Australia Country Case Study - UNESCOunesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259541e.pdf · Dr. Emma Rowe ... makers regard the primary challenge as increasing standardized test results

D r . E m m a R o w e 2 0 1 7

Australia Country Case Study

This paper was commissioned by the Global Education Monitoring Report as background information to assist in drafting the 2017/8 GEM Report, Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments. It has not been edited by the team. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the Global Education Monitoring Report or to UNESCO. The papers can be cited with the following reference: “Paper commissioned for the 2017/8 Global Education Monitoring Report, Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments”. For further information, please contact [email protected].

ED/GEMR/MRT/2017/C1/12

Country case study prepared for the 2017/8 Global Education Monitoring Report

Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments

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1. Contents DefiningAccountability:accountabilityinlocallanguage 4Introduction/countryprofile:politicalprocess 4Educationsystemstructureandresponsibilities:centralized/decentralized 5ActorsandAccountability 7SmallCasestudy:Instrumentsofaccountability-funding,rewardpaymentsandpenalties 8Policyrecommendations 11References 13

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2. List of Figures Figure1.AccountabilityinEducationinAustralia:thetechnicalarmsofgovernance. 13

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3. Defining Accountability: accountability in local language1 InAustralia, reformswhichaim to increaseaccountability ineducationareassociatedwith languagearoundtransparency,schoolautonomy,dataandevidence-drivenreform,top-downandbottom-upaccountability.Theconceptofaccountabilityineducation—andhowthisisunderstoodandconstituted—hasfundamentallyshiftedwithin Australian policy-making since the 1970s. In earlier policy reform, such as the 1973 Karmel Report,accountability ineducation is framed through thenotionof equity andquality schooling for thepublic (see,AustralianGovernment1973).Herein,theroleofeducationisregardedasapublic,civicgood.Fromthe1990sonwards,top-downandbottom-upmodesofaccountabilitypositionsschoolsandteachersasaccountableandliable to the market, framed through inputs, outputs and quality assurance processes (e.g. AustralianGovernment Productivity Commission 2016, Australian Government 2015b). Within contemporary policyreforms in Australia, the role of education is more so regarded through frames of global economiccompetitivenessandproductivity.The report will first outline a brief country profile, as relevant to schooling in Australia; an explanationsurroundingtheeducationsystem,includingdecentralizationofschools,andeducationchallenges.Thereportwilldiscussactorswithineducation,andhowthisrelatestoaccountability,includinganexplanationaroundtop-downandbottom-upaccountability;followedbyacasestudyregardingschoolfundingandpenaltypayments.Finally,thereportconcludeswithpolicyrecommendations.

4. Introduction/country profile: political process, democracy and landscape

Australiaisarepresentativedemocracy,withthreelevelsofgovernment:federal,stateorterritory,andlocal.Thegovernmentconsistsofrepresentativeswhoaredemocraticallyelectedbythepeople,andbasedaroundatwo-partypreferredpoliticalsystem.Thetwomajorpartiesconsistofaright-of-centreparty,referredtoastheLiberalPartyofAustralia,ortheCoalition;andacentre-leftpartyreferredtoastheAustralianLaborParty(ALP).Australiaisoftendescribedasasuccessfulmulticulturalcountry.AspartoftheAsia-Pacific,andBritishcolony,almosthalfof thepopulationconsistsof firstorsecond-generationmigrants (49%).Statistically69.8%of thepopulationwereborninAustralia(and6.4%ofthepopulationborninEnglandandNewZealand)(ABS2012).ItisimportanttoconsiderthegeographicallandscapeofAustralia,andhowthisaffectsthedeliveryandprovisionof schooling. The country has a population of 23 million (fourteen times smaller than the United Statespopulation)—butalandsizerelativelycomparabletotheUnitedStates.Therefore,thedistributionofAustralia’spopulation immensely differs. The bulk of the population is clustered aroundmajor cities, and therefore aschool’slocation(whetheritisrural,remoteorurban)isveryimportanttoconsider.Ruralandremoteschoolsarestatisticallymorelikelytoservelowersocio-economicstatuscohortsofstudents,andstruggleforresources,includingexperiencedteachers(Doherty,Rissman,andBrowning2013,Gonskietal.2011).Secondary schooling in Australia is highly privatized—farmore than other OECD countries. In 2016, 41% ofstudentswereenrolledinprivatesecondaryschools.ThisfaroutweighstheaverageOECDcountry,where18%istheaverageproportion.ComparethistotheUS,whereapproximately8%ofstudentsattendprivateschools(although,itisimportanttonotethattheterm‘public’alsoincludescharterschoolsintheUS).InCanada,this1WrittenbyDr.EmmaRowe,DeakinUniversity,Australia.Contact:[email protected]

