Backgrounder_ Yemen's Civil War, The Houthis, And the Saudi Intervention - Council on Foreign Relations

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1/16/2016 Backgrounder: Yemen's Civil War, the Houthis, and the Saudi Intervention - Council on Foreign Relations

http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488

CFR Backgrounders

Yemen in Crisis

Author: Zachary Laub, Online Writer/Editor

Updated: July 8, 2015

Introduction

Yemen faces its biggest crisis in decades with the overthrow of its government b y the Houthis, a Zaydi

Shia movement backed by Iran. As the Houthis captured the capital of Sana’a and advanced south

toward the Gulf of Aden in March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition launched an air campaign to reinstate

Yemen’s internationally recognized government.

These developments have derailed a political transition following a 2011 uprising against longtime

President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Amid factional fighting, al-Qaeda’s Arabian Peninsula

franchise has found new opportunities to capture territory. Meanwhile, in July 2015, the United

Nations designated the humanitarian emergency in Yemen as severe and complex as those in

Iraq, South Sudan, and Syria, while Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for a pause in

hostilities to facilitate the delivery of relief supplies.

Analysts worry that escalating foreign involvement could introduce sectarian conflict resembling

fighting in Syria and Iraq. With numerous armed factions able to spoil any potential settlement, the

prospects of a return to negotiations remain uncertain. Many experts question whether Yemen can

once again be a viable, unified state.

Ho w did Yemen become so divided?

The modern Yemeni state was formed in 1990 with the unification of the U.S.- and Saudi-backed

Yemeni Arab Republic, in the north, and the USSR-backed People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, tothe south. The military officer Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had ruled North Yemen since 1978, assumed

leadership of the new country. Somewhat larger than the state of California, Yemen has a

population of about twenty-five million.

Despite unification, the central government’s writ beyond the capital of Sana’a was never absolute,

and Saleh secured his power through patronage and by playing various factions off one another.

Under Saleh, Yemen faced numerous challenges to its unity. Al-Hirak, a movement of southern

Yemenis who felt marginalized under the post-unification government, rebelled in 1994; they have

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51327#.VZwmyflVhBdhttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51327#.VZwmyflVhBdhttp://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/zachary-laub/b19316http://www.cfr.org/publication/by_type/backgrounder.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.htmlhttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51327#.VZwmyflVhBdhttp://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/yemen-highest-emergency-response-level-declared-six-monthshttp://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/zachary-laub/b19316http://www.cfr.org/publication/by_type/backgrounder.html


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since pressed for greater autonomy within Yemen, if not secession. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

(AQAP) and the related Ansar al-Sharia insurgent group have captured territory in the south. The

Houthi movement, whose base is among the Zaydi Shias of northern Yemen, rose up against

Saleh’s government six times between 2004 and 2010.

Yemen's

administrative divisions. (Courtesy CIA)

Washington lent its support to Saleh beginning in the early 2000s, when counterterrorism

cooperation became Washington’s overriding regional concern. The United States gave Yemen $1.2

billion in military and police aid between 2000, when the USS Cole bombing in the Yemeni port of

Aden first made al-Qaeda a U.S. priority, and 2011, according to the online database Security Assistance Monitor.

Rights groups long charged that Saleh ran a corrupt and autocratic government. As the Arab

uprisings spread to Yemen in 2011, the president’s political and military rivals jockeyed to oust him.

While Yemeni security forces focused on putting down protests in urban areas, al-Qaeda made gains

in outlying regions.

Under escalating domestic and international pressure, Saleh stepped aside after receiving

assurances of immunity from prosecution. His vice president, Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, assumed

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014%282011%29https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/yemen#.VTqRQCFVhBchttp://www.securityassistance.org/yemenhttp://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemens-houthis/p36178


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office as interim president in a transition brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and

backed by the United States. As part of the GCC’s timetable for a transition, in 2013 the UN-sponsored

National Dialogue Conference (NDC) convened 565 delegates to formulate a new constitution

agreeable to Yemen’s many factions. But the NDC ended after delegates couldn’t resolve disputes over

the distribution of power.

What are the causes of the crisis?

Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, Hadi’s government lifted fuel subsidies in July

2014. The Houthi movement, which had attracted support beyond its base for calling out faults in the

transition process, organized mass protests demanding lower fuel prices and a new government.

Hadi’s supporters and the Sunni Islamist party Islah held counter rallies. Clashes broke out between

them and the Houthis, who captured the capital by mid-September.

