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Much of the debate about China’s rise in recent years has focused on the potential

dangers China could pose as an eventual peer competitor to the United States bent

on challenging the existing international order. But another issue is far more

pressing. For at least the next decade, while China remains relatively weak

compared to the United States, there is a real danger that Beijing and Washington

will find themselves in a crisis that could quickly escalate to military conflict. Unlike

a long-term great-power strategic rivalry that might or might not develop down the

road, the danger of a crisis involving the two nuclear-armed countries is a tangible,

near-term concern -- and the events of the past few years suggest the risk might be

increasing.

Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing and Washington have managed to avoid

perilous showdowns on several occasions: in 1995–96, when the United States

responded to Chinese missile tests intended to warn Taiwanese voters about the

danger of pushing for independence; in 1999, when U.S. warplanes accidentally

bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air assault on Serbia;

China’s Real and Present DangerNow Is the Time for Washington to Worry

By Avery Goldstein

Chinese soldiers participating in a drill (Courtesy Reuters)

12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs

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and in 2001, when a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet, leading to the

death of the Chinese pilot and Beijing’s detention of the U.S. plane and crew. But

the lack of serious escalation during those episodes should not breed complacency.

None of them met the definition of a genuine crisis: a confrontation that threatens

vital interests on both sides and thus sharply increases the risk of war. If Beijing and

Washington were to find themselves in that sort of showdown in the near future,

they would both have strong incentives to resort to force. Moreover, the temptations

and pressures to escalate would likely be highest in the early stages of the face-off,

making it harder for diplomacy to prevent war.

THIN RED LINES

It might seem that the prospects for a crisis of this sort in U.S.-Chinese relations

have diminished in recent years as tensions over Taiwan have cooled, defusing the

powder keg that has driven much Chinese and U.S. military planning in East Asia

since the mid-1990s. But other potential flash points have emerged. As China and its

neighbors squabble over islands and maritime rights in the East China and South

China seas, the United States has reiterated its treaty commitments to defend two of

the countries that are contesting China’s claims (Japan and the Philippines) and has

nurtured increasingly close ties with a third (Vietnam). Moreover, the Obama

administration’s “pivot,” or “rebalancing,” to Asia, a diplomatic turn matched by

planned military redeployments, has signaled that Washington is prepared to get

involved in the event of a regional conflict.

China might be less cautious about triggering a crisis -- and less

cautious about firing the first shot if a crisis ensued.

Also, the United States insists that international law affords it freedom of navigation

in international waters and airspace, defined as lying beyond a country’s 12-mile

territorial limit. China, by contrast, asserts that other countries’ military vessels and

aircraft are not free to enter its roughly 200-mile-wide “exclusive economic zone”

without express permission -- a prohibition that, given Beijing’s territorial claims,

could place much of the South China Sea and the airspace above it off-limits to U.S.

military ships and planes. Disputes over freedom of navigation have already caused

confrontations between China and the United States, and they remain a possible

trigger for a serious crisis.

It is true that China and the United States are not currently adversaries -- certainly

not in the way that the Soviet Union and the United States were during the Cold

War. But the risk of a U.S.-Chinese crisis might actually be greater than it would be

if Beijing and Washington were locked in a zero-sum, life-and-death struggle. As

armed adversaries on hair-trigger alert, the Soviet Union and the United States

understood that their fundamentally opposed interests might bring about a war.

After going through several nerve-racking confrontations over Berlin and Cuba,

they gained an understanding of each other’s vital interests -- not to be challenged

without risking a crisis -- and developed mechanisms to avoid escalation. China and

the United States have yet to reach a similar shared understanding about vital

interests or to develop reliable means for crisis management.

Neither China nor the United States has clearly defined its vital interests across

broad areas of the western Pacific. In recent years, China has issued various

unofficial statements about its “core interests” that have sometimes gone beyond

simply ensuring the territorial and political integrity of the mainland and its claim to

sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing has suggested, for example, that it might consider

the disputed areas of the East China and South China seas to be core interests.

12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs

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Washington has also been vague about what it sees as its vital interests in the region.

The United States hedges on the question of whether Taiwan falls under a U.S.

security umbrella. And the United States’ stance on the maritime disputes involving

China and its neighbors is somewhat confusing: Washington has remained neutral

on the rival sovereignty claims and insisted that the disputes be resolved peacefully

but has also reaffirmed its commitment to stand by its allies in the event that a

conflict erupts. Such Chinese and U.S. ambiguity about the “redlines” that cannot be

crossed without risking conflict increases the chances that either side could take steps

that it believes are safe but that turn out to be unexpectedly provocative.

MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE COLD WAR?

Uncertainty about what could lead either Beijing or Washington to risk war makes a

crisis far more likely, since neither side knows when, where, or just how hard it can

push without the other side pushing back. This situation bears some resemblance to

that of the early Cold War, when it took a number of serious crises for the two sides

to feel each other out and learn the rules of the road. But today’s environment might

be even more dangerous.

