Assignment #1

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G.R. No. L-62339 October 27, 1983SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA,petitioners,vs.SPOUSES VICTOR GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI,respondents.Amado G. Olis for petitioners.Paul G. Gorres for private respondents.ESCOLIN.,J.:In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court is called upon to determine the classes of actions which fall within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1508,1otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law. This law requires the compulsory process of arbitration at the Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, Petitioners contend that said legislation is so broad and all-embracing as to apply to actions cognizable not only by the city and municipal courts, now known as the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts, but also by the courts of first instance, now the regional trial courts. Upon the other hand, respondents would limit its coverage only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts.The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-22154.On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by private respondents.On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order dated October 3, 1982, as follows:Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal Courts in the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of P.D. No. 1508, as the Courts to which the dispute settled or arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat, shall be elevated for nullification of the award or for execution of the same, and considering that from the provision of Section 14 of the same law, the pre- condition to the filing of a complaint as provided for in Section 6 thereof, is specifically referred to, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the provision of Section 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11 and 12 of the law.In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants, of the order of September 2. 1982, denying their motion to dismiss, is hereby denied. [Annex 'G', p. 36, Rollo].From this order, petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a resolution dated December 2, 1982, We required respondents to file an answer, and likewise granted a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge from requiring petitioners to file their answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-22154.We find the petition impressed with merit. Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:[1] Where the accused is under detention;[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of LimitationsSection 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to which usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law does not distinguish, We should not distinguish.2By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the time-honored tradition of amicably settling disputes among family and barangay level without judicial resources would promote the speedy administration of justice and implement the constitutional mandate to preserve and develop Filipino culture and to strengthen the family as a basic social institution;WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of justice contributes heavily and unjustifiably to the congestion of court dockets, thus causing a deterioration in the quality of justice;WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket congestion and thereby enhance the quality of justice dispensed by the courts, it is deemed desirable to formally organize and institutionalize a system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level.There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, ... ," its obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the following rule on Venue, to wit:Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the Barangay where the real property or and part thereof is situated.for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically, jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer cases, has always been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial court].But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11,312,4and 14,5of the law speak of the city and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. We hold that this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the Lupon. As heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando,6the full text of which is quoted as follows:TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURTSUBJECT: Implementation of theKatarungang Pambarangay Law.Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as theKatarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons.Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro is to that extent modified.This Circular takes effect immediately.It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trial courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all government offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all government officials and offices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]."Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of respondent judge denying petitioners' motion to dismiss is hereby set aside. Respondent judge is restrained from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss the case. No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167261 March 2, 2007ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET,Petitioner,vs.CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of LEONCIO MANACNES and FLORENTINA MANACNES,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019, dated 9 February 2005, which reversed and set aside the Judgment2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and reinstated the Resolution3of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province dismissing herein petitioners action for Enforcement of Arbitration Award and Damages.The instant petition draws its origin from an Action4for recovery of possession of real property situated in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada filed by herein petitioner before the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province on 9 November 1994, against the spouses Leoncio and Florentina Manacnes, the predecessors-in-interest of herein respondent.On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their respective counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon (Lupon) of Dagdag, Sagada for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.5Consequently, the proceedings before the MCTC were suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution.6Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and their insistence that the case should go to court. On 8 March 1995, the Certification, as well as the records of the case, were forwarded to the MCTC.An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter for conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award thereon. According to the MCTC, based on the records of the case, an Agreement for Arbitration was executed by the parties concerned; however, the Lupon failed to issue an Arbitration Award as provided under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, so that, the case must be returned to the Lupon until an Arbitration Award is rendered.In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award on 10 May 1995 ordering herein petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the spouses Manacnes of the amount ofP8,000.00 for the improvements on the land. Aggrieved, Leoncios widow,7Florentina Manacnes, repudiated the Arbitration Award but her repudiation was rejected by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC was furnished with copies of the Arbitration Award.On 1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the Arbitration Award. On the other hand, Florentina Manacnes filed a Motion with the MCTC for the resumption of the proceedings in the original case for recovery of possession and praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation of the Arbitration Award issued by the Lupon.Subsequently, the MCTC heard the Motion of Florentina Manacnes notwithstanding the latters failure to appear before the court despite notice. The MCTC denied Florentina Manacnes Motion to repudiate the Arbitration Award elucidating that since the movant failed to take any action within the 10-day reglementary period provided for under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the arbitration award has become final and executory. Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC issued an Order remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the execution of the Arbitration Award. On 31 August 1995, the then incumbent Punong Barangay of Dagdag issued a Notice of Execution of the Award.Said Notice of Execution was never implemented. Thus, on 16 October 2001, herein petitioner Pang-et filed with the MCTC an action for enforcement of the Arbitration Award which was sought to be dismissed by the heir of the Manacnes spouses.8The heir of the Manacnes spouses argues that the Agreement for Arbitration and the Arbitration Award are void, the Agreement for Arbitration not having been personally signed by the spouses Manacnes, and the Arbitration Award having been written in English a language not understood by the parties.In its Resolution dated 20 August 2002, the MCTC dismissed the Petition for Enforcement of Arbitration Award in this wise:x x x Are defendants estopped from questioning the proceedings before the Lupon Tagapamayapa concerned?The defendants having put in issue the validity of the proceedings before the lupon concerned and the products thereof, they are not estopped. It is a hornbook rule that a null and void act could always be questioned at any time as the action or defense based upon it is imprescriptible.The second issue: Is the agreement to Arbitrate null and void? Let us peruse the pertinent law dealing on this matter which is Section 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), to wit:"Section 413 (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. x x x"The foregoing should be taken