AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM · 2017-04-28 · CIPS WORKING PAPER A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE REVIEW PAPERS: AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM Yerke Abildayeva,

CIPSWORKINGPAPER

ACOMPARATIVEANALYSIS OF DEFENCEREVIEWPAPERS:

AUSTRAL IA , FRANCE , AND THE UN ITED K INGDOM

YerkeAbildayeva,MustaphaAli-Hashi,ZainabFeroz,RoberthoDayIsaac,AlexanderMarquardt,MaximePerreault-Varin,EdinSabotic,MarcL.Tremblay,Mackenzie

Waddell-Harris,RyanWard,HeidiZaker

ForewordbySrdjanVucetic

GraduateSchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairsUniversityofOttawa

April2017

GSPIAstudents—April2017

Contents

Foreword.....................................................................................................................................................3

Introduction...............................................................................................................................................4

Context.........................................................................................................................................................5

NationalInterest.......................................................................................................................................7

ValuesandStrategy.................................................................................................................................7

ChallengesandThreats..........................................................................................................................8

Opportunities............................................................................................................................................8

Alliances......................................................................................................................................................9

EmergingNorms.....................................................................................................................................10

Personnel..................................................................................................................................................11

DefenceSpending...................................................................................................................................12

ProcurementStrategy...........................................................................................................................12

Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................13

Bibliography.............................................................................................................................................15

AppendixA:CommonNationalInterestCategories...................................................................17

AppendixB:DefenceSpending..........................................................................................................19

AppendixC:DefenceReviewCodebook..........................................................................................20

AComparativeAnalysisofDefenceReviewPapers

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FOREWORD

Canada’sdefencepolicyreviewstatementisslatedtobereleasedinMay2017,aweekortwobeforePrimeMinisterJustinTrudeautravelstoBrusselsonMay25forameetingwith theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (NATO)headsof state.Allofthemareexpectedtobethere:onApril12,NATOSecretaryGeneralJensStoltenbergvisited the White House to ensure that US President Donald Trump attends thesummitaswell.

Trump is also the main reason why Canadians are still waiting to see thisimportantpolicydocument.Draftedin2016followinganextensivereview,thewhitepaper—itsactualtitlehasnotbeenmadepublic—hasprobablybeencontinuouslyupdatedsincetheninordertoaccountforanewsenseofuncertaintythattheactionsofthenewUSadministrationhasgeneratedaboutthefutureofinternationalorderingeneralandofCanada–USrelationsinparticular.

An ever-more intense demand from Washington that “most of its allies”increasetheirmilitaryspendingissymptomaticoftheselargertransformations.Thisis a clear complication for Canada. According to the latest federal budget, defenceremainsalowerpriorityitem.Citingalarger-than-projecteddeficitat$29.4billion—nowprojectedtofallto$14.4billionby2020–21—theTrudeaugovernmentmovedto“re-profile”billionsinnewcapitalfundingattheDepartmentofNationalDefence.What thismeans is thatnewwarplane,warship, andotherbig-ticketpurchases aredelayeduntilthe2020s.

Thenewwhitepapermayormaynotaddresstheserealitiesdirectly.Farmorelikelyisageneralstatementofhowgrowinginstabilityandnewchallengesmarktheglobalsecurityenvironment,thusaddingnewcomplexitytotherolesandtasksthatthe Canadian Armed Forces will undertake at home and overseas. But beyondfinessing the Trump effect and the lack of the money for defence in one way oranother,whatelsewillthisnewdocumentdo?

Thispolicybriefprovidessomecontextforlookingatthisquestion.Itdoessothroughacompellingcompare-and-contrastofthewaysinwhichthereigningwhitepapersofCanada’s threekeyallies—Australia,France,and theUnitedKingdom—approachtheirstrategicoutlook,forceacquisition,anddefencespending.

This brief is also the first in what I hope will become a series of student-authoredpolicybriefspublishedbytheCentreforInternationalPolicyStudies(CIPS).Itselevenauthors—YerkeAbildayeva,MustaphaAli-Hashi,ZainabFeroz,RoberthoDay Isaac, Alexander Marquardt, Maxime Perreault-Varin, Edin Sabotic, Marc L.Tremblay,MackenzieWaddell-Harris,RyanWard,HeidiZaker—wereallstudentsinAPI6339 The Economics and Politics of Canadian Defence, an MA-level class I co-


taught at theGraduate School of Public and InternationalAffairs (GSPIA) inWinter2017 with Dr. Binyam Solomon, Senior Defence Scientist, Centre for OperationalResearch and Analysis at Defence Research andDevelopment Canada. (Suffice it tosay, although the content of this course informs the content of the brief, the finalresponsibility for the arguments and judgments in this document rests with theauthors.)Beginningwiththerelativelysparetheoreticalformulationofconceptssuchas “national interest”and “strategy,” theauthorsexaminehowthe threedocumentsissuedbyCanada’salliesbetween2013and2016dealwiththeperennialsofdefencewhitepaperwriting, fromexplaining to thepursuitof strategicaimsat thenationallevel to estimating the pace of transformation in world politics to addressingprocurementaswellasrecruitmentandretentionchallenges.

