What is a ‘Good’ Democracy? LEONARDO MORLINO This article introduces three different notions of quality grounded in procedure, content and result. Those three notions are at the core of three different notions of democratic quality. Each of them has different implications for empirical research. Starting from these premises, the article proposes some theoretical arguments fundamental to the analysis of democratic quality and good democracy. In the first section definitions of democracy and quality are suggested. The subsequent three sections analyse the main emphasized dimensions, such as the rule of law, accountability, responsiveness, freedom and equality. Such an analysis calls for indicators, certain measures that reveal how and to what degree each dimension is present in various models of good democracy, the numerous and related problems associated with empirical study, and the essential conditions for its existence. The penultimate section indicates models of good democracy and highlights the related and much more common models of low quality democracies. The concluding remarks briefly mention the main directions of future research on the topic. Key words: democracy; democratic quality; rule of law; accountability; responsiveness; freedom and equality Introduction An analysis of the quality of democracy, that is, an empirical check on how ‘good’ a democracy is, requires not only that we assume some definition of democracy, but also that we establish a clear notion of its quality. The minimal definition of democracy 1 suggests that such a regime has, at least, the following: universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of information. Among those that meet these minimum criteria, further empirical analysis is still necessary to detect the degree to which they have achieved the two main objectives of an ideal democracy: freedom and political equality. Thus, the analysis of a good democracy cannot include merely electoral democracies, 2 that is, hybrid regimes whose failure to ensure a minimum level of civil rights keeps them below the minimum threshold requirements for classification as strictly democratic. The defective democracies 3 are also Leonardo Morlino is Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence, Italy and Director of the Research Centre on Southern Europe. Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, December 2004, pp.10–32 ISSN 1351-0347 print=1743-890X online DOI: 10.1080=13510340412331304589 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
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What is a ‘Good’ Democracy?
LEONARDO MORLINO
This article introduces three different notions of quality grounded in procedure, contentand result. Those three notions are at the core of three different notions of democraticquality. Each of them has different implications for empirical research. Starting fromthese premises, the article proposes some theoretical arguments fundamental to theanalysis of democratic quality and good democracy. In the first section definitions ofdemocracy and quality are suggested. The subsequent three sections analyse themain emphasized dimensions, such as the rule of law, accountability, responsiveness,freedom and equality. Such an analysis calls for indicators, certain measures thatreveal how and to what degree each dimension is present in various models of gooddemocracy, the numerous and related problems associated with empirical study, andthe essential conditions for its existence. The penultimate section indicates modelsof good democracy and highlights the related and much more common models oflow quality democracies. The concluding remarks briefly mention the main directionsof future research on the topic.
Key words: democracy; democratic quality; rule of law; accountability;responsiveness; freedom and equality
Introduction
An analysis of the quality of democracy, that is, an empirical check on how
‘good’ a democracy is, requires not only that we assume some definition
of democracy, but also that we establish a clear notion of its quality. The
minimal definition of democracy1 suggests that such a regime has, at least,
the following: universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and
fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of
information. Among those that meet these minimum criteria, further empirical
analysis is still necessary to detect the degree to which they have achieved the
two main objectives of an ideal democracy: freedom and political equality.
Thus, the analysis of a good democracy cannot include merely electoral
democracies,2 that is, hybrid regimes whose failure to ensure a minimum
level of civil rights keeps them below the minimum threshold requirements
for classification as strictly democratic. The defective democracies3 are also
Leonardo Morlino is Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence, Italy andDirector of the Research Centre on Southern Europe.
Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, December 2004, pp.10–32ISSN 1351-0347 print=1743-890X onlineDOI: 10.1080=13510340412331304589 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
the ‘counterparts’ of good democracies. In fact, as seen in this collection,
exclusive democracies, domain democracies, illiberal democracies, and
delegative democracies are themselves institutional hybrids that again fall
short of the minimum threshold specified above.
