Autocratic Regime Duration and State Repression · Autocratic Regime Duration and State ... regime duration and state repression is ... We conceive of an autocratic regime spell as

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Autocratic Regime Duration and State Repression

Lasse Lykke Rørbæk

PhD candidate

Department of Political Science, Aarhus University

Bartholins Allé 7

8000 Aarhus C, Denmark

E-mail: [email protected]

Svend-Erik Skaaning

Professor, PhD


Bartholins Allé 7



Jakob Tolstrup

Assistant professor, PhD


Bartholins Allé 7



Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR joint sessions of workshops, April 10-15, Salamanca, 2014.

mailto:[email protected]



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Abstract

Whereas the link between political regime types and human rights violations has received much

attention in previous studies, the impact of autocratic regime endurance and repression of human rights

has largely been neglected in previous large-N studies. We argue that the formative years of

authoritarian regimes are also likely to be the most repressive ones because of greater challenges, lack

of short-term alternatives, wishes to signal credibility, and high ideological motivation. Accordingly,

levels of state repression are expected to be highest during the first years of an authoritarian regime

spell, and then to gradually decrease as the regime ages. We subject our general proposition to

empirical appraisal by using a country and year fixed-effects model covering authoritarian regimes in

107 countries in the period 1976-2010. The results show that the relationship between autocratic

regime duration and state repression is best specified as linearly declining. Autocracies are significantly

more likely to violate the rights of their citizens the first years after regime transitions. The effect is

strongest concerning physical integrity violations, whereas the results for civil liberty restrictions are

less robust. Moreover, we find that there is no systematic trend of high repression in the last years of

the autocratic regime cycle.

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And it should be considered that nothing is more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, nor more

dangerous to manage, than to put oneself at the head of introducing new orders. For the introducer has all those

who benefit from the old orders as enemies, and he has lukewarm defenders in all those who might benefit from

the new orders … And thus things must be ordered in such a mode that when [people] no longer believe, one can

make them believe with force.

Machiavelli (2010 [1532], 23-24)

Introduction

Authoritarian rule is renowned, even by some defined, by its comparatively high levels of state

repression. In virtually all authoritarian regimes, civil rights are routinely circumscribed, and the

incumbents occasionally resort to plain violence to crush opponents, intimidate potential challengers, or

to discipline the population at large. As such, repression can be regarded as a standard instrument of the

authoritarian toolbox used to uphold and extend political and social control (Tullock 1987; Wintrobe

1998). Compared to democracies, authoritarian regimes more frequently resort to coercive measures

but within this group we also see significant differences in their selectively and intensity of repression

(Geddes 1999; Davenport 2007a,b). Irrespective of such differences between authoritarian regimes, is it

perhaps possible to say something more general about when autocracies are most likely to use

repression? Is there a distinct period in the lives of dictatorships, where levels of state repression are

generally higher?

When the military took political power in Chile in 1973, at first the use of force was arbitrary

and unrestricted, soon it became more selective but remained on a high level, and with years the policy

of destruction was to a large extent replaced by a policy of containment (Frühling 1983; Drake 1994).

This pattern of repression, beginning at high levels and then decreasing with autocratic regime

endurance, is unlikely to be particular to the authoritarian rule under Augusto Pinochet. We argue that

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autocratic regimes generally have a tendency to use high levels of coercion in their initial phases to

consolidate power after which repression tends to decrease with time.

Despite the simplicity and strong intuitive appeal of this proposition, previous studies on the

relationship between political regime developments and human rights repression have mainly been

occupied with the impact of democracy (Davenport & Armstrong 2004; Davenport 2007a; Poe & Tate

1994; Møller & Skaaning 2013a), democratization and political regime change more generally

(Davenport 1999; Fein 1995; Regan & Henderson 2000; Zanger 2000), and variations across types of

autocracy (Davenport 2007b; Escriba-Folch & Wright 2010; Escriba-Folch 2012; Møller & Skaaning

2013b). So far no comparative large-N study has, to our knowledge, taken into account the potential

effect of autocratic regime endurance more generally.

Against this backdrop, we first tease out why our expectation of more repression in the initial

phase is likely to be operative in authoritarian regimes. Basically, new incumbents want to consolidate

their power position by cracking down on actual or potential opposition. Moreover, other means to

achieve regime consolidation are less available in the short-term, and extensive coercion in the early

years will signal credible commitment to followers and to build up deterrence among opponents.

Finally, ideological inclination to repress perceived enemies will be high. After a while, however, the

instrumental need to repress will tend to decline due to decimation of oppositional figures, anticipated

reactions, and increased opportunities to rely on alternative means of consolidation, whereas

ideological motivation to (over)repress perceived enemies will also tend to decrease over time.

The general proposition about decreasing repression as a function of regime endurance is

assessed in a cross-national statistical analysis using a country and year fixed-effects model, covering

authoritarian regimes in 107 countries in the period 1976-2010. The results reveal that physical

integrity violations are indeed most widespread under newly established autocratic regimes, while they

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tend to decrease (in a linear fashion) over time. This result is robust across different model

specifications and measures of physical integrity rights. We also find some support for a similar,

although weaker and less robust, tendency with regard to First Amendment-type civil liberties, that is,

freedom of expression, association, movement, and religion.