The UN brokered a peace deal in late September 2014 under terms seen as favorable to the Houthis.

Under it, they would withdraw from Sana’a, and all Yemeni parties would agree on a transitional

technocratic government.

But Houthi advances toward the end of 2014 exacerbated Yemen’s fractures: The Houthis clashed

with forces loyal to Islah, as well as Sunni tribesmen that allied with AQAP. Southern separatists

ramped up their calls for independence. Yemen’s armed forces split as well. Deposed President Saleh

continues to command the loyalty of some elements of the armed forces. They allied with the Houthis,

contributing to their battlefield success.

AQAP, described by the U.S. government as the most dangerous affiliate, has benefitted from the chaos.

In January 2015, after a constitutional dispute between the Houthis and the government, the Houthis

consolidated their control of the capital and placed Hadi and several members of the government

under house arrest. Hadi’s government resigned rather than submit to Houthi dominance. The next

month, the Houthis issued their own constitutional declaration and established governing bodies,

moves that provoked public backlash and international condemnation. The United States and several

EU and Gulf countries closed their embassies. The UN Security Council called on the Houthis to

withdraw from government and security institutions.

Hadi went into exile in Saudi Arabia, but remains Yemen’s internationally recognized executive.

Meanwhile, the Houthis continued their southward advance, and encircled the strategic portcity of Aden by March.

On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia began air strikes against the militia group, intending to roll back

advances by the Houthis, whom it views as a proxy of rival Iran and a threat to its southern border,

and reinstate Hadi. The conflict is the first major one undertaken by the new king, Salman, and a test

for his son, Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman.

Who are the parties to this conflict?

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/26/world/middleeast/geography-of-chaos-in-yemen-maps.html?_r=0http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2201%20%282015%29http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/21/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0HG04T20140921http://www.mei.edu/content/yemens-national-dialogue


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The Houthis began in the late 1980s as a religious and cultural revivalist movement among

practitioners of Zaydi Shi’ism in northern Yemen. The Zaydis are a minority in the majority-Sunni

Muslim country, but predominant in the northern highlands along the Saudi border, and until 1962,

Zaydi imams ruled much of the region. The Houthis became politically active after 2003,

opposing Saleh for backing the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Also known as Ansar Allah, the Houthis

repeatedly fought the Saleh regime—and, in 2009, an intervening Saudi force. In post-Saleh Yemen,

the militarily capable but politically inexperienced movement gained support from far beyond its

northern base for its criticisms of the transition. However, in its push to establish dominance, it hasalienated one-time supporters, writes the International Crisis Group.

Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, though deposed in 2011, has gained in popularity among

some Yemenis who have grown disillusioned with the transition. He and his son Ahmed Abdullah

Saleh command the loyalty of some elements of Yemen’s security forces. Their alliance with the

Houthis is a tactical one: Saleh is a secular nationalist, and the Houthis fought his regime for many

years. In late April, Saleh called on his loyalists to withdraw from captured territories, a

demand of the UN Security Council. Saleh’s loyalists oppose Hadi’s government and seek to

regain a leading role in Yemen. Saleh’s party, the General Peoples’ Congress, holds a majority inparliament.

Iran is the Houthis’ primary international backer and has allegedly provided the Houthis with

economic support. But regional specialists caution against overstating Tehran’s influence over the

movement. “The Houthis are much less a client of Iran than Hezbollah or the Iraqi Shia militias,” says

Texas A&M University’s F. Gregory Gause III. “They’re more homegrown.” (Iranians and Houthis

adhere to different schools of Shia Islam.) The Houthis and Iran share similar geopolitical

interests: Iran seeks to challenge Saudi and U.S. dominance of the region, and the Houthis are the

primary opposition to Hadi’s Saudi- and U.S.-backed government in Sana’a.

President Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, Yemen’s internationally recognized president, has

called his resignation null. He remains in exile in Saudi Arabia, however, and it is unclear whether he

commands much authority on the ground. The Sunni Islamist party Al-Islah (Reform), which

represents many tribesmen around the country, back Hadi’s government. They are the Houthis’ chief

antagonist.