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percentage iseven lower (approximately6%), and loweragain in countries suchasNewZealand, FinlandorSweden (again, this iscomplicated in termsofhowschoolsare labelled).Australiaalsomaintainsoneof thehighestpercentagesofprivateexpenditurewithintheschoolsector.Thiseffectivelymeansthattheschoolingsectorsrelyfarmoreona“user-pays”systemthantheaverageOECDcountry.This isclearlyproblematicforthosefamilieswithlesscapacitytopay.ThiswasnotedintheOECD’sEducationataGlance2016report.ForthemajorityofOECDcountries,whenitcomestosecondaryschooling,90%ofexpenditurecomesfromgovernmentfunds. But this wasn’t the case for Australia, Chile and Columbia, which “rely on over one-fifth of privateexpenditureatthislevel”(OECD2016,212).Australiaisclassifiedasa“highfundingandlowregulation”country(Teese2007,Lamb2007).IncomparisontootherOECDcountries,privateschools inAustraliaareheldtolimitedlevelsofaccountability intermsofhowtheyspendtheirmoney.Thesehighlevelsofprivatizationwithinsecondaryschoolsmaybelinkedtothelevelsofsegregationwithinsecondaryschools.Studentcohortswithinschoolstendtobehighlysegregatedasbasedon familysocio-economicstatus,countryofbirthandfirst languagespoken (see,Ho2011,Windle2015,Ho,Vincent, and Butler 2015, Rowe and Lubienski 2017, Rowe 2017, Watson and Ryan 2010). Private schoolenrolment is ‘strongly patternedby socioeconomic status (SES). The average income and SES of students inprivateschoolsishigherthaninpublicschools’(Perry,Lubienski,andLadwig2016,176).Schoolsegregationhasanegativeimpactonachievinghighequityandhighqualityoutcomes(Benito,Alegre,andGonzaLez-Balletbo2014).Educationsystemstructureandresponsibilities:centralized/decentralizedThe structure of government is also important for understanding how schooling works in Australia, andfurthermore,thechallengessurroundingaccountabilityanddecentralization.Decentralizationisanalternativetermorphrasethatdenotes,oriscoupledwith,accountabilitypracticesandaccountabilityreformsinAustralia.Decentralizationofschoolingrestsontheprinciplethatdecision-makingpowersaredivested,asfaraspossible,withinthesiteorlocusofschooling(Whitty,Power,andHalpin1998).ThecurrentmodelofdecentralizedschoolswithinAustraliais inconsistentforprovidinganenablingenvironmentforactorstofulfiltheirresponsibilities,butalsofordeterminingthesuccessoreffectivenessofdecentralizedschools.Decentralizationmustbecoupledwithautonomyinregardstodecision-makingaroundpedagogyandcurriculum;strongsupportstructuresforschoolsandteachers;and,adequateandequitableschoolresourcing(Whitty,Power,andHalpin1998,MalenandRice2004).Australia’seducationsystemisfundamentallycentralized—inthatschoolsarefundedfromacentralbody(thefederalgovernmentandthestategovernment),andkeydecisionsaroundcurriculumandresourcesaremadefromthecentralbody(Savage2016).However,decentralizationofschoolshasremainedtheover-archinggoalof successive governments. The stateofVictoriawas theearliest state inAustralia to implement formalizedlegislationtodecentralizeschools (1998Education (Self-Governing)SchoolAct) (ParliamentofVictoria1998).The fundamental objective of theActwas to enable government schools to be ‘self-managing’ and operateautonomously fromgovernment sectorsandagencies, similar toprivate schools (see,Caldwell andHayward1998, Crooks 1996, Hannan 1996, Seddon 1996). The majority of government (public) schools developedindependentchartersandelectedindependentschoolcouncils.Ideally,thesecouncilswouldappointbusinessleaders in order to facilitate competitive engagement within the market and improve fiscal productivity.Approximately 90 per cent of the school budget was decentralized (Spaull 1999). Public schools were toultimatelyblendintothemarket-place,be‘competitiveandcorporate,enterprisingandaccountable’(Hannan1996,61).Whilstthispolicyshiftwasfirstevidentinthestategovernment,itwaslatertakenupatthefederallevel in the2004 School Assistance Act (AustralianGovernment 2004). The 2004 Act stipulates that schoolsmaintaintheauthoritytorecruittheirownstaff,developtheirownschoolcharters,electindependentschool