We discuss these findings against alternative explanations and conclude that the logic of state

repression as a survival strategy (cf. Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Escriba-Folch 2013) – directed against

real or anticipated enemies – goes a long way in explaining the results. Moreover, we evaluate the

degree to which our results complement the “more murder in the middle” proposition (Fein 1995;

Regan & Henderson 2000) and briefly consider the implications of the finding that human rights

violations are not only a matter of democracy, democratization, and type of autocracy but also the age

of autocratic regimes.

State Repression in Authoritarian Regimes

State repression is defined as “behavior that is applied by governments in an effort to bring about

political quiescence and facilitate the continuity of the regime through some form of restriction or

violation of political and civil liberties” (Davenport 2006: 6). To further specify, repression “deals with

applications of state power that violate First Amendment-Type rights, due process in the enforcement

and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security” (Davenport 2007a: 2). As a rule,

authoritarian regimes use state repression as a means to uphold political power (Tullock 1987;

Wintrobe 1998). They constrain, harass, imprison, torture, and kill regime opponents, and occasionally

they even terrorize their own population (Haber 2006).

However, the level of repression in autocracies is not constant but tends to fluctuate with the

size of real and perceived challenges to regime stability – what has been termed “the law of coercive

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responsiveness” (Davenport 2007a: 7). Coercion has been shown to increase as a response to public

dissent (Davenport 1995, 1996; Carey 2010; Ritter 2014), during economic crisis and trade opening

(for a discussion, see Davenport 2007a), or when economic sanctions are imposed by outside actors

(Wood 2008; Peksen 2009; Escriba-Folch & Wright 2010). The degree to which authoritarian regimes

face such challenges of course varies, and the reasons for such disturbances are many and not always

easily predictable. But apart from occasional hikes in state repression levels, is there a certain time in

the lives of dictatorships, where repression is generally more widespread than normal?

Somewhat surprisingly, this question has so far been left unresolved since repression patterns

across the lifecycle of authoritarian regimes have not been subjected to a systematic large-N study.

True, examples abound of dictators coming to power that immediately persecute and repress opponents

in order to consolidate power. Just think of Samuel Doe of Liberia (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2011:

21-22), Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship in Chile (Remmer 1980: 282-283), or Joseph Mobutos

brutal first years of rule in Zaire (Young & Turner 1985: 57). Yet anecdotal evidence of intense

repression periods materializing in later periods of authoritarian regimes seems to be equally rich:

examples like Stalin’s great terror during the late 1930s (Conquest 2007), China’s Cultural Revolution

in 1966-1971 (Barnouin & Yu 1993), or Saddam Hussein’s purge of the Kurds during the so-called

“Anfal” campaign in 1987-1988 (Sassoon 2012: 216-217) naturally come to mind. Thus, there seems to

be no deterministic pattern of when, during the lifetime of autocracies, repression levels are likely to be

highest. How, then, should we expect repression levels to vary across the lifetime of an authoritarian

regime?

Repression as a Function of Regime Duration

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There are several good reasons to believe that repression levels will be particularly high in the

beginning of authoritarian regime spells.1 The most important reason is that the threat-level is normally

high in this formative period, and as the law of coercive responsiveness predicts, challenges to

authoritarian regimes will be met with increased levels of repression. Opposition to the regime in the

initial phase can be explained by general uncertainty, high fear of exclusion among larger groups in

society in general and the previous elites in particular, and the problem of weak institutions incapable

of channeling and accommodating popular demands. Taken together, new authoritarian regimes rely on

repression as their primary tool for demobilizing or eliminating actual or potential challengers and

thereby consolidating power (cf. Dallin & Breslauer 1970).

The formative phases of authoritarian regimes are generally characterized by a high degree of

uncertainty: Who will benefit from the new order? What resources can incumbent and opponents rely

on? And under what circumstances, if at all, is the new regime willing to resort to coercion to achieve

its goals? One group that is particular likely to contest the new rulers is the former elites – those groups

in society that during the previous regime enjoyed political, economic, and social privileges. They will,

rightfully or not, often fear that their privileged position is now endangered, and will therefore mobilize

to protect the status quo. Supporting this, Svolik (2012: 76) shows that most coups d’états happen

during the first couple of years of a dictators time in office. However, not only former elites, but also

the population at large or distinct groups defined by ethnicity, religion, social class, etc., are likely to

challenge the new authoritarian regime as it takes the first steps to curb political and civil rights.

1 Note that we focus on regime spells, not ruler spells. The reason is that rulers may change even when the ruling coalition

remain the same, and it is only when power change hands between ruling groups as such we expect state repression to be

high. We conceive of an autocratic regime spell as “a set of formal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies

(Geddes, Wright & Frantz 2014). We return to this in more depth in the section on methods and data.