Indoingthis,theauthorsmaketwocompellingcontributions.Oneisdesigningabasiccodebookforinterpretinghowwhitepapers—andarguablyallsimilarpolicydocuments—frameproblemsandsolutions,challengesandopportunities.TheotherisaninformedopiniononthewaysinwhichaclosereadingofAustralian,British,andFrenchwhitepaperscould informdebateanddiscussionsof the incomingCanadianwhitepaper.Readitandlearnfromit.

SrdjanVucetic,AssociateProfessor,GSPIA

Co-CoordinatorfortheCIPS’InternationalTheoryNetwork

INTRODUCTION

Thisreportprovidesacomparativeanalysisofdefencereviewpapers(DRP).The report compares three documents published by the Australian, British, andFrenchgovernments:Australia’s2016DefenceWhitePaper(WP), theUK’sNationalSecurityStrategyandStrategicDefenceandSecurityReview,2015(NSS&SDSR),andFrance’s Livre blanc : Défense et sécurité nationale, 2013. Each paper assessesnational security strategy and objectives, identifies national security risks, andoutlineshowtheyintendtoaddresstheserisks.

Thereportbeginsbydescribing thecontext surrounding thedevelopmentofthe DRPs, and includes details such as the development process, number ofdocuments published, and time horizons. The report then explores key themesidentifiedthroughcontentanalysis,includingnationalinterestcategories,valuesandstrategy,alliances,emergingnorms,personnelandresources,defencespending,andprocurement strategy. The report concludes by acknowledging the differentapproachestodefenceandsecurity,andsuggestshowinsightsfromthiscomparativeanalysiscaninformCanadiandefencepolicy.


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CONTEXT

The change in security environments is a common catalyst for developmentacrossallthreepapers.Theemergenceofnewchallengesincludingregionaltensions,terrorism, and the threat of cyber-attacks calls for new strategies, capabilities, andspending. Further, each paper voices dissatisfaction with past defence reviews.Australia’s capability plans have previously been criticized for being disconnectedfrom defence strategy and budget. The 2010 UK review was criticized for being atreasury-led review, dictated by budgetary considerations, rather than a strategicassessment of the resources needed by the armed forces.1The 2015UK documentwasalsodevelopedinresponsetoRussia’sactionsonNATO’seasternflank,aswellasthe end of their Afghanistan operations, which differentiates it from Australia andFrance. The rapid rise of China is a reason behind Australia’s WP development.France’s assessment for a new review is broader in nature; it refers to majoreconomicandinternationalchangessinceitslastWPin2008.

The development process is consistent across all papers. All documentsincorporatedinputreceivedthroughaconsultationprocesswithpoliticians,researchinstitutions, industryexperts, think tanks,andnon-governmentalorganizations.TheFrenchWPexplicitlyreferstoalliancewhitepapers(UK2010,USA2010)aspartofits consultation efforts. A whole-of-government approach was chosen for thedevelopment of all three documents. TheUK publication, led by the Cabinet Office,encompassed a broad range of departments, including the Home Office, theDepartment for InternationalDevelopment (DFID), theForeign andCommonwealthOffice(FCO),andtheMinistryofDefence(MoD).2TheMinistryofDefencealone ledprevious security reviews. The Australian process involved the Department ofDefence, Veteran’s Affairs, Immigration, Border Protection, and Foreign Affairs andTrade. Lastly, the French government sought input from Parliament, the NationalIntelligence Commission, Overseas France, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,FinanceandtheEconomy,theInterior,Defence,andHigherEducationandResearch.

Interestingly,eachcountrypublishedadifferentnumberofdocuments.TheUKNSS& SDSRweremerged into a single document for the first time in 2015,whichlinks defence strategy with decisions on investments and capabilities. The UK alsoseparately published a government-led National Security Risk Assessment. Incontrast,Australia’sWPisapartofanew“defencetrilogy”approach,comprisinganIntegratedInvestmentProgram(IIP)andaDefenceIndustryPolicyStatement(DIPS).While the FrenchWP is a single document, the government has also published key

1 House of Commons Library, “The 2015 SDSR: A Primer” (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 19

November 2015), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7235, p. 4. 2 Ibid., p. 3.


supporting documents, such as the “Horizons Stratégiques” slides or the 30-yearforward-lookingplan“PP30.”

TheUKdocumentpresentsnolegalcommitment.However,forittobeseenas“credible,” eachof the89 commitments it sets outmust be “implemented, followedthrough and monitored.”3To meet this objective, a new Sub-Committee of theNational Security Council was created and taskedwith overseeing implementation.TheAustralianpublicationencompassesasimilarsetofrecommendations.Thenewlyrepositioned Australian Defence Committee is held responsible for the leadership,coordination,andimplementationeffortsforthechangesproposedbythedocument.TheFrenchWP,althoughinitiatedbyvirtueofalegislativepresidentialdecree,doesnotrelyonlegalbindingforitsrecommendations.4TheLivreBlancdid,however,callfor the drafting of a Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM), or law for militaryprogramming,whichisanationaldefencespendinglaw.

