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nil Kumar Sardana, the CEO of the North Delhi Power Ltd. (NDPL), was

busy in his office attending to calls from different stakeholders of the

company one after another. But, at the back of his mind were several

questions: Could NDPL hope to escalate its aggregate technical and commercial(AT&C) loss reduction exponentially; obtain, what he called, customers’ affection;

increase revenue and shareholders’ wealth as per the company’s strategy; and attain

viability in the shortest possible time period? He was revered by his professional

team which ran NDPL. Members of the NDPL fraternity considered him as passionate,

visionary, transparent, and ethics-driven in the transformational role of running this

power distribution company.

In a way, NDPL could be seen as the lifeline for most of the residents of North

and North-West Delhi where it was the sole agency to distribute electricity. This

company symbolized a kind of a joint venture between private and public ownership.

It took over a portion of the ailing Delhi-Government-owned Delhi Vidyut Board

(DVB) with effect from July 1, 2002, under a privatization arrangement devised by

the government of the national capital region of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the

Delhi Government). Sardana was called from Mumbai to lead NDPL. He was working

there as one of the Vice-Presidents of the Bombay Suburban Electric Supply Ltd.

(BSES), a Reliance group-controlled company, which became NDPL’s competitor (in

a restricted sense) in Delhi; for, BSES owned the other two companies which took

up electricity distribution in the rest of Delhi as per the privatization arrangement.

Under Sardana’s leadership, NDPL undertook several initiatives to overcome the

problems from which DVB was suffering. Sardana’s immediate concern was to ensure

stabilization of the two-year old association between the Tata Power (the chief

stakeholder in NDPL) and the Delhi Government and eventually to see it becominga lasting success.

The company chose a team of performers to head each of the functional areas,

which, among others, included Abhay K Saini, its General Manager (GM) – Human

Resources. Saini focused himself on future rather than the past. When asked by

Sardana to look into the possibility of investigating the source of wealth that some

of the DVB employees had accumulated through unlawful means in the pre-takeover

phase, Saini advised him against it. He opined that the focus of the company vis-

North Delhi Power Ltd.:Dynamics of Change

Debi S Saini and Jyotsna Bhatnagar

describes a real-life situationfaced, a decision or action

taken by an individualmanager or by an

organization at the strategic,functional or operational

levels

KEY WORDS

Power Distribution

Technical andCommercial Losses

Takeover

Transformational Agenda

MANAGEMENTCAS E

VIKALPA • VOLUME 30 • NO 4 • OCTOBER - DECEMBER 2005 133

133



a-vis these employees should be on bringing them into

the core values of NDPL and should, therefore, rely more

on trust and counselling rather than policing and sus-

picion.

Sardana was aware that a number of eyes were set

on NDPL’s working as it symbolized one of the major

initiatives to reform the power sector in India. The

aggregate annual AT&C losses of all state electricity boards in India had reached a whopping Rs. 250 billion

in August 2004; initiation of privatization in power

distribution in other states appeared only a matter of

time. The success of the NDPL experiment would be

taken as a catalyst for power-sector turnaround and

change management in these states. He was, therefore,

looking forward to engineering fresh initiatives so as to

march towards the company’s vision of “becoming the

most preferred and admired energy company.” Sardana

was wondering whether the strategy of turnaround that

the company had been following would work on the

expected lines. He was asking himself whether he would

be able to realize the basic commitment of the company

to the Delhi Government, as had been agreed upon in

the acquisition deal, to stand on its own within the

stipulated five years and reduce the AT&C losses from

53 per cent at the time of acquisition to 20 per cent by

June 30, 2007.

BACKGROUND

Power consumers were unhappy with the interruptionsin power supply and the poor quality of service provided

by DVB. They faced regular power cuts especially during

peak summer and winter months. They also complained

that DVB employees were indifferent and corrupt. A

backlog of nearly 100,000 consumer complaints of dif-

ferent types was pending with DVB at the time of the

takeover. Its very high incidence of AT&C losses was

believed to be a result of several acts of commission and

omission on the part of DVB’s top management, poli-

ticians as well as employees.

The Delhi Electricity Regulation Act (DERA) was

enacted in the year 2000 to facilitate power sector reforms

in Delhi. As per the philosophy envisaged in the DERA,

the Delhi Government unbundled DVB into three sets

of functional corporate entities related to: (i) distribu-

tion, (ii) transmission, and (iii) generation. All the assets

and liabilities of DVB were acquired by the Delhi Gov-

ernment and were eventually transferred to six succes-

sor companies—one generating company (Genco), one

transmission and bulk supply company (Transco), three

distribution companies (Discom-I, Discom-II, and

Discom-III), and one holding company. The three dis-

tribution companies (or Discoms) were privatized to the

tune of 51 per cent but the three other companies con-

tinued to be wholly owned by the Delhi Government.

In all, the six entities thus created were as follows: Genco

(Delhi Generation Company Ltd.); Transco (Delhi TranscoLtd.); holding company; Discom-I (BSES: Bombay Sub-

urban Electric Supply Ltd., later renamed as Yamuna

Power Limited); Discom-II (BSES: Bombay Suburban

Electric Supply Ltd, later renamed as Rajdhani Power

Limited), and Discom-III (the North Delhi Power Ltd.).

While Discom-III covered the north and the north-west

zones, the remaining two Discoms were operating in the

rest of Delhi. The three Discoms bought electricity from

Transco at subsidized rates; the cost of the subsidy was

met by the Delhi Government. The control in manage-

ment of Discom-III (NDPL) was with Tata Power which

held 51 per cent shares in it; the rest of the shares were

with the holding company, i.e., Delhi Power Company

Ltd., a Delhi Government enterprise. The transition took

place subject to a clear commitment of the Delhi Gov-

ernment to provide financial support to the three Discoms.

This was done through subsidized power purchases

from Transco during a five-year transition period and

a better specified multi-year tariff-setting regime based

on more realistic loss targets that could be accurately

measured.The loss-reduction target in Delhi focused on a

concept called AT&C which meant measuring the dif-

ference between kwhs supplied to a Discom and kwhs

realized by the Discom from the retail customers. It was

estimated that the Delhi Government had already been

subsidizing DVB every year for its losses by about Rs.15

billion through ‘loans’ that were never expected to be

repaid. Thus DVB losses were expected to reach a figure

of more than Rs. 75 billion in five years . The subsidies

were intended to avoid the need for large post-priva-

tization tariff increases which would not have beensustainable for the Delhi Government.