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The literature discussing the “more murder in the middle”-claim (Fein 1995) suggests one

additional explanation for the high initial threat level. Following Fein, a long line of quantitative

studies (Davenport 1999; Hegre et al. 2001; Zanger 2000; Regan & Henderson 2002; Fearon & Laitin

2003; Buhaug 2006; Carey 2010) have documented that hybrid regimes are generally more conflict-

prone and they have accredited this finding to weak and inconsistent institutions that cannot efficiently

channel the demands of opposition groups into the political system. The same logic is likely to play out

in newly established autocracies that have not yet developed responsive institutions that can rein in

demands and effectively distribute spoils to selected supporters.

Hence, there are good reasons to believe that several groups in society will have the incentives

to challenge the new authoritarian regime, but this does not mean that they will actually do this. But

with no experience of past repression-trends to draw upon, potential regime-challengers simply do not

know what to expect: is the new regime prone to clamp down hard on opponents or not? Fear of

repression among the population and disheartened former elites is thus likely to be lower in the early

stages, and therefore the actual propensity to mobilize against the regime will also be higher.

A second reason for high repression levels in the early years of authoritarian regimes is that

coercion does not only materialize as a response to a high threat-level. Repression can also be used for

signaling purposes. Sending the rights signals in the beginning of a regime cycle is crucial for two

reasons. First, a disproportionate use of force sends a clear signal to potential challengers that all

resistance is fruitless and will be punished severely. Thus, early state repression serves as a deterrence

tool (Escriba-Folch 2013: 546), scarring people from taking to the streets, discouraging opposition

activities, and disciplining coup-inclined elites.

High levels of early coercion also signal credible commitment to elite supporters. To take power, a

dictator needs a support group, often termed the launching organization (Haber 2006: 695-696). Once

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in power, the ruler must show that he will continue to rely on the support of these launching elites and

be attentive to their demands. If they are in doubt, they will conspire against him. Albertus and

Menaldo (2012) have shown that one way to make such a credible commitment to launching elites is to

initially expropriate the assets of the dominant elites of the former regime. Hitting hard at the most

powerful people in a society sends the signal to regime supporters that only those that helped pave the

way for the new regime will also enjoy the fruits and privileges of power. Likewise, intense repression

of the most powerful opponents in the early phase can be thought of as a signal of credible commitment

to launching elites.

The third reason to expect high levels of state repression in the first years of authoritarian rule is

connected to the fact that the regime simply lacks alternative tools. Most autocracies do not solely rely

on repression to uphold power. Rather, they tend to mix coercive measures with attempts to win

support through cooptation efforts, ideology, and performance with regard to economic growth and

public order (Gerschewski 2013). The main reason for this is that repression is costly and can kick

back, in particular high intensity coercion like extrajudicial killings, terror, and violent suppression of

mass uprisings (Gartner & Regan 1996; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Wintrobe 1998). In the early

phases of authoritarian regimes, however alternatives may be short. To effectively channel rents to the

right people and to be able to grant policy concessions to dampen opposition demands, rulers must be

in firm control of the country’s resources and they must have well-established and well-functioning

institutions (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008). However, new regimes rarely have full control from the

beginning, and, as discussed above, they seldom have the institutions to effectively contain demands

and distribute rents. To win the time and freedom to build and shape such institutions and to be able to

concentrate economic power the regime must resort to coercive measures; hence the higher propensity

to initial use repression during the formative years.

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Finally, scholars have argued that in the initial phases, ideology can make rulers “over-repress” as

happened, for example, in many communist regimes (Dallin & Breslauer 1970; Kaminski & Soltan

1989). If the new regime rise to power with an ideology that depicts the ancient regime as a dangerous

opponent, as an erroneous system that must be eradicated if a new one is to flourish, repression of

former elites is simply more legitimate, even in cases, where they do not constitute a real threat. Thus,

authoritarian regimes with strong ideologies may simply be more likely to use repression, and

especially so during the formative years.

Repression Levels beyond the Formative Years

So far, we have discussed why we expect state repression levels to be particular high during the early

years of authoritarian regime spells. But how, then, do repression levels subsequently develop? For a

number of reasons, the repression levels in authoritarian regimes are likely to be continuously declining

after the repressive formative years – that is, across regimes there are no systematic new upsurges as a

function of regime duration. First, unlike the early years, threats to regime stability are unlikely to be

systematically increasing as a function of regime endurance. There seems to be no good reasons to

expect, for instance, that we should witness more conflict and coercion after a decade or two. In fact,

across authoritarian regime cycles, threats like mass demonstrations, riots, strikes, armed rebellions,

coup attempts, or foreign interventions are generally not more frequent or intensive after, say, twenty

years rather than ten years. In contrast, high levels of repression in the initial phase are likely to have

consolidated the incumbents and weakened potential challengers. Following the law of coercive

responsiveness, repression levels should therefore be lower.

Second, as the regime ages, some of the teething problems characterizing its formative years are

likely to diminish. For one, the uncertainty of the formative years has now been reduced and potential

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regime challengers are fully aware of the personal costs associated with opposition activities. Most

importantly, however, the regime is now likely to have more well-established institutions and rulers

have perhaps even been able to win control over vital economic resources, meaning that it becomes

easier to uphold power without resorting to costly repression activities as the opportunities for

cooptation increase. Authoritarian institutions can be used for different purposes such as effective rent-

distribution, intra-elite control, and granting policy concessions and coopting potential and actual

oppositionists (Conrad 2012; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2006). All these things taken together make it

less likely – in comparison to the first years of the authoritarian regime cycle – that substantial threats

to regime stability emerge. And it allows rulers to rely less on coercive measures and more on

performance legitimacy or cooptation.