The balance of nuclear and conventional military power between China and the

United States, for example, is much more lopsided than the one that existed between

the Soviet Union and the United States. Should Beijing and Washington find

themselves in a conflict, the huge U.S. advantage in conventional forces would

increase the temptation for Washington to threaten to or actually use force.

Recognizing the temptation facing Washington, Beijing might in turn feel pressure

to use its conventional forces before they are destroyed. Although China could not

reverse the military imbalance, it might believe that quickly imposing high costs on

the United States would be the best way to get it to back off.

The fact that both sides have nuclear arsenals would help keep the situation in check,

because both sides would want to avoid actions that would invite nuclear retaliation.

Indeed, if only nuclear considerations mattered, U.S.-Chinese crises would be very

stable and not worth worrying about too much. But the two sides’ conventional

forces complicate matters and undermine the stability provided by nuclear

deterrence. During a crisis, either side might believe that using its conventional

forces would confer bargaining leverage, manipulating the other side’s fear of

escalation through what the economist Thomas Schelling calls a “competition in

risk-taking.” In a crisis, China or the United States might believe that it valued what

was at stake more than the other and would therefore be willing to tolerate a higher

level of risk. But because using conventional forces would be only the first step in an

unpredictable process subject to misperception, missteps, and miscalculation, there

is no guarantee that brinkmanship would end before it led to an unanticipated

nuclear catastrophe.

China, moreover, apparently believes that nuclear deterrence opens the door to the

safe use of conventional force. Since both countries would fear a potential nuclear

exchange, the Chinese seem to think that neither they nor the Americans would

allow a military conflict to escalate too far. Soviet leaders, by contrast, indicated that

they would use whatever military means were necessary if war came -- which is one

reason why war never came. In addition, China’s official “no first use” nuclear

policy, which guides the Chinese military’s preparation and training for conflict,

might reinforce Beijing’s confidence that limited war with the United States would

not mean courting nuclear escalation. As a result of its beliefs, Beijing might be less

cautious about taking steps that would risk triggering a crisis. And if a crisis ensued,

China might also be less cautious about firing the first shot.

Such beliefs are particularly worrisome given recent developments in technology

12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs

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that have dramatically improved the precision and effectiveness of conventional

military capabilities. Their lethality might confer a dramatic advantage to the side

that attacks first, something that was generally not true of conventional military

operations in the main European theater of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Moreover,

because the sophisticated computer and satellite systems that guide contemporary

weapons are highly vulnerable to conventional military strikes or cyberattacks,

today’s more precise weapons might be effective only if they are used before an

adversary has struck or adopted countermeasures. If peacetime restraint were to give

way to a search for advantage in a crisis, neither China nor the United States could

be confident about the durability of the systems managing its advanced conventional

weapons.

Chinese analysts seem to overestimate how easy it is to send signals

through military actions and underestimate the risks of

miscommunication.

Under such circumstances, both Beijing and Washington would have incentives to

initiate an attack. China would feel particularly strong pressure, since its advanced

conventional weapons are more fully dependent on vulnerable computer networks,

fixed radar sites, and satellites. The effectiveness of U.S. advanced forces is less

dependent on these most vulnerable systems. The advantage held by the United

States, however, might increase its temptation to strike first, especially against

China’s satellites, since it would be able to cope with Chinese retaliation in kind.

COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN

A U.S.-Chinese crisis might also be more dangerous than Cold War showdowns

because of the unreliability of the existing channels of communication between

Beijing and Washington. After the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union and the

United States recognized the importance of direct communication between their top

leaders and set up the Moscow–Washington hot line. In 1998, China and the United

States also set up a hot line for direct communication between their presidents. But

despite the hot line’s availability, the White House was not able to contact China’s

top leaders in a timely fashion following the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing or the

2001 spy-plane incident. China’s failure to use the hot line as intended might have

reflected the reluctance of its leaders to respond until they had reached an internal

consensus or until they had consulted widely with their military. The delay might

also have reflected China’s difficulties in coordinating policy, since China lacks a

dependable counterpart to the U.S. National Security Council. Whatever the reason,

experience suggests that frustrating delays in direct communication are likely during

what would be the crucial early moments of an unfolding U.S.-Chinese crisis.

Instead, communication between the two countries might initially be limited to

either public statements or tacit signals sent through actions. But public statements

are aimed at multiple audiences, and nationalist passions in either China or the

United States, as well as pressure from allies, might force either side to take a more

aggressive public stance than it actually felt was warranted. Absent direct and

confidential communication, the two countries might be unable to discuss politically

sensitive proposals. They might also be unable to share information that could help

head off a disastrous escalation, such as classified details about military capabilities or

military maneuvers already under way.

