Australia and the Yom Kippur War of 1973

Australia and the “Yom Kippur”War of 1973

Chanan Reich

Abstract

The “Yom Kippur” War marked the lowest ebb in the history ofAustralia’s relations with the State of Israel and a crisis point in theWhitlam Labor Government’s relations with the Australian Jewishcommunity. Australian Jewish leaders, who were concerned duringthis War about the very survival of the Jewish State and who activelysought Prime Minister (PM) Gough Whitlam’s public support for Israel,found themselves rebuffed repeatedly by Whitlam who insisted on apolicy which he believed to be of “strict neutrality and evenhandedness”. In response, the majority of Australian Jewish voterswho supported Whitlam in 1972 turned against him in the subsequentelection of 1974. These developments represented a significantchange in the Australian Labor Party’s longstanding pro-Israel attitudeand policies. They also led to a profound division within the ALP.

This article will examine whether what appears to be a radicalchange indeed represented a complete departure from the policiesthat previous Australian Governments had towards Israel, or, asWhitlam argued, indicated a continuation of Australia's policy towardsthe Arab-Israeli conflict.

The profound hurt caused by the Whitlam Government’s “neutral andeven handed” Middle East policies still lingered on more than 30 yearslater among prominent Australian Jewish leaders such as Isi Leibler1

and Sam Lipski.2 In 2007 Leibler claimed that since the creation ofIsrael, Australia had been led by a succession of governments fromboth sides of the political spectrum that were supportive of Israel. Withthe “solitary exception” being Gough Whitlam, “whose hostility against

Australian Journal of Jewish Studies (2012) 26: 10 – 30

Israel during the Yom Kippur war is regarded as a historical aberration”(Leibler 2007). Whitlam’s Middle East policy has also earned theindignation of such outstanding Australian Jewish academics as SolEncel (2004: 58), Suzanne Rutland, Bill Rubinstein, and Danny Ben-Moshe.

Rutland maintained that during the preceding twenty-three yearsof conservative government, Australia had supported Israel but, withthe election of Whitlam, in December 1972, the policy changed to oneof neutrality, which at times leaned to the Arab position. This drawingback from Israel manifested itself in a range of decisions, includingAustralia's voting patterns at the United Nations (UN) and moves toestablish an Arab League Office in Australia, as well as creatingcontacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter PLO)and permitting its representatives to visit Australia (Rutland 2005: 90-91). Rubinstein claimed that Whitlam's undisguised opposition toIsraeli policy as Prime Minister, the fierce anti-Zionism of part of theVictorian “socialist left”, especially the wing around Bill Hartley, hadcost the ALP many Jewish votes (Rubinstein 1991: 35, 541-545; 2004:102). Similarly, Danny Ben-Moshe claimed that the centrality of Israelin Australian Jewish identity translated politically in 1975 to theAustralian Jewish leadership taking the unprecedented step of callingfor the community to vote for the Coalition and Malcolm Fraser. The1975 Election saw the nadir of Jewish voting for the Labor Party.Jewish support for the ALP dropped from 75 per cent in the 1940s to30 per cent (Ben-Moshe 2004: 132). Likewise, The Australian JewishNews editor, Dan Goldberg, accused Whitlam of having burned hisbridges with the Australian Jewish community, and having earned thewrath of its leadership in 1973 when he had failed to condemn thesurprise Arab attack on Israel during the Yom Kippur War (Goldberg2003).

Indeed, in contrast with the US and in line with most Europeancountries, the Whitlam Government’s Middle East policy had tilted ina more pro-Arab direction in its voting pattern at the UN SecurityCouncil before the outbreak of the War (Clark 1980: 155). This wasstrongly criticised in the Australian Jewish press which reported thatthe honeymoon between the Jewish community and the WhitlamGovernment was over. Jewish Community Director in Victoria, SamLipski, complained that the shift reflected a departure from theprevious bipartisan policy of support for Israel (Lipski 1976: 20).

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The disappointment in the Australian Jewish community with thenewly elected Labor Government must have been intensified by thegreat expectations emanating from fond memories of the Minister forImmigration in the Labor Government of Prime Minister Ben Chifley,Arthur Calwell (1945-1949), who supported the admission of Jewishrefugees into Australia (Medding 1968: 151-153), and of the Ministerfor External Affairs, “Doc” Evatt, who, at the UN in 1947, activelysupported the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. Labor’ssupport in those days stood in marked contrast with the hostility ofUnited Australia Party Prime Ministers, Joseph Lyons (1932-1939) andRobert Menzies (1939-1941), who opposed Jewish immigration toPalestine and the establishment of Israel. They did so because theyregarded the aims of Zionism as incompatible with the interests of theBritish Empire in the Middle East (Reich 2002: Chapter 2). Evatt’ssupport for Israel continued after he became Leader of the Oppositionwhen, while objecting fiercely to the use of force by Britain and Franceagainst Egypt during the Suez Campaign, he maintained his wholehearted support for Israel (Reich 2002: 132).

