and poctry are reducible to mathematics.

12. Ibid., pp. 65ff.13. Ibid., pp. 312.



Notes 119

14. Ibid., p. 32.

15. Ibid., p. 32.16. This notion of presentation that accompanies decisions will be developed later in

terms of politics when I examine the notion ofkairoiogical time.17. L’etre et févrâm^t, p. 32.18. Ibid., p. 33.19. Ibid., p.32.20. Ibid., p. 37.

21. Ibid., pp. 65ff.22. Ibid., p.69.23. Ibid., p. 65.24. Ibid., p. 65.

25. Ibid., p. 66.26. Ibid., p. 68.27. 'Je dis “vide” , plutôt que“ rien” , parce que Ie “ rien” est plutôt Ie nom du vide cor

rélé à l’effet global de la structure (tout est compté), et qu’il est plus aigu d’indiquerque le n’avoirpasétécompté est aussi bien Zocal, puisqu’il n’est pas compté pour un.

“Vide” indique la défaillance de l’un, le pasun, en un sens plus originaire que le pasdutout.’ Ibid., pp. 689.

28. ‘Le rien nomme cet indécidable de la presentation qui est son impresentable, distri-

bué entre la pure inertie dominale du multiple et la pure transparence de l’opéra-tion d’où prrcocede qu’il y ait de l’un.’ Ibid., p. 68.29. Fô^, pp. 12635.30. ‘La ligne que nous allons suivre consiste à étayer dans l’apparaître la possibilité

logique de la negation, sans pour autant poser que la neegation co^m e telle appa-raît ...’ Alain Badiou, ‘L’investigation transcendentale’, in Alain» B ^w u : Pmser Itmultiple (ed.) Charles Ramond (Paris: L’Harm attan, 2002), p. 17.

31. ‘L’événement sera cet ultraun d’un hasard, d’où le vide d’une situation est rétro-activement decelable . . . ’ L’ltre et p. 69.

32. ‘L’émergence du sujet dépend du choix par lequel un quelqu’un décide de se rapporter à une situation du point de vue de l’événement qui, comme dit Badiou, “ sup plémente” cette situation.’ Bernard Vainqueur, ‘De quoi “sujet” estil le nom pourAlain Badiou?’, in Alain Badiou: Penser It multiple (ed.) C. Ramond (Paris: L’Har-mattan, 2002), pp. 3234.

33. L'etre et l’b J ^ ^ ^ t , pp. l99ff.34. ‘L’événement est un multiple exceptionnel qui se surajoute à une situation en y

traçant l’incise d’une coupure.’ Bern ^d Vainqueur, ‘De quoi “sujet” estil le nom pour Alain Badiou?’ in Allain Badiou: Pmser It multipZe (ed.) C. Ramond (Paris:L’Harmattan, 2002), p. 324.

35. ‘C’est dire que la throrie de l’intervention est le noeud de toute théorie du temps.Le temps, s’il n’est pas côexenensif a la structure, s’il n’est pas la fmorme s^msiIt dela lAi, est l’intervention ellemême, pensée comme écart de deux événements.L’essentielle historicité de l’intervention ne renvoie pas au temps comme à unmilieu mesurable. Elle s’établit de ce que la capacité intervenante ne se sépare



120 Notes

de la situation qu’en prenant appui sur la circulation, déjà décidé, d’un multipleévénementiel. Seul cet appui, combiné à la fréquentation du site, peut introduireentre l’intervention et la situation une part suffi^nte de nonêtre pour que l’être

même, en tant qu’être, y soit parié sous les especes de l’imprésentable et de l’illégal,donc, en demier ressort, de la multiplicité inconsistante. Le temps est ici, à nou-

veau, l’exigence du Deux: pour qu’il y ait événement, il est requis qu’on puisse

être au point des conséquences d’un autre. L’intervention est le trait tiré d’un mul-

tiple paradoxal déjà circulant à la circulation d’un autre. Elle est une ddiagonale dela situation.’ L’2 lr et p. 232.

