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New ZealandTurn of Politics Nationals return to powerLead Issues
& Analysis
New White Paper Promise November 2009
Air Combat Debate Dead & buried
Barack Obama Headed for the White House
Kevin Rudd - Focus on China in security plan
NZs National Party, headed by John Key, has brought an end to
Helen Clarks eight years as Prime Minister. Key, however, is left
with a poisoned chalice in having to im-mediately deal with the
impact of the GFC pushing the NZ Budget into deficit. p4
Key and his new Defence Minister, Dr Wayne Mapp, have promised a
new Defence White Paper for New Zealand by end-2009, along with an
overhaul of Helen Clarks series of Defence Long Term Development
Plansp7
Early comments by John Key and Dr Mapp have scotched any hopes
the new National Government will overturn key elements of Helen
Clarks Defence Policy Framework, including a re-establishment of
the NZ Air Forces air combat capabilityp10
A year into his first term, Australian Prime Minister, Kevin
Rudd, has tabled his first National Security Statement. The
document exhibits little change from the policies of the Howard
Government, and even embraces its homeland security approachp14
Barack Obama is to be historically inaugu-rated US President on
20 January 2009. He carries to the White House the hopes and
aspirations of an unprecedented number of newly-political
Americans, all seeking economic and social changep11
Australian Defence Business Review (ADBR) magazine is published
up to 12 times annually, with additional printed and e-Newsletter
supplements by: Business Communications Group [a Division of
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Box 250, Mawson ACT 2607, Australia - Telephone: +61 (0)2 6280 5876
- Facsimile: +61 (0)2 6280 7507 - Email: [email protected] -
Internet: www.adbr.com.au - All material ap-pearing in ADBR is
subject to Copyright 2008. Reproduction in whole or part is not
permitted without expressed written permission or licence
agreement.
Defence 2009 Back to the drawing board to
Canberra Bureau Report
With the US$130 billion New Zealand national economy now in its
worst recession in 18 years and Secretary of the Treasury, John
Whitehead, forecasting late-December a shallow recovery in 2009,
the 8 November 2008-elected Prime Minister John Key and his
Minister for Defence, Dr Wayne Mapp, have wisely flick-passed any
substantive consideration of national se-curity and defence policy
to a new White Paper, to be prepared over the course of 2009.
In a faltering economy that Whitehead sees generating not much
more than low, rather than negative growth over the next two years,
the Treasury Secretary anticipates an early budgetary down-shift
into significant fiscal deficit is projected to last for some time,
and result-ing in an increase in public debt beyond the 18.8% (in
sovereign debt terms) of gross domestic debt inherited from the
former Clark La-bour government.
With Prime Minister Keys eyes focused on quickly implement-ing a
series of economic stimulus programs to address the parlous economy
extending from income tax cuts, reductions in official interest
rates, and a two-year assistance package for workers losing their
jobs (as promised in the election campaign) a reading of the NZ
Defence Force 2007/08 Annual Report clearly establishes why a new
defence assessment is needed.
According to the NZDF annual report, the countrys armed forc-es
are already under significant stress due to accumulating pressures
on funding as a result of multiple concurrent deployments, whilst
at the same time seeking to progress major force recapitalisation
out-lined in the former Clark governments series of Long Term
Devel-opment Plans (LTDP) the fourth update of which was published
in September.
define defence in recessionThe new Key-led National government
in New Zealand is now facing up to the same conundrum as currently
being addressed by the Australian Government, which in recent
months has opted to push through a hastily-developed efficiency
program and forced savings in national defence expenditures, whilst
a new Defence White Paper seeks to accommodate a rapidly changing
threat outlook against the onset in 2009 of global economic
recession.
AustralianDefence Business Review
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2 Australian Defence Business Review November-December 2008
New Zealand Defence Review
The return to power of the National Party after eight years,
finds the NZ defence landscape much changed by Helen Clarks
govern-ment, but still not well equipped to deal with the broad
range of threat contingencies expected to be thrown up by new
strategic guid-ance, especially in regard to increasingly hazardous
Afghanistan.
NZ DEFENCE & THE NOW RECESSION: Although defence issues did
not assume a high profile in the most recent NZ elec-tion campaign,
the 7 October release of both the LTDP-IV and the NZDFs 2007/08
Annual Report was found to be extremely useful in helping to inform
National Party defence policy, and the decision to defer addressing
accumulating funding stresses within the NZDF by promising to
develop and publish a new Defence White Paper within one year of
its winning office (ie: November 2009).
Unlike the Rudd Government in Australia which is pressing on
with the tabling of a new Defence White Paper in March-April 2009
with the intent of informing a new 2009-2019 Defence Capability
Plan set for release at the Defence+Industry Conference in Adelaide
on 30 June the timetable adopted by Prime Minister Key allows
plenty of time for an appreciation to be had of prospective changes
in United States foreign & national security policy under the
new Obama administration.
At the same time, the delay will provide time for a more
informed assessment to be made of the status of any pending
economic recov-ery, and hence, the state of the NZ Government
budget as it moves into an initial NZ$6.63 billion deficit in
2008/09 (rising to $11.38 billion by fiscal 2013), and accordingly
the Nationals ability to sup-port any major new defence investment
program coming out of the November 2009 White Paper.
Keys campaign through to 8 November naturally focused on re-cent
substantial budgetary blow-outs on major NZDF capital pur-chases,
and hence, the need for more to be done to properly analyse the
quality of defence procurement and budgetary procedures within the
Ministry of Defence and the NZ Defence Force.
As highlighted by LTDP-IV, the new White Paper is to examine
NZDF capability requirements at a time when a series of major
De-fence assets will have reached the end of their economic lives
(ie: the C-130H Hercules transport fleet), and when the horizon
(ie: out to 2015) of the LTDP will have effectively expired in
terms of its cur-rency against evolving threat scenarios.
While National defence policy stressed the new White Paper
should reflect NZs traditional penchant to take an independent
as-sessment of its security environment an approach firmly cemented
by the former Clark government when it first came to power in 1999
its election policy also placed primacy on the need to have
inter-operability with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in terms
of equipment, training, and doctrine.
NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY: In this regard, the 7 October policy
document conceded both countries are being drawn reluc-tantly to
play a bigger stabilisation role in the South Pacific, and it is
essential that NZ has a reasonable level of military capabilities
to achieve the full range of defence & civil tasks within our
region. Further, it acknowledged that NZs development assistance
similarly needed to be more focused on its immediate neighbourhood,
rather than scattered around parts of the globe where New Zealand
has lit-tle standing, and can make only a token contribution.
In a number of respects, therefore, the National Partys proposed
defence policy (as taken to the election campaign) has many
simi-larities with Kevin Rudds declarations during the Australian
election campaign. John Key, however, made no firm commitments to
sus-taining real defence funding, as Rudd did in the campaign
leading up to the Australian federal election in October 2007.
A year after coming to power, Rudds first National Security
State-ment (NSS) to the Australian Parliament on 4 December
trumpeted the dawn of the Asia-Pacific century, and pointed to a
need for the nation to assume the mantle of creative middle power
diplomacy in seeking to influence the many interactions that will
ultimately deter-mine the future strategic stability of the
Asia-Pacific region.
As part of this construct, Rudd nominated as a priority
continued ongoing close cooperation with New Zealand, in the
continuing se-curity challenges faced by the island states of the
South-west Pacific (and looking) to both help shape our region
through constructive engagement, as well as be prepared for any
unforeseen deterioration in the strategic environment.
During an 18 August visit to New Zealand for talks with former
Prime Minister Helen Clark, Prime Minister Rudd had similarly
spo-ken in terms of constructive engagement of the two nations
commitment to a new era of cooperation with the Pacific Island
countries. This was subsequently confirmed as being undertaken
through the roll-out of a Pacific Partnerships for Development
pro-gram, specifically focussed on addressing shortcomings amongst
Is-land neighbours in infrastructure, basic health & education,
improved public sector management and community-based
development.
Recognising such influences, National defence policy also stated
the NZDF of the future must have a sufficient range of
capabili-ties to deal with any reasonable foreseeable contingency
within our region, and to build security within the South Pacific.
There is a need for forces that are agile and can operate over long
distances at very short notice. Prospectively flagging a cap on the
extent of respon-sibilities to be undertaken by its forces when
deployed outside their immediate region, National defence policy
also stated such forces would be focused only on specific and
specialist capabilities that reflect New Zealands defence
expertise.