In fact, since the 1940s the Yishuv (the Jewish Community ofPalestine) established close ties with the President of the AustralianTrade Union Council (ACTU), Percy Cleary, who went on to supportIsrael enthusiastically in the 1950s as an ALP Member of the House ofRepresentatives (hereafter MHR). Close ties had also been establishedbetween the Australian and Israeli Labor Movements, mainly with Israel’sFederation of Labourers, the Histadrut (Reich 2002: 80).

Indeed, Whitlam himself, as Leader of the Opposition continuedthat tradition. In the aftermath of the 1967 War, he criticised the LiberalCountry Party Coalition Government for not going far enough in itssupport for Israel. He also endorsed Israel’s refusal to withdraw fromthe cease-fire lines without peace.3 Hence, the great disillusionmentfelt by the Australian Jewish community early in 1973 when Australia,under a newly elected Labor Government, voted to censure Israel ona number of occasions in the United Nations Security Council. Thisdisappointment intensified during the Yom Kippur War whenAustralian Jews were shocked to realise that Australia, in commonwith nearly every other government in the United Nations seemedunwilling or unable to express any support for Israel at a time when,despite an eventual military victory, the security of the Jewish statehad been in unprecedented danger (Lipski 1976: 20).

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This article will attempt to determine whether Whitlam’s criticswere justified in their harsh judgement of his Middle East policies andascertain the reasons for the changes in Whitlam’s own attitudes andpolicies as regards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Most of the criticism of Whitlam by the Australian Jewishcommunity focused on his statements and policies during the YomKippur War. This was the fourth Arab-Israeli War since 1948 and wasfought from 6 October to 26 October 1973 by a coalition of Arab statesled by Egypt and Syria against Israel. It began with a surprise jointattack by Egypt and Syria on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day ofAtonement, which is the holiest day in the Jewish year. Egypt andSyria respectively crossed the cease-fire lines in the Sinai and GolanHeights, which had been captured by Israel in 1967 during the Six-Day War. The initial military successes of the Egyptian and Syrianarmies shocked Israel and Jewish communities around the world.Historian Howard Sachar wrote, “The shadow of a new Holocaustdescended upon Israel” (Sachar 2007: 758-762).

On the eve of the War, there were intelligence reports indicatinga high probability of an impending Arab attack. But Prime Minister,Golda Meir, and Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, turned down arequest by the Israel Defence Force (IDF) Chief of Staff, GeneralDavid Elazar, of full, immediate Israeli mobilisation and a pre-emptiveair strike, on the grounds that it would lead to diplomatic quarantine.US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, demanded Meir not to strikepre-emptively, and since European nations, under threat of an Araboil embargo and trade boycott had stopped supplying Israel withmunitions, Israel had become totally dependent on the US for militaryresupply. Therefore, Israel was particularly sensitive to anything thatmight endanger its relationship with the US.

Meir believed Israel might need American assistance soon and itwas imperative that it not be blamed for starting the war.Consequently, she informed the US that Israel did not intend to pre-emptively start a war, and asked that US efforts be directed atpreventing war. Within two hours of the Arab attack, Washington wascalling for a ceasefire and a return to the pre-October 6 lines, butEgyptian President, Anwar Sadat, with Soviet endorsement, wasprepared to consider only a ceasefire after the withdrawal of Israeliforces to the pre-1967 borders. At the Security Council on 8 October

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1973, the British and the French called only for a ceasefire to be putin place (Sachar 2007: 754-767).

On becoming aware of the heavy losses inflicted on the Israeli AirForce by Soviet made and supplied SAM-6 missiles, US PresidentRichard Nixon, and Kissinger, authorised the replacement of Israeliaircraft losses, munitions and spare parts on 8-9 October 1973.Likewise, the Soviet Union began to supply its allies – Egypt and Syria- and called upon other Arab countries to join the war against Israel(Sachar 2007: 769-770).

Whitlam antagonised the Australian Jewish community when, inreaction to US supply of arms to Israel, he insisted that there shouldnot be supplies from outside the Middle East to either the Arabs orIsraelis. There were also unconfirmed reports that Australia hadspoken with US officials, criticising the American arms airlift to Israel(Albinski 1977: 137). Australia’s own policy was one of not permittingthe supply of Australian arms to any of the countries involved in thedispute (Whitlam 1985: 124-125).4 Hence, Whitlam rejected IsraeliAmbassador Moshe Erell’s request on 25 October 1973 to supply 18Australian Mirage aircraft to Israel (Whitlam 1985: 124-125). InParliament, Whitlam warned that the emergency in the Middle Eastwas taking on very grave aspects since the two superpowers werebacking the opposing forces, resupplying them and thus promotingthe prospect of a spread of hostilities.5 During the War, US bases inAustralia were apparently put on a general alert and furthermore,according to Australian academic, Desmond Ball, Australian groundstations were used for relaying American satellite reconnaissancephotographs of the Middle East conflict to the United States, and atleast some of these were passed on to the Israelis. This was donewithout consulting or officially informing the Australian government(Patience and Head 1979: 243-244).