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councilsandoperateanddeterminetheirownbudget2.In2014,thefederalgovernmentlegislatedIndependentPublicSchoolswiththeaimtomakeone-fourthofpublicschools inAustraliaautonomousanddecentralized(AustralianGovernmentDepartmentofEducationandTraining2014).ThislegislationwasenactedinpartnershipwiththeCouncilofAustralianGovernments(COAG)andtheCouncilonFederalFinancialRelations(seeFigure1).Therearedifferencesofopinion in termsof the challenges foreducation inAustralia. Politiciansandpolicy-makersregardtheprimarychallengeasincreasingstandardizedtestresultsandglobalcompetitiveness.IntheAustralianEducationAct2013,theveryfirstobjectiveis‘forAustraliatobeplaced,by2025,inthetop5highestperforming countries’ according to theOECDProgrammeof International StudentAssessment (PISA) results(AustralianGovernment2015a,3).StandardizedtestssuchasPISAareprincipallyutilizedtoinformandguideeducationreforms,andtoreinforcemodesofaccountabilityforschoolsandteachers.A secondary view is that Australia needs to reduce the relationship between socio-economic status andeducational outcomes. This was principally argued within the Federal Government’s Review of Funding,colloquiallyreferredtoasGonskiandrecently,Gonski2.0(AustralianGovernment2011).ResearchhasindicatedthisrelationshiptobemoresignificantinAustraliaincomparisontootherOECDcountries,suchasCanadaandFinland (Perry andMcConney2010,2013). This is somewhat counteractedby theOECDPISA reports,whichcategorizesAustraliaas‘highquality,highequity’(OECD2013c,a,b),howeveritisusefultonoteGorur’s(2014)analysisandproblematizationofhowthishasbeenmeasuredandclaimed.Arguably, there isaconsiderableschool-basedaffectforstudentsinAustralia,meaningthattheschoolinwhichastudentattendscansignificantlyinfluencetheireducationaloutcomes.Thisisprimarilyduetothe‘clustering-effect’oflowsocio-economicstatusstudents inparticularly schools,asopposed toamorediverseandheterogenousmixof students (Lubienski,Crane,andLubienski2008,WaslanderandThrupp1995,PerryandMcConney2010,2013).Australian-basedresearchindicatesthatschoolsthatservealargercohortoflowersocio-economicstatusstudentsmayretainlessormorelimitedaccesstohigh-tieredacademiccurriculuminsecondaryschools,astiedtouniversityaccess(PerryandSouthwell2014,Teese1998,Perry,Lubienski,andLadwig2016).TheFederalReviewofFundingfounda ‘significant gap between the highest and lowest performing students in Australia, relative to other OECDcountries’(Gonskietal.2011,22),estimatedtobebetweenthreetothreeandahalfyears.Another educational challenge for Australia is to reduce the gender gap, particularly in relation to girls andmathematics;and,boysandreading(Lambetal.2015,VAGO2015,OECD2015,2013a).AccordingtoOECDPISAresults,Australia retainsgender-specificachievementgapswhichare farmorepronounced incomparison tootherOECDcountries(OECD2015).ThisgendergapisalsopronouncedwithintheNationalAssessmentProgram–LiteracyandNumeracyresults3.TheVictorianAuditorGeneral’sReport(VAGO)stipulatesthatboys’writingperformanceisdecliningatafarfasterratethantheirfemalepeers(VAGO2015,28).Sotoo,therearegender-specific engagement gaps—understood as behavioural engagement, emotional engagement and cognitiveengagement.Females reporthigher levelsof connectedness topeers, schoolconnectedness,motivationandmorale,butalsohigherlevelsofanxietyinschool.Inaddition,boysrecordfarhigherlevelsofsuspensionanddisconnectednessfromschool(VAGO2015,30,31).

2However,itisquestionabletowhatextentthatschoolscandeterminetheirownbudget,asschoolbudgetsaredeterminedfromseveraldifferentexternalizedsources;andtheyarefluctuatingandunreliable.Schoolbudgetsaredependentuponthenumberofenrolments,withcertainschoolsbeingfarmoresensitiveandvulnerabletothemarketthanothers.

3NAPLANisamandatedannualtestforallschools.It tests students in years three, five, seven and nine, in five domains including: reading; persuasive writing; spelling; grammar and punctuation; and numeracy.