CLEARING THE F-16 & ANZAC DECKS: However Prime Minister Key
wishes to pursue the policy framework underpinning the next NZ
Defence White Paper, few commentators would doubt his work will
benefit from the discipline applied by former Prime Minister Clark,
which began in 2001 with the controversial scrap-ping of the former
Shipley-led Nationals deal to reinvigorate the RNZAFs fixed-wing
combat arm by leasing 28 F-16A/B fighters from the US, to replace
the existing upgraded Skyhawk fleet. Less controversial (albeit not
in Australia), was confirmation of the deci-sion (announced in
December 1998 by former Defence Minister, Max Bradford), not to buy
the third Anzac-class frigate.
Having cleared the decks with firm decisions on the F-16 and
third frigate acquisition, Helen Clark then moved to turn
traditional defence thinking on its head by formally expanding the
role of the NZDF across a much wider range of non-military threats
some-thing only just addressed by Prime Minister Rudd in his first
National Security Statement with sufficient funding to maintain a
highly professional, small army whose contribution would be
welcomed in multinational operations, particularly in the
Pacific.
Overviewing the formal statements to date, there is nothing in
Prime Minister Keys policies which indicate he will greatly change
current New Zealand defence posture, including the ban on the
en-try of nuclear-powered vessels into local harbours that resulted
in the United States moving in the 1980s to freeze New Zealand out
of the ANZUS circle. Still with serious budgetary difficulties now
impacting across the NZ economy, it is likely a number of programs
currently regarded as being critical to avoid the failure of policy
might slip to the right in terms of their acquisition priority, as
the policy itself is inevitably redefined in the context of the new
White Paper and changed global economic environment.
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Australian Defence Business Review November-December 20084
KEYS INHERITANCE FROM HELEN CLARK: One of the first tasks
undertaken by the Labour/Alliance coalition Government when it came
to power on 27 November 1999, was to advance early planning to
raise a new Defence Assessment, heralded at the time as the first
comprehensive review of overall defence policy since the
substantive 1991 Defence White Paper. This was undertaken in a
manner which in parallel sought to cast a more recent National 1997
White Paper The Shape of New Zealands Defence as being of limited
value moving forward, given it had only considered force structure,
equipment and funding.
The 1997 document nevertheless provided key long-term
value-added in setting out three ultimately enduring elements of
evolving NZ defence policy: the need to defend against low-level
threats, such as incursions into the countrys Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), and to counter terrorism; funding a substantive NZ
contribution to regional security (including maintenance of key
defence relationships with Australia, and the Five Power Defence
Arrangement partners); and being a good international citizen by
playing a part in global col-lective security efforts, particularly
peacekeeping.
By 2000, however, there had emerged a clear mismatch between
extant defence policy goals, the level of operational activity of
the NZDF, and available resources Prime Minister Clark was willing
to afford defence when compared to other national priorities. The
ul-timate conclusion was that NZDF resources were spread too thinly
over a wide range range of capabilities, not all of which could be
sustained into the future. A funding crunch was imminent, and thus
required the adoption of an appropriate methodology that would
en-able the re-prioritisation of New Zealands defence capability
against the available funds, in short, so the NZDF can do what it
needs to do, and do it well.
QUIGLEYS CULL OF AIR COMBAT FORCES: As a means to effecting
immediate defence policy changes, the new Clark Govern-ment
commissioned in late-December 1999 former ACT MP, Derek Quigley
(chair of the NZ Parliaments Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade
Select Committee) to review the F-16A/B fighter lease contract.
Quigley, a regular critic of National defence policy, was re-quired
to present his conclusions by 6 March 2000. The fighter deal
involved NZ$124.8 million being paid for two five-year fighter
leases, along with $238.2m for a start-up package to train strike
pilots, and bring the aircraft up to full operational
capability.
The deal also provided the option of buying the aircraft
outright after 10 years, which was estimated at the time to cost an
additional $287m. An equipment upgrade costing $93m (for targeting
pods, electronic countermeasure pods and precision- guided
missiles) would have ultimately brought the all-up capital cost to
NZ$743 million over 10 years, if both lease options were exercised.
NZ La-bour was critical of the deal throughout the 1999 election
campaign, preferring to pitch its Defence policy on support for the
conclusions
of a Parliamentary Select Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence
& Trade inquiry report Defence Beyond 2000 whose deliberations
were heavily guided by Quigley.
The Defence Beyond 2000 report published on 30 August 1999
advocated an urgent need for NZ to re-prioritise its defence
expenditures around fundamental national interests, and in turn
look-ing to sustain well-equipped forces to undertake less combat
inten-sive regional peacekeeping roles, as against expending scarce
treasure in far-flung theatres, such as Bosnia.
Labour pitched to voters that, in government, it would seek to
dismantle the F-16 lease deal to free up funds for new sea
transport capability, whilst similarly walking away from a third
Anzac frigate purchase in preference for a new fleet of smaller
multi-role naval patrol vessels. It was also said the equipment
needs of the NZ Army (ie: for its new emphasis on peacekeeping)
would be reviewed, along with associated pay and allowances.
Public perceptions of the Navy the most traditional of the three
services were also fast changing in response to the nature of
recent operations. At the time, NZs then two operational frigates
HMNZS Te Kaha and the steam-driven Leander-class HMNZS Canterbury,
had just returned home prior to Christmas after deploy-ments in the
Gulf and East Timor.
The Canterbury had spent 76 days on INTERFET duties, dur-ing
which she escorted 30 supply and merchant ships to East Timor,
mounted an anti-submarine search-and-deter operation, and covered
the NZ battalions amphibious landing at Suai. The Te Kaha had
similarly spent almost six months away, including three weeks on
East Timor duties, and six weeks in the Arabian Gulf enforcing UN
sanctions against Iraq.
DEFENCE POLICY FRAMEWORK: Reflective of these influ-ences, Helen
Clarks Labour-Alliance Party Government published 19 June 2000 a
new paper The Governments Defence Policy Framework which heralded
the dawn of a more firmly reasoned approach to determining military
force structure, by first setting out key defence policy
objectives, and distilling this down to eighteen required roles and
tasks for the NZDF. The five stated policy objec-tives were:
(1) To defend New Zealand and to protect its people, land,
territo-rial waters, EEZ, natural resources and critical
infrastructure;(2) To meet alliance commitments to Australia, by
maintaining a close defence partnership in pursuit of common
security interests;(3) To assist in the maintenance of security in
the South Pacific, and to provide assistance to Pacific
neighbours;(4) To play an appropriate role in the maintenance of
security in the Asia-Pacific region, including meeting obligations
as a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA); and(5) To
contribute to global security & peacekeeping through par-
New Zealand Defence Review
NEW DEFENCE WHITE PAPER FOR NEW ZEALAND: The new National
Government of Prime Minister, John Key, is to have another look at
New Zealands national security & defence priorities. Upon
coming to government in 1999, former Labour Prime Minister, Helen
Clark, made sweeping changes to the front line capabilities of the
NZ Defence Force by scotching a deal to replace the ageing Skyhawk
fleet (far L) with leased F-16s (L) from the United States, and
confirmed it would not reverse former PM, Jenny Shipleys decision
to cancel the acquisition of a third Anzac frigate (R) from
Australia. Also up for review were decisions about NZ ground force
deployments overseas, and whether contributions to far away
campaigns (ie: Bosnia) really did serve NZ national security
objectives. ADBR, TENIX DEFENCE & NZ GOVERNMENT PHOTOS
-
Australian Defence Business Review November-December 2008 5
ticipation in the full range of United Nations and other
appropriate multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief
operations.
Whilst acknowledging the wider Asia-Pacific strategic
environ-ment (of which NZ is a part) remained relevant, the new
policy framework controversially (at the time) declared New Zealand
to be not directly threatened by any other country, and not likely
to be involved in widespread armed conflict. This set the scene,
moving forward, for a down-shift in NZDF combat capabilities in
order to shape its forces so they could best contribute to regional
stability and global peace, by promoting comprehensive security
through a range of initiatives including diplomacy, the pursuit of
arms control & disarmament, addressing global environmental
concerns, providing development assistance, and building trade
& cultural links.
The document went on to affirm a new direction would be taken in
NZ defence and security policies, whereby future approaches were to
be based on New Zealands own assessment of the security
environment, in particular, on what action was considered to be in
the countrys best interests and without regard to the preferences
of major global powers, such as the United States.
