Austrian Nobles, Unity and the Kleindeutsch Solution

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Austrian Nobles, Unity and the kleindeutsch Solution

This paper will examine the reaction of the Austrian nobility to their exclusion from a

unified Germany in order to show that too much emphasis can be placed upon the ethno-

linguistic and historical commonalities between the Austrian lands of the Habsburg Empire

and the German states. Much research has already been carried out on the reasons for, and the

results of, the exclusion, yet they do not deal with the reaction of the Austrian nobility, or

where the interests of this stratum of society were likely to lie. The existing literature treats

the „German‟ character of the Austrian nobility with too much importance, assuming that the

kleindeutsch solution wrongly excluded Austria from a unified Germany, an assumption that

was to bear rotten fruit in the twentieth century with the Anschluss of Austria and the

realisation of the pan-German ideal.1

A brief look at the existing literature yields a few consistent themes. Austensen

describes the Metternichian position on the German problem and discusses Austrian foreign

policy between 1848 and 1864, showing how the Habsburg Monarchy attempted to react to

developments within and between the German states.23

Murray highlights the interpretation

of Robert Morier to unification, a British diplomat to various German states between 1853

and 1876, highlighting the interest of foreign powers and individuals in the German

Question.4 Sondhaus, Schmitt, Elrod, Austensen and Schroeder have written extensively on

the roles of the individual Austrian foreign ministers.56789

The assertion of ethnic identities

1 Robert A. Kann, „The Case of Austria‟, Journal of Contemporary History 15 (1980), pp. 37-

52 (p. 43). 2 Roy A. Austensen, „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?” Another Look at Metternich‟s View of the

German Dilemma‟, German Studies Review 6 (1983), pp. 41-57. 3 Roy A. Austensen, „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany,” 1848-1864‟,

Journal of Modern History 52 (1980), pp. 195-225. 4 Scott W. Murray, „In Pursuit of a Mirage: Robert Morier‟s Views of Liberal Nationalism

and German Unification, 1853-1876‟, International History Review 20 (1998), pp. 33-67. 5 Lawrence Sondhaus, „Schwarzenberg, Austria, and the German Question, 1848-1851‟,

International History Review 13 (1991), pp. 1-20.

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and the rise of nationalism within Central Europe, and Europe in general, is well documented;

Silesia‟s inclusion within the Prussian kleindeutsch unification project; 10

the assertion of a

Czech national identity; 11

Galician attempts to gain autonomy; 12

the assertion of Hungarian

nationalism, to the detriment of the other nationalities in Hungary, resulting in the Ausgleich;

13 and the loss of the Habsburg‟s Italian possessions.

1415 There has also been much debate on

the economic rise, or failure, and integration of the Empire, with Hertz, Whiteside and

Kolossa hailing the success of the Empire‟s economy, its free trade area and commercial

success, and Jaszi, Macesich and Gross contending that this is largely a fallacy, that

geographic obstacles prevented true integration and that trade would have been more natural

with certain areas outside of the Empire.1617

Much of the literature as outlined treats the German unification under the kleindeutsch

solution as a matter of high politics, the result of the policies of a few „great men‟

manipulating liberal and nationalist sentiments. The unification of Germany did not happen

6 Hans A. Schmitt, „Count Beust and Germany, 1866-1870: Reconquest, Realignment, or

Resignation?‟, Central European History 1 (1968), pp. 20-34. 7 Richard B. Elrod, „Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition: The Dilemma

of Conservative Statecraft‟, Journal of Modern History 56 (1984), pp. 430-455. 8 Austensen, „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?”‟ pp. 41-57.

9 Paul W. Schroeder, „Bruck versus Buol: The Dispute Over Austrian Eastern Policy, 1853-

1855,‟ Journal of Modern History 40 (1968), pp. 193-217. 10

Tomasz Kamusella, „Nations and their Borders: Changing Identities in Upper Silesia in the

Modern Age‟, German History 19 (2001), 400-407 (p. 401). 11

Gary B. Cohen, „Recent Research on Czech Nation-Building‟, in Journal of Modern

History 51 (1979), pp. 760-772 (p. 760). 12

Piotr S. Wandycz, „The Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy‟, Austrian History Yearbook 3

(1967), pp. 261-286. 13

Peter F. Sugar, „Nationalism as a Disintegrating Force‟, Austrian History Yearbook 3

(1967), pp. 91-120 (p. 116). 14

Kent Roberts Greenfield, „The Italian Nationality Problem of the Austrian Empire: The

Early Period of Austrian Rule‟, Austrian History Yearbook 3 (1967), pp. 491-526. 15

Geoffrey Wawr, „The Habsburg Flucht nach vorne in 1866: Domestic Political Origins of

the Austro-Prussian War‟, pp. 221-248 (p. 223). 16

Alexander Gerschenkron, An Economic Spurt that Failed (Surrey, 1977), p. 46. 17

David F. Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (London, 1984),

pp. 96-97.

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in a kleindeutsch fashion solely because of the machinations of Bismarck, nor was Austria

excluded from Germany purely as a result of the Battle of Sadowa. Likewise, the exclusion of

Austria from Germany did not just impinge upon a few political elites, it impacted upon all

stratums of Austrian and German society and therefore it is of great importance to understand

the reactions of those who had a vested interest in the outcome of German unification,

especially given the eventual use of the opposing grossdeutsch solution to justify annexation

of Austria by the German government of 1938.18

Taken on their own, each of these studies or

themes is unable to account for the reaction of a whole stratum of society to Austria‟s

exclusion from German unification, but when examined in concert, provides a facet in

determining how the Austrian nobility would have reacted, and therefore an examination of

the justice in this exclusion. Therefore this paper will focus on three key areas; the identity of

the Austrian nobility; the economic interests of the Austrian nobility; and Austria‟s foreign

policy, as expressed through certain members of the nobility.

