2015 BY THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION ISSN
2155-9708Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and
PhilosophiesNEWSLETTER|The American Philosophical AssociationVOLUME
14 | NUMBER 2SPRING 2015SPRING 2015 VOLUME 14|NUMBER 2FROM THE
EDITORS Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Matthew R. Dasti ARTICLES
Graham Priest Alethic Values Stephen Phillips Seeing from the
Others Point of View Shalini Sinha Self: Agency and the Good in
Classical Vaiesika K. S. Prasad Mind and Cognition: The Nyya
Perspective Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, R. Venkata Raghavan, and Don
Wallace Freeman Dcruz Lost in Translation? The Upanisadic Story
about Da and Interpretational Issues in Analytic Philosophy J.
Barton Scott Philosophy and Anticolonialism Dan Flory Race, Indian
Philosophy, and the Historiography of Western Philosophy C. K. Raju
Eternity and Infnity: The Western Misunderstanding of Indian
Mathematics, and Its Consequences for Science Today CALL FOR PAPERS
Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and PhilosophiesPRASANTA S.
BANDYOPADHYAY AND MATTHEW R. DASTI, CO-EDITORSVOLUME 14|NUMBER
2|SPRING 2015APA NEWSLETTER ONFROM THE EDITORS Prasanta S.
Bandyopadhyay MONTANASTATEUNIVERSITYMatthew R. Dasti
BRIDGEWATERSTATEUNIVERSITYThe topic of this newsletter is Indian
philosophy
andculture,chosentoallowforarichdiversityofcontributionsthatillustratesomeofthemajorapproachesorcurrentsofphilosophical
investigation into Indian philosophy, Indiancultural production,
and the status of Indian thinkers aslegitimate interlocutors within
the global philosophicalcommunity.One of the most visible and
inuential of these currentshas been the ongoing excavation of
classical Indianphilosophy, carried out by those with an eye for
bothphilological accuracy and philosophical relevance. This
isillustratedbyourrstveessays.GrahamPriestprovidesahistoricalinvestigationintothequestionHowmanytruthvalues
are there? Leading answers to this question,
aschartedbyPriest,includeresponsesgivenbyMadhyamakaand Jaina
philosophers. In his essay, Stephen Phillipscalls attention to the
way that Indian philosophy tends tobe categorized into hard
divisions based on schools ofthought (e.g., Vednta, Nyya, Skhya),
but he seeks tosoften the categories and oers a test case in the
formof a reexamination of the standard view of the
inuentialpolymath Vcaspati Mira (tenth century CE).
PhillipsarguesthatVcaspatiisnotmerelyascholastic,elucidatingschool-bound
commentaries delimited by the resourcesof this or that tradition,
but rather an original thinker whoarticulates common themes and
positions that harmonizeacross his commentaries on the core texts
of
dierentschools.ShaliniSinhasessayisdevotedtotheconceptofselfwithinthevenerableandinuentialVaieikatraditionof
Indian realism. She illustrates the way in which theself, in
Vaieika ontology, is the source of agency andnormativity, reason
and law, and the good itself,
withinnature.K.S.PrasadspaperprovidesanarticulationofmindandcognitionwithinNyya,asisterschooltoVaieika,focusing
on the relations between knower, thing known,and act of knowing,
along with Nyyas account of theinner organ or mind (manas) which
governs
cognitivefunctioning.ThepapersprimarilydevotedtoclassicalIndianphilosophy
close, ttingly, with reections on translationand interpretation. P.
S. Bandyopadhyay, R. V.
Raghavan,andD.WallaceDcruzreectonafamousUpanishadicstory,whereasinglesyllableutteredbythecreator,Prajpati,istakeninradicallydierentwaysbythreesetsoflisteners.Bandyopadhyay,
Raghavan, and Wallace Dcruz
considercontemporarytheoriesofmeaningandarguethattheworkofPaulGriceprovidesthebestresourcestomakesenseofthisstory.Another
current of inquiry seeks to understand the wayin which European
receptions of Indian thinkers and,indeed, the very notion of Indian
philosophy, have beendetermined by colonial and post-colonial
contexts. Thisis illustrated in our next three essays. J. Barton
Scottspaper examines the myriadand often
problematicwaysinwhichtheconceptofIndianphilosophyhasbeenintertwinedwithreligionandreligiosityintheeyesofbothpioneering
European Indologists and in the work of
anti-colonialIndianphilosophersthemselves.DanFloryspaperexamines
Western approaches to the notion of Indianphilosophy as genuine
philosophy, and argues that
thereareunderappreciatedreasonswhyIndianphilosophywasdenied such
status during and after the
Enlightenment.FocusingonKantandHegel,hearguesthatEnlightenmentviewsofraceandthelimitedcapabilitiesofnon-Europeanraces
informed the dubious refusal to take Indianphilosophy seriously. C.
K. Rajus paper engages in
boththeclassicalexcavationsnotedaboveandcritical,historicalexamination
of colonial attitudes and ways in which theyled to distortions and
denigrations of Indias
intellectualcontributions.Hecontraststhepractical,empiricalapproachto
mathematics in classical India with a more
theoretical,religiousapproachintheChristianWest,oftentakenbyits own
adherents to be clearly superior. Raju argues
thatthisisfarfromthecase.Wehavereceivedalargenumberofqualitypapersforthisissue,andhaveconsequentlydecidedtodivideitintotwo.Therefore,ourfall2015newsletterwillcontinuethistheme,andwillhavealargeportionofpapersdevotedtoathirdcurrentofinquiry,investigatingmodernIndianphilosophyandculture.Finally,wewouldliketothankNaliniBhushan,JayGareld,Leah
Kalmanson, David H. Kim, and Erin C. Shepherd
forsuggestions,assistance,andguidanceintheeditingofthisnewsletter.APA
NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES
ARTICLES Alethic Values Graham Priest
THEGRADUATECENTER,CUNY,ANDTHEUNIVERSITYOFMELBOURNETheAsianphilosophicaltraditionsarerichandsophisticated.Most
Western-trained philosophers, however, know verylittle of them. The
situation is slowly changing as moreWestern philosophers are coming
to read the Asian texts,and more Western philosophy departments are
teachingAsianmaterial.Thepresentessayisasmallcontributiontothisfelicitoustrend.Thequestionwhichwillconcernusheremightbeposedas,Howmanytruthvaluesarethere?Iwillnotbeconcernedtoanswerthisquestion.Rather,thepointistosurveysomeoftheanswerstothequestionadvancedbysomethinkersand
traditions, both East and West. The Eastern
traditionsthatwillconcernusherearebothIndianinorigin:BuddhismandJainism.It
should be said straight away that we will be looking atsome seminal
texts, both East and West. Such texts
arealwayssubjecttodisputesofinterpretation,andhereisnottheplacetodefendmyinterpretations.ThoseIshallgivearetheonesthatstrikemeasmostplausible,however.1*
*
*N=1Letmestartthisexerciseinthehistoryofideasbymakingthequestionmoreprecise.Weareconcernedwithtruthasit
applies to propositions, sentences, statements, beliefs,or whatnot
(rather than, e.g., friends or coins). Which ofthese sorts of
things are the primary bearers of
truthindeed,whatsuchaclaimmightmeanisaknottyissue.However, nothing
much here will depend on resolving it.So I shall just speak of
truth-bearers, in a
non-committalfashion.Truth-bearerscanbetrue;butaccordingtomosttraditions,theycantakeothervalues:mostnotablyfalsity.Asweshallsee,theymaybethoughttotakeothervaluesaswell.Toforestall
any quibbles about whether values are really
ofakindwithtruth,Iwillsimplycallthemalethicvalues.LetNbethenumberofalethicvalues.Ourquestion,then,is,WhatisN?The
simplest answer is that N=1: there is only one
truthvalue,thetruth(t):alltruth-bearersaretrue;thereisnosuchthingasfalsity.TheviewwasreputedlyheldbyAntisthenes(445365,
BCE), and what may have been his argumentsare rehearsed by Plato
(429347 BCE) in the Euthydemus,283e284c. A variation on the
arguments is rehearsed
intheTheaetetus(118d189b),essentially:Thefalseiswhatis not. What is
not does not exist. So the false does notexist.We do not need to
scrutinize the reasoning. It suceshere to note that it puts the
view that N=1 on the
table.Andhoweverplausibleitis,onecannotdenythatitisthesimplestofviews!2N=2For
the next answer in ascending order, we remain inAncient Greece, but
turn to Aristotle (384322 BCE):
N=2.Aristotleaddsasecondalethicvalue:falsity(f).Sotherearenowtwovalues,tandf,andtruth-bearerstakeexactlyoneof
these. This picture is encapsulated in the Principles ofExcluded
Middle (PEM) and Non-Contradiction (PNC).
ThePEMsaysthatatruth-bearermusthaveoneofthesevalues;thePNCsaysthattheycannothaveboth.Aristotle
defends these principles in Book of theMetaphysics. What, exactly,
his arguments are, and
howsuccessfultheywere,maybedisputed.TheargumentsforthePNCinBook4,inparticular,areamotleyandopaquebunch.However,thisneednotconcernushere.3N=3The
next answer in ascending order is that N=3. And
forthis,weturntoAristotleagain.In the somewhat notorious Book 9 of
De Interpretatione,Aristotle argues that truth-bearers whose
contents arecontingent states of aairs about the future, such as
thatit will rain in Melbourne at some time on 1/1/3001,
areneithertruenorfalse(n).Sonowwehavet,f,andn.Aristotlearguedthatifsuchtruth-bearerswereeithertrueor
false, the consequence would be fatalism, which herejects. How good
Aristotles arguments are, again,
neednotconcernus.PerhapsofmoreconcernistherelationshipbetweenthepositioninDeInterpretationeandthedefenseofthePEMintheMetaphysics.Aristotlegivesusnoguidetothisquestionineitheroftheseplacesoranyother.Intheend,Isuspect,thetwotextsarejustinconsistentwitheachother.However,
of more importance here is the fact that
theendorsementofathirdalethicvalueinDeInterpretationeis clearly
driven by metaphysical considerations, namely,the open and
indeterminate nature of aspects of
thefuture.Theanswertoourtargetquestionis,then,nomerebloodlessdisputeaboutthenatureoflogic.Logicisdrivenbymetaphysics.Intruth,thisshouldalreadyhavebeenvisibletouswhendiscussingthelastanswer.ForAristotledefendstheviewthat
N=2 in the Metaphysics, not the Analytics. Indeed,there, he points
out that the logical validity of
varioussyllogismsisindependentofthePNC(An.Post.77a10-21).Metaphysics
announces itself at the start as a study ofbeing qua being. The PEM
and PNC are, thus, principlesaboutthenatureofbeing.4PAGE2
SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND
ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIESN=4For the next answer,
we leave Ancient Greece and moveto Ancient India. Here we nd N=4.