Within a community of sceptical taxpayers, Clark promoted the
primary reason for maintaining a defence force was to secure New
Zealand against external threat, to protect our sovereign
interests, in-cluding in the EEZ, and to be able to take action to
meet likely con-tingencies in our strategic area of interest in
short, not too much different from the Nationals 1997 approach.
With the US having effectively turned out the lights in terms of
defence cooperation with New Zealand, The Defence Policy Framework
went on to declare there is no strategic partnership closer than
that with Australia. NZ will continue to meet its obligations as a
member of the FPDA. Special obligations to Pacific neighbours to
assist in maintaining peace, preserving the environment, promoting
good governance and achieving economic wellbeing were also
recognised, within the new Framework.
In short, the new policy sought a secure neighbourhood, and we
must work towards that. East Timor & Bougainville have
dem-onstrated that NZ has a role to play in helping keep the peace
in our region. The Government believes that this role extends
beyond the provision of military support. It also includes
assisting peace proc-esses through diplomacy and mediation.
Declaration of the Defence Policy Framework next addressed the
future structure of the NZDF, saying its progressive
implementa-tion will mean a shift towards a range of military
capabilities which are sustainable, safe and effective in combat
and in peacekeeping, and structured for maximum operational and
political impact. Future capital investments flagged included:
upgrading the Armys mobility, communications, surveillance, and
fire-support capabilities; providing effective air and naval
transport capabilities; and maintaining effective maritime
surveillance capabilities of the Air Force and Navy within New
Zealands EEZ, and the EEZs of Pacific Island States.
Such statements went on to inform a longer-term NZDF
re-structure (for completion by November 2000), with core
require-ments being to: ensure land forces were well equipped to
meet NZs most immediate needs; that effective air transport &
military sealift for deployment/support would be provided; and for
surveillance of the maritime environment that met international
obligations for search & rescue. Urgent capital acquisitions
viewed as fully consistent with the new defence policy goals &
priorities (ie: modernising the Army and addressing P-3K Orion
capabilities) were considered for funding before other reviews
concluded.
The 2000/01 Defence Budget allocated $61.6m for continuing the
Anzac ship project; $5.3m for the Orion aircraft life exten-sion
project; $61.3m for maritime helicopters; $1.9m for the Orion
auto pilot; $3.2m for very low-level defence; and $11.6m for
other projects (including a joint C2 system). Projects scheduled
for com-pletion over that financial year included: direct fire
support weapons (heavy machine guns) for the Army; a bridge
simulator for the Navy; the Orion autopilot, replacement of P-3K
wings and horizontal stabilisers; and surveillance, target
acquisition and night observation equipment for the Army.
THE LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT PLAN: Leveraging off the guidance
provided by the Defence Policy Framework, the Clark Government next
published 11 June 2002 its first NZDF Long Term Development Plan
(LTDP) , which contained a series of new projects and funding set
to ultimately reconfigure the nations military forces into the
armed combat/peace-keeping force mould that is prevalent today (see
major projects review below). Similar to the Austral-ian
Governments initial 2001-2010 Defence Capability Plan (DCP), the
LTDP drew off both the June 2000 Defence Policy Framework, as well
as capability requirements outlined 8 May 2001 in the Defence
Statement A Modern Sustainable Defence Force Matched to New
Zealands Needs.
Key decisions in the Defence Statement were based around a joint
approach to structure and operational orientation. There would be a
modernised Army with new light armoured and light operational
vehicles, improved communications, and new weapons. There would be
a practical Navy fleet matched to New Zealands wider security
needs: two Anzac-class frigates, a new multi-role vessel and new
offshore and inshore patrol vessels (ie: as ultimately reflected in
project Protector).
Thirdly, there would be a refocussed and updated Air Force not
in the mould of traditional western militaries but one with
up-graded/replacement transport aircraft, new helicopters, and
upgraded patrol aircraft. All of these investments were to be
underpinned by a funding commitment to provide financial certainty
and reflecting the need to provide depth rather than breadth, and
the need to focus resources on capabilities that contribute the
most to NZ objectives. The line of argument ultimately supported
the decision to disband the Air Combat Force, and follow-on
decisions to eventually close the Whenuapai airbase, and
consolidate the Air Forces operational capacity at Ohakea.
The first stage of implementing the new joint approach saw
es-tablishment of Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ) in
2001, at Trentham. The Clark Government also sought greater
cooperation and collaboration within the NZDF, and between the NZDF
and the Ministry of Defence, drawing on the recommenda-tions of a
2003 Review of Accountabilities & Structural Arrange-ments
(RASA).
The LTDP also reflected a new governance construct whereby
elected officials began to assume much more control over the
direc-tion of military spending. Pitched by then-NZ Defence
Minister, Mark Burton, as a planning tool to enable decisions on
defence acquisitions to be taken in the context of the Clark
Governments approach to national defence policy the new LTDP sought
to bet-ter communicate the priority and estimated affordability of
future NZDF acquisitions.
The prioritisation of LTDP projects was achieved through a gap
analysis that compared the current NZDF force structure against an
assessment of its ability to meet the reoriented roles tasked to it
by the new Defence Policy Framework. Tasking was not solely related
to operational deployments, but related also to the development and
maintenance of a force in being, and capable of undertaking a range
of operations if required. Projects were also prioritised against
the five policy objectives earlier laid down by the Clark
Government.
The most pressing capability gaps fell into three broad
categories:
New Zealand Defence Review
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Australian Defence Business Review November-December 2008
New Zealand Defence Review
Type 1 Projects considered critical to avoiding outright failure
to achieve policy objectives capabilities necessary to facilitate
the essential functioning of the NZDF, and its ability to undertake
op-erational missions (eg: systems for joint command & control,
airfield infrastructure maintenance, etc), as well as fundamental
operational capabilities. Predictably, the gap analysis highlighted
major shortcom-ings caused by the decision to disband RNZAFs combat
wing;
Type 2 Projects considered necessary to avoid significant policy
risks (eg: particularly for Land forces); and
Type 3 Projects considered as carrying a lower level of risk in
terms of policy failure, but affecting the degree to which policy
objectives were met and the manner in which they were fulfilled,
but still requiring upgrades to current leading defence assets.
Given a view that the five defence policy objectives were of
equal importance, there was a supplementary need to undertake a
sensitiv-ity analysis to assign a measure of the relative
importance of each objective. This approach was said to demonstrate
that the projects within the top category (Type 1) remained
constant, and confirmed their importance to avoid policy
failure.
As a further check, the list of highest priority projects was
then compared against the priorities set out in the Defence Policy
Frame-work, which elucidated Clarks core requirement to raise and
sustain well-equipped, combat-trained land forces which are also
able to act as effective peacekeepers. The LTDP ultimately took
this directive to heart, resulting in the nomination of a series of
Type 1 projects addressing total force mobility, including the need
for NZ to pos-
sess an independent means of transporting military capabilities
to theatres of operations.
Highest priority projects were then supported with a raft of
Type 2 initiatives seeking to complement earlier decisions to
acquire 105 Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV-IIIs) from GM of Canada,
as well as 308 Light Operational Vehicles, for which an RFT had
just been released. Heading this list was the acquisition by
2003/04 of both a Direct Fire Support Weapon, and a medium-range
Anti-Armour Weapon. Basic NZ Army operational capabilities were
also proposed to be upgraded through the acquisition of new
engineer-ing equipment and supporting communications systems.
Nominated Type 1 and 2 projects were afforded the highest
probability (ie: for progression over the next five years), after
which the LTDP would be adjusted reflective of changing policy
circumstances and/or because elected Government might not be able
to maintain real (ie: adjusted for inflation) funding levels.
The first LTDP allocated up to NZ$1 billion (nominal terms) over
the next 10 years with current operating baselines set to 2005/06,
with adjustments for unfunded depreciation thereafter. Leasing
options were to be considered where there was a neutral trade-off
between capital and operating expenditure. All in all, in-cluding
projects already approved, some $3 billion was proposed to be spent
on upgrading NZDF capabilities over the next ten years.
To firm-up the costing base for the full LTDP, NZ authorities
also had to improve the individual project costing data en-
compassing all elements of defence capital expenditure, in-cluding
acquisition costs, through-life costs and cost/risk mitigation.
Deflators also had to be developed to reflect how
military-related
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Australian Defence Business Review November-December 2008 7
New Zealand Defence Review
inflation impacted on defence capital expenditure and planning.