Here it is crucial to make a distinction between different types of coercion. Recall, that state

repression may concern both first and second amendment-type rights; that is, both civil liberties and

physical integrity rights (Davenport 2007a: 2). While both were expected to suffer severely during the

formative years of authoritarian regimes, the decreasing tendency might be less pronounced for civil

liberties than for physical integrity rights. As Escribá-Folch (2013: 546) notes:

[Civil liberty] restrictions attempt to deter collective action by limiting the coordination

and mobilization capacity of actors and individuals by explicitly prohibiting a given set

of behaviors and activities and by constraining others. Alternatively, violations of

personal integrity aim at eliminating those individuals or groups the regime suspects of

having surpassed those limits or being likely to do so, by killing or imprisoning them.

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Thus, physical integrity violations are the second choice option, implemented only when the regime is

not strong enough to enforce restrictions on civil liberties, or when such restrictions are not enough to

deter opposition activity. In comparison, although we would also expect a relaxing trend in this respect,

the repression of on civil liberties will be more continuously employed to limit overt criticism and other

oppositional activities.

In sum, the above discussion proposes that state repression levels tend to be high in the

beginning of authoritarian regime cycles when new rulers fight to consolidate power. Subsequently, we

expect the use of state coercion to drop steadily as initial challenges are eliminated and less costly tools

to prevent further challenges are institutionalized. The argument can be boiled down to the following

two hypotheses that we set out to test below:

Hypothesis 1: Violations of physical integrity rights decrease with autocratic regime duration.

Hypothesis 2: Violations of civil liberties decrease with autocratic regime duration.

So, there is reason to believe that on average repression levels decline as authoritarian rulers

consolidate and institutionalize power. But what about the final years? Authoritarian regimes collapse

for a reason, and most often the reason is that pressure from different internal or external sources force

rulers to give up power. The question, however, is how this final act plays out. Are the last years of

authoritarian regimes characterized by a new upsurge in state repression levels, or do they, on the

contrary, continue the decreasing pattern of the preceding period?

Often, authoritarian regimes do not just wither away, but fight to maintain power to the last man

standing. The Gaddafi-regime in Libya and the Saddam-regime in Iraq are recent extreme examples of

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autocracies bend on fighting back, whatever the costs. Consequently, it is indeed plausible that as the

collapse of the average authoritarian regime approaches, violations of both civil liberties and physical

integrity rights will again increase.

Yet for a number of reasons it seems equally plausible that the declining state repression level

of the preceding period continues. As Geddes (1999) has shown, autocracies break down in different

ways, depending on the ways in which they are ruled. That is, only certain types of authoritarian

regimes, the personalist regimes, are particularly prone to have violent ends. Personalist regimes are

characterized by their small winning coalitions (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), and after years of

enjoying substantial privileges and engaging in societal exploitation, they have so much to lose and no

prospect of regaining privileges if power changes hands. Consequently, they circle the wagons and

fight when the end draws near. Regime insiders in party regimes, are on the contrary, much more likely

to defect to the opposition when the regime ages and faces staunch opposition (Reuter & Gandhi 2011)

things are heating up, and in military dictatorships, the generals in power has the exit-option of

returning to the barracks (Geddes 1999).

Accordingly, the normal mode of regime breakdown might be that authoritarian regimes simply

collapse due to elite-splits. This would mean that the final years of an authoritarian regime spell are

likely to be characterized by regime weakness, not strength. Hence, not only may rulers feel forced to

give concessions to the opposition in the form of easing civil liberty restrictions, but they may also be

incapable of effectively applying violence once the situation starts to spin out of control. If regime

supporters can see that the leader is about to fall, they will be less disposed to protect him, and

therefore also less inclined to resort to violence, thus sacrificing the leader in the hope of maintaining

their privileges. As Bellin (2012) argues, regime survival often really comes down to one thing: is the

military willing to shoot or not. Defections not only from state elites but also from the rank and file in

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the military may thus make the use of physical coercion much more difficult to pursue for “dying”

authoritarian regimes.

However, as stressed above, political authorities are often subject to intense pressure in the final

years of an autocratic regime spell, and numerous examples of autocrats fighting tooth and nail to

preserve political power come to mind. We thus supplement our main propositions with two alternative

hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Violations of physical integrity rights increase in the final years of the autocratic

regime cycle.

Hypothesis 4: Violations of civil liberties increase in the final years of the autocratic regime

cycle.

Data and Research Design

To test the hypotheses, we need an empirical model that enables us to describe the temporal dynamics

in state repression within authoritarian countries. That is, we are not interested in showing cross-

national patterns in whether young autocracies engage in more repression than long-lasting ones. Such

a model might be confounded by several country-specific factors such as state legitimacy, civil society

institutions, and group inequality. Rather, it is a more rewarding strategy to show whether authoritarian

regimes on average decrease their use of repression with their years in power. To do just this, we

employ a country and year fixed-effects OLS model that only accounts for country-specific time-trends

in the data. It thus leaves out cross-sectional and time-specific variation and allows us to test whether

changes in the covariates in fact are significantly related to changes in repression.