36. L’é^ ÿ w , pp. 912.37. The term operation comes from Derrida’s Voiz et p ^ ^ ^ ^ (Paris: PUF, 1967),

p. 98, where Derrida speaks ofdifférance as an operation.

38. We think here ofJoachim ofFiore. One could also see Marc Bloch’s reading ofhistory as falling in this same category.

39. Badiou, Lbgi'quesi desmonties, pp. 407ft:40. Ibid.

41. 'j’appelle sujet toute configuration locale d’une procédure générique dont unevérité sesoutient .. .J ’appellesubjectwrtw- l’émergence d’un opérateur, consécutiveà une nomination intervenante.’ L’être et Ρ έ υ ^^^ Μ , pp. 42930.

42. ‘La vraie difficulté réside en ceci que les conséquences d’un événement, é tant sou-mises à la structure, ne sont pas discernables comme td les.J’ai pointé cette indécidabilité, par quoi l’événement n’est possible qui se conserve, par des procédures

speciales, que les conséquences d’un événement sont événementielles. C’est pour-quoi elle ne se fonde que d ’une discipline du temps, qui contrôle de bout en bout lesconséquences de la mise en circulation du multiple paradoxal, et sait à tout moment

en discerner la connexion au hasard. J ’appellerai jidJliti ce contrôle organisédu temps.

Intervenir, c’est effectuer, au bord du vide, l’êtrefidèle à son bord antérieur.’ L’être et l’év fa^m t, p. 233.

43. ‘De quelle “décision” s’origine alors le prixocesus d'une vérité? De la décisionde se rapporter désormais à la situation flu point tk vue flu supplhnmnt éomemndel.

Nommons c i a une jidJliiti. Etre fidèle a un événement, c’est se mouvoir dansla situation que cet événement a supplémenté, en ppensant (mais toute pensée estune pratique, une mise à l’epreuve) la situation “selon” l'événement. Ce qui,

bien entendu, puisque l’événement éta it en dehors de toutes les lois régulières dela situation, contraint à une nouvelle m an iae d’êue et d’agir dans lasituation.

Il est clair que sous l’effet d’une rencontre amoureuse, et si je veux lui être fidèleréeUtêm., je dois ramier de fond en comble ma manière ordinaire d’“habiter” masituation. Sije veux être fidèle à l’événement “Révolution culturelle”, je dois entout cas pratiquer la politique (enparticulierle rapport auxouvriers) de façon entièrementdifterente de ce que pro^pos la tradition socialiste et syndicaliste . . .

On appelle “vérité” (arme vérité) le processus réel d'une fidélité à un événement.Ce que cette fidélité produit dans la situation. Par exemple, la politique des maoïstes



Notes 121

français entre 1966 et 1976, qui tente de penser et de pratiquer une fidéJité à deuxévénements enchevêtrés: la Révolution culturelle en Chine et Mai 68 en France.’

L'éthique, pp. 613.

44. L ’être et l’é v ^ ^ w t, p. 233.45. Recall that the counting as one is folded in to th e event as the situation. This meansthat there is a counting tha t happens in the ultra one of the event.

46. ‘L’événement, s’il y en a, consiste a faire l’impossible. Mais quand quelqu’un faitl'impossible, si quelqu’un fait l’impossible, personne, à commencer par l’auteur decette action, ne peut être en mesure d’ajuster un dire théorique, assure de luimême,

a cet événement et dire: “ceci a eu lieu” ou “le pardon a eu lieu” ou “j’ai par-donné”.’ Derrida, ‘Une certmnepossibilité impossible dedire , p. 94.

47. L'itre et l’é»en^î, p. 379.

48. Ibid., p. 379.49. ‘Le pacte social est la fo r"" évfa""nfa.lL· que l’on doit supposer si l’on veut penser

la vérité de cet être aléatoire qu’est le corps politique. En lui, nous atteignonsl’événementialité de l’événement o ù toute procédure politique trouve sa vérité.’

