Azizul Rasel BA Thesis

The Mughals and the Dutch

in the Making of Dhaka

B.A Thesis

M.M. Azizul Islam Rasel

S-1068628

Nieuwe Rijn, 97

Email: [email protected]

Supervisor: Professor Dr. Jos Gommans

Department of History

University of Leiden, The Netherlands

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Table of Contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………….. 3

Chapter One: Emergence of Dhaka

Location of Dhaka and its Connection with other parts of Bengal…………………. 18

Chapter Two: The Mughals in Dhaka: Dhaka as a Mughal Store House

Dhaka as a strategic location…………………………………………………………20

Dhaka as a military labour supplier…………………………………………………...23

Dhaka as a store house of war- equipments ……….………………………………….27

Dhaka as food and fodder supplier…………………………………………………….29

Mughals Contribution to the Making of Dhaka………………………………………..29

Chapter Three: The Dutch in Dhaka: Emergence of Dhaka as a Commercial Centre

The Dutch in Dhaka.........................................................................................................34

Emergence of Dhaka as a Commercial Centre………………………………………….39

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………43

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………….46

Maps

Map- 1: Eastern Bengal………………………………………………………………12

Map-2: The VOC factory in Dhaka………………………………………………… 38

Table-1: ………………………………………………………………………………. 40

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Introduction

Dhaka, now the capital city of Bangladesh, is one of the largest cities of South Asia and the

world. Today’s Dhaka is the ninth largest city of the world.1 It is also the most densely

populated city in the world, where more than 12 million people live in.2 Nowadays Dhaka

serves as one of the principal centres for trade, administration, culture and education in this

region. Before it was made the capital of independent Bangladesh in 1971, Dhaka served as

the capital of three different States. Dhaka first gained the status of capital in 1612 as a

Mughal provincial capital. After the Mughal period, it had also played role as the provincial

capital of British India from 1905 to 1911. After the partition of India into India and Pakistan

in 1947, Dhaka played a role as a provincial capital of Pakistan.

The emergence of Dhaka as a Mughal provincial capital and later as a commercial

centre is one of the conspicuous events in the history of Bengal and South Asia. This event

has also implication for world history. Within fifty years of its birth, the city expanded and

European trading Companies established their factories in Dhaka. Besides Companies,

private traders from different parts of the world flocked into the city in a bid to make their

fortune. However, very few historians have taken the trouble to illustrate the history of the

birth of this city which made considerable contribution to the seventeenth and eighteenth

century world economy.

The reason why Dhaka emerged in the seventeenth century is still unclear. Dhaka

attracted the attention of a Resident of the British East India Company named James Taylor

who was then posted in Dhaka. In 1840, he wrote a book on Dhaka titled A Sketch of the

1 World Bank. Country Assistance Strategy for the People´s Republic of Bangladesh. July 30, 2010 Can be accessed at Country Assistance Strategy for the People's Republic of Bangladesh for the Period FY11-14, page 4 2 Bangladesh Government, Statistical Pocket Book, 2008, (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2008) 2009). Can be accessed at http://www.bbs.gov.bd/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/SubjectMatterDataIndex/pk_book_09.pdf.)

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Topography & Statistics of Dacca.3 Based on firsthand experience and Persian chronicles, his

book gives a general history of Dhaka and mainly focuses on the topographical description of

Dhaka. However, this book cannot be taken as a modern scientific work; rather it should be

considered a reference book for the historians of Dhaka. In 1914, another book contributed to

the history of Dhaka, written by a British civilian, F.B Bradley-Birt titled Dacca: The

Romance of an Eastern Capital.4 His work offers a popular account and hardly mentions any

sources. The first modern research on Dhaka appeared in 1962, when Ahmad Hasan Dani the

Pakistani historian wrote Dacca: Record of its Changing Fortune.5 Nonetheless, this book

has some limitations. He tried to capture a vast era, starting from the early seventeenth

century up to the middle of the twentieth century, providing only a general landscape of

Dhaka from the seventeenth to twentieth century without rigorous analysis. His research

mostly depended on Persian chronicles and in some parts, merely reproduced James Taylor

and F.B Bradley-Birt. Another major work on Dhaka appeared in 1964 by Abdul Karim who

first touched the question `why did Dhaka emerge as a Mughal capital in the seventeenth

century’? Without further explanation he opined that Dhaka emerged as a Mughal capital

because of the shifting of river courses. He also maintained that another reason of the

establishment of the Mughal capital in Dhaka was to suppress the Arakanese and the

Portuguese.6 In 1985, Om Prakash, an Indian historian published a seminal research on the

economy of Bengal. The title of his book is The Dutch East Indies Company and the

Economy of Bengal. He also takes Abdul Karim’s position regarding the shifting of river

3 JamesTaylor, A Sketch of the Topography and Statistics of Dacca, revised and reprinted, ( Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2010)

4 F.B Bradley-Birt, Dacca: The Romance of an Eastern Capital, (London: G. Bell and Sons LTD, 1914)5 Ahmad Hasan Dani, Dhaka : A Record of its Changing Fortunes, revised and reprinted (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2009) 6 Abdul Karim, Dacca: The Mughal Capital, (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1964): 4; 8-9

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courses and the Mughals’ settlement in eastern Bengal and likewise does not offer further

analysis.7

The theory of the shifting of river courses is further strengthened by the work of

Richard M. Eaton. He extended this theory in his book titled The Rise of Islam and the

Bengal Frontier 1204-1760. Although Richard Eaton believes that one of the reasons for the

selecting Dhaka as Mughal provincial capital was for strategic reasons 8 but even he insisted

on the shifting of river courses.9 He argues that before the shifting of the river courses,

eastern Bengal— `virtually the whole delta, east of Karatotoya and south of the Padma—was,

in the early seventeenth century, still largely undeveloped, a region covered by marsh and

forest.’10 He argues that after the shifting of river courses the Mughals established themselves

in the heart of the active delta— Dhaka and together with Sufis, took remarkable initiatives

for the reclamation of wild land and settlement, as a result, eastern Bengal emerged as an

economic centre.11 Richard Eaton also argues that soon after the establishment of Mughal

capital in Dhaka, the Mughal’s power was effectively established in Bengal.12 This theory

became very dominant since its inception, influencing the historiography of early modern

Bengal.13

One of the aims of this thesis will be to analyze to what extent this so-called

ecological factor contributed to the emergence of Dhaka. In this context the thesis addresses

one main research question—why did Dhaka emerge in the seventeenth century? The thesis

also poses a sub question— `Why and how did the Dutch East India Company establish its 7 Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630-1720, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985): 24-58 Richard M. Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204-1760, (California: University of California Press, 1993): 3079 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 194-5; 30710 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 30711 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 137; 226-712 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 15013 For perfect examples of the influence of Eaton’s The Rise of Islam and Bengal Frontier over later works see André Wink’s Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, The Slaves Kings and the Islamic Conquest, 11th-13th Centuries, Vol.-II, (Leiden: Brill, 1997): 5, 259-61 also see Joya Chaterjee, Spoils of Partition : Bengal and India, 1947-1967 , (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 5

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factory in Dhaka in the second half of the seventeenth century? This sub question will

investigate the principal research question by studying the Dutch decision making regarding

the establishment of their factory in Dhaka.

The thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter will analyze the

theory of the emergence of Dhaka and will attempt to find out plausible reason why Dhaka

emerged in the early seventeenth century. The chapter will also briefly discuss the geography

of Dhaka and its connection with other parts of Bengal. The second chapter will elaborate the

argument of the first chapter: why was Dhaka important to the Mughals. It will discuss the

Mughals’ contribution to making of a secure and politically stable city. This chapter will also

create a bridge between chapter one and three. The third chapter will explain why and how

the Dutch did establish their factory in Dhaka. This chapter will also briefly discuss the

contribution of the Dutch in the making of Dhaka as a commercial centre.

This thesis is mainly based on secondary sources. But I have also used primary

sources ranging from published and unpublished archival sources, travelers account and

translated Persian chronicles. Published VOC documents such as Dag Register, Corpus

Diplomaticum, Generale Missiven and the VOC archive are used in this study. However, I

admit that due to time limitation I could not use large number of Dutch sources. It was also

not possible to consult the Portuguese sources which might be very crucial for discussing the

emergence of Dhaka. Consulting large number of Dutch and Portuguese sources might reveal

the clear picture of early years of Dhaka.

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CHAPTER ONE

Emergence of Dhaka

The emergence of Dhaka as a Mughal provincial capital is late compared to other provincial

capitals of the Mughals. Its emergence as a city and a commercial centre in South Asia is late

as well. Dhaka attained the status of prestigious Mughal provincial capital in the early

seventeenth century when Islam Khan, the newly appointed subahdar of Bengal, after a

prolonging and enervating campaign against the Bara Bhuiya, the zamindars and the

chieftains of eastern Bengal, established his capital in 1612.14 The question remains why

Dhaka emerged in the early seventeenth century as a Mughal provincial capital. The

conventional and dominant historiography points out its finger toward the ecological factor.

According to this historiography Dhaka emerged as a Mughal provincial capital in the

seventeenth century due to the shifting of the river courses in the late sixteenth century. This

theory also suggests that soon after the establishment of the Mughal provincial capital in

Dhaka, the Mughals established control over the whole eastern Bengal and thus by their

initiatives made Dhaka as an economic centre. This chapter will analyze this theory and will

also attempt to seek the factual reason for the emergence of Dhaka in the early seventeenth

century. As geographical location and the connection between cities and its neighbouring

areas is crucial to the emergence and growth of a city, this chapter will also pay attention to

the discussion of the geographical location of Dhaka and its connection with its neighbouring

areas and other parts of Bengal.