Thetimehorizonsdifferforeachdocument.TheAustralianpaperplacesheavyemphasis on themedium term, providing a detailed 10-year spending plan. It alsoincludes a 25-year strategic outlook. The rationale for this decision is to deliver astrong long-termplan that incorporates necessary funding for infrastructure, skills,and capabilities. The timeframe for France’s white paper extends over 15 years toensurelong-termsecuritythoughthedefencestrategywillberevisedevery5years.TheUKsetsoutitsnationalsecuritystrategyforfiveyears(2015–2020);thecoalitiongovernmentin2010pledgedtoundertakearevieweveryfiveyearstoavoidthegapthat had developed between the 2010 SDSR and its predecessor, the 1998Defenceand Security Review.5However, the recent change in the political environmentbecause of Brexit may require a new security review before 2020. 6 The UKGovernment did, however, publish an official policy document in February 2017underlining the themes of their goals for negotiations with the EU, such as trade,immigration, sovereignty, and border controls between Northern Ireland and theRepublicofIreland.7

3 Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and

Security Review 2015: First Report of Session 2016–17 (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2017), https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtnatsec/153/153.pdf, p. 37.

4 République de France, Livre blanc : Défense et sécurité nationale, 2013 (Direction de l’information légale et administrative, Paris, 2013), http://www-dam.cea.fr/missions/docs/Livre-blanc-sur-la-Defense-et-la-Securite-nationale-2013.pdf, p. 148.

5 House of Commons Library, “The 2015 SDSR,” p. 3. 6 Malcolm Chalmers, “Would a New SDSR Be Needed After a Brexit Vote?” (Royal United Services

Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016), https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/chalmers_brexit_sdsr.final_.pdf

7 BBC News, “Brexit Plan Published in Government White Paper,” 2 February 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38836906.


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NATIONALINTEREST

The protection of national security is identified as the most important nationalinterestcategoryacrossallthreedocuments.InFrance,the“protectionofthenationalterritory, its population, and French nationals abroad is a vital and fundamentalobligationoftheState.”Similarly,inAustralia,thehighestpriorityofthegovernmentisto“keepournationsafeandprotectourwayoflifeforfuturegenerations.”Lastly,in theUK, the firstnational securityobjective is to “protect thepeople” athome, intheir overseas territories, and abroad. The UK and Australia briefly discuss theimportanceofsovereigntyaspartoftheoverallobjectivetoprotectnationalsecurity,whereasFranceemphasizespreserving sovereignty inall circumstances throughoutits paper. A parallel across all three countries is the extension of the territorialdefinitionofsecuritytoincorporatecybersecurity,thusreflectingthegrowthofnon-traditional threat vectors. See Appendix A for a comparison of national interestcategories.

Nationalsecurityisdeeplyintertwinedwithprosperity.Foreachcountry,prosperityis key to achieving national security objectives.Whereas France’s idea of economicprosperity is closely linked to theprosperityof theEuropeanUnion, bothAustraliaandtheUKclearlyidentifytheinterdependencebetweenprosperityandsecurity.TheUKtreatsnationalsecurityandprosperityastwosidesofthesamecoin,asevidencedinthePrimeMinister’sForeword,whereDavidCameronstates,“Ournationalsecuritydepends on our economic security, and vice versa.” The UK paper sets outinvestments to meet the range of threats, while recognizing the imperatives ofbalancedbudgetsandtheimportanceoftradeandworldwideprosperitytonationalwell-being.Infact,theUKpaperhasbeencriticized,withcommentatorsarguingthatnationalsecurityremainsofsecondaryimportancetoprosperity.

AnotabledifferenceamongthethreecountriesistheUK’snationalsecurityobjectivetoprojectglobalinfluenceandtheroleofthearmedforcesinachievingthisobjective.IntheUK,forceprojectionisviewedastheoverallpurposeofthearmedforces.Thenation’s image as a “guardian of global order” is evident in the DRP; a nationalsecuritystrategyaimstostrengthenthearmedforcessotheyremainworldleading.Although France and Australia both aim to enhance armed forces capabilities, thenotionofglobalinfluenceisnotincorporatedintotheirrespectivestrategies.

VALUESANDSTRATEGY

In order to achieve domestic security goals, both Australia and France producedstrategies that involve investing in enhanced defence capabilities, ensuring thatdefence forces and security-related organizations have the necessary resources tocarry out projects and missions. Both countries also define links to their national


research and development sectors as key partners in meeting security goals.Interestingly, the UK mainly defined its security strategy with respect to “softer”approachessuchasbuildingdiverseandintegratedcommunities.

On the international scale, Australia’s and France’s conceptions of security areintrinsically linkedwith secure and stable nearer regions so alliances are a crucialaspectinmaintainingeachnation’srespectivenationalsecurity.WhileAustraliaandthe UK explicitly link their alliances and partnerships to defending a rules-basedinternationalorder,France indirectlymentions thisaspartof itsdesire to continuewithNATOmissions.