Ibid., p. 380.50. Ibid., p. 380.51. Ibid., p. 381.52. Alain Badiou, Cwrt traité d'ontologie transitoire (Paris: Seuil, 1998) pp. 559.53. Alain Badiou, Conditions (Paris: Seuil, 1992) pp. 222ff.54. ‘La politique est une création, locale et fragile, de l’humanité collective, elle n’est

j amai s le traitement d’une nécessité vitale. La nécessité est toujours apolitique,soit en amont (état de nature), soit en aval (éta t dissous). La politique n’est, dans

son être, commensurable qu’à l’événement qui l’institue.’ L ’être et l’évfa ^m t, p. 380.55. Mainfestepourlaphilosophit, p. 79.

56. See the interview with Alain Badiou conducted by the English translator ofBadiou’s Ethics, Peter Hallward, p. 115.

57. Alain Badiou, Peut-onpenserlapolitique? (Paris: Seuil, 1985), p. 114.

58. Ibid., p. 78.59. Ibid., p. 76.60. Ibid., p. 77.61. ‘Ta lbot est une situation prépolitique, en ce que la qualification d e la situation

comme grève syndicale contre les licenciements y est tenue en échec . . . [Les ouvr-iers} . . . sont . . . innombrables

. . . L’événement est ici annoncé du droit sans droit. II est produit par l’intérprétation des formes programmatiques inadéquates o ù il opere. L’indice d’inadéquationde ces formes est la multiplicité flottante: les uns disent: il nous faut vingt millions,les autres: le remboursement des cotisations sociales, les autres: un moi de salaire

par année d’ancienneté, etc. L’intéprétation produit cet événement que, dans unesituation prépolitique, a été énoncé qu ’il était im ^^sible de traiter des ouvrierscomme des marchandises usées. Cet impossible est injustement, en la circonstance,la réalité, donc la possibilité. La possibilité de l’im^Msibilité est le fond de la

politique. Elle s’op^ê masivem ent à tout ce qu’on nous enseigne aujourd ’hui,



122 Notes

qui est que la politique est la gestion du nécessaire. La politique commence parle même geste par lequel Rousseau dégage le fondement de l’inégalité: laisser decôté les faits.

Il importede laisser de coté les faits, pour qu’advienne l’événement’.Ibid., pp. 778.62. ‘Que l’activité centrale de la politique soit la ré eunion est une métonymie locale de

son être intrinsèquement collectif, et donc principiellement universel.’ Abrégé demetapolitique, p. 156.

63. ‘Comme une politique inclut dans la situation la pensée de tous, elle procède Ii lamise en évidence de l’infinité subjective des situations.’ Ibid., p. 157.

64. ‘Empiriquement, cela veut dire, quand il y a un événement réellement politique,l’Etat se montre. II montre son excès de puissance, c’est la dimension répressive.

Mais il montre aussi une mesure de cet excès qui en temps ordinaire ne se laisse pasvoir. Parce qu’il est essentiel au fonctionnement normal de l’Etat que sa puissancereste sans mesure, errante, inassignable. C’est à tout cela que l’événement politiquemet fin, en assignant à la puissance excessive de l’état une mesure visible.’ Ibid.,

p. 159.65. The diritto allo sstudiow.

66. Alain Finkielkraut, La défaite delapensee (Paris: Gallimard, 1987).67. Luc Ferry, ‘La literature smùtr": Entretien <wec Ie Ministre de l’ÆEducati'on N ^ '^ ^ ', in

Le Figaro Littéraire: 10/04/2003.68. Ethics. e J e a n Wahl’s preface and the inteerview with Peter Hallward at the end of

the text.

69. ‘La politique a aussi pour tâche de reponctuer la chronique. Elle y distribued’autres accents, isole d’autres séquences.’ Peut-on ppenser lafwlitiqque?, p. 69.

70. ‘Mais le temps politique réel est le futur antérieur. C’est dans la double dimensionde son antériorité et de son avenir que ce temps implique l’organisation.’ Ibid.,

p. 107.