The most prominent and principal proponent of ecological theory is Richard M. Eaton

who in 1993, stated this theory in his The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204-1760.

His theory implies that the emergence of Dhaka in the late seventeenth century was due to the

14 Sir Jadunath Sarkar (ed.) The History of Bengal, Muslim Period,1200-1757, vol. II, reprint, (Dhaka: Dhaka University Press, 2006): 283

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shifting of courses of the river Ganges.15 He states that in the late sixteenth century main

course of the river Ganges shifted from the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, which is now in West

Bengal, to the Bhairab, the Mathabhanga, the Garai-Madhumati, the Arialkhan and

eventually today´s Padma-Meghna channel in eastern Bengal.16 According to him, the

shifting of courses of the Ganges withdrew greater level of fresh water and silt from the

western delta, which is now West Bengal. As a consequence, the active part of the Bengal

delta, was becoming increasingly moribund area, thus, environment was polluted and

diseases spread, which ultimately resulted to the abandonment of cities and habitations of the

western delta.17 Conversely, the areas of the eastern delta were becoming exceedingly fertile.

According to him this had changed the agrarian epicentre of Bengal. As a result of the greater

flow of fresh water, it was possible to cultivate wet rice in the eastern delta. To him this

ecological changes stirred migration to the eastern delta from the moribund western delta and

as far as from North India and Middle East.18 This led to the pouring of charismatic Muslim

pioneers who had outstanding organizational power, took arduous effort for the agricultural

expansion in eastern Bengal.19 These Sufis in the course of their initiating agriculture

converted the indigenous fishermen to peasants and thus, Muslim. In this way, he argues,

Islam penetrated the whole eastern delta in the course of the seventeenth century and eastern

Bengal saw considerable population changes.20

To Eaton, the effort of the Sufis for the expansion of agriculture was accompanied by

the arrival of the Mughals in the eastern delta. He opines that when course of the Ganges

completed its shifting into the eastern delta, the Mughals established themselves in eastern

Bengal. They established their capital in the heart of the active delta— Dhaka. As soon they

15 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 30716 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier:194-5

17 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 194-518 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 195; 307; 31019 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 226, 307-820 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 310

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curbed the power of the Bara Bhuiyas, and the other defiant zamindars and chieftains, the

Mughals established its authority at the local level. According to Eaton, unlike the western

delta, virtually the whole eastern delta was mostly undeveloped and covered with dense forest

where the expansion of agriculture was not an easy task for the Mughals and Islamic leaders.

To him, the Mughals had to create an agrarian base in eastern Bengal.21 He states that from

Sylhet to Chittagong, the Mughals attempted to gain the political goal of inculcating the

Mughal authority among `the dependant client’ rooted on the land, with the economic goal of

expanding the arable area. Eaton argues that principal mechanism for accomplishing this goal

was to grant land which contributed to the agricultural development of the forested

hinterland. He suggested that a large extent of land was granted in Dhaka, Bakerganj, Sylhet,

and Chittagong.22

Eaton´s theory of the shifting of river courses of the Ganges and consequently the

Mughals and Sufis’ arrival in eastern Bengal and their arduous endeavours to clear `forested

and marshy’ land of eastern Bengal and thus agricultural expansion in the active eastern delta

might seem plausible. However, paying a closer attention to the development of the sixteenth

and seventeenth centuries will provide a useful understanding to cast doubt on the ecological

theory of Richard Eaton. What Eaton says that the shifting of river courses of the Ganges

took place in the late sixteenth century (c. 1548-1579)23, is not accepted by some historians.24

Stephan van Galen, a Dutch historian argues that it is implausible that the eastward changing

of the Ganges was so drastic. He insists that the changes showed by Eaton could not be

happened in such a short time. Van Galen states that the maps used by Eaton 25 to demonstrate

the rapid eastward movement of the Ganges are not suitable for the context. Moreover, the

map Eaton used was made by Gastaldi and printed in 1548. But Gastaldi’s map was mainly 21 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier:307 22 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 307-823 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 19624 See Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 23-4; also Akbar Khan, Discovery of Bangladesh: Explorations into Dynamics of a Hidden Nation ( Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2009): 10925 See Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 196-7

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based on geography of Ptolemy (c. 150 AD). His maps on India were modified and were used

in modern travelers´ accounts. But these maps are quite erroneous. These are not appropriate

to show the changes in complex river system such as the Ganges delta.26 Van Galen argues

that the shifting of river courses of the Ganges took much longer than Eaton assumes.27

Eaton also overstresses on the role of Islamic leaders to the expansion of agriculture.

For instance, elsewhere in his book he stresses on a popular story to support his argument.

The story told that an Islamic leader, Shah Saiyid Nasir al- Din emigrated from the Middle

East teaching the local people methods of wet rice cultivation and clearing forests. 28 It seems

quite unpersuasive as how an immigrant from the arid Middle East could teach the local

people methods of wet rice cultivation and clearing forests? These local people were

acquainted with wet rice cultivation before. It also seems unconvincing that Eaton is always

terming the areas of eastern Bengal as undeveloped, marshy and forested area. Later in this

chapter we will provide some examples that before the Mughals came to eastern Bengal,

there were several prosperous areas in eastern Bengal. Eaton’s perception of the rooting of

the Mughal authority all over the Bengal right after the establishment of the provincial capital

in Dhaka also needs to be revised.

What Eaton argues that soon after the establishment of capital the Mughals

established their power over the whole Bengal29 is not convincing. Eaton states that after

establishing their capital in Dhaka, the Mughals took endeavours to expand agriculture by

granting land in Chittagong, Shylhet, Bakerganj, but evidences show that though the Mughals

established themselves in Dhaka in the early seventeenth century they were not successful to

control the whole of eastern Bengal. They had to engage continuous fighting against the

Arakanese. Stephan Van Galen shows in his extensive work on the Arakan and Bengal that

26 Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 2327 Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 244

28 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 20829 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 150

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the Arakanese king would collect tribute from the local Mughals officials in the early

seventeenth century.30 Next chapter will also show how much effort the Mughal had to pay

for fighting against the Arakanese. In the case of Chittagong it was quite impossible for the

Mughals to grant land for the expansion of agriculture, since Chittagong was under the

control of the Arakanese until 1666.

Few more words about Eaton’s perception of eastern Bengal as a densely forested and

marshy land; Eaton’s demarcation of eastern and western Bengal into sharp line is not

pragmatic. If we give a closer look to ancient geographical division of Bengal we will see

that there was no such sharp geographical division what Eaton perceives. All most all of the

historical-geographers find difficulty to demarcate sharply one parts of Bengal from the other

as different geographical divisions were changing time to time. Describing the difficulties of

sketching historical geography of ancient Bengal, one of the reputed historians writes,

‘unfortunately boundaries of some of the units [Janapada or Divison] cannot be fixed with

any degree of certainty, and the difficulty is increased by the fact that extent of even well-

known divisions like Gauda, Vanga and Radha varied in different ages.’31 Even today eastern

and western Bengal shares almost the same geographical features. Therefore to show one part

of the Bengal delta as a densely forested land and the other as an agriculturally developed is

not logical. It is natural that in the sixteenth and the seventeenth century, forests would be

found in different parts of Bengal as well as other parts of India; forest was not a unique case

for eastern Bengal. Cultivation of wet rice was also possible in the eastern delta before the so-

called shifting of courses of the Ganges. Enormous rainfall in the eastern delta made possible

to grow considerable amount of wet rice. Now shifting attention to some of the prosperous

regions of eastern Bengal before the advent of the Mughals will make clear that the eastern

30 Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 731 Ramesh Chandra Majumder (ed.), The History of Bengal: Hindu period, vol. I, reprint, (Dhaka: Dhaka University Press, 2006): 12

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delta was not forested and undeveloped as Eaton insists. Regarding our study area, we will

only discuss the surrounding areas of Dhaka.

Map-1:Eastern Bengal:1608-12

Source: Jos Gommans, Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Emipere,1500-1700

(London: Routledge, 2002):170

Bikrampur was one of the prosperous cities of eastern Bengal from the Pala rule (c.

770-810) to the Mughal arrival in eastern Bengal. It was very close to present day Dhaka and

is in now Dhaka division. James Taylor suggests that Bikrampur was 12 miles south of the

present capital Dhaka.32 Bikrampur gained importance during the Pala ruler (c. 770-810

A.D).33 It was also the seat of the Chandra dynasty (c. 900-1020 A.D)34. After the Chandra

32 Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography : 7533 Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography34 Harry Belitz, Budhism in Bangladesh. can be accessed at http://bangladesh-buddhist.org/heritage.html , also `Chandra Dynasty’ in Sirajul Islam (ed.), Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2003). Can be accessed athttp://www.banglapedia.org/httpdocs/HT/C_0124.HTM

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dynasty, the Sena had their administrative centre in Bikrampaur (c. 1097-1280).35 When

Lakhnauti fall to the hand of Bakhtiar Khilji, Laksman Sena came to eastern Bengal and

established himself in Bikrampur. During the Pala, Chandra, and Sena dynasties, Bikrampur

was situated between the river Ichamati and Meghna on the east and the Ganges [Padma] on

the west. On the south, Bikrampur was surrounded by the river Kritinasa, on the north it was

extended up to Jalalpur Pargana.36 Therefore the kingdom of Bikrampur was surrounded by a

well network of river namely Ganges [Padma], Buriganga, Meghna, Ichamati and

Brahmaputra which made possible to connect it with neighbouring areas.37 Bikrampur was

not only well connected by waterways but Bradley-Birt says during the Sena period, it held

an important position by means of road communication.38 Although Bredley Birt’s statement

that ‘Bikrampura with every side stretched broad highways, ever open, offering the swiftest

means of communication with the world beyond’ might be exaggeration but the historical

evidences show that Bikrampur was one of the wealthy kingdoms of eastern Bengal.