After the commencement of hostilities, Erell sought Australia’ssupport for a ceasefire and withdrawal of the Egyptian and Syrianforces to the pre-war lines, insisting that the aggressors should notobtain any reward for their aggression.6 Much to the dismay of Israeland the Australian Jewish Community, the Australian Governmentinsisted on the pressing need for a ceasefire and refused to allocateresponsibility for the outbreak of war. A Department of Foreign Affairs(hereafter DFA) brief argued, in line with Australian Ambassador to

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the UN and President of the UN Security Council, Sir LaurenceMcIntyre’s conviction, that, whatever the immediate origin of thehostilities, it seemed clear that, with the continuing acute tensionresulting from the failure to settle the problems left over from the 1967conflict and in particular Israel’s continued occupation of capturedArab territories, a further round in the Middle East conflict had alwaysbeen likely. The Egyptians, backed by the Arab world as a whole,became convinced that only another war could bring sufficientinternational pressure to bear on Israel to force it to evacuate thecaptured territories.7

When War did break out, Whitlam deplored it and expressedAustralia's hope that the hostilities would be brought to an end at theearliest possible moment and an effective ceasefire established. Healso expressed his conviction that the fighting underlined once againthe urgent need for a just and durable settlement of the Middle Eastproblem, and undertook to continue to support all efforts to bring sucha settlement about on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 of1967 which, he believed, “provided a sound equitable basis for asettlement”.8

The deadlock in the implementation of Resolution 242, which hadled to the Yom Kippur War, emanated from different interpretations ofthat Resolution by Israel and the Arabs. UN Security CouncilResolution 242 of 22 November 1967, which was adoptedunanimously, called for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in therecent conflict; the termination of all claims by states of belligerencyand “acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, andpolitical independence of every State in the area and their right to livein peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threatsor acts of force”. The resolution also called for freedom of navigationthrough international waterways in the area; a just settlement of therefugee problem; a guarantee of the territorial inviolability and politicalindependence of every state in the area (Keesing 1967-1968: 22473).

While Egypt formally accepted Resolution 242, it had consistentlystated that it would not enter into negotiations with Israel in the absenceof an advance commitment by Israel to withdraw from all occupied Arabterritory. On the other hand, Israel's view was that its acceptance ofResolution 242 did not oblige it to withdraw from all territories occupied

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in 1967, but only to secure and defensible borders which would havehad to have been negotiated, and which would not have been the pre-1967 lines. This would have involved retention of areas in the Sinai andthe Golan Heights, considered essential for its security.

At the outbreak of the War, the Australian Jewish communityshared the initial great apprehension in Israel and mobilised at onceto assist the Jewish State financially and in promoting Israel’s causeto political leaders and the public at large in Australia. While Jews inAustralia expected Whitlam to support Israel, to their greatdisappointment, he insisted on complete neutrality and even-handedness. When the war ended the Australian Jewish communityand its leadership never forgot nor forgave Whitlam for his refusal todenounce what they regarded as undisputed Arab aggression againstIsrael. Since they were convinced that the Arabs’ real aim was notmerely to recover land they had lost to Israel in the 1967 War but thetotal destruction of the Jewish State, they could not accept Whitlam’sneutral position which they regarded as in fact pro-Arab.

Whitlam also came under heavy criticism from prominentAustralian journalist, Peter Samuel, who scorned the PM’s policy of“even-handedness and neutrality,” branding it “an unfortunate choiceof words and, in fact, a euphemism used by pro-Arab sympathisers”.Samuel quoted the President of the Victorian Jewish Board ofDeputies (hereafter VJBD) Isi Leibler’s statement, in which he hadrhetorically asked:

Is it even-handed not to distinguish between self-defence andaggression as Mr Whitlam has failed to do? Is it even-handedto remain silent as Mr Whitlam was when the Soviet Unionpoured in limitless arms supplies to the Arab armies and onlyto criticise when the United States was forced to ensureIsrael's survival by also supplying arms? (Samuel 1973).

In marked contrast, American academic, Henry Albinski,maintained that for Whitlam personally it was morally wrong andprobably diplomatically counterproductive to ascribe “blame” in theMiddle East conflict (Albinski 1977: 136, 327).