Ac-cording to LTDP-I, by changing levels of capability, cost and
policy compliance it is possible to identify options within
projects. These options, which will be investigated for each
project, could include phasing projects to spread the cash flow or
reducing the size and/or scope of a project.
The Long Term Development Plan also made provision for a fourth
type of project deemed necessary to deliver the capabil-ity
required by Government which in a budgetary squeeze would fall
below the line in terms of achieving overall priorities. Type 4
projects included: the creation of a High Readiness Infantry
Com-pany; resourcing a short-medium range air patrol capability;
and modifying the new Multi-Role Vessel/Offshore Patrol Vessels to
operate in the Ross Sea.
They also included upgrading mine detection capability;
resourc-ing an Army manoeuvre range; replacing indirect fire
support weap-ons after 2012; as well as upgrading a raft of
military infrastructure projects. LTDP-I also directed that, given
Type 4 projects are unlike-ly to be funded, this underlines the
importance of reviewing projects that are above the line in order
to realise potential savings. These projects will still require
work to clarify their scope, utility across the policy objectives
and cost, and will be included in future reviews of the Long Term
Development Plan. Changing strategic circumstances (however), could
result in a reprioritisation of projects.
Headquarters NZDF Development Branch was tasked to provide a
work plan to manage the LTDP, that would allow the single
Serv-ices, NZDF and MoD to plan for, and allocate appropriate
resources to those projects that have a higher priority on the
LTDP. Early goals for LTDP-I implementation included: beginning
construction of the project Protector fleet; delivery of the Armys
light opera-tional vehicles; delivery of the two Boeing 757s;
selecting new heli-copters; procuring special operations equipment;
and securing timely delivery of the earlier approved NZLAVs and
Army radios.
DEFENCE SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE: Three years into LTDP-1 (2
May 2005), the Clark Government published a Defence Sustainability
Initiative (DSI), represented at the time as the fourth stage of a
systemic approach to reshape New Zealands military forces around a
more realistic appreciation of the countrys place in global
politics, reflective of the available resources and cognisant of
NZs domestic national security requirements.
At the time of its presentation, Defence Minister Burton
prom-ised that by the end of the 10-year DSI funding package, the
Clark Government would have increased the NZDFs operational
base-line funding by 51% since it took office in 1999. There was
little acknowledgement, however, such funding was buying a much
less capable defence force, compared with earlier times. Still,
Burton went on to pitch his efforts as addressing an under
investment begun in 1991/92 when the former National government was
said to have cut defence baseline spending by $112.75m, which was
followed by cuts totalling $150m well into the late-1990s.
Less well acknowledged in all of the above was the genesis of
the DSI, which emerged via a December 2003 NZ Ministers for
Defence, Finance & State Services commissioned multi-agency
review that yielded the Defence Capability and Resourcing Review
(DCARR). In an atmosphere of scarce resources, the Terms of
Reference required this Review to assess the optimum capability
configuration and resource requirements of the NZDF to undertake
the roles and tasks set out in the governments statements of
defence policy, and in the Defence LTDP-I. DCARR was not empowered
to review stated Defence policy, however.
Presented in February 2005, the final DCARR report identified
several areas where, due to a lack of funding, clear deficiencies
had emerged in both NZDF and Ministry of Defence (MoD)
activities.
Heading this list were: shortfalls in personnel numbers across
the three services; interactions between Headquarters NZDF &
Head-quarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ); and deficiencies
in personnel numbers and the trained state of individuals in some
trades. Latter NZDF annual reports showed that at this time, the
total number of military personnel had fallen from 20,785 in June
1991, to 15,512 in June 1998, and 12,889 in June 2004. In short,
the DCARRs message was that if corrective action was not taken, the
NZDF was in danger of becoming ineffective.
Continuing funding constraints were further said to have led to
under-expenditure on replenishing both equipment and reserves, with
stocks having fallen well below appropriate levels. Certain
priority weapon platforms were nominated as requiring upgrades or
replacement (these were omitted in the public DCARR), while other
military equipment was acknowledged as no longer meeting the
required standard. Depleted contingency reserve stocks of
ammuni-tion (the NZ Army estimated it would need to spend $170m on
such stocks over the next ten years), fuel and spares were also
evident. Development of infrastructure at camps and bases and
improved corporate management capability was also called for. The
DCARR estimated that a total of $690m would be required to fully
fund mi-nor equipment upgrades and replacements over the next ten
years. It also estimated $210m would need to be spent over the next
decade modernising the NZDFs existing command, control,
communica-tions and intelligence (C3I) system.
In terms of The Defence Estate, an independent study found the
existing management structures might lead to sub-optimal resource
allocations and Defence would need to invest $450m to upgrade some
facilities over the next ten years. The document further noted the
ongoing role of the new Capability Management Framework (CMF) in
making such assessments, which was introduced in 2004 to replace in
part the cumbersome Defence Planning System.
NEED FOR STRATEGIC PLAN: To evaluate the NZDFs man-agement
systems and processes, the DCARR commissioned char-tered accounting
firm Deloittes to undertake an assessment. Their key critical
observation was that the NZDF lacked an overarching Strategic Plan,
and that extant planning systems tended to be op-erationally
biased, focussed on output delivery rather than organisa-tional
capacity. The DCARR recommended that certain management projects
currently under way should be given priority.
These included the creation of a Planning Branch to coordinate
the strategic planning and program management capabilities of the
HQ NZDF, and to monitor progress of the organisational activ-ity
arising from the DCARR and RASA. It also included continuing
development of the Capability Management Framework processes and
the rollout of enhanced frameworks for corporate planning, risk
management, performance management and knowledge manage-ment across
the NZDF.
Subsequent analysis indicated that from the early 1990s to 1999,
the level of commitment of personnel to operational deployments
ranged between 2% and 6% of the regular force, including
deploy-ments to Bougainville and frigate-based deployments to the
Multina-tional Interception Force in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. This
low level of commitment accordingly helped to conceal the extent to
which NZDF capability was declining.
Since 1999, the continuing strain on capability became more
evi-dent as the level of deployment to peace support operations
ranged between 14-25% of the regular force, with the Army often
deploying 35% of its regular force. DCARR found shortages were
particularly significant in the Army and in HQ NZDF. For example,
the Army was unable to sustain a motorised battalion in the
near-term, and faced critical shortages in a number of trades. The
Headquarters NZDF was affected by shortages of middle and senior
ranking offic-
-
Lead Issues & Analysis
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-
Australian Defence Business Review November-December 2008 9
New Zealand Defence Review
ers, due to the need for such ranks to deploy operationally. The
Air Force identified a need for significant increases in logistics
support personnel, including flight safety, to support planned
future introduc-tions of aircraft. The Navy was looking to recruit
appropriate per-sonnel to ensure the full crewing of the project
Protector fleet from 2007 [It is noted that at the end of 2008,
with only some of these new platforms having been introduced into
service, the NZDF has still not recruited enough personnel].
URGENT DSI RECOVERY PACKAGE: The Clark Govern-ments DSI response
comprised a NZ$4.4 billion (excluding GST) 10-year package
(starting in FY2005/06), in addition to $1 billion al-ready
allocated to LTDP-I in supplemental capital funding to sustain
initiatives [Note, figures for NZ defence spending in previous
years were inclusive of GST]. An additional permanent baseline
increase of $0.844m for the Ministry of Defence commenced from
2005/06. Additional capability requirements relevant to the
post-9/11 inter-national security environment also featured in the
DSI response. An additional $209m was provided for anticipated use
over 2007/08 to 2009/10, and later, if the initial $1 billion
allocated for the LTDP had not been exhausted by then.
Further, 11 September 2001 terrorist attack response influences
were evident in the DSA as it included the need for an holistic
whole-of-government view of security; the need to be ready for
unexpected changes in the security environment; and the need for a
defence force with multi-role capabilities ... that is
interoperable with our likely partners. The DCARR also commented on
operational and organisational capabilities in several areas of the
NZDF and Ministry of Defence, saying it did not match what was
required by government policy.
Gaps were also attributed to equipment continuing to be used in
service despite such equipment having exceeded its economic life, a
strong labour market affecting recruitment and retention of key
NZDF personnel, which had had fallen to 12,889 (10,684 RF and 2,205
TF). Reasons cited for personnel decline included disband-ment of
the Air Combat Force, reductions of the frigate fleet, the
contracting out of support services (such as the Devonport naval
dockyard, catering and base maintenance), and the implementation of
efficiency and effectiveness initiatives.