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5. Actors and Accountability There are many actors seeking to address the education challenges, including teachers, schools, staff andfamilies, in addition to awide range of community advocacy groups (see, Rowe 2017). However, there aredifferentperspectives in termsofhowtorespondtotheeducationchallenges.Researchtendstobeframedbetweentwoopposingarguments.ManyscholarsarguethatthecomplicatedfundingarrangementsinAustralia,andthehighlevelsofschoolingprivatization,hasledtoinequitableschoolingoutcomes,largegapsinstudentachievement,andoverlycomplexfundingmodels,whicharelackingintransparency(Skourdoumbis2014).Ontheotherhand,scholarssuchasHattiearguethatthemostimportantfactorintheclassroomistheteacher,andadditionalfactorssuchasschoolfundinglevels,classsizesandthesocio-economicstatusofthestudentcohorthaslittleinfluenceoneducationoutcomes(Hattie2013b,a,2003).Thishasledtomanyrecentreformstargetingclassroomteacherqualityandreadiness(AustralianGovernment2015b,TEMAG2014).Tomeetthesechallenges,Australiaseekstomaintainaccountabilityofschools,teachersandparentsviaatop-down and bottom-upi approach. Even though this is described as ‘top’ and ‘bottom’, the approach sharescommonalitiesinrelyingoncentralizedmodesofgovernancetomaintainaccountability.Australia’sapproachtoaccountability tends to bemarket responsive or ‘market oriented’ (Bunar 2010), as opposed to a ‘capacitybuilding’ approach to accountability, which is evident in Finland (Itkonen and Jahnukainen 2007). Theseapproaches respond to educational challenges differently and develop particular frames of reference forconstitutingperformanceandunder-performance.Themarketorientedapproachtoaccountabilityofschools,teachersandstudentstendstorelyonstandardizedteststomeasureunder-performance;constructsrankingsandcomparisonsbetweenschools,teachersandstudents;andimposespenaltiesorsanctionsontoschoolsandteachers forunder-performing,asmeasuredbystandardizedtests (BesleyandPeters2006,Suspitsyna2010,ItkonenandJahnukainen2007).A‘capacity-building’approachtoaccountabilityaimsforcollaboration,andasthenameindicates,aimstofosterandbuildcapacityforschools,teachersandfamiliestoachievesetgoals.Acapacity building approach incorporates early intervention programs for students, who are identified asstruggling;rigorousprofessionalsupportforteachers;andeliminatesstructuresthatmayharmcapacity,suchasstreamingstudentsorearlytrackingofstudentsintopathwaysorstreams(OECD2012,Sahlberg2011,ItkonenandJahnukainen2007).Acapacitybuildingapproachdoesnotnecessarilyimplyincreasedfunding,ratheritaimsforamoreeffectivedistributionof funding, inorder to raise capacity inparticular schools (Itkonenand Jahnukainen2007,Crow2009).Thisisalsoimportantforthinkingabouttheenablingenvironmentwhichisnecessaryforactors,suchasprincipalsandclassroomteachers, to fulfil their responsibilities.Acapacitybuildingapproachworks towardsbuilding resource-rich schools. In her research from the United States, Powers (2004) found that schoolperformance ispositivelycorrelatedwiththe levelofresourceswithinaschool, including ‘qualifiedteachers,sufficientandup-to-datetextbooks,andadequate,safefacilities’(786).IntkonenandJahnukainen(2007)referto ‘resource-rich and ‘resource-poor’ schools, stating that ‘resources and school performance are positivelycorrelated’ (7). Malen and Rice (2004) have found that ‘high-stakes accountability initiatives may depleteresources…[and]depleteordilutethecapacityoflow-performingschoolstoimprove’(653).Inthefollowingcasestudy,IexplorerewardpaymentsandpenaltiesinAustralia,andhowthesearemanagedanddistributed.Thisfundingarrangementendeavourstocreateanenablingormotivationalenvironmentforclassroomteachersandschoolleaderstorespondtotheeducationalchallenges.However,Iwillhighlighthowcertain funding mechanisms may be largely counterproductive for driving educational improvements andachievingschoolautonomy.