Whitlam and the DFA repeatedly maintained that in fact their policywas very much in line with that of successive Australian governments

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that had pursued a policy of “strict neutrality and sympathetic interestin a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute”. This strategy, the DFA briefclarified, had taken into account Australia's considerable commercial(wheat in particular) and civil aviation interests in the Arab world aswell as its historical but less material ties with Israel. Accordingly,successive Governments had endeavoured to maintain friendlyrelations with both Israel and the Arab states and to avoid partisancomments. Australia continued to support Israel’s right to exist as astate and maintained, in line with Israel’s position, that the question ofIsrael's final boundaries, and the nature of a final settlement, lay in thehands of the parties directly concerned and, as Whitlam had put it,from an agreement freely arrived at between the parties in accordancewith the principles of Resolution 242.9

However, in response to the public statement of the ExecutiveCouncil of Australian Jewry (hereafter ECAJ) calling upon theAustralian Government to initiate action for achieving a peacefulsolution by means of direct negotiations, the brief was evasive,elaborating that Australia saw direct negotiation as one possiblemeans of seeking a peaceful settlement, and that it could only succeedif willingly entered into by the parties concerned and could not beimposed upon them.10 By taking this line, the brief in fact abandonedWhitlam’s stated support of direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, a majorissue for Israel. Arab consent to negotiate directly with Israel wouldhave amounted to Arab de facto recognition of Israel which could havepaved the way to a more thorough peace process - but this was still along way down the track.

In line with its official “even-handed” position, while restatingAustralia’s support of Israel’s right to exist, the brief also emphasisedthe need for a resolution of the problem of Palestinian refugees.11

Indeed, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the rapid and dramaticimprovement in the international standing of the PLO, had engagedthe considerable attention of the United Nations and also broughtAustralia's Middle East policies under much more intense publicscrutiny, and deepened divisions between the Arab and Jewishcommunities (Clark 1980: 154).

In his address to the National Press Club in Canberra on 8November 1973, Whitlam was asked why it was necessary for him socarefully to refuse to condemn what was quite clearly the Arab

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initiation of warfare on Israel. Whitlam retorted that it was quitespurious that one could come to any sound view or one could produceany solution to the disputes in the Middle East by looking at any oneparticular date. The situation there had continued for quarter of acentury and there were certain features of it which had to be solved ifit was to end: the question of recognition of the existence andsovereignty of Israel; the question of the occupation of Arab territoriesby Israel; and “the one which people mention least” was thePalestinian problem – not just the question of Palestinian terrorism,but “of people who lived in what used to be called Palestine and nolonger live there”.12

Interestingly, when Whitlam met Erell on 15 October 1973, hereportedly told the Israeli Ambassador that it was entirely clear thatthe Arabs had started the war, and that Israel’s victory was assured.13

In contrast with Whitlam, the Democratic Labor Party (hereafterDLP) Parliamentary Group praised Israel and the US for their effortsto prevent the War, and accepted Israel’s position that Egypt and Syriahad in fact commenced the war. It also condemned these attacks asa grave threat to world peace and stability and called on the AustralianGovernment to use its influence in the Security Council to bring worldpressure to bear on Egypt and Syria to withdraw their forces behindthe 1967 cease fire lines and agree to “realistic negotiations for MiddleEast settlement based on Israel’s right to existence”.14 On 11 October1973, DLP NSW Senator John Kane proceeded to present his motion,referring to the Arab assault as “another Pearl Harbor style attack”,with the military and political support of the Soviet Union, but theGovernment moved an adjournment, which was opposed by only fourDLP and one Liberal Senator from Queensland, Aboriginal SenatorNeville Bonner.14

Whitlam’s instructions to Australia’s envoys abroad on 15 October1973 clearly reflected a pro-Arab shift in his policy: (a) Australia shouldnot seek to use United Nations authority to have the Arabs “withdrawfrom any (Arab) territory they had just occupied;” (b) envoys shouldemphasise the need to ensure the security and integrity of Israel; (c)Australia should acknowledge that the more balanced force situationcalled for both a greater requirement that Arab demands be met anda greater need to meet demands to an extent necessary to avoidfurther conflict which could lead to the destruction of the State of Israel;

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(d) Australia should continue to support certain principles such as theintegrity of Israel, the need for secure and lasting frontiers, a justsettlement of the refugee problem, and the withdrawal of Israeli forcesfrom territory occupied in the 1967 War; (e) Australia should supportan international effort to look into the political, economic and socialproblems of the Palestinian refugees, and an international effort toexamine and draw up plans for the future status of Jerusalem; and,(f) Australia should seek to have mutual reduction of forces by Israeland the Arab states embodied in a treaty.16

These instructions, while seemingly fair and even-handed,reflected Whitlam’s naïve belief that, once Israel withdrew to the pre-1967 borders, peace would prevail in the Middle East. However, theGovernment of Israel was convinced that this would have been merelya repetition of Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in 1957,under Soviet and American threats, which had not led to peace butrather to the outbreak of the 1967 War.

DFA’s “man on the ground”, Australia’s Ambassador to Israel,Rawdon Dalrymple, seemed, as one might expect, attentive to hishosts’ “deep feelings of anxiety and insecurity,” which, he wasconvinced, were at the root of “Israeli intransigence”. On 17 October1973, he argued that the Israelis were convinced that the Arabs werededicated to their destruction and that the only way to forestall thiswas to be strong and keep their opponents if possible at arm's length.Consequently, he counselled offering Israel ample reassurance, andcautioned DFA that its instructions included little that would reassurethe Israelis and facilitate the concessions DFA expected would berequired of them.