together with Section 415 of the same code which provides:"Section 415. Appearance of parties in person. In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers."It is very clear from the foregoing that personal appearance of the parties in conciliation proceedings before a Lupon Tagapamayapa is mandatory. Likewise, the execution of the agreement to arbitrate must be done personally by the parties themselves so that they themselves are mandated to sign the agreement.Unfortunately, in this case, it was not respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed the agreement to arbitrate as plaintiff herself admitted but another person. Thus, it is very clear that the mandatory provisos of Section 413 and 415 of RA 7160 are violated. Granting arguendo that it was Catherine who signed the agreement per instruction of her parents, will it cure the violation? The answer must still be in the negative. As provided for by the cited provisos of RA 7160, if ever a party is entitled to an assistance, it shall be done only when the party concerned is a minor or incompetent. Here, there is no showing that the spouses [Manacnis] were incompetent. Perhaps very old but not incompetent. Likewise, what the law provides is assistance, not signing of agreements or settlements.Just suppose the spouses [Manacnis] executed a special power of attorney in favor of their daughter Catherine to attend the proceedings and to sign the agreement to arbitrate? The more that it is proscribed by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law specifically Section 415 of RA 7160 which mandates the personal appearance of the parties before the lupon and likewise prohibits the appearance of representatives.In view of the foregoing, it could now be safely concluded that the questioned agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious for being violative of the mandatory provisions of RA 7160 particularly sections 413 and 415 thereof as it was not the respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed it.The third issue: Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced effective? Much to be desired, the natural flow of events must follow as a consequence. Considering that the agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious as earlier declared, it follows that the arbitration award which emanated from it is also inefficacious. Further, the Arbitration Award by itself, granting arguendo that the agreement to arbitrate is valid, will readily show that it does not also conform with the mandate of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law particularly Section 411 thereto which provides:"Sec. 411. Form of Settlement All amicable settlements shall be in writing in a language or dialect known to the parties x x x. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the settlement shall be written in the language known to them."Likewise, the implementing rules thereof, particularly Section 13 provides:"Sec. 13 Form of Settlement and Award. All settlements, whether by mediation, conciliation or arbitration, shall be in writing, in a language or dialect known to the parties. x x x"It is of no dispute that the parties concerned belong to and are natives of the scenic and serene community of Sagada, Mt. Province who speak the Kankanaey language. Thus, the Arbitration Award should have been written in the Kankanaey language. However, as shown by the Arbitration Award, it is written in English language which the parties do not speak and therefore a further violation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.IN THE LIGHT of all the foregoing considerations, the above-entitled case is hereby dismissed.9Petitioner Pang-ets Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she filed an Appeal before the RTC which reversed and set aside the Resolution of the MCTC and remanded the case to the MCTC for further proceedings. According to the RTC:As it appears on its face, the Agreement for Arbitration in point found on page 51 of the expediente, dated Feb. 6, 1995, and attested by the Pangkat Chairman of the Office of the Barangay Lupon of Dagdag, Sagada was signed by the respondents/defendants spouses Manacnis. The representative of the Appellee in the instant case assails such Agreement claiming that the signatures of her aforesaid predecessors-in-interest therein were not personally affixed by the latter or are falsified-which in effect is an attack on the validity of the document on the ground that the consent of the defendants spouses Manacnis is vitiated by fraud. Indulging the Appellee Heirs of Manacnis its contention that such indeed is the truth of the matter, the fact still remains as borne out by the circumstances, that neither did said original defendants nor did any of such heirs effectively repudiate the Agreement in question in accordance with the procedure outlined by the law, within five (5) days from Feb. 6, 1995, on the ground as above-stated (Secs. 413 (a), 418, RA 7160; Secs. 7, 13, KP Law; Sec. 12, Rule IV, KP Rules). As mandated, such failure is deemed a waiver on the part of the defendants spouses Manacnis to challenge the Agreement for Arbitration on the ground that their consent thereto is obtained and vitiated by fraud (Sec. 12, Par. 3, KP Rules). Corollarily, the Appellee Heirs being privy to the now deceased original defendants should have not been permitted by the court a quo under the equitable principle of estoppel, to raise the matter in issue for the first time in the present case (Lopez vs. Ochoa, 103 Phil. 94).The Arbitration Award relative to Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) dated May 10, 1995, written in English, attested by the Punong Barangay of Dagdag and found on page 4 of the record is likewise assailed by the Appellee as void on the ground that the English language is not known by the defendants spouses Manacnis who are Igorots. Said Appellee contends that the document should have been written in Kankana-ey, the dialect known to the party (Sec. 413 (b), RA 7160; Sec. 7, Par. 2, KP law, Sec. 11, KP Rules). On this score, the court a quo presumptuously concluded on the basis of the self-serving mere say-so of the representative of the Appellee that her predecessors did not speak or understand English. As a matter of judicial notice, American Episcopalian Missionaries had been in Sagada, Mountain Province as early as 1902 and continuously stayed in the place by turns, co-mingling with the indigenous people thereat, instructing and educating them, and converting most to the Christian faith, among other things, until the former left about twenty years ago. By constant association with the white folks, the natives too old to go to school somehow learned the Kings English by ear and can effectively speak and communicate in that language. Any which way, even granting arguendo that the defendants spouses Manacnis were the exceptions and indeed totally ignorant of English, no petition to nullify the Arbitration award in issue on such ground as advanced was filed by the party or any of the Appellee Heirs with the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, within ten (10) days from May 10, 1995, the date of the document. Thus, upon the expiration thereof, the Arbitration Award acquired the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 416, RA 7160; Sec. 11, KP Law; Sec. 13, KP Rules); conclusive upon the original defendants in Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) and the Appellee Heirs herein privy to said defendants.In the light thereof, the collateral attack of the Appellee on the Agreement for Arbitration and Arbitration Award re Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) should not have in the first place been given due course by the court a quo. In which case, it would not have in the logical flow of things declared both documents "inefficacious"; without which pronouncements, said court would not have dismissed the case at bar.Wherefore, Judgment is hereby rendered Reversing and Setting Aside the Resolution appealed from, and ordering the record of the case subject thereof remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.10Aggrieved by the reversal of the RTC, herein respondent filed a petition before the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC Judgment. On 9 February 2005, the appellate court rendered the herein assailed Decision, to wit:After thoroughly reviewing through the record, We find nothing that would show that the spouses Manacnes were ever amenable to any compromise with respondent Pang-et. Thus, We are at a loss as to the basis of the Arbitration Award sought to be enforced by respondent Pang-ets subsequent action before the MCTC.There is no dispute that the proceeding in Civil Case No. 83 was suspended and the same remanded to the Lupon on account of the Agreement to Arbitrate which was allegedly not signed by the parties but agreed upon by their respective counsels during the pre-trial conference. In the meeting before the Lupon, it would seem that the agreement to arbitrate was not signed by the spouses Manacnes. More importantly, when the pangkat chairman asked the spouses Manacnes to sign or affix their thumbmarks in the agreement, they refused and insisted that the case should instead go to court. Thus, the Lupon had no other recourse but to issue a certificate to file action. Unfortunately, the case was again remanded to the Lupon to "render an arbitration award". This time, the Lupon heard the voice tape of the late Beket Padonay affirming respondent Pang-ets right to the disputed property. While Pang-et offered to payP8,000.00 for the improvements made by the spouses Manacnes, the latter refused to accept the same and insisted on their right to the subject property. Despite this, the Lupon on May 10, 1995 issued an Arbitration award which favored respondent Pang-et.From the time the case was first referred to the Lupon to the time the same was again remanded to it, the Spouses Manacnes remained firm in not entering into any compromise with respondent Pang-et. This was made clear in both the minutes of the Arbitration Hearing on 26 February 1995 and on 9 April 1995. With the foregoing, We find it evident that the spouses Manacnes never