CHALLENGESANDTHREATS

Toreiterate,FranceandAustraliacomplementeachotherintheiridentificationofthegap between defence capabilities and available funding and resources as a keydomesticchallengefortheirrespectiveDRP.Notably,bothDRPsalsoindirectlyfaultpast governments in allowing the funding-capability gap to reach its current state.Meanwhile,publichealthandmajornaturaldisasters,includingdisasterresponse,arestressedasdomesticchallengesfortheUK.

Not surprisingly, all three countries converge in their assessment of instability anduncertainty in the security environment as the key international challenge facingdefence. This includes failed states and the relatedproliferation of non-state actorsengagedininternationalterrorism,morecomplexfutureconflictsthatinvolvingcyberthreat elements, or the possibility of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear(CBRN) attacks, the increasing militarization of states, and the proliferation ofweapons.BothFranceandtheUKmentionhealthrelatedchallenges,environmentaleventssuchasnaturalcatastrophes,aswellasthegrowthoforganizedcrimeasothercrucial threats. Interestingly, only the UK included resource insecurity as a futurechallenge,whichperhapsspeakstoitssituationasaresource-deprivednationreliantontrade.

OPPORTUNITIES

Giventhesechallenges,all threecountriesrecognizetheneedtomatchstrategyandcapability plans for their defence forces with appropriate, sufficient, and mostimportantly,availableresourcesandinvestments.ForAustralia,anessentialelementof this is investingheavily inpartnershipswithboth thedomesticdefence industryand the science and technology research organizations. France also definesautonomous R&D capacities as crucial to implementing its DRP. Australia is alsodistinct in that its approach to addressing challenges involves both cultural andorganizational reform through the implementation of the First Principles Review.


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Both countries also acknowledge the role of enhanced intelligence capabilities as akeymeansofdeterrence,partof aneffectivepreventionandprotection strategy. Inparticular,Australiafocusesoninvestinginamoreagileandpotentdefenceforce,anddecreasingbureaucratichurdlesintheprovisionofsecurity.Moreover,AustraliaandFranceemphasizehowjointresponsesandinternationaldefencepartnershipsbasedonsharedsecurityinterestsarekeytoachievingdefencestrategygoals.

ALLIANCES

Economists,historians,andpoliticalscientistshavelongstudiedtheroleofalliancesin national defence production. All three white papers indeed underscore thecentrality of alliances and, more generally, relationships with partners, includingmultilateral organizations. Bilaterally, Australia and the UK discuss the specialrelationship with the United States. The US and NATOwere first addressed in theBritish paper, affirming that they remain the touchstone of UK security. Similarly,AustraliaemphasizedtheUSasakeystrategicpartner.

A significant difference betweenAustralia, France, and the UK is regional alliances.Franceplaces strongemphasisonEuropeansecurity, recommending improvementstothestructureof theEUtoenhancethesecurityof itsmembers.TheUKdiscussesthe “Euro-Atlantic Area” and the importance of key Eastern European andScandinavian defence partners. Australia’s regional alliances differ; it has a strongSouth-Pacificdefenceandsecurityalliance,particularlywithNewZealandandtheUS.Further, Australia seeks to strengthen regional security architectures that supporttransparencyandco-operationbyworkingwiththeFivePowerDefenceArrangementandASEANDefenceMinisters’Meeting-Plus.

NATO is a common alliance across the three countries and a foundation of BritishSecurity.TheUKcommitmenttoNATOisaffirmedthroughitstargetofspending2%ofGDPondefence.Australia, althoughnot a formalmember, refers to co-operationwithNATOwithinitsglobalpartnershipsframeworkinordertoachieverules-basedinternational order. NATO is also a pillar of the French defence policy; however,Francestresses thatNATOmust “take intoaccount thedifferencesofpriorities thatrequire each member of this Alliance to assume their own responsibilities.”Throughout its paper, France emphasizes its strategic autonomy, underpinned bynationalownershipof itsessentialdefenceandsecurity capabilities. France is fullycommitted to NATO, but stresses the importance of maintaining its own decision-makingautonomyandfreedomofaction.


EMERGINGNORMS

Themostimportantemergingnormindefenceisthedynamicsecurityenvironment.Cyberdefenceasanewstrategiccontext is illustrativeofanemergingnorm.All theDRPsdiscuss increasingcapabilities tocombatnewthreats, includingcyber threats.This encompasses an increase in research and development (R&D) to ensure thearmedforcesarecapableofdealingwithsuchthreats.Theamountofemphasiseachcountryplacesoncyber threats illustrates theneedtoredefineattacksasno longerstrictlyphysical,butalsooccurringinthecyberworld.Thisdevelopmentrequiresaninnovative response and an increased partnership with the defence industry toenhance science and technology research while increasing defence capabilities. Anexample of such an innovative response by the UK is the Joint Cyber andElectromagneticActivitiesGroup.

Climatechangeismentionedacrossallthreedocuments,thoughtheattentiongiventothe topic varies. The Australian WP says climate change will exacerbate naturaldisastersandextremeweather,therebythreateningeconomicdevelopmentandfoodsecurity.Climatechangeismentionedseveraltimesinthedocument,thoughmostlyinthecontextofemergingchallenges.TheAustraliandocumentprovidesasimplisticfocusonclimatechangeanddoesnotexpand,butitsmentionasatopicofconcernfortheAustralianDefenceForce(ADF)suggeststhatclimatechangeshouldberegardedasatangiblethreatlikelytoplayanuncertainfuturerole.