In contrast, delegative democracies, according to the different notion
proposed by O’Donnell,4 sometimes referred to as populist democracies, over-
come that minimal democratic threshold. These regimes are usually based on a
majority system, they host ‘clean elections’, ‘parties, parliament, and the press
are usually free to express their criticisms’, and ‘the courts block unconstitu-
tional policies’. In practice, however, citizens in these democracies ‘delegate
others to make decisions on their behalf’ when they cast their vote, and then
no longer have the opportunity to check and evaluate the performance of their
officials once they are elected. Other organs of government, even those meant
for this purpose, also neglect or fail to carry out their watchdog function and,
consequently, the so-called rule of law is only partially or minimally respected.5
Those who analyze populist democracies cite similar problems, evaluating
many current democracies as regimes in which the principle of representa-
tion, and thus those of the delegation of powers and accountability, are not
supported in reality. These principles are instead overcome by a supposed
‘direct’ democracy in which largely symbolic, irrational ties connect a
powerful leader, often a particularly strong president or prime minister, to a
relatively undifferentiated civil society. Certain countries in eastern Europe
and Latin America, and some suggest even Italy, come close to this model,
presenting clear flaws in providing a full and comprehensive guarantee of
civil rights, and of political rights as well.
As mentioned above, a second step in evaluating ‘good’ democracies
requires a clear definition of ‘quality’. A survey of the use of the term in the
industrial and marketing literatures suggests at least three different meanings:
1. Quality is defined by the established procedural aspects associated with
each product; a ‘quality’ product is the result of an exact, controlled
process carried out according to precise, recurring methods and timing;
here, the emphasis is on the procedure.
2. Quality consists in the structural characteristics of a product, be it the
design, materials or functioning of the good product, or other details that
it features. Here, the emphasis is on the content.
3. The quality of a product or service is indirectly indicated by the satisfaction
expressed by the customer, namely by their requesting again the same
product or service, regardless of either how it is produced or what
the actual contents are, or how the consumer goes about acquiring the
product or service. According to such a meaning, the quality is simply
based on result.
WHAT IS A ‘GOOD’ DEMOCRACY? 11
In summary, the three different notions of quality are grounded either in
procedures, contents or results. Each has different implications for empirical
research. Importantly, even with all the adjustments demanded by the com-
plexity of the ‘object’ under examination – that is, democracy – it is still
necessary to keep these conceptualizations of quality in mind as we elaborate
definitions and models of democratic quality. Starting from these premises,
the rest of the article proposes some theoretical arguments fundamental to
the analysis of democratic quality and good democracy. The first section
suggests a definition of good democracy and, therefore, of democratic
quality. The subsequent three sections then evaluate the main dimensions of
variation. They are followed by a section that indicates models of ‘good’
democracy and the related and much more diffuse models of low-quality
democracies. The concluding remarks will briefly outline the main directions
of future research on the topic.
What is a ‘Good’ Democracy?
Starting from both the definition mentioned above and from the prevailing
notions of quality, a good democracy can be said to be one that presents
a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of
citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and
mechanisms.6 A good democracy is thus first and foremost a broadly legiti-
mated regime that completely satisfies its citizens (quality in terms of
result).7 When institutions have the full backing of civil society, they can
pursue the values of the democratic regime. If, in contrast, the institutions
must postpone their objectives and expend energy and resources on con-
solidating and maintaining their legitimacy, then crossing over even the
minimum threshold for democracy becomes a remarkable feat. Second, a
good democracy is one in which the citizens, associations and communities
of which it is composed enjoy at least a moderate level of liberty and equality
(quality in terms of content). Third, in a good democracy, there are the citizens
themselves who have the power to check and evaluate whether the govern-
ment pursues the objectives of liberty and equality according to the rule of
law. They monitor the efficiency of the application of the laws in force,
the efficacy of the decisions made by government, and the political respon-
sibility and accountability of elected officials in relation to the demands
expressed by civil society (quality in terms of procedure).
With the above in mind, we can identify five possible dimensions in
which good democracies might vary that should be at the core of empirical
analysis. The first two are procedural dimensions. Though also quite relevant
to content, these dimensions mainly concern the rules. The first procedural
dimension is the rule of law. The second procedural dimension is account-
12 DEMOCRATIZATION
ability.8 The third variable dimension concerns the responsiveness or corre-
spondence of the system to the desires of citizens and civil society in
general. The final two variable dimensions are substantive in nature. The
first is the full respect for rights that are expanded through the achievement
of a range of freedoms. The second is the progressive implementation of
greater political, social and economic equality. These five dimensions will
be further elaborated in three separate sections below.