71. See Chapter I of Marion’s recent text, Desurcrott (Paris: PUF, 2001), pp. 135.

72. Reduction et Recherches sur Husserl, Hdeidtgger etlaphinorminohgie (Paris: PUF,1989), p. 59.

73. Marges, p. 7.

C o n c l u s i o n

1. Monique Tredé, Kairos: L ’à-propos et l'occasion (Le mot et la 1UJtion d'Homere à lajin du

IV eà ic kavm tJ.C .) (Paris: Mitions^Klincksieck, 1992).2. Ibid., p. 189.3. ‘La guerre . . . est pour un Grec une partie de la politique. ês mêmes hommes,

au Ve siOle, assument le plus souvent, les deux formes de responsabilité, politiqueet militaire. O n ne s’étonnera donc pas de rencontrer dans le récit de Thucydide, àcôté du tactique qu’il appartient au stratège de percevoir et de saisir, unk ^rœ politique qu’il est du devoir de l’homme d’Etat de discerner .. . H est clair



Notes 123

que l’action efficace se fonde sur une psychologie des peuples, des armées, des indi-vidus. Les refluons générales de Thucydide le prouvent, et il est aise de montrer

que leur contenu vise souvent à déterminer un kairos. Avec lui, l’histoire des actions

humaines devient très largement une histoire des occasions reconnues ou perdues.Si les mêmes qualites font le bon stratège et le bon politique ar t de calculer lesvraisemblances, réflexion dépassant le niveau des apparences pour prendre encompte l’ensemble des composantes historiques, politiques ou financières de l’ac-tion, qu’elles s’enracinent dans un passé lointain ou soient liées à des événementsrécents , la connaissance des conduites humaines et l ’analyse psychologique

jouent un rôle plus important encore dans le domaine politique.’

Ibid., pp. 2223.4. Ibid.

5. Kenneth Dorter, ‘PhilosopherRulers: How Contemplation Becomes Action’, in Arnient Philosophy 21 (2001), p. 346.

6. ‘L’investigation transcendentale’, in Alain Badiou: Penserle multiple (ed.) C. Ramond(Paris: L’Harm attan, 2002), p. 8.

7. This is only within the strict context of time understood as interventions as devel-

oped in L ’être et l’b ^ ^ ^ t .

8. Badiou himself uses the term ‘evil’. Evil, for Badiou, consists of not being faithful tothe tru th of event, that is, its consistent ordering, temporal and othe^ ^æ. SSe his

L ’i^ ^ w .9. L’éthique, p. 63.10. ‘O n appellera “éthique d’une vérité”, de façon générale, le principe de continua-

tion d’un procûs de vérité ou, de fa ^ n plus précise et complexe, ce qui dodon

ctmts^tance a la présence dequelqu’un la composition flu mjet qu’M uit Ie processus de ceife Ibid., p. 65.

11. Alain Badiou, SaintPaul: L a fo ^ ^ r n de l'umverssal ismt (Paris: PUF, 1997), pp. 12ff.

12. See Manifeste pour laphilosophü.

13. JeanLuc Nancy, Unepensitfiau (Paris: Galilée, 1990).



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Index

Note: Page numbers in bold type indicate chapters and sections of chapters

Abelard and Heloise 61Abu Jamal, M. 86absence 9, 14, 16,17, 19, 22, 24, 269,

39,4 0,424,48, 50, 55, 60, 72, 73,80

Alghanistan 24Alexander the Great 79Algeria 49American Civil War 90

American Revolution 56, 57, 58, 76, 77,90, 95, 106 (seealsoevent)Aquinas, T. 90arch structure 3, 6, 9, II , 13, 21, 26, 28,

31,48,50, 51, 557,60,80 ,81,94,95,1079

Aristotle 11,42,83,90,94apartheid 8aporia 2, 8,9, 13, 14, 29, 34, 38,40, 41,

4850, 56, 62, 63, 67, 81,93, 94, 96,98, 1079

as politics, 98109appearance 9, 602, 657, 81, 104Athenian Golden Age 78Athenian politics IAthens 44Augustine 28

Bastille 74, 79 (fee also French

Revolution)Beardsworth, R. 13 being 6, 17, 23, 25,61, 635,679 , 70,

71, 746, 813 ,94,95, 105 (see alsometaphysics)

qua being 63 beingthere 66,68, 71, 72, 75

counted as one 69emptiness 64,68, 69, 70, 71, 76event 9,63 72,82 ,90, 103, 104multiple 63, 64, 69nonbeing 65as one 64, 65undecidable 63, 70unpresentable 69, 70