Entry of The CEO

Sardana joined NDPL on July 11, 2002 as the CEO. Saini

came into his team in December, 2002. Sardana took

stock of the challenges that NDPL was facing. His top-

most priority was to put the dilapidated structures and

archaic processes of the former DVB in order and to

134 NORTH DELHI POWER LTD.

134



imbibe an ongoing change in them to gain viability. He

knew that his change agenda was being implemented

in an organization that had a heritage of government-

controlled culture. In his efforts to promote viable chang-

es, his knowledge of all functional areas helped him in

taking crucial decisions quickly.

After constituting his team, Sardana took immedi-

ate steps to stem the rot. He took some incremental stepstowards improvement and some radical performance

initiatives. He regularly reviewed the company’s per-

formance in the monthly top-management meetings

which included all officers above the rank of assistant

general managers (AGMs). His critical focus was on

operations and maintenance and the extent to which

they were in tune with the needs of the customer. He

believed that corporate performance was determined by

‘customer care and empowerment of employees.’ Man-

aging the external environment took a considerable

amount of his time as he had to deal with the local

politicians, bureaucracy, and all other stakeholders in

the company.

Concerns and Issues on Takeover

Some of the key problems that Sardana encountered on

takeover included the presence of a large number of non-

metered and illegal customers, under-billing, and poor

collections. DVB had accumulated a huge amount of

receivables. There was neither any register of assets nor

an accurate master list of customers. He encountered acovert nexus between the vested interests that promoted

and legitimized power theft. In a large number of cases,

meter readers were hand-in-glove with power thieves;

they advised consumers as to how to give a gloss of

legality to the theft they were indulging in.

The distribution network system was much below

the requisite standards and in a state of dilapidation. The

level of hygiene and sanitation at the worksites and

offices showed total casualness in the way the work must

have gone on in the DVB. The common employee en-

joyed over-security and was indifferent to customer

requirements. An army of workforce existed which

fattened the wage bills resulting into further worsening

of the DVB finances.

The workforce was managed in such a way that high

performers had little incentive to excel. Nobody ever gave

them compliments for the good work done. The employ-

ees were not clear about what all they were supposed to

do. Almost all employees were averse to working on

computers. There were just two computers in the whole

organization. As almost all work was done manually, a

large number of files had got accumulated that had even

lost relevance. Ninety per cent of the employees were

paid their salaries in cash which had resulted in DVB

undertaking multiple transactions related to withdrawal

of cash from banks around the beginning of the monthand disbursement of salaries at each zone. Salary dis-

bursement work used to get staggered over a week in-

volving unusually large number of manhours.

The exercise of power in the DVB structure was

highly centralized. Decision-making was slow. There

was no system of job rotation. Once an engineer was

posted in a place, he used to spend 80 per cent of the

time of his service tenure in that area. Any move to

transfer him was opposed on the ground that he was

the main person having the knowledge of the technical

intricacies of the area’s power distribution system and

its geography. The concerned official remained the sole

incharge of the region for a long time. Also, there was

widespread corruption among the officials.

Mapping of the organization was taken as a big

agenda by the company. The hierarchical designations

used, among others, included those such as Junior

Engineer, Assistant Engineer, Executive Engineer and so

on. DVB did not have much of an HR function though

nearly 150 people were associated with the Personnel

Department who were mostly concerned with maintain-ing employee-related records pertaining to leave, per-

sonal files, and benefits availed, etc. NDPL reduced this

number to 51 and planned to further reduce it to a figure

of 25 to 30. DVB neither performed any training function

nor any project or corporate function. It only had a

Planning Department. Operations and maintenance work

was divided into two circles consisting of ten districts

and 40 zones in all. Employees who manned various

positions, among others, included about 300 engineers,

300 supervisors, clerks, and a large number of semi-

literate, semi-trained linemen.

Most DVB-scheme employees had never seen a

training hall in their lifetime; the quality of their work

was low. DVB’s performance appraisal and review system

mainly consisted of confidential reports as found in the

government. Even if some one got a poor rating, he was

expected to be promoted on completion of a certain

number of years.


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CHALLENGES

NDPL faced the key challenge of bringing about the

desired changes in different spheres of organizational

working. DVB was the largest exclusive urban utility in

India at the time the transition happened but its crisis

had reached serious proportions. The DVB had made

little investment in infrastructure for the last two to three

years as talks for takeover were going on for quite sometime. NDPL first made a Rs. 12.5 billion capital expend-

iture plan for five years. Running expenses meant an-

other Rs. 2.5 billion annually, on an average, for five

years.

Some of the key challenges that the company was

facing since the acquisition included dealing with ram-

pant theft by slum dwellers as well as industrial/com-

mercial consumers; improving the sub-standard and

dilapidated distribution network system; reducing the

AT&C losses within a period of five years from 53 per

cent during the takeover to 20 per cent after a period

of five years; improving system reliability so as to be

comparable with the best utilities in India; changing the

consumer perception of NDPL; promoting consumer

service and IT interface at a level comparable with world

standards; tackling the nexus between the vested inter-

ests who were responsible for power theft; securing a

more comprehensive information on its assets; decreas-

ing restoration periods to acceptable levels; internaliz-

ing in the company’s culture a concept of consumer

priority and service; changing the mindsets of a neg-lected and semi-trained workforce; enhancing role clar-

ity to the employees so as to increase the quality of

performance; imbibing transparent and ethical working

in all administrative centres and among the employees

of the company; and establishing the Tata brand image

in terms of the standards of the Tata Business Excellence

Model (TBEM).

A significant development in the power sector was

the enactment of the Electricity Act, 2003, by the Indian

Parliament, which was a major step forward in improv-

ing and speeding up the power sector reforms in the

country. The only other such experiment took place in

Orissa which could be said to be quite successful.

Consequently, the power industry opened up in the

generation, transmission, and distribution sectors. The

Delhi Government also expected the three Discoms to

deliver performance in consonance with the changing

climate and expectations.

THE TRANSFORMATIONAL AGENDA AND

ACTION

In order to deal with the problems the company encoun-

tered, the top management of NDPL took the following

major steps:

Performance Initiatives

On takeover, one of the key priorities of the companywas to improve operations and maintenance. This meant

minimizing the number and duration of interruptions,

making the fault-repair system simpler and consumer-

friendly, improving power-supply reliability, minimiz-

ing or removing the faulty billing, and replacing the old

meters by electronic ones. The long-term measures

included substantial improvements in the hygiene levels

in zonal and district offices. Huge quantity of scraps had

got accumulated, the removal of which was a priority.