The analytical framework proposed here differs from other studies on the
quality of democracy, such as those of Altman and Perez-Linan, and Lijphart.9
While those two studies are also based on indicators encompassed by some
of the elements discussed above, they do not consider all of them, and
the consequent empirical analysis is thus more limited.10 The first revisits
three aspects that draw on Dahl’s concept of polyarchy (civil rights, participation
and competition), which fit into the first substantive dimension indicated above,
and which may also function as indicators for procedural dimensions. Some of
the indicators Lijphart employs in his study include female representation, elec-
toral participation, satisfaction with democracy and corruption. These indicators
also fall under the five dimensions mentioned above.
The analysis here, however, is closer to that of Beetham,11 who stresses the
virtuous combination of qualitative and quantitative measures in the general
empirical analysis of the phenomenon at hand. Some difference emerges
immediately, however, in the definition of good democracy that is proposed
here, and in its approach to presenting and justifying the varying indicators
and dimensions.
The institutions and mechanisms of representative democracies are the
main objects of the analysis of the quality of a democracy. This is not to
ignore direct democracy as the highest expression of democratic quality, but
to acknowledge the secular experience of representative democracies and
their real potential for improvement. If the analysis has to be focused on
representative democracies, then the accountability – a core feature in the
experience of representative democracy – becomes a truly central dimension,
in so much as it grants citizens and civil society in general an effective means
of control over political institutions. This feature attenuates the difficulties that
objectively exist when there is a shift from direct to representative democracy.
Accountability is implicitly based on two assumptions from the liberal
tradition that highlight the interconnectedness of all of the dimensions explained
above. The first assumption is that if citizens are genuinely given the opportu-
nity to evaluate the responsibility of government in terms of its satisfaction of
their own needs and requests, they are, in fact, capable of doing so, possessing
above all a relatively accurate perception of their own needs. The second
assumption is that citizens, either alone or as part of a group, are the only poss-
ible judges of their own needs; that is to say, no third party can decide those
WHAT IS A ‘GOOD’ DEMOCRACY? 13
needs. Ignoring, and not making these assumptions clear from the outset, would
be fallacious. It is also erroneous to consider each of them as a mere ideological
choice. One must rather acknowledge that western democracies have followed a
liberal-democratic trajectory and that any concrete analysis of the quality of a
given democracy must take this into account and shift towards a direction
marked by more egalitarian choices.
Freedom and equality, however they are understood, are necessarily linked
to accountability and responsiveness. Indeed, a higher implementation of
freedom and equality for citizens and civil society lies in the sphere of
those representative mechanisms. In addition, effective rule of law is also
indispensable for a good democracy. The rule of law is intertwined with
freedom in the same respect for all laws that directly or indirectly sanction
those rights and their concrete realization. As the next section will explain,
freedom, equality and even accountability are actually unobtainable if the
respect for law is ineffective or decisional efficacy is not granted by the gov-
ernment and the administration. These are the fundamental presuppositions
necessary for deciding on and realizing good democratic policies.
The principal subjects of such a democracy are individual citizens, territorial
communities and various forms of associations who share common values, tra-
ditions or aims. In this sense, the possibility for good democracy exists not only
for a defined territory with a specific population controlled by state institutions
under a democratic government, but also for wider-ranging entities. The main
point here is that the above-named subjects are at the heart of a democracy,
in which the most important processes are those that work from the bottom
up, and not vice-versa. In this way, the shift of the analysis of the dimensions
of democratic functioning from the national to the supra-national level,
though not entirely problematic, is nevertheless possible. The key is to hold con-
stant the same elements characteristic of each dimension.12
The necessity of capturing the complexity inherent in the notion of a
‘good’ democracy motivates the employment of the five dimensions
elaborated above. The present elaboration flags two aspects of each dimension:
Each might vary from the others, both in terms of form and relative degree of
development. As such, the analysis calls for indicators, that is to say certain
measures that reveal how and to what degree each dimension is present
both in various models of good democracy and in their practical application
in different countries. The empirical data should also enable an eventual
tracking of the growth of quality democracies.