TheFrenchWPoffersasimilarexplanation,adding that regionsalreadyaffectedbyextremeweatherwillmost likelysuffer inthe futureasclimatechange increases itsfrequency and severity. The French publication differs in its acknowledgement ofchanging sea-lanes as Arctic ice recedes, thereby making the claim that new searouteswillbringnewstrategicconsiderations.TheBritishpublicationframesclimatechange as a factor in threatening food security and population growth, therebycreating instability insomeof theworld’smostvulnerableregions.Theauthorsusethe Middle East and Africa as their examples of regions most likely to be affectednegatively by climate change. They conclude that changing weather patterns willdisruptallfacetsoflifeinvulnerableregions,makingpoliticalinstabilityandviolenceallthemorelikely.

While all three publications discuss climate change, and express largely similarconcerns,theBritishWPisthemostexplicitinitsbeliefoftheimplicationsofclimatechange for future generations. The French are unique in mentioning the changingArcticgeographyasanemergingstrategic consideration.The lengths towhicheachpaperdiscussesclimatechange(disclaimer:discussionisbrief)suggeststheydonotyetpreoccupytheWPauthorsasatopfactor,buttheirmentionshowsforesight,anda subtle acknowledgement that climate change will become a potential driver ofregionalandworldinstability.


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Diversity isanotheremergingnorm.Twocountriesexplicitlyaddressedthe issueofdiversitywithindefence.TheUKstatedthattheirdefenceindustryworkforcewouldbe15%femaleby2020.Theywillalsoreviewwhetherwomenshouldtakeafullrolein armed combat. Contrary to the 15% the UK is striving for and the belief thatwomenmaynotbeabletofulfillafullcombatrole,Australiastatedthat15%oftheADF is already female,which is anunderrepresentationofwomen. It isAustralia’sgoaltoincreasethisfigure,ensuringthatthewomenrecruitedcanattainalljobs,withanemphasisonhigh-levelpositions.Francedefinesitspersonnelasinterchangeablebyusingthephrase“ourwomenandmen.”

Lastly,mentalhealthwasavery important issue raised in theAustralianWP;a fullsection is dedicated to detailing how they will look after their “people.” This wasunique to theAustralianWP.Australia is trying todevelopanewnormof intensivecareduringandafterservicetoactivepersonnel,theirfamilies,andveterans.

PERSONNEL

The personnel policies found in the UK DRP are the most conservative. The DRPcommits to maintaining the current size of the British armed forces, although itrebalances personnel slightly in favour of the navy and air force (700 personnel intotal).However,thereisasignificantincrease(1,900personnel)plannedforBritain’ssecurityand intelligenceagencies. In regard to theworkingand livingconditionsofservicemembers,theDRPpromisesinitiativestoimprovework/lifebalance,promotediversity, and make it easier to transfer between the reserves and regular forces.Overall,theBritishpaperdevoteslittlespacetopersonnelissues.

Australia’s DRP, on the other hand, devotes a large section to personnel issues. Anumber of initiatives to improve conditions of life for service members and topromote diversity are announced. The improvement of conditions for servicemembers is promoted primarily as an aid to recruitment. The DRP notes that, incurrentAustraliansociety, it isnowmoredifficult to interest individuals inmilitarycareers, and therefore greater incentives are required to attract recruits. Diversityinitiatives are justified in similar terms, but also in “integrationist” terms, as anecessary harmonization of the armed forces with broader Australian values.Althoughthenumberofpersonnelissettoincreaseby2,500,theoverallpercentageof thebudgetdevoted topersonnelwill be reduced.Australia plans to specialize inhigh-tech, capital-intensive defence sectors, relying on allies able to deploy largenumbersofpersonnelatalowermarginalcost.

TheFrenchWPlargelyrejectsthe“integrationist”frameworkfoundinitsAustraliancounterpart.The“specialstatus”ofthearmedforcesisrepeatedlyreaffirmed,asarethe particular demands of military service. However, the French WP displays


sensitivity to the difficulty of attracting recruits in modern affluent societies andproposes improved training opportunities, grievance procedures, and prospects forpromotion to entice recruits. Although theWP calls for a reduction in the defenceworkforceby34,000,thisisjustifiedbythenecessityofcuttingcosts,ratherthanbyconsiderationsofmarginalcostandallianceco-operation,asintheAustraliancase.

DEFENCESPENDING

National security strategy drives defence spending (see Appendix B for a cross-countrycomparison).Australiashowsthegreatestcommitmenttoincreasingdefencespending; this is likely due to the difference in strategic situation of the threecountries. France and the UK both enjoy a highly formal alliance with the UnitedStates andNATO, aswell aswith friendly countries in Europe. The spillovers fromthese alliances restrain the demand for defence expenditure in these countries.Australia, however, is geographically isolatedandenjoys a less formal alliancewiththeUnitedStates.Forthisreason,Australiaisincreasingitsspendingrapidly,sothatitcaneffectivelystrengthenthecapacityofitslocalpartners,showingawillingnesstocontributetoitsowndefence,thusattractingAmericansupport.