This operation was still going on when the case writers

completed the data collection; every day, three trucks

were operating in scrap-removing operations. Infrastruc-

ture received the top attention of the management.

NDPL’s new state-of-the-art corporate office that was

coming up within the next two years was expected to

facilitate a much better coordination of the company’s

activities. Table 1 shows some of the performance in-

itiatives that the company took in relation to people

issues and a comparison with the earlier scenario.

In order to expedite its functioning, the company

started working towards building a management infor-mation system (MIS). Sardana sat till 2 o’clock in the

night to develop a system of daily reporting of opera-

tions. The MIS (built through software programming)

was eventually fully internalized which was being

considered necessary for knowing where the company

stood. A centralized control room was established which

was located in one of the grid stations and the report

on operations was circulated to all the concerned depart-

ments through e-mail. A full-fledged performance

monitoring cell was created in the corporate office which

directly reported to Sardana. The respective functional

heads prepared the functional reports on a monthly basis

including, among others, the monthly human resource

information system (HRIS).

Another important performance initiative was the

holding of the top management meeting on the 20th of

each month which included all AGMs and above (this

came to 26 people including the CEO and the seven


136



departmental heads). Presentations were made in thesemeetings by different departments which were followed

by discussion and action formulation. This forum helped

a great deal in ensuring performance monitoring. The

senior management meetings, which included Sardana

and his seven departmental heads, were held on the first

Saturday of every month. The DVB-scheme engineers

initially showed total resistance to the computer system

but gradually realized its importance. Eventually, they

got well-versed in handling computer technology; in

fact, each one of them prepared his own presentation.

After some time, some kind of competition developedamong them to demonstrate their performance with the

help of PowerPoint.

Since January 2004, a system of zonal performance

monitoring was started. Internet facilities were installed

in each of the 46 zones. The zonal managers (who were

mostly employees under the DVB scheme) started send-

ing zonal performance data to the corporate office by

e-mail. The company started giving zonal performance

scorecard which provided the relative performance of

the zone. All these activities came under the Perform-

ance Management and MIS Department.

In order to deliver improved performance to the

consumer, the company adopted a 5S concept which

consisted of: sugam (easy), sahyog (cooperation of con-

sumers), spasht (unambiguous), sankalp (determination),

and sampark (communication). Implementing the 5S

concept meant, among others, the following: billing and

payment details of all 0.8 million consumers were

uploaded on the NDPL website with facilities for print-

ing duplicate bills, payment of bill on the website, andviewing consumption graph and payment details from

the date of inception of the NDPL. These initiatives were

the first of their type in the power sector anywhere in

India. In order to promote the payment facility, NDPL

came up with other initiatives. They included, among

others, setting up of NDPL Consumer Care Centres for

payment by cheque or cash; 24-hour manned drop-boxes

at the announced NDPL premises with stamped on-the-

spot acknowledgement; and payment of bills through

the internet. The company appointed a Customer Rela-

tions Coordinator to whom complaints on power theftcould be made confidentially on the telephone, post or

the web. Some of the other major initiatives undertaken

under this concept included strengthening of the call

centre by increasing and rationalizing its work stations

which led to improvement in the response to consumers

from 50-60 per cent to 98-100 cent; auditing of equipment

and installation and asking the original equipment

manufacturers to take corrective measures to improve

the overall system; restructuring of the organization;

training of manpower; communicating with the consum-

ers about the expected power interruptions due to various

reasons and load-shedding schedules; and taking steps

to introduce the state-of-the-art technology in all spheres

of business functions.

Rightsizing and Service Conditions

As per the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed

at the time of acquisition, NDPL inherited 5,368 employ-

ees from the DVB. Sardana devised an attractive volun-

Salary was being disbursed in cash/cheques to subordinate staff/ executives starting from the last day of the month till the 7th of thefollowing month. There would be 500 to 700 errors in salary disbursementevery month which necessitated a continuous audit system.

Only two computers were provided for 5,500 employees.

There was no scheme for any technical, behavioural, quality orcomputer training.

There was no ISO certification of any function or process.

No mobile phones/pager was provided to the field staff.

Junior/field staff were hardly sponsored for exposure/training in foreigncountries.

Table 1: Major HR Initiatives of NDPL

Pre-takeover August 2004

Delhi Vidyut Board North Delhi Power Limited

Salary was being transferred through electronic clearance to therespective bank accounts of the employees directly; every employeegot his pay on the last day of the month. Error level was negligible.Audit was done randomly to stabilize the system.

1,200 computers were provided for 3,400 employees.

18,000 mandays training was imparted in the last two years in quality,customer orientation, and computer handling.

ISO certification was obtained for engineering, projects, IT, humanresource, and stores departments.

Mobile phones were provided to all executives, junior engineers, andother field staff for better connectivity.

Executives/field staff were sponsored for training under peer exchangeprogramme to different countries; 32 personnel were sent under thisscheme till August 2004.


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tary retirement scheme (VRS). The employees who had

earlier worked only occasionally were aware that they

would have to work for the new company. They were

also apprehensive of their suitability in the new scenario.

Out of the total DVB workforce, 1,794 employees sought

retirement under the VRS. This included nearly 90 per

cent of meter readers who availed the VRS; the remain-

ing 10 per cent were re-deployed after training. Theunion was involved in the rightsizing process through-

out. Some forms of separation, which facilitated right-

sizing, among others, included 375 cases of superannu-

ation since the takeover and 70 cases of voluntary re-

tirement. NDPL employed 482 new employees to var-

ious positions with new service conditions which, among

others, included more than 300 engineers to facilitate the

operations and maintenance work and 15 fresh or ex-

perienced MBAs in different functional areas. In addi-

tion, 72 persons were taken as consultants or on contract-

tenure in different departments. Twenty-six were on

deputation from Tata Power; their compensation was

governed by the Tata Power compensation norms. The

DVB-scheme employees got their pay and compensation

as per the Fifth Pay Commission of the Government of

India including the dearness and other allowances. They

continued to be governed by the old DVB pay structure

as per the MOU and were also entitled to pension and

retirement benefits as per the DVB structure. The service

conditions of NDPL employees were incentive-linked.

Thirty per cent of their pay was variable.Sardana was facing the challenge of downsizing/

redeploying about 750 employees including about 190

women who were earlier involved in serving water in

DVB offices; they had little role in the new scheme of

organization. At one of the joint interaction forum (JIF)

meetings, Sardana said to the participants: “One of our

concerns has to be improving the skills of our employees.