This is embodied ina principle called the catukoi (four corners).
The fourcorners are four alethic possibilities. These add one
toAristotles triad, both true and false (b), to give us t (trueand
true only), f (false and false only), n (neither true
norfalse),andb(bothtrueandfalse).The origin of the catukoi in
Indian philosophy
isunknown.ItiscertainlyinplacebythetimeofthehistoricalBuddha
(Siddhrtha Gautama; according to one
standardchronology:563483BCE);forintheMajjhimaNikyaandother stras,
we nd the Buddhas disciples asking himdicult metaphysical
questions, such as What happensto the enlightened person after
death? They put thequestion by asking whether the person exists,
not, both,or neither; and it is clear that they take themselves to
begivingtheBuddhafourmutuallyexclusiveandexhaustivepossibilitiestochoosefrom.Insteadoftertiumnondatur,wehavequintumnondatur.InthesestrastheBuddha,infact,refusestoendorseanyoftheseanswers.Thereasonoftengiven(forexample,inthe
Cula-Malunkyovada Stra) is that such
metaphysicalspeculationisawasteoftime,andirrelevanttoachievingenlightenment.
But in some of the stras, notably theMajjhima Nikya, something else
is hinted at: that noneof these four possibilities ts the case,
though
nothingfurtherismadeoftheideaforalongtime.5N=5ItseemstohavelaindormantinBuddhistphilosophyuntiltakenupbyNgrjuna(datesunknown,sometimerstorsecondcenturyCE),wholaidthephilosophicalgroundforalaterkindofBuddhism,Mahyna.Anditishewhowillgiveusournextanswer:N=5.The
central metaphysical claim of Mahyna Buddhism isthat all things are
empty (nya). The claim is interpretedsomewhat dierently in dierent
Mahyna schools.
ButinMadhyamaka(Ngrjunasschool),tobeemptyistobeempty of intrinsic
nature: everything is what it is in virtueof its relationships (and
only in virtue of its relationships)to other things. Ngrjunas
Mulamadhyamakkrik isan extended argument to the conclusion that
everythingis empty. Frequently, he runs through the cases of
thecatukoiinafour-prongedreductio.But he also says (e.g., ch. 22)
that sometimes none ofthe four appliesfor example, with respect to
the natureof the enlightened person after death. So we have a
fthpossibility.Callthise,noneoftheabove.Sonowwehavet,f,b,n,ande.Butwhatisthise?To
understand this, we have to delve into metaphysicsagain. According
to Ngrjunaor at least one
standardinterpretationofhimanyobjecthasadualreality(satya),conventional
and ultimate (like the two sides of one
andthesamecoin).Itsultimaterealitycanbegraspeddirectly(if you work
hard at it), without conceptual mediation. Itsconventional reality
is how it appears when seen
throughthegridofconceptsandlanguagewhichthoughtimposesonit.And
corresponding to the two sorts of reality, there aretwo sorts of
truth: the truth about conventional
reality,conventionaltruth;andthetruthaboutultimatereality,theultimatetruth.Thesortsofthingsthatareconventionaltruthsareobviousenough:
I live in New York, cats are mammals, Caesarcrossed the Rubicon.
What of the sorts of things that
areultimatetruthsaboutanobject?Onecannotsay.Todosowould be to
impose our conceptual/linguistic grid,
andthustodescribeitsconventionalreality.Ultimaterealityisthereforeineable.Thisisourfthvalue,e,ineability.Wenowhavetobealittlecarefulaboutwhattruth-bearersare.
It does not make much sense to suppose that
asentenceisineable:tobeineableistobeinexpressiblein language. So
truth-bearers have to be propositions
orstatesofaairs:somethingnot,bydenition,guaranteedoflinguisticexpression.Butthatisbutawrinkle.Asusual,thisisnottheplaceheretogointothetruthofNgrjunasvieworthesoundnessofhisargumentsforit.ItsucesthattheviewhastakenustoN=5.6N=6WhichbringsustoN=6.Sadly,Iknownoexamplesofthis.7N=7ButN=7isquiteadierentmatter.Forthis,westayinIndia,butmovefromBuddhismtoJainism.There,wendN=7.TheoriginsofJainismaresomewhatclouded,butitseemsto
arise in India about the same time as Buddhism (andso circa sixth
century BCE). Its philosophical
foundationswerelaidsomewhatlater,betweenaboutthesecondandfththcenturiesCE,byphilosopherssuchasSiddenansena(.fthcentury).Beforewegettoseven,wehavetogobacktothree.Forthe
Jains, there were three basic alethic values, t, f, anda third. Let
me call this i. The meaning of i is somewhatobscure (and modern
commentators disagree abouthow it is to be interpreted). Sometimes
it is glossed (orat least translated) as non-assertible, which
suggestsneithertruenorfalse.Sometimesitisglossed(oratleasttranslated)asassertableanddeniable,whichsuggestsboth
true and false. Given that ineability is certainly inthe air in
both Buddhist and Hindu thought at this time,maybe it should be
understood as ineable. Maybe it
istododutyforallthese.Anyway,wecanleavescholarstoargueaboutthis.Togetfromthreetoseven,wehavetoconsidersomecoreJainametaphysics.Thisisencapsulatedintheprincipleofaneknta
vdathe principle of
non-(one-sidedness)asarticulated,forexample,bySiddhasenainhisNyyvatra,v.29.Realityismulti-faceted,likeapolyhedron.EveryoneSPRING2015
| VOLUME14| NUMBER2 PAGE3APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES
whohasaviewhasaviewofoneofthefacets.Theirviewsareallequallycorrectandequallyincomplete.As
far as alethic values goes, the result is spelled out byVdideva Sri
(. twelfth century CE) in his Prama
NayaTattvloklamkra(ch.4,vv.1521),withaviewcalledthesaptabhag(seven-folddivision).Every
truth-bearer will have one of the three basic valuesin every facet.
(The Jains use the word syd to meansomething like in some facet.)
So to capture the wholepicture we have to take into account the
alethic value
ateveryfacet.So,forexample,ifthetruth-beareristinsomefacets,finothers,andiinnone,itstotalvaluewillbe{t,f}.Thus,
the overall possible values of a truth-bearer willbe any non-empty
subset of {t,i,f}non-empty,
becauserealityhasmanyfacets,andsoatleastone.SoN=7=23-1.8* * *So we
have reached N=7. Let me end with a few nalcomments.First, none of
the philosophers we have met had anyknowledge of modern formal
logic. However, each of
theaboveviewscanbeturnedintoarigoroussuchlogic.Themain logical
technique to be deployed isnaturallythatof many-valued logic.
Formally, many-valued logics allowforNtobeofanysize.Next, I
certainly do not claim that we have had
anexhaustivetouroftheterrainwehavebeencrossingevenin ancient
philosophy. I have chosen some
philosopherswhoseviewsareimportantanddistinctive.Iamsurethereare
others. Despite this, and modern many-valued logicsnotwithstanding,
I know of no natural suggestions forvalues of N greater than 7.
With one exception:
modernfuzzylogicsallowfordegreesoftruth;soanalethicvalueisanyrealnumberbetween0and1inclusive.Thatis,Nis2tothepowerof0.AsfarasIknow,nothinglikethisviewistobefoundinantiquity.Third,
since I expect that most readers of this article
willknowlittleofAsianphilosophicaltraditions,andtoforestallpossiblemisconception,IshouldpointoutthattherewerecertainlyIndianphilosopherswhoendorsedtheclaimthatN=2,suchastheHinduNyyaphilosophersaschoolgoingback
to about the second century CE, but regenerated inthe tenth century
CE as Navya-Nyya (new Nyya)andthe Buddhist logicians Dignga (.
sixth century CE)
andDharmkrti(.seventhcenturyCE).9Finally,asisclear,Ihavemadenoattempttoevaluatethevarious
claims about the value of N, or the
metaphysicalviewsonwhichthesearebased.Thatwouldbeanentirelydierent,andmuchlengthier,project.Thepointofthisnotehassimplybeentochartsomehistory;and,intheprocess,Ihope,toopenpeopleseyestosomepossibilitiesofwhichtheymayhavebeenunaware.NOTES1.
Iwilladdareferenceortwoattheendofeachsection,forthosewhowishtotakemattersfurther.2.
For further discussions of Antisthenes and related matters,
seeDenyer,Language,Thought,andFalsehood.3. On the arguments, see
Dancy, Sense and Contradiction
inAristotle,andPriest,DoubtTruthtoBeaLiar,chapter1.4.
OntheargumentofDe.Int.9,seeHaack,DeviantLogic,chapter4),andPriest,IntroductiontoNon-ClassicalLogic,secs.7.9and11a.7.5.
Onthecatukoi,seeRuegg,TheUsesoftheFourPositionsoftheCatukoi,andPriest,TheLogicoftheCatukoi.6.
For further discussion of Ngrjunas use of the catukoi,
seeWesterho,NgrjunasCatukoi,andPriest,TheLogicoftheCatukoi.7.
Sothisisthenullreference.8. On Jaina logic, see Ganeri, Jaina Logic
and the PhilosophicalBasis of Pluralism, and Priest, Janina Logic:
A ContemporaryPerspective.9.