intended to submit the case for arbitration.Moreover, the award itself is riddled with flaws. First of all there is no showing that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was duly constituted in accordance with Rule V of the Katarungan Pambarangay Rules. And after constituting of the Pangkat, Rule VI, thereof the Punong Barangay and the Pangkat must proceed to hear the case. However, according to the minutes of the hearing before the lupon on 9 April 1995, the pangkat Chairman and another pangkat member were absent for the hearing.Finally, Section 13 of the same Rule requires that the Punong Barangay or the Pangkat Chairman should attest that parties freely and voluntarily agreed to the settlement arrived at. But how can this be possible when the minutes of the two hearings show that the spouses Manacnes neither freely nor voluntarily agreed to anything.While RA 7160 and the Katarungan Pambarangay rules provide for a period to repudiate the Arbitration Award, the same is neither applicable nor necessary since the Agreement to Arbitrate or the Arbitration Award were never freely nor voluntarily entered into by one of the parties to the dispute. In short, there is no agreement validly concluded that needs to be repudiated.With all the foregoing, estoppel may not be applied against petitioners for an action or defense against a null and void act does not prescribe. With this, We cannot but agree with the MCTC that the very agreement to arbitrate is null and void. Similarly, the arbitration award which was but the off shoot of the agreement is also void.WHEREFORE, the RTC judgment of 2 June 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the MCTC Resolution DISMISSING the Civil Case No. 118 for enforcement of Arbitration Award is REINSTATED.11Vehemently disagreeing with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner Pang-et filed the instant petition. Petitioner maintains that the appellate court overlooked material facts that resulted in reversible errors in the assailed Decision. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the original parties, as represented by their respective counsels in Civil Case No. 83, mutually agreed to submit the case for arbitration by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dagdag. Petitioner insists that the parties must be bound by the initial agreement by their counsels during pre-trial to an amicable settlement as any representation made by the lawyers are deemed made with the conformity of their clients. Furthermore, petitioner maintains that if indeed the spouses Manacnes did not want to enter into an amicable settlement, then they should have raised their opposition at the first instance, which was at the pre-trial on Civil Case No. 83 when the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for arbitration.We do not agree with the petitioner.First and foremost, in order to resolve the case before us, it is pivotal to stress that, during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, the spouses Manacnes declined to sign the Agreement for Arbitration and were adamant that the proceedings before the MCTC in Civil Case No. 83 must continue. As reflected in the Minutes12of the Arbitration Hearing held on 26 February 1995, the legality of the signature of Catherine Manacnes, daughter of the Manacnes spouses, who signed the Agreement for Arbitration on behalf of her parents, was assailed on the ground that it should be the spouses Manacnes themselves who should have signed such agreement. To resolve the issue, the Pangkat Chairman then asked the spouses Manacnes that if they wanted the arbitration proceedings to continue, they must signify their intention in the Agreement for Arbitration form. However, as stated earlier, the Manacnes spouses did not want to sign such agreement and instead insisted that the case go to court.Consequently, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses. Indicated in said Certification are the following: 1) that there was personal confrontation between the parties before the Punong Barangay but conciliation failed and 2) that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was constituted but the personal confrontation before the Pangkat failed likewise because respondents do not want to submit this case for arbitration and insist that said case will go to court.13Nevertheless, upon receipt of said certification and the records of the case, the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and for the latter to render an arbitration award, explaining that:Going over the documents submitted to the court by the office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Dagdag, Sagada, Mountain Province, the court observed that an "Agreement for Arbitration" was executed by the parties anent the above-entitled case. However, said Lupon did not make any arbitration award as mandated by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law but instead made a finding that the case may now be brought to the court. This is violative of the KP Law, which cannot be sanctioned by the court.14At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties.15Through this mechanism, the parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without enduring the rigors of court litigation. Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to settle their controversy during the barangay proceedings before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to instead find recourse in the courts16in the event that no true compromise is reached.The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a final judgment of a court.17Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the MCTC further remanded the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that the arbitration proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the controversy for arbitration.It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for arbitration to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the parties to submit the case for arbitration until an arbitration award is rendered by the Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the very nature of the proceedings under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law which espouses the principle of voluntary acquiescence of the disputing parties to amicable settlement.What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be a confrontation between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that a certification be issued that no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a case falling within the authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication.18In other words, the only necessary pre-condition before any case falling within the authority of the Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a court is that there has been personal confrontation between the parties but despite earnest efforts to conciliate, there was a failure to amicably settle the dispute. It should be emphasized that while the spouses Manacnes appeared before the Lupon during the initial hearing for the conciliation proceedings, they refused to sign the Agreement for Arbitration form, which would have signified their consent to submit the case for arbitration. Therefore, upon certification by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that the confrontation before the Pangkat failed because the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the case for arbitration and insisted that the case should go to court, the MCTC should have continued with the proceedings in the case for recovery of possession which it suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable resolution of the case through arbitration before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa.Petitioners assertion that the parties must be bound by their respective counsels agreement to submit the case for arbitration and thereafter enter into an amicable settlement is imprecise. What was agreed to by the parties respective counsels was the remand of the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for conciliation proceedings and not the actual amicable settlement of the case. As stated earlier, the parties may only be compelled to appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary confrontation, but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at bar, to sign the Agreement for Arbitration. Thus, when the Manacnes spouses personally appeared during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, they had already complied with the agreement during the pre-trial to submit the case for conciliation proceedings. Their presence during said hearing is already their acquiescence to the order of the MCTC remanding the case to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings, as there has been an actual confrontation between the parties despite the fact that no amicable settlement was reached due to the spouses Manacnes refusal to sign the Agreement for Arbitration.Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa to render an arbitration award upon the refusal of the spouses Manacnes to submit the case for arbitration since such arbitration award will not bind the spouses. As reflected in Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in order that a party may be bound by an arbitration award, said party must have agreed in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any other contract, parties who have not signed an agreement to arbitrate will not be bound by said agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it.19In view of the fact that upon verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to settle the issue of whether or not they intend to submit the matter for arbitration, the spouses Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb mark on the Agreement for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement for Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since they never became privy to any agreement submitting the case for arbitration by the Pangkat.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 83 for Recovery of Possession of Real Property, and the immediate resolution of the same with deliberate dispatch. No costs.SO ORDERED.

DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by REYMEL R. SAGARIO,Petitioner,-versus-MARILOU M. PASCUAL,Respondent.G.R. No. 157830Present:PANGANIBAN,Chairman,SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,*CORONA,CARPIO MORALES, andGARCIA,JJ.Promulgated:November 17, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the February 10, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 23 at Roxas dismissing, on motion of herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual, the complaint filed against her by her brother-herein petitioner Dante M. Pascual, represented by his attorney-in-fact Reymel R. Sagario (Sagario), for non-compliance with the conciliation provision-pre condition to filing of complaint in court under R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code).Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario as his attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10, 2002:1. To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271656 issued in the name of Marilou M. Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale of Registered Land (Dec. No. 639; Page No. 52; Book No. XXI; Series of 1994) and/or Reconveyance at the appropriate court;2. To collect the monthly rentals from the tenant;3. To enter into amicable settlement with Marilou M. Pascual or any other mode of payment/and/or dispute resolution;4. To execute and sign any and all papers, contracts/documents which may be necessary relative to the above acts.x x x[1]Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 before the Isabela RTC at Roxas a complaint entitledDante M. Pascual, plaintiff v. Marilou M. Pascual and Register of Deeds, Defendants, docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-713-02, for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271657 of Isabela and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages.[2]To the Complaint the defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion to Dismiss[3]on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code,[4]she contending that there is no showing that the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was filed in court.By the assailed Order of February 10, 2003,[5]Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC at Roxas granted respondents Motion to Dismiss in this wise:. . . RA 7160 repealing P.D. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay provides under Section 409 All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated. Hence, the reliance of the plaintiff on Section 408 of R.A. 7160 is incorrect. When real property or any interest therein is involved,the dispute shall be filed before the barangay where the property is located,regardless of the residence of the parties. Besides, it is incorrect to say that the parties are not residents of the same place, Vira, Roxas, Isabela.The Attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff in the person of Reymel R. Sagario is a resident of Vira, Roxas, Isabela, and he substitute(sic)Dante Pascual by virtue of said Special Power of Attorney. Hence, said Attorney-in-fact should have brought the dispute before barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela, where the property is located. In the case of Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 127 SCRA 470, Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity.[6](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[7]of the above-said order was denied by Order of March 24, 2003:[8]x x xConsequently, the Court is [of] the opinion that the saidAttorney-in-fact shall be deemed to be the real party in interest, reading from the tenor of the provisions of the Special Power of Attorney.Being a real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact is therefore obliged to bring this case first before the Barangay Court. Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest.x x xBeing the real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact may therefore bring the necessary complaint before the Lupon Tagapayapa andappear in person as if he is the owner of the land.[9](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Hence, the present petition questioning the palpable legal errors of the RTC.Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party in interest, and since he actually resides abroad, theluponwould have no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real property, he citingAgbayani v. Belen.[10]Respondent submits, on the other hand, that Section 408, paragraph (f), of the Local Government Code, is qualified by paragraph (c) of Section 409 of the same Code the latter of which provides that [a]ll disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property is located, hence, the use of the word shall makes it mandatory for the bringing of the dispute before thelupon.That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of hers, respondent argues in any event, brings the matter under the jurisdiction of thelupon, for Sagario, following Section 3 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:Sec. 3.Representative as parties. -Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal,being a substitute, becomes the real party-in-interest.Respondents submissions do not lie.The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read:SEC. 408.Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the partiesactually residingin the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; and(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial,motu propriorefer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement. (Emphasis supplied)SEC. 409.Venue.(a) Disputes between personsactually residingin the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay .(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding. (Emphasis supplied)In the 1982 case ofTavora v. Veloso,[11]this Court held that where the parties are notactual residentsin the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to theluponas provided for in Section 6vis a visSections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang PambarangayLaw).[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes wherethepartiesare notactualresidentsof the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other. (Underscoring supplied)In the 2000 case ofVercide v. Hernandez,[12]this Court, noting that theTavoraruling, reiterated in other cases including the 1996 case ofAgbayani[13]cited by petitioner, was decided under the provisions of P.D. No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay)Law which were, except for some modifications, echoed in Sections 408-409 of the Local Government Code which took effect on January 1, 1992, held that theTavoraruling remained.To construe the express statutory requirement ofactualresidencyas applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a real party in interest as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3[14]of the 1997 Rules of Courtvis a visSection 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by respondent.In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner,the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the localluponhas no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioners complaint.WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed February 10, 2003 Order, as well as the March 24, 2003 Order denying reconsideration of the first, of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela at Roxas isSET ASIDE. Said court is accordingly directed to reinstate Civil Case No. 23-713-02 to its docket and take appropriate action thereon with dispatch.SO ORDERED.