How do we multi-skill a large number of assistant linemen

(ALM), drivers, cleaners, pharmacists, shift engineers,

women who supply water, and clerks whose skills have

hardly any relevance in today’s environment?” Hewanted to do this in a manner acceptable to the union.

It was not certain whether he could succeed in that

endeavour. In fact, the union leaders were pressurized

by this group of employees for maintaining the status

quo about their service conditions. The re-training po-

tential of especially the women who served water in

terms of learning any sort of technical skills was almost

negligible.

Changes in Organizational Structure

After the acquisition, NDPL carried out changes in the

organizational structure. It increased the number of

circles to five; districts to 12; and zones to 46. It

wanted to emphasize the company’s 24x7 accountabil-

ity to the consumer. A circle, which was responsible

for operations and maintenance of the area in its

jurisdiction, used to be earlier manned by 30 to 40

people. In the post-takeover scenario, only five people

worked in it. This was possible due to the use of

technology, computerization, and organizational re-

structuring. With new induction of engineers to facil-

itate the operations and maintenance work, the number

of engineers reached nearly 700 out of which 300 were

under the DVB scheme (as on September 1, 2004). In

place of one engineer earlier, three engineers were

given the responsibility of an area to work in three

different shifts in a day. The person concerned wasresponsible for his shift of eight hours. General shift

working was introduced for attending to the day-to-

day problems; major problems were handled by the

staff of the general shift. Shift working fostered com-

petition for efficiency even within the zone. The

concept of ‘ideal zones’ was developed wherein few

zones were to be selected and developed as world-

class model zones. The new arrangement gave oppor-

tunities for job rotation and wider job roles.

The NDPL top management consisted of the CEO,heads of seven main departments, which were headed

by a General Manager (GM) or a Deputy General

Manager (DGM), and the circle heads. Besides, there

were seven cells which directly reported to the CEO.

Almost all the designations were rechristened. The

new designations were changed to manager, assistant

manager, office associate, work attendant, and so on.

Re-designation aroused considerable resistance from

most DVB-scheme employees including senior officers.

Most of them had not yet reconciled to this reality.

On the contrary, some of them felt empowered, e.g.,when stenographers and daftaries were designated as

office associates, they felt more dignified. So did the

operator, who was now called a ‘Service Associate.’

Since meter readers were one of the biggest sources

of corruption, this function was completely outsourced.

A considerable number of meter readers took VRS; the

remaining ones were re-deployed to undertake other

functions.


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Quality Focus

NDPL’s quality concerns could be inferred from its

mission statement which read: “To be the most preferred

and admired energy company, we will strive to deliver

quality and cost-effective services….” It had a quality

policy which stated that the company “will deliver error-

free services to our consumers by doing our jobs right,

the first time and every time.”

The company considerably revamped its grid sys-

tems, transformers, sub-stations, distribution cables, and

conductors. During the year 2003-04, it revamped 1,500

substations. Conversion of low-tension (LT) distribution

system to high-voltage distribution system had been

carried out to improve the quality of power and to reduce

AT&C losses. The ring main units were installed in the

distribution sub-stations in place of existing LT distri-

bution panels. Of the 40 grid stat ions that it had at the

time of case writing, only one was fully automatic andremote-controlled; the plan was to make all 40 remote-

controlled.

There was a full-fledged Inspection and Quality

Assurance Department which was accountable to the

GM-Operations. This department ensured right quality

of the equipment by inspecting samples. Also, there was

a separate department of ISO and TBEM which was

accountable to the GM-Technical Services and Projects.

This department prepared and implemented the sys-

tems and procedures for implementation of ISO in a

phased manner. It was also responsible for implement-

ing the TBEM in the company.

The Institute of Quality Enhancement, New Delhi,

was engaged for giving quality training to employees.

This institute followed the Philips Crosby model of quality

enhancement. The trainer started with the top manage-

ment and later on trained the supervisory group and the

operational associates.

The company secured the ISO 9001: 2000 certifica-

tion for Quality Management System from Det Norske

Veritas of Netherlands for its five departments: engi-

neering, projects, IT groups of technical services, human

resource management, and stores group of operations.

And, out of the 150 companies which participated in the

Grow Talent survey of the best quality companies in

2003, NDPL got the 27th rank.

Employee Welfare and Performance Incentives

Improving the working conditions, welfare facilities,

and employee care became the core concern of the

company for implementing NDPL’s transformational

agenda. One of the most unique features of employee

care at NDPL was its employee helpline, named Saarathi.

Any NDPL employee could submit his/her grievance

by e-mail or telephone and this helpline assisted in

giving a time-bound reply to him/her and helped in

processing grievance handling. The grievances could

even relate to issues like promotion, posting, error inpay-slip, administration-related issues, and other per-

sonnel matters. NDPL was supposedly the first such

company in India to have started this kind of a helpline.

Table 2 reveals an overview of some of the welfare and

performance measures that were being undertaken by

NDPL and compares them with the pre-takeover situ-

ation. Besides, the company introduced an incentive

scheme to promote performance-based culture for

employees who successfully achieved their targets. It

also launched a reward and recognition scheme with a

view to recognizing ingenuities and promoting talent.

Training

NDPL aimed at improving the quality of the employees

and hence invested Rs. 0.4 million towards making the

state-of-the-art training facilities available to them. It

defined job descriptions and key result areas (KRAs) for

each position based on the suggestions made in the

report of the Shriram Institute Committee. It designed

and administered training modules on quality, team-

building, behavioural aspects, and business develop-ment. This helped in improving the overall level of

competency in the organization.

The company carried out a training need analysis

in a larger perspective taking into account the skills and

the knowledge required by different pockets of the

organization. For example, when computers were

brought in and about 100 employees who were earlier

involved in salary preparation were to be re-deployed,

it was necessary to train them for different jobs including

computer handling. Imparting quality training helped

in improving the general technical proficiency in the

organization.

The company’s policy emphasized training for all.

It was envisaged that every employee had the right to

receive need-based training at regular intervals as per

organizational, functional, and individual needs. Ini-

tially, the company planned to have at least a minimum

of two training mandays in a year per employee for the

whole of the employee base. It also designed a peer


139



in India and abroad. The HRD Institute conducted 300

training programmes in 2003-04 in areas such as quality

improvement, customer orientation, and computer han-dling for all employees. In the last two years, 18,000

mandays of training had been imparted.