“The Saudis have dialed back their goals. They would claim victory for just a return to the table.” —F. Gregory

Gause, III, Texas A&M University

Saudi Arabia has led the coalition air campaign to roll back the Houthis and reinstate Hadi’s

government. Riyadh perceives that Houthi control of Yemen would mean a hostile neighbor that

threatens its southern border. It also considers Yemen a front in its contest with Iran for regional

dominance, and losing Sana’a would only add to what it perceives as an ascendant Iran that has allies

in power in Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus. Riyadh’s concerns have been compounded by its

perception that the United States is retrenching from the region and its pursuit of an Iranian

nuclear deal will embolden Tehran. Journalist Peter Salisbury writes that Saudi Arabia may be trying

http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/new-saudi-foreign-policy/p36456http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-shia-divide/p33176#!/http://www.gregorygause.com/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/frontline-fight-for-yemen/after-a-month-of-airstrikes-where-does-yemen-stand/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2015-04-19/cahoots-houthishttp://www.securitycouncilreport.org/yemen/http://news.yahoo.com/yemen-ex-president-urges-rebel-allies-implement-un-184850303.htmlhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/b045-yemen-at-war.aspxhttp://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemens-houthis/p36178http://www.yementimes.com/en/1759/opinion/3540/Yemen-is-more-nuanced-than-%E2%80%98Sunni%E2%80%99-amp;%C2%A0%E2%80%98Shia%E2%80%99.htm


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to restore its longstanding strategy of “containment and maintenance” vis-à-vis its southern

neighbor: Keep Yemen weak, and therefore beholden to Riyadh, but not so weak that state collapse

could threaten it with an influx of migrants.

Saudi Arabia has cobbled together a coalition of Sunni-majority Arab states: Bahrain. Egypt,

Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the UAE. (That includes all the GCC states except for

Oman, a potential mediator.) The operation seems to consolidate Saudi Arabia’s leadership

over the bloc, which has split over other regional issues, and signals consensus against allowing Iranto gain influence in Yemen. But their assistance to the Saudi-led air campaign has been limited. Both

Egypt and Pakistan receive Gulf aid, yet neither volunteered the ground troops that Saudi Arabia

requested. As a result, Gause says, “the Saudis have dialed back their goals. They would claim victory

for just a return to the table, where Hadi has a seat and the Houthis have been pushed back from

Aden.”

The United States’ interests include maintaining stability in Yemen and security for Saudi borders;

free passage in the Bab al-Mandeb, the chokepoint through which 4.7 million barrels of oil per

day transit; and a government in Sana’a that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism

programs (PDF). In the current conflict, Washington has provided the Saudi-led coalition with

logistical and intelligence support, as well as stationed warships in the Gulf of Aden. But while the

United States continues to support coalition operations, by late April U.S. officials pressed for

restraint, warning their Saudi counterparts that the intensity of the bombing campaign was

undercutting U.S. and Saudi political goals—namely, a return to the transition.

What is the role of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?

AQAP, described by the U.S. government as the most dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate (PDF), has

benefitted from the current chaos. It has suffered some battlefield setbacks at the hands of

Houthi forces, but the Houthis’ rapid advances have led some Sunni tribesmen to align with al-Qaeda

against a perceived common threat. A distracted Yemeni army has eased pressure against the

militants.

Though U.S. drone strikes continue, in late March Washington withdrew special operations

forces that were training and assisting Yemeni troops, and the Saudi air campaign has reportedly

destroyed military installations belonging to U.S.-trained Yemeni counterterrorism units. In

April, AQAP captured much of the city of Mukalla, and sprung three hundred inmates, many

believed to be AQAP members, from the city’s prison.

What is the humanitarian situation?

With a poverty rate of more than 50 percent, Yemen was the Arab world’s poorest country prior to

the Houthi offensive and Saudi-led air campaign, which began in mid-March. The conflict has

pushed the country into humanitarian emergency.

The World Health Organization says that 3,200 hundred Yemenis have been killed and nearly sixteen

thousand injured since mid-March. Half of those killed have been civilians, the UN estimates.

Critical infrastructure has been destroyed.

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51327#.VZws4PlVhBehttp://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overviewhttp://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2015/04/02/396987722/al-qaeda-force-in-yemen-hits-port-city-miles-away-fighting-rages-in-adenhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/world/middleeast/yemen-airstrikes.htmlhttp://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-confirms-special-operations-forces-withdrawal-from-yemen-1427046997http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/yemen/analysis.htmlhttp://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/04/will-al-qaeda-be-the-great-winner-of-yemens-collapse/http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/233708.pdfhttp://www.wsj.com/articles/houthis-advance-in-yemen-as-saudis-turn-to-negotiations-1429708217https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdfhttp://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=20932http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143303/bilal-y-saab/houthi-and-the-blowbackhttp://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-and-saudi-iranian-cold-war


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The UN refugee agency reported in the summer of 2015 that more than one million Yemenis were

internally displaced and shelter is scarce. Humanitarian groups have warned of possible mass

outflows across Yemen’s land borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman, and across the Gulf of Aden to

Somalia and Djibouti.

