Australia's Defence Cooperation Program · levelled at the DC it would seem that an evaluation of the Program is warranted. Australia's Defence Cooperation Program concludes with

prepared for general distribution to Members of the Auatmlian Parliament. Parliament are reminded that thia ia not an Austmlian Government document, but

a paper prepared by the author and pubbhed by the Parliamentary Research Service to contribute to enators and Members. The view expressed in this Paper are those of the

author and do not reflect thoae of the B Service and are not to be attributed to the Department of the Parliamentary Library.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

. . . . . . . . . . . .

trategic Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ppropriateness of DCP Strategic Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

. . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Australia's Regional Standing and the Future of DCP Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

efence Cooperation Destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

sistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1 . An Overview of Australian DCP Aid: 1973-93 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

. Australian uinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

sia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4 . Australian DCP ore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

to Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 . Australian DCP Aid to Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

8 . Australian DCP Aid to Southwest Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

u s t d d s Defence Cooperation i

able 1:

Table 3:

Table 4:

Table 5:

Table 6:

Table 7:

Table 12:

able 13:

Table 15:

Table 16:

Australian DC by Country ($A millions) . . . . . . . Australian percentages.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e . 6 Australian DC ($A millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . m . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8

United States military aid to selected Asia-Pacific Nations ($US millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Australian DCP to PNG ($A millions) . . . . . . . . 12-13

Australian DCP to Malaysia ($A millions) . . . . . . . . 16

to Singapore ($A millions) . . . e . . 19-20

illions) . . . . e .

millions) . . . . . . . us tralia to on Islands (

illion) . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

to Vanuatu ($A millions) . . e . . . . . . 35

stern Samoa ( millions) . 37

millions) . - . . . . . . . . 39

- General Assistance ons) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

ii A a's tion

ACFOA:

.

MEAN:

DPR:

EEZ:

FMS:

.

PM:

RTAF:

TDS:

ian Development Assistance

Australian International Development Assistance Bureau

Association of South East Asian Nations

Defence Public Relations (Australian Department of Defence)

Exclusive Economic Zone

epublic of Singapore Airforce

oyal Thailand Airforce

Royal Thailand

Singaporean Armed Forces

ration m iii

$76.1 million. For most of the last two decades the DCP vote has remained close to one percent of the total Defence budget.

This paper provides an analysis of the CP over a twenty year period, drawing many of its findings from statistical data provided in the appendices at the end of the publication. The tables reveal trends in the nature of DCP support to recipient countries over time and point to the likely future development of the Program. It is noted that the percentage value of Defence Cooperation funding to the Southeast Asian states has been in decline since the early 1980s and that there has been a rapid rise for the Southwest Pacific, This shift in funding was due to the declining communist threat in Southeast Asia, as well as the maturation of the economic and military capabilities of many Asian states. At the same time there was a growing Australian awareness of the physical and economic vulnerability of the South

ficant criticisms that have been nate committee report, the 198 senior analysts and jou

uals from some of the DCP recipient

an alleged lack of definition in the strategic objectives of the The 1984 Senate DCP report and the 1986 Auditor-General's report on the DCP claimed that there was a lack of definition in the Program's objectives. The Senate committee claimed that the DCP appeared to operate in a policy vacuum, while the Auditor- General believed that the lack of definition in DCP objectives made it difficult for Defence personnel to implement DCP projects and evaluate them once underway. The Department of Defence appears to have acknowledged these significant criticisms: DCP objectives are now clearly stated in Department of Defence information and is now freely available to the public;

the appropriateness of the objectives that have been officially identified. Some critics have suggested that the strategic objectives of the DCP reflect Cold War imperatives rather than the current strategic situation of the Asia-Pacific region. Drawing upon

effectiveness of s een that defence cooperation activities with states such as New Guinea and Indonesia have failed to meet the

objectives of the DCP pro am. These recipients, some critics suggest, use DCP funding t eople rather than enhance their external secur funding has not always been appropriate but recent initiatives such as the Pacific Patrol Boat project have attracted wide support from the South Pacific region.

0 the overlap of DCP projects with civilian aid programs. Some critics have argued that the DCP involvement in 'civil' projects overlaps with the work of the civilian aid agencies, and that needless repetition of work occurs because of the lack of coordination. This appears to have been a real concern during the early 1980s but sources from both the Departments of Defence, and Foreign Affairs and Trade argue that this is less of a problem at present;

ved Australia's a in~l le /~olomon

In order to evaluate the criticisms of.the DCP and the extent of the changes that have occurred over the last decade this paper follows the evaluative structure employed by the 1984 Senate DCP report. Given the scope and quantity of the criticisms that have been levelled at the DC it would seem that an evaluation of the Program is warranted.

Australia's Defence Cooperation Program concludes with an assessment of the possible future direction of Australia's DCP program. It is noted that the Southwest Pacific will continue to require a

acific micro-states will continue to have inadequate economic resources to meet many of their own security needs. By contrast the economies and armed forces of the Southeast Asian states have matured and they no longer require Defence assistance. Instead they are seeking defence cooperation of equals - usually these arrangements fall outside the DCP program. A number of bilateral agreements are already in place between Australia and its northern neighbours and these types of arrangements appear set to increase.

nding under the DC

Australia's Defence Cooperation 1

respectively. These inflated budgets were the result of the transfer to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) of Australian defence assets based in PNG at the time of that country's independence.

This paper seeks to assess the trends and the effectiveness of the Defence Cooperation Program. While the DCP accounts for only a small part of the total Defence budget, it has attracted a considerable amount of public attention. In particular, criticisms have been directed at: an alleged lack of definition in DCP strategic objectives; the appropriateness of the objectives officially identified; the limited achievements made against specific DCP projects; the overlap of DCP with civilian aid programs; the impact of DCP upon Australia's regional standin the future direction of aid. Given the

ogram, it would seem that an evaluation is wa~an ted .

nd ~uan t i ty of the criticisms 1

to provide an analysis of the tatistical data. This inform

appendices at t e end of this paper.

The appendices provide important statistical information and commentary on Australian DCP funding. They reveal the recipient countries, the size of the DCP budget and the type of assistance provided. The tables in this publication have been created from data contained in the Senate Standing Committee report Australia's Defence Co-opration with Its Neighbours in the Asian-Pacific Region, the

ance Statements: Defence Portfolio and Explanatory Notes: ~ e ~ a r t ~ e n t of Defence between 1977-78 and 1993-94. Some additional i n f o ~ a t i o n has also been obtained from Hansard. These sources were not able to provide complete statistical runs in all tables in all years. The ~epa r tmen t of lied the missing

1. 'Administration of the Defence Cooperation Program', Section 5.1, Report of the Auditor-General u p n audits, t?.~atninations and inspections under the Audit and other Acts, March 1986: 6. Hereafter r e f e d to the Auditor-General's report on the DCP.

2 All currency amounts are Australian dollars, and unless otherwise stated.

years are Financial Years,

A ~ t ~ i a ~ Defence C o o ~ ~ ~ o n m

r record provided o

'Facilities for Training in Australia'.

In a submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign llffairs and Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs noted that the primary goal of the Defence Cooperation Program was military in orientation. It was intended that the DCP program would compensate for the drawdown of direct Australian military involvement in Asia during the 1970s. The DCP, it was hoped,-would 'assist in fulfilling our role of maintaining and furthering Australia's defence interest in South East Asia.'* Foreign Affairs also noted that the Program had a number of non-military aims, which include:

advance bi~ateral elationships in which defence ,

of the friendly an co-operative association with other ~ountries;

(b) to promote political stability and economic civil aid projects where they take pla

owth in the region nder the program;

(c) to foster friendly attitudes towards Australia on a popular level?

then, Defence Cooperation was claimed to have two broad aims. Firstly, it was intended to strengthen the defence capabilities of nations within Australia's area of strategic interest, and thereby foster regional stability. Secondly, it aimed to enhance Canberra's wider security interests, which include diplomatic and economic considerations. There has been, however, some criticism of these aims.

3 This paper partially follows the evaluative structure employed by the 1984 Senate DCP report, in order to gauge the extent of the changes that have occurred within the program since that time.

4 Australia's Defence Coopration with Its Nei&Bours in the Asian-Pacific Region, The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, AGPS, Canberra, 1984: 5. (hereafter r e fend to as the Senate DCP report, 1984.)

5 Senate DCP report, 1984: 6. These points were made as a part of a submission to the Senate Standing Committee by the Department of Foreign Affairs,

ration m

... the Committee has reservations regarding the functioning of the Defence Co- operation Program. The failure of the Departments involved (Defence, Foreign Affairs and Defence Support) to spell out clearly the objectives, pu- and criteria of the program raises questions about the clarity of those objectives and the effectiveness of the program in achieving them!