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6. Small Case study: Instruments of accountability- funding, reward payments and penalties

AccordingtoSection51andSection96oftheAustralianConstitution,thestategovernmentisresponsiblefortheday-to-daygovernanceofschools,includingcurriculum,testing,staffingandadministration.Thisreferstopublic(orstate)schools,althoughthestategovernmentalsocontributesfundingtoprivateschools.Overtime,thefederalgovernmenthasincreasinglybecomemoreinvolvedinschooling,intermsofregulationandqualitycontrol.Thishasbeenreferredtoasfederalism(Lingard2000,Keating2009).Duetoverticalfiscalimbalance,thefederalgovernmentgeneratesgreaterrevenuethanthestates/territories,andthereforecanwieldgreaterinfluencewithineducation.Toillustratethisinmoredetail,andthe‘subdivisions’ofcentralizedgovernance,Idrawonaparticularwindowofeducationalreformfrom2008-2013.Thisperiodofreformwasreferredtoasthe‘EducationRevolution’(2008-2013),ledbythefederalcentre-leftgovernment (Labor,PrimeMinisterRudd/Gillard).Thisperiodof reform legislated theAustralianCurriculum,Assessment and Reporting Authority Act (Australian Government 2008), which was significant in that itintroduced three major planks of accountability reform (Savage 2016). This Act established the AustralianCurriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority (hereby referred to as ACARA)ii, responsible for thedevelopmentofthemandatednationalcurriculum(AustralianCurriculum);inadditiontothedevelopmentandadministration of standardized tests across Australian schooling (NAPLAN); and the publication of thestandardizedtestresultsonawebsitecalled‘MySchool’iii.Savage(2016)describesthegovernanceofACARAas‘unique’,becauseit‘receivesdirectionfrom(andisaccountableto)thefederalAustralianGovernmentandallstateandterritoryeducationministersviatheEducationCouncil’(5,emphasisinoriginal).Many scholars argue that the centralized federal initiatives, including the mandated testing and nationalcurriculum,havecomplicatedthehistoricalschoolingarrangementsbetweenthelevelsofgovernment(Lingard2000,Keating2009,SavageandO’Connor2015).Byutilizingnumeroussubdivisionsofgovernance,thefederalgovernment administers a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ audit culture aroundperformancemanagement. Thefollowing diagram demonstrates the subdivisions in more detail, and with attention to various levels ofgovernance(seefigure1):

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Figure1.AccountabilityineducationinAustralia:thetechnicalarmsofgovernance.The Council of AustralianGovernments (hereby referred to as COAG)was established in 1992, prior to thiswindowofreform.COAGis instrumental forunderstandinghowaccountability is implementedanddriven inAustralia.TheCouncilwascreatedtoestablishmoremeaningfulengagementandcollaborationbetweenthestates/territoriesandfederalgovernmentindrivingpolicyreform.TheCouncilincludesthePrimeMinister,StatePremiers and Territory Chief Ministers, and the President of the Australian Local Government Association.Several changes were initiated during the ‘Education Revolution’ to broaden the ability of COAG to driveaccountabilityreformsiv.One of the principleways that COAG, and the Standing Councils, endeavour to steer education reform andimprove outcomes is via ‘reward payments’ for the states and territories, in regard to school funding.RepresentativesfromeachDepartmentofEducation(ineachjurisdiction—therespectivestate/territory)areto

Australian federal government

The Council of Australian Governments

(COAG): established 1992.

COAG Standing Councils: including the Federal

Financial Relations and Education Council.

The Productivity Commission:

an independent research body that provides

research for the COAG-led reforms and reports to

COAG.

The Australian Curriculum, Reporting

and Assessment Authority (ACARA):

established 2009.

Responsible for developing and implementing the Australian National

Curriculum.

Responsible for NAPLAN and

publishing the results on'My School' website.

The Australian Institute for Teaching and School

Leadership (AITSL): established 2001.

Rewards Pay Scheme for teachers: introduced in

2011/2012.

National Professional Standards for Teachers

introduced in 2013.