Archaeological excavation suggests Bikrampur as a prosperous city of Bengal. A relic of

Sena King Ballasena’s palace which is called Ballalbari was one of the magnificent

architectures of the ancient period of Bengal.39 Ballalbari was quadrangular shaped palace

which covers an area of 3000 square feet. In the eastern side, the palace was connected with

the mainland.40

Sonargaon or Suvarngrama means golden village, some 27 kilometers south-east of

present day Dhaka metropolitan was another city of eastern Bengal during the pre- Mughal

period.41 The very name of the city denotes that the area was prosperous. Though it is tough

to locate the precise boundary of the city but from the residual relics, it can be well inferred

35 Ibid36 Jalapur Pargana was under Vanga, Present days it is Bakerganj and Barisal District, See, Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography : 7537 Birt, Dacca: The Romance of an Eastern Capital: 1638 Brit, Dacca: The Romance of an Eastern Capital: 1639 Dani, Dhaka: A Record of its Changing Fortunes: 32-340 Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography: 7641 Dani, Dhaka : A Record of its Changing Fortunes: 228

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that Sonargaon had embraced a large tract bordered on the east, west and south by the river

Meghna, Shitalakhya and Dhaleshwari respectively and on the north by the river

Brahmaputra. Sonargaon's fame before the pre-Muslim period can be identified from a land

grant Suvarnavithi, issued in a 6th century AD mentioned the name of Suvarnagrama.

Another copper- plate titled Ghugrahati copper-plate of Samacharadeva also mentioned the

name of Suvarnagrama or Sonargaoan.42 Before the Muslim independent rulers’ advances it

was the seat of Hindu king. Zia al-Din Barani also mentions the name of one of the Hindu

kings Rai Danuj. Barani suggests, this Sena king had very friendly relation with the Delhi

sultan Ghiyad-al-din Balaban.43 The Delhi sultan once paid courtesy visit to the capital of this

king, in A.D1281.44

It is difficult to say clearly about the position of Dhaka before the Mughal established

their capital here. Sources on Dhaka before the Mughal advent are very limited. Portuguese

sources might show revealing picture of pre-Mughal Dhaka. However, two inscription of

Sultan Nasir-ud-din Mahmud Shah (1435-1459) have been discovered in Dhaka city. One is

Narinda inscription dated 1456-57 A. D. and another is Naswalagali inscription dated 1559

A.D. Abdul Karim suggests that these inscriptions show Dhaka was a place of some

importance during the Sultanate period.45

Discussion on the powerful Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars of Bengal and also on the

Arakanese invasion in eastern Bengal will provide an idea that eastern Bengal was not

unpopulated before the Mughal conquered eastern Bengal. The Bara Bhuiyas and the

zamindars of eastern Bengal were active in the sixteenth century. They were operating almost

as independent rulers and very often neglected the Mughal emperor. If we briefly look to the

42 Sirajul Islam (ed.), Banglapedia, Can be accessed at http://www.banglapedia.org/httpdocs/HT/S_0495.HTM43 Zia Ud-Din Barani, Tarikh-i- Firoz Shahi, quoted in Dani’s Dhaka: A Record of its Changing Fortunes: 228 44 Dani, Dhaka: A Record of its Changing Fortunes: 228 45 Abdul Karim, `` Origin and Development of Mughal Dhaka’’ In Sharif Uddin Ahmed (ed.), Dhaka: Past Present Future, ( Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991)

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political development of eastern Bengal before the Islam Khan’s conquest of Dhaka, it will

be useful to get an idea that how powerful they were.

The Mughal war commander Mirza Nathan frequently mentioned the strength of the

Bara Bhuiyas.46 In Bharastn-i- Ghaybi, Mirza Nathan mentioned some names of the Bara

Bhuiyas’ alliance. The mentioned names are: Bahadur Ghazi, Suna Ghazi, Anwar Ghazi,

Shaikh Pir, son of Haji Bhakul, Mirza Mumin, Madhu Ray, Binod Ray, Phalwan and Haji

Shams-ud-din Baghdadi.47 Among the Bara Bhuiyas Musa Khan who was the son of one of

the powerful zamindars of eastern Bengal Isha Khan was famous and the strongest one

among the Bara Bhuiyas. He succeeded to his father Isha Khan’s large territory which was

comprised of about the half of modern Dhaka district, half of Tippera, most part of

Mymensing, Bagura and Pabna.48 Musa Khan’s centre of political authority was in present

day Dhaka, where the Padma Lakhya, Brahmaputra met at that time.49 After the death of

powerful zamindar Kedar Ray, Musa Khan extended his control over Sripur in Bikrampur.50

Bhadur Gazi was one of the notable figures in the alliance of Bara Bhuiyas who played very

crucial role during the Musa Khan’s battle against the Mughal. Bharistan-i- Gahaybi refers

Bahadur Gazi as the zamindar of Cahura, south- east to modern Dhaka, near Kaliganj.51 Suna

Gazi was the powerful zamindar of Sarail who possessed many war- boats. But he submitted

to the Mughal when the Mughal undertook their campaign in the early seventeenth century.52

Another notable zamindar of Bara Bhuiyas’ alliance was Phalwan. He was the zamindar of

Matang, north of Sarail and South of Taraf which is now between the present district of

46 See, Mirza Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi: A history of the Mughal Wars in Assam, Cooch Behar, Bengal, Bihar during the reigns of Jahangir and Shahjahan, Vol.I, trans. M.I Borah, (Gauhati: Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Naaryani Handiqui Historical Institute, Government of Assam, 1936): 53; 56-58;77-11947 Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi, vol. I: 5648 Sarkar, The History of Bengal vol. II: 23649 Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi, vol. I: 56,60,64, also Sarkar, The History of Bengal, Vol. II: 23850 Sarkar, The History of Bengal, vol. II: 23851 See, Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi, vol. I: 88-8952 Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi, vol. I: 243-253,

15

Tippera and Sylhet.53 Nathan showed him as one of the most resolute fighter among the

zamindars of eastern Bengal. Baharistan-i-Ghayibi mentions about his stubborn defence

against the Mughal campaign. Among others, Raja Pratapaditya was regarded as one of the

most powerful zamindars of eastern Bengal before the Mughals established their capital in

Dhaka in the early seventeenth century.54 Baharistan-i-Ghaybi, Travel Dairy of Abdul Latif

and European travelers’ accounts frequently mentioned about Raja Pratapaditya. He was

famous for his military prowess and also for political eminence. Therefore, we see, in the

sixteenth century eastern Bengal was dominated by these semi-independent Bara Bhuiyas

and zamindars. The Mughal emperor Akbar and Jahangir were also concerned over the

strength of these Bara Bhuiyas and other zamindars.55 Before the establishment of Mughal

capital in Dhaka, they had attempted several times to subdue the alliance of Bara Bhuiyas and

the zamindars. However, in the late sixteenth century saw the decline of this powerful

alliance of Bara Bhuiyas and the zamindars due to various reasons. One of the reasons of the

decline of the powerful Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars might be for the growing dominance of

the Arakanese in this area from the middle of the sixteenth century. The other reason might

be internal power crisis among the Bara Bhuiyas. 56

The Arakanese dominance over eastern Bengal in the second half of the seventeenth

century is well known episode in the history of Bengal. Recently Stephan van Galen in his

Arakan and Bengal: The Rise of the Maruk U kingdom (Burma) from the fifteenth to the

seventeenth century AD shows that from the mid sixteenth century the Arakan king had

gained control over the port city Chittagong and south-eastern Bengal. Confirm evidences are

available of the Arakanese domination over south-eastern Bengal from the regime of the

53 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, Vol. II: 24054 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, Vol. II: 23755 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, Vol. II: 23556 For instance one of the powerful Zamindars Suna Ghazi went against Musa Khan. For details see Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 239

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Arakanese king Man Phalaung (1571-1593). This interaction between Bengal and Arakan can

be dated back to the fifteenth century.57

Thus, the changing of capital from Rajmahal to Dhaka in the early seventeenth

century was due to the Mughals’ political and economic ambition over eastern Bengal and its

neighbouring states. During the late sixteenth century, power of the Bara Bhuiyas and the

zaminadrs of eastern Bengal was declined considerably. This consequence created

welcoming circumstances for the Mughals to come to Dhaka. However, still the Mughals had

to fight against these Bara Bhuiyas’ alliance and the zamindars for almost four years to

establish themselves in Dhaka in 1612.58 The main objective of the establishment of capital in

Dhaka was to check these defiant Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars and to fight against the

Arakanese and also to launch campaigns against neighbouring states. As eastern Bengal was

a prosperous region, therefore the Mughal thought if they could curb the power of the

zamindars and could defeat the Arakanese it would ensure vast revenue for the Mughal

Empire. Geographically Dhaka stands almost the centre of eastern Bengal and was well

connected with other parts of Bengal. Here we will briefly discuss about the geographical

location of Dhaka and its connection with other parts of Bengal.