Foradiscussionofmany-valuedlogic,includingfuzzylogic,seePriest,IntroductiontoNon-ClassicalLogic,chapters7and11.Fora
general discussion of Indian logic, see the papers in
Ganeri,IndianLogic:AReader.BIBLIOGRAPHYDancy, R. M. Sense and
Contradiction in Aristotle. Dordrecht: Reidel,1975.Denyer, N.
Language, Thought, and Falsehood in Ancient
GreekPhilosophy.London:Routledge,1993.Ganeri,J.(ed.).IndianLogic:AReader.London:Routledge,2001.Ganeri,J.JainaLogicandthePhilosophicalBasisofPluralism.HistoryandPhilosophyofLogic23(2002):26881.Haack,S.DeviantLogic.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1974.Priest,G.DoubtTruthtoBeaLiar.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006.Priest,G.IntroductiontoNon-ClassicalLogic:FromIftoIs.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008a.Priest,
G. Jaina Logic: A Contemporary Perspective. History
andPhilosophyofLogic29(2008b):26378.Priest,G.TheLogicoftheCatukoi.ComparativePhilosophy1(2010):3254.Ruegg,
D. The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catukoi and
theProblemoftheDescriptionofRealityinMahynaBuddhism.JournalofIndianPhilosophy5(1977):171.Westerho,J.NgrjunasCatukoi.JournalofIndianPhilosophy34(2006):36795.Seeing
From the Others Point of View: Counter the Schismatic
Interpretation of Vcaspati Mira Stephen Phillips
THEUNIVERSITYOFTEXASATAUSTINTextbooktreatmentsofclassicalIndianphilosophytypicallyidentify
three pairs of schools falling under the
broaderrubricofVedicorHindu:PrvaandUttaraMms(or,MmsandVednta),SkhyaandYoga,andNyyaandVaieika.
All six are classically tagged stika as opposedto nstika, the
latter being non-Vedic, non-Hindu.
TheseincludeBuddhistandJainaschoolsbutalsomaterialist,anti-religiousCrvka.ItisalsosaidthatitislessdoctrinethanPAGE4
SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND
ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND
PHILOSOPHIESculturalpracticethatunitesthestikaschoolstheSanskritword
connotes more orthopraxis than orthodoxy. Theassumption is that
there is no orthodox credo for earlyHinduism. Although it is
recognized that much is
sharedbyapartnerschoolwithitssister,YogawithSkhya,forinstance, the
six stika schools often take sharply distinctand opposed positions,
it is pointed out or
assumed.Indeed,withinMmsandVedntainparticularthereareimportant
subschools, Advaita and Viidvaita Vednta,for example, and Bha and
Prbhkara Mms, whichtake dierent positions on various issues and
presentsometimes pointed, barbed refutations of the theories
oftherivalsubschool.Theorganizationofthefteen-centurytextbook by
Mdhava, Sarva-Darana-Sagraha, respectsand reinforces these
divisions, as does, like almost allmodern treatments, the
multi-volumed Encyclopedia
ofIndianPhilosophieseditedbyKarlPotter.Therethepracticeistodevoteavolumetoeachseparateschoolandinsomecasessubschoolorlaterperiod(aswiththethreevolumesonNyya).Nowmypointinthisshortpaperisnottooverhaulourwholesense
of the classical schools as units of organizationalimportance but
rather to try to dislodge the idea thataside from the founders of
the separate darana
classicalwriterstendednottothinkforthemselves,nottoinnovateorcorrect,butonlytoelucidate,defend,andoccasionallyexpand
a bundle of inherited positions collected underthe several banners
of Mms, Nyya, and so
on.Innovation,onsuchaschismatichermeneutics,ismainlyamatterofsomeonecomingupwithanewlineofdefenseand
sometimes new lines of attack on the arguments orpositions of the
home schools detractors, not with freshthinking through an issue.
The commentarial nature ofthe philosophic literature proves the
point, its
genresuppositionstakentoextendtonon-commentarialtreatises.However,
while it is true that the commentary as a genredominates the later
literature, there are many
importantnon-commentarialtextsthatareclearlyinadierentclass,with
dierent genre suppositions, showing on their face,moreover, a
certain originality. Furthermore, despite whatscholars regard as
naturally a deep conservatism
withinthecommentarygenre,itiswrongtothinkthattheseveralphilosophic
inheritances oer their students only
rigidlyxedpositions.Withthisquestioninmind,scrutinyofthecommentarial
writing of the great philosophic namesafortiori in the case of
non-commentarial
treatisesshowsinuencesfromahostofsources,stikaandnstika,andadvocacy
of positions inaugurated elsewhere than in
theschoolortextbeingcommentedupon.Thereisphilosophicprogress over
the centuries in my opinion, and often itappears to be sparked by
close study of the literature ofapparentlyrivalschools.In sum, my
argument is not directed at any and allscholastic labeling but
rather against the hardening ofthe categories that would take the
barriers between theschools to be much less permeable than is the
case andthat would skew our interpretation and evaluation of
thephilosophicworkofindividuals.The outstanding example of a
classical philosopherwho learns from multiple sources and crosses
barriersadmittedly so subtly sometimes that the trespassing
iseasilymissedinnovatingandthinkingforhimselfbywayof commanding
issues and a broad range of positionsand arguments, is the
tenth-century Vcaspati Mira, whoprobably lived in Mithil in what is
now Bihar.
Vcaspatidoesnotboastofhisaccomplishments,givingcredittohispredecessors
for positions and arguments that are reallyhisinnovations.But the
going wisdom about Vcaspati is that he wasthe consummate academic,
not a philosopher thinkingfor himselfexcept in the case, possibly,
of his BhmatcommentaryontheBrahma-stra-bhyaofakarawithinAdvaita
Vednta (and even there some say he is muchindebted to Maana Mira).
Such academicism wouldapparently explain his having composed major
treatiseswithin a total of ve distinct schoolsAdvaita Vednta,Yoga,
Skhya, Nyya, and Mmsincluding long,detailed subcommentaries in Nyya
and Yoga. In
otherwords,thephilosopherwasanacademicspecicallyinhisabilitytochangescholastichats.Thus,forexample,inhisNotes
on Uddyotakaras subcommentary on the
Nyya-stra,VcaspatispointisnottotellwhathehimselfthinksisthetruthornalwordonsomeissueorotherbutratherthetruthfromtheNyyaperspective;similarlyforhisYogatreatiseandsoon.S.Ranganath,forexample,presentingall-toldasolidstudyof
our author showing his many innovations, sees him
asmakingseparatecontributionstotheseveralschools.Attheend of a
chapter devoted to his contribution to Skhya,Ranganathwrites:Here
again we nd in Vcaspati Mira a devotedexponent of the Skhya process
of creationwithout any preconceived notions created by
hisknowledgeoftheVedntaandothertraditions.HisdefenseoftheSkhyasystemisinthetruespiritof
a commentator defending the position of
thetextheiscommentingupon.1VcaspatiisthenanexponentofSkhyathewayamodernacademiccanbeanexponentofPlato,tryingtomakeusseethingsthewayPlatosawthem,thatis,withoneexception,namely,
unlike with Plato himself, without advocacy.
ThusVcaspatiwouldbeaprofessionalintellectualwithacertainexpertise,indeed,asincrediblygoodathiscraft,expositingpositionsandargumentsaccordingtotheparticularschoolwhose
literature he is expanding with his
compositionall,ofcourse,withthepossibleexceptionoftheBhmat,hisAdvaitaVedntaopuswhereitiscommonlysupposed(on
slim evidence, I must say, given the attitude towardsthe
non-Vedntic treatises) that here he is telling us whathe really
believes, thus founding the so-called BhmatsubschoolofAdvaita.In
sum, the separate schools take distinct positions on ahost of
issues, and Vcaspati, like everyone else writingin the middle and
later classical periods, is pretty tightlyconstrained by a
doctrinal inheritance. The inheritance
iselucidatedbyhimandperhapsexpandedbutnotrejected.ThisistrueevenfortheBhmat,hisAdvaitaworkwherewemaysuppose(mainlyontheevidencethatthiswasthelastSPRING2015
| VOLUME14| NUMBER2 PAGE5APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES treatise he wrote) that he is
actually asserting for himselftheexpositedviews.That Vcaspati is
the consummate academic of classicalthought is, I admit, one way of
looking at him, aninterpretation that cannot be proved wrong
conclusively.On high-level hermeneutical questions rarely are
thereknock-down arguments. My hope, however, is that byshowing a
few convergences between or among theschools according to his
treatises this paper will help ussee Vcaspatiand others, of
courseas philosopherswhose resources are not restricted to any
single
textual,philosophictradition,andwhosepositionsasphilosophersspantraditionsandschools.The
case is rather easy to make. Take rst VcaspatisMms treatise, the
Tattva-bindu. This is far from acommentary on the whole long
Mms-stra but
ratheratreatmentofasingleissue,asthetitlemaybetakentoimply, A Drop
of Truth. The issue is sentence
meaninganditsrelationstothemeaningsofindividualwords,whichis an
important issue, indeed at the center of theory ofknowledge through
testimony (abda-prama) which
inturnisatthecenterofMmsdefenseofVedicritualism.Vcaspatis reection
seems informed by
thorough-goingMmsstudy,especiallyofKumrila,theeighth-centuryphilosopher
whose view on this issue Vcaspati defendsand expands. Embracing one
position hardly makes aMmsaka.Thedeeperpoint,however,isthathendsor
carves outconvergence among Mms, Yoga, andNyya in this area of
epistemology. The view is that weunderstand words as individually
having reference whilewe understand a sentence by cognizing the
referents ina certain relationshipcall this the Bha theory,
afterKumrila Bhaa. The issue of sentence meaning doesnot arise, as
far as I can tell, in Vcaspatis Bhmat, hisAdvaita opus. The Bha
theory is nevertheless utilizedby him to make another point, not
one endorsed
byKumrila,namely,thatstatementsintheUpanishadsaboutBrahman the
Absolute are meaningful although they arenot connected to action
pace a deeply held Mmsakasupposition.2 What the Tattva-bindu shows
then is, alongwith Vcaspatis familiarity with Mmsaka literature(and
Kumrila in particular), a full airing of the
sentence-meaningissue(vedistincttheoriesarescrutinized).Intheend,theoneknownastheBhaorabhihitnvaya-vdaisdefended.