The first section will examine the identity of the nobility with regard to religion,

ethnicity/race and language, highlighting the weight placed upon national identity in the

existing literature. There is a vast literature on Austria‟s participation in German history, with

the Habsburgs having been the titular head‟s of the Holy Roman Empire of the German

Nation from 1440 to 1806, with but one exception, the Bavarian Emperor, Charles VII.

Following the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine and the Congress of Vienna,

Austria once more stepped into a leading position in the German Confederation, this time

sharing the privilege with Prussia.19

This raises the issue of whether or not the Austria

nobility can be considered German, or if their participation in the Habsburg Empire

18

Rüdiger Wischenbart, „National Identity and Immigration in Austria - Historical

Framework and Political Dispute‟, West European Politics 17 (1994), pp. 72-90 (p. 82). 19

Enno E. Kraehe, „Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation, 1851-

1863‟, American Historical Review 56 (1951), pp. 276-294 (p. 276).

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complicates such a simplistic understanding of Austrian identity. An examination of Ritter‟s

work on Austria and its struggle for an identity along with his examination of whether

Austria shares a German history or if Austrian‟s can legitimately disavow a common

heritage, will highlight the importance of reaching a conclusion as to the cultural and national

sentiments of the Austrian nobility.20

This will be followed by a comparison of the language,

ethnicity/race and religion of the nobility, leading to a conclusion as to whether the Austrian

nobility were „ethnic Germans,‟ or if the loyalties of the nobility were shared between the

German states and the Empire.21

Having shown the limitations of looking at identity through a nationalist lens, the

economic interests of the Austrian nobility will be explored to show that whilst ethno-

linguistic ties are of importance, using this as an a priori framework can result in ignoring

other vital aspects of Austrian identity. To better understand the orientation of the Austrian

nobility, whether towards the German states, the Empire or Europe, the economic structure of

Austria will be examined. This will begin with a look at the role of the Austrian nobility in

the Empire‟s economy. Tariff barriers and industrialisation/regional specialisation will be

examined to evidence the orientation of the nobilities economic interests; specifically a

comparative look at the Habsburg Empire as a Customs Union against the Prussian

Zollverein.2223

The purpose of this discussion is to highlight the economic interests of the

nobility to highlight whether exclusion from a unified Germany would have grossly altered

their economic orientation.

20

Harry Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, German Studies Review 15

(1992), pp. 111-129. 21

Pieter C. Van Duin, Central European Crossroads: Social Democracy and National

Revolution in Bratislava (Pressburg), 1867-1921 (Oxford, 2009), p. 114. 22

John Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union: Economic Development in

Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century (Surrey, 1983). 23

Wolfram Fischer, „The German Zollverein: A Case Study in Customs Union‟, Kyklos 13

(1960), pp. 65-89.

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Having established the „nationalist‟ identity and economic interests of the Austrian

nobility, it will be to the foreign policy of the Empire that this section will turn. An

examination of the competing ideologies on German unification will be discussed followed

by a look at the foreign policies the Empire with regard to Germany. 24

Of note to this paper

is that within the foreign office, two of the three branches, the diplomats and the central

office, were predominantly staffed by the nobility; one laregly by the courtly first society and

the other by the bureaucratic second society.25

Indeed, Heindl notes that the bureaucracy was

dominated by the middle class and lower aristocracy as early as 1780 and that between 1781

and 1848, the prevalence of the nobility in the higher bureaucracy increased.26

Therefore

action taken by the foreign office can be considered to be largely representative of those

nobles serving in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy. This will be followed by a brief

examination of Metternich, Schwarzenberg, von Buol and von Rechberg during their

respective tenures as Chancellor or foreign minister. This examination will be used to see if

Austensen is correct in his contention that Austrian foreign policy was consistent in the post

Metternich era,27

and therefore that Austria sought to avoid entanglement in a unified German

state as much as it sought to impede the creation of a Prussian-led kleindeutsch unification.

Having thus ascertained the cultural/ethnic identity of the nobility, their economic

orientation and their reluctance to be part of a unified German state, a conclusion will be

reached which, whilst acknowledging the importance of Austria identity, will show that the

nobility were not motivated solely by nationalist or ethno-linguistic interests and that the

24

Lawrence Birken, „Volkish Nationalism in Perspective‟, History Teacher 27 (1994), pp.

133-143 (p. 135). 25

William D. Godsey Jr., Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the

Eve of the First World War (Indiana, 1999), p. 17.

26 Waltraud Heindl, „Bureaucracy, Officials, and the State in the Austrian Monarchy: Stages

of Change since the Eighteenth Century‟, Austrian History Yearbook 37 (2006), pp. 35-57 (p.

42). 27

Austensen, „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany “‟, p. 199.

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kleindeutsch unification was not as large a travesty as portrayed. Therefore too much

emphasis placed on such an arbitrary characteristic as ethnicity or nationality can obscure the

past and place events within an incorrect context.

Beginning with Ritter‟s work on the search for an Austrian identity, integrated within

a German framework or separate to the unified German states, there will be a discussion on

the proper placement of Austria‟s history. This will be followed by a comparison of the

themes of religion, language and race/ethnicity across the nobility of Austria and their

counterparts in Hungary and the Empire, and Prussia and the German states. This section will

show whom the Austrian nobility would have been better able to communicate with, across

the three criteria, and draw a conclusion as to whether the nobility were more culturally,

linguistically and ethnically integrated within the Empire or with the German states. Thus an

assessment of Erdmann‟s claims can be made, noting the difficulty of taking Austria out of its

integrated history, a history shared with Hungary as much as with Germany.28

This

comparison will be conducted under the auspices of a functionalist theory of nationalism; that

the ability to communicate more effectively, over a wider range of subjects or criteria, with

one group over another leads to greater cohesion and therefore nationalist feeling.29

This

exploration will therefore highlight the nationalist claims of the pan-German movement and

the justification for Austrian inclusion. Kedourie‟s theory of nationalism provides the reason

for the selection of race/ethnicity, language and history as characteristics to be explored,

claiming that, „In nationalist doctrine, language, race, culture and sometimes even religion

constitute different aspects of the same primordial entity, the nation.‟30

28

Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, p. 124. 29

Karl W. Deutsch, „Nationalism and Social Communication‟, in John Hutchinson and

Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 26-29 (p. 27). 30

Elie Kedourie, „Nationalism and Self-Determination‟ in John Hutchinson and Anthony D.

Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 49-55 (p. 49).

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Ritter‟s study on a search for an Austrian identity deals with Erdmann‟s claim that

there is “Drei Staaten –Zwei Nationen – Ein Volk”, and his detractors who have argued

against these statements.31

Erdmann subscribes to the idea that whilst Austria may be a

territorial nation, it is part of a German cultural nation, with a past rooted in German history

and therefore the framework in which to study Austrian history and culture is one shared with

Germany.32

In response to Erdmann‟s claims, Ritter acknowledges three arguments against

such an attempt to place Austrian history within an overarching German Kulturnation;

political; methodological; and historical.33

On the political argument Ritter notes the claim

that placing Austria within the framework of German history performs an historic Anschluss;

following decades of Austrian nation-building separate to Germany, placing its culture and

history with that of Germany demeans and contradicts Austria‟s modern small-state

identity.34

The methodological argument of Schmid and Ardelt takes issue with Erdmann‟s a

priori German national-historical paradigm and idealist attempt to see this grand narrative

developing towards a contemporary German and Austrian telos.35

The historical argument of

Stourzh accuses Erdmann of perpetuating the Nazi policy of a grossdeutschland through his

relocation of Austria within German history whereas Weinzierl takes an extreme position,

claiming that Austria‟s defeat at Konnigratz led to joint German/Austria history being

severed at this point.36

Erdmann‟s work therefore imposes a grossdeutsch view of history retroactively; it

claims that Austria needs to be returned to a confederative German history, a history from

which Austria was politically excluded. Pertinent to this paper is that it appears to presuppose

31

Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, pp. 114-125. 32



Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, p. 119-120. 35


Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, p. 121-122.

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that Austria should not have been excluded from German unification, and that therefore the

Austrian nobility would thus have not wanted to be expelled from Germany, owing to the

staggering importance of inclusion within the Kulturnation. These claims can be assessed by

comparing Austria and its neighbours across the three topics of religion, language and

ethnicity/race.

Starting with religion, Austria‟s integrated nature becomes obvious, integrated within

both the German states and the Empire. Pombeni notes the dominance of Protestantism in the

Prussian state and Savelsberg highlights the prevalence of Lutheranism in Germany applying

this to Prussia, Silesia, Saxony, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Mecklenburg and Wurttemberg and

noting that in the main, the states south of the Danube River remained Catholic, mentioning

Westphalia, Palatine and Bavaria.3738

In his discussion on Austrian state education, Gruber

states, „The House of Habsburg was strictly Roman Catholic, and made sure that its nobility

and its subjects retained the Catholic faith,‟ and further commenting on the Counter-

Reformation and the expulsion of Protestantism from their lands.39

Sugar‟s discussion of non-

Germanic societies living under the Habsburgs, states that the Magyar inhabitants of Hungary

were predominantly Catholic and Peter goes further in noting the differences between the

Catholic, titled aristocracy and the Protestant provincial gentry, highlighting the influence

once exerted by the Catholic Church.4041

Whilst these statements clearly cannot account for

each and every noble or aristocrat of Prussia, Austria and Hungary, a few tentative claims can

37

Paolo Pombeni, „The Ideology of Christian Democracy‟, Journal of Political Ideologies 5

(2000), pp. 289-300 (p. 293). 38

Joachim J. Savelsberg, „Religion, Historical Contingencies, and Institutional Conditions of

Criminal Punishment: The German Case and Beyond‟, Law and Social Inquiry 29 (2004), pp.

373-401 (p. 377). 39

Karl Heinz Gruber, „Higher Education and the State in Austria: An Historical and

Institutional Approach‟, European Journal of Education 17 (1982), pp. 259-270 (p. 259-260). 40

Peter F. Sugar, „The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule‟, Slavic

Review 22 (1963), pp. 1-30 (pp. 4-5). 41

Laszlo Peter, „The Aristocracy, the Gentry and their Parliamentary Tradition in Nineteenth-

Century Hungary‟, Slavonic and East European Review 70 (1992), pp. 77-110 (p. 77).

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be made; the Austrian nobility, whilst having a common Christian faith with both the

Magyars and German nobles, shared a denominational faith with the Hungarians and South

Germans, anathema to the protestant Prussia and emerging German Reich with its eventual

Kulturkampf.42

On the subject of language and its importance to identity and nationalism, Weber and

Breuilly advanced contrasting views; Weber claimed that language is not necessarily linked

to nationalism or a nation whilst Breuilly discusses language as an expression of community,

understood as both a spoken tongue and an expression of common values.4344

Whilst placing

different emphasis on the importance of language to their understanding of nationalism, they

do both acknowledge the importance that communities can place upon it. To this end Weber

states, „The pretension, however, to be considered a special „nation‟ is regularly associated

with a common language as a culture value of the masses.‟45

On the subject of German

nation-building in particular, Wright discusses the importance of language, citing Herder,

Fichte and von Humboldt as focusing on the critical import of culture, blood and

language.46

Unlike the case of religious beliefs, Austria is much more closely linked to the

German states in terms of language. Indeed, as Medgyes and Miklosy note,

42

Ronald J. Ross, „Enforcing the Kulturkampf in the Bismarckian State and the Limits of

Coercion in Imperial Germany,‟ Journal of Modern History 56 (1984), pp. 456-482 (pp. 457-

458). 43

Max Weber, „The Nation‟, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism

(Oxford, 1994), pp. 21-25 (p. 22). 44

John Breuilly, „The Sources of Nationalist Ideology‟, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D.

Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 103-113 (p. 105). 45

Weber, „The Nation‟, p. 22. 46

Sue Wright, „Language as a Contributing Factor in Conflicts between States and Within

States‟, Current Issues in Language and Society 4 (1997), pp. 215-237 (p. 222).

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Hungarian is a unique and isolated language of central Europe, because it is not Indo-

European in origin; rather it belongs to the Finno-Ugric branch of the Uralic family of

languages.47

Since the German Confederation, including Austria and Prussia, were German

speaking, as opposed to the Hungarian Magyars, it is likely that the Austrian nobility, at least

in relation to language, would have felt a much greater affinity towards the German states and

Prussia.

The final comparison to be made is on the idea of ethnicity/race which corresponds to

two competing theories of nationalism; one claiming that nations are an extension of kin

groups and the other that there is an essence, a primordial nature, which is a result of a

common history, culture and geographical position.4849

The importance of race/ethnicity has

been overstated in the Austro-German case and whilst not disregarding the importance that

may have been placed upon this „German essence,‟ it can be equally argued that Austria

shared similar ties within the Empire and therefore there was an „Austro-Hungarian essence‟.

Nevertheless, if ethnicity is defined against another group, it is likely that the Austrian

nobility would have defined its ethnicity against that of the Magyars and identified more

closely with the German states.50

Indeed, Karner‟s study on modern Austrian identity claims

that there is one essential German nation, comprising the blood, soil and people of both

47

Péter Medgyes and Katalin Miklós, „The Language Situation in Hungary‟, Current Issues

in Language Planning 1 (2000), pp. 148-242 (p. 149). 48

Pierre Van Den Berghe, „A Socio-Biological Perspective‟, in John Hutchinson and

Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 96-103. 49

John Hutchinson, „Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration‟, in John Hutchinson and

Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 122-131. 50

Walker Connor, „A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is and Ethnic Group, is a...‟, in John

Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 36-46 (p. 45).

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Germany and Austria; the often assumed belief that the Austrians and Germans, and therefore

Austrian nobility, were of the same essential and ethnic composition.51

This brief look at identity has therefore shown that when looking at the identity of the

Austrian nobility, Austria cannot be disentangled from its German heritage and that to an

extent Erdmann is correct to claim that Austria is part of a German Kulturnation, sharing a

common language and ethnicity with the other German states. This claim does appear to

negate Austria‟s integration within the Habsburg Empire. By comparing the themes of

religion, language and race/ethnicity it has been shown that Austria also had common

interests within the Empire and therefore, whilst situating the history and identity of the

Austrian nobility within a German Kulturnation, care must be taken not to solely construct a

German identity, nor do so to the exclusion of other vital characteristics.

It can be concluded that on the subject of nationalist feeling and shared identities, the

Austrian nobility are likely to have felt a greater affinity to their German counterparts, and to

have felt apprehension at their exclusion from their ethno-linguistic compatriots in Germany

but this position is largely overstated in the existing literature. Indeed this justification in part

led to the Anschluss given the greater weight and priority attached to ethno-linguistic ties,

much as Erdmann attaches far too much import to the idea of a Kulturnation. Whilst perhaps

mourning their exclusion from German unification on these grounds, the Austrian nobility

had other interests besides their ethnicity and language and therefore it is to the economy of

Austria, and the economic interests of the nobility that this paper will now turn.

The aim of the next section is to highlight that whilst sharing a German identity

outside of the Empire, it was actually within the Empire that the Austrian nobility found its

economic sphere of interest. This will be evidenced by an examination of the role of the

51

Christian Karner, „The “Habsburg Dilemma” Today: Competing Discourses of National

Identity in Contemporary Austria‟, National Identities 7 (2005), pp. 409-432 (pp. 411-412).

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Austrian nobility in Austria‟s economy followed by a look at regional specialisation within

the Empire. A discussion of the internal and external tariff barriers of the Habsburg Empire in

conjunction with the Prussian led Zollverein will lead to a conclusion as to whether exclusion

from a united Germany would have grossly affected the nobility‟s economic concerns.

Good notes the emergence of an entrepreneurial class within the Austrian and

Bohemian lands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and goes on to discuss the

integral role of the aristocracy in this emerging class, particularly in the iron industry.52

He

goes on to highlight the active involvement of the aristocracy in the industrial and financial

sectors of the Empire, an industrial sector which did not really exist in 1830 and was built

largely on the estates of the nobility, concluding that they effectively performed the role of

capitalists in other societies and helped to finance economic development.5354

Godsey points

to the unrivalled position of the land-owning aristocracy in the Empire, the economic power

that land-ownership entailed and going on to distinguish between the landowning courtly

society and the bureaucratic and entrepreneurial second society.55

He also notes that,

Despite aristocratic involvement in modern aspects of the economy, like banking and

industry, the basis of aristocratic Weltanschauung and prestige during our period

remained landowning. In this respect, the court nobility differed from the new

plutocracy of the industrial age, whose wealth had been derived through

entrepreneurship in the financial and commercial markets.

These two interpretations appear to contradict one another, with Good stating that the

aristocracy performed the role of an entrepreneurial, industrialising capitalist class and

52

Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 21-22. 53

Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, p. 233. 54

Helmut Haberl and Fridolin Krausmann, „Changes in Population, Affluence, and

Environmental Pressures During Industrialisation: The Case of Austria 1830-1995‟,

Population and Environment 23 (2001), pp. 49-69 (p. 57). 55

Godsey, Aristocratic Redoubt, pp. 59-61.

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Godsey stating that the nobility derived its wealth and power from the land, pointing to a

more agrarian economic base. This discrepancy can be alleviated by both Good and

Rudolph‟s acknowledgement of the role of the landowning aristocracy in developing

manufacturing industries upon their great estates.565758

Therefore the Austrian nobility had an

important role in financing and growing the industrial sector in Austria, and therefore within

the Empire.