Location of Dhaka and its Connection with other parts of Bengal

In our studied period Dhaka was situated in the eastern part of Bengal on the northern bank of

the river Buriganga. It was situated between 23 degrees and 24 degrees of the north latitude

and 90 degrees of the east longitude. In the seventeenth century Dhaka stood between the

river Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna. The city was extended from east to west which

57 Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 3-4

58 For details about Islam Khan Campaign see Gommans, Mughal Warfare: 171-9; also Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 247-84

17

formed a triangular shape. One of its parts was extended to the meeting place of the river

Brahmaputra and Meghna. The city was surrounded by Mymensing district on the north,

Bakerganj district on the south, Tiperah [Sylhet] district on the east and Faridpur on the

west.59

The important role that Dhaka played as a Mughal administrative and later as a

commercial centre was possible because of its easy and suitable connectivity with the other

parts of Bengal. Dhaka was situated in such a suitable position that it was very easy for her to

connect with the great Padma- Brahmaputra basin which had their tributaries running all

through the country. The river Buriganga on which bank Dhaka was situated was 26 miles in

length. In fact, the river Buriganga and the other small river Dhaleswari connected Dhaka

with the great river Padma (it is called Ganges in India), Brahmaputra and Meghna.60

The Buriganga was also connected with a river called Lakhya by two branches, one in

Khizirpur and the other in near Demra approximately four miles higher up.61 By its

intersection, the river Lkahya was connected with the river Meghna through the river

Dhaleswari and the river Ichamati. Thus, Dhaka was connected with all the districts those

were on the bank of the river Meghna.62 The Meghna flowed to the Bay of Bengal near

Chandpur. Consequently Dhaka was also connected with the Bay of Bengal and thus with the

coastal districts of Bengal. The Bramaputra flowed down its old strait to the Meghna. Thus,

Brahmaputra connected Dhaka with northern Rangpur, Dinajpur, Assam, Koch Bihar and

other northern districts of Bengal. Another two rivers Karatoya and Atrai were flowing down

to the Padma. It connected Dhaka with the upper district of North Bengal. In the southern

part, the Padma was flowing right to the south before it met with the Meghna. Foreign

travelers who travelled to Dhaka also depicted that how aptly Dhaka was connected with

59 Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography : 160 Karim, Dacca: The Mughal Capital: 461 Karim, Dacca: The Mughal Capital: 462 Karim, Dacca: The Mughal Capital: 4

18

other parts of Bengal and even its peripheries. The foreign travelers could easily travel from

Dhaka to its neighbouring areas, and other parts of Bengal.

Although Dhaka was principally connected with other parts of Bengal by water ways

there were also some roads which made it possible to connect with neighbouring districts. A

European traveler Jean Baptiste Tavernier mentioned that it was possible to reach Dhaka by

land from neighbouring cities and villages. However, he mentioned that those who wanted to

do that they had to depend on foot.63

This chapter suggests that the emergence of Dhaka was not for the shifting of river

courses as the conventional and dominant historiography portrayed. It argues that Dhaka was

selected as the Mughal provincial capital in the early seventeenth century because of the

Mughals political and economic ambition. But what advantages Dhaka provided to the

Mughal ambition? Next chapter will discuss the importance of Dhaka to the Mughal purpose.

63, Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India, William Crooke (ed.), vol. I, (London: Oxford University Press, 1925): 102-4

19

CHAPTER TWO

The Mughals in Dhaka:

Dhaka as a Mughal Store House

The Previous chapter has discussed the emergence of Dhaka and the establishment of the

Mughal capital in Dhaka. It is argued in the first chapter that the rationale behind the

establishment of the Mughal provincial capital in Dhaka was for political and economic

ambition. This chapter will elaborate on this by explaining why and how Dhaka was

important to the Mughal and what role Dhaka played as a Mughal administrative centre in the

seventeenth century. This chapter states that Dhaka was important for the Mughal as a

military base to fulfill their ambition over eastern Bengal and the neighboring areas. The

chapter will also focus on the Mughals contribution in the making of Dhaka as a stable and

secure city.

Dhaka as a strategic location

Dhaka played a very important role as a Mughal administrative centre in the seventeenth

century. We have discussed in the previous chapter that Dhaka was situated almost in the

centre of eastern Bengal and as such strategically connected with other parts of Bengal as

well as with its peripheries. Now we will see how this location was useful for the Mughal

military campaigns in the seventeenth century. We have already seen that the Arakanese had

considerable dominance over south-eastern Bengal. Dhaka was a place from where the

Mughals could launch military campaigns against the Arakanese. It was also the most

suitable location from where they could tackle the Arakanese invasions in Bhalua, Bakla,

Jogidia, as far as Jessore, The location of Dhaka was also very ideal to launch campaigns

20

against the Arakanese settlement in Chittagong as it was well connected with the Padma-

Meghna river system and through the river Meghna, the Mughals had easy access to previous

mentioned areas, Sandwip and as far as Chittagong. It is noticed that most of the Mughal

campaigns against the Arakanese settled in Chittagong, the starting point was Dhaka and later

reinforced by the Mughal thana64 Bhalua and Jogadia.65 Location of Dhaka was also

important to launch campaigns against neighbouring states of eastern Bengal.

During the seventeenth century Mughal interest grew strongly in Koch Bihar, Kamrup

and Assam which were situated to the northern border of eastern Bengal. The Mughals’

interest in these regions was mainly for two reasons. The Mughals had an aspiration to

capture the imperial power over these areas. Secondly, they wanted to keep vigilance over

these regions. Immediately prior to the Mughal invasion, Koch Bihar grew into a powerful

state under king Naranarayan. Historians suggested that the Koch king Naranarayan came

from the Mech or Bodo tribal group.66 Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries this tribal

group was being transformed into a dominant caste. In the course of the fifteenth century,

Naraynarayan established a powerful principality in these areas. He restored the temples of

the goddess Kamakhya and was a generous patron of Sanskrit scholars. He established a

claim to his family’s connection with the mythical exploits of Parashumara against the

Kshatriya. It was also found that, later on, the Koch in this area took the designation of

Rajbanshi. Thus it appeared that in the sixteenth century the Koch people and the nobility felt

a strong attachment to the royal house.67 This unity is also observed in the seventeenth

century, when the Mughals were launching campaigns against Koch Bihar and Assam.

64 Thana means military post consisted of several hundred soldiers.65 For details on the Mughals’ campaign against the Arakanese see Sarkar, The History of Bengal, vol. II: 292-5; 297-301; 302-566See B.R. Hodgson, ‘Koch, Bodo and Dhimal Tribes’ Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. XVIII, part II (1849): 704-567 Gautam Bhadra, ``Two Frontier Uprisings in Mughal India’’ In Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies II: Writings on South Asian History and Society, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983): 56

21

Gautam Bhadra in his seminal essay, ‘Two Frontier uprisings in Mughal India’ records two

uprisings against the Mughal polity.68 These uprisings had occurred in the Koch Bihar and

border areas of Assam in the early seventeenth century (c.a. 1619-1621). He shows that the

basic characteristic of these uprisings was that the common people, kings and peasants jointly

attacked the Mughals.69 This challenge against the Mughal authority was not peculiar for

these two uprisings only; this type of uprising was in fact a common phenomenon throughout

the seventeenth century. Gautam Bhadra shows that the Mughals were sometimes so pressed

by these strong protests that they had to reconcile with the kings of these areas.70 Therefore, it

is clear from the above discussion that to bring these areas into the Mughal sway and later on

to quell the protests against the Mughals, they had to choose a suitable place from where they

could launch powerful campaigns against the kings of these areas. Fortunately, Dhaka offered

them such opportunity to carry out military campaigns against the Koch, Assam or Kamrup.

Due to Dhaka’s strategic geographic location, it was easy to carry out expeditions through the

Meghna and Brahmaputra river system and also by land to these areas [see map], which was

not possible from Rajmahal—the previous capital of Bengal. After the establishment of the

capital in Dhaka, the Mughals had strengthened their thanas in the frontiers such as Susung.

When the Mughal army would send their campaigns to these areas, the core Mughal army

was always reinforced from its frontier thanas. The presumption about the importance of

Dhaka to the Mughal military campaigns make sense when it is seen that immediately after

the establishment of the capital in Dhaka, Bengal subahdar Islam Khan launched campaign

against the kings of Koch and Kamrup in 1613.71

The assumption is further strengthened by the transfer of the capital from Rajmahal to

Dhaka for the second time. When Prince Muhammad Shuja became the subahdar of Bengal,

68 Bhadra, ``Two Frontier Uprisings’’ In Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies: II: 43-5969 Bhadra, ``Two Frontier Uprisings’’ In Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies: II : 47; 5870 Bhadra, ``Two Frontier Uprisings’’ In Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies: II : 5571 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal vol. II: 285; also Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi: 222-253

22

he transferred his capital from Dhaka to Rajmahal in 1639.72 During the viceroyalty of Prince

Shuja no such campaign to these areas was noticed. However, after the appointment of Mir

Jumla in 1659, he again transferred the capital of Bengal from Rajmahal to Dhaka. 73 It is safe

to presume that one of the reasons behind the transfer of the capital from Rajmahal to Dhaka

was to launch campaigns against Koch Bihar, Kamrup and Assam. It is noticed soon after his

arrival in Dhaka, Mir Jumla launched campaigns against Assam and Koch Bihar in

November 1661 and ended in 1663 when he died.74 All these events demonstrate the

importance of the location of Dhaka in realizing Mughal ambitions in these regions.