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annually set ‘reformtargets’ for improvements thataredeemed ‘satisfactorilyambitious’ (LingardandSellar2013).Thereare threeprimaryareasas stipulatedunder theNationalPartnershipAgreements: LiteracyandNumeracy,TeacherQuality,andLowSocio-economicStatusSchoolCommunities(COAGReformCouncil2011,2012). Under the National Partnership Agreement on Literacy and Numeracy (LNNP), for example, eachjurisdiction is required to identify a sampleof schools toparticipate in thenationalpartnership, and specifytargetsfor improvement.Thetargetsaretobenegotiatedbyeachjurisdiction,andrepresentativesfromtheDepartmentofEducation.COAGisthenresponsibleforauditingeachjurisdictionanddeterminingwhethertheyhaveachieved their reformtargets,utilizingNAPLANresultsand thenationalminimumstandardbenchmark(CommonwealthofAustralia2008,COAG2008).Asubstantialproportionofschoolfundingisonlyavailableviatherewardpayments.Forexample,from2008–09to2011–12undertheNationalPartnershipAgreementonLiteracyandNumeracy(LNNP),$150million4infundsisguaranteedtoeachjurisdiction(state/territory),whereasthelargerproportionisobtainableviarewardpayments($350million).Attimes,theDepartmentofEducationintherespectivejurisdictiononlypartiallyreceivestheirannualschoolfunding,asstipulatedinthereport:TheAustralianGovernmentmadereportedrewardpaymentstotalling$138.5milliontostatesinJune2011(outof$175millioninavailablerewardfundingfortheperiod),basedontheCOAGReformCouncil’sassessmentoftheextenttowhichstatesachievedreformtargetsfor2010.(CommonwealthofAustralia2012,20)Thisleadstostatejurisdictions,andthereforeschoolsreceivingloweramountsoffundingbasedonstandardizedtest results. The tensions surrounding this fiscal arrangement are effectively explored by Lingard and Sellar(2013),whoidentify‘perverseeffects’ofsettingfinancialconditionssuchasthese(634).Theirresearchsuggeststhat,byimposingpenaltiesandsanctions,representativesfromtheDepartmentofEducationhaverespondedbydistortingandmanipulatingtheirdatatoacquiremuch-neededschoolfunding.Thewayinwhichthereformtargetsaremeasuredalsodiffers,andLingardandSellar(2013)identifysamplingissues—severalstatesprofferawidesampleofstudentstogaugeperformancelevels,whereasothersnominateaverysmallsample,therebyincreasing their chance of success (ranging from 4% of students to 22% of students). During other auditingperiods,theNAPLANresultswereavailabletothestatesandterritorieswhilsttheywereestablishingtheirreformtargets, therefore invalidating the process (Commonwealth of Australia 2014b, c, a)v. It is also important toconsidertheeffectonteachers.IfNAPLANresultshavetheinfluencetoaffectchancesofapromotion,oreventheiremploymentposition,teachersarelikelyto‘teachtothetest’andspenddisproportionateamountsoftimepreparing students for a test, utilizing rote learning methods (Thompson and Cook 2014, Thompson andHarbaugh2013).Clearlythesereformtargetsareoccurringfromadistance;first,fromthecentralizedfederallevel;andsecond,fromacentralizedlevelatthestate/territoryeducationdepartment.Thisisacaseof‘steeringatadistance’,withpedagogical decisions surrounding curriculum and assessment, in addition to a school’s capacity to buildresources, occurring from a distance. In this equation, data is ‘central to new modes of regulation, whichaccompanythesteeringatadistanceofthecompetitionstate’(Lingard2011,370).Essentially,thesedecisions—which have ramifications for students, teachers and families—are decontextualized and detached from thespacesinwhichformalizedteachingandlearningoccurs,whichisintheclassroom,attheschool-level.However,schools, teachers (and students) are held responsible for their performance via standardized, centralizedinitiatives(mandatedteststhataredesignedandassessedoutsideoftheclassroom).As it is evident on figure 1, there are numerous arms and subdivisions that support these centralizedmechanisms. Whilst there are separate ‘arms’, each division is directed and responsible to COAG and theStandingCouncils.TheAustralianInstituteforTeachingandSchoolLeadership(AITSL) isdesignedto improve

4AllcurrencyisreportedinAustralianDollarsinthisreport($AUD).