Regional specialisation, combined with tariff barriers, provides the evidence in

highlighting the economic interests of the Austrian nobility. Good acknowledges the claims

that Vienna actively encouraged capitalist manufacturing in the western Austrian lands and

sought to hinder it in the east, thus providing the West with a market for its goods and a

source of raw materials from the East, culminating in the customs union which reinforced this

colonialism.59

In another of his studies, Good states that,

For the Empire the scattered evidence on trade, urbanisation, and industrial activity

reveals a modest gradient stretching from West to East in the later eighteenth century.

Habsburg mercantilism indirectly confirms such evidence since it aimed at promoting

regional specialisation between an industrial west and an agrarian east.60

Whether Vienna actually encouraged such specialisation or if the levels of

industrialisation reflected a European wide trend of west to east diffusion of industrialisation

is of little concern to this paper; the evidence shows that an easily accessible market existed

56


David F. Good, „Uneven Development in the Nineteenth Century: A Comparison of the

Habsburg Empire and the United States‟, Journal of Economic History 46 (1986), pp. 137-

151 (p. 148). 58

Richard L. Rudolph, „Economic Revolution in Austria? The Meaning of 1848 in Austrian

Economic History,‟ in John Komlos (ed.), Economic Development in the Habsburg

Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century: Essays (New York, 1983), pp. 165-182 (p. 171). 59


Good, „Uneven Development in the Nineteenth Century‟, pp. 140-141.

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for the manufactured goods of the Austrian nobility given the promotion of greater transport

links within the Empire.6162

Indeed, export figures of manufactured goods for the period

1841-1858 highlight this trend; Hungary exported between 1 and 1.3 million florins worth of

manufactured goods each year to Austria, whereas in the same period, Austria exported

between 32.7 and 46.9 million florins worth to Hungary.63

Outside of the Empire, Hungary

exported between 2.4 and 4 million florins worth of manufactured goods and Austria

exported between 25.2 and 34.3 million worth.64

These figures therefore confirm the fact that

the interests of the entrepreneurial second society and landowning courtly society had a

greater interest in Hungary as a market for their goods, as opposed to outside of the Empire.

Having shown that the Empire acted as a readymade market for the exports of the Austrian

nobilities manufactured goods due to industrial levels within the Empire, an analysis of the

tariff barriers of the Empire and Prussia-Germany will highlight the other reason for Austria

favouring Hungary as a market.

The elimination of the internal customs barrier between Austria and Hungary in 1851

had the effect of causing the price of agricultural products in Hungary to rise and in Austria

to fall, and the price of industrial goods to rise in Austria and fall in Hungary leading Komlos

to conclude that the customs union benefitted both partners after 1850.6566

This customs

union therefore had the effect of perpetuating the colonialism of Austro-Hungarian relations

and aided in, „Promoting regional specialisation between an industrial west and an agrarian

east.‟67

Good highlights the low levels of exports relative to the rest of Europe and Germany,

61

Patrick Karl O‟Brien, „The Foundations of European Industrialization: From the

Perspective of the World‟, Journal of Historical Sociology 4 (1991), pp. 288-316 (p. 289). 62

Good, „Uneven Development in the Nineteenth Century‟, p. 145. 63

Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, p. 118. 64




Good, „Uneven Development in the Nineteenth Century‟, p. 141.

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whilst simultaneously acknowledging the large volume and complementary nature of Austro-

Hungarian trade, a point concurred by Rudolph.6869

He concludes that whilst from a strictly

geographical point of view the customs union may not have been of vital importance, it

functioned sufficiently for both Austria and Hungary and assuring a market for their

specialised goods.70

Given this internal customs union, it is unsurprising to note the external barriers

erected by the Habsburg‟s and the preferential treatment for the exchange of goods within the

Empire.71

Komlos concludes that the main market for Austrian industrial products was

therefore Hungary, though noting that Austria could have done just as well with other

markets.72

So whilst both Good and Komlos note the functionality of the Habsburg custom

area and concentration of Austrian markets in Hungary and vice versa, they also both

conclude that the customs union was not a necessity to Austria. Pahre however claims that

whilst Hungary favoured lower external tariffs and looked to Germany as an export market,

Austria favoured higher external tariffs, saw Germany as a threat to its manufactured goods

and looked within the Empire for its markets.73

Therefore from these three arguments it can

be seen that whilst the Empire may not have been the best possible market for Austria, as per

Komlos, it was either a guaranteed market, on Good‟s argument, or a preferred market on

Pahre‟s view, given the subordination of economic policy to foreign policy.74

68


Rudolph, „Economic Revolution in Austria?‟, p. 171. 70



Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, pp. 218-219. 73

Robert Pahre, „Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary,

Sweden-Norway and the European Union‟, European Union Politics 2 (2001), pp. 131-162

(p. 148). 74

Pahre, „Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-

Norway and the European Union‟, p. 148.

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16

On the subject of the Prussian led Zollverein Hallerberg and Weber make the claim

that,

Prussia, recognising that internal trade impediments were obstructing national

prosperity, began the process by reducing and harmonising its remaining internal

tariffs soon after the Treaty of Vienna, and raising the tariffs (and enforcing them) for

goods headed outside of the country. It wanted a customs union, and by making it

more costly for its neighbours not to enter into a union it hoped to convince them to

change their minds.75

They go on to note that Prussia, due to its size and wealth, defined the terms for new

membership, negotiated with foreign countries, distributed revenues and that in the years

following 1850, the Austrian government‟s attempts to join were refuted by Prussia, by then

openly engaged in a struggle for the hegemonic position in Germany.7677

Therefore a

situation arose in which Austria was economically excluded from Germany, many years

before its political exclusion, adding additional weight to its reliance on the Empire as a

market. Within the central states of Europe, two rival customs areas thus existed, the Prussian

led Zollverein and the Habsburg‟s custom union, and given Prussia‟s insistence that Austria

remain excluded, and the internal removal of tariff barriers, Austria‟s nobility will have been

faced with an obvious avenue for their economic activities.