Now this theory of sentence meaning is thenslid neatly into both
his Nyya-vrika-ttparya-k (underNyya-stra 1.1.8 on knowledge through
testimony)
andhisYogicTattva-vairad(under,surprisingly,thesiddhiorpowerofcomingtounderstandthelanguageofanimals,Yoga-stra3.17).ConsidernextVcaspatistheism,plainfromhisextensivenotes
on Nyya-stra 4.1.21 (Thakur 564,
whereVcaspatitellsuswhyitistheomniscientvarathatmustbesupposedtobetheagentinferred:(Thatwhichistobeaccountedfor)isthesimultaneityofproductionofeectsthroughout
immeasurable and unlimited space at everyplace and location, eects
perceptible and
imperceptibleinanimalsandplantsandtheorganicworldasawholeandso on).
Concerning God or vara, we nd convergencewhere we should nd sharp
divergence if Vcaspatiwere merely changing hats: in Nyya, Yoga, and
AdvaitaVednta.Inallthreetreatises,heputsforthandelucidatesthe same
argument for the existence of God. This is thatthere is a single
all-embracing intelligence responsiblefor the universe as is shown
by the harmony among itsparts. Although Advaita is sometimes
thought to be non-theistic, Vcaspatis Advaita presentation of the
argumentis as theistic as the others, focusing on the notion of
aconscious agent as instrumental cause.3 Admittedly,
theGodthatisprovedbyVcaspatiinthethreetreatisesisnotconceptualizedinpreciselythesameways.Nevertheless,there
is a supreme being conceived similarly across thethree works and
schools whereas vara is not
conceivedsosimilarlybythethreeauthorsUddyotakara,Vysa,andakarawhosetextsheiselucidating.Thisinitselfprovesheisnotjustacommentator.Further,althoughKumrilapresentsabarrageofatheisticarguments,
our philosopher does not mention them orindeed vara at all in his
Mms treatise. Nor is varadirectly discussed in his Skhya-kaumudi.
Causationis of course a dominant issue, thoroughly aired, and
theSkhyatheoryofsat-krya-vdadefended,i.e.,theeectas anticipated in
the cause. Since Nyya holds to asat-krya-vda, the eect as something
new, not anticipatedin the cause, we may think that at least here
we havedirect opposition that should force Vcaspati to changehats.
However, Vcaspati leaves room for the Nyya viewwhich distinguishes
three kinds of causal
relationship.Thatinsisteduponbytheasat-krya-vdinandVcaspatiinthistextwherehedoesfollowtheSkhya(andVedntic)traditionofarguingexnihilonihilt(fromnothingcomesnothing)
is, in the Nyya schema, the inherent cause.The Nyya philosopher can
accept the ex nihilo nihil tprinciple, viewing it, in line with
Vaieika, as a matterof the continuity between, for example, a piece
of clothand the threads that make it up. The intricate subject
ofinstrumental causality is not broached by Vcaspati in
hisSkhya-kaumudi. That to my ears is a deafening
silencefromonewhohasmade(orwillmake)advanceselsewherein the
conception of vara as an instrumental cause
ofearthandthelike,astheinferentialsubjectinhistheisticargument is
conceptualized in his Ttparya-k Nyyatreatise.There is not space
here to air many more convergences,although looking one nds them
practically everywhere.Another important conict may be taken to
concernillusion, which is given a very dierent explanation
andoveralltreatmentinNyyaasopposedtoAdvaitaVednta.Or so it is
commonly thought. But the truth is that onthis centralmost
topicwhich may well be that on whichclassical Indian philosophy as
a whole best proves itsexcellence both by a richness of theory and
by tight
anddetailedanalyses,ahostofconsiderationsbeingbroughtinVcaspati, in
a long discussion in his Advaita
treatise,seemstofavortheNyyatheoryofanyath-khyti(illusionas
awareness of something as other than it is). This
istruedespiteakarasstressingnottheroleoftheexternalobjectbutratherinternalsuperimposition(adhysa).Theocial
Advaita view is anirvacanya-khyti (awarenessof something
indeterminable as real or unreal). In
anintroductiontotheireditionandtranslationoftherstfourPAGE6
SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND
ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIESstras of the Bhmat,
Suryanarayana Sastri and KunhanRaja say the following, making my
point though they
tooseemtopresupposetheschismaticinterpretation:The anyath-khyti
view, though attributed tothe Logicians [Nyya], has some popularity
withAdvaitins too in the explanation of sopdhika-bhrama, delusion
caused by the presence of
anexternaladjunct.Forexample,thecrystalseenasredissoseenbecausetherednessoftheowerinproximitytoitiserroneouslyreferredtoit.Andthe
white shell is seen to be yellow, because inthe jaundiced person
bile goes forth with rays
oflightfromtheeyes,andtheyellownessofthebileiserroneouslyreferredtotheobjectapprehendedbythoseraysoflight.Thisviewissomuchtothefore
in Vcaspatis account of
superimpositionthatheseemstobeasupporterofanyath-khyti.Amalnanda [a
classical commentator] has torescue him from this charge by
pointing to
theexplanationofthemirage,whereatleastwehavenotacrossedreferencebutapurecreationwhichisnotdeterminableaseitherrealorunreal.4Moreover,
in Vcaspatis explanation of the
Yoga-strasdenitionofviparyaya,wrongcognition,understra1.8,he again
advances the theory of anyath-khyti, havingjust previously, in long
comments under Yoga-stra 1.7,presented the gist of the whole of his
version of Nyyaepistemology (which emphasizes a
defeater-defeatedrelationship among cognitions or beliefs as
epistemicallycentral).ThereisalsoastrikingexampleofVcaspatisincorporationofanstikaposition.FromstudyingBuddhistYogcra(aswell
as Kumrila, who also studied Yogcra), Vcaspatiinnovates an
understanding of perception within Nyyathat is not that of his Nyya
predecessors. He
introducesintothesystemthenotionofthetypeofperceptionthatisconcept-free,
nirvikalpaka, the unverbalizable, as a
rststageoftheprocessthatleadstoknowledge.5Accordingto his Nyya
inheritance, in contrast, all perception
issavikalpaka,concept-laden.Let me present now a dierent line of
evidence for
mythesis,towit,Vcaspatiscitingothercompositionsofhis.6This shows
that he expected his audience to read acrossdivisions of school. In
other words, often Vcaspati
takesusalreadytoknowwhathispositionisonanissue,orheassumeswecanndoutbyconsultingtheworkheexplicitlyreferences.Therearealsoreferencestonon-NyyatextsinhisNyyaworkandmutatismutandiforhistreatisesyingother
banners. Obviously Vcaspati does not assume
hisstudentstohavestrictloyaltytooneschool.Hisnalviewseemsacompositeandverycomplexinitsindebtedness.Well,
then, what is his nal view? What does he
reallybelieve?ThisisnotforusIthinkpreciselytherightquestion.Let me
close by saying a few words about Vcaspati
asprecursorofGageaandNavyaNyya.By running through numerous theories
and argumentsabout an issue, the nature of the internal
organ,manas, for example, one gets not just the right view buta
wide appreciation of the subject. Concerning manas,considerations
are so complex that one senses
thatGageaisnotentirelyconvincedoftheviewheendorses.Muchthesamemaybesaidforhistreatmentofupalakaa,indirectattribution,aswellasforanalogy,upamna,asaseparateanduniqueknowledgesource.Theexplorationis
as important as the result. Similarly, by bringing us tosee
strengths and weakness of several positions andpoints of view,
Vcaspati enriches his readers sense
ofwherethetruthlies.Weareablenotonlytoseefromtheothersperspectivebuttoincorporateit,orpartofit,intoourownview.This,tomymind,istherealsignicanceoftheepithet,sarva-tantra-sva-tantra,Whohasmadeallthesystemshisownsystem,commonlyawardedVcaspati(atitlesharednotablywithPrabhkara,therenegadepupilofKumrila,whoinnovatespositionswithinMms).IhavefocusedonVcaspatibecausewithhimitiseasytosee
that this is not merely a commentator and
academiccapableofchanginghatsbutratheragreatmindexploringuniversalissues.Inanothervenue,Iplantomakethecasefor
Raghuntha and other Naiyyikas. With Advaita, thestory is much the
same since outside of a commitmentto the reality of Brahman
(variously understood) thereis enormous variety within the camp.
That Mms andtheistic Vednta are similarly porous is my sense, but
letmedesistoutoffearofmakingtoosweepingastatement.School loyalty is
a trump in many instances, I admit.
Butoftenwendaclassicalauthorthinkingoutsideaparticularscholastic
inheritance. It is my view that Vcaspati andmany other classical
authors are less like the modernacademic capable of changing hats
than like the analyticphilosopher who incorporates a broad
inheritance
whileforgingherownposition.(ThinkofRawlsstudyingprevioussocial-contract
theorists, or Chisholm studying
Descartes,Hume,andRussell,etcetera,etcetera.)Unfortunately,thecenturiesrichwithclassicalIndianphilosophyhavenotyetbeenverywellmined.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSIthankNirmalyaGuhafordiscussionswehadofthispaper.NOTES1.
S. Ranganath, Contribution of Vcaspati Mira to
IndianPhilosophy,189.2.
S.S.SuryanarayanaSastriandC.KunhanRaja,ed.andtrans.,TheBhmat:Catusstr,217-18.3.
Ibid.,121-22.4. Ibid.,xxv-xxvi.5.
AnantalalThakur,ed.,NyyavrttikattparyakofVcaspatimira,10912.6.