Union Dynamics

NDPL inherited the DVB workforce along with its re-

cognized Indian National Trade Union Congress (IN-

TUC)-affiliated union and seven staff associations. While

it accepted the workers’ union, it refused to recognize

any of the staff associations. Except for some minor

disturbances, the company witnessed a peaceful acqui-

sition process. The concept of JIF was put in place at the

district and circle levels; monthly and quarterly meet-

ings of JIF were held regularly. One of the case writers

attended some JIF meetings. Even a semblance of ad-

versarialism was not visible in these meetings; a few

union leaders from the unrecognized unions occasion-

ally made their points which demonstrated some degree

of suppressed dissent. In one of the JIF meetings, the

secretary of the recognized union made a PowerPoint

Table 2: Welfare Measures of NDPL

Pre-takeover August 2004

Delhi Vidyut Board North Delhi Power Limited

Medical claims of indoor patient/ treatment were reimbursed by DVBafter the expenditure was incurred by the employee from his pocket.

Forty hospitals were empanelled; no payment was required to be madeby the employee concerned; the employee had to just show the identitycard and avail treatment.

A Janata Insurance Scheme with a cover value of Rs. 0.1 million wasin place for accidental injuries; premium was paid by the employees.

NDPL got every employee insured against work-related accidents fora cover value of Rs. 0.25 million at company’s cost.

There was no forum/platform for interaction between management andemployee representatives.

A JIF was launched at the district and circle level; monthly and quarterlymeetings of JIF were held.

Time-bound promotion scale was being allowed to the eligible employeesafter considerable lapse of time. Many cases since 1994 onwards werepending.

Time-bound promotion scale cases were updated. All employees whowere eligible for this were allowed the same on 30th June and 31stDecember every year––No case was pending.

Pathetic working conditions existed in offices; there was no cleanlinessand hygiene maintenance.

A number of buildings was renovated; hygienic conditions weremaintained.

Potable drinking water was not available in many district/zonal offices. Proper drinking water was made available in all district/zonal offices.Water purifiers were installed or filtered (bottled) water was provided.

No tea allowance was paid. All NDPL employees were served tea twice a day at company’s costor tea allowance was paid every month.

No gift was given to employees on any occasion. A wrist watch was given to every Group D staff and contractual

employee to commemorate the Raising Day on July 1, 2003.No function was ever held to celebrate the Labour Day on May 1. Labour Day was celebrated every year by observing Industrial Harmony

Week; it involved employee participation.

Summer and winter uniforms were almost never supplied to the eligibleemployees on time.

Cash payment (allowance + tax at company cost) in lieu of uniformswas made to eligible employees.

Group D staff appointed on compassionate grounds were not givenany training before regularization.

Group D staff were provided with 12 to 16 weeks’ technical trainingat an industrial training institute (ITI) at company’s cost and inductedat a higher salary, i.e., Group C on regular rolls.

No sports meet was organized. Sports meets were organized for employees and dependants.

exchange training programme with Baltimore power

utility and Columbian power utility in the US with the

host company taking care of all the logistics. Later on,some employees were sent to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh,

Hong Kong, and Nepal to know how things were

managed there.

The Centre for Power Efficiency in Distribution

(CENPEID) was established by the company to impart

training. This centre got the accreditation of the Ministry

of Power, Government of India and was partly funded

by USAID. It had three wings: the HRD Institute (Delhi)

that catered to the training needs; the Skill Training

Institute (also situated in Delhi), which was expected to

become fully functional in December 2004; and Policy

and Research, which was expected to start functioning

in December 2004. While the former two functioned

under the HRM Department, the third was expected to

function under the Entrepreneurship and Knowledge

Management (EKM) Department. The Skill Training In-

stitute was being built to impart world-class skill de-

velopment in the power sector. The company proposed

to sell the services of this institute to other companies


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presentation on “How NDPL employees could contri-

bute towards greater efficiency?” He openly applauded

the company for its proactive policies and for sending

the union leaders to Tata Steel at Jamshedpur for ob-

taining a first-hand exposure to situations of cooperative

industrial relations. The company’s consultant, Dr S N

Pandey, who was the former Director-Industrial Rela-

tions at the Tata Steel, was guiding the working of the JIF; his contribution to JIF was largely appreciated both

by the union leaders as well as the managers.

Saini and his team also worked towards implement-

ing the Tata culture in the company as per the TBEM.

The payment of retirement benefits to employees for the

period for which they had rendered service to DVB in

the pre-takeover phase was the responsibility of the

Delhi Government. When NDPL announced the VRS

scheme, the Delhi Government could not meet its re-

sponsibilities of paying the workers’ dues even after

more than two years of privatization. This aroused deep

resentment among the retired as well as the serving

employees against the government. Saini issued a cir-

cular to all the employees that the Raising Day would

not be celebrated on July 1, 2004 due to the non-receipt

of retirement benefit by the 1,797 retired employees. He

also issued another circular suggesting that the NDPL

fraternity would not celebrate Puja and Diwali festivals

in 2004 as a mark of protest against the Delhi Govern-

ment.

Sardana too gave priority to the issue of union–management relations. According to him, he “consid-

ered it important to focus on removing any fear psycho-

sis amongst employees related to their job security in

the new dispensation.” While commenting on the un-

ion’s role in NDPL’s functioning, he remarked, “Unions

played the inevitable role of facilitating communication

and rumour management. The union leaders have shown

remarkable maturity in the acquisition exercise and

handling of the consequential issues. We read positive

in anything they asked for as our initial response. Happily,

we have thus been able to forge cooperative relationswith them.”

NDPL prioritized the improvement in working

conditions. Employees saw this as company’s concern

for orderliness in work organization. Old furniture was

replaced by new. Buildings were renovated. People were

made to feel better by providing facilities for comfort-

able work atmosphere. A manager remarked: “Espe-

cially the rank-and-file employees initially resisted a

switchover from payment of salary in cash to credit in

bank account. The union raised slogans against the

management but no deep-rooted feeling of injustice was

visible from their body language. The management stuck

to its guns. Gradually, the employees saw the positive

side of the management’s position and relented.”

The management did not view union resistance as

a serious roadblock in implementing the company’stransformational agenda. Both Sardana and Saini fo-

cused on problems of the rank- and-file. Sardana took

a positive stand on three of the burning issues which

were of grave concern to the common employee. This

was done partly on the advice of the two NDPL advisors

on employee affairs who were earlier officers in DVB

and, on retirement, were taken by NDPL as retainer-

consultants. They could feel the pulse of the entire

organization and were also aware of the sensitivity of

the issue from the employees’ point of view. They advised

Saini to take a soft stand on these three contentious

issues that the employees were facing since long.