Dhaka as a military labour supplier

Military labour recruitment was very important for the Mughals. What crucially important

military labour recruitment was for the Mughals has been explained by a well known Mughal

court historian Abul Fazl: `the number of men brought before His Majesty [for service]

depends on the number of men available.’75 Apart from its strategic location, Dhaka offered

soldiers to the Mughal army. A close look to the Islam Khan’s campaign to eastern Bengal

and the establishment of provincial capital in Dhaka exhibits the importance of Bara Bhuiyas

and zamindars of eastern Bengal to the Mughals. We have seen that after a prolonged

campaign against the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars of eastern Bengal, Islam Khan Chisti was

able to establish his capital in Dhaka. But Islam khan Chisti’s campaign in eastern Bengal did

not wipe out the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars completely. The Mughals opted for

pacification and political reconciliation. Political reconciliation was indeed needed to achieve

military assistance from the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars of eastern Bengal. We have seen in

72 Karim, Dacca:The Mughal Capital, (Dhaka,1964): 1473 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal,vol. II: 34274 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal,vol. II: 35075 Abul Fazl Allami, The A-in- Akbari, ed. By H. Blochmann, vol. II, ( Calcutta, 1872-7) cited In Jos,Gommans, Mughal Warfare : Indian and High Roads to Empire, 1500-1700, (London: Routledge, 2002): 67

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the previous chapter that the Bara Bhuiyas were very powerful before the Mughals

established capital in Dhaka. They had numerous war-boats and soldiers. After the

submission of the Bara Bhuiyas, their military forces were incorporated to the Mughal army.

It is observed that Musa Khan, one of the major players of the Bara Bhuiyas alliance and the

other zamindars still retained their position though their power was curtailed. These pacified

Bara Bhuiyas, zamindars and their successors played very important role in almost all the

Mughal military campaigns. Military assistance of Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars was

indispensable for the Mughal fighting against the Arakanese. It will be clear if we give an

example of such military assistance. The Mughals’ fighting against the Arakanese in 1620,

Musa Khan and zamindar Raja Raghunath had noticeable contributions. Half of the forces of

the Mughal army of this campaign came from Musa Khan and Raja Raghunath who joined

the Mughal forces with 7000/8000 soldiers and 4000 to 5000 war-boats.76 Other members of

the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars were also active in this campaign. The evidence of such

military assistance was not unique for this campaign only. Military assistance of Bara

Bhuiyas and zamindars was also vital for the Mughals campaign against Koch Bihar, Assam

and Kamrup. Again we will take an example of the Mughal campaign in Koch Bihar and

Kamrup. In the very first Mughals’ campaign in these regions in 1613, it is noticed that Musa

Khan was playing an active role. He contributed to the Mughal army 100 war-boats with his

forces under his war commander Adil Khan.77 Likewise, other zamindars of eastern Bengal

also offered considerable military assistance to the Mughals. Thus, here we can perceive the

importance of Dhaka as a Mughal administrative centre. It was only possible to get this

consistent military assistance from the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars if the Mughals had their

76 Sarkar, The History of Bengal vol. II: 30377 For details about Kamrup Campaign see Sarkar, The History of Bengal vol. II: 285, also Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi: 222-253

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capital in Dhaka. Indeed this assistance was not unconditional; the Mughals had to motivate

them by offering different opportunities.

The Mughal administration in Dhaka not only received assistance from the Bara

Bhuiyas and zamindars but they also exploited Dhaka’s position to get assistance from

European trading companies. The Mughal usually promised to give more trading

opportunities in return for their assistance. For instance the campaign against Koch Bihar and

Assam (1661-1663), the Mughals received help from the Europeans. Many Dutch,

Portuguese and English, sailors and soldiers joined the Mughals’ campaign against Koch

Bihar and Assam.78 The evidences of these time to time military supports are also available in

VOC documents. One such document informs that in 1663 the Dutch Director of Bengal

trade ordered the Resident in Dhaka to lend the Mughal subahdar 6 canons and some other

war equipments.79 It is also noticed that during the Shaista Khan’s campaign against the

Arakanese in 1666, the Dutch and the Portuguese extended their support to the Bengal

subahdar.80 VOC documents shows that the Dutch sent two ships named Lansmeer and

Purmerlant to assist the Mughal campaigns against the Arakanese.81

Though there are no specific statistics available on the number of recruits to the

Mughal army, it can be well asserted that Dhaka was a promising place for the Mughals to

recruit individuals for its army. As we have already seen that the Arakan king had

considerable domination over eastern Bengal from mid sixteenth century. They used to

invade south-eastern part of Bengal and captivated people from these areas for the slave

trade. Therefore, the Mughals might have maintained hopes of recruiting substantial number

of people in the army, had they been able to contain this invader. The Mughals’ aspiration

78 Sarkar (ed.),The History of Bengal, vol. II: 34679 H.T. Colenbrander (ed.), Dagh-registers gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1663, ( The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1899): 42580 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 34681 DR. W. PH. Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, van Gouverneurs-Generaal en raden aan heren XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel III: 1655-1674,( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964): 587

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over military recruitment from Bengal may be substantiated by explaining the siege of Hugli

in 1632. Some historians argue that the reason behind the siege of Hugli was economic. They

argue that from 1630 onwards Mughals’ interest grew on the Bengal trade.82 This is a

plausible argument. The Portuguese had significant control over the trade in this region. If the

Mughal had to think over the maritime trade of Bengal, it had to curb the power of the

Portuguese who were settled in Hugli and also partly in Chittagong. Beyond the economic

reason of the Mughal campaign against the Portuguese in Hugli, one other reason of the

campaign was also to destroy the slave market in Hugli where the Portuguese and the

Arakanese were engaged in slave trade. Most of these slaves were captivated from south-

eastern part of Bengal. The question, however, is that: why the Mughals were so keen to

destroy the slave market. Pointing out the reasons behind the Hugli siege one of the historians

argues:

…It [Hugli] was a slave- market to which both Magh [the Arakanese] and the Portuguese

pirates had free access. It is there that they disposed of their unlucky prisoners. Slavery, it is

true, was an institution recognized by Muslim and Hindu law, but it is elementary duty of

every State to provide for the security of life and property of each and every one of its

members. Shah Jahan could not permit his subjects to be bought and sold like cattle in the

slave- market of Hugli, simply because his officers had proved unequal to the task of

defending their persons against the rovers of Chittagong and Arakan. The Portuguese of

Hughli undoubtedly shared their guilt morally and legally when they trafficked with them in

their offensive spoils. If Shah Jahan found it impossible to clear the Bay and the rivers of

Bengal of these human sharks, the least he could do was to close the market where they

bought their victims, and to eliminate their partners in this dismal business. 83

82 Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), The Mughal State 1526-1750, reprint, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008): 2883 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol: II: 367

26

The reason behind the attack of Hugli might not be as simple as he presumes. Going

beyond the conventional thinking, it may be inferred that Shah Jahan´s intention to destroy

the slave market in Hugli might not be for the emotional attachment to the ruled but he might

have seen the possibility of military recruitment from eastern Bengal. Mughals effort to wipe

out the slave trade is also evident in VOC sources. In an agreement signed between nawab of

Dhaka and the Dutch shows that the Mughal imposed the condition that the Dutch were not

permitted to recruit servants from this area and they were also not permitted to buy and

transport slaves from this area.84

Dhaka as a store house of war-equipments

Another importance of Dhaka to the Mughals was that Dhaka supplied war equipments. For

the Mughal expansion in eastern Bengal and around these areas they had to depend mostly on

water vessels. Water vessels such as war-boats were profusely found in Dhaka and its

surrounding areas from ancient period.85 It is easy to understand why water vessels were

numerously found in Dhaka. The main raw material for war-boats, wood was massively

available around Dhaka. A kind of tree locally called Dhack abundantly grew in Dhaka.86 The

wood of this tree was very apposite for boat-making. It can also be easily assumed why

Dhaka was famous for boat-making. Dhaka was surrounded by rivers and tributaries;

therefore, the principal medium for communication of these areas was mostly dependent on

84 In this agreement one of the conditions was that: …De Hollanders mogen geen jnlandsche dienaers in dienst nemen….Sij mogen geen bossekruijt, sallpeter, slaven offte slavinnen opcoopen nog min vervoeren. See ``Accordt met den nabbab Eslimchan gemaeckt in Decca den 18e September 1636’’ In H.T. Colenbrander (ed.), Dagh-registers gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1637, ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1899): 100

85 Ramesh Chandra Majumdar, Bangla Desher Itihas Prachin Jug, reprint, (Calcutta: General, 1998): 20086 Karim, Dacca: The Mughal Capital: 2

27

water vessels. Even today, a large number of boats are produced in the neighbourhood of

Dhaka.

Elephants were indispensible for military expedition in the Indian subcontinent.