The Senate Committee contended that there was only minimal awareness within Australia of the objectives of the Defence Cooperation Program. Furthermore, it was noted that the Government departments involved in the program had not taken the opportunity provided by the Senate investigation to explain the DCP objectives. The limited explanation given to the inquiry was, the Senate committee complained, couched in vague terminolo the impression 'of events occurring in a policy

These findings were corroborated by the Auditor-General in 1986 when

Since these observations in 1984 and 1986, however, efforts have been made to clarify the aims and objectives of the DCP. Because of this, public awareness of the Defence Cooperation Program has increased significantly over the last five or six years. The Australian media has played a major role in focussing greater public attention on the program, prompting the Department of Defence to boost its public relations in this area. Defence Public Relations (DPR) now freely provides information on the DCP relationship between Australia and each of the aid recipients. The information is still of a general nature but it clearly states the objectives of the pro am. It is noted that:

The structure of bilateral defence relationships and the nature of cooperative defence activities undertaken varies with the countries concerned, taking account

6

7

8.

Senate DCP report, 1984: 7

Senate DCP report, 1984: 53-4,

Auditor-General's report on the DCP: 8.

owever,

sha

contribute to each countlty's defence self-

utual understanding and recognition of respective

plied on the specific objectives of DCP aid to each of the recipient nations. For instance the DPR briefing notes observe that DCP activities with Indonesia are structured around the outcome of the Bilateral Defence Discussions but aim 'to build personnel and professional relationships to increase understanding between the defence establishments of both countries.'

In its findings, the Senate DCP report also suggested that defence cooperation objectives could be made clearer by the detailed breakdown of DCP funding. It was argued that this action would promote a more informed public debate on the aims of the program." Following this suggestion, in 1988-89 the budget-related Explanatory Notes began

of a d to each recipient. The r a dr specific DCP programs over

has had the effect of the last five years suggests that t romoting discussion on Australia's

tives

nee attempts to clarify ement remains as to th

objectives in recent years, ropriateness of these goals.

Dr Stewart Woodman of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre has suggested that the strategic underpinn of the program need to be reassessed in the light of the end of Cold War." To bac assertion, Woodman points to the Australian-PNG relationship argues that Canberra's funding of Defence Cooperation activities with Port Moresby is based on the Cold War strategy of denying an external power access to PNG and thereby complicating Australia's security

ironment. But his claims do not reflect the true nature of the stralia-PNG relationship, or the trends that are observable in the

ata relating to DCP assistance.

9 'Cooperative Defence Activities with Public Relations, April 1993.

10 Senate DCP report, 1984: 65. Greater financial visibility and accountability was also advocated by the Auditor-General's DCP report: 9.

man cited in Mask Metherell, 'Redefining regional defence aid', The Age? 23 Sept 1992.

a's Defence Cooperation m

high level of civil aid provided by (Australian International

capabilities to perform a number of national roles, including internal and external security. Funding is allocated for: ADF loan personnel; the training of PNGDF personnel; the provision of equipment such as Nomad training aircraft and assistance for a helicopter capability; and assistance with survey and mapping in the PNGDndonesian border area. l2

Another indication that the objectives of the Australian DCP Program are based not on Cold War 'strategic underpinnings' but rather post- Cold War imperatives, may be deduced from the statistical data of the Defence Cooperation Program itself. During the Cold War, Southeast

cies declined in the early robust, the justification

eater portion of its resources to . DCP funding to Southeast Asia

moved away from the supply of equipment and towards personnel exchanges. In 1972-73 the five Southeast Asian nations included in Table 1 (Appendix 1, pp.4-5) accounted for 99. 7 percent of the DCP budget, by 1984-85 this had dropped to 49.74 percent, and by 1992-93 this percentage was only 26.21.

As funding to Asia declined, assistance to the South Pacific rose from 0.03 percent to 35.17 percent of the DCP budget between 1972-73 and 1992-93 (see Appendix 1, pp.7-8). The growth in DCP allocations to the region was initially prompte Soviet presence in the Pacific during the mid-1980s. By 1990-91 this threat had also diminished and DCP funding was adjusted to this change in circumstances. A large portion of the Defence Cooperation budget in the Pacific is now aimed at providing training and study opportunities

12 Program Performance Statements, 1992-93: Defence Portfolio, Appendix 7: 530- 32.

states in order

better placed to provide engineering in remote locations.

otect fishing resources

These priorities suggest that the ~us t ra l ian underpinned by Cold War objectives as Stewa suggested. Indeed, the D e p ~ m e n t of Defence has demonstrated that it is cognisant of the numerous changes that have occurred in the Asia- Pacific region over the last fifteen or twenty years, and has adjusted its DCP priorities accordingly. While the strategic underpinnings of the DCP would appear to reflect the current strategic situation of the Asia-Pacific region, there are a number of problems associated with some of the specific projects initiated under that program. The following pages suggest that more frequent and critical reviews projects are necessary to improve the effectiveness of DCP fu

e et~ve ee

ublic and political reservations about the effectivenes$ e last decade. Thi t the allocation

initiatives have continued to emerge over will assess a number of complaints a

rd to Indone$ia and phs will also address o he Pacific Patrol

Indonesia has long been a destination of ~us t ra l ian CP funding. But its poor human rights record, its invasion of East Timor, and its suppression of the Fretelin and OPM resistance movements, have caused some Australian observers to challenge the appropriateness of DCP assistance to Jakarta. Robin Osborne notes that during the mid- 1980s Australian DCP allocations to Indonesia were averaging out at approximately $10 million per annum13. He notes that during the 1970s and early 1980s this was being spent on:

13 At the same time the United States was supplying more than $40 million per annum in defence aid to Indonesia: military equipment and the training of Indonesian personnel accounted for most of this aid. See US Foreign Assistance Legislation for F M Y ~ r s 1986-87 (prt 5), Hearings and Markup Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Con , First Session, Feb. 20 - March 20, 1985: 13.

's Defence Cooperation 7

Sabre jets, providing small ' tenance and continui

umerous critics have argued that Australian an other Western defence funding was used, not to guarantee Indonesia from external threats, but to suppress internal problems. According to Osborne, Jakarta was able to achieve this most effectively given the level of defence assistance from Australia, and the higher level of funding from the US. However, the DCP relationship ceased in 1988 when Indonesia took exception to David Jenkins' Sydney Morning Herald article on corruption in the Suharto family.

As part of an attempt to rejuvenate AustralianJndonesian relations, defence cooperation with Indonesia resumed in 1990-91, under a bilateral defence cooperation agreement. In 1992-93 $3.041 million was allocated for this purpose. It has been argued that this figure could increase in the following years given that the US Congress decided to withdraw military aid in mid-1992 in response to the Dili massacre. l5 Some commentators believe that Australia should follow the US lead and discontinue all military assistance. This would,

counter-productive to stralian security easons. ~ i r s t ly , it is the aim he DCP to foster

iplomatic relations: the ~ t h d r a w a l of this ndermine ~ a n b e ~ a ts to enter into a closer ts neighbours. Sec the maintenance of the

t ion$hi~ does give ~ u s t r a l i a an entree to high- ment officials, and may provide Canberra with

at least a modicum of influence over 1.ndonesian domestic and foreign activities.

ustralian military assistance to PNG has a1 come into public focus over the last five or six years because of the ugainville crisis. Port Moresby's blockade of Bougainville Island to reduce the BRA support base, and the deployment of PNGDF troops to the island, has called Australia's continuing defence cooperation with PNG into question, In ~articular, DCP funding came under scrutiny in 1990 because of allegations that the ex-Australian helicopters were being armed by the PNGDF for use as helicopter gunships? ~r i t ic ism of the DCP then

14 Indonesia's Secret War: 146-47.

15 Mark Metherell, 'US Indon. split on defence training', The Age, 1 July, 1992.

16 Sonya Voumard, 'Review defence aid abuse, says Amnesty', The Age, 11 July, 1991. Colonel Leo Nuia, the former commander of PNG troops on Bougainville, has eombora€ed Amnesty claims that the four Australian Iroquois helicopters were used as gunships. See James Grubel, 'Aid to PNG looks past rights abuse',