Perhaps the most complex of these issues was the

payment of Rs. 10,000 out of the Widows’ Fund to each

of the employees’ widows whose husbands had died on

service. The issue was whether this money should be

paid from the Employee Welfare Fund (which was raised

by contribution from employees) or by NDPL. This issue

was pending with DVB for quite some time; the man-

agement had refused to pay them from the DVB re-

sources. It was a question of only Rs. 0.4 million. Sainimade Sardana agree to pay from the company’s funds.

Another hot issue related to the employees’ uniforms.

The management had been discussing the issue for the

last two months. Employees were demanding Rs. 5,000

per month as uniform allowance. The company felt that

only Rs. 1,100 per employee was justified in this case

and hence thought of a quid pro quo. Saini preferred to

settle this matter on employees’ terms; the settlement

on uniform allowance took place at Rs. 2,700 per em-

ployee per annum. Saini also closed about 70 of the 80

files of employees who were facing disciplinary action but their cases involved petty issues. Another important

issue from the employees’ point of view was that of

promotion. DVB had a time-bound promotion policy

which assured three promotions to all the 75 categories

of employees; but promotions had not taken place since

1992 due to financial stringency faced by DVB. Saini

convinced Sardana about the need to take a positive

stand on the time-bound promotion issue; eventually the


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issue got cleared. In the last two years in question, time-

bound promotion was given to 350 employees governed

by the DVB scheme; some got a higher designation while

the others were just promoted to the next scale. Two

batches of union leaders were sent to the Tata Steel plant

in Jamshedpur in September 2003 for ten days each to

observe how the cheapest steel was made in the world

in a climate of harmonious industrial relations among40,000 people.

Performance Management System

On acquisition of DVB, a key priority of the management

was to differentiate between the performer and the non-

performer employees. The company was keen to devise

a performance management system. The first step in this

direction was to develop people for assessing the train-

ing needs. Initially, since people did not understand

their own training needs, efforts were made to build

capabilities in them. It was decided that the performance

appraisal (PA) system for the employees should be kept

simple; the PA form comprised of only two pages. It

contained parameters such as technical knowledge, team-

building capability, strategic initiatives, behavioural

inputs, and man-management skills. This was applica-

ble for the first year. From 2004, KRAs were developed

up to the level of Assistant Manager with a view to

assessing individual performance. The company pro-

posed to provide two sets of PA systems: an operational

performance management system based on targets set by the company in different business areas such as

financial performance, commercial targets achieved,

consumer billing, capital expenditure, etc, and an indi-

vidual performance management system whereby the

performance of the individual was judged on the basis

of his KRA. The key responsibility of every individual

was expected to flow from his KRA. For each set of

positions, certain level of competency was felt desirable.

Performance management system was viewed as an

attempt to measure one’s level of competency for a given

position.The Tata group of companies had identified 14 broad

leadership practices to facilitate people development.

NDPL worked towards establishing these practices so

that the requisite capability including knowledge could

be developed among the employees.

Communication

NDPL’s top management forum aimed at ensuring multi-

pronged communication amongst members and also

performance monitoring. Initially, it used to meet every

fortnight which was later on made a monthly event.

Sometimes, meetings went on for as long as eight hours.

Sardana took a lead role in many of these meetings so

as to convey his pressing concerns. Since he had the

background of technical expertise, he was even seen

explaining a circuit diagram to the members concerned.Some of the sessions got converted into training sessions

as the situations so demanded. Most of these 20 members

were erstwhile DVB people. They were initially some-

what docile in these meetings. An HR manager remarked:

“Their body language showed that they were question-

ing their own competence as they had perhaps never

done those things at a critical level.” Apart from these,

Operations Review Team meetings took place at the

levels of circles and zones under the chairmanship of

the GM-Operations. These meetings inspired members

to do self-introspection and eventually in better artic-

ulation of performance-related and other issues.

JIF too proved to be an important forum where

representatives of union and management aired their

respective issues of concern. In some sense, it helped

grievance articulation and redressal. An in-house quar-

terly magazine named Navodaya was launched in No-

vember 2003 which contained in-house articles and

information that the management wanted to deliver to

the employees.

Human Resource Management InformationSystem (HRIS)

The company started the process of establishing its HRIS

system in January 2003. The HRIS software installation

work was given to Tata Consultancy Services (TCS). The

system was customized for NDPL’s needs. It had two-

fold objectives: to link salary with the employee and to

keep accurate data related to all the employees. For this

purpose, two different modules were created: the HRIS

module and the pay roll module. The modules were still

in the process of comprehensive development and werenot fully integrated. The base module had nine appli-

cations linked through network. In each module, there

were sub-modules. The system was designed in such a

way that offline data could be loaded. The system could

help generate any kind of report.

HRIS reflected the changes that NDPL was witness-

ing. Among others, ID numbers were provided to all the

employees. For each position, KRAs were designed. If


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the position was filled up, it got updated in the system.

Each position thus had an employee number, a job

description number, and a position ID.

Managing Knowledge

NDPL set up an EKM cell which reported directly to the

CEO. It had four wings, i.e., benchmarking, knowledge

management (KM) portal, customer and external anal-ysis, and sectoral analysis. Each of these wings was

headed by an MBA graduate. The role of the EKM cell

was performed with the belief that there was a wealth

of knowledge within the company as well as outside

which had to be tapped for delivering a better value to

the customer. Entrepreneurship was seen as a function

involving formulation of strategy and its deployment

(i.e., action plan) and KM was concerned with collecting

and processing of information for facilitating the real-

ization of the organizational goals.

NDPL hired AC Nielsen, an American Company,

for conducting surveys on customer aspirations to know

how soon the aspirations changed. This agency selected

15 parameters on which information was collected. A

sample of 2,500 consumers in the NDPL area was se-

lected on whom it administered a half-an-hour interview

schedule. The EKM cell chief remarked: “It was the first

time that an electricity-distribution agency undertook

this type of an exercise.” In the April 2003 survey, it was

revealed that 85 per cent consumers expected ‘power

reliability’ to be one of the most important expectationsfrom NDPL. As power reliability increased in the NDPL

area, in the second survey conducted by the same com-

pany, the importance of ‘communication about load-

shedding’ increased from the earlier 60 per cent in the

first survey to 72 per cent. Following the survey result,

NDPL sought the help of Radio Mirchi, an FM radio

broadcaster in Delhi, to announce communications about

power cuts in different parts of its operational area on

a particular day. It also started a system of munadi

(Hindi), i.e., a van with a loudspeaker going to a locality

and announcing a message.NDPL got feedback about its service from various

sources including the communication received on its

website. It also had a telephone service which could be

used by whistle blowers for reporting power theft or

indifference of the NDPL staff. An action plan was

followed by the top management every month.