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, A.C. No. 6296 Complainant,Present: PANGANIBAN,J.,Chairman- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES and GARCIA,JJ. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA,Promulgated: Respondent. November 22, 2005x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xR E S O L U T I O NGARCIA,J.:In hersworncomplaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styledSumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos. Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before thePunong Barangay,acted as Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what complainant said in her complaint:[2]5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject matter of the complaint. A heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos said that [complainants brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to the barangay hall to have the incident recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex A 6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing also with the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the complainant because only her statements were recorded for which reason, marginal insertions were made to include what [respondent] wanted to be put on record. She also signed as saksi in the minutes . 7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the Punong Barangay dated December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family, a copy of the letter is attached as Annex C . . . . (Words in bracket added.) In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice, her answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be considered as in default.[3] The case, docketed asCBD No. 03-1061,was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due time.[4] In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of thePunong Barangay,instead of before theLupong Tagapamayapa,and heard byPunong BarangayBonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegialLuponor a conciliation panel known aspangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client inkatarungan pambarangayproceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact. In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5]Commissioner Maala stated that the charge of complainant has been established by clear preponderance of evidence and, on that basis, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession for a period of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory finding of the investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235,[6]a lighter penalty, to wit: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,with modification, and considering respondent's actuations was in violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence and representation by lawyers in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is herebyADMONISHED. This resolution is now before us for confirmation. Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subjectKatarungang Pambarangay, provides: Section 415.Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangayproceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties inkatarungan pambarangayconciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable theluponto secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues,[8]the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.[9] Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case. The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed herSumbongto the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote herSumbongwith the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed herSumbongto the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs theLupong Tagapamayapa.[10] Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to allkatarungan barangayproceedings. Section 412(a)[11]the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before theluponchairman or theluponorpangkat. As what happened in this case, thepunong barangay, as chairman of theLupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two parties. Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose of thekatarunganpambarangay system. What compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her continued appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is herebyFINEDin the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code of 1991 withWARNINGthat commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983.]

PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO,Petitioner, v. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY, Municipality/City Trial Court of Cebu City, and ATTY. RICARDO REYES,Respondents.

Antonio T. Uy forPetitioner.

Numeriano G. Estenzo forRespondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; ACTION NOT BARRED IN THE CASE AT BAR. Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and this period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de Laureano, 18 SCRA 116, Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, Development Bank of the Philippines v. Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197) In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9) months-ample time indeed- within which to bring his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF P.D. No. 1508; CONSTRUED. Under Section 4(a) of PD 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; REFERRAL TO BARANGAY LUPON, NOT REQUIRED. In Civil Case No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. while it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

D E C I S I O N

ESCOLIN,J.:

Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.

The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building bearing the deceaseds name, located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased and occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00 payable in advance within the first five days of the month.

On August 28, 1982, private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate and a resident of Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals corresponding to the period from March to September 1982, and thereafter to vacate the premises. As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted on September 16, 1982 an ejectment case against the former in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-23915 and assigned to the sala of respondent judge.

On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among others, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court. Pointing out that the parties are residents of the same city, as alleged in the complaint, petitioner contended that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondent Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court, as required by PD No. 1508, otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. He justified the order in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. That from the acceptance from (sic) filing, with the plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that the case was docketed in the civil division of this court could be considered as meeting the requirement or precondition for were it not so, the Clerk of Court would not have accepted the filing of the case especially that there is a standing circular from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court without even mentioning the Letter of Instruction of the President of the Philippines that civil cases and criminal cases with certain exceptions must not be filed without passing the barangay court." (Order dated December 14, 1982, Annex "c", P. 13, Rollo).

Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court through this petition forcertiorari. In both his comment and memorandum, private respondent admitted not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation process, but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4, section 6 of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations, as applying to the case at bar.

The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, 1 and this period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. 2

In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, 3 the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9) months ample time indeed within which to bring his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.

With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies. For this reason, Circular No. 22 addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on November 9, 1979. Said Circular reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons."cralaw virtua1aw library

While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of December 14, 1982, he nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege compliance with the requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any circumstance as would place the suit outside the operation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in the performance by the clerk of court of his official duty, which to Our mind has been sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by the Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action from the Lupon or Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint. 4

Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." 5 Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered to try and decide Civil Case No. R-23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83907. September 13, 1989.*NAPOLEON GEGARE,petitionervs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS (ELEVENTH DIVISION) AND ARMIE ELMA,respondents.Camilo Cario Dionio, Jr. for petitioner.Cedo, Ferrer & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.GANCAYCO, J.:The familiar story in the Old Testament is of how King Solomon settled the dispute between two women over a child by deciding that the child be cut into two for them to share. The real mother full of love implored that the King not kill the child and give the child to the other woman. The latter asked the King not to give it to either of them and to go on, cut the child into two.This case involves a small piece of land. The decision was to cut it into two between the parties. But the parallel ends there. The petitioner wants the whole lot. Private respondent is happy with his half. This is the impasse that must be resolved.The center of controversy is Lot 5989, Ts-217 with an area of about 270 square meters situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City. This lot was titled in the name of Paulino Elma under Original Certificate of Title No. (P-29947) (P-11503) P-1987 issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of General Santos City and Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-635. A reversion case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Paulino Elma in the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato docketed as Civil Case No. 950, wherein in due course a decision was rendered on January 29, 1973 declaring the title of Paulino Elma null and void and the same was ordered cancelled. The lot was reverted to the mass of public domain subject to disposition and giving preferential right to its actual occupant, Napoleon Gegare.This decision was affirmed by this Court when We dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the heirs of Elma on March 13, 1974 in G.R. No. L-38069. Thereafter, the writ of execution was issued and the title of Elma to the property was cancelled.Both petitioner and private respondent filed an application for this lot in the Board of Liquidators (Board for short) in 1975. On June 15, 1976, Resolution No. 606, Series of 1976 was passed by the Board disposing of the lot in favor of petitioner by way of a negotiated sale in conformity with the decision in Civil Case No. 950. Private respondent protested against the application of petitioner and on August 8, 1978, the Board adopted Resolution No. 611, Series of 1978 denying private respondent's protest for the same reason. A request for reconsideration of private respondent was referred by the Board to Mr. Artemio Garlit, liquidator-designee, General Santos Branch, for verification and investigation. After hearings, Mr. Garlit submitted a report to the Manila office recommending division of the lot to the parties. Nevertheless, on March 13, 1981, the Board denied the protest because the case had already been decided by the court.However, a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was favorably considered by the Board in Resolution No. 233, Series of 1981 dated July 8, 1981. Thus, the Board directed the chief of LASEDECO to investigate the occupancy and area of the lot. In this investigation, it was found that only private respondent was the actual occupant so the LASEDECO chief recommended the division of the property between petitioner and private respondent.On August 14, 1981, the Board passed Resolution No. 272, Series of 1981 approving said recommendation by dividing the lot equally between the parties at 135.5 square meters each to be disposed to them by negotiated sale.Both parties appealed to the Office of the President but in a decision dated March 25, 1984, both appeals were dismissed. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied on May 29,1984.Private respondent paid for the value of 1/2 of the lot and applied for the issuance of a patent. In Resolution No. 185, Series of 1985 adopted on October 7, 1985, the Board gave due course to the application of private respondent and for the issuance of a patent to 1/2 portion of the lot. Petitioner was also advised to file his application and pay for his portion. Thus, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 4261 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-5139 were issued to private respondent.On November 27, 1985, petitioner filed an action for "Annulment and Cancellation of Partition of Lot 5989, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City and Annulment of Resolutions No. 272 and 185 and/or to Declare them Null and Void" against private respondent and the Board. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 3270 in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.On February 11, 1985, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) petitioner has no capacity to sue; (3) petitioner is not a real party-in-interest; and (4) the action is barred by prior judgment. Private respondent added another ground (5) lack of conciliation efforts pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508. The motion was granted in an order dated March 18, 1986.On April 3, 1986, petitioner moved for a reconsideration thereof to which an opposition was filed by private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was granted in an order of April 21, 1986 and private respondent was required to file his responsive pleading. Private respondent filed his answer. On July 10, 1986, private respondent asked for a preliminary hearing of the grounds for the motion to dismiss in his affirmative defenses. This was denied on July 24, 1986.Hence, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals questioning the said orders of the trial court dated April 21, 1986 and July 24, 1986. In due course, a decision was rendered by the appellate court on March 16, 1988 granting the petition, declaring the questioned orders null and void, and directing the trial court to dismiss the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, without pronouncement as to costs. An urgent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated May 31, 1988.1Thus, the herein petition wherein petitioner raises the following issues---FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORTHE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECIDING CA-G.R. SP NO. 12183WITHOUTFIRST SERVING SUMMONS AND A COPY OF THE PETITION TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE SAID CASE (NOW PETITIONER IN THE INSTANT CASE), THUS,DEPRIVINGHIM OF HISCONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORTHE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION OF ARMIE ELMA IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 12183 IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) ORDERS SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION AREINTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE.THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORTHE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 3270.FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORTHE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED CIVIL CASE NO. 3270 FOR FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P.D. NO. 1508 BEFORE FILING HIS COMPLAINT IN COURT.2The petition is devoid of any merit.Under the first assigned error, petitioner alleges that he was not served summons and a copy of the petition so that he was deprived of due process and the respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.Private respondent disputes this claim by showing that it was at the address of petitioner appearing in the petition at Liwayway Disco Restaurant and Disco Pub, Ilang-Ilang Street, General Santos City, where petitioner was served a copy of private respondent's "Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution.3Petitioner's counsel was also served a copy of the resolution dated June 28, 1987,4"Motion for Restraining Order" dated July 28, 1987 and Manifestation dated December 1, 1987.5Indeed, petitioner's counsel filed a motion dated April 4, 1988 seeking a reconsideration of the decision of respondent court6which was denied on May 31, 1988. Obviously, petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the respondent court and was never deprived of due process.7Under the second and third assigned errors, petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in giving due course to the petition that assailed the two orders of the courta quowhich are interlocutory in character and in holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3270.It is precisely to correct the lower court when in the course of proceedings it acts without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or if the trial court judge otherwise acted with grave abuse of discretion that the extraordinary writ of certiorari or prohibition is afforded to parties as a relief. Such writ is available even in respect to interlocutory orders.8The appellate court correctly ruled that courts of justice will not interfere with purely administrative matters rendered by administrative bodies or officials acting within the scope of their power and authority. The discretionary power vested in the proper executive official in the absence of arbitrariness or grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of the courts and is treated with finality.9When Board Resolution No. 272 was passed in 1981, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President. After his appeal was denied on March 26, 1984, he did not file a petition for review in this court. Thus, the said decision became final and it was duly implemented. We agree that when petitioner filed Civil Case No. 3270, the trial court should have refrained from interfering with said administrative disposition of the chief executive absent any showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.Moreover, petitioner had no capacity to file the questioned suit in the lower court. The real party-in-interest who can seek the nullification of the land grant is the government or the state.10Under the fourth and last assigned error, petitioner argues that it was erroneous for the appellate court to hold that the case should be dismissed by the lower court for failure to comply with a provision of Presidential Decree No. 1508 before filing the complaint. He alleges that this rule is not applicable in said case for one of the parties therein is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof which is excepted from this requirement under Section 2 of said law.True it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the petitioner and private respondent who are also contending parties in the case are residents of the same barangay so Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 should apply to them as it provides---Section 6.Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of theLuponas provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before theLuponChairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by theLuponSecretary or thePangkatSecretary attested by theLupon or PangkatChairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences amicably. If the other only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the exception but when it is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other parties.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.SO ORDERED.