8 Australia's Defence Cmperation m

acific neighbours, particularly PNG.'17

m i l e this paper argues that the strategic objectives of the DC largely compatible with Australia's security interests, the achieve men^ made against these aims are less satisfactory. Dr Woodman is right to note that there are problems associated with the PNG/Australia Defence Cooperation relationship. The problems are not the consequence of ill-defined strategic objectives but rather an inadequate political understanding which can lead to defence aid being used against Australia's own interests, including its human-rights convictions. In a recent report, Amnesty International alleged that a number of human rights violations had been perpetrated by members of the PNGDF against residents of Bougainville Island.18 It might be argued from this report that the DCP has the potential to create an embarrassing situation for Australia: the supply of ex-Australian helicopters to PNG is one such example of a DCP project running contrary to Australi anitarian concerns. However, the longer term benefits of the a New Guinea would be seen by the

artment of Defe roblem of short-term e of supplied h

Uneasiness at the rising level of viole ougainville Islan G caused Bob Hawke to call for a revision of

to in August 199L1' ed be d d away from the sup YlS

and military infrastructure towards law and order, His suggestion may be a viable solution to uncertainties over the connection between Indonesian human rights abuses and Australian DCP assistance but it is not workable in the case of PNG. Australia is the principal supplier of defence aid to Port Moresby: without it the PNGDF would see a rapid decline in capabilities?' Nor can PNG afford to equi

The Age, 13 Aug. 1991,

17 Mark met here^, '€&defining regional defence aid'.

18. Amnesty International %port, Under the Barrel ofa Gun: Bougainville 1991-93, 19 November, 1993.

19 Tony Parkinson, 'Hawke wants defence aid to PNG blsed in crime war', The Australian, 29 August, 1991,

20. In 1990 the Papua New Guinea Defence expenditure totalled $US49.82 million (or approximately $A71 million if the Australian dollar is valued at approximately 70 US cents. In 1989-90 Australia supplied PNG with $A37.886

a's Defence Cmpmtion P m p m 9

version of Aus

funding, There is no way that Australia could have foreseen this eventuality at the time that the helicopters were supplied. If Australia decided to halt DCP funding to Port Moresby, Canberra would need to consider other arrangements to guarantee PNG security. One alternative to the current level of DCP funding is for Australia to enter into an agreement to underwrite PNG security. This would, however, be an even less workable arrangement because Australian security would then be subject to an undue level of influence from PNG,

Claims that Australia's Defence Cooperation projects are inconsistent with Canberra's human rights stance have also been made in relation to a number of other DCP destinations. In late 1992 a Tongan MP recommended that Canberra should drop its military assistance to Tonga and support the island's push for greater democracy. Mr Akilisi Pohiva asserted that there were no external military threats to Tonga and that the island's armed farces were intended to 'intimidate ordinary Tongans.'21 In the instance of Tonga, however, DCP

towards the provision of non-offensive allocated to Tonga under uthwest Pacific' head in^ ree Pacific Patrol

noted that these boats are from fishing poachers.22 ed exercises, study and e (TDS) personnel in

Australia, the loan of AIDF personnel to the TDS, and the constructi of a communications network and small armoury for the TDS.23 these programs only the armoury project might possibly be claime 'intimidate' Tongans because of the weapons held within the faci But it is true that any defence force could in theory be directed to the suppression of the local population. In order to assure that it is not held responsible for providing the TDS with capabilities to suppress its

million in DCP assistance which equates to approximately 53.5 percent of the total PNG budget. Without this DCP funding the PNGDF would see a significant decline in its capabilities.

21 'Tongan MP urges Au t . to scrap defence aid', The Canberra Times, 26 November, 1992.

22 'Tongan M p urges Aust. to scrap defence aid', 26 Nov. 1992.

23 Further definition of these expenditure items may be found in the Ekplanatory Notes: Defence Portfolio and Program Performance Statements: Defence Portfolio, between 1989-90 and 1993-94.

1 m

its own strategic objectives and regional security.

Criticism of the DCP has also issued from the Solomon Islands but this would seem largely a reaction to the September 1992 PNGDF raid into Solomon Islands territory, and Australia's part in arming the PNGDF with the capabilities to achieve this. Over the last five years DCP funding to the Solomons has included allocations for: two Pacific Patrol Boats (PPB); the construction of a PPB base; channel clearance; the provision of a small hydrographic vessel and equipment to chart inshore waters of the Solomon Islands; development of a national surveillance centre; the loan of ADF advisory personnel; and, training and study visits for Solomon Islands personnel in Australia. In late 1992 Honiara requested that Australia redirect Solomon Islands DCP funding to provide protection alang the Solomon IslandsPNG border on Bougainville Island? Recognising the legitimacy of the Solomon Islands security concerns, Australia decided in late April 1993 to supply six small, fast patrol boats to assist Honiara in the surveillance

r with PNG.25 In this

P that has enjoyed a generally favourable response arly criticism of the PPBs from the Pacific

islands gave way to an ap~reciation of the vessels' capabilities in EEZ surveillance:

More and more the island nations are coming to appreciate the advantages of possessing patrol boats. [There is] a feeling of satisfaction at being able to arrest poachers without having to call on outside help.

The PPBs enable the island nations to exercise sovereignty - an essential component of nationhood and important for national self-esteem.26

ile there has been some criticism of PNG's use of its ougainville, the majority of opinion has been in

to of

24 'Solomons wants Aust. defence aid redirected', The Canbema ZYmeq 20 November, 1992.

2% Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, 'Patrol Boats for Solomom', The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 April, 1993.

26 Dora Alves, 'Patrol boats foster regional stability', Pacific Defence Reprter, June 1990: 18-19.

a's Defence Cooperation Iz-2 11

In summary then, DCP funding has had mixed success to date. There are many strengths in the program but there is still room for improvement. Australia could enhance the effectiveness of its DCP funding by more fully appreciating the political consequences of each of the DCP projects. While the reasons for the provision of certain types of aid might seem appropriate at the time of funding, there are sometimes consequences of these projects that do not become obvious until after the aid has been provided. DCP projects need to be assessed frequently and with the particular recipient's requirements (and potential risks of the program) in mind. With the more careful direction of DCP funds the program's contribution to Australian security could be furt

ver

other issue of int overlap betw and military overseas

ate committee, the Australian

ced to provide non-military assistance than the Department of Defence. But in 1984 The Report o f the Committee to Review the Australian verseas Aid Program (the Jackson Report) was less concerned about the DCP/AIDAB relationship. It noted that 16 percent of the DCP budget was civil in nature but concluded that many of the Defence Cooperation projects complemented Australia's civil aid," Nor was the Senate report concerned by the alleged overlap of programs, noting that there was a

27 'Patrol boats foster regional stability'.

28 Program Performance Statements, 1993-94: Defence Portfolio: 38 1. Fiji was originally included in the initial PPB project but was excluded after the 1987 coup in that country. It was subsequently reinsta a PPB recipient in 1993.

29 Report of the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid March 1984: 54,

m, AGPS,

1 In

orei

The Senate committee was not able to determine w efence was less efficient than the Department of its provision of some civilian development assistance.

In some instances the committee believed that Defence personnel were better placed to provide some engineering works than the civil authorities. The 1986 Auditor-General's report, however, did express some reservations about the DCP/ADAB relationship. I t was noted that 'co-ordination and consultation between Defence and the Australian Development Assistance Bureau ... require improvement to achieve better integration of civil aid a~t iv i t ies . '~~

Using the Jackson Report definition of 'civilian' assistance, this type of aid would probably exceed 16 percent of the 1992-93 DCP budget

cts for the Sout

tame given its resources an ponsible for a number of other

might be defined as non-military, including: the Western n Police Communications system ($0.205 million); the Kiribati Communications system ($0.172 million); and, the Fijian Rural

Development Unit ($0.973 million). The communications projects were oversighted by the ADF because of its expertise in rugged, secure communications technology and because no other organisation had the expertise to manage the project. Secondly, the Fijian Rural Development Unit Project was funded by the Do

Military Forces ( because it was a

30

31.

32

Senate DCP Report: 59.

Auditor-General's BCP report: 8.