Communicating through actions is also problematic, with many possibilities for

distortion in sending messages and for misinterpretation in receiving them. Chinese

analysts seem to overestimate how easy it is to send signals through military actions

and underestimate the risks of escalation resulting from miscommunication. For

12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger 5/17

example, the analysts Andrew Erickson and David Yang have drawn attention to

Chinese military writings that propose using China’s antiship ballistic missile

system, designed for targeting U.S. aircraft carriers, to convey Beijing’s resolve

during a crisis. Some Chinese military thinkers have suggested that China could

send a signal by firing warning shots intended to land near a moving U.S. aircraft

carrier or even by carefully aiming strikes at the command tower of the U.S. carrier

while sparing the rest of the vessel. But as the political scientist Owen Coté has

noted, even a very accurate antiship ballistic missile system will inevitably have some

margin of error. Consequently, even the smallest salvo of this kind would entail a

risk of inadvertent serious damage and thus unintended escalation.

A final important factor that could make a U.S.-Chinese crisis more dangerous than

those during the Cold War is geography. The focus of Cold War confrontations was

primarily on land, especially in central Europe, whereas a future confrontation

between China and the United States would almost certainly begin at sea. This

difference would shape a U.S.-Chinese crisis in a number of ways, especially by

requiring both sides to make some fateful choices early on. China’s small fleet of

nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and its much larger fleet of

conventionally armed attack submarines are most secure when they remain in the

shallow waters near the Chinese mainland, where poor acoustics compromise the

effectiveness of U.S. undersea antisubmarine operations. Their proximity to Chinese

land-based aircraft and air defenses also limits Washington’s ability to rely on its

airpower and surface ships to counter them. For China’s submarine forces to play a

role in a showdown with the United States, however, they would have to move out of

those safer waters.

The prospect of China’s submarines breaking out would dramatically increase the

instability of a crisis. Although U.S. antisubmarine warfare technology would be

more effective against China’s submarines operating in less noisy open waters

(where the United States also enjoys air superiority), it would not be perfect: some

U.S. naval assets that came within range of surviving Chinese submarines would be

at risk. Early in a crisis, therefore, the United States would be tempted to minimize

this risk by sinking Chinese attack submarines as they tried to leave their home

waters. Especially because there are only a few narrow routes through which

Chinese submarines can reach deeper waters, the United States would be tempted to

strike early rather than accept an increased risk to U.S. naval forces. Regardless of

the U.S. decision, any Chinese attack submarines that managed to reach distant

deeper waters would face a “use them or lose them” dilemma, thanks to their greater

vulnerability to U.S. antisubmarine forces -- one more potential trigger for

escalation.

China’s nuclear-armed SSBNs present other risks. Under its no-first-use policy,

China has clearly stated that any attack on its strategic nuclear forces would justify

nuclear retaliation, making a U.S. strike against its SSBNs seem unlikely. Early in a

crisis, therefore, Beijing would probably believe that it could safely deploy its SSBNs

to distant, deeper waters, where they would be best positioned to execute their

launch orders. Such a deep-water deployment, however, would introduce new

dangers. One is the possibility that U.S. naval forces might mistake a Chinese SSBN

for a conventional attack submarine and fire on it, inviting Chinese nuclear

retaliation. Another is the danger that a Chinese SSBN could escalate the conflict

without explicit orders from Beijing, owing to the limited communication such

submarines maintain with the mainland in order to avoid detection.

MANAGING THE RISK

The chances of a U.S.-Chinese crisis in the coming years are low, but they are not

negligible, and they are made more troubling by the risk of such a confrontation

escalating. The most important steps Beijing and Washington can take are those

12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger 6/17

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82 comments 0

that might help prevent crises from developing in the first place. Since uncertainty

about the scope of each side’s vital interests would be a trigger for such crises, the

two countries should deepen political and military exchanges that focus closely on

this problem. Even if they cannot achieve full clarity, discussions can help draw

attention to what each side believes poses the greatest risks.

Although it will be difficult to eliminate the possibility of U.S.-Chinese

confrontations, both countries can do more to address the sources of potential

instability and improve their ability to manage the risks they would face during a

crisis. Leaders in Washington could share their rich experience in crisis management

with their Chinese counterparts, emphasizing the importance of policy coordination.

In addition, the United States should stress the need for China to use the existing hot

line for prompt, direct communication between the countries’ top leaders during a

crisis.

China and the United States should also deepen their currently modest military-to-

military exchanges. Without compromising essential secrets, increasing familiarity

with each other’s military systems and practices would reduce the risk of inadvertent

escalation during a showdown. Both sides would be wise to foster greater personal

familiarity among the two countries’ commanding officers, which, in the event of a

crisis, would establish a modicum of trust that would be helpful if political leaders

sought to de-escalate the conflict.

Getting Beijing and Washington to tackle the difficult task of containing a future

crisis will not be easy. In the end, it might take the experience of living through a

terrifying showdown of the kind that defined the early Cold War. But it should not

have to come to that.

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• Reply •

Juan Palerm • 3 months ago

Realists always assume that the only strategy is one based upon military might and

self-interest. One difference between the U.S,-Soviet adversarial relationship and the

U.S.-China relationship is that China and the U.S. have so much monetary interaction,

unlike that of the former. Neither would escalate a conflict to the degree stated in this

article. There is too much at stake. China's military has a direct stake in the Chinese

economy and the import-export relationship it has with the U.S. As well, China holds a

huge sum of dollars and would never risk the world financial crisis that would occur if

the two were to have a military conflict. Even the Chinese know that Taiwan, unlike

Hong Kong, is gone and very unlikely to come back to Chinese control. Taiwan won't

declare independence despite all the rhetoric and even referendum coming from Taipei.