A boy

pulls containers of water amid an acute shortage in Sana'a. (Photo: Mohamed al-Sayaghi/Reuters)

In all, the UN says, "more than 21.1 million people—four in five Yemenis—need some form of

humanitarian assistance." International organizations and nongovernmental organizations have been

hindered by ongoing fighting as well as an air and sea blockade that Saudi Arabia established to

enforce a UN arms embargo.

This has exacerbated food and fuel shortages; Yemen relies on imports for both. The country

imports more than 80 percent of its food, including 90 percent of staples such as wheat and all of

its rice, according to relief group Oxfam. Nearly thirteen million Yemenis do not have consistentaccess to adequate food, the UN estimates.

Meanwhile, the aid group Doctors Without Borders reports the near collapse of Yemen’s health

care infrastructure.

What are the prospects for a solution to the crisis?

The Houthis’ assertion of power and the Saudi-led air campaign have militarized the divisions

between the parties, and in the short term, conditions may militate against a negotiated settlement.

http://www.msf.org.uk/country-region/yemenhttp://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/yemen-highest-emergency-response-level-declared-six-monthshttp://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-response/yemen-crisishttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemen-grinds-to-a-halt-as-war-starves-it-of-gas/2015/04/18/df7ef7ca-e2ed-11e4-ae0f-f8c46aa8c3a4_story.htmlhttp://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/yemen-highest-emergency-response-level-declared-six-monthshttp://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486ba6.html


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The Houthis, who long felt marginalized from Yemeni politics, “think that if they even compromise,

that will mean defeat and their eventual elimination,” journalist Adam Baron told PBS Frontline,

while southerners believe that the Houthis pose a reciprocal threat to them. As Iran and Saudi Arabia

increasingly perceive each other meddling in Yemen, they will likely up their support to their

respective clients. That could introduce a sectarian dimension to Yemen’s civil conflict, making

the conflict even more toxic.

These factors will make it more difficult for Yemen’s many parties to return to the negotiating table. In April 2015, UN special envoy Jamal Benomar, who had brokered the GCC-sponsored transition in

2001, resigned from his post. Ould Cheikh Ahmed, a UN veteran who previously coordinated the

Ebola response, was appointed Benomar’s successor.

But while the Houthis have established their dominance over Sana’a and beyond, they cannot govern

Yemen on their own. Without buy in from Yemen’s numerous other parties and financial support

from its Gulf neighbors, Yemen faces financial collapse, protracted civil conflict, and an escalating

humanitarian crisis.

Additional Resources

The International Crisis Group discusses the groups at war in Yemen and the prospects for

deescalation. A previous report offers a deep dive into the Houthi movement.

The New York Times maps the Saudi air campaign and Houthi territorial gains.

A UN Security Council panel assessed developments in Yemen (PDF) in February 2015.

Journalist Peter Salisbury discusses how actors in Yemen’s internal conflict are influenced by theSaudi-Iranian "cold war."

More on this topic from CFR

Who Are Yemen's Houthis?

Interviewee: April Longley Alley, Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group

Interviewer:

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, Online Writer/Editor

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Author:

Zachary Laub


Low Expectations for UN Syria Talks

Interviewee: Richard Gowan, Associate Director, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Interviewer:

http://www.cfr.org/syria/low-expectations-un-syria-talks/p36513http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/zachary-laub/b19316http://www.cfr.org/eritrea/authoritarianism-eritrea-migrant-crisis/p37239http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/zachary-laub/b19316http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemens-houthis/p36178http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-and-saudi-iranian-cold-warhttp://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/125http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/26/world/middleeast/geography-of-chaos-in-yemen-maps.htmlhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/154-the-huthis-from-saada-to-sanaa.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Yemen/b045-yemen-at-warhttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50690#.VT_2hCFVhBchttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32333046http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemens-houthis/p36178http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/frontline-fight-for-yemen/after-a-month-of-airstrikes-where-does-yemen-stand/


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Zachary Laub


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Backgrounder_ Yemen's Civil War, The Houthis, And the Saudi Intervention - Council on Foreign Relations

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