^^ as co n i, R. 12

Bush, George W. 234 , 38 (see also9/11 )

Canadian Confederation 78Cantor, G. 72capital punishment 40,41, 53, 56, 94, 95

(see also death penalty) (see also deathsentence)

Caputo,J. 12chauvinism 50China 78, 105Chinese Revolu tion 91 (see also Maoist

Revolution )chronology 14,82, 957, 100, 101, 108collectivity 84, 85 ,87,89 ,91, 92, 100,

103Columbia 47Communism

Fall of 80 (seealso Marxism, fall of)

communism 6, 29Congo 47Cornell, D. 12, 13count as one 6274, 78, 80, 80n. 45, 81,

85,92,95, 98,104,1068Critchley, S. II, 12Cultural Revolution 105



132 Index

death penalty 8,53 ,54,62,80 (see also capital punishment) (see also deathsentence)

death sentence 53, 54,86 (see also capital punishment) (see also death penalty)

decidability 2,13, 28 ,50,52,53 ,73,76,80,84

Declaration of Independence 56,57,58deconstruction 2,8 ,11 ,14 ,16 , 20,21,

26,2831, 36,40,46,50,55,56,58,62, 63, 70 ,80,81,94,107

delay and differentiation 3,4, 5, 8, 18,19,21,22,24,25,27,29,34,37,41,

43,46,50,58,93,94,107Deleuze, G . 75democracy 3,4 ,6 , 11, 12, 29 ,30 ,326,

3845 ,47 ,52 ,55 , 58n. 120, 78Athenian 29,78contemporary 32,35, 77Derridean 3, 14 ,30,32 ,35,39 ,93and différance 4, 33Greek 36

liberal 12,29 parliamentary 29,359 pluralist 52, 54,55representative 36,37,38to come (see democracy to come)Western 3,29,36, 78

democracy to come 2 ,3 ,4 ,6 ,8 ,11-59,60,70,935,109

différance 2,14,15double bind offriendship and

hospitality 42-50 injunction 15,30,48,70 promise 15

Descartes, R. 64différance 26,8,1114,15-21,22,

2431,3341,43,45,4750,55,56,60 ,61,67,70 , 73, 74,81,935,109

as delay and differentiation 2—3,4,14,

14n. 16,15, 18, 21, 22, 2730, 36,37,38n. 71,49,57,93,94,95

democracy to come 11, 12,15iterable time flow 17, 24

justice 11, 1In. 4nonoriginary origin 1517

(see nonoriginary origin)

radical absence 24repetition 4,1518,94spatiotemporization 3 ,4 ,1 4 ,14n. 16,

19,20,21,27,93difference 4,1619,24,25,30,328,44,

46,47,50,525,57,60,66,95,96sexual 1213

differentiation 3,4,1419,2230,323,41,43,459,51,52,55,57,70,75,95,96

Dorter, K. 99,100,102double bind 2 ,9 ,14 ,14n. 16,20,22,23,

268,30,31,39,41,42,4550,524,

56,60,62,80,96,109 (seealso différance)

of possibility and impossibility 2,4,6,8,213,25,27,31,36,39,405,48,50,51, 53,54,61,62,80,93,94

elements 14,18,19,268,30,35,379,64,66,68,73,759,82,83,86,88,90,

103,104,1068emptiness (le vide) 6,9,60,62,64,68,69,69n. 27, 70—3, 76,91,95, (seealso void)

Encyclopaedists 71enemy 11,14,426,48, 78equality 15eternal forms 1eternity 1ethical relativism 79ethics 12,12n. 12,42, 79,89,105,