Yes, China and the U.S. will continue to have tension. The hotline doesn't necessarily

have to work considering all the other forms of communication out in the world today.

Both sides will get the message in any crisis. The realist zero-sum game scenario is

dead and the intricate relationship that the U.S. and China are developing is far too

important to allow any "minor" conflict (as noted in the article) to undermine such an

important global dynamic. Of course China will flex its muscles, but it will do so

economically before it does so militarily. This is actually a more sobering thought as a

complete economic meltdown would have a far more destructive effect on the

relationship which would lead to a potential conflict more than any military first

scenario.

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• Reply •

Bing520 • 3 months ago Juan Palerm

As a Chinese, you misunderstand our character. Taiwan is an important issue,

unlikely to fade away easily. Taiwan is a deep wound in our national pride. The

cost we are willing to pay may be much higher than you think. It does not

mean we will succeed. It is highly unlikely we would let it go without putting up

a fight.

I also think you underestimate the desire of Americans to put down Chinese.

Americans will never let us have a say in international order which they

monopolizes The US ally, Japan, only complicates the issue. Americans have

every intention to make us their pussycat and force us to eat whatever they

throw at us. They will forever push us to the limit because it is in their gene.

Americans are aggressive by nature. They don't feel safe if we are not totally

submissive to them. Just look at how Americans treated Japan in 80's.

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• Reply •

Michal • 3 months ago Bing520

'Taiwan is a deep wound in our national pride.'

Sir, can you explain that to me? And how does Chinese national pride

cope with the fact that Taiwanese have no wish to be part of China? I do

not wish to stir any fight here but my claim can be easily backed up by

reliable data. The ultimate question is, do the Chinese put any

consideration into whether people in Taiwan should have any say in

determining their fate?

14 1

Bing520 • 2 months ago Michal

It is a long story. It would take too long to explain. You can

google the whole history from various angles. Chinese and

Japanese versions are different. Taiwanese version which was

published no more than 2 decades ago deviates from both

Chinese and Japanese stories.

What Taiwan means to China can be understood to a

considerable degree by understanding the sentimental complex

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• Reply •

considerable degree by understanding the sentimental complex

between Kosovo and Serbia.

Serbia is too small a country to dictate her terms. China is huge.

if Chinese refuse to have a new perspective on her relationship

with Taiwan, the war in my opinion is inevitable.

I can understand Taiwan's position and her reliance on the US.

The more Taiwan wants to the US to step in, the more China

feels Taiwan is a dagger on Chinese throat.

If I were to suggest a solution, I'd say that China changes her

thinking, but the vast majority of Chinese I spoke to disagree.

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• Reply •

Michal • 2 months ago Bing520

Thanks and sorry for late reply. I am aware of some of the

complexities, I believe, although would not claim that I

understand all of them. The parallel to Kosovo is interesting.

However, one big difference is that Kosovo was until recently

under Serbian rule whereas there is not a single living soul in

China and elsewhere that would remember Taiwan under the

control of central government in China. It is documented that

MZD was not very interested in Taiwan and even mentioned that

Taiwan could seek independence...from Japan of course, neither

Nationalist were expressing great interest in Taiwan until before

the last years of Japanese control of Taiwan. I am really curios

whether there is some consideration among ordinary people in

China about whether people in Taiwan should have their say. My

anecdotal experience is that there is some understanding of the

reluctance on Taiwan's side, but it is very limited anecdotal

evidence.

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Bing520 • 2 months ago Michal

Of course I think Taiwan should determine her future by herself.

The vast majority of Chinese disagree with me.

Nationalist Government from 1911 to 1945 was too weak to do

anything about Taiwan. There was a substantial number of

Taiwanese working within Nationalist Government during that

era. After WW II, the return of Taiwan to China was a main

demand from Nationalists, but they ruined the chance to win

over Taiwanese by sending a bandit-like military garrison to

occupy Taiwan.

14% Taiwanese population immigrated from China after 1949.

Taiwanese support for unification with China has dwindled from

more than 70% 1989 (prior to Tiananmen Square massacre) to

less than 10% 2012. Without democracy, freedom and rule of

law, the chance of China's peaceful unification with Taiwan is

virtually nil.

There were suggestions prior to 1945 that Taiwan should seek

independence from Japan because there was no way for China to

5 1

Anastas ia Mark • 2 months ago Michal

There are two possible answers to this question: how the average

joe feels about Taiwan and how the leadership deals with the

issue.