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We rely on the newly released Autocratic Breakdowns and Regime Transitions data set by

Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), which systematically codes regime transitions in 280 autocracies

across 110 countries around the world from 1946-2010. The dataset is unique because it not only

identifies transitions to/from democracy but also autocracy-to-autocracy transitions and even captures

regime changes (understood as changes in the ruling elite group) even if the general type (e.g., military

dictatorship) remains the same. This feature lets us investigate the effect of changes in regime

institutions defined as the formal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies. The main

independent variable, autocratic regime duration, thus measures years since transition to the existent

autocratic institutions of a given country. Importantly, it does not show how many years a country has

been autocratic, how many years a given leader has been incumbent, or how many years a country has

been characterized as a certain type of autocratic rule. Regimes are often more enduring than their

leaders and transition from, for instance, one military rule to another military rule may significantly

change the political institutions, the winning coalition, and create a new threat scenario as theorized

above. Accordingly, this new data set enables us to tease out the proposed predictor, that is, the

duration of autocratic regimes.

Concerning the dependent variable, state repression, we employ several indicators because the

robustness of the existent human rights measures has been widely debated (see, e.g., Clark & Sikkink

2013; Møller & Skaaning 2013c). The two most often used indicators of physical integrity violations are the

Political Terror Scale (PTS) and Cingranelli and Richards’ (CIRI) physical integrity rights index. PTS ranges

from 1 to 5 and assesses the overall intensity of abuses in a country (from 1976-2011) based on political

imprisonment, torture, killings and other state sponsored mistreatment and abuses (Wood & Gibney 2010).

Because PTS is coded as an ordinal variable and thus might be biased in the linear model, we also include the

CIRI physical integrity rights index, which has been shown to be unidimensional (Cingranelli & Richards

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1999).2 The measure summarizes four human rights indicators – torture, disappearances, political

imprisonments, and extrajudicial killings – into a 0-8 index stretching from 1981-2010 (Cingranelli & Richards

2010). In general, human rights measures suffer from what Fariss (2014) terms “changing standard of

accountability” because the primary sources, Amnesty International and US State Department reports, have

become systematically more stringent over time.3 Yet by including year fixed-effects, we accommodate this

potential bias by neutralizing cross-sectional time trends in the data.

We also consider two measures for civil liberty violations to secure the robustness of our findings. First,

we include a 13-point index from the Civil Liberty Dataset (CLD) summarizing four indicators (each coded from

0-4) of freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion, and freedom of

movement stretching from 1976-2010 (Møller & Skaaning 2013c). Second, we summarize the same four civil

liberty indicators from CIRI in an index ranging from 0-8. All measures of repression are recoded so that high

values indicate higher human rights violations. The empirical model includes the lagged dependent variable

(repression at t-1) to ensure that it actually predict changes in the level of state repression.

Depending on the coverage of the dependent variables, the sample size varies from 1900-2300

observations in 104-107 countries. We had to drop the monarchy of Oman from the sample, which with more

than 250 years regime duration had a disproportionate high influence on the results. The mean regime duration in

the final sample is 22 years with a maximum duration of 85 years (the Mexican one-party PRI rule ending in

2000).

We control for potential confounders, that is, time-varying factors that are correlated with regime

duration and expected to affect the level of repression across countries. First, we include income

(GDP/cap., logged, from the Penn World Tables) because economic downturn may lead to regime

breakdown while at the same time restricting political authorities’ ability to accommodate policy

2 Although several of the dependent variables are ordinal, we choose to relax the strict linearity assumption of OLS because

we, regarding the current research agenda, have more faith in fixed-effects models than random-effects models that do not

neutralize country-specific time-invariant factors. 3 The included PTS scores are based on US State Department reports, whereas CIRI takes into account both Amnesty

International and State Department reports.

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claims without the use of coercion. Next, population size (logged, from the Penn World Tables) is

included because population growth may increase demands for public goods provisions and create

unrest. We also include oil production (per capita, logged, from Ross 2013) because natural resource

abundance can be used to prolong political survival and appease adversaries thereby avoiding protest

and repressive events.

Armed conflicts can overturn authoritarian regimes and lead to repressive trajectories, and we

include dummy variables for both intra-state and internal armed conflict (binary variable coding

country-years with at least 25 battle related deaths, based on the UCDP/PRIO dataset). To minimize

simultaneity bias, all these control variables are lagged one year. Lastly, we want to make sure that our

results are not driven by specific types of autocratic regimes that are less sustainable while at the same

time rely heavily on repression. Based on the Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions data set

mentioned above we distinguish between military, party, personal, and monarchical regimes (Geddes,

Wright & Frantz 2014).4

We test the empirical model in four tables presented below corresponding to each of the four

hypotheses. The first two investigate the relationship between regime duration and personal integrity

violations and civil liberty violations, respectively. As proposed, the level of repression may on average

decrease gradually with regime duration in a linear manner. Alternatively, however, there might be

systematic fluctuations in the relationship. For example, repression might be high in the first regime

years, gradually decrease, and then suddenly increase again (i.e., a quadratic relationship). Also, the

level of repression might swing back and forth because decreased repression enables challenges, which

are likely to be countered with repression and so forth (i.e., a cubic relationship). By testing the effect

4 For all the mentioned variables we use versions compiled in the Quality of Government Data Set (Teorell et al. 2013).

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of regime duration as well as that of its squared and cubic term, we are able to assess any systematic

relationship between regime duration and repression in the sample (cf. Carter and Signorino 2010).