Dalrymple doubted whether the previous frontiers were likely toconstitute by themselves anything very secure and lasting if theIsraelis were to withdraw to the 1967 ceasefire line. He insisted thatIsrael would certainly need some assurance that the Arabs would notdestroy it, including United Nations and international peacekeeping,the establishment of demilitarised zones, international guarantees andan international peacekeeping force. Dalrymple cautioned that “a justsolution to the Palestinian refugees” would be the most difficult issuefor the Israelis to deal with because the Arabs had convinced themthat it meant the dismemberment of Israel and indeed even less spacefor Israel than provided in the 1947 partition. He insisted that all the

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countries in the area, rather than Israel alone, should share inresolving that problem and that the Arabs should abolish their boycottof Israel.17

By contrast, McIntyre concurred with DFA’s proposal for a cease-fire to be set in place, insisting that any resolution calling also for anArab withdrawal would have been “a non-starter.” He maintained that,to get majority support in the UN Security Council, a resolution wouldhave had to include a demand for a specific Israeli guarantee ofintention to withdraw its armed forces, including, probably, acommitment to withdraw to the pre-June 1967 lines.18 Needless to say,McIntyre’s pro-Arab views were completely unacceptable to Israel. Herepeated in essence his advocacy after the 1967 War, of unconditionalIsraeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders in return for vagueassurances, a move that could have endangered the very existenceof the Jewish State.

In 1967 his position was utterly unacceptable to Liberal ExternalAffairs Minister, Paul Hasluck, who supported Israel’s position that theoccupied territories should only be exchanged for a genuine peaceagreement.19 But, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, withWhitlam as PM and Minister for Foreign Affairs, McIntyre found a morecongenial superior who, by then, had moved closer to his own views.Indeed DFA’s desire to maintain good relations with the Arabs led itto veto a request by the Australian Army Chief at the end of Octoberto send a military attaché to Israel, a customary part of diplomaticrelations,20 on the dubious ground that it could be misconstrued by theArabs as a form of military co-operation with Israel, with repercussionsagainst Australia.21

Israel also came under criticism from The Sydney Morning Herald(SMH), which on 11 October 1973 blamed it for widening the War, byintroducing “essentially terror tactics” of air and artillery bombardmentof Arab cities, in which innocent civilians were killed and maimed. Incontrast, SMH maintained, the Arabs’ military objectives were limitedto recapturing territory seized from them by Israel by force of arms.SMH warned there were signs, ominous for Israel, of a waningenthusiasm in Washington for its cause, and more particularly, for itsattitude – which had caused the renewal of hostilities – that theoccupied Arab lands were non-negotiable because their retention wasnecessary to Israel's security. It warned that, if Israel's action led the

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great Arab oil producers to cutting off oil supplies to the West, theenthusiasm for Israel’s cause might well vanish altogether.

The Canberra Times’ editorial was very concerned with the intenserivalries of the great powers, particularly with The Soviet Union's aim“to maintain and enlarge its zone of influence in the Middle East ... bysupplying the arms to the Arabs”. The newspaper claimed that Egyptand Syria must bear responsibility for lighting the fuse, but they andIsrael were almost equally intransigent in their attitudes.22 Likewise,SMH condemned “great power subsidisation of these wretched andinterminable squabbles between countries too stubborn and stupid tocompromise”.23 The Australian Financial Review (hereafter AFR) on1 November 1973 justified the Australian Government’s refusal tosupport either side in the war, maintaining that it was not merely aregional conflict, but a world problem that carried a greater risk oferupting into a military collision between the two super powers.

The Middle East situation deteriorated with the development of theenergy crisis. On 17 October 1973, in response to US support forIsrael, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries(OAPEC) led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5%per month and two days later, in response to Nixon’s authorisation ofa further major allocation of arms supplies to Israel, Saudi Arabiadeclared an embargo against the United States. Other oil exporterslater joined the boycott, which was extended against the Netherlandsand other countries considered to be supporting Israel. Australia wasnot affected by the OAPEC oil embargo because of its neutrality in theArab-Israeli conflict (Indyk 1976: 74).

When a delegation of the ECAJ met Prime Minister Whitlam on16 October 1973 and requested that he condemn what it perceivedas “Arab aggression”, Whitlam refused on the grounds of Australia’sneutral, even-handed policy (Taft and Solomon 1973: 68). The PMinsisted that, because of Australia's Presidency of the Security Counciland in line with its interests, its public position had to remain neutral,adding that, only if a motion would be put to the Security Council thatthe Arabs had been the party to initiate the War, Australia wouldsupport it.24 According to Lipski who attended the meeting togetherwith ECAJ President, Louis Klein, the PM told them: “We all know whostarted the War and who will finish it”, implying that the Arabs had infact started the War, and that the Israelis would prevail at the end.

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Whitlam’s refusal to condemn the Arabs for starting the hostilitiesgreatly disappointed the Jewish leaders,25 their disappointmentaggravated by the fact that the War was started on the Day ofAtonement, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar.