Most Chinese people have been told from a very early age that

Taiwan is and always has been a part of China in a kind of "one

day the lost child will come home" type of storyline - with no

information or data concerning what people in Taiwan

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see more

information or data concerning what people in Taiwan

want/think. Their baby was stolen by the evil men who fought

Mao, and one day we will all be reunited China family. It might

seem odd but remember - its not as if China asks Chinese people

what they want either, so the idea of looking to what citizens

want to determine what should happen is grafting a very western

perspective onto the whole issue to begin with. The propaganda is

all over the place too -- I was once in a cave tour and at the end

there was lots of bright colorful lights and a song about how one

day, China will be united!

As far as the leadership, it does have to do a lot with pride, as in

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• Reply •

Kuba Łojewsk i • 3 months ago Michal

They don't and they shouldn't put that into consideration. Why

do western people always want to play democracy everywhere,

even where it doesn't belong? West got rid of Kaddafi and now

they would all give a lot to have him back, because of

"democracy" in north Africa.

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• Reply •

Bing520 • 2 months ago Kuba Łojewski

I don't think it is a matter of democracy. A democratic China

could be more dangerous. Nationalist sentiment is very strong.

Japanese PM Abe said that Chinese and Japanese peoples would

get along just fine if the Chinese Communist Party stop

manipulating the media. It is true that CCP deliberately conceals

the Japanese aids and free technical assistances given to China,

but I think it more accurate to say that CCP abuses the anti-

Japan sentiment that has never diminished since Japan's

invasion of China. Taiwan is the symbol of that wound.

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• Reply •

Michal • 3 months ago Kuba Łojewski

I do not know who do you include in 'We'. In any case, point

made is pointless, my question has nothing to do with what

Western people think. It concerns what Taiwanese want and

think. Are you suggesting democracy does not belong to Taiwan?

Is that a joke suggestion? Democracy there was not West-

imposed but generated from the will of the people to have one.

Are you even remotely familiar with the recent history of

Taiwan?

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• Reply •

Kuba Łojewsk i • 3 months ago Michal

Oh my, a poor idealist. Do you seriously think China cares about

the will of the people on Taiwan? I wouldn't. Democracy doesn't

belong to Taiwan if China wants to annex it. If there was no

USA, they would've done it already, and there's nothing else to

stop them. Simple.

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• Reply •

Michal • 3 months ago Kuba Łojewski

Alright, I am not an idealist but anyway. What I was interested

in was a Chinese perspective on the issue, you can't provide that.

Your assumptions are just that.

6 2

Juan Palerm • 2 months ago Bing520

The fact that after the Cold War, the U.S. was the only hegemon does

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• Reply •

not mean that the dominance in the international arena will continue.

China will continue to increase its wealth, military capability,

technological advancement, etc. and will rival the U.S. in the future. The

U.S. will have no say in the matter. The one power monopoly will end

eventually. You also talk about "national pride" which most people have

towards their own nation. However, it is also a subjective element in

every relationship that can and does get in the way of logical and

rational dialogue between nations and states. Will China and the U.S. go

to war over Taiwan? Not if reason is used in the dialogue. To your point

about Americans and their inherent aggressiveness, it is obvious your

statement is based upon your own anecdotal evidence and not empirical

research. I think I argue objectively the opposite in my previous

dialogue. To your last pint, China is no pussycat and indeed is a tiger

that continues to gain strength. China certainly does not do what the

United States says, and we certainly do not have the power (not without

creating a world military disaster) to compel China to do what the U.S.

says. Japan was an economic powerhouse until their bubble collapsed in

the late 80s. That was their own doing and their continued decline is

their own doing. To sum up my point, use real evidence in your

arguments and don't presume to know what all people in a country are

thinking and what is in their genes.

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Bing520 • 2 months ago Juan Palerm

I don't disagree with you. Mine is simply a Chinese perspective.

Every people believes that their country is peace-loving and

nonaggressive and FIRMLY believes the other one is an

aggressor. Chinese will always look at Iraq, Korea, Chile, Iran

and Vietnam as a fine example of American aggression.

Americans will always see Chinese assistance to North Korea, a

territorial dispute with her neighbors as proof of her aggressive

nature.

By the same token, Pivot to Asia is an American way to provide

peace and stability and viewed by Chinese as a proof of American

threat against Chinese and American means to confine China to

a minor role. Chinese point to Panetta's eagerness to sell F-35 to

India and American assistance to help South Korea to have long-

range cruise missiles that can hit Beijing with ease. It is difficult

for Chinese long-term planners to consider Americans as friends.

Of course Chinese can wait for American relative decline but no

powerful nation has been made into greatness by waiting for

their opponents to fade away.

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• Reply •

IAN MCCORRISTON • 2 months ago Juan Palerm

Americans are not aggressive? Ask that question to people in any

of the countries that the U.S. has invaded over the last couple of

centuries.

2

Juan Palerm • 2 months ago IAN MCCORRISTON

I am quite sure one can find numerous examples of U.S. foreign

policy

that is considered aggressive. I surely did not discount that. What

I

did discount is the actual assumption that as individuals, we are

aggressive. There are innate aggressive traits in all humans, and

being

an American does not preclude one to be more aggressive than

another.