105n.8,105n. 10,106Derridean 12

European Union 94Evans J . C. 56,57,58event (l’événement ) 2,4,67,9,10,25,37,

38,49, 56, 58,617,61n. 4,7192,95,96,1009

intervention 61,71,95

political 2, 6, 7,9 ,14, 38,49,56, 58,61,62,67,68,77,80,836,88,91,95,1029

singular 7,9,62,71,77,81,82,92,105,106

singularity 71 ,73 ,74 ,76 —8,80 ,81 ,83,86,902,101,1034,108



Index 133

subjectivating 71, 75, 79 ,90 ,92,95,106,108

subjective 9temporal 65,75,92

exccs 33, 38,53, 71,72, 80,85,87, 88,100,103,106

of being 71

Ferry, L. 88fidelity (fideliU) 2,6, 7,58, 60,62, 64,

66,67, 73, 76, 76n. 42, 76n. 43, 779,81,83,84, 86,90,1057

as temporal ordering 50, 62, 64, 77,79,83,90,106

Finkielkraut, A. 88France 38, 84,87, 88,92, 103, 105friend 11, 425, 47,48friendship 11, 14, 31,34, 36 ,415,47 ,

48,51French Enlightenment 71French Revolution 6,7 ,9,5 6,6 1,6 8,

727, 79,90,95,106,108 (seealso

event)Freud, S. 2On. 29Fukuyama, F. 12future anterior 4n. 2, 45, 82, 89,

89n. 70,90

Galileo 61Great Britain 57Greece 81

Hegel, G .W .F. 13,64,76,83Heidegger, M. 4, 5,8, 13, 23, 53,65, 71,

75,92,94heritage 2,8,1 6,20 ,21,2 8,29 , 32,36,

38,41,42,44, 58, 58n. 120,62,95,107

Hobbes, T. 32Holocaust 58

Homer 98horizon 4,5,22,23,25,27,35,41,43,

45,47,48,50, 52, 54hospitality 6, 11, 14, 34, 36, 41, 42,

446, 48,93Hussein, S. 38Husserl, E. 35 ,8 , 20, 21,29,43, 71

identity 3,1719, 24, 25, 30, 33, 34, 39,43,53, 54, 61, 63,66, 73, 76, 78,91,92,104

gender 13national 32,46,47nonidentity 33, 35subjective 33

impossibility 36, 8,9 ,12 15, 18, 205,27, 28,304,39,405,4853,55,57,602,65, 73 ,80,83,84,93,94,96

indeterminacy 2inexistant 62, 68, 71, 72, 75inhospitality 6, 14,42,44, 45,48 ,93

injunction 11,15,24, 26, 26n. 40, 27, 30,34,37,41 ,42,45,48, 50,535,59, 70

injustice 6, 8, 14, 23, 26, 34,41, 4850,87,93,94,100,104,106,107

intersubjectivity 3, 20, 34, 43interval 16, 1820,26,37, 38,43intervalling 19, 22, 28 (see also spacing)intervention 2,6 , 7,9, 10, 25, 34,402,

568, 606, 717, 79109, 102n. 7

military 38 political 9,41 , 80,8 46 ,9 6, 97, 101,102,1057

singular 56, 101, 107subjectivating 2,6,9 ,66 ,71, 79, 86,

87,913,96,100,109subjective 9,62,63,71,73,76,101,108temporal 7,9, 10, 73, 73n. 35, 75, 79,

80,86,957,100,105, 106Iraq 234,37,38,46,107irresponsibility 6, 42, 48, 93Israel 47Italy 87, 88Ivory Coast 47

Jefferson, T. 57 justice 6,11, l lnA , 12, 14, 23, 24, 26,

30, 31,34, 37, 40,41,44, 47n. 89,4850,54, 59, 70, 93

retributive 23

Kafka, F. 13t e n s 2,9,10,97,98104 , 1049

(see also prepolitical)as presubjective 1046

Kant, I. 12, 90



134 Index

Lacan,J. 64,72Lazarus, S. 74, 77,87Lenin, V. I. 76, 77Levinas, E. 12,13,54liberalism 29living present 35, 12, 20, 21, 39,45Louis XVI 746,79 ,82 (see also French

Revolution)

Magna Carta 82Mandela, Nelson 8Mao 78Maoists 105

Maoist Revolution 72, 78,91 (see also Chinese Revolution)