Early priorities identified for the DSI included an In- terim
Strategic Plan to be developed by mid-2005 (to clearly set out
spending priorities), and a Defence Corporate Plan-ning Framework
to guide the strategic management of the NZDF and the Ministry of
Defence and a set of subordinate plans to integrate the management
of people, infrastructure, equipment and resources were also
developed.
The DSI was directed initially towards recovery of personnel
levels, recruitment and retention, putting new and upgraded
capabili-ties into service, and strengthening the organisational
and corporate capability of HQNZDF. Other early priorities were
reviewing the optimal configuration of the Army as it rebuilt its
capability (ie: who would operate the NH90s?), and developing a
program to address the backlog in minor capital projects, for
example, in infrastructure, equipment and IT.
The implementation of the new processes and management sys-tems
in the NZDF would be substantially complete by mid-2006. A mid-term
review would be commissioned after five years to assess the
appropriateness of the level of funding for the remainder of the
funding period.
On 17 October 2006, Phil Goff who succeeded Mark Burton as NZ
Minister for Defence on 19 October 2005 outlined the third update
of the LTDP at the NZ Defence Industry Associations (NZDIA) annual
forum. LTDP-III (earlier updates were in June 2003
and November 2004) entailed more than NZ$1b in NZDF spending.
Goff noted that since the documents first release in 2002, the NZ
Government had approved 13 projects for progression to
acquisi-tion; five projects had been approved in principle by the
Govern-ment; and 12 projects were currently in their capability
development phase.
The new Minister told the NZDIA the eight NH90 helicopters being
acquired to replace the Iroquois the single biggest NZ de-fence
purchase since the Anzac frigates in the 1980s represented the last
of the core capability projects of LTDP-I. The NH90 contract had
been signed four months earlier in July for a cost of NZ$771m.
Seven new major projects were included in the LTDP-III Update,
including: a new fuel storage facility, power generation and
reticula-tion system at the Devonport Naval Base; the upgrading of
taxiways at Ohakea air base; and replacement of leased Beechcraft
200 King Air trainers after 2008. It also included the purchase of
close-in pro-tection weapons mounts for the two Anzac-class
frigates; and possi-bly sharing a satellite to enhance NZDF
communications after 2010.
ACCOUNTING FOR CLARKS DECADE: Publication of the NZ Defence
Forces 2007/08 Annual Report marks a useful point in independently
accounting for Helen Clarks administration of NZ national security
and defence affairs. According to that document, since 1999, some
NZ$7.6 billion was committed under the 2002 and 2006 updated
Defence LTDPs, and the subsequent $4.4b DSI, in order to rebuild
the capacity and capability of the countrys defence force.
DSI priorities were confirmed as being the restoration of
person-nel numbers, the delivery of initial LTDP projects and
improvements in Defences organisational abilities. Significant
progress is said in the annual report to have been made in
replacing and upgrading major equipment, improving service
personnel pay and allowances and meeting the countrys local,
regional and global commitments.
The Annual Report nevertheless also reveals a national defence
force struggling to satisfy declared national security priorities
(as well as the DSI goals) under the combined weight of a
widespread lack of personnel and consistently poorly performing
equipment. Multi-ple, concurrent deployments (and attendant
training programs and/or defence diplomacy) are said to be placing
pressure on the Armys mission critical equipment, and putting
greater demands on experi-enced and specialised personnel including
command & control, com-munications, logistical support and
other key trades.
Similar pressures, including contractor delays, are also said to
be being felt by the Navy and Air Force as they bring new platforms
into service, in particular the project Protector fleet (ie: HMNZS
Canterbury only commenced introduction into service in 2007), and
upgraded C-130H Hercules, P-3K Orion and Boeing 757 aircraft. Army
performance benchmarks declared in the Annual Report in-dicated it
was only partially prepared for low-level conflicts and not
equipped to meet higher level threats (albeit with company-sized
forces having been deployed to Afghanistan and East Timor).
Turning to the NZ Air Force, the report said it had insufficient
personnel to meet air and ground crew requirements, and was only
partially prepared for complex maritime air operations. The Navy
was said to have similarly struggled to sustain deployments for the
balance of its ships for more than half the number of days at sea
originally envisaged by capability planners. As at 8 December 2008,
the NZDF comprised 9,432 personnel in the Regular Force, 2,157 in
the Territorial Force and 2,586 civilian staff members across the
armed services of Navy, Army and Air Force. Some 673 personnel were
deployed on 16 peacekeeping operations, UN missions and de-fence
exercises around the world. There were 41 non-operational (ie:
Defence attaches) on overseas postings. The report found there
were
-
Australian Defence Business Review November-December 200810
After winning office, the Nationals new Defence Minister, Dr
Wayne Mapp, was quick to express a different view of the current
status of the NZDF, and the commentary contained in its 2007/08
Annual Report. In Dr Mapps view, the annual report had revealed
significant problems with the state of the NZDF that Labour sim-ply
had not even acknowledged. He added the NZ Auditor-General had to
abandon an audit of major procurement projects under La-bour
because the projects were so poorly managed that Kevin Brady (the
Controller & Auditor-General) couldnt even find enough
infor-mation to conduct an audit on.
Moving into 2009, the Nationals have given themselves a year to
come to grips with the defence capability inheritance left after
eight years of the application of Labour thinking, now set to be
explained in a new Defence White Paper.
A I R P R O J E C T S
BOEING 757 MODIFICATION: The NZDF reports the 2007/08 financial
year saw the return of the first of two upgraded and modified Royal
New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) Boe-ing 757-200 transports, which had
been out of service since Novem-ber 2007. The aircraft conversion
and avionics upgrade program will allow the carriage of passengers,
freight, mixed passenger-freight, very important person and
aero-medical evacuation (AME) missions.
The prototype aircraft completed flight testing 23 July. Work on
the second aircraft being undertaken by Singapore Technologies
Aerospace (ST Aerospace) at its US facility, ST Mobile Aerospace
Engineering (MAE) will be completed by the end of the year. B-757
aircrews are said to have been below directed levels through-out
2007/08 as a result of the modifications. An additional B-757 crew
was therefore proposed to be generated in late-2008. The 757s flew
273 hours from a target of 950 in 2007/08.
C-130 LIFE EXTENSION: The first upgraded aircraft under the
C-130 Hercules Life Extension Project (LEP) was delivered in 2008,
with fleet modernisation expected to be completed in 2011. The
RNZAFs H-model fleet (five aircraft) is scheduled to serve until
around 2017. The first C-130H with an upgraded self-protection
system being undertaken in conjunction with the C-130 LEP is
scheduled to be delivered and operational in 2009. The scope of the
life extension program includes the replacement of specific
mechani-cal, avionic and structural components, and the design
& installation of flight deck communications and navigation
improvements to meet evolving air traffic management regulations.
Despite the modifica-tions, the aircrafts engines, propellers, and
some other systems are viewed as remaining possible sources of
unserviceabilities.
The Hercules fleet flew 1,814 hours from a total target of 2,166
hours in 2007/08 with the under fly a result of unforeseen delays
in the C-130 LEP. Training activities for both the C-130 and Boeing
757-200 fleets, in particular simulator training, is said to have
been difficult to achieve because of limited instructors. The
consolidation and complete departure of Air Force personnel from
Whenuapai will take ten years. A dedicated medical aero evacuation
capability has not yet been realised by the RNZAF. Accordingly, the
Hercules remains available for aero evacuation, albeit not yet
specifically equipped for it. Personnel dedicated to AME missions
are not yet available.
ADVANCED PILOT TRAINING CAPABILITY: NZ Ministry of Defence
officials report the tender process is well advanced for an
Advanced Pilot Training Capability and maintenance support pack-age
to replace the five Beech King Air B200 aircraft, for likely
intro-
New Zealand Defence Review
no significant problems with interoperability and effective
standardi-sation with other friendly forces, except for the lack of
cueing and identification equipment for New Zealands air defence
capability.
The 2007/08 NZDF Annual Report also cited consolidation of the
NZDF Strategic Plan, consolidation of the organisational capac-ity
in Headquarters NZDF, a continuation of projects under the DSI and
significant progress with the Defence LTDP as milestones achieved
over the year. It said there had been positive growth in the
numbers of Regular Force personnel since the DSI commenced in 2005,
but conceded this rate of growth had recently slowed, meaning
shortfalls in critical trades still existed.