The Procedural Dimensions
The first procedural dimension refers to the rule of law. The second concerns
the relationship between input and output and regards accountability.
14 DEMOCRATIZATION
A large body of literature (not summarized here) already exists on these two
dimensions. To put it simply, each dimension will be analyzed with regard to
three aspects: the empirical definition, the problems of implementation, and
the central condition or conditions.
The rule of law is not only the enforcement of legal norms. It basically
connotes the principle of the supremacy of law, that is the Ciceronian
legum servi sumus, and entails, at least, the capacity, even if limited, of
authorities to enforce the law, and to have laws that are non-retroactive and
in public knowledge universal, stable, predictable and unambiguous.13
These characteristics are fundamental to any civil order, democratic or
non-democratic, and a basic requirement for democratic consolidation,14
along with other basic qualities, such as the civilian control over the military
and the independence of the judiciary. This implies that the rule of law
bears a special ‘status’ vis-a-vis the subsequent dimensions that will be dis-
cussed in this article. That is, it comes first and can be considered a prerequi-
site for all other dimensions.
Even if the rule of law is preserved and respected in varying forms and
to various degrees in different democracies, we can identify a number of
particularly critical features in the analysis of ‘good democracy’. These
include:
. The application erga omnes of the legal system, also at the supra-national
level, guaranteeing the rights and equality of citizens.. The absence of areas dominated by organized crime.. The absence of corruption in the political, administrative, and judicial
branches.. The existence of a local and centralized civil bureaucracy that
competently, effectively and universally applies the law and assumes
responsibility in the event of error.. The existence of an efficient police force that respects the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by law.. Equal, unhindered access of citizens to the legal system in the case of
lawsuits either between private citizens or between private citizens and
public institutions; this also implies that citizens know their rights and
can obtain representation.. Reasonably swift resolution of criminal inquiries and of civil and
administrative lawsuits.. The complete independence of the judiciary from any political influence.
All of the above concerns the effective application of the law and the fair
resolution of lawsuits within the legal system. Each can be represented by
various indicators, and the relevant data can be analyzed on a case-by-case
WHAT IS A ‘GOOD’ DEMOCRACY? 15
basis using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The main character-
istics, and the degree to which the rule of law is respected, can be recon-
structed for each case in each country.15
It should be emphasized that the analysis implicitly proposed here would
be extremely expensive and practically impossible to apply to a high
number of cases. The level of detail and thoroughness of such an investigation
is suited to a limited number of cases, yielding the best results for a project
aimed at examining, at most, four or five countries. Additional cases would
require a reduction in the number of variables and the elimination of some
dimensions. Those that should be kept in the analysis at all costs, even in a
quantitative analysis involving many cases, include: the level of corruption,
with whatever data are available regarding the phenomenon; the access of
citizens to the court system; and the duration of legal proceedings using the
pertinent judiciary statistics. It is clear, however, that these few indicators
can provide only an incomplete picture.
A closer look at the concrete problems of implementation should be
accompanied by an awareness of some opposing forces that have recently
received attention in numerous papers and studies. First and foremost, a
rigorous application of laws or, in certain cases, the relationship with an
only superficially efficient bureaucracy can have particularly negative conse-
quences for the most socially weak and vulnerable members of society.16 Then
there is the possible use of the law as a genuine ‘political weapon’.17 Here we
see a persistent and diffuse temptation for politicians to use the election law
against their adversaries if, for example, a political party is condemned to
remain in opposition status for a long time and has no chance of electoral
victory in the near future. Politicians are also tempted to use judicial acts
to reinforce their own positions against the opposition. In other cases, when
there is collusion among politicians, the judges themselves, with the support
of the media, are tempted to turn to the judiciary when retaliating against
certain political decisions that they consider unacceptable. On a different
level, there is also a growing tendency among individual citizens or economic
groups to resort to the law to assert their own interests. Some scholars
note this phenomenon as a ‘juridification’ of contemporary democracy.18
Finally, and related to this, there is the popular and diffuse cultural attitude
that interprets the law as a severe impediment to realizing one’s own interests
that should be circumvented in any way possible. This attitude, common
in various countries throughout the world, from southern Europe to
Latin America and also eastern Europe, extends from the popular to the
entrepreneurial classes.