Marion,J.L. 71,90,94Marx, K. 11,29,76 ,77,81,84 ,88,96Marxism

fall of 67 (seealso Communism,Fall of)

May ’68 6,10, 73,8590,1005,108(see also event)

messianic In. 1, 4n. 2, 24, 25, 26, 27metaphysics 13, 16, 17, 18, 30n, 49, 35,38n. 71,40,44,46,51,56, 58,63,65,71,81,90,94,107

ofpresence 3,8, l In. 4, 19,21 ,26,28,302, 39, 48, 50,54, 58,61 ,94,95,109

Messiah 25Milvian Bridge 74Mouffe, C. 53more than one (l'ultraun) 70multiplicity 2, 6,9, 10, 6078,825,89,

91,92,95101, 1037,109event 73consistent 63, 66, 69, 98, 106inconsistent 63, 66, 69,98,104 prepolitical 100 presentation 657regime of presentation 67, 71

situation 9, 10 ,85,89,95 ,97, 98,100,101, 104

Nancy, J . L. 109 Napoleon 73 (see also event)nation 3, 32, 46,99

NieUsche, F. 32,42, 79

Nigeria 479/11 23, 24 (see also Bush, George W.)nonoriginary origin 3,6, 1517, 22, 26,

28, 33,43,48, 93 North Korea 47,99

one 60, 64, 65, 6770, 92,107oneness 34, 60, 92ontology 6, 37n. 70, 60 ,624, 64n. H ,

65,67,68, 70, 78, 79,83,85,91,95,96,99, 100, 104,1079

ontotheology 17,21, 25, 34, 37n. 70,40,53,58,62,65, 80, 100,107

Palestine 47Pessoa, F. 72

phenomenology 20, 21,66 , 69, 71,90Plato 1,8, 11, 20,42,64,83,100

political decisionmaking 6,8 , 13, 14,21,41,52, 53, 55n. 110,94

political economy 7, 40, 92 politics 2 ,3 ,6 8 , 1114,21,35,3941,

43,51,5961,64,67,71,75,813,85,8795,97,98,106,107,109Athenian 1Badiou’s conception ofdemocratic 6, 14and events (see event)and time (see time)

lapolitique 7,40, 84,93Iepolitique 7, 39, 40, 92

possibility 1,2 ,4 9,1 214, 17, 1925,27,30,325,3841,436,48,505,57,62,71,73,80,837,92,93,95,96,100,102,104,1069

preevents 108 preintervention 108 prepolitical 2, 7, 9, 10, 71,84,89, 90,

968,1008 (see also kairos) presence 3 ,4 ,8 ,9 , 12, 1426, 28, 302,

37,39,40,41,43,44,48,524,60,61,

65, 73,80 ,93,94,109 presentation 6571

as appearance 66, 67as the present 66,67rijpm o f 67, 71

presubjective 1046 pretime 10



Index 135

propaganda 37, 39,107 promise I n. 1 ,3 ,4 , 4n. 2, 5 ,6, 8,1215,

225,27,28, 30, 31, 337, 3942,45,47,48, 50,51,54, 56,60 ,70,93

of democracy to come 15, 2930, 70 psychoanalysis 20

racism 8, 50, 62Reign of Terror 74repetition 4, 16,17, 22, 268, 33,37, 38,

40, 424, 47, 54, 94, 95Resolution ofIndependence 57,

57n. 115responsibility 6, II , 12, 26, 27,42, 44,

47, 48, 50, 525, 55n. 110, 59, 93, 95,109

retroactive apprehension 65, 66retrospective apprehension 66,67,69,

70,71,86,98Rimbaud 72Robespierre 71, 73,75 ,76 (seealso

French Revolution)

Rome 81fall of 74

Rorty, R. 51,52,58Rousseau,J.J. 8,64,813rupture 2, 6, 7, 9,19, 20, 26, 37,43, 57,

61, 70,72, 73, 77,80,85,87,89, 90,95,96,102,105

Russian Revolution 9, 56, 72, 74, 77,79, 80, 90, 95, 106, 107 (seealso

event)