IntheBhmat,SastriandKunhanRaja46(Skhya),154(Nyya),181-82 (Nyya),
and so on, and even in the presumably
earlierTattva-vairad,hemakesreferencetotwoworksofhisthatarelost,oneNyyaandoneVednta,JamesWoods,trans.,TheYogaSystemofPatanjali,70.BIBLIOGRAPHYS.
Ranganath. Contribution of Vcaspati Mira to Indian
Philosophy.Delhi:PratibhaPrakashan,1999.Vcaspati Mira. Bhmat
(commentary on akaras
Brahma-stra-bhya).Ed.andtr.(rstfourstras)S.S.SuryanarayanaSastriandC.SPRING2015
| VOLUME14| NUMBER2PAGE7APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES
KunhanRaja.TheBhmat:Catusstr.Madras:TheosophicalPublishingHouse,1933..
Nyya-vrttika-ttparya-k (Notes on (Uddyotakaras)Intention in his
Nyya-vrttika Commentary). Ed. Anantalal
Thakur.NyyavrttikattparyakofVcaspatimira.NewDelhi:IndianCouncilofPhilosophicalResearch,1996..
Tattva-bindu. Ed. V. A. Ramaswami Sastri. Tattvabindu
byVcaspatimira with Tattvavibhvana by iputra Paramevara.New Delhi:
1991. Ed. and tr. Madeleine Biardeau, Le Tattvabindu
deVcaspatimira.Pondichry:InstitutFranaisdIndologie,1979..
Tattva-kaumudi (commentary on the Skhya-krik). Ed. andtr.
Ganganatha Jha. 1896. Reprint: Dill: Bhratya Buka Kraporeana,2008..
Tattva-vairad (commentary on the Yoga-stra-bhya). Ed.Jibananda
Vidyasagara. 3rd. ed. Calcutta: 1940. Translated: JamesWoods, The
Yoga System of Patanjali. Harvard Oriental Series
17.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1914.Self: Agency and the Good
in Classical Vaiesika Shalini Sinha
UNIVERSITYOFREADINGINTRODUCTIONThe subject of this essay is the
idea of self (tman) inthe Vaieika tradition of classical Indian
philosophy.Among the major classical Indian schools, Vaieika
isdistinguished by a categorial metaphysics that
attemptstogiveanaccountofeverythingthereisintheworldinaschema that
include substances (dravya), their properties(gua) and motions
(karman). I dub this ne-grainedtaxonomy dierential
(vaieika)1naturalism,a categorialstructure that by incorporating
nonphysical selves andphysical substances2places the phenomena of
selfhood,inclusive here of reason, values, and law, at the heart
ofnatural order. In what follows, I look at what
Vaieikaphilosophers mean by a self, what the nature of a self
is,andtheplaceselfhasinthenaturalworld.ThekeyfeaturesoftheVaieikaselfarepresentedinthecoretext
of the classical school, the Padrthadharmasagraha(A Compendium of
the Characteristics of the
Categories)ofPraastapda(c.530CE)anditscommentarialliterature.For
the purposes of this essay, I refer to two classicalcommentaries on
this text, rdharas Nyyakandal(tenth century CE) and Udayanas
Kiraval (late tenthcentury/early eleventh century CE), and an early
moderncommentary,JagadasSkti(seventeenthcenturyCE).The notion of
self in Vaieika has a particularly
widephilosophicalscope.Selfisthebeareroftherst-personalstates of
consciousness (caitanya) and agency (karttva),and the ethical
states of compositional law (ada)3in the natural world.4 The
synonymity here of
naturalcompositionallaw(ada)andmorallaw(dharma)meansthatmetaphysicsisinfusedwithanethicsthatplacesthevaluesandlaws(dharma,ada)ofsacricialreason,orinMcDowellsterms(McDowell1996,1998,2004),thespaceofreasonsandtherealmoflaw,inselfitselfinnatureorsoIargue.I
rst look at the idea of self in classical Vaieika andthe various
levels of reexivity5 and ownership (svatva,svmitva) this involves.
I then locate three aspects of selfand selfhoodagentive,
constructivist, and elementaland consider how these explicate self
as the source
ofreason,values,andlawinthenaturalworld.1.THEIDEAOFSELFSelf, in
Vaieika, is a substance whose unitary
characterandmetaphysicaldistinctivenessgroundpersonalidentityandethicalidentity,atatimeandovertime,inthecategorialorder
of things. It is the subject of consciousness (jna)(PDS 1984: 76-7)
and the agent (kart) of actions
(PDS1984:78),thebearer,orowner,ofmentalstates(PDS1984:79-80)andthewillfulcontroller(prayatnavnadhiht)ofbodilybehaviorandbiologicalprocesses(PDS1984:78).Self
appears here as the locus of personal identity
wherethisisinextricablyboundtoitsethicalidentityasthegood(nireyasa)
itself that is the bearer of compositional law(ada,dharma).6rdhara
and Udayana elucidate the inner or introspectiveaspects of
selfhood. Self, they claim, is that
whichdistinguishesmefromthatwhichisnot-me.Itisthatwhichhas the
intrinsic capacity to experience its self-identity,or being-own
(sva), from the inside so to speak, that isexpressed as I. And that
exhibits underivative
ownershiporown-ness(svatva)ofallthatitinformsitsmentalstatesanditsbody(NK1984:84,20-22;ATV1995:346-7).Onlyaself,aunitary,intrinsicallyreexivesubstance,canconferownership
of its properties and powers and uniquelyattribute them to me,
their owner or bearer (PDS 1994:79). A self-substance is required
as the unier of theseessentially reexive mental and ethical states
(PDS
1994:77-78);anditisthissubstancethatisdesignatedbytherst-personpronounI(PDS1994:79).7Praastapda
denes self as substance in the followingway: Its [i.e., selfs]
qualities are, cognition (jna),pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha),
desire (icch), aversion(dvea), will (prayatna), [the states of]
virtue (dharma),non-virtue (adharma),8cognitive imprints
(saskra),9number(sakhy),10spatialdimension(dik),metaphysicaldistinction
(pthaktva),11 conjunction (sayoga) anddisjunction (vibhga) (PDS
1984: 80). Three distinctaspects of self are presented here: (i)
the agentive selfwhich is the bearer of the rst-personal structures
ofagency: the properties of cognition, pleasure and
pain,desireandaversion,andwill(PDS1984:79-80);12(ii)theconstructivist
self which as the good itself is the bearerof natural compositional
law that is synonymous withthe goodness or virtue (dharma) of selfs
actions; (iii)
theelementalselfwhichexistsasbareself-substancedevoidof all mental
and moral structures and is the true
nature(svarpasthita)ofself(PDS1994:319).Iconsidertheseaspectsofselfinturn.2.THEAGENTIVESELFAsconsciousagents,Praastapdaargues(PDS1974:78),human
beings are deliberative beings who stand in
anevaluativeattitudetotheirowncondition.Thisisexplicatedin the
structure of human actions in the following way:judgements (jna)
about whether an object is a sourcePAGE8 SPRING2015 | VOLUME14|
NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND
PHILOSOPHIES of pleasure (suka) or pain (dukha), favorable (hita)
orunfavorable (ahita) for oneself, induces desire (icch) oraversion
(dvea) towards it. Desire and aversion, in turn,motivate willful
impulses (prayatna) which are executedby manas, selfs instrument of
execution and attention(see Chakrabarti 1999), as mental and bodily
striving(pravtti) and restraint (nivtti) to acquire or avoid
thatobject, respectively (PDS 1974: 78).13 These sorts
ofrationaltendenciesareevident,ourphilosophersargue,in(i)
intentional acts such as striving to eat a mango whosetaste is
considered pleasurable (PDS 1974: 78), butextends to (ii)
subintentional and instinctual acts such asbreathing and blinking
(PDS 1974: 78),14 or sneezing ina dusty environment to avoid harm
(NK(J) 1982: 646), (iii)subpersonal processes that maintain bodily
equilibriumandpreventthebodyfromfallingdown(PDS(J)1982:563-4, 646),
and (iv) biological processes of growth,
healingandrepairofthehumanorganism(PDS1974:78).15The core claim
here is that all human mental and
bodilyactivity,thatistosay,cognitions,intentional,subintentional,andinstinctualbodilybehavior,subpersonalandbiologicalprocesses,
exhibit rational and normative structures
andregularitiesthatarecharacteristicofagency(karttva)(PDS1994:
76-80). These activities exhibit normativity,
quaself-concern,instrivingforwhatisgoodorbenecial(hita)for oneself,
and shunning what is unfavorable or harmful(ahita) to oneself. The
rational structure of such
activitiesdistinguishesthemfromphysicalcausalregularities,suchas
the wind blowing, since the latter fail to demonstratereexive
values of self-concernstriving for what isgood for itself.16
Rather, physical regularities and randomor accidental physical
events follow an impact-modelof causation (NK 1984: 84, 2-3; S
1983: 364). For thisreason, two domains of causation, rational and
physical,aredistinguishable.Therst,denedbythereexiveandrationalstructuresofimplicitorexplicitownershipandself-referentialitythatarecharacteristicoftherationalorderofagency.Thesecond,bytheimpersonalstructuresofimpactcausationthatcharacterizephysicalcausalorder.As
the locus of conscious agency, the agentive self is
areexivebeingthatdemonstratesthecapacitytoknowthegood, to determine
its good, and strives to achieve thisby its actions. We might say,
in this case, that self is thesource of those powers and properties
that incorporatethe force of ought:17 reexive and relational powers
andpropertiesthatnecessarilyrefertothegoodforsomeone,by way of
reasons and values that are self-referring
andexhibitownership(svatva,svmitva).Buttheforceofoughtarisesherefromthepossessiveorappropriativeownership(svmitva)
of mental states, that is, from their
associationwiththeI-object(ahakra)asI(aham)andmine(aham)thelayingclaimtooneselfasanownerandanagent,thatinstigatesintentionalactions(NK(J)1982:597).18Further,thedomainofought,asofreexivityandownership,isnotlimitedtoconsciousanddeliberativeagencybutextendstoanintegratedspectrumofmoreprimitiveformsofagencyandlife19thatareownedandself-referring,andsomarkthepresenceofaself(PDS1974:78).203.THECONSTRUCTIVISTSELFANDTHEGOODNESSOFACTIONItisthegoodness(dharma)ofactionthatisthesourceoftheconstructiveandconstructivist21activitiesoftheself.Activegoodness(dharma)22isexplicatedinselfsactionsanditslife
as the virtuous (dharma) or non-virtuous (adharma)relationship in
which it stands, qua agent, to all
otherelementsoftheworld.Itconcernsselfspropensitytoownand
appropriate objects as me and mine by its
I-forming(ahamkra)orI-objectifyingcapacitiessinceactingisthepositingofIastheI-form(ahakra)orI-objectthatlaysclaimtoselfasanowner(svm)ofitsmentalstatesandanagent(kart)ofitsactions.The
notions of the good and the goodness of an actionrefer here, at
least implicitly, to a sacricial conceptionof rationality.