So to clarify my point in the previous statement, show me the

empirical

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• Reply •

empirical

evidence that statistically shows that American foreign policy

from the

beginning is inherently aggressive. Tell me what percentage of all

foreign policy decisions have been aggressive vs. those that have

not

been. There are plenty of examples, but I want to see

quantification on

your part. When I posted my argument against what the author

pointed

out, I used a rational, logical argument that one is more than

welcome

to destroy with an even more rational and logical argument. I

would

like for you to do the same with your point.

• Reply •

Mark • 4 months ago

This is a joke-article coming from a bone-head.

26 8

• Reply •

Jimmy Wang • 2 months ago Mark

Mark, Prof. Avery Goldstein is a well reputed professor and an influential

scholar in this field of nuclear deterrence and foreign policy. I had the joy of

attending his classes during college, and I know you are the bone-head. I'm

surprised you even took the time to troll this comment board and leave a

comment

4

• Reply •

qusdis • 2 months ago Mark

Could you elaborate? Even a tiny bit?

• Reply •

BRIAN WEAVER • 2 months ago Mark

Mark, try researching what the author is discussing, this is a huge issue and

actually the subject of my Master's degree thesis. The only issue I see with Prof.

Goldstein's essay is talking about Obama's "Asian Pivot". Many are saying there

is no "Asian Pivot" Writer Calum Macleod quotes Sadanand Dhume from the

American Enterprise Insitute as saying " So far, Obama's 'pivot' to Asia can be

summed up in three letters 'MIA'." Also he reports the Washington Think Tank

The Heritage Foundation as saying "the Obama administrations 'Asian Pivot'

appears to be in name only."

Macleod, Calum. China Launches Charm Offensive as Obama Cancels Asia

Trip

USA Today Oct 4 2013 Accessed Oct. 11, 2013

http://www.rgj.com/usatoday/ar...

• Reply •

bsetrader • 2 months ago

Another strategic studies product brought to you by the interests at Boeing, Lockheed

Martin, Raytheon, the pentagon, and the defense industry consortium. It would be

refreshing and certainly lest costly to invest in a knowledge of Chinese history, culture,

and commerce.

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• Reply •

Warren82 • 2 months ago bsetrader

yup, sounds like someone's trying to get others to draw 'red lines' for them

again...red lines push up the bottom line

3

Bing520 • 2 months ago bsetrader

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Bing520 • 2 months ago bsetrader

Interesting perspective. It has never occurred to me. Eisenhower may be right

warning us about military-industrial complex.

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• Reply •

David Mart in • 3 months ago

B-

9 2

• Reply •

AndrewL • 2 months ago

China is on the rise. America is in decline. The Chinese strategist knows time is on his

side. The American strategist knows time is not. It's the American that will be eager to

exploit his military advantage before it's gone. Hence, America is a clear and present

danger to China, not the other way around.

4

• Reply •

Bing520 • 2 months ago AndrewL

Not that simple. Both must have the will to fight and the backing of people. It is

not going to be about money or core interest. It is pride which will be coated as

core interest.

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• Reply •

Alexandre Charron-t rudel • 2 months ago Bing520

"It is pride which will be coated as core interest." Pretty much; the CPC

has been very good about keeping old grudges alive for political,

economic, and international gain. Elsewhere it's called revanchism or

irredentism, but I suppose that to the CPC it's just plain, old,

nationalism.

Additionally, I don't think that economics will stop two sides from going

to war; back in 1914, plenty of people argued that Germany and Britain

were too economically interlinked to go to war........look where that got

them. What brought the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente were their

obligations and sense of national pride; pride, too, was what--along with

the machinations of a crazed madman and economics--was what made

Germany make the opening moves of WWII in europe, and it was

national pride, ethnocentrism, economics and sheer hubris that

encouraged Japanese leaders to engineer the Mukden incident in 1931.

The primary drivers of war have always been wealth, nationalism and

territory. Both the PRC and the U.S possess all three, and the desire to

acquire or retain it, in ample measure.

6

• Reply •

Bing520 • 2 months ago Alexandre Charron-trudel

You articulate better.

• Reply •

Alexandre Charron-t rudel • 2 months ago Bing520

is that a request, a comment, or a criticism, Bing520?

1

• Reply •

Bing520 • 2 months ago Alexandre Charron-trudel

A compliment, Alexander.

1

MICHAEL ROSENZWEIG • 2 months ago Bing520

This is the worst history lesson ever. Alexandre's nationalist,

jingoistic, economy-based theory of early 20th century great

power politics is horrendous. Really Bing520? After all of your

articulations, you settle for this baseless nonsense? China is

mimicking the U.S- trying to dominate Asia like the U.S.

dominates the West. It follows realist logic. China is a

provocateur that is creating security complications for the U.S. to

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• Reply •

provocateur that is creating security complications for the U.S. to

keep Uncle Sam out of its perceived sphere of influence. Since

1949, China has settled many of its territorial disputes, but today

has 6 outstanding disputes. Why? Domestically speaking, China

is a victim of hypernationalism. Let's now take the time to

remember ideology and its sway over bullshit economics. The

Cold War ended because two regimes altered their ideas and their

world perspective. Soviet-US face-offs were not about economics,

it was ideology! Values will always trump money when security

implications are concerned, especially those ties to principles of a

state's existence. Go ahead China, throw away your burgeoning

status over Taiwan. Lose credibility, increase domestic threats

capable of threatening the regime. China lacks domestic and

external capital to make any big moves. Vegas showmen, always

with cards folded…

• Reply •

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Bing520 • 2 months ago MICHAEL ROSENZWEIG

@MI CHAEL RO SENZWEI G

Nationalism is real and concrete in China. The small

confrontation between China and the Philippines was not

directed by Beijing but started by a small marine agency which

regulates fishing. Beijing had to reigned in by consolidating all

the related agencies into one central command in Beijing.