In summary, the analysis of the democratic rule of law in any one country
should be made carefully, with attention to trends that work against its
full realization. It remains an essential factor of democratic quality, and it
16 DEMOCRATIZATION
plays a very important role for the existence and development of the other
relevant dimensions.
What then, are the fundamental conditions that allow for at least a
moderate development of the rule of law? Research on various aspects of
this topic suggests that the diffusion of liberal and democratic values on
both the popular and, especially, the elite level, as well as the existence of a
bureaucratic tradition and the legislative and economic means necessary
for its full implementation, are necessary conditions for the democratic rule
of law. However, these conditions exist in very few countries, and they are
very difficult to create. Consequently, it is also difficult to cultivate and
grow this dimension of democratic quality. The most reasonable and concrete
strategy would be to proceed in short, measured steps that follow the reasoning
and objectives pursued above. This strategy is inherently critical of Putnam’s
conclusions that the institutional contours of a specific democratic regime
are fixed in the oldest civic traditions of that country, and that a country’s
Note: The minus sign indicates the lack of the dimension listed at the top of the relevant column.
28 DEMOCRATIZATION
in strong conceptions of the market and competition, but are not attenuated by
the presence of solidarity and social justice. In addition, high levels of immi-
gration of individuals who have no means of subsistence and are willing to
take any job can also contribute to the development of this type of regime.
In these democracies, social and economic distances between sub-groups of
the population steadily increase, rather than decline.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis of democratic quality could be continued in at least four different
directions. The first one is the empirical analysis of either one case or a few
cases through the development of indicators and field research.47 A second
direction refers to the development of typologies and models of democratic
quality following the analysis sketched out in the previous section of this
chapter. The basic idea is that there is no unique model of good democracy
available for consideration. A pluralism of notions has to be accepted, in so
far as such pluralism simply mirrors the different ideal choices that may be
made when we refer normatively to democracy. The explanations of the
levels of quality and of detected models should also be explored in depth.
This third direction of analysis largely overlaps with the research carried
out by Merkel, Puhle48 and others, who explicitly refer to explanatory
factors (see Merkel in this collection). Finally, there is also a fourth path
that is more focused on policy features and may be reduced to a few basic
questions. The main ones include the following: How is it possible to over-
come the authoritarian traditions of a given country and, from this perspective,
to cope with one of the main obstacles to the development of quality? Is there
a best institutional design for a ‘good’ democracy, with the help of which
some institutional adaptation and change might bring about higher quality?
Do international factors hinder a ‘good’ democracy? How, if this is so, can
such factors be circumvented or, as viewed from another vantage-point,
could external help be exploited to increase the quality of a given country’s
democracy? All four directions of research briefly mentioned here can be
usefully studied further and are relevant to the lives of everyone who lives
in a democracy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author thanks Wolfgang Merkel and Jurg Steiner for their very helpful comments on the firstdraft of this study.
NOTES
1. Leonardo Morlino, Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups, andCitizens in Southern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
WHAT IS A ‘GOOD’ DEMOCRACY? 29
2. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1999); and Merkel in this collection.
3. Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Rules of DefectiveDemocracies’, Central European Political Science Review, Vol.1, No.2 (2000), pp.31–47;and Merkel in this volume.
5. Ibid., pp.60–62.6. A good democracy is an embedded democracy, as well (see Merkel in this collection).
The focus on democratic quality either singles out other dimensions vis-a-vis embeddednessor points to the same dimension in different perspectives. Both perspectives are useful inthis analysis.
7. See Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘Public Opinion and the “Quality” of Democracy in Portugal’,in Houchang E. Chehabi and Alfred Stepan (eds), Essays in Honor of Juan J. Linz. Politics,Society, and Democracy. Comparative Studies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995),pp.345–62; e.g., Schmitter (p.348) also refers to result when defining democratic qualityas a form of legitimacy, namely where positive evidence in the evaluation of democracyby the mass public is searched.