SaintJust 75,76 (seealso FrenchRevolution)

de Saussure, F. 8, 16, 17, 19, 20Schmitt, C. 11, 42, 43, 83set theory 63, 64sexism 50, 62sign 1518, 215, 33, 37, 38, 41, 49, 77,

106singular 58 ,60 3,67 , 713, 76, 77,

80,81,89,91,92,94,95,101,105,106

singularity 12, 56, 62,63, 71,73, 74,768,80 ,81,83, 84, 86,88,902,95,96,101,103, 106, 108 (see also event)

situation 6, 7,911, 49, 50, 57, 58, 61,6579,82,847,89,90,935,97,98,1002,104, 105,107, 108 (see also multiplicity)

chronological 82, 108multiple 82, 98, 100, 108

prepolitical 84,90,1002 ,108 presentation of 65, 6770split 68, 69

social contract 813Socrates 1Sou th Korea 47Soviet Union 56 (seealso USSR)

dissolution of 84spacing 16, 28, 29, 35, 37, 39,41, 48, 51,

74 (seealso intervalling)spatiotemporization 3,4,14,15,1921,

27, 30, 93 (see also différance)

Spinoza, B. 64State 9 (l'EtaI) 85, 87, 90, 100

force of 85, 87, 88, 89state power 85, 90, 102

Stein, E. 92subject 4,6, 7,9,10, 335,44 , 45, 47,55,63, 65,66, 69, 713, 759, 76n. 41,81,84,86,87,89,913,958,1006,109 («« also subjectivation)

subjectivating intervention 2, 6, 9, 66,71,79,86, 87,91 3,96 , 100,109

subjectivation 2, 6, 9, 71, 79, 86, 87,903, 95, 96, 100 (see also intervention) (see also subject)

subjective intervention 2,6, 9, 62,63,71,76, 101

subjectivity 3, 6, 33, 34, 34n. 59, 35,3942,44,53,55,65,71,76,87,91,92

Sudan 47Suffragette Movement in Canada 91

teleology 55

temporal intervention 7, 9,10, 73, 75,79, 80,86, 957, 100, 105, 106

temporal ordering 60 ,62 ,64 , 74, 75, 77,79,82,83,89,90,106 (see also fidelity)

temporality 12,13,49,51,56,75,97temporalization 29, 37, 40, 48, 93, 94,

109



136 Index

temporization 2, 3, 5, 79, 1417, 226,2830, 357,3941,43 , 45,48,51,52, 60, 61, 73, 74, 936, 108, 109

Thucydides 98time

Badiou’s conception of 7383and being 75chronological 14, 95and democracy to come 12, 2942,

203Derridean 2,13,31,93,96,109diagonalization of 735 ,82 (see also

Two)

and event 2,9, 58, 757, 79and injunction 24 ,26,2 7, 30as intervention 2,6 , 9, 6°4, 73, 74,

7981,83,85,89,93,94,97,102n. 7, 103, 108, 109

kairological 9,98109nonoriginary originary 22and politics 110 ,1214,51 ,6097,

108

Badiou’s conception of 89 92 prepolitical 2, 7, 9, 10, 10 1, 102, 105,107, 108

subjective 6,9,96, 103,105, 106,108,109

transbeing 82Treaty ofVersailles 74Trédé, M;. 98, 100truth 7, 63, 779,81 ,83, 84, 105n. 10,

1057Two (Deux) 74,75,77,82,92,101

(seealso time, diagonalization of )

ultra one 80, 80n. 45, 81,92, 95undecidability 2, 3,4, 6,8, 9, 11n. 4,

1318,20,21, 20n. 29,2232,34,35, 37, 38, 402, 45 ,4863 , 6773,758, 802, 84,935,99,104 ,

1079unicity 56, 768, 80,91, 92,96,100,

101United States 3 7, 38,46,107unity 34, 37, 60,65, 92,101, 109unpresentable 6870, 72, 73USSR (see Soviet Union)utopia 12,51

Van Gogh 79viWesrefuges 8, 11, 34, 40, 94virtue 78, 79void 62, 64, 69n. 27 (see also emptiness)

Badiou and Derrida (Politics, Events and Their Time) - Antonio Calcagno

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