The Jackson Report claimed that 'civil' elements of the DCP budget included survey and mapping, river and harbour clearance, provision of training and equipment where there is both a civil and a military application, maritime surveillance, and anti-smu ng activities. See Jackson

capability to effectively unrest and internal secu funded this project, for the development of 'a community-based policing strategy?

out police tasks associated with civil While the DCP program could have

as able to provide appropriate assistance

In summary, while the DCP does undertake civilian aid projects, there is no evidence to suggest that DCP activities run contrary to the aims of the AIDAB program. Indeed, there would appear to be a large degree of cooperation between the two organisations. The majority of DCP funding is specifically military in orientation, being earmarked for military training, exchange of defence personnel, and the development of force capabilities. But even the types of assistance that have dual application do not appear to conflict with AIDAE3 initiatives because the DCP program is able to provide very specific know-how for some

is able to provide sensitive types of rovision t ~ r o u g h the DCP might be

nd, there is ason under the of AI

ile there are persisting tensions in Australia's elationship with Indonesia and Malaysia, Australia's image in th a-Pacific region is generally favourable. AIDAB has made a si t contribution to the living standards of Australia's neighbours, and the DCP has made a serious effort to improve the security of the nations in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Comments such as those made by Geoffrey

inister of the Cook Islands, are not uncommon:

Henry spoke appreciatively of Australia's understanding of the Cook Islands' economic situation. He was enthusiastic about multilateral arrangements to protect regional r"esou1y=e8 and saw opportunities for cent Pacific nations to co-

33. Question upon notice (No.376) from Senator Chamarette to Senator Evans, Hanslard (Senate), 30 Aug. 1993: 619.

34. Hansard (Senate), Question No.376: 619.

ted by the Australian Council for evelopment Dossier No.31, ACF

d (ACFOA) in, Aid

Department 'noted expressions tries for many of the DCP

projects.'37 There have, however, been some instances where Australia's DCP activities have met with criticisms: Honiara's rebuke to Canberra after the PN raid into Solomon Islands' territory i is one such example. his matter was subsequently resol Honiara's satisfaction. However, Canberra will have to pay close attention to the emphases of the program if it hopes to preserve and enhance regional perceptions of Australia and the DCP. Well- conceived plans for the future directions of DCP funding could reduce the likelihood of other embarrassments (such as the Bougainville/Solomon Islands issue) to the program.

Future Defence Cooperation Des

The gradual shift in DCP funding from Southeast Asia to the Southwest Pacific over the last decade (see Appendix 1, Tables 2 and 3) was in accordance with the c vironment of the

e on external see their physical remoten vulnerabilities of these states, and the continuing pockets of instability in the region, it would seem prudent for Australia to at least maintain current levels of funding to the Southwest Pacific for the foreseeable future.

ile this paper argues that the Southwest Pacific should be a major concern of the DCP, it should not be the only focus of the program. Given that Canberra seeks to be engaged in Southeast Asia, it must continue to seek to build bilateral security relationships in that region, though not as it has done traditionally. Many of the recipient states in Southeast Asia, notably the MEAN states, have matured

36

37.

38

Tatrol bats foster regional stability': 19,

Auditor-General's report on the DCP: 29.

See especially, David Hegarty, Small State Securityin the South Pacific ~ o r ~ n g Paper No.126, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canb

seeking to establish a greater range of bilateral defence agreements that acknowledge an equality in the security relationship. This is being achieved both under the DCP, and independently of it. For example the renewed Australian-Indonesian bilateral defence cooperation relationship is being funded under the DCP heading of 'Bilateral Cooperative Activities with Indonesia' in the 1993-94 Program Performance Statements). At the same time, Canberra is fostering co-operative defence activities with other nations separately from the DCP: the signing of the Australian-Singaporean defence science cooperation agreement on 24 March 1993 is one such instance of this new trend. These are desirable developments and Canberra should continue to encourage the development of a network of defence relationships based upon mutual cooperation.

Australian security would be well-served by a network of bilateral defence relationships with its Southeast Asian neighbours. The MEAN states should remain as the primary recipients of Australia's

defence assistanc mitations on t

tralian public withi merits in forging

Australian-Vietnamese relationship could be established via economic aid rather than the more sensitive defence aid option. Subject to the success of the economic relationship, Canberra could consider allocating funds in the following decade for Vietnamese training and study visits to Australia.

e fo of ce

noted, efforts of the DCP to impro South Pacific islands have met w

the surveillance capabilities of a great deal of praise from the

islands themselves. The most publicised of these efforts was the Pacific Patrol Boat program and the associated command and control systems. The success of these types of initiatives may be attributed to two major factors. Firstly, this category of aid is a less useable means

39 Cameron Stewart, 'Ray's Vietnam defence plan outrages veterans', The Australian, 23 November, 1992.

a's Defence tion m

ipient state or ne

the ability to detect a possible enemy; and enable the operator to detect unauthorised fishing or exploitation of other maritime resources. This is particularly relevant to the island states of the Pacific which have enormous EEZs, and traditionally have had little ability to monitor them. Given the favourable response received by the patrol boats, the DCP should continue to be concerned with the p r o ~ s i o n of similar low- threat, dual application surveillance capabilities to the region,

The defence requirements of the Southeast Asian states are markedly different from those of the Southwest Pacific. Southeast Asian nations have a need for training and technical assistance, whereas the South Pacific micro-states require project and equipment assistance. This divergence will continue as the wealth and defence capabilities of the Southeast Asian nations increase. The tables in the appendices suggest that Canberra has recognised these changes and has adjusted its DCP funding to the region. Project and equipment assistance, for example, was discontinued to Singapore after 1978-79, the Philippines after 1984-85 and Indonesia after 1987-88. As of 1991-92 both Malaysia an

ere still r e c e i ~ n oject assistan to decline as a ortion of the

countries. ~ u r t h e ~ o r e these funds were spent on personnel s and specific defence research rojects rather than

ore, recent trends towards the development of bilateral relationships between Australia and .its Asian neighbours suggest a new and appropriate phase in defence cooperation. These new forms of cooperation are occurring outside the DCP, Australia and its Asian neighbours now see mutual benefits from exchanges in military capabilities. This association of equals began with a bilateral defence agreement with Indonesia and is now being carried forward with the signing of the Bilateral Defence Science Agreement between Australia and Singapore on 24 March 1993:

Under terms of the Australia-Singapore defence science agreement, an immediate exchan of information on dual-use communications technology will take place. In addition, beginning in 1994, a Singaporean communications engineer wil l be attached to the communications division of the Electronics

40 The PPBs might be considered the most offensive of these surveillance assets and the threat of these has been lessened by the fact that most of the Pacific states received at least one of these vessels.

Science and T

e theast Asia was

noted by DSTO's international programs director. He asserted that in the longer-term Australia was aiming to strengthen defence science relationships with most nations in Southeast Asia, including Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.42 Apart from defence science and

eements with its Asian neighbours, Australia to emphasise the value of: combined exercises - both bilateral and multilateral under the Five Power Defence Arrangements; personnel exchanges between the ADF and regional armed forces; training in Australia for regional personnel and the provision of ADF personnel to conduct training courses in-country; consultancy attachments of ADF or Departmental personnel to regional countries; and study visits to Australia.43

Defence, while still of a general nature, is nonetheless much clearer than that which was previous lable. Secondly, where the Senate questioned the effectiveness cific DCP projects in 1984, DCP funding would now appear to be lar ely appropriate to both the security needs of the recipient-state on. While the

innings' of the DCP reflect the strategic situation of ian and Southwest Pacific regions, there is a need for

the Department of nce to more rigorously assess the consequences of the assistance t t p r o ~ d e s for regional states. This work also argues that there is not a serious overlap in DCP and DAB projects:

41

42

43

Gregor Ferguson, 'Australia Boosts Ti pore, Other Asian Neighburs', Defense News, 26 April-2 May, 1993,

n, 'Australia Boosts Ties With Singapore ... ': 18-29.

'Cooperative Defence Activities ith Asia', Defence Public latiom, April 1993: 1-2.

le i n f o ~ ~ a t i o n suggests that the S.

lo , the emphases of the Program would seem appropriate, The current trend towards increased assistance for the Southwest Pacific is appropriate given the points of instability in the region, and the inability of the micro-states to provide for their own security. It was also determined that it is important for Australia to at least maintain its current DCP presence in the Southeast Asian region, given that it is seeking closer relations with its northern neighbours. But rather than continue to fund military equipment purchases that these states can now well afford, Australia should seek to place added emphasis on fostering a network of defence cooperation agreements between equals. This trend is already observable in. the Australian-Indonesian and the Australian-Singaporean defence cooperation agreements. The number of these agreements is likely to proliferate over the next decade, and will be established outside the DCP structure. As Australia's defence co-operative activities with Southeast Asia proliferate outside the parameters of am itself will decline in importance for Australia's

1

Table 1 covers Australian Defence Cooperation budgets for the years 1972-93. In 197 -73 the DCP total budget was $10.306 million or 0.8 percent of total Defence expenditure.' In 199 was $76.071 million, which also represented 0.8 budget. In dollar terms there has been a st funding, with the highest dollar spend occu $93.014 million was expended. As a percen budget, the greatest expenditure occurred in 1974-75 when the $88.646 million represented 5 percent of total Defence expenditure. The second highest expenditure, as a percentage of the D nce budget, occurred the following Financial Year when $38.951 million accounted for 2 percent of the total Defence budget.2

There are a number of trends which are manifest in Tables 1 and 2. Firstly, since PNG's independence in 1975 it has consistently attracted more DCP aid than any other recipient. In 1974-75 it accounted for

tralian defence aid, its share een a high of 87.75 percent i

represented an average of 48.20 percent of the Australian DCP budget.