Elephant could carry war materials and were also effective in sieges in hilly areas. Dhaka was

a storehouse of elephants. Elephants were found in the hilly regions of eastern Bengal. But

after the establishment of capital in Dhaka, most of the elephants came here from Assam and

Koch Bihar’s forests and hilly areas.87 Here we can infer that before the Mughal conquest of

eastern Bengal, the Mughals might have an ambition over the elephants of these areas. They

might think if they could establish capital in a suitable area of eastern Bengal, and later if

they establish control over Assam and Koch Bihar they would get ample supply of elephants

from these regions.

Our speculation about Dhaka as a store house of war-equipments becomes stronger

when we pay a close look to a rebellion which occurred in 1623. In 1623 Prince Khurram,

one of the competitors for the succession of the Mughal emperorship started rebellion against

Emperor Jahangir from the Deccan.88 The main reason behind his revolt was his aspiration to

become the Mughal emperor, which was being upset by his step mother Nur Jahan, who had

much influence on the court at that time. In the course of his revolt, he defeated and killed the

Bengal subahdar Ibrahim Khan in 1624 in Akbarnagar.89 Now, it is also necessary to pay

attention to the rebel-prince’s movement. After defeating subahdar Ibrahim Khan, Prince

Khurram advanced towards Bengal capital Dhaka. After nine days of journey, Khurram

reached Dhaka in May 1624.90 Here the question interests us is: why the rebel prince took the

risk to march towards Dhaka? The answer is clear. As has been stated before, Dhaka was a

87 Bhadra, ``Two Frontier Uprisings in Mughal India’’ In Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies II: 4988 See Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 306-7 also Nathan, Bharaistan-i- Ghaybi, Vol.II: 688-694

89 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal , p. 309,Nathan, Bharaistan-i- Ghaybi, Vol. II: 692-3

90 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal p. 309, Nathan, Bharaistan-i- Ghaybi, vol. II: 708-9

28

store house of war-equipments, his march towards Dhaka was targeted to grab war

equipments and to make friendship with the most important power players of Dhaka and the

eastern Bengal so that he could get consistent military support in the future. The available

literature shows that Prince Khurram had grabbed a large sum of money, amounting forty

millions of rupees, war equipments such as 500 elephants, 400 horses, entire artillery, and all

the fleets.91

Dhaka as food and fodder supplier

The importance of Dhaka as an administrative centre to the Mughal was not only for military

store house but also as a supplier of large amount of food for the Mughal army and fodder for

horses and elephants. Throughout centuries, rivers and flood waters deposited alluvial soil in

eastern Bengal. Thus, the land of eastern Bengal was very fertile which contributed to this

region to become rich in agriculture. Rice, pulse, vegetables and other crops produced

plentifully in Dhaka and especially in its neighboring areas. It was very easy for the Mughal

to obtain food supply and fodder for the horses from the neighbouring areas.

Mughals Contribution in the Making of Dhaka

Here we will highlight the contribution of the Mughal administration in the making of Dhaka.

The first and foremost contribution of the Mughals to Dhaka was the designation of Dhaka as

the provincial capital of Bengal. The Mughals then contributed to the stability and security of

Dhaka by pacifying the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars of eastern Bengal and by containing the

invaders. Pacification of the Bara Bhuiya and zamindars was mostly done during Islam

91 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 309, Nathan, also see Bharaistan-i- Ghaybi, vol. II: 708-9

29

Khan’s early years of viceroyalty (1608-1612). However, they needed to be checked from

time to time. To protect Dhaka and the south-eastern Bengal from invaders was not an easy

task though.

We have already mentioned the Arakanese influence over eastern Bengal. In the early

seventeenth century powerful King Meng Khamaung made strenuous efforts to continue

control over south-eastern Bengal. A letter written in 1614 to VOC personnel by the king of

Arakan also gives testimony of his ambition over Bengal. In this letter he claimed himself as

the emperor of the most `beautiful lands in the world’. Interestingly enough, he included in

his kingdom not only Rammapour [Ramu], Mawathin [Meghawati], Rawathin[Rammawati],

Chackanna[Cukkara], Satigan[Chittagong] etc. but also Syripoura[ Sripur, south to present

Dhaka] Bachlebaer[Bhallua, south to Dhaka], Kijbrajepour[Khizirpur, south to Dhaka, where

the Mughal had a military post], Vettipoura[ Bikrampur, south to Dhaka] and Bakaa[possibly

Dhaka]. In this letter he also wrote to the VOC personnel Pieter Both that he [Meng

Khamaung] was so powerful and gallant that he possessed the power to conquer the whole

world for a while.92 No doubt what he claimed in his letter was exaggeration but it is also true

that although the Mughals established themselves in Dhaka in 1612, they were not able to

control areas such as Sripur, Khizirpur or Bhallua effectively. Dhaka administration was

considerably penetrated by the Arakanese invasion in these areas almost every year until

1622.93 Between 1614 and 1626, the Arakan king made six major invasions to eastern Bengal.

On one occasion, Manrique states, they even seized Dhaka for three days and plundered the

city, and set it on fire.94 After 1630’s the Mughals were more successful in war against the

Arakanese. Henceforth, the Mughals did not face such major invasion from the Arakanese.

92 National Archives of the Netherlands, The Hague: Archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (hereafter NA VOC), 1059, fol.108-109, Briefje van Man Khamaung tot Pieter Both, n.d [ 1614] cited In Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 243 93 Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 24394 Fray SebastienManrique, Travels of Fray Sebastien Manrique, 1629-1643, vol. I, Arakan, trans. and notes by Lt.-Col. C. Eckford Luard from Itinerario De Las Missiones Orientales, ( Oxford: The Hakluyt Society, 1927): xxv-xxvi

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By 1630s, Dhaka became more or less a secure and stable city. The Arakan kingdom was

considerably weakened after the death of King Meng Khamaung and Sirisudhammaraja and

the subsequent civil war. Security of Dhaka was further consolidated when Subahdar Shaista

Khan conquered Sandwip and Chittagong in 1666.95 In fact, the conquest of Chittagong was

very important for the security of Dhaka as well as for its commerce. Before the conquest of

Chittagong in 1666 the Mughals had made several attempts to conquer Chittagong but were

failed.

Now, the focus will be turned to the strategic initiatives that were taken by the

Mughal administration in Dhaka to the protection of Dhaka. As soon as the establishment of

the capital in Dhaka, Islam Khan Chishti strengthened the defence of Dhaka by erecting a

number of forts in some strategic places in Dhaka and around Dhaka,96 such as in Khizirpur,

Jatrapur and Idrakpur. Permanent armies were encamped there.97 Islam Khan Chishti also

increased the number of Mughal choukis or guard houses. He strengthened the pre-existing

Dhaka fort which served as a strong defense against enemy invasion.

Mir Jumla further strengthened the defence of his capital by constructing several

roads for easy and quick military movement to the other parts of the eastern Bengal and its

border regions. One such road was constructed to connect Dhaka with the northern parts of

Bengal. Abdul Karim identifies this road as the present day’s Dhaka-Mymensing road.98 He

constructed another road to connect Dhaka with eastern part of Bengal.99 Tangi Bridge built

by Mir Jumla connected Dhaka with its suburbs. French traveler Tavernier who visited Dhaka

in 1665 and Italian traveler Niccolao Manucci who visited the Mughal Empire from 1653-

1708[1663] confirms the existence of another bridge which was constructed over the Pagla

95 For detail description about Shaista Khan’s Chittagong campaign see Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 192-8, also Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 377-381, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Studies in Mughal India, (London, 1920): 131-153

96 Dani, Dhaka: A Record of its Changing Fortunes: 2897 See Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Studies in Mughal India: 127 98 Karim, Dacca:The Mughal Capital: 3699 S.M Taifoor, Glimpses of Old Dacca, (Dhaka,1952) : 78

31

river in the neighborhood of Dhaka.100 Another European traveler Thomas Bowery who

travelled Dhaka also mentions that Mir Jumla’s initiative to build up Dhaka as a stronger city

than Rajmahal is conspicuous.101

In conclusion, on the basis of above discussion it is clear that in the seventeenth

century Dhaka worked as a wonderful military base for the Mughal campaigns against the

Arakanese, Kamrup, Koch Bihar and Assam. With arduous and continuous efforts, the

Mughal administration was more or less able to ensure the stability and security of Dhaka by

1630s. But the Mughals had to await until 1666 for the final consolidation of the security of

Dhaka when they completely defeated the Arakanese in Chittagong.

100 Tavernier, Travels in India, vol. I: 105 also Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor or Mogul India, 1653-1708, Vol- 1 translated by William Irvine, (Calcutta, 1965): 86101 Thomas Bowery, A Geographical Account of the Countries round the Bay of Bengal, 1669-1679, (Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society, 1903): 139-41

32

CHAPTER THREE

The Dutch in Dhaka: The Emergence of Dhaka as a Commercial Centre

With the protection and the political stability of Dhaka ensured by the Mughals, it was

emerging as a favorable place for trade and commerce by the late 1630s. Consequently, the

Dutch East Indies Company sent a mission to investigate the prospect of establishing factory

in Dhaka. However, the Dutch were not convinced at that time to establish their factory here.

It took fourteen more years after the first Dutch mission to establish their factory in Dhaka.

The Dutch established their factory here in 1650.102 The Dutch were the first among the

European Companies who established their factories in Dhaka. This chapter will mainly

analyze why the Dutch were interested to establish their factory in Dhaka. At the same time,

the chapter will briefly discuss the Dutch contribution to the making of Dhaka as a

commercial centre.