According to Lipski, the use of the term “even-handed” in asituation where there was a surprise attack by one side againstanother was not well received in the Jewish community. There wasalso widespread indignation that Whitlam refrained from criticising theSoviet Union's continuing supply of weapons to the ArabGovernments, but then, a week later, he condemned both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union after the United States had begun to re-supply Israel (Lipski 1976: 20).

In the debate in Parliament on 16 October 1973, the Governmentcame under attack from the Liberal and Country Party Opposition, bythe DLP, and by some ALP back benchers. Jewish ALP MHR, JosephBerinson, contradicted Whitlam by denouncing “Arab aggressionagainst Israel”, maintaining that the Security Council should haveimmediately called for the restoration of the ceasefire and of theceasefire lines. He also denounced those who argued that Israel hadbrought the Arab attack upon herself by not having returned theoccupied territories, blaming the Arabs’ refusal to accept Israel’slegitimate existence before the 1967 War as the real cause of thatconfrontation and its consequences. But, in marked contrast withBerinson and Joseph Riordan, the ALP MHR for Phillip, NSW, anelectorate with a significant number of Jewish voters, their ALPcolleague, Attorney General, Senator Lionel Murphy, adhered toWhitlam’s public contentions that official reports of UN observersregarding the outbreak of war had not yet been received. He alsomade reference to Egypt and Syria’s version of events, that themovement of their forces across the ceasefire lines had been inretaliation for earlier Israeli attacks against Egyptian territory in theGulf of Suez.26 However, twenty six members of the ALP Friends ofIsrael expressed their support for Israel, including Joseph Riordan.27

Support for Israel came also from the NSW ALP Arncliffe Branch.28

Likewise, the Leader of the Opposition, Billy Snedden, in markedcontrast to Whitlam, and speaking on behalf of the Liberal and CountryParties Coalition on 17 October 1973, called for an immediateceasefire and withdrawal to positions held prior to the outbreak of the

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hostilities.29 This represented a significant change in the Coalition’sposition as a week earlier it had been reluctant to criticise theGovernment in the Senate. Liberal MHR and former Minister forForeign Affairs, Leslie Bury, continued the Opposition attack onWhitlam, challenging the PM to support Israel in the UN SecurityCouncil, in line with his previous public commitment to Israel'ssovereignty in front of a Jewish audience.30 Israel also receivedsupport on 21 October from Liberal MHR, Malcolm Fraser, the manwho was to replace Whitlam as PM some two years later. Hedenounced the Soviet Union for having trained and rearmed many ofthe Arab nations, thus compelling the US to re-supply Israel so that itcould continue to defend itself. Fraser expressed his suspicion thatthe USSR was aiming at reopening the Suez Canal to the Soviet Navyin order to dominate the Indian Ocean.31

Former Prime Minister John Gorton, the Liberal MHR for Higgins,a Melbourne electorate including many Jewish voters, asserted thatthe Australian Government should have used all its efforts to bringabout a ceasefire, on terms which “would remove the endemic causesof these continuing conflicts and fully guarantee Israel's continuingright to live in peace and free from threat.” He expressed his hope thatpeace would be restored as quickly as possible but, if that provedimpossible, Israel would emerge victorious.32 Gorton claimed that,despite considerable pressure to condemn the Arab nations asaggressors, Whitlam and his Government, with Snedden's completesupport, had refused to do so. He insisted that Australia ought to havesupported the concept that Israel had the right to exist with securityand with a guarantee of peace, and expressed his conviction thatIsrael should have retained defensible borders and secure access tothe Gulf of Aqaba. Gorton also maintained there should have been aworld effort to resettle the Palestinian refugees. He counselled thatthe US and USSR should have guaranteed peace in the Middle Eastand refused to arm and train countries which posed a threat to othercountries.33

By the time the war had ended, the vast majority of MelbourneJews perceived the Whitlam Government as being unfavourable toIsrael (Taft and Solomon 1973: 68). Hence, while in 1972 the Jewishvote for the Labor Party was more than 60 per cent, in the May 1974Election, both in terms of financial support and voting preference, theLabor Party had lost a considerable Jewish element ((Lipski 1976: 22).

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Even so, the Jewish leadership noticed with satisfaction, that sometwenty-seven ALP backbenchers had taken a different point of viewfrom the Government and that over forty members of theParliamentary Labor caucus considered themselves to be “Laborfriends of Israel”. Above all, the Jewish community’s leadership andAmbassador Erell regarded the President of the ALP and ACTU,Robert (Bob) Hawke, and the ALP Victorian Leader and Leader of theOpposition, Clyde Holding, as outstanding supporters of Israel.34

The VJBD concluded that the Liberal Party and its leader, BillySnedden, were much more favourable to Israel than the ALP, andpraised Australia’s longest serving Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies,and the Liberal leader and Premier of Victoria, Rupert Hamer, for theirsupport of the Jewish State.35

This article has shown a clear shift in Whitlam’s policies regardingthe Arab-Israeli conflict. That change reflected Whitlam’s publicstatement on coming to power in December 1972 that he aimed at amore independent Australian stance in international affairs, whichmeant being more independent of the US. Whitlam’s initiativesincluded, inter alia, the recognition of Communist China and NorthKorea, and the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. The PM’spolicies were those of a new, ideologically inclined government, andwere largely shaped, introduced and pressed by Whitlam himself. Theparty provided a context more than an influence: except on a verysmall number of issues, the Parliamentary Caucus played very littlepart. Policy on the Middle East War was not an issue where theCaucus played a significant role (Millar 1978: 405-408, 420).