From this examination of the economic interests of the Austrian nobility, a number of

conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the aristocracy had both industrial and agrarian interests

within the Empire and the industrial growth which occurred upon their great estates is of

75

Mark Hallerberg and Katja Weber, „German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for

Integration Theory‟, Journal of European Integration 24 (2002), pp. 1-21 (p. 5). 76

Hallerberg and Weber, „German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for Integration

Theory‟, p. 5. 77

Hallerberg and Weber, „German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for Integration

Theory‟, p. 6.

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especial note. Industrial growth in the Austrian portion of the Empire, whether government

encouraged or not, differed from the more agrarian, slower eastern portion of the Empire and

indeed put it in an advantageous position within the Empire. With the eastern portion of the

Empire less industrialised, the Austrian nobility found a market for both investment and for

their manufactured goods, as evidenced by the levels of exported goods. With the removal of

internal tariff barriers and improvement in transport infrastructure, the Austrian nobility were

given added incentive to focus their economic activity towards Hungary, whilst the Prussian-

led Zollverein actively discouraged a more German centred economic sphere. It has therefore

been shown that despite their ethno-linguistic ties in Germany, the Austrian nobility focussed

their economic activity towards the Empire, highlighting that these characteristics do not

carry much weight when it comes to material concerns. This is not to claim that Austria did

not attempt to gain entrance to the Zollverein or to propose alternatives, nor that Prussian

initiative was met with equanimity. As the next section will highlight, Austria‟s foreign

policy was not one which accepted exclusion from German affairs and given the prominent

roles of the Austrian nobility in pursuing and formulating this policy, it is these issues which

need now to be explored.

The final section will explore the reaction of Austria‟s nobility, as expressed through

the actions of those in the employ of the Austrian state, to Prussia‟s growing influence

amongst the German states. This will show that as with their economic interests, the Austrian

nobility were not motivated by the elusive „German essence‟ and that the interests of the

Empire were deemed more important. It will begin with an examination of the competing

solutions to German unification: grossdeutsch; kleindeutsch; and Mitteleuropa. This will lead

to an exploration of the consistency of Austrian foreign policy in the decades following

Metternich‟s departure. This look at foreign policy, and those formulating it, will allow

conclusions to be made as to how specific members of the nobility perceived the issue of

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German unification and how they would have reacted to their exclusion from Bismarck‟s

kleindeutsch Reich.

Prior to examining Austrian foreign policy in the decades preceding German

unification, an exploration of the themes of kleindeutsch, grossdeutsch and Mitteleuropa will

allow a better understanding of the issues facing the respective Foreign Ministers. Birken

surmises the competing traditions as,

The first calling for the complete exclusion of Austria from the German state, the

second for the inclusion of German Austria, and the third for the inclusion of the

entire Austrian Empire, Prussia and the German statelets in a vast multinational

polity.78

Each of these solutions found supporters across the German states, though as Birken

goes on to argue, the grossdeutsch solution was the only one which genuinely represented an

attempt to realise the creation of a genuine German state.79

This statement itself represents

the issue previously highlighted in the discussion of Erdmann‟s claims; it presupposes the

existence of a German people of which Austria was a constitutive part. Such statements are of

little use in assessing the reaction of the Austrian nobility; any statement pertaining to

Austria‟s rightful inclusion or exclusion presupposes a German or Austrian identity.

Sondhaus, however, notes that in the Frankfurt parliament,

In October 1848, when voting on a motion for the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire

and inclusion of the German Austrian lands in a united Germany, the Austrians split

78

Birken, „Volkish Nationalism in Perspective‟, p. 135. 79

Birken, „Volkish Nationalism in Perspective‟, p. 135.

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into three roughly equal camps: those in favour, those opposed, and those casting no

vote at all.80

Clearly German unification was a contested issue, with pan-German nationalism an

important aspect, yet the attitudes and policies of the Austrian Foreign Ministers highlight

that as with economic interests, ethno-linguistic and historic ties were not of paramount

importance. Therefore it is to the issues of Austro-German integration that this paper now

turns, to assess the validity of claims that Austria should have been included within a unified

Germany and if Austensen is correct to assert the consistency of Habsburg foreign policy.

Of Prince Metternich, Austensen states that, „He regarded men such as Felix

Schwarzenberg, Karl von Buol-Schauenstein, Bernard von Rechberg, and a number of others

as the “pupils” of his “school.”‟81

Austensen goes on to claim that between 1849 and 1864,

unity without unification became Austria‟s main policy with regard to Germany, in the same

vein as had been previously pursued by Metternich.82

This policy of unity without unification

carries with it the implicit acknowledgement that neither Austria nor the Habsburg Empire as

a whole should be involved in German unification, on either a federal or unitary basis. A

memorandum of September 3rd

1849 from Metternich to Schwarzenberg contains the formers

views on Germany; unity was a German ideal, represented by the Holy Roman Empire and

German confederation whereas unification was a new concept that was largely impractical,

the grossdeutsch solution was impossible, the kleindeutsch would be nothing more than a

disguise for Prussian expansion and he therefore advocated the restoration of the

Confederation.83

Of the three solutions, Metternich advocated a policy closest to the

80

Lawrence Sondhaus, „Schwarzenberg, Austria, and the German Question, 1848-1851‟,

International History Review 13 (1991), pp. 1-20 (p. 1). 81

Austensen, „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?”‟, p. 42. 82

Austensen, „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?”‟, p. 44. 83

Austensen, „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?”‟, pp. 44-45.