Sacricial rationality (see Chakrabarti 1999:260-61)23 consists in
giving-up the false cognition of selfas the I-object (ahakra). For
this is the source of non-virtuous (adharma) passions and interests
that motivateactions which claim the world of objects as me or
mine.Non-virtuous interests must be replaced by
virtuousconsiderations,considerationsthatseekthegood(dharma)and
ultimately the highest good (nireyasa), the true orelemental self,
which is arrived at by reective analysisand meditative attention
(see NK(J) 1982: 596; ATV 1995:378 ;).24 It is by the degree to
which an action accordswith this fundamental sacricial norm of
giving-up of theI-object (ahakra) that its moral quality is judged
(NK(J)1982:596-98,608).Concordance,ornot,withthissacricialethics
determines the compositional characteristics ofthe psychophysical
self and its world. These explicate
aperceptual,aective,andphysicalorderthatappearstobebasedinthereciprocalnormsthatstructurecausation(PDS1994:31).25Theideaisthatthegoodnessofaselfsactions,historically,26determines
the sorts of objects (artha) it can experienceand enjoy (bhoga) as
sources of pleasurable and painfulexperience. But this requires a
body t to provide
thenecessarycausalbasis(dhra)forexperiencingthemorallyappropriate
range of aective pleasures and pains
(PDS1994:31,359).Italsorequiresaworldofobjectsthatcanaordthisrangeofaectiveexperiences.Objects,inthisview,areinherentlysourcesofvaluethatelicitaectiveandvolitionalconcernfromselves,quaagents;andtheirmodesof
appropriation as me or mine in intentional actions hasvirtuous or
non-virtuous consequences for the self (NK(J)1982: 42). This means
that both selfs body and its worldexplicate the historical or
genealogical goodness of
itsactionsinitspastlives(PDS1994:31,59,80),andariseasontologicalconstructsthatareequallymoralconstructsinvirtueoftheirconcordancewithsacricialnorms.Selfappearshereasthatwhichcomposesandrecomposesits
embodiment, as body and world, by its own eorts.
Itdoessoasthesourceofagentialvaluesandnormsandtheethicalpowersofintentionalpracticesthatiscompositionallaw
(ada).27It is the synonymity of the norms andregularities of law
(ada) with the goodness (dharma,adharma) of actions that grants to
self compositionalpowers that structure nature as an ethical order
that isSPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2 PAGE9APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND
ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES irreducible to mere
matter (bhta). Because natural
orderincorporatestherealmofagentialvaluesandreasonsandthedomainofsacricialnormsthatunderpincompositionallawandorder.284.EMBODIEDAGENCYANDTHEELEMENTALSELFThe
agentive and constructivist self is an embodiedself because only
the bodied self is minded, a locus
ofconsciousness(caitanya)andagency(karttva).29Further,itisonlythebodiedselfthatisalocusofgoodness(dharma)orcompositionallaw(ada).30Theliberatedselfwhichisdisembodied
is unminded; it is a de-composed self,
anelementarysubstancethatisdevoidofmentalandbodilypropertiesandthephenomenaofownershipandreexivity.This
elemental self exists as bare substance, a structuraldimension,
much like spatiality (dik) and temporality(kla), devoid of selfs
distinguishing (viea) propertiesof consciousness, agency, and law.
It appears as
themetaphysicalinfrastructureoftheagentialandethicalself,abaremetaphysicalindividual(viea)thatistheconditionofpossibilityofmentalcausationandnaturalcausalorder,much
as space and time are the condition of
possibilityofphysicalcausationandorder(PDS1994:319;NK1984:287,
15-16). This is the true form (svarpa) of the self,
itsexistenceasabaremetaphysicalsingularity(kevala).CONCLUSIONWe see
above that the assimilation of an ethics of actionand composition
into a metaphysics of self in
classicalVaieikastructuresanontologyinwhichselfisthesourceofagencyandnormativity,reason,andlaw,andthegooditself,
in nature. Such a self is sui generis a relational
andreexivesubstance,onwhichaccount,itisthegooditselfwhich can have
a good, and act for its own good, as
theconditionofpossibilityofrationalagencyandnaturalorderandcausation.NOTES1.
The term dierential (vaieika) owes to the concept ofa dierentiator
or distinguisher (viea) that individuateselementary substancesa
concept that is unique to classicalVaieikaas well as Vaieika's
ne-grained dierentiation oftheconstituentsoftheworld.2. This is a
non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) somewhat
inthetraditionofNCSDssuchasE.J.Lowesemergentsubstancedualism. See
E. J. Lowe, Personal Agency (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2008).3.
Ada literally means non-visible, unobserved, or unseen. Itrefers to
those natural forces or laws that are unobservable,non-visible, or
simply unknown. See Anantlal Thakur, Originand Development of the
Vaieika System. History of Science,Philosophy and Culture in Indian
Civilization, ii/4 (Delhi:
CentreforStudiesinCivilizations,2003),15.Theseforcesandlawsareregulative
principles that deal with the laws of composition
bywhichtheelementaryconstituentsoftheworldcometoconstituteaworldofcompositeobjects.Adaunderpinsphysicalcausalregularitiesastheirconditionofpossibilitybutremainsdistinctfrom
these. It also includes those forces that govern physicalcausal
relations that lie beyond a dened domain of
physicalcausalregularities,suchasmagnetism,etc.Physicalregularitiesrefertothingssuchasthewindblowinghorizontally,etc.(see,ibid.).
I term this compositional and constructivist, as well
asregulative,powerlaworcompositionallaw.4. Note that for the
purposes of this essay, nature, natural order,and natural world
refer specically to the domain of naturalcausal law (ada), qua
moral law (dharma), which
integratesallaspectsoftheuniverse,physical,mental,andmoral,astheirconditionofpossibility.5.
Reexiveisusedhereinthesenseofsomethingthatisdirectedback on itself.
Thus, I, for example, is a reexive
pronoun.Reexivitydoesnotrefertothereexivityofconsciousness,thatis,
the idea that consciousness is immediately aware of itselfin each
cognitive act, which Vaieika does not
acknowledge.ForVaieika,selfcannotbebothawareofitselfandofanotherobjectinthesamecognitiveact.Rather,selfcanbecognitivelygrasped
only in a succeeding cognition which has the rstcognition as its
object. Note that cognition of the true self
isconsideredtheultimategoodhere.6.
Note,itisthetrueself,ortheelementalself,thatisthehighestgood. The
vitalistic conception of self espoused here owesmuch to Upaniadic
claims of a self that is the essence of lifeand the world
(Bhadrayaka Upaniad, in Upaniads, editedand translated by Patrick
Olivelle, 2.4.12, 4.5.12-4 [Oxfordand New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996]; Kaha
Upaniad,inUpaniads,editedandtranslatedbyPatrickOlivelle,5.10-1[OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996];aswellastotheUpaniadicnotionofanagentiveself(ibid.,1.1;3.3-4).7.
The claim here is that a self must be the referent of the
rst-person pronoun I, given its unique usage, which
distinguishesitfromotherwords.TheuniquenatureofIseemstorefertoitsreexivityandtothedemandthatthisrequiresauniquesortofreferent,aself(PDS1994:79).Butthismaybedebatable.8.
Dharma and adharma are the inherited moral dispositions
andcapacitiesoftheindividualself,derivedfromthemoralqualityofitspreviousintentionalactions,whichareoftentranslatedasmerit
and demerit, respectively. They are the source of selfspleasurable
and painful experiences in its current embodimentbut also
underwrite mental and bodily life and natural order.See Praastapda,
Word Index to the Praastapdabhaya,
eds.J.BronkhorstandY.Ramseier(Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass,1994),31,80.9.
These are imprints of cognitive experiences, aections, andactions,
and include the learning of theoretical and
practicalskillsacquiredinaselfscurrentembodiment.Cognitiveimprintsareretainedandaccessedasmemories,dispositions,charactertraits,andtheoreticalandpracticalskills.10.
Number (sakhy) is the property of there being one or
more(selves).11. Pthaktva refers to the quality of intrinsic
metaphysicaldistinctivenessthatisresponsibleforthenumericalidentityandindividualityofasubstance.12.
They (pleasure, pain, desire, aversion) are always
expressed[sententially]with[referenceto]theI-object(ahakra)(ibid.,79).13.
Justasacharioteerisinferredbythemotionofthechariot,soa willful
controller (prayatnavan adhiht) [of the living body]is inferred by
such activity (pravtti) as is t for obtaining whatis advantageous
(hita) and such restraint (nivtti) as is t
foravoidingwhatisdisadvantageous(ahita),bothbeinglocatedinthebody(vigraha)(ibid.,78).14.
[Theselfisalsoinferred]fromsuchprocessesasbreathinginandbreathingout.Howso?Fromobservingthechanging(vikta)movement
of the air contained in the body, [we infer a
willfulcontrollerwhois]likeonewhopumpsthebellows.Onaccountof the
regular activity of opening and shutting the eyes,
[weinferacontrollerwhois]likeapuppeteer[directing]awoodenpuppet(ibid.,78).15.