EDWIN N. TRIBIANA,petitioner,vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA,respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis petition for review oncertiorari[1]seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals Resolutions[2]dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[3]of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite (RTC), denying petitioner Edwin N. Tribianas (Edwin) motion to dismiss the petition forhabeas corpusfiled against him by respondent Lourdes Tribiana (Lourdes).Antecedent FactsEdwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their union only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition forhabeas corpusbefore the RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (Khriza). Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4) months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwins mother, Rosalina Tribiana (Rosalina). Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss claiming that there were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification to File Action from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwins petition on 2 July 1998. The appellate court also denied Edwins motion for reconsideration.Hence, this petition.The Rulings of the RTC and the Court of AppealsThe RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss on the ground that the Certification to File Action attached by Lourdes to her opposition clearly indicates that the parties attempted to reach a compromise but failed.The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and added that under Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code, conciliation proceedings before the barangay are not required in petitions forhabeas corpus.The IssueEdwin seeks a reversal and raises the following issue for resolution:WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITION PRECEDENT UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.The Ruling of the CourtThe petition lacks merit.Edwin argues that Lourdes failure to indicate in her petition forhabeas corpusthat the parties exerted prior efforts to reach a compromise and that such efforts failed is a ground for the petitions dismissal under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[4]Edwin maintains that under Article 151 of the Family Code, an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable condition precedent. Article 151 provides:No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.Edwins arguments do not persuade us.It is true that the petition forhabeas corpusfiled by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the petition dismissed despite the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute.Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is afailure to complywith a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a merefailure to allegecompliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[5]It would have been a different matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts to arrive at a compromise have been made at all.In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect.[6]Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the courts power to resolve. If a party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.[7]Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading.[8]A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.[9]More importantly, an amendment alleging compliance with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the cause of action of a petition forhabeas corpus. We have held that in cases where the defect consists of the failure to state compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court should order the amendment of the complaint.[10]Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and to present the real controversies between the parties.[11]Moreover, in ahabeas corpusproceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection.[12]This rule has sound statutory basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. In this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year and four months when taken away from the mother.The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwins contentions by citing as an additional ground the exception in Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) on barangay conciliation, which states:(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. the parties may go directly to court in the following instances:xxx2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling forhabeas corpusproceedings;xxx.Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may resort to ahabeas corpusproceeding in two instances. The first is when any person is deprived of liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention. The second instance is when custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to such custody. The most common case falling under the second instance involves children who are taken away from a parent by another parent or by a relative. The case filed by Lourdes falls under this category.The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply tohabeas corpusproceedings where a person is deprived of personal liberty. In such a case, Section 412 expressly authorizes the parties to go directly to court without need of any conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation of personal liberty warranting a petition forhabeas corpuswhere the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.[13]Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed Edwins contentions on the additional ground that Section 412 exempts petitions forhabeas corpusfrom the barangay conciliation requirement.The petition forcertiorarifiled by Edwin questioning the RTCs denial of his motion to dismiss merely states a blanket allegation of grave abuse of discretion. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and is not a proper subject of a petition for certiorari.[14]Even in the face of an error of judgment on the part of a judge denying the motion to dismiss, certiorari will not lie. Certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors of procedure.[15]The proper remedy ag