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© 2016, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its Affiliates. All rights reserved. Jason Chan December 2016 SAC307 The Psychology of Security Automation
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AWS re:Invent 2016: The Psychology of Security Automation (SAC307)

Apr 16, 2017

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Page 1: AWS re:Invent 2016: The Psychology of Security Automation (SAC307)

© 2016, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its Affiliates. All rights reserved.

Jason Chan

December 2016

SAC307

The Psychology of

Security Automation

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What to Expect from the Session

An inside look at cloud security automation at Netflix

How to use the opportunities that AWS and cloud present

to make security more ubiquitous

Design principles for security automation that improve both

security and developer-security relationships

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The Psychology of Security Automation

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History:

Developer - Security

Relationships

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Opportunities for Developers

are also

Opportunities for Security Teams

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Opportunities + History = Powerful Tools

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Design Principles for Security Automation

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Design Principles

Integrate

Security++

Transparency

Low Touch and Decoupled

Reduce Cognitive Load

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SSL

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Historic Issues

• Expiry-based outages

• Security vulnerabilities

• Complex configuration

SSL/TLS Certificate Management

Now with AWS

• API-driven config

• Centralized management

• Machine-readable policies

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Lemurhttps://github.com/Netflix/lemur

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Lemur

One-stop shop for SSL certificate management

Request, provision, deploy, monitor, escrow

Identify SSL configuration issues

Plugin architecture to extend as necessary

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Lemur Certificate Creation

Create and Escrow Keys

Create CSR

Certificate Authority

Issue Certificate

Deploy to AWS Account(s)

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Lemur Takeaways

APIs = Opportunities

Focus automation investments on persistent, difficult,

common problems

Security++

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Permissions Management and

Access Control

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Goal = Least Privilege

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But . . .

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“It is often easier to ask for

forgiveness than to ask for

permission”

– Grace Hopper

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AWS Permissions Management

• Innovation is enabled by composition of multiple

services, but . . . .

• Sophisticated policy language

• 2500+ individual API calls

• New services and features released weekly

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Historic Issues

• Least privilege is difficult in

practice

• Multiple disconnected systems

to configure

• Low visibility

Permissions Management and Access Control

Now with AWS

• One place for all permissions

• API level, API driven

• Visibility

• Infrastructure as code

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Repoman:

Right-sizing IAM

Permissions

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Repoman Benefits

Low-risk access reduction

Transparent and versioned operations

Enables innovation and high-velocity development on AWS

Security++

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Rollie Pollie – AWS

Permissions Management via

ChatOps

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ChatOps Basics

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Rollie Pollie

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Rollie Pollie Benefits

Engineering-native workflows

Transparent decisions

Automated, secure, consistent

ChatOps allows quicker changes and reduced context

switching

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Security in the Development

Lifecycle

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Security in the Agile Lifecycle

17 steps across 7 phases

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Application Risk Assessment

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Application Risk Assessment

Historic Issues

Spreadsheet and human-driven

One-time

Presupposes managed intake

Now with AWS

Objective observability

Ongoing analysis

No humans required!

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Penguin Shortbread: Automated Risk Analysis for Microservice Architectures

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Penguin Shortbread Operation

Passively and continually analyze system dimensions, e.g.:

• Instance count

• Dependencies

• Connectivity to sensitive systems

• Internet-accessibility

• AWS account location

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Risk Assessment

Develop risk scoring based on observations

Use risk scoring to prioritize efforts

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Application Risk Metric

Metric summary

Metric algorithm

Scoring

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Application Risk Rollup

MetricsRisk metrics by region/environment

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Developer View in Context

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Penguin Shortbread Benefits

Low touch and ongoing

Objective and transparent view to application risk

Simple prioritization helps reduce cognitive load

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Security Requirements

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Historic Issues

Ambiguous

Difficult to verify

Security Requirements

Now with AWS

API-driven implementation

API-driven evaluation

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Security Requirements via Production Ready

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Production Ready

SRE-driven developer outreach program

Evangelize well-established patterns and practices, e.g.:

• Deployment

• Monitoring and Alerting

• Testing

Automated scoring

Uncover risk and reward operational excellence

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Security-Specific Production Ready Measures

App-Specific Security Group

App-Specific IAM Role

No plaintext secrets in code

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Production Ready Scorecard

Tracking over time

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Production Ready Benefits

Security integrated with other measures of readiness

Simple to evaluate compliance

Paved road lowers cognitive load

Easy to extend as capabilities expand

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Takeaways

• Security teams can and should leverage the high-

velocity development ecosystem

• Shared history provides both lessons and input to

development

• Aim to make security more integrated and ubiquitous

while also improving other system characteristics

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Thank you!

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Remember to complete

your evaluations!

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