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Mitteleuropa option, though accepting the exclusion of the non-Austrian Habsburg lands; a

strong German confederation, including Austria, was his desired German outcome.84

Schwarzenberg, much like Metternich, would not relinquish Austria‟s primacy in

Germany, but was prepared to use the medium sized states against Prussia rather than

compromising with Berlin and, according to Rock, had the intention of bringing all of the

Habsburg lands into the Confederation, making Austria the predominant power of

Germany.85

This interpretation is challenged by Austensen who claims that Schwarzenberg

promptly dropped plans for the inclusion of the non-German Habsburg lands and merely

considered this course initially because of the difficulties involved in maintaining the

Confederate and non-Confederate portions of the Empire separately.86

Sondhaus discusses

the various positions on the debate over Schwarzenberg‟s conduct and the interpretations of

his attempts to institute a Mitteleuropa empire of seventy millions: Schroeder‟s contention

that post 1848 Austria merely fought a defensive battle to maintain its position in Austria;

Austensen‟s claims that Schwarzenberg followed the Metternichian school and aimed for a

restored Confederation and conservative Austro-Prussian partnership; Rumpler‟s assertion

that above all Schwarzenberg desired an alliance with Prussia and all other actions pertained

to improving the Empire‟s bargaining power with Austria‟s rival; Lutz who argued that

Schwarzenberg indeed sought the Mitteleuropa empire of seventy millions; Sked‟s criticism

that Schwarzenberg was not a Metternichian, but a failed Realpolitiker; and finally Nipperdey

who attempts to reconcile the various positions by positing Schwarzenberg as a Realpolitiker

but noting that the Mitteleuropa program, the Reich of seventy millions, was still an attempt

84

Austensen, „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany”,‟ p. 204. 85

Kenneth W. Rock, „Felix Schwarzenberg, Military Diplomat‟, Austrian History Yearbook

11 (1975), pp. 85-100 (p. 94). 86

Austensen, „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany”,‟ p. 209.

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21

at confederate unity as opposed to federal unification.87

Whilst noting the range of opinion

and possible interpretations of the evidence, it has been shown that Schwarzenberg, much

like Metternich, did not attempt to include Austria within a unified federal Germany.

Sondhaus‟s work on Austria and the German Navy highlights Schwarzenberg‟s machinations

over Germany and a joint Navy, concluding that,

In the German question as a whole, Austria could not seriously consider a settlement

which would require the abandonment of her non-German territories; likewise, in the

navy question, she could only consider solutions which took into account the defence

of her interests in the Adriatic.88

The issue of the German Navy thus represents the Austrian interpretation of the

unification dilemma; unwilling to relinquish its rights in Germany, much like its influence

over the Navy, yet entirely against subsuming Austria within a unified Germany and severing

it from the Empire, thus contributing to a genuine Germany Navy; Schwarzenberg‟s hands

were tied. At one extreme he can be argued to have been attempting to maintain the status

quo of the Confederation, at the other he sought to create the Empire of seventy millions,

though still a confederacy of states. Schwarzenberg did not seek to include Austria in a

unified Germany, nor was he prepared to allow the confederate states to dissolve into a

Prussian led union.

Whilst Schwarzenberg pursued his confederate Empire, the task of convincing Prussia

at the Dresden conference fell to von Buol, who quickly became disillusioned and

recommended that the policy be dropped and Austria return to the Metternichian policy of

87

Sondhaus, „Schwarzenberg, Austria, and the German Question, 1848-1851‟, pp. 4-6. 88

Lawrence Sondhaus, „Mitteleuropa zur See? Austria and the German Navy Question 1848-

52‟, Central European History 20 (1987), pp. 125-144 (p. 143).

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22

reviving the federal diet, exclusive of the non-Austrian Habsburg lands.89

Austensen goes on

to claim that upon succeeding Schwarzenberg, von Buol‟s ideas were entirely Metternichian;

he did not attempt to include the Habsburg Empire within a grossdeutsch unification, nor

would he allow a kleindeutsch unification under Prussian hegemony and as already shown, he

was not enthusiastic about Schwarzenberg‟s Mitteleuropa solution, given the opposition of

Prussia and loss of prestige among the middle sized states.90

Schroeder illustrates this point in

a discussion of von Buol‟s relationship with Bruck over Austrian foreign policy and quotes

von Buol thus,

A great union with Germany in order to decide the issue vis-a-vis both East and West

is a beautiful but empty dream. Prussia feels nothing but hatred and envy toward us

and the small states can only at best be compelled to do what they feel like doing.91

Therefore, much like Schwarzenberg, von Buol sought to maintain Austrian prestige

within a German confederation, but did not seek to include the Empire or Austria lands

within a unified Germany; „His German policy as foreign minister was to assert Austria's

rights to leadership in Germany and to hold the line against Prussian pretensions to the

contrary.‟92

Indeed Austensen notes that despite their differences, both von Buol and von

Rechberg agreed that the German Confederation should remain the way it was.93

Von Rechberg, „Was fundamentally unsympathetic to the idea of making changes in

Germany and acquiesced in Austrian efforts to reform the German Confederation only with

the greatest reluctance.‟94

Elrod further goes on to claim that Rechberg‟s policy rested on

89

Roy A. Austensen, „Count Buol and the Metternich Tradition‟, Austrian History Yearbook

9 (1973), pp. 173-193 (pp. 182-183). 90

Austensen, „Count Buol and the Metternich Tradition‟, pp. 186-187. 91

Schroeder, „Bruck versus Buol‟, p. 212. 92

Austensen, „Count Buol and the Metternich Tradition‟, p. 187. 93

Austensen, „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany”,‟ p. 210. 94

Elrod, „Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition‟, p. 442.