The Middle East acquired importance to Labor because theconflict there was seen as destabilising progress towards great powerdétente and because it raised significant problems touching on suchALP concerns as self-determination, humanitarianism, the rights ofstates to exist free of intimidation and the peaceful rather than forcefulsettlement of disputes. Particularly after the Yom Kippur War,economic issues such as trade with the Middle East, petroleumsupplies and potential investment funds for Australia required specialand delicate treatment (Albinski 1977: 135-136). The WhitlamGovernment displayed great sympathy for and identification with thecauses espoused by the majority of the Afro-Asian world – for their“legitimate aspirations”. Mendes has argued that after the 1967 Six-

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Day War, the Left discovered the Palestinians and the romance withthe PLO began. Israel was stereotyped as a powerful oppressor stateand a tool of Western Imperialism involved in suppressing the nationalrights of the Palestinians. Leftist anti-Zionism soon spread beyond theradical Left to mainstream social democratic parties. In Australia, leftistanti-Zionism was reflected in Whitlam’s “even-handed” policy duringthe Yom Kippur War (Mendes 2003).

Erell had already reported in September 1972 that Whitlam, whilesupporting the existence of Israel and admiring its social achievementsand moral values, was nevertheless burdened by the feeling that agreat injustice had been perpetrated against the Palestinians and thathe would support Israel unequivocally and wholeheartedly only whenthis injustice was rectified. Whitlam, according to Erell, placed a highpriority on the settlement of the dispossessed Palestinians while, atthe same time, conceding that it would not be realistic to admit themass of these refugees into Israel. Similarly, according to Erell,Whitlam acknowledged Israel’s need for security, but accepted onlyminor territorial changes, including the demilitarisation of the Sinai.Erell consequently concluded that Whitlam was lost in the Middle Eastlabyrinth and that it was essential “to open his eyes and help him toresolve his contradictory positions”.36

Whitlam’s more pro-Arab policy also came about because of thegrowth of the Muslim population through immigration; the lobbying bymembers of the Lebanese community, and the oil crisis (Rutland 2005:90-91). However, this change cannot be solely attributed to Whitlamhimself. Admittedly, notwithstanding his previous support for Israel, bythe eve of his election as Prime Minister Whitlam's enthusiasticsupport for Israel had declined significantly,37 to the point where hehad questioned Israel’s very legitimacy.38 He certainly was not,however, alone in this change of heart. DFA officials contributedsignificantly to this low ebb in Australia’s attitudes and policies towardsIsrael.

The newly-appointed Secretary of the Department of ForeignAffairs, Sir Keith Waller, in marked contrast to his predecessor, SirJames Plimsoll, argued in May 1972 that Australia’s interest in Israelwas “little more than sentimental, and diminishing at that”.39 Thisdeterioration had occurred gradually after the Six Day War. It cameabout for several reasons, including the replacement during that period

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of several pro-Israel decision-makers, including Prime Minister Gortonand the Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, by significantly lesssupportive ones, such as William McMahon, first as Minister forExternal Affairs and, later as PM; Australia’s growing trade with theArab countries; Australia’s aviation interests in Egypt and Syria;Australia’s desire to gain the support of the Arab states and theirsympathisers in Africa, and among other Moslem states, such asPakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia at the UN, and the growingfrustration among some decision-makers and sections of theAustralian media with the stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, whichthey attributed to Israel’s continuing occupation of the West Bank andGaza and its refusal to commit itself in advance to total withdrawal(Reich: 2010).

Furthermore, Whitlam and Murphy were greatly angered at Israel’sretaliatory actions against Lebanon following the massacre of Israeliathletes at the Munich Olympics in September 1972.40 Erellconsequently described the ALP top leadership as having “their headsin the clouds (and) under the spell of theoretical doctrines.” Hetherefore pinned his hopes on Hawke, whom he described as “a loyaland powerful friend of Israel,” and expressed regret that he had failedto persuade Hawke to become a member of a future LaborGovernment.41

Despite great efforts by the Israelis and the leaders of theAustralian Jewish community to persuade him otherwise, Whitlamcontinued, until the end of his tenure as PM in November 1975, thepolicy which he regarded as “neutral and even handed”, a policy whichthe Australian Jewish community, by and large, regarded as hostileto Israel.