Yet authoritarian regimes do not break down after a fixed number of years. This means that we

cannot test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 (i.e., whether repression increases in the final regime years)

without including regime breakdowns in the model. We do this in the next two tables (Tables 3 and 4)

by including a binary variable indicating whenever a regime breaks down in subsequent years. Because

it is unknown when, if at all, increases in repression are likely to occur, we test periods of one, two, and

three years preceding regime breakdowns.5 All in all, the empirical analysis lets us investigate how

changes in the level of state repression are best predicted throughout the autocratic regime cycle.

Results

Table 1 displays the effect of autocratic regime duration on physical integrity violations. Model 1 finds

a negative and statistically significant effect of regime duration on PTS, indicating that authoritarian

regimes decrease their use of political terror with their years in power. As theorized above, this effect

might very well stem from a need to eliminate political threats right after coming into power and a

subsequent institutionalization that enables authorities to accommodate policy claims without engaging

in costly repressive activities. Models 2 and 3 investigate whether this gradual decline in repression is

biased by non-linear patterns over time. The results indicate that this is not the case. Neither the second

nor the third order equation of regime duration seems consequential, which supports that the

relationship between regime duration and political terror is best specified by the linear function in

Model 1.

5 Only 70 of the 107 countries in our sample experienced at least one autocratic breakdown in our sample.

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[Table 1 about here]

Moving on to CIRI’s physical integrity index in the second part of Table 1, we find similar results:

Regime duration has a linear, negative, and strongly significant effect on personal integrity violations,

whereas no evidence supports a quadratic or cubic relationship. Accordingly, the empirical model

substantiates Hypothesis 1 and the “more murder in the beginning” proposition: Authoritarian regimes

use more physical repression such as political imprisonment, torture, and extrajudicial killings in their

early years.

Looking at the effect of the control variables in Table 1, it is clear that several of the usual

suspects predicting state repression are driven by cross-sectional trends. The fixed-effects model thus

indicates that neither changes in population size and oil production affects state repression. And only

the PTS models suggest that economic growth decrease repression. These findings are largely in line

with those reported by Poe and Tate (1994), who have shown that absolute levels of population size

and socio-economic development help explain human rights abuses across countries, whereas

population change and economic growth are inconsequential. Other than that, intra-state conflict but

not international armed conflict significantly increases repression. Finally, transitions between specific

autocratic subtypes do not seem to matter. The statistically significant effect of monarchical regimes

are solely driven by the one monarchy in the sample experiencing regime transition, that is, the

overturn of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran in 1979.


20

In Table 2 we move on to look at the relationship between regime duration and civil liberty violations.

The first part of the table presents the models that use CLD as dependent variables. The results clearly

support Hypothesis 2: Autocratic regimes are more likely to violate civil liberties such as freedom of

speech and freedom of movement closely following regime transition. Their engagement in civil liberty

restrictions tend to weaken in a with regime duration in a linear fashion (Models 7-9). However, when

we replace CLD indicators with the corresponding ones from CIRI the statistically significant

association between regime duration and civil liberty violations disappears. Accordingly, we only find

partial support for Hypothesis 2 in the empirical assessment (more on this apparent discrepancy below).

As in Table 1, we only find weak indications that factors such as economic development, population

growth, and oil production are responsible for changes in the level of repression.

We are not, as described above, able to test whether autocratic regimes tend to increase the

level of repression in their final years only by looking at regime duration. Instead we present two

additional tables that include “future breakdowns” as predictor in addition to the regime duration

variable that estimates the linear decline in repression. This allows us to test whether the final years of

authoritarian regimes in fact deviate from the illustrated linear decline in repression.

As shown in Table 3, we find little evidence for Hypothesis 3 and the notion that regimes are

more likely to violate physical integrity rights of their citizens prior to breakdowns. Only in one PTS

model (Model 13), the most recent year before a breakdown (breakdown at t+1) approximates

statistical significance (p=.093). Although this result does indicate that some autocrats intensify

political terror when they are just about to be ousted from power, the overall finding indicates that this

is not a systematic trend. Many autocratic transitions do not follow from widespread violence. What

our results show is that repression is likely to occur after autocratic transitions when the new

institutions are not yet consolidated.

21



The results for civil liberty violations find even less support for a repressive upturn in final years of

authoritarian regimes (Hypothesis 4). Rather, the results in Table 4 that the degree of civil liberty

repression tends to be lower in the two years prior to autocratic breakdowns. As we discuss below, this

further suggests that civil liberty restrictions and personal integrity violations differ in nature and are

employed by authorities in different contexts.