A second trend, more observable in Table 2 than Table 1, is the general swing away from DCP fundin to Southeast ia. Malaysia,

1 DCP report of 1984 cites $10.306 million, successive annual quote $10.789 million but give no breakdown of this figure.

equates to 0.87 percent of the $1,233.6 million Australian Defence budget of the time.

2 DCP totals in 1974-75 and 1975-76 include $70 million and respectively in equipment transfers to the PNGDF at the time of Papua New Guinea's independence. The 1975-76 total also includes an additional $8.1 million grant to supplement the PNG budget allocation for defence. Successive Defence Reports have included the transferral value of these ADF assets in the DCP budget for those years. The Senate DCP report of 1984 did not include these assets in their tables. As a consequence their PNG totals for those years are $7.784 million and $ million respectively, not $77.784 million and $27.791 as recorded by th . Of course the Australian DCP totals are also much higher in these years of the PNG additions.

Appendices

DCP budget: they r propo~ion of total points over twenty-one years, Indonesia's has reduced by 45.43 percentage points in twenty years and Singapore's has dropped 9.42 percentage points over the same time. The DCP allocation to the Philippines rose steadily from 0.21 to 4.83 percent of Australia's DCP budget between 1972-73 and 1981-82. After this time funding was more erratic, with the greatest variation occurring FY 1990-91 and 1991-92 when Manila was awarded respectively 1.99 and 3.42 percent of the defence aid budget. Thailand received less than 0.5 percent of the DCP budget between 1972-73 and 1979-80 but with the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (now Cambodia) in 1979, the figure rose from 1.71 percent in 1980-81 to 12.36 percent of DCP in spending in 1983- 84. Since 1983-84 there has been a downward trend in Australian DCP contributions to Thailand, accounting for 5.48 percent in 1992-93.

be observed in both the lly in Table 3, which is

93. In 1972-73 Australia's

percentage value of DCP funding to the South Pacific. In the twenty- one years of this table the region's portion of the budget has multiplied by 1172 times.

Most of the island states in the South Pacific have experienced an increase in Australian DCP funding over the life of this table. Aid to Tonga and the Solomon Islands has risen significantly over the last fifteen years, while Table 3 suggests that defence aid to Kiribati, Vanuatu and Western Samoa has been more erratic. In effect, even these latter states have continued to attract a large amount of aid through projects f u n d e ~ by the 'General stance to the South Pacific' sub-program. The General Assistanc gram includes finance for the production of twenty Pacific Patrol Boats (PPBs) which are

to many of these micro-states for surveillance of their as dropped from the DCP pro am in 1988-89 after the

1987 coup in that country, and did not receive further assistance until

3 Originally the PPB project included funding for fi 1993 another five were added.

n vessels but in February

additional information on the level of their funding.

Table 4, United States Aid to Selected Asia-Pacific included as a comparison Australian DCP figures. Washington's funding to the region has largely followed the trend of Canberra's military assistance to these countries. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have all experienced a decline in US military aid durin life of the table. Singapore, PNG and Fiji have never attracted large- scale assistance from the US, which indicates that there is little overlap between the US and Australian assistance programs. Only the Philippines continued to attract increased funding from the US until 1990. Since the withdrawal of the US from Subic Bay and Clark Field, however, Manila has also witnessed a rapid decline in defence assistance.

It should be noted that the rows in Tables 1, exactly to the totals shown. These very small by the roundin

I

2 and 3 may not add differences are cause

TRY ($A millions)

1972-73 1973-7 1974-7 1975-7 1976-7 19?7-7g 1978-79 19?9-80 1980-81 1981-82 982-83

1983-84 1984-85

G

7 ~ . 7 8 4 ~ ) 15.684 13.968 14.565(c) 11.511 14.179 15.245 16.654 ~7.280

alaysia Indon. h i l i~ . Thai. Other(a)

5.523 3.986

3.963 2.876 3.909 3.954 4.859 5.744

.763 5.108 5.565

.25

.59 7.209 .183 ,589

11.930 8.627 10.184 8.902

3

0.006 .024 .032 .025

0.031 0.027 0.053 0.107 0.650 1.206 3.839 5.642 4.302

0.075 0.027 0.041 0.071 0.105 0.472 1.406 1.791 3.839 6.081 4.933 5.633 6.755

~ o t a l Aus

24.599 30.044 37. 39. 44. 45. 45.33 1

a) In evidence supplied the Senate Standing Commit n includes the South Pacific

did not specify the countries included in t Fmm 1984-85 the 60 I: Regional Activities' expenses, and DCP Australia. Total DCP figures offered in the Senate DCP report, and the ExplanatoryNotes= Defence Portfolio vary source includes in the 'Other' column. For a breakdown of the South Pacific States see Table 3.

(b) The DCP total to PNG in 1974-75 includes $70 million in In 1975-76 an additional $8.1 million grant was made to s in the DCP totals for these years for corn

assets transfers, and 1975-76 saw the transfer of an extra $4 in budget allocation for Defence. These figures h n i

(e) Statisties submitted by the Department of Defence (DoD) to the Senate report on DCP in 1984 disagree with this figure. Evidence p m ~ d ~ to the Senate Committee claims that this figure is $15.043 million.

able 1: TRY ($A millions) continued

otal ilip. Thai. ther

1985-8 1986-87 1987-88 1988-8 1989-9 1990-911 1991-92 1992-93

27.372 37.88 52.06 37.17 28.17

5.115 4.145 4.991 5.246 4.011 4.350 4.246 4.17

) Australian DCP ~ntnbutions to Indonesia ended bi-lateral cooperative activities' with Indonesia wh Portfolio: 544.

Notes 19&89: Defence Portfolio, p.A5 program, see Pmgmm Pedormance Sta

(e) Program Performance Statements for 1991-92 do n This figure was obtained from Hansard (Senate), 2 in the DCP budget in 1991-92.

use the amount was not nce co-operative activiti

1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 988-89 989-90 990-9 1

1991-92 1992-93

PN

- - 7.75 1.35

55.06 54.04 46.7 47.19 40.21 41.97 39.09 36.03 35.36 38.13

1.95 2.15

45.17 51.06 5.98 9.44

37.04

Table 2: AUST RESSED AS PIE

alaysia In ilip. Thai. Other TOta

53.5 38.5

43 .37

15.34 15.03

12.58 12.38 11.97

11.27

31.92 31.48 21.74 23.04

-

42 4.00

0.36 1.71 3.04 8.68 12.36 9.49

7.59 8.67 8.66 5.39 4.68 5.65 5.48

5.72

12.34 14.90 17.47 25.33 29.88 29.05 30.20 28.82 27.86 36.76

(a) Figures in this table are percentages of the figures found in this is due to the rounding process in both tables.

. In some instances the rows do not add exactly to 100 pem

able UT ($A millions)

Fiji onga Solomon ti anuatu stern Gen. slands Samoa

.oo

.o 1

.03

.061

.071

0.589 0.604 0.498 1.160 .98 1 284 ,863 .945

1.684

.436@) .. -

.oo

.70 * 12 .74 .70 243 .847 '

.36

.16

.29

1978-79 1979-80

1986-87

- ,893 .282 . .546 .924

1.59 1.70 .169

2.6 12 3.03$ c

.05 2 0 .45 .45

5.97

.03 1

.153

.416

.408 1.216

(a) In 1991-92 the 'General Assistance - South Pacific' heading was drop Program Performance Statements 1992-93: Defence ~o~foli~: 540.

in favour of Multi-Lateral Program - %ut

(b) The DoD submission to the Senate report on Australia's on Fiji in 1977-78 and 1979-80. Appendix 2 states that for that year. Furthermore, in 1979-80 Appendix 2 reco certain that the latter figure is a typographical error.

vities, provides what appear to be conflicting fi illion was supplied in 1977-78, while Appendix

nditure of $0.605 million, while Appendix 6 no

($A mi~~ions) continued

Fiji

1987-88 0.368(d) 1988-89 - 1989-9 - 1990-91 1991-92 - 1992-93 1.356

onga lomon ti anuatu n Gen. ands Assist e

S th. P. (c)

.967 8.92

.357 9.04 1.557 0.435 15.007

.073 2.491 4.657 0.958 4.414 11.353 12.527(0 26.75

b

(e) In 1991-92 the 'General Assistance - South Pacific' Program Performance Statements 1992-93: Defence P ~ ~ f o ~ ~ : 540.

in favour of ' M u l t i - ~ ~ r a l Program - South Pacific',

(d) DCP to Fiji was terminated after the 1987 coup in that and Fiji a

efence Co-operation did not resume until Februa to a number of joint assistance p ce Fmnce Pmwe (AFP), 4 Feb. 1993.