8. Herbert Kitchelt et al., Post-communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation, andInter-party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Kitschelt alsoconsiders ‘accountability’ to be a ‘procedural’ dimension (see ibid., pp.43ff.).
9. David A. Altman and Anıbal Perez-Linan, ‘Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Freedom,Competitiveness, and Participation in 18 Latin American Countries’, Democratization,Vol.9, No.2 (2002), pp.85–100; Arend P. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. GovernmentForms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1999).
10. These choices are only justified by a research strategy involving comparative analysis ofmany cases. In effect, this is the strategy followed by Alman and Perez-Linan (note 9), aswell as by Lijphart (note 9).
11. Stuart Weir and David Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain(London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
12. This subject is addressed in the following two sections.13. Jose Maria Maravall, ‘The Rule of Law as a Political Weapon’, in Jose Maria Maravall
and Adam Przeworski (eds), Democracy and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2002), pp.261–301); M.K. Dietrich, Legal and Judicial Reform inCentral Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Voices From Five Countries, (Washington,DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2000).The minimal definition of the rule of law, suggested by Maravall (p.261), refers to ‘theimplementation of laws that (i) were enacted and approved following pre-established pro-cedures; (ii) that are not retroactive . . ., but general, stable, clear, and hierarchicallyordered . . .; (iii) applied to particular cases by courts free from political influence and acces-sible to all, the decisions of which follow procedural requirements, and that establish guiltthrough ordinary means’. With reference to eastern Europe, Dietrich (pp.6–7) points outthat ‘legal reform seeks to supplant this autocratic and state-centered system with a rule oflaw that: Operates objectively. The law is interpreted and enforced by lawyers, judges, pro-secutors, and other officials in an ethical and fair manner, without special preferences and pri-vileges. Is administered based on knowledge of the law. Those charged with interpreting andenforcing the legislative framework know what the law is, and understand its underlying prin-ciples. Is accessible. Individuals have meaningful access to the legal system. This means thatthey know what their rights are, can obtain representation, and filing fees are affordable.Is reasonably efficient. Is transparent. Citizens affected by legislation have an opportunityto comment on it as it is drafted. Likewise, judicial decisions are justified and explainedand subject to press and academic scrutiny. Is predictable. Legislation is drafted in areasonably clear manner, so that outcomes are predictable and undue discretion is not leftin the hands of public officials. Is enforceable. Judicial and administrative decisions, rendered
30 DEMOCRATIZATION
fairly, are enforced. Protects private property rights. Protects individual and human rights.Protects legitimate state interests, e.g., by prosecuting those charged with clearly definedcriminal acts’.
14. Morlino, Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties (note 1).15. For example, the analysis of the Italian case in Leonardo Morlino, ‘What is a “Good” Democ-
racy? Theory and the Case of Italy’, Southern European Society and Politics, Vol.8, No.3(2003), pp.1–32.
16. Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies’, in AndreasSchedler, Larry J. Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds), The Self-restraining State: Power andAccountability in New Democracies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp.29–52.
17. Maravall, ‘The rule of law’ (note 13) esp. pp.283–96.18. See, for example, Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, La democrazia giudiziaria
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997).19. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), esp. pp.121–62.20. Schedler, Diamond and Plattner (note 16) p.17.21. See O’Donnell, Horizontal Accountability (note 16) pp.29–52; Philippe C. Schmitter,
‘The Limits of Horizontal Accountability’, in Schedler, Diamond and Plattner (note 16)pp.59–62.
22. Altman and Perez-Linan (note 9) pp.85ff.23. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, ‘Changing Modes of Party Organization and Party Democ-
racy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics, Vol.1, No.1 (1995), pp.5–28.24. Jose Maria Maravall, Surviving Accountability (Florence: Jean Monnet Chair Papers,
European University Institute, Florence, 1997).25. O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’ (note 4).26. I will not address the theoretical problems associated with the connection between
responsibility and responsiveness that has been discussed within the theory of representativedemocracy. For more on this point, see Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987), esp. pp.6–9.
27. Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps (1977), ‘The Puzzle of Representation: SpecifyingComponents of Responsiveness’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.3, No.2 (1977),pp.233–54.