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23

Metternichian principles; Austria should maintain the Confederation and independence of the

smaller states and that German issues were secondary to European issues.95

Rechberg‟s

repeated attempts to accommodate Prussia serve to highlight his interests in maintaining a

German Confederation over either a grossdeutsch or kleindeutsch solution. Kraehe does

however discuss Rechberg‟s reluctant backing of Baron von Dalwigk‟s grossdeutsch reform

plans for the Confederation, including a federal court, an alternating presidency between

Austria and Prussia, an assembly of delegates from the Landtage, the advancement of general

legislation and an executive committee based on trialism.96

This grossdeutsch reform was a

response to the possibility of the revival of the Prussian Union project and a proposal from

Baden calling for Prussian leadership of Germany.97

As with Metternich, Schwarzenberg, von

Buol and von Rechberg would not accept complete exclusion from German affairs, but were

equally opposed to greater Austrian involvement in German affairs; the Empire‟s sphere of

interest was to remain European and German affairs were but one aspect of this outlook.

This examination has shown that there was considerable consistency in Austria‟s

foreign policy and attitude towards German unity and unification. The nobility who guided

Austria policy between 1848 and 1864 thus followed a similar course in Germany; Austria

was to retain its position within a confederation of German states, preferably with a

conservative alliance with Prussia. The impracticality of subsuming Austria into a unified

Germany prevented the grossdeutsch solution, which would have been likely to precipitate

the collapse of the Habsburg Empire or reduce its prestige to that of a secondary power, from

becoming a reality and likewise a retreat from Germany went against Austria‟s historic rights,

95

Elrod, „Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition‟, p. 442. 96

Kraehe, „Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation‟, p. 283. 97

Kraehe, „Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation‟, p. 282.

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24

thus rendering the kleindeutsch solution equally, if not considerably more, abhorrent.98

The

evidence for the Mitteleuropa plan is tentative at best but even assuming Schwarzenberg had

genuinely considered this a suitable alternative to German unification, the case remains that

this was to be a confederation of states, not a unitary state. These Austrian nobles did not

want to be included with a unified Germany; they wanted to retain Austria‟s rights within the

German Confederation, a separate Austrian existence.

The reaction of the Austrian nobility to German unification under a kleindeutsch

program can be highlighted by von Rechberg, who in response to Bismarck‟s suggestion that

Austria focus its attentions upon Hungary, replied that Austria intended to preserve its

historic rights in Germany.99

For Hobelt,

The Habsburgs and a majority of their bureaucratic and aristocratic camp-followers

clearly opted to hold on to the Empire they had got rather than exchange it for an

uncertain future as overlords of the new Germany.100

Whilst acknowledging the cultural identity shared between the ethno-linguistic

German states, including Austria, Breuilly rightly acknowledges that, „National identity is not

a mysterious cultural essence which can endure without appropriate political and economic

conditions.‟101

This paper has therefore evidenced that economically and politically, the

Austrian nobility were not focussed upon the German states, at least not to the extent that

they were focussed upon the Empire. The Empire acted as a market for entrepreneurial and

industrial activity, the nobility had avenues for investment and a market for their

98

Bo Strath, „Mitteleuropa: From List to Naumann‟, European Journal of Social Theory 11

(2008), pp.171-183 (p. 176). 99

Kraehe, „Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation‟, p. 290. 100

Lothar Hobelt, „The Austrians in the German National Assembly in 1848‟, Parliaments,

Estates and Representation 18 (1998), pp. 91-101 (p. 95). 101

John Breuilly, „Nations and Nationalism in Modern German History‟, Historical Journal

33 (1990), pp. 659-675 (p. 662).

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25

manufactured goods. Politically, the Austrian nobility, as embodied in the foreign ministers,

followed a policy aimed at maintaining Austria‟s position in the German Confederation, but

only as a part of their European policy which concerned the Empire as a whole. They wanted

to maintain Austria‟s historic rights but were not willing to disentangle Austria from the

Empire for inclusion in a unified Germany, nor were they willing to concede a kleindeutsch

solution to Prussia.

It is therefore most likely that whilst there may have been lamentation at the exclusion

of Austria from German unification, it arose as a result of ethno-linguistic ties being severed

and an acknowledgement of the decline in Austrian prestige, not as a result of any practical

concern. Economically the nobility will have found little change in the situation, the

Zollverein having already excluded them from the common German economic union.

Politically, the Austrian‟s had failed at maintaining a presence in Germany but given the

pursuit of policies aiming at maintaining a confederacy of states, it could be argued that the

exclusion of Austria from German unification only represents a partial failure. The Austrian

nobility did not want to be included in a unified German state; a confederacy became

impossible, therefore exclusion became inevitable.

Erdmann‟s claims that Austrian history needs to be relocated in that of a German

Kulturnation relies on the ethno-linguistic links between the two. This paper has shown that,

for the nobility at least, these links are not the only ones of relevance. If Austrian history is to

be placed within a framework, it can equally be placed within a similar one to the

Mitteleuropa solution. To this end, Boyer claims,

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26

Austrian history is embedded in the cultural history of the various German-speaking

lands, and, in a much less predictable fashion, a part of the institutional and policy

history of what might loosely be called Central European state development.102

Indeed, Spohn concurs, noting that Austrian identity, „Oscillated between an Empire-

oriented, regional Austrian as well as pan-German nationalism.‟103

It would be folly to

attempt to disentangle Austrian history from either its German or Empire roots and therefore

any attempt to retroactively place Austria in a grossdeutsch framework, or to claim the

injustice of the kleindeutsch unification, presupposes the importance of nationalist sentiment

over political and economic reality.

102

John W. Boyer, „Some Reflections on the Problem of Austria, Germany, and

Mitteleuropa‟, Central European History 22 (1989), pp. 301-315 (p. 314). 103

Willfried Spohn, „Austria: From Habsburg Empire to a Small Nation in Europe‟, in

Atsuko Ichijo and Willfried Spohn (eds.), Entangled Identities: Nations and Europe

(Hampshire, 2005), pp. 55-71 (p. 55).

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27

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Austrian Nobles, Unity and the Kleindeutsch Solution

Documents

einheit oder einigkeit

bernhard von rechberg

bruck versus buol

domestic political origins

promoting regional specialisation

robert moriers views

central european crossroads

holy roman empire