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AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT [email protected] (413) 535-4088 Review of Market Rule 1: Section III.13.2.7.9 FCM Carry Forward Rule
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AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT [email protected] (413) 535-4088 [email protected] Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

Dec 11, 2015

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Page 1: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA

Andrew GillespieMARKET DEVELOPMENT

[email protected] (413) 535-4088

Review of Market Rule 1: Section III.13.2.7.9

FCM Carry Forward Rule

Page 2: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

CARRY FORWARD DUE TO RATIONINGWhy is this provision necessary, and what is it meant to do?

Page 3: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

What is the issue?

• Conceptually, the FCA would work better if all resources were rationable

But, requiring all resources to be rationable would make it very difficult for new resources to enter the FCA; most new resources cannot be easily scaled

• By being non-rationable, sponsors of new projects avoid the risk of being rationed below the full capability of the project, which allows lower per-MW costs to be reflected in their FCA offer

However, because of this ‘lumpiness,’ the auction may over-buy in order to meet capacity requirements

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Page 4: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

What is the impact of over-buying?

• The excess created when a lumpy new offer must be procured to meet the requirement can affect prices in subsequent FCAs

In the next auction, the excess is now existing and can depress the clearing price

• After any multiple year election, this is also a risk for new entrants

This risk also leads to higher offers from new resources; a risk premium would be included in the initial offer because of the uncertainty about future capacity values – times when the price should have been set by new capacity, but wasn’t because of the excess

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Page 5: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

What does the carry-forward provision do?

• The carry forward provision is meant to address the situation when, due to a previously cleared lumpy new offer, an excess amount of existing capacity was created

• The problem is price suppression in subsequent auctions; it is possible that this excess has offset the need for any new capacity in subsequent auctions, and hence the price was not set by a new offer

• The solution: Reset the clearing price when, because of this excess, the price should have been set by new capacity, but wasn’t because of the excess

• Reset to what price? Reset the price to that of new capacity

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Page 6: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

MARKET RULE CITATIONS What exactly are the provisions?

Page 7: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

III.13.2.7.9.1. Trigger.

“The capacity carry forward rule shall be triggered in an import-constrained Capacity Zone if all of the following conditions are met:

a)the sum of the amount of New Capacity Required plus the amount of Permanent De-List Bids clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction in the Capacity Zone is less than or equal to zero;

b)there is not Inadequate Supply in the Forward Capacity Auction in the Capacity Zone; and

c)at the Capacity Clearing Price, the sum of the amount of New Capacity Required plus the amount of Permanent De-List Bids clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction plus the amount of capacity carried forward due to rationing is greater than zero. The amount of capacity carried forward due to rationing shall equal the amount of capacity above the Local Sourcing Requirement procured in that Capacity Zone in the previous Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule. “

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Page 8: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

What is New Capacity Required?

• Seciton III.13.2.8.1.1

“…“New Capacity Required” shall mean the Capacity Zone’s Local Sourcing Requirement, minus the total amount of capacity of Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources in the Capacity Zone (that is not permanently de-listed for the Capacity Commitment Period), …”

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Page 9: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

III.13.2.7.9.2. Pricing.

“If the capacity carry forward rule is triggered, then the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone shall be the lesser of: (1) $0.01 below the price at which the last New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Resource in the Capacity Zone to withdraw withdrew from the Forward Capacity Auction; or (2) the Offer Review Trigger Price for a combustion turbine, as set forth in Section III.A.21.1.1; provided, however, that if in the Capacity Zone there is Insufficient Competition and no capacity offered from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources has been withdrawn from the Forward Capacity Auction, then the Capacity Clearing Price shall equal the Offer Review Trigger Price for a combustion turbine, as set forth in Section III.A.21.1.1.”

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Page 10: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

REVIEW OF CURRENT PROVISIONS Do the current provisions work?

Page 11: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

Review of Trigger

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Page 12: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

Review of Administrative Price

• The method prescribed to determine an administrative price will work for FCA 8

• The administrative price will be either:

One cent below the last new offer to withdraw from the auction, or

The price of a new combustion turbine

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Page 13: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

Notes and Conclusion

• Any new capacity offer participating in the auction in conformance with the Offer Review Trigger Price rules, and not an exercise of market power, is appropriate for use as an administrative price

• How this excess might increase or decrease in subsequent auctions (FCA 9 and beyond) is not an immediate problem

Recall, the proposed administration of carry forward out-of-market (OOM) capacity was a very similar problem that was ultimately not approved by the FERC

• Conclusion: based on this review and other considerations, the ISO is not proposing any modifications to this provision at this time

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Page 14: AUGUST 7-9, 2013 | LENOX, MA Andrew Gillespie MARKET DEVELOPMENT AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM (413) 535-4088 AGILLESPIE@ISO-NE.COM Review of Market Rule 1: Section.

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Andrew Gillespie [email protected]