28. A common question, for example, is ‘How satisfied are you with the way in which democracyfunctions in your country?’ See Morlino, Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis(note 1) ch.7, for more on this regarding southern Europe.
29. See, for example, Lijphart (note 9) pp.286–8. There are a number of quantitative studiesthat analyse this theme, including Eulau and Karps (note 27); Sidney Verba and NormanH. Nie, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison (London:Cambridge University Press, 1978); and, more recently: Gary King, ‘Electoral Responsive-ness and Partisan Bias in Multiparty Democracies’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.15,No.2 (1990); John D. Huber and G. Bingham Powell, ‘Congruence Between Citizensand Policy Makers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy’, World Politics, Vol.46, No.3(1994), pp.291–326.
30. See Morlino, Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis, (note 1) pp.9–108.31. Ibid., pp.111–68.32. For more on the problem of the meaning of democracy at the mass level, see
Leonardo Morlino and Jose Ramon Montero, ‘Legitimacy and Democracy in SouthernEurope’, in Gunther Richard, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jurgen Puhle (eds),The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. Southern Europe in Comparative Pespective(Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp.253–9.
33. The relationship between the procedures, outcomes, and the substantive dimensions of qualitydemocracy should, by now, be fairly evident.
34. Max Kaase and Kenneth Newton (eds), Beliefs in Government (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1995), pp.150ff.
WHAT IS A ‘GOOD’ DEMOCRACY? 31
35. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam (eds), Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling theTrilateral Countries? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Russell J. Dalton,Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam ‘What’s Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?’ inPharr and Putnam, Disaffected Democracies, p.25.
36. Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris, ‘Confidence in Public Institutions: Fate, Culture, orPerformance?’ in Pharr and Putnam, Disaffected Democracies (note 35) pp.52–73.
37. Donatella Della Porta, ‘Social Capital, Beliefs in Government and Political Corruption’, inPharr and Putnam (note 35) pp.202–29; for research on corruption, see Donatella DellaPorta and Yves Meny (eds), Democracy and Corruption in Europe (London: Washington,Pinter, 1997), and Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, Corrupt Exchanges.Actors, Resources and Mechanisms of Political Corruption (New York: Aldine de Gruyter,1999).
38. Robert A. Dahl, Poliarchy. Participation and Opposition, (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1971); Thomas H. Marshall, Sociology at the Crossroad (London: Heinemann, 1963).
39. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, CapitalistDevelopment and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp.269–302.
40. This equality is also sanctioned by the legal system and covered in manuals of constitutionalrights. See Paolo Caretti, I diritti fondamentali: liberta e diritti sociali (Torino: Giappichelli2002), esp. ch.5.
41. This is ‘simply’ part of paragraph 2, article 3 of the Italian constitution (see ibid., pp.150–51).42. The web sites of the European Union and of the Italian Chamber of Deputies provide the text
of this charter, with the EU site offering commentary on and explanations of the document.43. Leonardo Morlino, Democrazie e Democratizzazioni (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), pp.225–54.44. O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’ (note 4).45. See, for example, Peter Mair, ‘Populist Democracy vs. Party Democracy’, in Yves Meny
and Yves Surel (eds), Democracies and the Populist Challenge (London: Palgrave, 2002),pp.81–98.
46. The populist phenomenon, with its placing of ‘the people’ at the centre of democracy, hasrecently been analysed as a reaction to the tensions, discontent, dissatisfaction and protest –in a word, to the democratic ‘malaise’ that has surfaced in recent years in western Europe. SeeMeny and Surel (note 45); Marco Tarchi, L’Italia populista (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003).
47. For an empirical implementation of the theoretical framework suggested above to the Italiancase see Leonardo Morlino, ‘What is a “Good” Democracy?’ (note 15) pp.14–32.
48. Wolfgang Merkel, Hans-Jurgen Puhle et al., Defekte Demokratien (Opladen: VS Verlag,2003).
Manuscript accepted for publication June 2004.
Address for correspondence: Leonardo Morlino, Universita degli Studi di Firenze, Via dellePandette, 21, I-50127 Firenze, Italy. E-mail: [email protected]