(e) This figure includes DCP to the Federa ($0.332 million), Excluding these amounts, the figure for 'General Assistance - South Pacific' should read $9.176 million.

million), the Marshall Islands ( 0.935 million) and the lan

(0 This figure includes DCP to the Federated States o ($0.557 million), and Tuvalu ($0.132 million). Excluding these amounts, the figure for 'General Assistance - South Pacific shoul million.

icronesia ($0.482 million), the Marshall Islands ($1.090 million), the

Table 4: ILI PACIFIC S ($US ~i l l ions~(a)

ndonesia(b) alaysia Phi S ailand Singapore

- - - - 0.048 0.050 0.047 0.050 0.050

Source: -1990, Hearings and Markup, before the S u b - c o m ~ i t ~ e on h i a n acific Affairs, us House of Representatives.

(a) US military assistance includes: Foreign Military S Military Assistance Program funding. These mu comparison with Australian DCP funding.

its; International Military Education and Training ( tion of states which receive military aid from the US an

) The US Congress froze $US2.3 million in defence Far &tern Economic Review, 22 Oct. 1992.

onesia in 1992. This was in response to the

1

Australia was directly responsible for the security of PNG until the latter's independence in 197 dependence Australia transferred $74 million of locally-statio assets to Port Moresby's control. This signalled the beginning of Austral s significant Defence Cooperation Pro am with PNG. Since 1975 ustralia and PNG have signed a number of agreements, including the Agreed Statement on Security Co-operation Between Australia and Papua New Guinea, which have reinforced the defence cooperation relationship. Table 2 reveals that Port Moresby has been consistently the single largest recipient of Australian DCP funding. In some years PNG received more defence aid than all the other recipients combined. For example, in 1974-75 it received $77.784 million in defence aid, or 87.75 percent of Australia's entire DCP aid program. Over the last nineteen years PNG has received, on average, 48.20 percent of Australia's DCP budget.

umber of areas, including:

associated with ADF advisers represents 71.57 percent of the $15.684 million DCP vote to Port Moresby. This item accounted for more than half of the DCP budget to PNG until 1985-86 when it dropped to 40.47 percent. In 1990-91 loan personnel costs decreased to their lowest percentage value of the DCP budget: 24.90 percent. The 1990-91 drop

as largely the result of abnormally high expenses in the 'Project and quipment' category: a consequence the despatch of additional

weapons in response to the worsening inville crisis. In 1992-93 loan personnel funding was 45.94 per t of the PNG DCP bud These statistics point to the importance that both Australia and P attribute to the transferral of personnel skills from the PNGDF.

Expenditure on projects and equipment has, as a rule, been second only to 'Loan Personnel'. In 1975-76 equipment and projects represented 8.38 percent of DCP expenditure and if the $12.100 million in extraordinary expenses are subtracted from the total PNG DCP

re, this catego for 14.85 percent in that year.

project, Other important projects not included under this heading are the PPB project and the Survey project. These items are long-running and have attracted a high-level of funding, and for this reason have been given separate columns in Table 5.

A third major category of Australian DCP funding to PNG has been for 'Training and Study Visits'. From a low of $0.856 million or 3.08 percent of that country's DCP allocation in 1975-76, it has steadily risen to $9.513 million or 33.77 percent in 1992-93. As a percentage there has been an eleven-fold increase in eighteen years, and suggests that training of PNGDF personnel in Australia is viewed as an important form of assistance.

Thefile percentages are significantly increased if funding from the Pacific Patrol tively. m is included: 23.92 percent and 53.97 percent

G ($A millions)

~ r o j e c t ~ q . Survey Assist. ~roject

1977-78 1978-7 1979-8

- 11.225 1 11.138 8.61 8.36 8.143 9.843

.95

.14 8.568 7.732 .698

(a) This column includes expenditure on Spial ist Techni

- 2.32 1.92 1.810 1.007 3.462

4.067 4.33 1 4.351 4,558 5.835 7.466

- 1.274 0.751 1.060

-

(b) See footnote No. 2 i the 'Overview' of the DCP p m for an explanation of the 1974-75 and 1975-76 figures.

an rsonnel(c)

1987-88 11.725(d) 13.041

1989-90 12.632 1990-9 1 12.965 1991-92 14.31 1 1992-93 12.944

le 5: ST G ($A millions) continued

3.833

ng/ Visits

1.968 - 4.

13 - -

(e) The costs of ADF loan personnel and Project/Equip 1988-89: Defence Portfolio: A 5-2. They have been with earlier figures in this column.

ta in

combined under the rubric of "Projects' in the e but the method of calculation may not be ent

(d)

(e)

This column includes expenditure on Specialist Techni

Includes $0.610 million in Nomad aircraft maintenance en ning' in 6993-94 Prognm Perfonnanae Statemen

14

ustralian defence cooper etween 1963 and 1970

alaysia commenced in 1963. concentrated on supplyin

equipment, the training of Malaysian personnel in Australia, and th loan of Australian personnel to Malaysia. In 1963 Austr lia committed $0.144 million and reached $6.520 million b 0.

During the 1970s Australia's DCP commitment to Malaysia and Singapore could be seen, partly, in the context of the withdrawal of British forces from the region. Canberra did not see its role as being a British surrogate but %elieved it would be more effective in the long- term if an indigenous military force in the region was de~eloped.'~ In 1971 Australia commenced a three year defence aid program to Malaysia which concentrated on project and equipment assistance. Then, in November 1971, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) came into effect, replacing the earlier Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. Australia perceived its allocation of defence aid to

alaysia and §in art of its commitment to the FPDA.

of this table Malaysi dropped by 42.32 percentage points. The largest single drop occurred between 1973-74 and 1974-75 when there was a 34.14 percentage point de n DCP assistance? The second largest drop occurred between 19 and 1973-74 when there was a 15.02 percentage point

hese years the funding decline is less dramatic, .5 percentage points between 1975-76 and 1992-

93.

The significant reductions i Malaysia occurred for several reasons. Firstly, as the th alaysian security shifted from internal to external sources, defence: defence expenditure rose from 4 percent of GNP in 1975 to

aysia began to spend more on its o

5 Senate DCP report, 1984: 41.

6 This drop is only 17.49 percentage points if the $70 million asset transfer from the ADF to the PNGDF in 1974-75 is not included in the DCP totals for that year.

placing a considerable strain on defence aid se of this there was a change in the emphasis

assistance, study visits, training and exercises rather than equipment oriented projects, which had previously dominated the programet7

In 1973-74 equipment projects accounted for nearly 67 defence aid to that country: by 1976-77 it had dropped to around 33 percent, and was only 8.20 percent in 1992-93. In the life of this table the significant equipment projects included: financial contributions to the Armed Forces Manufacturing Centre, the Defence Research Centre, the Special Warfare Centre and the Royal Malaysian Police Technical School. In 1992-93 Training and Study Visits accounted for 55.56 percent and ADF loan personnel another 26.99 percent of the DCP allocation to Malaysia.

7 Senate

11978-79

1985-86 1986-87

1991-92 11992-93

($A millions)

ine Training/ roject/ ises Study Visits Equip. Assist.

0.972 1.398 1.449 2.263 1.694 1.446 1.372 2.855 3.468 3.42 3.629 3.347 3.867 3.985 3.922 4.102 4.214 4.549 4.816 4.764

- 2.660 2.235 2.322 1.282 2.118 2.239 1.257 .889 .400 .271

2.033(a~ 2.266

.132 ,523 ,451

1.039 1.088 .837 .705

0.703

(a) roject/l3quipment Assistance figures for 1983-84 an -85 include funding for the attachment of an Australian Army Team which was tasked with improving Malaysian conventional warfare capabilities. From 1987-88 this eost is recorded in the Australian Loan Personnel column.