From the growth of the body, the healing of its wounds
andfractures, etc., [we infer a controller] like a house-owner
[whoextendsandrepairshishouse].16. [Self is inferred from these]
two [types of movement,
bodilystrivingandrestraint,insofaras]theyenablethat[theacquisitionor
avoidance of desired and undesired objects,
respectively].Themovementofwind,etc.,ontheotherhand,doesnothavethe
capacity of bringing about and averting what is favourableand
unfavourable, respectively, for the wind, etc.
Jagada,Skti,inGopinathKavirajandPanditrajDhundhirajShastri,eds.Praastapdabhyam
of Mahaikalpa - Praastadevcrya, withCommentaries (up to Dravya),
Skt by Jagada Tarklakra,Setu by Padmanbha Mira and Vyomavat by
Vyomaivcrya,(Varanasi:ChowkhambAmarabhratPrakaana,1983),364.PAGE10
SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND
ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES The thrust of
Praastapdas argument (Praastapda. op. cit.,7680), and those of his
commentators, is that reexivity
andownershipofthissort,whetherself-consciousanddeliberative,orprimitive,requiresasubstancethatissuigenerisaself,thatis
to say, a substance that is sui generis self-referring. But
thismust be a non-physical substance because of the atomic
andcompositeontologyofthephysical(ibid.,77),andthefactthatphysical
properties lack reexive and relational features, i.e.,they lack
intentional contents or telic goals that refer back
totheirownerorbearer.SeealsoJagadaopcit.,364.17. See Christine
Korsgaard, Moral Animals, Lecture One: TheOrigin of the Good and
Our Animal Nature, people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.MA3.pdf.18.
From these notions of I and mine follow an aection for thepleasant
and aversion for the unpleasant; these aections
andaversionsgiverisetoactivityandrestraintofactivity;thencefollowdharmaandadharma...Seerdhara,Padrthadharmasagrahaof
Praastapda With the Nyyakandal of rdhara, ed.,
andtrans.,G.Jha(Varanasi:ChaukhambhaOrientalia,Reprint,1982),597.Asopposedtoappropriativeepistemicownershipofmentalstates,
their non-appropriative ownership lies merely in
theirmetaphysicalbasisinasubstantiveself,onwhichaccount,theyarephenomenallyandperspectivallyuniquelymyown(sva).19.
SeealsoChristineKorsgaard,op.cit.20.
Theconceptionofselfasbearerofthereexivityofconsciousnessandthereexivestructuresoflifeandthegoodlie,Isuggest,inearlyIndianphilosophy.SelfarisesintheUpaniadsasthelivingessence
of human life and the natural world as the vital forceor breath
that re-enters itself, goes back into itself, followingits
emergence as, and in, a world of objects. See Brian Smith,Reections
on Resemblance, Ritual, and Religion (New
York:OxfordUniversityPress,1989),58.21. Constructive refers to
constructing or composing something ina telic manner.
Constructivist or constructivism refers here tothe construction or
composition of ones own
psychophysicalselfandworldthroughtheethicalpowersassociatedwithonesintentionalactions.22.
Thenotion of the good or active goodness (dharma) is
adevelopmentoftheVedicconceptionofta.TheVedasproposean aesthetic,
harmonic and ethical principle, ta, a principle
ofactive,creativetruthoractiverealizationofthetruth(MichaelWitzel,
Vedas and Upaniads, Gavin Flood, ed., The BlackwellCompanion to
Hinduism [Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003],70), which is later
termed dharma. This principle maintains
acohesiveanddierentiatedorderofobjectsandactionsacrossthe physical,
moral, and divine realms, biological and socialphenomena. Moreover,
as we see below, just as sacricialactions institute or realize ta
in the Vedic sacrice, so dointentional actions institute dharma in
classical Vaieika in amoregeneralizedmanner.23.
Thenotionofrationalityhereisoneofsacricingorgiving-upthefalsesenseofself,quatheI-object(ahakra),inthoughtandaction.ThisaccordswithChakrabartisthesisthatsacriceisthehumanrationalactivityparexcellenceinIndianphilosophy.Ahumanbeinghasthecapacitytoriseabovenarrowself-interestand
perform sacrices both in the literal and ritualistic sensefor the
sake of unseen results in the future. Further, [o]nlyhumans are
capable of dharma considerations of piety
andmorality,rightorwrongconductandreectiveanalysis(vicra),and aware
of what causes what (karaja) while consciouslyseeking pleasure.
Arindam Chakrabarti, Rationality in
IndianPhilosophy,E.DeutschandR.Bontekoe,eds.,ACompaniontoWorldPhilosophies(Oxford:Wiley-Blackwell,1999),260-61.24.
rdharaexplainsthatethicalpractices,epistemicandbehavioral,mustleadtotheattainmentofwisdomoftheform:Iamnot,nothingismineand[thereis]noI(SmkhyaKrika64,quotedin
rdhara. op cit., 596, revised trans.), and this is true
self-knowledge.OrasUdayanaexplains,theethicalselfisthatwhichhasovercomenarrowpassions,interests,andlimitations:[It]isnot
aected by . . . [the] passions; for one who has discardedall
limitations has no attachment to progeny or riches becausehe is not
beneted by these. . . . This false cognition [of self]is dissipated
by right knowledge. As to this right knowledge,it arises gradually
through listening to scriptural
statements,thenmeditationontheseandsoon.Thecause(ofdesiresandaversions)beingthuseliminated,theeect[thatis,desireandaversion]
is also eliminated. Udayana, tmatattvaviveka
ofUdayancryawithTranslation,ExplanationandAnalytical-CriticalSurvey,
N. S. Dravid, ed. and trans. (Shimla: Indian Institute
ofAdvancedStudies,1995),378,revisedtrans.25. The virtuous (dharma)
and non-virtuous (adharma) actions
ofbeings...actonatomstoformbodiesasameansofexperiencingpainandpleasurethatisconsistentwiththequalityoftheirpastactions.Godsandsagesthusobtainbodiesthatresultfromtheaction
of meritorious deeds on atomic matter, whereas
insect-bodiesareappropriatetoexperiencingpunishmentsthataccordwiththepastdeedsofthesebeings(PDS1994:31).NotetheparallelwithearlyBrahmanicalthought,whichconstruesselfassomethingthatisself-distributingandreturnstoin-formitselfasself(tman).SeeBrianSmith,ReectionsonResemblance,RitualandReligion(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1989),58.26.
Historical actions refer to selfs actions in past lives
whosemoralquality,ormoralgenealogy,isrecordedasaccruedvirtue(dharma)andnon-virtue(adharma).Accruedvirtueandnon-virtueinuencetherangeofpossibleexperiencesofpleasureandpainthataselfcanenjoyinthislifeandthesortofbodyitcanhaveabodythataordsthepossibilityofsuchexperiences.27.
The inuence of early Brahmanical thought is evident
here.tmanrefersintheseearlyphilosophiestobody,self,andsocio-ontologicalidentity.ItisconstructedandperfectedintheVedicsacrice.Selfismade(saskurute)t,whole,andperfect,bythesacricialactivityquaself-perfection(tma-saskti)asaworkofart(ilpa).Sacricialactivitythusexpressesandregeneratesthesacricerstman,hispsychophysicalandsocio-ontologicalbeing.BrianSmith,ReectionsonResemblance,101.Human
beings depend on ritual or sacricial actions
(karman)forcreatinganontologicallyviableselfandtheworldthatselfinhabits.
So that both self and world emerge as constructsof sacricial
action: a human being takes birth, is embodied,in a world whose
construction is measured by his
sacricialactions.Sacriceistheconstitutionofbeingitself,humanandcosmic,
through a process of ritual construction (ibid., 101-2).As in
Vedism, in classical Vaieika, human life is a process
ofconstructingandreningaself,antman,bysacricialactivitywhere
sacrice refers to giving-up of the I-object rather
thanritualsacrice,andreferstoallactionsratherthanmerelyritualaction.28.
Nature, if we are to use the term, pertains not merely to
thematerial since matter (bhta) is considered dead or inactive
inVaieikaintheabsenceofitsactivation,i.e.,theactivationofitsproperties
and powers, by selfs vital powers of dharma
whichinstitutecompositionallaw(Praastapda.opcit.,57-58).29.
Thisisanimportantnon-CartesianaspectofVaieikassubstancemetaphysics.30.
In thePDS, the post-mortem self that is the bearer
ofadapossessesasubtlebody(ibid.,358-59).BIBLIOGRAPHYSANSKRIT TEXTS
AND ABBREVIATIONS TV tmatattvaviveka.N.S.Dravid,ed.withtrans.
tmatattvavivekaofUdayancryawithTranslation,ExplanationandAnalytical-CriticalSurvey.Shimla:IndianInstituteofAdvancedStudies,1995.PDS
Padrthadharmasagraha. J. Bronkhorst and Y. Ramseier,eds. Word Index
to the Praastapdabhaya. Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass,1994.PDS(J)
Padrthadharmasagraha. G. Jha, ed., and trans.Padrthadharmasagraha
of Praastapda with
theNyyakandalofSrdhara.Varanasi:ChaukhambhaOrientalia,Reprint,1982.NK
Nyyakandal.V.P.Dvivedin,ed.TheBhyaofPraastapdatogether with
Nyyakandal of rdhara, 2nd ed. Delhi:
SriSatguruPublications,1984.NK(J)
Nyyakandal.G.Jha,ed.andtrans.PadrthadharmasagrahaofPraastapdawiththeNyyakandalofrdhara.Varanasi:ChaukhambhaOrientalia,reprint1982.Ki
Kiraval. Jitendra S. Jetly, ed. Praastapdabhyam
withtheCommentaryKiravalofUdayancrya.Baroda:OrientalInstitute,1971.SPRING2015
| VOLUME14| NUMBER2PAGE11APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIESS
Skti.GopinathKavirajandPanditrajDhundhirajShastri,eds.Praastapdabhyam
of Mahaikalpa Praastadevcrya,with Commentaries (up to Dravya), Skt
by JagadaTarklakra, Setu by Padmanbha Mira and Vyomavatby
Vyomaivcrya. Varanasi: Chowkhamb AmarabhratPrakaana,1983.TC
Tattvacintmai.S.H.PhillipsandN.S.RamanujaTatacharya,trans.EpistemologyofPerception:GageasTattvacintmai,Jewel
of Reection on the Truth (about Epistemology):The Perception
Chapter (Pratyaka-khaa). New York: TheUniversityPressGroup,2004.BUp
Bhadrayaka Upaniad. Patrick Olivelle, ed. and trans.Upaniads.