PERFORMANCE AND ACHIEVEMENTS

NDPL targeted at bringing about changes in several

spheres. Large-scale changes took place in operations

and maintenance work which were facilitated by the

MIS. The company developed a system-orientation in

most of its key processes. It improved its functioning

on several operational parameters. It benchmarked itself

against the top five utilities in the world. The companyadded an international concept called n-1. This was

meant to ensure that even if one part of the equipment

failed to function, the system kept functioning and the

consumers did not suffer. The company was working

towards making all its 66 kv and 33 kv stations on n-

1 concept by the end of 2004 with all of them having

a back-up. Operations and maintenance work had been

facilitated by ‘one store concept.’ The store was housed

in an area of about five acres at a central place and was

responsible for delivering material to the places where

it was required––also called the ‘home delivery’ concept.

At the time of takeover, the number of provisional

billing had reached 0.2 mill ion consumers. NDPL was

able to reduce the number of provisional bills only to

1,45,000 at the end of March 31, 2004. Larger the number

of provisional bills, greater is the possibility of loss of

revenue for the company. In relation to billing errors,

while a substantial reduction had taken place since the

time of takeover, they were still believed to be an area

of concern. Sardana admitted at one of the recent JIF

meetings: “Billing errors of our company are still in the bracket of 1 to 1.5 per cent which are high against the

international benchmark of 0.3 per cent.”

The company attained better level of performance

and consequently achieved a gradual reduction in AT&C

losses. These are visible from Figure 1. On September

30, 2004, the AT&C loss stood reduced from 53 to 41.3

per cent which meant a reduction of about 12 per cent

in a period of 27 months from the takeover. A reduction

of one per cent in AT&C loss roughly translated to a

corresponding gain in company’s additional revenue to

the tune of at least Rs. 220 million. The steps taken

towards reducing this loss included: energy audit of the

distribution network, rationalization and updating of

billing database, installation of low tensionless systems

in theft-prone areas, replacement of faulty meters, and

aggressive enforcement activities. The company became

cash-sufficient too. It expected to better the target of loss


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Figure 1: Twelve-month Rolling AT&C Loss at NDPL

reduction in the financial year 2004-05.

Speaking of the change progress on HR front,

Sardana observed:

Our biggest achievement so far is that we have

been able to secure our right to govern vis-à-

vis our employees covered under the DVB

scheme. This category of employees has no fear

psychosis about the new milieu in which they

would be working. Yet, the environment is one

of accountability. We have also been able to

institutionalize the concept of what the con-

sumer wants from us; this is surely the first step

in our working towards the consumer affection.

The union cooperation could be secured through

our transparent attitude to collective concerns

of people, our belief in their right to play their

role, and our decision to take on issues head-

on rather than avoiding or suppressing them.Sardana continuously interacted with Delhi politi-

cians with a view to changing their attitude towards

issues in the Delhi power sector. While commenting on

the progress towards this goal, he remarked: “Each

member of the legislative assembly (MLA) of Delhi is

regularly invited to have lunch with our team. Politi-

cians have realized the need for radical reforms in this

sector. When we ask them to allow us to manage our

commercial concerns as per the demands of an enter-

prise, they tell us to give them more time rather than

rejecting our demands outright.”

Table 3 presents the company’s performance since

takeover on several parameters. Also, in the year 2003-

04, it earned a net profit after tax of Rs. 292.9 million

compared to Rs. 222.1 million for the year 2002-03. NDPL

got a better media response of its performance than had

been the case with the two BSES companies operating

in the remaining parts of Delhi.

And, in a recent survey of power consumers by the

media, 57 per cent respondents felt that the three Discoms

had improved power supply in Delhi. But, 80 per cent

of them felt that the meters used by them were not

working properly. Sixty-five per cent respondents opined

Table 3: Improvement in Power Supply Position sinceJuly 2002

Parameter On FY Q1 FYTakeover 2003-04 2004-05

Reliability index (%) 98.5 99.57 99.61

No. of transformer failureper annum

584 248 37

Capacitor availability (MVAR) 252 506 669

Mean time taken to repair cablefaults (days)

11 7 2

No. of supply complaints receivedper day at call centre

8,000 2,578 2,419

Load-shedding share in Delhi (%) 40 17 6

Street lights in working condition (%) < 50 > 80 99


144



that their main problem was the faster running of the

new electronic meters. However, a majority of them were

satisfied with the system of consumer grievance redressal

provided by the Discoms. The case writers talked to a

cross-section of the DVB-scheme employees about how

they felt working for NDPL. They considered Sardana

as a highly competent CEO. While comparing their as-

sociation as employees with DVB and NDPL, they couldnot pin-point any specific reason to be excited about

working for NDPL.

Comparatively speaking, the media had reported

that NDPL fared much better than BSES. Some of the

excerpts from reports in the leading Indian newspapers

reflecting the performance of these companies included

the following: “Dikshit (Chief Minister of Delhi) ap-

peared not too pleased with the performance of the BSES

which supplies power to most of the city but praised

NDPL for its work. NDPL is doing extremely well, be

it with regard to metering, service to consumers or

recovery of dues” (Indian Express, December 16, 2004);

“…Sheila Dikshit seems to have genuine reasons for

being upset with BSES…the areas under the Tata-Power-

managed NDPL are fast emerging as islands of quality

and reliable power supply in the capital…Last year, 64

per cent of the power cuts were because of BSES, while

19 per cent were because of Delhi Transco, and 17 per

cent due to fault at the level of NDPL…while billing

errors are rare in NDPL, they are massive in BSES” (The

Hindu, May 22, 2004); “Reliance Discoms spent peanutson Network: DERC” (Financial Express, May 12, 2004);

“CM praises NDPL work” ( Asian Age , December 16,

2004). It was widely believed in and outside NDPL that

some of the key factors responsible for major differences

in the performance of BSES and NDPL included the Tata

culture and the leadership of Sardana. The former com-

pany had changed four CEOs in the last 18 months but

NDPL could retain Sardana to carry out its transforma-

tional agenda.