A significant common point in the spending priorities of all three countries is theconcerted focus on intelligence. This not only involves expanding intelligenceorganizations, but also investing in new and upgraded intelligence-gatheringequipment.Thisisakeyaspectofmodernizationforallthreecountries.

The defence reviews serve as an operational guide for defence budgets. Australia’splans are fully costed; the paper places heavy emphasis on the importance ofpredictability,bothfortheADFandforthedefenceindustry.Itisthereforeexpectedthat the Australian budget will be subject to less revision than that of the UK orFrance.IntheUKcase,thepaperwasplannedinparallelwiththeSpendingReview,which sets out budget allocations to government departments, including thosechargedwiththeimplementationofthedefenceandsecurityreview.

PROCUREMENTSTRATEGY

TheAustraliangovernmentuseditsDRPasanopportunitytoaligndefenceindustryinvestment with defence capability needs. The 10-year defence plan provides thefundsneededtocarryout the IIPreleasedalongside theDRP.The IIPsignals to thedefenceindustrythecapabilityneedsoftheADFsoindustrialpartnersmayshifttheiroperations toproviding the capabilityneedsoutlined in theDRP.Theoretically, thiswill eliminate the asymmetry of information between the defence industry and thegovernment. The paper’s plan for the defence industry emphasizes integration intoglobalsupplychainsandexportcompetitivenessratherthananattemptatautarchy.


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Major procurement projects include the government’s decision to support thecontinuous building of ships in Australia, thereby sustaining jobs and creatingprolongedcontractsfordomesticshipbuilders.

TheFrenchWPacknowledgesthedefenceindustryascrucialtoequippingthearmedforces to satisfy capability needs. Budget reductions threaten the defence industryandmanyfirmsareconcentratedinselectregions,therebyendangeringthelivelihoodofregionalworkers.Therefore,thefocusisonmaintainingcertainindustriesthatarekey toa sovereigndefence industry, andon theprotectionof industryworker jobs.Publicinvestmentindefenceindustriesmustbemaintainedtomeettheneedsofthemilitary, thereby sustaining jobs, providing the right tools to the armed forces, anddrivingresearchanddevelopment thatmaycarryover into thecivilianmarket.TheFrenchWPplanstocontinuesupportingexportersandacquiringequipmenttosatisfyNATOrequirements.

TheUKDRPpledgestospend£178billionondefenceequipmentthrough2024–25,andhascreatedpartnershipswiththedefenceindustrytodrivecompetitivenessandsupport exporters. The DRP calls for launching a defence innovation initiative andpublishinganationalshipbuildingstrategythatdebutedin2016.Alleffortsaremadeto “drive” the defence industry and to maintain leading technologies, includingmutuallybeneficialcollaborationswithinternationalpartners.TheMoDalsoplanstouse a new independent procurement regulator to oversee the acquisition of newfrigatesandsubmarines.All threestatementsemphasize internationallycompetitiveandgloballyintegrateddefenceindustries,apositionbeneficialineconomictermsbutonethatraisesquestionsregardingemergencypreparednessandthe“surgecapacity”oflocaldefenceindustries.

CONCLUSION

TheAustralian,French,andBritishpapershavedifferentapproaches to thedefencereview process. However, they share many similarities, as evidenced through keythemes thatdrivenational security strategies, including commonnational interests,threats,alliances,andemergingnorms.Further,eachcountryprogressivelybuildsapolicy rationale and narrative in sequential steps. Each begins by defining thenation’splaceintheworld,followedbyananalysisoftheregionalandglobalstrategicoutlook. Each nation then defines the defence strategy they intend to follow,incorporatingadiscussionofthedefencecapabilitiestheyaimtomaintainoracquire.Lastly, there is a discussion of financial considerations. This systematic approachavoids thedangerofpresentinga simple “shopping list”ofdesiredcapabilities, andprovidesabasisforfuturere-evaluationandmodificationofprojectsandprioritiesinresponsetochangingcircumstances.


One particular strength of the Australian WP is its rigorous costing and focus onpredictability.This is facilitatedbytheseparationoftheWPfromthemoredetailedinvestmentandindustrialstrategypapers,whichcanbemodifiedwhilemaintainingthemoregeneralcommitmentsintheWP.TheUK,incontrast,seemstoriskexcessivefuturemodificationbycombiningitsdefenceandsecuritypoliciesinonedocument.

The national security green paper released by the Canadian government in 2016suggeststhatforthetimebeing,securityanddefencepapersshouldremainseparateas per the Australian model. If information released in the 2016 green paper isincorporatedintotheupcomingCanadianwhitepaper,thentheCanadiangovernmentmay take a similar approach to theirBritish counterparts.At present, however, theCanadian government’s national security and defence policy objectives remainseparate.