Table 7 provides a break do^ of 74 and 1992-93. In 1973-74 DCP million, or 11.21 percent of the P budget. In financial year Singapore was th ion of only 1, Australian defence aid, though this is raised to 6.77 percent if the transfer of $70 million in ADF assets to PNG is not included in the DCP budget that year. Beyond this time Australian defence assistance to Singapore remained low, with the highest funding of 3.61 percent occurring in 1982-83. In 1992-93 Australia contributed $1.316 million in defence aid, which amounted to 1.79 percent of the total DCP budget.

ingapore between 1973- n Singapore was $1.744

Two major trends are made obvious by Table 7. Firstly, funding for 'Project and Equipment Assistance' declined rapidly between 1973-74 and 1978-79. In 1973-74 spending on projects and equipment

udy Visits' categori

y Visits' accounted for the bulk of Australian defence assistance, This shift in emphasis reflected Australia's aim to improve training in the Singaporean defences rather than provide materiel assistance:

While the armed forces of

Thus the mqjor priority of the forces is in improving training.8

pore are well equip are without combat

with technically rience of any sort.

a consequence of this perception Australian defence cooperation moved to increase its support of training programs for the defence forces. In 1973-74 Australian military advisers an and study visits accounted for 7.22 percent of the DCP budget. Beyond 1979-80 these categories accounted for th entire DCP budget,

1980-81, 1988-89, 1991-92 and 19 -93 when funds were ile the loan personnel category

ceased after 1987-88 and was replaced by the exchange of military for 'Combined Exercises'.

8 Senate DCP report, 1984: 22.

ortant

from the Australian Defence Cooperation Program but it is eager to establish with Canberra a defence relationship . For example, in 1992 the Australian DoD announced that porean Armed Forces (SAF) would be given greater access to training facilities. This included the use of selected bases by the Republic of Singapore Air Force ( Training School at Noma." These initiatives are outside the parameters of the DCP.

>9 and SAF use of the

9 'Singapore Air Force to Extend Training in Australia', Defence News &lease, DPR 237/92, October 22, 1992.

Release, DPR

($A m~llions).

1973-7 1974-7 1975-7 1976-77

1980-81 1981-82

1984-85

~roject/ its

18 45

0.294 0.049 0.012 .lo8 -

I

(a) DCP aid in this Appendix

(b) , This figure includes $3,821 expend

(c) This figure includes thb year ‘Study Visitq penses were me ““mining and Study Visits’.

1985-8 1986-8 1987-88 1988-89 1989-9 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93

able ($A ~ i l ~ i Q n s ) ~ Q n t i n ~

Project/

.44

.33 ,635 .004(d~ .oz .02 . O l .033

- 1.058 - 1.024 D .OB9

.682 ,807

* 375 .061 313

(d) in this Golumn bet from the exchanp of military inst

Until 1985-86 Indonesi In that year it accounted for $8.333 million or 16.63 percent of total

the second largest recipient of

P budget (see Tables 1 and 2). Indonesia recei centage of the overall DCP budget in 1973-74 when

49.43 percent of the Defence Cooperation bud Indonesia was halted in 1988 because of the generally strained relations in the late 1980s.

Table 8 reveals that until 1988 the major category of defence assistance to Indonesia related to projects and equipment. The Attack-class Patrol Boat program, the Nomad aircraft project, the Survey project and other items of equipment that came under the Equipment Assistance' column, accounted for the bulk of DCP funding to Indonesia in any given year. In 1973-74 $4.833 million or 94.62 percent of the DCP budget for Indonesia, was apportioned to project

nd 1987-88 al~ocation

training of Indonesian personnel, either in Australia or in Indonesia itself, was not a high priority of the Australian Defence Cooperation Program.

me of defence cooperation was established following the visit lia of the then Commander of the Indonesi

General Try Sutrisno i 1990. Canberra and Jakart defence relations through the emphasis of the new and study visits:

s on joint training

The aim of cooperation is to build increase understanding between the defence es countries."

mnnel and professional relationshi

In 1990-91 Australia allocated $0.530 million for bi-lateral defence cooperation with Indonesia. This expenditure rose to $1.816 million

ia', April 1993: 2.

exercises, and we also plan to assist in the evel loping opportunities for defence industry cooperation~'12

rative Defence Activiti

ST ($A millions) (a)

Survey/ apping

0.755 0.956 0.883 1.083 2.550 2.128 2.408 3.377 1.958 1.659 2.69 2.204

om

-

1.292

(a) Headings used in this table are closer to headingp other tables in this publication.

in later .&timates of Expenditures volumes and

add to $3.402 million, not t ~.763 million. Additional funding came from the individu

(6) his figure includes $75,000 for combined exercises in t

(d) the Estimates of E x ~ n d i t u ~ pub not provide a breakdown of DCP fundin

1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-9 l(g) 1991-92 1992-93

8: ($A millions)(e) continue

otal oma

- 1.15 1.20 0.438 - .19 0.342 2.293

0.098( - - -

(e) Headings is table are closer to Headings timatas of Expenditurn volumes and allow rough com other tables in this publication.

This figure includes an unspecified amount for the t ~ ~ n g of n d o n ~ i a n personnel in Australia. Australian DCP to Indo halted in 1988.

(€0 efenee funding resumed in 1990-91. In 1991-92 it was classified as i-lateral Cooperative Activities'.

(h) This figure was ex ded on m a n & ~ m e n t of Nomad main n a n ~ for the Indonesian Navy.

Australia has sent hilippines since 1 73 but this was of little consequence until 1979-80. In 1972-73 the allocation to the Philippines was 0.21 percent and in 1992-93 it was 3.67 percent of the total DCP budget. The Philippine DCP allocation reached its highest percentage value in 1981-82 when it represented 4.83 percent of the Defence Cooperation budget (see Table 2). Until 1980-81 the program consisted of costs associated with the exchange of Defence personnel and Australian participation in combined army and naval exercises. l3 In 1979-80 Australia expanded its training project, increasing funding from $0.090 million to $0.804 million. In 1980-81 'Project and Equipment Assistance' also commenced, providing funding for the electronic Dart target range and maintenance for the twelve Nomad aircraft that had been purchased in 1975. Beyond the mid-1980s Australian DCP aid concentrated solely on the provision of funds for 'Training and Study Visits'.'* This remained the case in 1992-93.

13 Senate DCP report, 1984: 45.

14 Senator Robert Ray notes that Australia's DCP aid only included funding for the training of Philippines rsonnel in Australia and study visits to Australia. See H a m a d (Senate) 13 August, 1991: 190.

1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88

P c

0.090 0.804 0 449 0.567 0.671 0.879 0.698 0.965 1.019 1.703

- 0.712 1.350 0.849 0,781 0.658 0.329 0,190

,022 0.031 0.031 0*044 0.077 0.078 0.090 0,804 1.161 1.917 1,520 1,660 1,356 1.294 1.209

Thailand first received $0.006 million or 0.06 remained low until the Vietnamese invasion of mpuchea and the refugee crisis emerged. Until 1980 DCP had been primarily directed to the funding of training and study visits. After this time the program also placed an emphasis on 'providing project aid, mainly in the areas of new equipment for training schools, provision for the refurbishing of tracker aircraft and assistance in the maintenance of Nomad aircraft in service with the Thai Air Force.'15

funding in 1972-73, when it w nt of the total DCP budget.

Table 10 reveals that DCP funding to Thailand remained low until 1980-81 when it rose to $0.649 million - a six-fold increase on the previous year. This increase had a percentage value of 1.71 percent of the DCP budget (see Table 2). In the first half of the 1980s Thailand's share of the DCP vote percent of the budget.

of the DCP program

Equipment Assistance' rubric include the Language Project, training in gun refurbishment and maintenance, provision of a Target System, the provision of Defence research cons funding of joint research into the ionospheric project.

project and equipment assistance declined, funding for training and ce - representing 85.78 percent of present Thailand ranks fourth in

terms of the le

15 Senate DCP report, 19

le 1 ($A millions)

1972-73 1973-7 1974-7 1975-7 19~6-77 1977-78 1978-7 1979-8 1980-81 1981-82

P r o j e ~ ~ ~ ~ u i p . otal Assist.

- .211 .330 2.785(a) 4.2 76(b) 3.253 3.420 2.300 1.748 1.094 .562

0*909 0.754 0.593

.006

.024

.032 0.025

3.839 5.642 4.302

(a) Includes $2. 50 mi~ion for Royal Thailand (RTAF) Nomad assistance.

mraft, and $0.279 million in Royal Thailand

(b) Includes $3.~0 million for RTN Nomad aircraft and $0.958 illi ion in RTAF Nomad Assistance.