Nevertheless, Beijing can't undo the damage because nationalistic

hardliners demanded a tougher position.

Before the incident, Beijing & Manila regularly held jointly

military exercises and enjoyed close cooperation. Many believe

concessions to Manila are necessary to mend the relationship but

can't prevail over hardliners.

This irrationality is at play. Nationalistic sentiment over Taiwan

issue is much stronger. There have been no suggestion within or

outside the government as well as party to lessen the demand for

unification. Indeed China does not have the means to force the

change of status quo at this moment, but they are building the

military strength and capabilities in anticipation of confronting

• Reply •

Jim Ziegler • 3 months ago

You know, one sort of core customer service principle is that you don't shoot at your

customer. China has the wealth it has because of the US buying it's goods. A war

would cause a dramatic economic slowdown for China that would last for decades.

These folks aren't stupid, nor are they hot heads.

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• Reply •

Bing520 • 3 months ago Jim Ziegler

Assuming Chinese will forever be your submissive partner for a fistful of dollars

could be very dangerous.

3

• Reply •

Jim Ziegler • 3 months ago Bing520

Fist full of dollars? Try freighters full of dollars... The Chinese have

shown themselves to be a fairly rational actor who dislikes the use of

force. We have strong economic ties, and good diplomatic ties. There is

no reason to believe that the areas that we do disagree are going to flare

up into a shooting war.

7 1

Bing520 • 2 months ago Jim Ziegler

It is not going to be over money. Americans do not start a war

over money. Nor will Chinese. It will always about one thing we

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over money. Nor will Chinese. It will always about one thing we

both call principles.

1

• Reply •

fdsaasdf • 2 months ago Bing520

And what principles are those?

Sorry, war is about money, and most Chinese have read enough

Marx to understand that.

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• Reply •

Bing520 • 2 months ago fdsaasdf

Hard to imagine Korean War or Vietnam War was all about

money to Chinese. Even the Sino-India border war has little to do

with money. I doubt the Afghanistan or Iraq war is all about

money either. You said yourself that one theory does not explain

all. Money does not explain all the causes of war.

The South China Sea dispute is obviously about economic

resources, but it is a stretch to insist that Senkaku dispute is about

money. The current economic losses for both China and Japan

outweighs the unproven economic potential of those islands.

1

• Reply •

fdsaasdf • 2 months ago Bing520

To quote Lupe Fiasco about the USA in Af/Pak: "what's in

Afghanistan? HEROIN. You think that's by mistake? That they

can't stop that?"

As for the USA's second war in Iraq, there's a clear money

component when you look at the trillions doled out for weapons

contracts.

Way to call me out on my statement that simplistic explanations

do not work in international relations :)

Please tell me what principles would cause a collision between the

USA and PRC. I can't think of anything because both are such

running capitalist dogs at this point.

And the current economic losses are the reason that neither

Japan nor China engages over the islands. There's not enough

economic incentive. If there was proven reserves of

hydrocarbons, however, that outweigh a few deaths...

2

• Reply •

Bing520 • 2 months ago fdsaasdf

I can't ascertain. I speculate the national pride. Chinese want to

restore to the old glory lost more than two hundred years ago.

Americans want to maintain the glory of a sole superpower they

have attained over the past 100 years. I can constantly feel the

impatience of Chinese via their writing and daily conversations

about a new place for China and a new order by China. I can

also feel Americans' desire and determination to maintain their

current status as well as their anxiety of being challenged by

Chinese.

3

fdsaasdf • 2 months ago Bing520

Is there anything tangible that you can name other than the

emotional outbursts online, which is potentially just PR

companies on message boards? I mean, a Great Power War is

serious business. When the Italian, German and Japanese

fascists went on their wars of aggression, a major reason was

access to raw materials (as the Germans and Japanese learned,

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access to raw materials (as the Germans and Japanese learned,

foreign occupation is not easy). China has no access problems to

raw materials because the American Empire is about non-

restrictive trade barriers, a contrast to the British and French

Empires, which were their own worst enemies.

Chinese people can complain about past glory all they want, but

at the end of the day most Chinese seem to realize there are

bigger problems than the evil American imperialists -- air quality,

food safety, affordable housing, wages, etc. I see these issues are

more fundamental to regain a former civilization than fighting a

war with foreigners on the other side of the ocean.