Discussion

The relationship between autocratic regime endurance and repression of human rights has received

surprisingly little attention in the literature. In our attempt to shed light on this issue, we have presented

arguments in favor of the proposition that repression in authoritarian regimes tend to begin on a

relatively high level and then gradually declines. Our empirical examination lent strong support to this

expectation as autocracies are most likely to violate the rights of their citizens in the first years after

regime transitions, which we ascribe to high level of political threats and low degree of

institutionalization. The effect is strongest concerning physical integrity violations, whereas the results

for civil liberty restrictions are mixed. Our analysis also showed that there is no general evidence of

higher levels repression in the last years of the autocratic regime cycle.

Looking at how political leaders use repression, it might not be overly puzzling that the two

examined strategies do not follow identical patterns. Physical integrity violations are primarily used

22

against organized groups, whereas civil liberty restrictions serve to prevent collective actions (Escribà-

Folch 2013). When the political threats are high, as we argue they are in regimes’ early years,

authorities are likely to use both repressive strategies. First, they want to keep protesters of the streets,

criticism of the government out of the newsnagenda, and prevent opponents from getting organized –

all in order to preclude further oppositional collective action. Second, they want to eliminate opposition

leaders and other targetable persons that present an immediate threat to their survival for which reason

they engage in political imprisonment and killings. If these repressive strategies are successful in

demobilizing regime challengers, the level of physical sanctions drops markedly. Yet the authorities

might continue suppressing civil liberties to inhibit overt challenges. This would indicate that physical

integrity violations varies more with regime duration than civil liberty restrictions, exactly as we found

in this study.

Some of the results, however, did suggest that non-democratic regimes do violate civil liberties

less over time. On the one hand, this illustrates that it is costly to restrict the coordination goods of

citizens so that a decline in revolutionary threats can be expected to relax the repression in order to

increase economic performance (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010). On the other hand, it indicates

that regimes with higher degrees of institutionalization are better able to handle potential threats

without engaging in costly repressive strategies. An agenda for future research is thus to investigate the

speed and sequence of the establishment of institutional frameworks and how variations in these factors

affect future repressive trajectories. Another line of research that deserves more attention is to reveal

the extent of, and patterns in, ideologically motivated (over)repression of especially civil liberties.

Previous research has stressed how countries that undertake democratization processes are

particularly in risk of political violence. However, as we argue, also transitions from one autocratic

setting to another often result in high levels of repression. Advocates of human rights thus need to pay

23

attention the potential effects of a broader range of regime changes to better understand, anticipate, and

prevent state repression.

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Table 1. Autocratic regime duration and personal integrity violations

Political Terror Scale CIRI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Regime duration -.007**

(.003)

-.011**

(.004)

-.011

(.007)

-.024**

(.007)

-.024**

(.007)

-.036*

(.015)

Regime duration2 – .000

(.000)

.000

(.000)

– .000

(.000)

.000

(.000)

Regime duration3

– – .000

(.000)

– – -.000

(.000)

GDP/capita (log) (t-1) -.179+

(0.96)

-.188*

(0.92)

-.187*

(0.93)

.030

(.218)

.033

(.218)

.005

(.225)

Population size (log) (t-1) .195

(.250)

.237

(.254)

.238

(.255)

-.534

(.622)

-.541

(.619)

-.478

(.645)

Oil prod./cap (log) (t-1) .002

(.022)

.006

(.024)

.006

(.024)

-.040

(.046)

-.039

(.047)

-.032

(.050)

Armed conflict (t-1) .308**

(.052)

.307**

(.051)

.307**

(.051)

.523**

(.144)

.525**

(.144)

.522**

(.143)

Int’l armed conflict (t-1) .056

(.096)

.058

(.098)

.058

(.094)

.005

(.135)

-.005

(.133)

.003

(.132)

Party (versus military)

regimes

-.163

(.144)

-.153

(.145)

-.154

(.146)

.001

(.254)

.005

(.255)

.019

(.254)

Personal (versus military)

regimes

-.015

(.138)

-.007

(.139)

-.008

(.139)

-.006

(.273)

-.003

(.273)

.018

(.273)

Monarchical (versus

military) regimes

1.315**

(.216)

1.229**

(.223)

1.235**

(.230)

– – –

Repression (t-1) .472**

(.032)

.471**

(.031)

.471**

(.032)

.415**

(.035)

.413**

(.035)

.415**

(.035)

Country fixed effects YES YES

Year fixed effects YES YES

N Countries/Observations 107/2246 104/1898

Note: **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

28

Table 2. Autocratic regime duration and civil liberty violations

CLD CIRI (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


(.003)

-.010+

(.006)

-.020*

(0.010)

-.002

(.005)

.005

(.009)

.001

(.014)

Regime duration2 – .000

(.000)

.000

(0.000)

– -.000

(.000)

.000

(.000)

Regime duration3

– – -.000

(.000)

– – -.000

(.000)

GDP/capita (log) (t-1) .207+

(0.109)