Between the end of the Second World security of the micro-states of the Southwest Pacific remaine relatively uncomplicated. towards the Western Alliance and, as a conse often regarded as a strategic lake of the United half of the 1980s, however, saw a dramatic change to the status-quo as superpower rivalry spread in the region. Anti-American sentiment crept into the area because o hington's unwillingness to negotiate fishing agreements with the island-states of the South Pacific. Seizing the opportunity, Mikhail Gorbachev signalled the USSR's entry to the region in a speech made at Vladivostok in July 1986. Moscow negotiated fishing agreements with Kiribati in 1985 and Vanuatu in 1987. These agreements established a Soviet commercial presence in the region and Moscow was thus able to 'expand its interests and influence in the South Pacific.'" This influence, however, declined with the end of the Cold War.

r and the mid-1980s the

Most of the states were well dis

art from racial tensions in

states need to improve their surveillance capabilities within their exclusive economic zones. The bulk of DCP assistance to the region is earmarked to achieve this end.

demonstrates the rapidity of the rise in Australian funding to funding to In 1972 Australia's defence c only $0.003 million or 0.03 p

with the region accounted for e entire DCP budget. By 1993

5 million or 35.

the program's greatest to the region. In the t of the DCP budget a1

16 David Hegarty, Small State Security in the South Pacific: 2.

17 Small State Security in the South Pacific:

30

million or 5.80 percent of the DCP budget. The greatest dollar increase occurred between 1990-91 and 1991-92 when the allocation increased by $2.584 million or nearly I25 percent.

Data in Table 11 reveals that the 'Project and Equipment' category has been the largest expenditure item in most years, The majority of the items included under this heading were 'of a civil nature involving channel clearance, hydrographic survey work, police communications and malaria control.'" Another significant DCP equipment program has related to the supply of patrol boats to the Solomon Islands. In 1979 a twelve metre craft was supplied and was subsequently maintained until 1982-83. Then in 1988 it was decided to initiate the Pacific Patrol Boat (PPB) program, and the Solomon Islands were allocated two out of the initial fifteen PPBs. The first boat was delivered on July 7, 1988 and the second on November 2, 1991." Spending for these PPBs was not included in the country DCP allocations but under the 'General Assistance for the Southwest Pacific' heading. The delivery of these two boats to the Solomon Islands,

tudy Visits' have accounted for olornon Islands over the only a small portion of the

life of the Table.

18 Senate DCP report, 1984, p.50. This continues to be the case in 1992-93: see P m p m Performance Statements 1993-94: Defence Portfolio: 629-30.

19 Dora Alves, 'Patrol ts foster regional stability',Pacifi Defence fiprteq June 1990: 19.

20 Mary-Louise O'Cdaghan, 'Patml. Boats for Solomons', The Sydney Morning Herald 22 April, 1993.

able 11: DS ($A million)

ornbine Projectmq. atro xercises Assistance oat

- .007

0.026 0.601 0.481 1.067 0.663 - 1.259 - 1.022 0.949 - 1.639 - 2.028 - 1.931 1.398 3.85 -

- -

3 .670~) -

(a) Figures for 1990-91 and l991-92 include advisers an tive support costs for these

re includes $ Z . ~ l l illion in funding of t in Honiara.

i

occurred in 1986-87 when $1 cooperation with Suva. The Pro

spent on defence 8 after the coup led

and 1977-78 Australian ining and advisory suppo

CP funding to Fiji In 1978 it was dec

to expand the DCP program to the islands of the South Pacific, For its part Fiji received additional funding for assistance in 'project assistance, survey and mapping activities and the supply of rifles and ammunition to equip the Fiji peacekeeping force in the Lebanon. Most of the assistance has been of a civil rather than a military nature.'21 Among these projects were the Rural Development Project, the Survey Project and the Disaster Relief Project. In 1978-79 these three programs accounted for 100 percent (or $0.372 million) of the funding for the 'Project and Equipment Assistance' category. The civil component of this category remained prominent until 1981-82 when it

accounted for 7

21. SenateDCPre

able 12: ($A million)

tu Proj ect/Eq. Assistance

otal an rsonnel

- 0.372 0.393 0.202 0.803 0.482 0.766

376 .624 .469 .340

1991-92 - 1.038

- 1.356

(a) Appendix 6 of the Senate Standi this year was $0.436 million, ye diffemnce.

Cooperation Program records that expenditure on Fiji in notes $0.300 million. No explanation is given for the

) Australian CP assistance to Fiji after the 1987 eoup in t

A

Cooperation budget.

The bulk of the Australian for 'Project and Equipme when it accounted for 65.6 percent, or more, of the total allocation. In 1990-91 this dropped to 28.02 percent in 1991-92 before rising to 51.11 percent in 1992-93. In 1992-93 DCP projects included: survey work and equipment; provision of an ADF workshop supervisor; provision of equipment to the Vanuatu Police; developing military operational transport capabilities; provision of an inshore hydrographic and equipment to enable Vanuatu to chart its inshore waters; a

allocation to Vanuatu istance' between 1980-

Since 1988-89 cos associated with combined exercises have also become a feature of the DCP aid package to Vanuatu. This is to provide operational training in the use of the patrol boat supplied in 1987. In 1992-93 this activity accounted for 10.42 percent of the

1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-8 ~986-8 1987-8 1988-8 1989-9 1990-9 1991-9 1992-9

able 13: UATU ($A millions)

an bine rsonne Exercises

- .584

Training/ Study Visits Assistance

- 0.021 0.078 0.156 0.092

393 ,185

0.424 0.784 1.434 1.615 1.309

1.726

(a) Figures for 990-91 and 1992-93 include ADF advisers, and a ~ ~ n ~ t ~ t i v ~ support costs for these advisers.

3

n, or 2.68 percent o f t budget, was allocated to Western Samoa.

Since 1987-88 'Training and Study Visits' have steadily declined percentage of the Western Samoan DCP budget. 'Projects and Equipment' assistance to Western Samoa has varied greatly during the course of this table: from 78.72 percent in 1990-91 to 33.51 percent in 1991-92. As of 1992-93 this figure again rose to 64.52 percent of assistance to that country. The 1992-93 increase was the result of the provision for ADF adviser housing in Western Samoa, and additional funding for the provision of communications equipment for the Western Samoan Police.

Western Samoa has also received 8 Pacific Patrol Boat und

is vessel was sup visers in 1990-91,

08 since the su

1982-83

1986-8?

able 1 ST TE ($A millions)

Proj ectsmq. Assistance

(a) 90-91 to 1992-93 include advisers an trative support costs for these advisers.

nc in

total DCP budget the Tongan allocation rose from 0,028 percent to 4.12 percent in the same time-frame. This represents a one hundred and forty-seven times increase over the life of the table.

In 1978079 almost the entire DCP allocation to onga was expended on 'Loan Personnel' and 'Training and tudy Visits' categorie 1987-88 these categories received only 6.58 percent of the while 'Projects and Equipment' accounted for .42 percent of the Tongan allocation. In 1992-93 equipment a project assistance accounted for 72.82 percent of Tonga's CP allocation: ~ n c l ~ d i n g funding for the Tongan Defence Service communications network; adviser housing; and, PPB support facilities,

Personnel and training expenses accounted for 20.63 percent of 1992- 93 funding and combined exercises received another 6.55 percent. Combined exercises have only become a feature of DCP funding to Tonga since 1989-90: representing 1.99 percent in that year and 6.55 percent in 1992-93.

1991-92 1992-93

($A million)

its

1.288 2.280@)

-91 to 1992-93 include advisers and ad tive support eosts for these advisers.

(b) Includes $1.861 million in funding for PPB berthing

oat ountry ate

No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11

PNG Vanuatu PNG Western Samoa Solomon Islands PNG Cook Islands PNG Tonga Federated States of

16 May 1987 13 June 1987 31 October 1987 19 March 1988 7 July 1988 29 October 1988 1 September 1989 1 July 1989 28 October 1989

he thrust of the program was to improve the surveillance and minor armed forces or constabularies uring the period between 1987-88 and

project accounted for no less than 88.76 percent of the Assistance budget. The building of these vessels was

interdiction capabilities of t maintained by these states.

completed by 1991-92, although it was claimed that the continue 'to provi countries.t22 It 1993 that Canberra would construc

are either relate unications Netw

security personnel in Australia.

SOUT IFIC ($A illi ion)

1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-9 1990-91 1991-92(c) 1992-93

Pacific Projectmq. To atrol ssistance

- 5.850

8 8

- .458

1.453

- 1.433@) 0.317

584 1.687

(a) Expenses in th column for 1987-88 and 1988-89 were for olicy Discussions/Seminars.

figure includes all non- acific Patrol Boat (PP e South West Pacific.

(c) In this year t m was renamed '