Further, I don't think China and the USA have democratic

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• Reply •

Bing520 • 2 months ago fdsaasdf

I believe war is irrational. When we embarked on a war, we

rationalized our irrationality. A Japanese lord asked his top sword

fighter to kill a defying samurai in duet, the sword fighter

reasoned with his Lord, "In a duet, a man has to disregard his

own safety in order to win. I have a wife and young kids and

therefore can't take that risk." The Lord stood up, kicked right in

his face and shouted, "You disgrace our clan. I'll kill you if you

don't go."

A war is an emotional outburst complete with distorted tangible

benefits and aspirations. Chinese have irrational expectation of

themselves and Americans. Americans irrationally expect

Chinese to behave in the way Americans approve of. Politicians,

democratically elected or rising through brutal power struggle,

are not as rational as we think they should be.

Human race rarely failed to raise the exuberant expectation of

the outcome of a war preceding the outburst of a war.

Yes, I am the one from Foreignpolicy.com. I recognize your

handle, too. You are very good at laying out a clear argument.

Thank you, my friend.

• Reply •

fdsaasdf • 2 months ago Bing520

That's a great point -- war justifies the irrational. I just sincerely

hope you're wrong, and a peaceful rise of a great power happens!

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• Reply •

IAN MCCORRISTON • 2 months ago Bing520

What any country wants is usually about what their leaders want

and not necessarily what their citizens want.

• Reply •

Michal • 2 months ago Bing520

Totally and fully agree with you, people tend to have way too

simplistic idea about why wars are fought. Usually do not go

beyond financial motivation, resource thirst etc.

• Reply •

IAN MCCORRISTON • 2 months ago Bing520

When you get down to it all wars are over money.

Miguel • 2 months ago

How is China an enemy when the U.S. built China, and China, in turn, buys off toxic

U.S. debt? And the U.S. is still at it, shipping evermore technology and jobs every day

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that goes by. This is done by treaty. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. The

Trans-Pacific harmonization deals. Etc.

How is China a threat when China is a totalitarian corporate conglomerate owned by

JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Barclays, and all the rest, using the Communist Party and

the army as internal managers? How is China an enemy when U.S. conquests in

Central Asia are handed out to Chinese-based consortiums? Here's Afghanistan's

copper: it's yours Goldman Sachs, via your Chinese enterprises.

These are the usual Cold War like con games. Back in the Cold War you also had

NATO building up the Soviets with industry, technology and finance, but they were

incredible enemies at the end of the day right? Well, the only ones who suffered from

the "clash of titans" were the Third World, with NATO and the USSR playing their

dialectical games, and managed to keep those countries underdeveloped, at constant

conflict, so as to buy them off on the cheap, and rule them.

And it's very profitable in the war departments too, with the big military contractors

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• Reply •

ALDO MATTEUCCI • 2 months ago

Pity China, it just can’t win with Prof. GOLDSTEIN. It

defines “vital interests”? It risks getting involved in defending them (this is

what happened to the US in Vietnam). It remains vague about them? This may lead

to war through miscalculation. It delays the use of the hotline in order to

achieve a (hopefully reasonable) consensus in the reply? It could be

interpreted as Chinese inscrutability. It might strike first conventionally,

lest the US smother Chinese forces with high tech (This is what the Japanese

did at Pearl Harbor). By deploying its SSBN, it might invite an attack from the

“daughter of USS Maddox”.

I’d like Prof. GOLDSTEIN for providing such a splendid

example of “China paranoia.” Has it possibly ever occurred to him that when

confronted with a global hegemon, a regional power may be forced to react, and

that stop hegemonic bullying may be the simplest and best way forwards? Not one

line of the article is wasted on US restraint!

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• Reply •

Ivan Terrible • 2 months ago

To simplify it down to the level of cartoons, China military might does not scare me.

Chinese are he whipping boy of the Asia. Everybody in Asia kicked their butt: Soviets

did it on small scale, Japanese did it, even Vietnamese did it. No obvious reason why

that should change

2

Bing520 • 2 months ago Ivan Terrible

I could not agree more. Chinese military might, experiences and officer caliber

are of dubious quality. PLA may possess some advanced technology in missile.

It is however limited in scope and striking capabilities. The officer corp is

subjugated by political commissars who are less trained and possess much

smaller military competency. Many officers are firmly convinced that the

numerical superiority will overcome any technological deficiency.

A PLA officer not aligned with political commissars will not be in line for

promotion. It says a lot about the quality of PLA military commanders. PLA is

upgrading its officers, but the effort is resisted and sabotaged by its own officers

whose promotions to a very largest extent are dependent upon personal

connections, instead of demonstrated competency.

Average Chinese are made to believe China is a militarily powerful nation. The

leadership understands the true capabilities of the military forces, but do not

hesitate to fool their citizens into believing that their leaders have toiled hard to

build a worthy defense force. That's why China is extremely cautious to deploy

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build a worthy defense force. That's why China is extremely cautious to deploy

or even to display her military might. Once it is tested, the bubble bursts.

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