The Dutch East India Company or De Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie commonly

known as the VOC was established in 1602 in the Netherlands. It was a chartered company

granted by the Sates-General of the Dutch Republic. The Company was bestowed with a

monopoly to carry out business in Asia. It was also given authority to engage in war with

other foreign companies, if needed. The VOC was like a multinational company that carried

out extensive business in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and employed millions of

employees. The VOC first started its trading activities in Indonesian Archipelago. Then the

Company also expanded its business to different parts of South Asia, Far-east Asia and

Persia.103 For the case of Bengal, the VOC first established its factory in Hugli, in

102 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 40-41103 For details about the foundation the Dutch East India Company and its trading network see Femme F.Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, Expansion and Decline, (Leiden: Walburg Pers, 2003): 13-55

33

1633.104Thereafter, the VOC established factories in Balasore Pipli, and Patna. Finally, the

VOC established their business headquarters for Bengal in Chinsura, a village near Hugli.

However, their Chinsura headquarters was often mentioned as Hugli factory.105 In the course

of time, they established their factory in Dhaka. Now it will be discussed why and how the

VOC decided to establish its factory in Dhaka in the second half of the seventeenth century.

The Dutch in Dhaka

Here we will explain that how the VOC responded to the political development of Dhaka that

has been discussed in the second chapter. However, a brief discussion about the process of

the establishment of the VOC’s factories in Bengal in general will give us a useful

understanding as to why the VOC had established their factory in Dhaka. Attracted by the

prospect of Bengal trade, the VOC started their mission to establish factories in Bengal. The

commodities which attracted the VOC most for Bengal trade were especially sugar, rice,

butter, textiles, and slaves as well. Before starting factories in Bengal, the VOC purchased

Bengal commodities at the Coromandel Coast.106 These goods were earlier brought to the

Coromandel Coast by Indian merchants. Thus, it would increase the price of the goods. To

ascertain the potentiality of Bengal trade, the head of the Dutch Coromandel trade Jan Gaeff

first travelled to Bengal and Arakan in May 1615. But Gaeff’s mission which started in

1616 was failed due to bad weather. After the unsuccessful trip, not much is known of the

VOC’s attitude about Bengal trade. But a letter written in 1623 by Governor-general

Carpentier to the chief factor of Masulipatnam informs that the Company had sent three ships

for the further investigation of the prospects of Bengal trade. However, the Company

postponed the plan to establish factories in Bengal this time too. The next few years, the

104 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 37105 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 40106 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 35

34

Company was suspicious about the prospect of Bengal trade because of political turbulence.

It is discussed in the second chapter that during the rebellion of Prince Khurram in 1624,

Bengal became politically unstable. Indeed, Dhaka was the worst victim. In 1626

Masulipatnam factor reported to the Directors that they found no prospect for the Bengal

trade.107 However, after few years of further investigations and consultations, the VOC

decided to open factories in Bengal. As in 1632 the Portuguese were driven out by the

Mughals, the Dutch found an excellent opportunity to open up their factory in Hugli. The

VOC established its factory in Hugli in 1633.108 In the course of few years, the VOC

established factories in Pipli, Balasore and Patna. Pipli and Balasore factories were

established in 1636 and Patna factory was established in 1638.109

But the VOC’s Bengal factories in Hugli, Pipli and Patna were not running as

profitable as the VOC officials expected. For instance, although the VOC was able to obtain a

farman, in 1636 that permitted the VOC to carry on trade freely in these areas, did not benefit

much the VOC’s Bengal trade. The Dutch factory in Hugli was still running low as previous.

In this context, the Dutch were trying to search a supply centre that could contribute

to their Bengal trade. As has been seen before the Mughals were more successful to ensure

the security and political stability of Dhaka by 1630s, the Dutch sent a mission to Dhaka. The

VOC documents show that by the order of the Director of VOC Coromandel trade, six Dutch

people had started their mission from Hugli to Dhaka with two ships Santvoort and Wessaen

in July 1636 to investigate the prospects of Dhaka trade and also for a diplomatic meeting

with the subahdar of Bengal. But because of a dispute with the Mughal local authorities in

Hugli the Dutch were detained and brought to Dhaka where they were imprisoned for few

days. Although they were released later by the intervention of the higher VOC officials and

107 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 36108 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 37

109 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 38-9

35

the Mughal court in Delhi, however, the VOC had to spend more than thousand rupees to

solve the problem. The VOC official later had to buy a row boat and hire rowers to go back to

Hugli.110

Not only the Dutch had to spend money to solve the problem but shortly after they

had also to conclude an accord with subahdar Islam Khan Mashhadi. The agreement they

concluded with the Bengal subahdar was not too friendly for the VOC. In this agreement, the

toll of VOC ships was redefined, indeed increased. According to this agreement, a large VOC

ship was charged 3,000 rupees, a semi large ship was charged 2,000 rupees and a small ship

was charged 1,200 rupees as toll. The accord also imposed restriction of trade and shipping

on some commodities. It was said in the agreement that the VOC was not allowed to buy and

transport of slaves from Bengal and also not permitted to employ locals in their service. It

was further mentioned that VOC ships were also not permitted to carry gunpowder and

saltpeter.111

After this incident the Hugli factory was closed in December 1636 at the suggestions

of Mahuisjen and the factors were shifted to Pipli in Orissa. When subahdar Prince

Mohammad Shuja took the charge of Bengal province the Dutch were invited to reopen their

factory in Hugli.112 However, the VOC was not convinced by the subahdar’s invitation. The

Dutch did not reopen their factory sometime between 1645 and 1647.113 The other Dutch

factories in Bengal trade was not per expectation. For instance, VOC’s Patna factory was

closed after few months of its establishments in 1638.114

110 See Lennart Bes, ``Dhaka’s Dutch depictions: Dutch Records on the Capital’’s First Two Centuries’’ (Unpublished paper which was presented in Dhaka in 2010). I am very grateful to Mr. Lennart Bes who generously permited me to use his unpublished paper. also Colenbrander (ed.), Dagh Registers Casteel Batavia,1637: 96-102, also NA VOC 1122, ff 651-652111 Colenbrander (ed.), Dagh-registers Casteel Batavia,1637: 99-100112 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 39113 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal:38114DR. W. PH. Coolhaas, Generale missiven van gouverneurs-generaal en raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel. II, 1639-1655(The Hague : Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1964 ): 61

36

Over the following half decade the VOC did not show interest on Dhaka. The

question remains why the Dutch could not decide regarding the establishment of factory in

Dhaka? There might be two possible reasons— firstly the Dutch were not still convinced

about the security of Dhaka and secondly, the incident that happened in 1636 could delay

their decision about the establishing of factory in Dhaka.

The unfriendly relationship between the VOC and the Mughal local authority had

been continued until the second half of the 1640s. Although the Mughal authority in Bengal

reduced the duty on VOC ships in 1641 and 1642,115 this does not necessarily mean that the

relation between the Dutch and the Mughal local authority improved considerably. Once

expressing his grievance over Mughal authority, the chief of the VOC Hugli factory Jacob

Mahuijsen wrote to the VOC governor Carel Reijniersen that though the Mughal authority

gave them authority to do business freely in Hugli, it did not work in practice. The VOC

documents mention that the Mughal Osearon and Cororij (perhaps tax collectors) very often

abused their power and had collected illegal taxes at different points.116

During the late 1640s, the Dutch again showed some interest to establish a factory in

Dhaka. This might have been contributed by another factor. The relation between the Mughal

provincial officials and the VOC in Bengal was improving by the late 1640s. In the early

1648, a farman of the Dhaka nawab opened the

115 See J.E Heeres (ed.), Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum: Verzameling van Politieke contracten en Verdragen de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten, van Privilegebrieven, aan hen verleend, enz., 1596-1650, Eerste deel, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1907): 339-342

116 Colenbrander (ed.), Dagh-registers Casteel Batavia, 1637: 96

37

Map-2: The Dutch Factories in Dhaka and its supply centre in the neighbourhood of Dhaka . “Carannigons”( Keraniganj),

Korbarrie ( Perhaps Junglebari), Roepgons(Rupganj), Nababgons(nababganj) and “Damerah” (Demra), c. 18th century

(National Archives, The Hague: Vosmaer family map collection (access code 4.VMF), inv. no. 848, plate 36, f. 46)117

window for the establishment of the Dutch factory in Dhaka.118 On 10 February 1648 nawab

Fidai Khan issued a farman which granted power to the VOC to carry on business anywhere

in the Bengal province. In this farman, the nawab of Dhaka stipulated very strict measures

against the dishonest Mughal tax collectors and other subordinate officials. The Nawab

mentioned that all the officers under his jurisdiction in Dhaka, Hugli and Patna should take

the farman seriously. The farman mentioned that the Dutch were given the right to do

business freely in the whole Bengal and those officials or tax collectors who would collect

illegal taxes or would create inconvenience for the Dutch Bengal trade, they must have to

face legal action. Any disobedience of the sections of this farman by any Mughal officials

117 I am grateful to Lennart Bes. He permitted me to use his collection which he collected from National Archive, The Hague. 118 See Heeres (ed.), Corpus Diplomaticum, 1596-1650: 506

38

would bring dire consequences for them. The nawab mentioned that it was not his order but