CHALLENGES AND LOOKING AHEAD

While Sardana looked back at the progress made on

various fronts, he was cautious not to feel complacent.

He was well aware of some of the challenges lying ahead

of him. Reliability of power supply had not been achieved.

Only about 30 per cent of the equipments had been

changed; 70 per cent was still old. Its anti-theft drive

against the power thieves was not fully effective. The

company was looking forward to drawing clearer plans

that helped sustain and catalyze the efforts in terms of

framing a long-term roadmap. But, something that it felt

was critical was the need to change the mindset of the

Delhi power consumers, a large number of whom were

used to consuming power for 50 years without paying

adequately for it; and changing the attitude and skill

levels of a large number of DVB-scheme employees. A

union office-bearer thought that employees remainedfearful of losing their jobs in the new scenario despite

the security provided to them by the tripartite agreement

signed at the time of acquisition. The nexus between the

power thieves and the political configurations was seen

as quite strong and breaking its steel-frame a complex

task. NDPL had made a far higher capital investment

in the infrastructure than its competitor BSES. It was to

be seen whether that was the right way of facing the

challenges. The media reported that the two BSES Dis-

coms were to spend Rs. 7 billion on the infrastructure

but had actually spent only Rs. 1.47 billion till March

31, 2004. On the contrary, NDPL made a capital expend-

iture of Rs. 2.88 billion against Rs. 2.87 billion that the

Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC) had

required it to invest till this period. Despite the above-

mentioned performance indicators, Sardana felt that it

was a great challenge for NDPL “to make the Delhi

Government openly acknowledge that NDPL has per-

formed far better than BSES.”

NDPL had not yet got 100 per cent loyalty of its

people. The administration in the zonal offices was stillfar from satisfactory. Commenting on the change of

mindsets that had taken place, one of the GMs observed:

“We have been able to acclimatize about 50 per cent

employees into the NDPL ethos; about 30 per cent are

fence-sitters; and about 20 per cent have not changed

at all.” On being asked the same question, an HR manager

remarked: “In my opinion, only 40 per cent of the DVB-

scheme employees were fully acclimatized, 50 per cent

had partially changed, and 10 per cent had not changed

at all. These 10 per cent employees have no fear at all

as they have the union’s support.” But, the DVB-schemeemployees were not believed to be less competent. An

operations manager considered a large number of them

as “far more intelligent and competent than the new

employees of NDPL.” While elaborating on some of the

challenges that NDPL faced, Sardana observed: “We

have not been able to enforce a sense of responsibility

amongst the consumers.” Another manager remarked

that while 95 employees knew Sardana, not more than


145



60 per cent knew the General Managers. The authors’

interaction with some of the employees at the field level

revealed that they still had no idea of the company’s

vision and mission. Of course, they could read it on the

wall hangings. The training imparted could have fo-

cused more on functional capability. The incompatibility

between the fast-track NDPL-scheme employee and the

old DVB-scheme Junior Engineer was worrying themanagers in Operations and Maintenance Department.

A recent survey undertaken by AC Nielsen revealed:

“Employees were involved in tampering of meters of

consumers and also their own meters at their homes.

While the employee behaviour has improved for the

better, the contractors’ staff should also be trained and

subjected to behaviour modification exercises.”

The company planned to bring about substantial

increase in its performance by regulating power supply

and feeders. Considerable investment was required for

this. Many policy decisions had to be taken. Sardana was

deliberating on many other questions: What would

happen in 2007 when the five-year subsidy contract

between the Delhi Government and the three Discomswas going to be over? Where would NDPL then stand

in competitive reckoning? What roadmap should the

company draw and focus upon so as to march towards

its vision? He was searching for possible directions that

he and his team would adopt so as to move ahead with

greater speed and vigour.

Acknowledgement • The authors thank Professor C P Shrimali,

Chairperson––HRM Area at MDI, Gurgaon, for his help in

introduction to NDPL; Pratish Thakur, Rajgopalan, and Vimal

Ojha, students of MDI National Management Programme,

Gurgaon, for their assistance in coordinating the initial case

construction process; and Professor Mukesh Chaturvedi of

MDI, Gurgaon, for his insightful comments on the earlier

drafts.

Debi S Saini, Ph.D. (Delhi) is Professor of HRM at Management

Development Institute (MDI), Gurgaon. He has authored oredited seven books including Change Champion’s Field Guide

(Editors: Dave Ulrich, Louis Carter, Marshall Goldsmith, and

Debi S Saini) published by Excel, New Delhi, 2005. He is

the author of a book-size volume on “Social Security Law:

India,” which forms part of the International Encyclopaedia

of Laws (Kluwer Law International, The Hague). He has also

authored 46 papers and management cases in the area of

HRM, change management, labour relations, and employment

law. He is the Editor of Vision––The Journal of Business

Perspective, the journal of MDI. Among others, he has been

on the Editorial Board of Industrial Relations Journal , Blackwell,

Oxford (1998-2002). He has been invited to chair sessionsand make presentations in a large number of workshops,

seminars, and MDPs in India and abroad. Among others, he

has done consultancy assignments for ILO and GTZ (Germany).

He is on the Board of the Best Practice Institute, Boston, USA,

as well as on the Advisory Board of the Society for Leadership

of Change, Huntersville, USA.

e-mail: [email protected]

Jyotsna Bhatnagar (Ph.D., IIT, Delhi) is Assistant Professor of

HRM at Management Development Institute, Gurgaon. She

launched her academic career at IIM, Ahmedabad in 1990

and has over ten years of experience in teaching, research,

and training. She has published around 40 papers in national

and international journals including International Journal of

HRM, Journal of Labour Research, Asia-Pacific Business

Review, HRD International, Vikalpa, Management and Labour

Studies among others. She has been invited to provide training

on HR issues to IAS officers and defence officers, managers

of American Express, ONGC, PGCIL, ABB, BEL, NTPC, IOCL,

etc. She has also been invited to present papers in international

conferences including at the Knowledge Management

Conference at Amsterdam, the Netherlands (2000); European

Academy of HRD (UK, 2004, ’03, ‘02), Asian Academy of

HRD (Bangkok, 2003), European Consortium for the Learning

Organization (Birmingham, UK, 2005), and APROS 11

Conference (Melbourne, Australia, 2005). She is an activeconsultant in competency mapping and talent management

in India.

e-mail:[email protected]


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