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regulations around teacher quality and professional development. AITSL was first initiated in 2001 as thegovernance body for professional teachers, funded by the federal government. During the ‘EducationRevolution’, theNational Partnership Agreement on Rewards for Great Teacherswas legislated in 2012, inpartnershipwithACARA,andtheCOAGStandingCouncils.Thisestablishedfinancialrewardsforteacherswhoexceeded performance accreditation criteria and improved student outcomes, asmeasured by standardizedtests.Thearrangementworksinasimilarfashiontotherewardpaymentsforstates/territories.ThereformsviewclassroomteachersascrucialtoovercomingeducationalchallengesinAustralia.Thispointcanclearlynotberefuted.Certainly,researchhasconsistentlydemonstratedthattheclassroomteacherishighlyimportant for student learning, in addition to the socio-economic status of the student (OECD 2013c, b,Rutkowski, Rutkowski, and Plucker 2012, Connell 2009, Hayes et al. 2006, OECD 2005). However, there aredifferent instruments and methodologies that may respond to this target. Australia’s current approach toaccountability in education penalizes teachers (in addition to schools and students) for not achieving setbenchmarks.Setting performance targets is not a negative practice by itself, but setting performance targets based onstandardized tests results, that are linked to sanctions or penalties,may result in negative outcomeswhenappliedtoschools,teachersandeffectively,students.Ball(2003)hassuggestedthispracticeresultsinacultureof‘performativity’forclassroomteachers.Internationalresearchhasdemonstratedthataccountabilityreforms,whenstructuredinthisparticularway,hasledtoanincreaseinteacherturnover,adeclineinteacherautonomy,jobsatisfactionandprofessionalefficacy,andthecapacityforteachers’tobecreativeandinnovativewithintheirpedagogicalpractice(DayandSmethem2009,Day2002,Ball2003,Hargreaves2003,ThompsonandCook2014).Promotingandsupportingclassroomteacher innovationisanecessarycomponentfor improvingeducationaloutcomes and economic productivity. It is further questionable whether the auditing process (which usespenalties and sanctions) has resulted in higher educational outcomes (OECD PISA results would indicateotherwise,particularlyforAustralia).ThisisexpandeduponbyDayandSmethem(2009):Whilstsuchhighstakestestingregimesmaybeaccompaniedbyincreasedsupportforteachersandschools,itisdisputedwhethertheyhavecontributedto improvements instudentachievements;andthereare increasingconcernsbothabouttheirnegativeeffectsuponteachers’motivation,morale,wellbeingandeffectiveness.(DayandSmethem2009,143)Furthermore, when standardized test results are attached to sanctions and penalties, this heightens issuespertainingtoeducationalequity.Researchdemonstratesthatschoolstendtorespondbybeingmoreselectiveoftheirstudentintake(iftheyhavethecapacitytodoso)(Windle2015,Rowe2017).Whenthereisahigherlevelorpracticeofstudentselection,thereisahigherlevelofsegregationwithinstudentcohortsaroundraceandethnicity,religion,disabilityandfamilymedianlevelsof income(Gorard2016,RoweandLubienski2017,RodaandWells2013).Thisisconcerningformattersofequity,anditalsopointstotheperceiveddifferencesandqualitygapbetweenschools,forconsumers.Ideally,thereshouldbeverylittlequalitydifferencebetweenschools(OECD2003).AsIwillexpanduponinthefollowingsection,anapproachthatisfocusedoncapacity-buildingasopposedtopenaltiesandsanctions,wouldbemoreconstructiveforfosteringandsupportinghighereducationaloutcomes(MalenandRice2004).

7. Policy recommendations Ratherthanworktoimproveaccountability,itisrecommendedthatdecision-makerscarefullyconsidertheend-goalsofaccountability:toprovidehigh-qualityandhigh-equityeducation;andimproveengagement,retentionandstudentoutcomesineducation.Toachievethesegoals,theanswerisnotnecessarilytoincreasetheamount