`this is the order of the higher authority of mine.’119

The importance of the farman can also be perceived from an undelivered letter written

by chief factors of Pipli Jan van Elbinck to the VOC governor in Pulicat. In this letter he

mentioned that previously they had received several farmans from the `Groot-Mogols` [‘ the

Great Mughals’] but the farman of 1648 was really especial one as it granted them

extraordinary prerogatives and also vowed against the `corrupted’ tax collectors which he

hoped would foster the Dutch trade in Bengal.120 After two years of receiving this farman the

VOC established its factory in Dhaka in 1650.121 The relics of the VOC factories and garden

in Dhaka are located by Ahmad Hasan Dani on the bank of the river Buriganga at present day

Mitford and at Tejgaoan.122Tavernier who visited Dhaka in 1665 also mentioned about the

Dutch factory in Dhaka. He wrote `…The Dutch finding that their goods were not sufficiently

safe in the common house of Dacca have built a very fine house.’123

Emergence of Dhaka as a Commercial Centre

Now we will see what happened to Dhaka after the establishment of Dutch factory in here

which was in fact a battle ground in the early years of the seventeenth century. After the

establishment of the Dutch factory in Dhaka, it was being emerge as a commercial centre. In

fact the primary importance of Dhaka to the VOC was that Dhaka played as an important role

as a supply centre. VOC documents show that the Dhaka factory had started its trading

activities soon after the establishment and the commodities procured by the VOC in Dhaka

119 Heeres (ed.), Corpus Diplomaticum, 1596- 1650: 506120 `Onuitgegeven missive van Jan van Elbinck te Pippli aan den gouverneur Arnold Heussen te Pulicat, 20 Mei 1648; van Heussen aan onze vertegen woordigers te Pipli, 9 Juni 1648’ In Heeres (ed.), Corpus Diplomaticum, 1596-1650: 505121 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 41122 Dani, Dhaka:Record of a Changing Fortune: 36123 Tavernieer, Travels in India, vol. I: 105

39

were not insignificant in compared to other VOC factories in Bengal. From a letter written in

1652, it is noticed that the VOC ordered silk textiles worth of f 600,000 from Kasimbazar,

saltpeter and textiles worth of f 80,000, commodities from Hugli worth of f 100,000, textiles

from Udaiganj worth of f 120,000, from Balasore sugar, textiles, rice worth of f 50,000, from

Pipli sugar, rice, textile etc. and from Dhaka textiles and etc. worth of f 120,000 (see table.1).

Factory Commodity Amount in

Guilder

Kasimbazar Silk textile 600,000

Dhaka Textiles and etc. 120,000

Patna Saltpeter and

Textiles

80,000

Hugli and its

neighbourhood

…. 100,000

Udaiganj Textiles 120,000

Balasore Sugar, textiles

and rice

50,000

Pipli Sugar, rice,

textiles, etc

60,000

Total f 1130,000

Table- 1: The VOC Supply demand mentioned in a Letter written in 1652

Source: DR. W. PH. Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, van Gouverneurs-Generaal en raden aan heren

XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel II: 1639-1655,( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,

1964): 621-622

40

A letter written in 1656 also informs about the VOC procurement opportunity in

Dhaka. The letter informs that in Patna, the VOC had good opportunity to procure saltpeter

and in Dhaka procurement of cotton textiles was favourable (`gunstig’).124 An early

eighteenth century map shows that in the course of time the VOC expanded its supply centre

in the vicinity of Dhaka such as at Rupganj, Narayanganj, Demrah, Nababganj, Junglebari,

Sonargaon, Keraniganj and Chandpur [also see Map- 2].

Growing up of Dhaka as a commercial centre is also evident from a letter written by

Rading Oecker Sary in 1661 to a Captain of the ship [the name of the ship and the name of

the person is not clear in VOC document], in which he mentioned that Dhaka was now more

successful. But at the same time he was worried about the security of their Dhaka factory

because of the `robbery’ of local influential. He advised for an inquiry of the VOC’s Dhaka

trade as the VOC agents were `robbed’ by the local influential and some of the VOC

cashboxes were lost. He also suggested an investigation of the responsible VOC officials’

activities in Dhaka.125 However the relationship between the Mughal local authority in Dhaka

and the Dutch was not always unfriendly. For instance, sometimes nobles of Dhaka requested

the VOC to import goods from its other trading centre. One such occasion by two merchant

ships Lansmeer and Purmerlant, the VOC imported different goods such as tin, sandalwood,

cinnamon, mace, catty pepper, Japanese copper rode, silver etc.126

We have already stated that the role of Dhaka factory to the VOC was as a supply

centre. Here we see by supplying the commodities to the VOC Bengal trade, Dhaka got

124 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, 1655-1674 , Deel-III: 621-622

125 `Brief een oprecht gemoed en genegentheyd geschreven door Rading Oecker Sary aen den capteyn `t schip In J.A. van Der Chijs, Dag Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1661, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1889): 386-9126 J.A van der Chijs, Dag Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1666-1667, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1895): 135

41

connected directly with the VOC chief factory in Bengal. At the same time the Dutch also

imported commodities from other trading centre to Dhaka. These trading activities connected

Dhaka not only with the trading centres of Bengal but with VOC’s farthest trading centre

such as Batavia, Persia, Japan etc. indirectly. In fact the most important contribution of the

Dutch to the making of Dhaka as a commercial ecntre was that the Dutch linked Dhaka to the

wider trading network of the Dutch.

In conclusion, this chapter argues that the Dutch established their factory in Dhaka in

the second half of the seventeenth century, as the security of Dhaka was improving by 1630s

and onwards, thus a favorable environment was created for trade. During the relentless

warfare between the Arakanese and the Mughal in the early seventeenth century commercial

centres of eastern Bengal were shifting to western Bengal.127

127 See Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 7

42

Conclusion

One of the aims of this thesis was to analyze the validity of the theory of ecological factor

which some historians believe contributed to the emergence of Dhaka. The thesis has

suggested that the so called shifting of the river courses of the Ganges in the late sixteenth

century was not vital to the formation of eastern-Bengal and the emergence of Dhaka. The

shifting of river courses is a usual factor in the history of riverine Bengal. Moreover, the

shifting of courses of the Ganges is debatable. Some historians suggest that the shifting of

river courses took much longer than perceived by Richard Eaton.128 Richard Eaton also

overstates the role of Sufis who according to Eaton contributed to the spread of agriculture in

eastern Bengal. The thesis argues that the role of Islamic leaders was not as prominent in so

called `the land reclamation’ and massive agriculture in eastern Bengal as Eaton states in his

work.129 This thesis also argues that land of eastern Bengal and area around Dhaka was not

marshy land and was not covered by dense forest as Eaton shows in his The Rise of Islam and

the Bengal Frontier 1204/1760. The thesis has suggested that before the Mughal had

penetrated eastern Bengal it had several prosperous areas. Eastern Bengal was not a vacuum

place and unpopulated land. Bara Bhuiyas activities and the Arakanese invasion in eastern

Bengal and slave trade also show that the land was well populated. The thesis also through

doubt on Eaton´s view that soon after the establishment of capital in Dhaka, the Mughal

established control over the whole eastern Bengal.130 For the first two decades in the early

seventeenth century the Mughal had to engage severe battle against the Arakanese.

The thesis has stressed on the principal research question, `why did Dhaka emerge in

the seventeenth century?’. It has been suggested that the emergence of Dhaka in the

128 See Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 244; also Khan, Discovery of Bangladesh: 109129 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 207130 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier:150

43

seventeenth century was due to the Mughals’ economic and political ambition over eastern

Bengal and its neighboring states. During the sixteenth century the Bara Bhuiyas ruled

eastern Bengal. But they had no single political centre. Therefore it was easy for the powerful

Arakanese to establish dominance over Bengal. In the late sixteenth century the strength of

the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars of Bengal was declining due to the Arakanese dominance in

these areas and also for the internal political crisis. The Mughal found it as a welcoming

situation to establish their capital in Dhaka. However, they had to fight for four years

(c.1608-1612) to establish capital in Dhaka. The Mughals’ ambition was to establish control

over eastern Bengal and to annex their power in the neighbouring states of Bengal. Dhaka

was the most suitable choice to accomplish these aspirations as Dhaka offered a wonderful

launching pad for the military campaigns in Bengal and its neighbouring states.

The thesis has also attempted to answer the sub research question that why and how

the Dutch East India Company established its factory in Dhaka in the second half of the

seventeenth century. The thesis has argued that the Mughals gained more success to ensure

the political stability of Dhaka before 1630s. They had to fight incessantly against the

Arakanese before 1630 to take grip over eastern Bengal. Thus, the commercial centres of

Bengal were normally shifted to western Bengal. As the security and the political stability of

Dhaka improved the Dutch started thinking to establish factory in Dhaka. However, the

process took about fourteen years to finally establish their factory in Dhaka.

The thesis has also illustrated the contribution of the Mughals and the Dutch in the

making of Dhaka. The Mughals´ effort, to the making of Dhaka was that they selected it as

the provincial capital and later ensured the security and political stability of Dhaka. The

contribution of the Dutch East India Company to the making of Dhaka as a commercial

centre is remarkable. The Dutch were the first among the European Companies who

established their factories in Dhaka. The Dutch commercial activities in Dhaka stimulated the

44

commerce of Dhaka. In fact the Dutch connected Dhaka to a wide trading network. Thus the

Dutch contributed to the emergence of Dhaka as a commercial centre in the second half of the

seventeenth century.

45

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