A new initiative was introduced in the form of a Defence
Trans-formation Program (DTP), to help ensure the NZDF improved the
resource efficiency and effectiveness of internal systems in line
with strategic objectives. The DTP is organised into five main
areas: hu-man resource management, information technology, defence
estate, education and training and logistics.
LTDP-IV & THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN: The second pri-ority under
the DSI had been implementation of the major capital projects on
the Defence LTDP list. To assess performance in this quest, Phil
Goff (now leader of the NZ Labour Party) released 8 October 2008
the latest Update of the Defence Long Term De-velopment Plan
(LTDP-IV). This document stated the Ministry of Defence, assisted
by the NZDF, was managing 15 major capital ac-quisition projects
(seven worth over $100m each), while the NZDF was managing around
400 minor capital program projects.
It further reported the NZ Government had introduced over the
year a strategic plan and balanced scorecard tool to measure the
NZDFs progress towards its vision. A new Defence Performance
Management System was also to have been fully implemented by
end-2008. Such process improvements are to be further enhanced by
implementation of the recommendations of a recent NZ Treas-ury-led
Capital Asset Management review, which aims to have all capital
projects supported and resourced under a common whole-of life
framework.
NZ Labour released 23 October its defence election policy two
weeks prior to the 8 November poll. It said that if returned to
gov-ernment, a new Defence White Paper would be published in 2009,
to coincide with the mid-point review of the DSI, and the
develop-ment of a new post-2012 capital expenditure plan. Phil Goff
added Labours version of the new NZ Defence White Paper would also
take into account the findings of Australias new Defence White
Paper, and submitted that funding for immediate defence needs was
provided for under the 10-year LTDP since its last extension to
2012. Operational expenditure (through the DSI) and running to
2017, was said to represent around NZ$8 billion above base-line
levels over the subject period.
Goff also listed numerous Labour achievements in terms of
highlighting projects that would soon be coming on stream and
in-cluding: two new helicopter fleets over the next three years;
together with rebuilt Hercules transports; and upgraded Orion
maritime patrol aircraft. In the next three years, he said the
project Protector maritime fleet would also be in-service, and
major upgrading work would be done on the RNZNs Anzac frigates.
Similarly, the NZ Army would be afforded a digitally based
command & control system, and a computerised intelligence &
reconnaissance system, new night vision equipment and upgraded
weapons, and would be replacing its Unimog vehicle fleet. Goff
committed Labour to a 12% rise in personnel numbers above 2005
levels (ie: an extra 1,600 personnel), noting we are already
two-thirds of the way towards achieving that. By mid-2009, Labour
also pitched it would have fully introduced a new military
remuneration system, giving personnel an average wage rise of over
10% in FY2008/09. >>> page 16
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Australian Defence Business Review November-December 2008 11
Lead Issues & Analysis
NATIONAL SECURITY STATEMENT
Trevor J Thomas/CANBERRA
Kevin Rudds quest to bring forward a docu- m e n t t o u n d e r
p i n thinking and the development of subsequent policy responses
to emergent national security and defence challenges, in many ways
mirrors the approach of former New Zealand Prime Minister, Helen
Clark, when wiping the slate clean upon first coming to power in
1999.
At that time, Clark called for a new approach to prioritising
the asset base & resourcing of the New Zealand Defence Force
(NZDF). Clark began that process by fostering a new Defence Policy
Framework built upon a substan-tive reconsideration of national
security policy objectives.
The Australian Prime Minis-ters first move involves a push to
re-engineer the national secu-rity institutional structure, with
the nomination of until recently Department of Prime Minister &
Cabinet (PM&C) Deputy Sec-retary, Duncan Lewis, as Aus-tralias
first National Security Adviser (NSA).
Lewis first task is to recruit a cadre of top operatives to
resource the functions of the new Office of National Security
(ONS), which has been charged with providing improved stra-tegic
direction within the na-tional security community; to support
whole-of-government national security policy develop-ment and
crisis response; and
Love of China risks miscalculation on Barack Obama presidencyThe
Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, tabled 4 December a document entitled
the first National Security Statement to the Australian Parliament.
The well overdue presentation makes an initial down-payment on the
raft of national security and defence policy undertakings made by
Labor during the course of the 2007 election campaign, that will
ultimately see: a new Defence White Paper (and accompanying Defence
Capability Plan); a new Foreign Policy Statement; a new
Counter-Terrorism White Paper; and a first National Energy Security
Assessment.
to promote a cohesive national security culture.
Lewis new NSA position is to be established at the As-sociate
Secretary level within PM&C to enable direct interac-tion with
agency and depart-mental heads. He will also be assisted by a
Deputy National Security Adviser, and a PM&C support group that
includes the ONS. The existing Office of National Assessments (ONA)
will remain, however, as a sep-arate entity within the Prime
Ministers portfolio.
The Government is also pro-posing to establish a National
Intelligence Coordination Com-mittee (NICC), which Lewis will
chair, with the aim of ensuring the national intelligence effort
including foreign, defence, security and transnational law
enforcement intelligence is effectively integrated and closely
aligned with Australias national security priorities.
To begin the process of set-ting new national security pri-
orities, Prime Minister Rudds National Security Statement (NSS)
alluded to a future focus on clear and enduring secu-rity interests
that transcend the scope of state and territory ju-risdictional
responsibilities.
These were subsequently said to include: maintaining Austral-ias
territorial & border security; promoting Australias political
sovereignty; preserving Austral-ias cohesive and resilient society
and the long-term strengths of our economy; protecting Aus-tralians
and Australian interests both at home and abroad; and promoting an
international en-vironment, particularly in the Asia-Pacific
region, that is sta-ble, peaceful and prosperous, to-gether with a
global rules-based order which enhances Australias national
interests.
Having set the above ground-space, the Prime Ministers NSS went
on to outline his view of the enduring principles the Government
will use to guide future initiatives to advance Aus-tralias
national security interests. In short, these comprised:
(1) Australia will seek, wher-ever possible, to develop
self-reliance across the range of relevant national security
capa-bilities to ensure an effective contribution to its own
secu-rity and to the security of its friends and allies;
(2) The United States alliance remains fundamental to
Aus-tralias national security interests both globally, and in the
Asia-Pacific region. (3) As Australias security is linked
inextricably to the se-curity of the region, regional engagement is
crucial. This in-cludes strengthening Australias bilateral
relationships and effec-tive engagement in regional in-stitutions.
It also means seeking to positively influence the shape of the
future regional architec-ture in a manner that develops a culture
of security policy coop-eration, rather than defaulting to any
assumption that conflict is somehow inevitable.(4) At the global
level, Austral-ia is committed to multilateral institutions, and in
particular the United Nations, to promote a rules-based
international order that enhances Australias secu-rity and economy.
We believe those that share the benefits of these systems must also
share the responsibilities of support-ing them.(5) National
security policy must also be advanced through the agency of
creative middle power diplomacy an active foreign policy capable of
iden-tifying opportunities to promote Australias security and to
other-wise prevent, reduce or delay the emergence of national
security challenges.(6) Australia must also apply a risk-based
approach to assess-ing, prioritising and resourcing its national
security policy across the defence, diplomatic, intel-ligence and
wider national secu-rity community.(7) The Commonwea l th must work
in partnership with state and territory governments where our
national security re-sponsibilities coincide or neces-sarily
complement each other in an increasingly interconnected operational
environment.
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Australian Defence Business Review November-December 200814
Lead Issues & Analysis
Prime Minister Rudd went on to declare that Australians today
live at the dawn of the Asia-Pacific century. With it comes the
potential for a fundamental change in the global order, re-sulting
in both economic oppor-tunities and potential security concerns for
Australia.
He further considered that while the likelihood of conflict
between major powers was cur-rently low, their interactions still
largely shape the interna-tional order in which Australia must
operate.
Summing up the immediate outlook, Rudd went on to state the
Government believes that the future strategic stability of the
Asia-Pacific region will in large part rely on the continuing
strong presence of Australias closest ally, the United States.
Coming on the cusp of an accelerating global recession driven by
the decimation of as-set values and confidence in fi-nancial
markets heralded by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
early-October, Rudds pitching of the US as the lynchpin of
Australian national security into the future comes with certain
risks in underlying assumptions.
One primary risk is that un-der the new Barack Obama-led
administration, the US will turn inward in order to concentrate on
licking its own wounds, and resulting in a little more distance
being put in its relationships with countries not directly linked
with the task of economic re-construction.