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of surveillance, evaluations andmeasurements on schools, teachers and students. Themethodology behindincreased accountability can be counter-productive for the end-goal. The instruments of accountability arecreatingfarmorecentralizedinitiatives.Thiscausesdetrimentaleffects intwosignificantways:distributionalfundingissues;andsecond,empoweringschoolsandeducatorstobeautonomous.Effective distribution and utilization of funding: These centralized initiatives and bodies detract funds fromclassrooms,schoolsandnecessaryresources.Thisisadistributionalproblem.ThiswasidentifiedbytheMcKinseyReport (2007), ‘How theworld’s best performing school systems come out on top’, and expanded upon byMichael Barber (see, Crow 2009). Countries such as the United States and Australia tie up their fundingexcessivelyinadministrationandbureaucracy,and‘thereforelessmoneyisgettingintotheclassrooms’(Crow2009,16).Forexample,inthe2011-2012financialyear,theAustralianGovernmentcontributed$12.175milliontotheAustralianCurriculum,AssessmentandReporting(ACARA)budget inordertomanageNAPLANtesting(see,SenateStandingCommittee2014).ACARAareresponsibleforthetestdevelopment,analysisandreportingofresults.Thiscostdoesnotincludetheotherdifferentregulationbodies,suchasAITSL.Thisfundingmaybebetter served and utilized within schools, and spent within the classroom itself. Longitudinal research hasconsistently demonstrated the importance of educational funding for student outcomes. Increased ‘schoolfunding alonemay not guarantee improved outcomes, but our findings indicate that provision of adequatefundingmay be a necessary condition’ for student achievement (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 2016, 214).Equitable,consistentandeffectivedistributionoffundingisparamount.Empoweringschoolsandeducatorstobeautonomous:centralizedinitiativesweakentheabilitiesofschoolsandteachers to respond to their students, and draw on their professional expertise. Key pedagogical decisionsaroundteachingandlearningneedtobeallocatedtotheexperts,asfaraspossible.Anapproachtoaccountabilitywhichutilizes ‘capacity-building’, tobuildresources,andsupportteachersandprincipals within schools would be more effective than a market-oriented approach, which penalizes andsanctionsschoolsandteachersdeemedaslowerperformers(ItkonenandJahnukainen2007).Thereneedstobeagreaterfocusonensuringfairandequitablefundingtoschools,tominimizeresourcegapsandschool-levelgapsanddifferentiations.Accountabilitymeasures—particularlywhenutilizedtosanctionandpenalize—arenotshowntoresultinhigherstudent outcomes. Successful education systems are not necessarily focused on ‘accountability’ but ratherfocused on constructing and supporting quality, via rigorous recruitment of professional teachers andwell-fundedschools(Sahlberg2011).Successfuleducationsystemsmaintainlimitedgapsanddifferencesbetweenschools(Gorard2016,PerryandMcConney2013,Field,Kuczera,andPont2007).

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iThetop-downandbottom-upapproachwasrecentlyemphasizedintheAustralianGovernmentProductivityCommissionReport,‘NationalEducationEvidenceBase’(2016).Thisisausefulreferencepointforunderstandingframesoftop-downandbottom-upapproachestoaccountability.iiSeetheACARA(2016)website,availableat:http://www.acara.edu.au/,inadditiontothe‘MySchool’website:http://www.myschool.edu.au/andtheAustralianCurriculumwebsite:http://www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/iiiInregardstoNAPLAN,andthe‘MySchool’website,eachschoolisassessedinfivedomains(reading;persuasivewriting;spelling;grammarandpunctuation;numeracy).Thewebsite,asdesignedandadministeredbyACARA,utilizescolour-codedshadingtoindicatewhetheraschoolisachievingbelow,averageorabove60otherstatistically‘like’schools,accordingtotheiraverageNAPLANresults.Schoolsarecategorizedas‘statisticallysimilar’asbasedonameasurementthatisreferred

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toastheschool‘ICSEA’value.TheICSEAiscalculatedbyutilizingdirectdata(students’familybackgrounds)andindirectdata (school-level factors). The student’s family background includes parental occupation, parental levels of schooleducationandnon-schooleducation.Theschool-levelfactorsincludeaschool’sgeographicallocation(i.e.remoteness)andthe proportion of Indigenous students (see ACARA 2010). Utilizing value-addedmeasurements aims to alleviate blunt‘leaguetable’ likecomparisonsofNAPLANdata,andenablefaircomparisonsbetweenstatisticallysimilarschools(RoweandWindle2012,Gorur2013).TheEducationMinisteratthetimecelebrated‘MySchool’asawinforthepeople,exclaimingthatthewebsiteenabledgreatertransparencyofresults;increasedaccountabilityforschools;and,ifparentsareunhappyabouttheirresults,theyshouldpressurethePrincipaltoimprovetheschool’sresults.Particularschoolsaremoresensitivetodecliningresultsorlesscompetitiveresults,accordingtoNAPLAN,andarefarmorereliantonthewebsitetoincreasetheircustomer-baseandtherebytheirfunding(see,Rowe2017).iv In2009,COAGestablishedthe IntergovernmentalAgreementonFederalFinancialRelations(IGAFFR),whichledtotheCouncilonFederalFinancialRelations(referredtoasaStandingCouncil,seeFigure1).ThisCouncilworksinconjunctionwiththeCOAGStandingCouncilonEducationandEarlyChildhood(SCSEEC).vTherewardpaymentinitiativesweredevelopedfromasimilarpremise,inwhichstatesandterritoriesweresubjectto‘financialconditions’.Inthe2004SchoolsAssistanceAct(AustralianGovernment2004),itclearlyoutlinesthatstates/territoriesmustsubmitandagreetotwentyprovisionsinordertoreceivetheirfinancialschoolfunding.