In his memoirs, Whitlam explained the change in his perceptionsand policies regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of moraland political grounds. He proudly reiterated that he had visited Israelfour times before he had become Prime Minister, and had come toknow every Labour Prime Minister of Israel. He recollectedappreciatively what he regarded as the modesty and magnanimityshown by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (1963-1969) and ForeignMinister Abba Eban (1966-1974) during his visit to Israel, three weeksafter the commencement of the 1967 Six Day War. According toWhitlam, both Israeli leaders had been intent on obtaining secure

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borders for Israel but had conceded that Israel would lose the reasonfor its existence if it had expanded its borders to embrace a large andunassimilable population.

In 1968 and 1971, he recalled, he had visited Lebanon as well asIsrael and had become increasingly aware of the sufferings of thePalestinian people and the attitudes of the other Arab nations. By hisfourth visit in December 1971, he claimed, misgivings had beenexpressed to him by the younger elements in the Histadrut and bymany in the Israeli Labour Party at the establishment of settlementsin the occupied territories. It had been feared, he maintained, that suchsettlements, “usually by the most fanatical and bigoted elements”,would have made it increasingly difficult for any Israeli Government tonegotiate on the country's borders. Any such negotiations would havebeen criticised as undermining the faith and security of the nation. The1973 War, Whitlam recalled, had convinced him that security for Israeland justice for the Arabs could not have been achieved “by sheerinaction and procrastination”. He also readily conceded that, by thetime of the 1972 election, he had become well aware of the fact thatthere were as many Arabs as Jews in Australia, and that while theArabs had not been as articulate and established as the Jews, theywere important in as many individual electorates as the Jews.

In the face of critics of his policy, Whitlam insisted that AustralianGovernments had always professed an even-handed attitude towardsIsrael and the Arab nations in international forums, while in practicethey had been thought to be favouring Israel in the 1948, 1956 and1967 conflicts. When the 1973 conflict erupted, according to Whitlam,it had been expected in Australia that his Government would supportIsrael, but this was not to be. By then Whitlam had also become verycritical of the Australian Jewish community, accusing it of oftenundermining “the skilful work of successive Israeli diplomats” by thecrude blackmail of spokesmen and letter writers” (Whitlam 1985: 124-126).

Endnotes1. Personal interview, Jerusalem, 2008.2. Personal interview, Melbourne, 2008.3. Israel State Archives - hereafter ISA, 4168/24.4. See also “Background”, undated, Australian Archives - hereafter

AA - :A1838/272 181/17/1/1 Part 4 – hereafter “Background”.

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5. Australian Foreign Affairs Records, hereafter AFAR, volume 44,number 10, October 1973, p. 699.

6. Record of Conversation with Erell, 8 October 1973,AA:A1838/351 181/17/5 Part 16.

7. SA:5306/23.8. DFA News Release, 7 October 1973.9. “Background”.10. “Background”.11. “Background”.12. http://www.whitlam.org/collection/1973/19731108 Press Club/index.html13. ISA:5306/23.14. ISA:5307/215. Parliamentary Debates Senate, 1178.16. DFA to Australian UN Mission, 15 October 1973, AA:A1838/272

181/17/1/1 Part 4.17. AA:A1838/351 181/17/1/1 Part 5.18. AA:A1838/272 181/17/1/1 Part 4.19. AA: A1838/2 181/17/5 Pt 1.20. ISA:5306/23.21. AA:A1838/385 175/10/4 Part 3.22. Erell to Israel Department of Foreign Affairs – hereafter IDFA- 17

October 1973, ISA:5307/2.23. Erell to IDFA, 17 October 1973, ISA:5307/2.24. Erell to IDFA, 17 October 1973, 39, ISA:5306/23.25. Personal meeting with Sam Lipski, 13 October 2008, Melbourne.26. Parliamentary Debates Senate 16 October 1973, 1247.27. Riordan to Erell, 12 October 1973, ISA:5306/23.28. Consul to IDFA, 9 October, ISA: 5307/2.29. Liberal Country Party Statement, 17 October 1973, ISA:5307/2.30. ISA:5306/23.31. Press Statement by Fraser, 21 October 1973, ISA: 5307/1.32. Gorton to Spitz, 23 October 1973, ISA:5307/2.33. Parliamentary Debates Representatives 23 October 1973, 2622-

2623.34. Erell to IDFA, 26 October 1973, ISA:5306/23.35. (VJBD, 1973/74, 8-14, 66.36. Erell to MASOK, 25 September 1972, ISA: 5307/13.37. Erell to MASOK, 25 September 1972, ISA: 5307/13.38. Erell to MASOK, 22 September 1972, ISA: 5306/21.39. Waller to Johnston, 2 May 1972, AA: A1838/272 175/10/21.

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40. Erell to Murphy, 13 September 1972, ISA:5307/1.41. Erell to MASOK, 22 September 1972, Lavon Labor Archives, Tel

Aviv, IV-a219-4-2.

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