With the fall into econom-ic recession confirmed by lead market
indicators in the run up to Christmas, perceptions that
after 12-18 months of low eco-nomic growth all will
miracu-lously return to the situation experienced in the ten years
run-ning up to 2008, requires some further examination.
The assumption that the Chi-nese economy even with its US$2
trillion of reserves could ride out the chill wind blow-ing from
the United States (and progressively Europe) in the last quarter of
2008 has proved incorrect, as Chinese growth es-timates similarly
faltered against an uncomfortable realisation that this powerhouse
of global manufacturing remains depend-ent upon substantive demand
for exports from the major west-ern economies.
Having emptied their Treas-uries over the past quarter cen-tury
into Chinese coffers due to an insatiable thirst for imports, an
alternative view to that held by Prime Minister Rudd sug-gests that
coming out of the current global financial crisis, western
democracies might nat-urally seek to turn foreign and trade policy
more inward.
This is likely to occur as countries seek to repair their own
economies and foreign trade balances by looking to new markets to
expand their own exports, whilst also seeking to moderate the
growth of imports not immediately relevant to the economic
reconstruction task.
In such a scenario, Rudds assertion the most crucial
re-lationship, in East Asia and glo-bally, will be between the
United States and China, brings with it some further uncertainty
for Australia. The National Security Statement acknowledges that
relationships between China, the
US and Japan will affect our security and our economy, and
recognises the likely material impact on the wider region of any
significant deterioration in the relations between them.
Rudd also noted the rise of India (including, the manage-ment of
its relationship with Pakistan), as being an important new factor
in the strategic stabil-ity of the Asia-Pacific region. The
discussion next moved to conclude the solution for Aus-tralia was
to push for the realisa-tion of his personal aspirations for an all
encompassing Asia-Pacific Community in 2020, as the most optimal
means of strengthening political, econom-ic and security
cooperation in the region in the long-term.
The strategy is clever, in that as a second preference option,
it provides Rudd with a door to the longer-term pursuit of
secu-rity within our region amongst geographically close neighbours
should the US economy fail to quickly bounce back from the current
global financial crisis.
In such a case, 2008 would come to mark a watershed in the
long-term decline of the US economy as a global economic and
security powerhouse, hence undermining successive com-fortable
assumptions in Aus-tralian defence white papers of continuing US
supremacy for the next thirty years.
Of course, there is no dis-cussion by Rudd in his national
security statement in regard to the emergence of any alterna-tive
eventualities in global politi-cal and economic dynamics (ie: such
as an inwardly-focused US electing not to sustain in the
longer-term its role in the Asia-
Pacific, and thus failing to deliv-er the means by which
Australia underpins its own security), and this is perhaps the 4
December Statements greatest weakness.
Whilst nothing is ever cer-tain in politics, current statistics
and demographic trends suggest that once Barack Obama as-sumes the
US Presidency on 20 January 2009, he is pretty well guaranteed to
serve a two-term Presidency. After that (ie: 2016), alternative
politics Republicans are likely to struggle to regain a majority
vote, as global dy-namics will have substantively changed.
Current economic difficulties and Obamas eventual responses will
not only have a profound impact on American domestic politics, but
also on the shape of the world. Current births, deaths and
marriages data suggests that white voters will become
pro-gressively outnumbered by black and ethnic minorities, thus
turn-ing upside down the US political dynamic.
Subsequent pres ident ia l poll analysis indicates that on 5
November, the white vote was down to 74%, as against 90% when Jimmy
Carter was elected US President. Of white voters, 55% were found to
have backed presidential hopeful John Mc-Cain, with 43% falling in
behind Obama (ie: support was effec-tively split). Black and ethnic
mi-nority voters accounted for 26% of the national vote, up from
19% as recently as 2000.
Significantly, the black vote went 90% to Obama, along with some
two-thirds of the Hispan-ic and Asian vote. Obama also picked up
66% of the votes of
>>> page 23
CHANGING PRIORITIES IN WASHINGTON?: Former special forces
commander, Duncan Lewis (far L) will become Australias first
National Security Adviser as President George W Bush (L) hands over
to Barack Obama (R) on 20 January. Obamas rise to power has been
fuelled by a huge wave of political support from blacks, hispanics
and other minorities, with many holding the view they missed out on
gaining an equitable share of the prosperity of the last decade.
Political pressures from such groups for a righting of such
perceived injustices at a time when the United States is also
looking to rebuild its economy through the exploitation of new
growth markets, may lead the new president down the path of
declaring a new age of economic opportunity for America in
partnership with Africa and Latin America ADoD, DFAT & DEMOCRAT
CAMPAIGN PHOTOS
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Australian Defence Business Review November-December 200816
Developments at the base include an upgrade of the existing main
runway and taxiways, development of new hangars for the new light
and utility helicopter fleets and the construction of a new
passenger and freight terminal, including offices for NZ Customs,
Biosecurity, and Immigration. The NH90 and A109 fleets will arrive
at RNZAF Base Ohakea in 2010.
P-3K ORION UPGRADES: The P-3KII Orion Upgrade Project,
specifically addressing sensor and communication equipment
inade-quacies, is now running approximately nine months behind
schedule, with the project (ie: the whole fleet) not expected to be
completed until 2011/12. Equipment limitations have meant only a
basic level of anti-submarine warfare capability was achieved in
2007/08. The first P-3 aircraft receiving mission management,
communication, and navigation systems upgrades is scheduled to be
delivered in 2009.
According to official documents, the P-3 fleet currently has no
dedicated self-protection equipment, hence the push to have it
fitted as soon as the upgraded P-3 fleet is delivered. The P-3s can
pres-ently provide targeting information, but do not have an
air-to-surface weapon capability. The timing of this project also
depends on the completion of the P-3 mission systems upgrade and
will be consid-ered in coordination with the P-3 Self-Protection
project.
The 2007/08 Annual Report stated the RNZAFs Maritime Patrol
Force (MPF) of six P-3K Orion aircraft was fully prepared for NZ
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and South Pacific Ocean search and
rescue and regional surveillance, but only partially prepared to
contribute to collective global security operations. It identified
the need for a project to acquire air-to-surface weapons for the
P-3Ks, but work has yet to start on such an acquisition.
P-3K aircrew numbers and experience was deemed a major prob-lem
with a major regeneration program under way to increase crew
numbers by 20% in 2008. Of the fleet of six, two P-3K Orion
air-craft are said to have been available for deployed military
tasks dur-ing 2007/08. One was available for maritime search and
rescue. The MPF flew 2,329 hours (from the annual target of 2,550),
with the marginal under fly due to delays in conducting the
acceptance test and evaluation flying on the upgraded P-3KIIs.
M A R I T I M E P R O J E C T S
PROJECT PROTECTOR CAPABILITY: The major challenge facing the
Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) in 2009 is said to be achievement of
the introduction into operational service of the seven new ships
being acquired under the $500m Project Protector. One multi-role
vessel (MRV), two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and four inshore
patrol vessels (IPVs) are being acquired to replace
duction into service by 2010. There is a view the 17 Aermacchi
jets decommissioned by the Clark Labour Government in 2001 (yet
well maintained in storage) could be brought back into service by
the new Government, to work with the army and navy.
In November 2007, former Defence Minister Goff said the
Aermacchis were not suitable to replace the air forces King Air
advanced pilot training aircraft, nor could they provide full
training capabilities for the upgraded C-130H Hercules, P-3K
Orions, 757s or the new helicopter fleets. New NZ Defence Minister,
Dr Wayne Mapp has since indicated that the Nationals new defence
white pa-per, to be published in 2009, would address the need to
retain some level of jet training capability, although Prime
Minister Key in early-December dismissed the possibility as
extremely unlikely.
NZDF MEDIUM UTILITY HELICOPTERS: The NZ De-fence Force has a
resident project team in France monitoring the NH90 NZDF Medium
Utility Helicopter Capability development and manufacturing
program. Eight NH90s were ordered in 2006 for NZ$771m, including
logistics & support, spare parts project costs, training and
extra equipment. The first (of nine) aircraft for frontline
military and civil operations is presently undergoing assembly, and
NH Industries is expected to undertake the first test flight in
ear-ly-2009. The NZDFs first NH90 is scheduled to enter into
service in 2010, with full operational capability to be achieved by
2013.