.204+

(0.111)

.188+

(0.112)

.122

(.176)

.138

(.171)

.131

(.170)

Population size (log) (t-1) .660+

(.361)

.670+

(.350)

.654+

(.353)

.098

(.432)

.037

(.439)

.029

(.440)

Oil prod./cap (log) (t-1) -.011

(.027)

-.010

(.027)

-.008

(.028)

.066+

(.036)

.060+

(.036)

.060+

(.035)

Armed conflict (t-1) .023

(.069)

.023

(.070)

.023

(.068)

.091

(.089)

.093

(.089)

.093

(.089)

Int’l armed conflict (t-1) -.122

(.109)

-.121

(.110)

-.122

(.111)

-.010

(.155)

-.009

(.151)

-.010

(.151)


regimes

-.010

(.136)

-.008

(.137)

-.003

(.139)

.232

(.181)

.215

(.182)

.216

(.183)


regimes

-.067

(.156)

-.065

(.157)

-.057

(.160)

.396

(.244)

.380

(.246)

.385

(.248)

Monarchical (versus

military) regimes

.813**

(.252)

.790**

(.264)

.698**

(.263)

– – –


(.025)

.783**

(.025)

.782**

(.025)

.571**

(.028)

.571**

(.028)

.570**

(.028)





29

Table 3. Regime duration, future breakdowns, and personal integrity violations

Political Terror Scale CIRI (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)


(.003)

-.008**

(.003)

-.008**

(.003)

-.023**

(.007)

-.024**

(.007)

-.024**

(.007)

Regime breakdown (t+1) .099+

(.058)

– – -.089

(.177)

– –

Regime breakdown (t+1–t+2)

– .058

(.052)

– – .099

(.111)

–

Regime breakdown (t+1–t+3) – – .047

(.047)

– – .092

(.104)

GDP/capita (log) (t-1) -.174+

(0.96)

-.173+

(0.96)

-.174+

(0.96)

.027

(.218)

.038

(.219)

.039

(.219)


(.247)

.205

(.247)

.204

(.247)

-.540

(.622)

-.521

(.621)

-.519

(.620)

Oil prod./cap (log) (t-1) .002

(.023)

.002

(.023)

.002

(.023)

-.041

(.046)

-.040

(.046)

-.039

(.046)

Armed conflict (t-1) .305**

(.051)

.306**

(.051)

.307**

(.051)

.525**

(.144)

.520**

(.143)

.522**

(.143)

Int’l armed conflict (t-1) .056

(.095)

.057

(.095)

.056

(.095)

.004

(.135)

.008

(.135)

.005

(.136)


regimes

-.154

(.138)

-.156

(.141)

-.156

(.142)

-.002

(.255)

.004

(.251)

.007

(.251)


regimes

.003

(.138)

-.000

(.138)

.001

(.140)

-.024

(.277)

.015

(.274)

.017

(.276)

Monarchical (versus military)

regimes

1.326**

(.214)

1.273**

(.223)

1.285**

(.221)

– – –


(.032)

.472**

(.032)

.472**

(.032)

.415**

(.035)

.414**

(.035)

.414**

(.035)





30

Table 4. Regime duration, future breakdowns, and civil liberty violations

CLD CIRI (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)

Regime duration -.008*

(.003)

-.008*

(.003)

-.008*

(.003)

-.001

(.005)

-.001

(.005)

-.001

(.005)

Regime breakdown (t+1) -.336**

(.118)

– – -.351*

(.156)

– –

Regime breakdown (t+1–t+2)

– -.243**

(.085)

– – -.237**

(.090)

–

Regime breakdown (t+1–t+3) – – -.101

(.079)

– – -.145

(.093)

GDP/capita (log) (t-1) .192+

(.107)

.186+

(.107)

.197+

(.108)

.107

(.174)

.101

(.174)

.108

(.174)


(.356)

.624

(.355)

.642

(.358)

.067

(.431)

.061

(.430)

.071

(.431)

Oil prod./cap (log) (t-1) -.009

(.025)

-.009

(.025)

-.011

(.026)

.065+

(.037)

.065+

(.037)

.064+

(.037)

Armed conflict (t-1) .035

(.069)

.036

(.069)

.028

(.069)

.101

(.088)

.101

(.090)

.094

(.089)

Int’l armed conflict (t-1) -.122

(.107)

-.125

(.107)

-.121

(.109)

-.015

(.156)

-.017

(.160)

-.011

(.158)

Party (versus military) regimes -.040

(.135)

-.039

(.132)

-.024

(.134)

.223

(.185)

.225

(.185)

.224

(.183)


regimes

-.120

(.152)

-.124

(.143)

-.098

(.152)

.328

(.254)

.347

(.252)

.361

(.246)

Monarchical (versus military)

regimes

.846**

(.254)

.885**

(.255)

.835**

(.255)

– – –


(.025)

.779**

(.025)

.781**

(.025)

.570**

(.028)

.570**

(.027)

.570**

(.028)





Autocratic Regime Duration and State Repression · Autocratic Regime Duration and State ... regime duration and state repression is ... We conceive of an autocratic regime spell as

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