TheBritishpaperprovidesamodelintermsofrecoveringfromadamagingperiodofausterity.Byemphasizingstabilityandtheslowgrowthoffundingcommitments,theBritishpapermapsoutanapproach for restoringdefencecapacityafteraperiodoffunding reductions,while avoiding excessive commitments that are likely not to bemet.However,givenCanada’sreluctancetoallocateresourcestodefence,thismodelmaynotbeapplicabletoourcircumstances.Rather,theFrenchWP,withitsemphasisonefficiencyandrestrainedspendingtargets,morecloselyresemblesCanada’slikelyfuture funding trajectory. In this regard, it is important to note the French WP’scarefulattentiontostrategyandtherequiredcapabilitiestoimplementthisstrategy.Inthisway,thepaperensuresthatcost-efficiencywillnotcomeattheexpenseofcorecapabilities.Thisprovidesamodel forCanada inpursuinggenuineefficiencyratherthancost-savingsattheexpenseofnationalinterest.

Since the2017 federalbudgetdidnot indicatean increase indefencespending,butratherdeferredspending,theupcomingCanadianwhitepapermayhavetoredefineitsstrategiesandprioritiesinordertomatchstrategytobudgetrealistically.Shouldthisbethecase,theFrenchWPmaywellbethebestpointofcomparisonsinceitgivesmost detail on how to tailor national defence strategy in light of the budgetarychallenges. This report acknowledges that the experience of these nations will nottranslatedirectlyintotheCanadiancontext;italsoacknowledgesthatagooddefencereview alone does not guarantee effective defence policies. Rather, effectiveimplementationmechanismsandasupportivepoliticalenvironmentarerequiredtoensure that a defence strategy is effectively carried out. We hope that thiscomparative analysiswill provide important strategic insightsworth considering inevaluatingCanadiandefencepolicy.


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Davies,Charles.“ChartingtheCoursetoaNewCanadianDefencePolicy:InsightsfromOtherNations,”CDAInstitute,2016.https://cdainstitute.ca/images/Analysis/Davies_Analysis_March_2016.pdf

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JointCommitteeontheNationalSecurityStrategy.NationalSecurityStrategyandStrategicDefenceandSecurityReview2015:FirstReportofSession2016–17.ParliamentoftheUnitedKingdom,2017.https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtnatsec/153/153.pdf

Keohane,Daniel.“IsBritainBack?The2015UKDefenseReview.”CSSAnalysesinSecurityPolicy185.CenterforSecurityStudies,2016.http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalysen-185-EN.pdf

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Olson,M.,andR.Zeckhauser.“AnEconomicTheoryofAlliances.”ReviewofEconomicsandStatistics48,no.3(1966):266–79.

Pickford,Andrew,andJeffreyCollins.“CanadaCanOnlyLearnSoMuchfromAustralianDefencePolicy,”InsidePolicy.MacDonald-LaurierInstitute,3March2016.http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/canada-can-only-learn-so-much-from-australian-defence-policy-andrew-pickford-and-jeffrey-collins-for-inside-policy/


RépubliquedeFrance.Livreblanc:Défenseetsécuriténationale,2013.Directiondel’informationlégaleetadministrative,Paris,2013.http://www-dam.cea.fr/missions/docs/Livre-blanc-sur-la-Defense-et-la-Securite-nationale-2013.pdf

Ritchie,Nick.“RethinkingSecurity:ACriticalAnalysisoftheStrategicDefenceandSecurityReview.”InternationalAffairs[London]87,no.2(2011):355–376.doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00977.x

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Winslow,Donna.“CanadianSocietyandItsArmy.”CanadianMilitaryJournal4(2004):11–24.http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo4/no4/military-socio-eng.asp


17

APPENDIXA:COMMONNATIONALINTERESTCATEGORIES

Australia France UnitedKingdom

ThesafetyandsecurityoftheAustralianpeople

ProtectnationalterritoryandFrenchnationalsabroad

Protectthepeople

ADFcapabilities Guaranteeingtheabilitytocompletemilitarymissions

Renewedinvestmentandspendingindefencecapabilities

Asecure,resilientAustralia ProtectionofFrenchterritory

Domesticresilience

Thegovernmentisstrengtheningdefence’sintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissancecapabilities

Sufficientauthorityandpowertointelligenceagenciesandspecialforces

Increasethecapabilitiesofthearmedforcesandintelligenceservices

Deepeningregionalandinternationalsecuritypartnerships

SecurityoftheEUandEurope

UK’ssecurityrelationshipswithstatesandmultilateralorganizationsinthe“Euro-Atlanticarea

WorkcloselywithourallytheUnitedStatesandotherinternationalpartners

Co-operationwithNATOallies(US,Canada)toguaranteesecurityofEuropeandNorthAtlanticspace

NATOandtheUSremainthetouchstonesofUKsecurity

OpportunitiestoincreaseAustralia’seconomyandsecurityastheIndo-Pacificregiongrowsineconomicandstrategicweight

Economicindependence Promoteeconomicprosperity

Stablerules-basedglobalorder

Contributiontoaninternationalorderbasedonpeace,justice,andtheruleoflaw

Helpstrengthentherules-basedinternationalorderanditsinstitutions

Providedomesticcounter-terrorismsupportwhennecessary

Theanti-terrorismplanenablesaglobalapproachtotheterroristthreatbothonthenationalterritoryandto