In a related development, the Governments of New Zealand and
Germany signed 4 November a Status of Forces Agreement setting out
conditions governing the temporary deployment of NZDF per-sonnel to
Germany in early-2009, to undertake training to prepare for the
introduction into service of the new NH90 helicopter fleet. Germany
was the first country to receive NH90 helicopters of a vari-ant
similar to NZs, and is also the first to introduce it into service.
As part of the training arrangement, Germany will send two
heli-copter pilots to NZ to learn how the NZDF operates its
aircraft and trains its personnel.
TRAINING/LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTERS: A resident NZ Defence
project team has been established in Italy to monitor the
AgustaWestland A109 light utility helicopter development and
manufacturing program (and the delivery of a flight training device
and spares support), all scheduled to enter service in 2010. The
five Training and Light Utility Helicopters replacing the Air
Forces fleet of Sioux helicopters will provide air transport,
search & res-cue, aero-medical evacuation, disaster response,
and surveillance & counter terrorism support.
The A109 chosen for its ability to operate at sea & to train
SH-2G Seasprite pilots will form part of No.3 Squadron at Ohakea
Air Force Base, which has started a NZ$129 million up-grade to its
facilities (ie: announced in December 2007 by Phil Goff).
New Zealand Defence Review
RECAPITALISING THE NAVY: With its ageing Leander-class frigates
all but ready for the scrap yard, but having confirmed it would not
purchase a third Anzac-class frigate from Australia, the Clark
government needed to rapidly bring forward a recapitalisation of
the Royal New Zealand Navy, given wholesale obsolescence of the
extant fleet right down to its inshore patrol vessels (far L). This
was achieved through project Protector (L), which has seen the
construction of a new multi-role vessel (R), two new offshore
patrol vessels (far R), and four new inshore patrol vessels (IPVs).
ADBR, TENIX DEFENCE & NZ MoD PHOTOS & IMAGES
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Australian Defence Business Review November-December 2008 17
three Leander-class frigates, one militarised roll-on/roll-off
ship (the former HMNZ Ship Charles Upham) and five obsolete inshore
patrol vessels.
Naval Patrol Forces (NPF) rationalisation had seen the remaining
inshore patrol craft (IPC) HMNZ Ships Wakakura & Kiwi op-erated
for the first five and a half months of 2007/08 subsequently
decommissioned on 11 December 2007 at the Devonport Naval Base.
Sister ships, HMNZS Hinau and HMNZS Moa were latterly
decommissioned on 23 January 2007, with the fifth IPC, HMNZS Kahu,
remaining as the Navigational & Seamanship Training Ship, and
as a backup MCM Support Vessel.
The NPF was then to be supplemented by the first two new IPVs
Rotoiti & Hawea and the first OPV Otago, by the end of the
2007/08 period. However, this did not eventuate due to delays with
their delivery from the former Tenix Defence Systems (now BAES
Systems Australia). The Otago was supposed to have been delivered
in November 2007, followed by the Wellington in May/June 2008. Of
the IPVs, HMNZS Rotoiti was to have been delivered in Sep-tember
2007, followed by HMNZS Hawea in December 2007, HM-NZS Pukaki in
March 2008, and HMNZS Taupo in June 2008.
Official documents indicate HMNZS Otago was intended to have
been available for up to 100 days at sea, and the Wellington for 20
days at sea. Similarly, the four IPVs Rotoiti (160 days), Hawea
(100 days), Pukaki (55 days) and Taupo (35 days) were also
sup-posed to have spent time at sea. Accordingly, confirmed
delivery dates for the project Protector fleet remains
uncertain.
The entire project Protector fleet, including HMNZS Canter-bury,
is in parallel being upgraded to the Offshore Systems ECPINS
(Electronic Chart Precise Integrated Navigation System) M system,
which is also being extended throughout the RNZNs training
facili-ties. A contract option for the system was exercised 26
August 2004 to achieve high level compliance with the NATO Warship
Electronic Chart Display Information System (WECDIS) standard.
On 17 November 2008, Dr Mapp publicly conceded the six
undelivered project Protector ships appeared to have significant
problems. Safety issues relating to the ships sea boats had
prevented them being certified by Lloyds. This meant 70 RNZN crew
stationed in Melbourne with the new OPVs had to be sent back to New
Zealand, and were not expected to return to the Williamstown
dockyard until the ships were considered ready to enter into
service. Dr Mapp added a suspicion the HMNZS Otago was 100 tonnes
overweight. The vessels had been strengthened for ice-breaking
operations in the Southern Ocean and Ross Depend-ency a key
Government requirement but extra weight might now prevent them from
undertaking such missions.
Negotiations in regard to the above with BAE Systems (BAES)
Australia are now expected to delay the ships delivery by six
months, with some of the vessels ready to enter service by
end-March 2009. Dr Mapp indicated at the time it was a priority for
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to establish how long the problems
would take to be fixed, how much it will cost and whose
responsibility it was. Despite being designed for Antarctic waters,
the Minister further confirmed the NZDF did not have plans to
station the MRV or OPVs in the Ross Sea to monitor Japanese whaling
activities, which currently are being firmly opposed via regular
Orion surveillance flights and the provision of intelligence
updates.
Of the project Protector fleet, HMNZS Canterbury is the only
vessel in active service. Official documents indicate that since
its 12 June 2007 commissioning, the multi-role vessel has been
undergo-ing an introduction into service and operational release
period to generate its amphibious sealift capability. The ship and
crew are not expected to fully achieve all output performance
targets until the end of FY2008/09, however.
Expenditure of $20m was required to buy new rigid-hull
inflat-able boats (RHIBs), additional ballasting to reduce the
ships mo-tion in heavy seas, and modifications to the propulsion
gear, in the aftermath of the findings of an independent review
(published 12 September) by John Coles, the former chief of the
British MoDs Warship Support Agency. The review was prompted by two
incidents on 10 July and 5 October 2007 (that caused the death of a
member of the ship), both involving damage to the RHIBs as they
were being deployed in heavy seas.
Coles report exposed serious weaknesses in NZ MoD acquisition
procedures, stating the procurement was constrained ... by the
initial choice of ship design, has (since) been managed to get the
ship into service as soon as possible, (and) has been characterised
by shortcomings in project management and governance and collective
wishful thinking.
The review team also judged that the ship is unlikely to meet
all of the requirements of the delivery contract awarded to Tenix
in July 2004, and that remedial work would be necessary to allow
the Canterbury to perform military tasks. It went on to state that
even after the improvements were made to the vessel, the RNZN would
have to impose operating limitations on the ship, especially in
higher sea states.
Reference was made to former Defence Minister Goff having
repeatedly stated that the [building of] Canterbury [by Tenix]
repre-sented a bargain. National policy statements and Dr Mapp had
con-sistently expressed concern that choosing a one-off model could
lead to unproven risks, adding that the Coles Report into the
acquisition of HMNZS Canterbury was a damning indictment of the
former Governments defence procurement processes.
Dr Mapp added, there was a perfectly suitable military design to
select that is (already) in-service in the Dutch, Spanish and Royal
navies, but the project team opted for an unproven, one-off design
instead. New Zealand had first identified its requirement for a
multi-role ship able to deploy army units around the South Pacific
region to perform sealift, logistic support, and relief tasks as
far back in 1987 as part of an earlier defence review.
ANZUS (MINUS THE US) ALLIANCE: In May 2008, the New Zealand-led
exercise Joint Kiwi 08 sought to improve interoperabili-ty between
the New Zealand and Australian Defence Forces. A Com-bined Joint
Task Force (CTF) was raised consisting of the Australian Landing
Platform Amphibious (LPA) warship, HMAS Manoora, an amphibious
command element from HMNZS Canterbury, and a NZ Land Forces Combat
Team component provided by Queen Alexandras Mounted Rifles &
Bravo Company, 2/1 RNZIR. The exercise, held off the east coast of
NZs South Island, was based on a fictitious insurgency and involved
amphibious beach landings and withdrawals designed to increase
joint preparation between the two countries for emergency disaster
relief and peacekeeping.
A meeting in Canberra mid-May between the Australian Minister
for Home Affairs, Bob Debus, and the former NZ Customs Minis-ter,
Nanaia Mahuta, is reported to have resolved to enhance border
security through more effective cooperation targeting criminal
net-works, maritime security threats and intellectual property
theft.
According to the two Ministers, each nations Customs agencies
are now working on joint intelligence and investigation responses
to identified border risks, including those posed by criminal
networks common to both countries. Australian and NZ Customs have
since signed an agreement t