Tackleterrorismhead-onathomeandabroadinatoughandcomprehensiveway,counterextremism,and


ourinterestsoutsideFrance challengethepoisonousideologiesthatfeedit

Tocounterthegrowingthreatofcyber-attack,thegovernmentisimprovingournationalcybersecuritycapabilities

Thecapacitytodetectandprotectourselvesagainstcyberattacks

Remainaworldleaderincybersecurity

Humanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations

Peacebuildingthereforerequiresaglobalapproach,includingaconsistentpoliticalstrategywithalltheleversavailabletotheinternationalcommunityabletocometotheaidofcountriesincrisisorthreatenedbycrisis

Expandourworld-leadingsoftpowerandourglobalreachtopromoteourvaluesandinterests,usingourdiplomatsanddevelopmentassistance

ThegovernmentwillrecognizethefundamentalinputtodefencecapabilityprovidedbytheAustraliandefenceindustrytoensureitdeliversthesupportdefenceneeds

ThedefenceindustryisakeycomponentofFrance’sstrategicautonomy

Workingwithindustrytoensurewehavethecapabilitiesandequipmentthatweneed

InterestsandRelationships(Numberofmentions)

Autonomy/

Self-Reliance

Alliance/

Partnership

Rules-basedGlobal/

InternationalOrder

France 19 55 7

UnitedKingdom 0 66 28

Australia 2 57 49


19

APPENDIXB:DEFENCESPENDING

Australia France UnitedKingdom

Defencebudgetof$32.2Bin2016–17

Committedtoreach$42.4Bby2020–21

$58.7Bby2025–26

Investmentplanallocatesapproximately$195Binthedecadeupto2025–26forinvestmentinnewandenhancedcapabilities

Invest€174.2Bbetween2014–19(5-yearplan)

€364Bbetween2014–2025(10-yearplan)

£34.4Bfor2015–16

£38.1Bby2019–20

PromisestomeetNATOtargetspendingof2%GDPondefence


APPENDIXC:DEFENCEREVIEWCODEBOOK

QUESTIONINDEX

PARTI

1 CountryName

2 Howmanydefencedocumentshavebeenpublished?

3 Whatisthisdefencedocumentprimarilyabout?(inorderofimportance)

4 Catalystfordocumentdevelopment?

5 Howwasthisdocumentdeveloped?

6 Number of documents? If there is more than 1 document, what are theadditionaldocumentsfor?

7 Doesthisdocumentrequirelegislativeapproval?

8 Was there a joint effort between different government departments +agenciesindevelopingthedefencedocument(Y/N)?Listthecontributors.

9 How is defence handled institutionally in the jurisdiction? (Who isresponsible?)

PARTII

10 What are the frames used to define national security, values, security, andstrategy?(Domestic)

11 What are the frames used to define national security, values, security, andstrategy?(International)

12 Whatdomesticchallengesareidentifiedforthecountry’sparticulardefencepolicy?(inorderofimportance)

13 What international challenges are identified for the country’s particulardefencepolicy?(inorderofimportance)


21

14 WhoisidentifiedastheleadingcauseoftheQ10?(inorderofimportance)

15 WhoisidentifiedastheleadingcauseoftheQ11?(inorderofimportance)

16 What are the frames used to identify opportunities for achieving nationalsecurityviadefencepolicy?(Domestic)

17 What are the frames used to identify opportunities for achieving nationalsecurityviadefencepolicy?(International)

18 Howarealliancesandbi-/multi-relationswithotherstatesdiscussed?Whatstates/alliancesareexplicitlymentioned?

19 Whatisthenatureofthesolution?(Domestic)

20 Whatisthenatureofthesolution?(International)

21 WhoisidentifiedinrelationtothesolutioninQ14?

22 WhoisidentifiedinrelationtothesolutioninQ15?

23 Does the defence document discuss emerging norms such as gender,technology?Ifso,inwhatcontext?

PARTIII

24 Doesthedefencedocumentserveasanoperationalguideforthebudget?

25 Howmuchmoneydoesthedefencedocumentstatethecountrywillspend,andbywhen?

26 Does the defence document discuss defence spending as% of GDP? If so,what%ofGDParetheyplanningonspendingandbywhen?

27 Isthereanyindicationastowheremostoftheinvestmentwillbeplaced?(inorderofimportance)

28 Doesthedefencedocumentdiscussadefenceprocurementstrategy?


29 Does the defence document discuss personnel (FTEs)? Will there be anincreaseordecreaseinFTEs?

PARTIV

30 Whatistheproposedtimeframethedefencedocumentcovers?

31 Howmanyyears(exactly)doesthedefencedocumentcover?

32 Is a rationale provided for proposed time frame covered by the defencedocument?

33 Arethereanyreviewandevaluationstrategiesfortheimplementationofthedefencedocument?

34 Whenisthenextdefencedocumentslatedfor?


23

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AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM · 2017-04-28 · CIPS WORKING PAPER A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE REVIEW PAPERS: AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM Yerke Abildayeva,

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