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press1996.KaUp Kaha Upaniad.
Patrick Olivelle, ed. and trans.
Upaniads.OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996.WESTERN
LANGUAGE REFERENCES
Chakrabarti,Arindam.RationalityinIndianPhilosophy.InACompaniontoWorldPhilosophies,editedbyE.DeutschandR.Bontekoe,25978.Oxford:Wiley-Blackwell,1999..
The Connecting Manas: Inner Sense, Common Sense, orthe Organ of
Imagination. In After Appropriation: Explorations inIntercultural
Philosophy and Religion, edited by Morny Joy,
5776.Calgary:UniversityofCalgaryPress,2011.Ganeri, Jonardon.
Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work
ofReason.London:Routledge,2001..TheSelf:Naturalism,Consciousness,andtheFirst-PersonStance.Oxford:ClarendonPress,2012.Kim,
Jaegwon. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough.
Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2005.Korsgaard,Christine.TheSourcesofNormativity,TheTannerLecturesonHumanValues,DeliveredatClareHall,CambridgeUniversity,November16
and 17, 1992. Accessed September 16, 2014.
tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/k/korsgaard94.pdf.. Moral
Animals, Lecture One: The Origin of the Good and OurAnimal Nature.
Accessed September 15, 2014.
people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.MA3.pdf.Lowe,E.J.PersonalAgency.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008.McDowell,John.MindandWorld,2nded.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1996..TwoSortsofNaturalism.InMind,Value,andReality,16797.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1998..
Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind. In Naturalism
inQuestion,editedbyM.DeCaroandD.Macarthur,91105.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2004.Mohanty,
J. N. Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought.
Oxford:ClarendonPress,1992.Smith,B.K.ReectionsonResemblance,Ritual,andReligion.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1989.Sosa,
E. Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation.
InMidwestStudiesinPhilosophy9(1984):27181.Thakur,A.OriginandDevelopmentoftheVaieikaSystem.HistoryofScience,Philosophy,andCultureinIndianCivilization,ii/4.Delhi:CentreforStudiesinCivilizations,2003.Witzel,
M. Vedas and Upaniads. In The Blackwell Companion
toHinduism,editedbyGavinFlood,68101.Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,2003.Mind
and Cognition: The Nyya Perspective K. S. Prasad
UNIVERSITYOFHYDERABADAllofusengageinvariouscognitiveepisodesthroughoutour
life. Whether it is reading a book, talking to a friend,watching a
movie, or simply listening to music, we
areattendingto,makingsenseof,andsometimesrememberingwhatwesaworheard.Whileallthesecognitiveepisodesare
routine, seemingly simple, and often eortless, theprocess involved
in them is more sophisticated than
isapparent.Analysisofcognitionleadstotheconclusionthatitisspeciedbyacertaintypeofconnectionbetweenthecognizingpersonandtheobjectcognized.IfIassertthatIcognizesomethingaboutsomethingelse,thisimpliesthefollowing:rstly,thatmycognitionrelatestosomeobject;secondly,
that this cognition belongs to me, that it is mewho implements the
process of cognition; and thirdly,I claim to express an actual
state of things. A
completeaccountofthecognitivesystemmustexplainhowittakesinformation
in and retains as well as how it
transmits.AmongclassicalIndianthinkers,reectiononcognitionanditsepistemicstatuswasinitiatedbyGautamainhisNyya-sutras.
Indian philosophers in general and the Naiyyikasin particular have
addressed issues on cognition withinthe framework of their
discussion on pramas (methodsof valid cognition). An eort is made
in this paper
topresenttheNyyatheoryofcognition.Ibeginwithanoteontranslationofthetermbuddhi,whichisanapproximateequivalentofthetermcognitionfollowedbythenatureof
buddhi as understood in the Nyya system. Next, Iconsider the
cognitive apparatus, which includes
variouscomponentsinvolvedincognition,and,nally,theroleofmindincognitiveprocess.IAccording
to the Naiyyikas, buddhi is taken to meanthe same as jna
(cognition), upalabdhi (apprehension),bodha (understanding),
pratyaya (cognizance), andadhyavasya (ascertainment). In other
words, they treatthese three words almost as synonyms.1 Gautama
hasdevoted fty six sutras in Nyya-stras on
cognition(buddhi).2Twoimportantissueswereraisedanddiscussedin this
connection. They are as follows: 1) What iscognition as a fact of
reality? 2) Is cognition enduring
orephemeral?Cognition,accordingtoNyya,consistsinthemanifestationofobjects(arthaprakaobuddhih).Thingsaremademanifestorrevealedtousonlywhentheybecomeobjects
of cognition. According to Nyya, cognition is aquality. Vtsyayana
states, of what then is the quality?
ItisthequalityoftheCognitiveAgent,asitishewhoisthecontroller.Asamatteroffact,thecontrolleristhecognizerand
that which is controlled is the instrument.3 It cannotbe quality of
any material substance, for, unlike that, itdoes not admit of
external perception. Physical
qualitiesareperceivedbytheexternalsenses,butcognitionisnotso
perceived. Being thus fundamentally dierent fromall physical
qualities, cognition is to be regarded as thequality of the
immaterial substance called self. To quote:PAGE12 SPRING2015 |
VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIESBy reason of EliminationThe quality of
cognition
beingdeniedinreferencetotheBody,theSense-organsandtheMind,4 there
being no other Substance left to which thesaid quality could
belong, and the Soul5 being the onlylikely Substance leftCognition
is regarded as being
thequalityoftheSoul.6Further,cognitionisnotanessentialqualityoftheself.Theselfhasacquiredthispropertyinitsbodilysettingand,hence,cognitionisephemeral.IIInasimplecognitiveprocesslikeperceptionwehavefourentities
and three connections. The four entities are
self,object,sense-organ,andmind.Thethreeconnectionsaresense-object,sense-mind,andmind-self.The
presence of self is an indubitable fact in the
processofcognition.EventhoseschoolsofIndianphilosophythatare
skeptical about the existence of self also
recognizetheimportanceofacognizerincognitionthoughtherearedierencesamongthemwithregardtotheessentialnatureof
the cognizer. Self (tman) is the rst in Gautamas listof objects of
cognition. According to Gautama, the
marksoftheselfaredesire,aversion,eort,pleasure,pain,andcognition.7Itisonthebasisofthesemarksthatwecaninferthe
existence of self. Uddyotakara, while commenting
onthis,explicitlystates,becauseDesireandtheresthavethesameobjectasRecognition,theyprovethatallcognitionsappearingintheRecognitionmusthaveacommonagent;itisawell-knownfactthatnorecognitionofcognitionsispossible,(a)whenthesecognitionshavedierentagents,or(b)whentheirobjectsarenotthesame,or(c)whentheyarebroughtaboutbydierentinstruments.8Wend,forinstance,
a cognizer can remember and recognize what(s)he has perceived and
not what remained unperceivedfor him/her or what others might have
perceived. Desireto acquire a thing or aversion towards a thing
originatesonlyfromtheremembranceofpreviouscognitions.Thisispossibleonlywhenallthecognitiveeventsareregisteredasattributesofthecognizer.Thus,selfisthesubstratumofcognitions.Proper
cognition presupposes an inventory of objects
ofcognitionthatarediscussedunderthecaptionofprameyasin Nyya
philosophy.9 These prameyas constitute thebasic types of cognitive
reality that exist independent
ofcognitions.Wecanaswellbringthemundertwovarieties.They are
entities that are directly related to the
senses,suchastable,etc.,andtheotherentitiesthatareindirectlyrelated
to the sense-organs, such as color of the table,etc. We cannot
withhold the acceptance of the
evidentialvalueofourexperiencethatguaranteestherealityoftheseobjects
of the world. A detailed Nyya discussion on
thecognitionofdierentkindsofobjectsisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.IratherconnemyselftothepointthattheNaiyyikasbeingcommittedtorealismbelieveintherealityof
the external world consisting of objects, and a
properunderstandingoftheseobjectsalonewillshowthewaytotheattainmentofthehighestgood.The
next entity in the cognitive process is the sense-organ. According
to Gautama, the sense-organs are
thirdinthelistofobjectsofcognition(prameyas).Therearesixsense-organs.
Of these, ve are external senses and oneis internal sense.10Gautama
establishes the reality of
theveexternalsense-organsintwostages.Tobeginwith,herejectstheviewthatthereisonlyoneexternalsense,thecutaneous
sense-organ, and the other sense-organs
aresimplythespecialpartsofit.Hethenproceedstoexplaintherealityofalltheveexternalsense-organs.Vtsyyana,while
commenting on Nyya-stra 3.1.54, explains thatthe existence of ve
sense-organs is inferred from vedistinct varieties of sense
experiences, namely,
touch,color,smell,taste,andsound.Thesevedistincttypesofsense
experiences require ve distinct sense-organs
fortheircognition.Forinstance,coloriscognizedbythevisualsense-organ(eye)butdoesnotapprehendsmell.Similarly,weinfertheexistenceoftheolfactorysense,whichservesthepurposeofapprehendingsmell.Likewise,theexistenceof
other sense-organs also can be inferred.11 Thus,
fromthevekindsofapprehensions,visual,auditory,olfactory,gustatory,andcutaneous,wecanvalidlyinfertheexistenceofthevedierentsense-organs.Further,themultiplicityof
the sense-organs is also inferred from the diversity oftheir
locations. These sense-organs are responsible
forreceivingthesensations.Sensationsarethosewhichmakethe object
intelligible to the cognizer through mind. It isimperative that the
sense-organs should function and
beincontactwiththemindbeforesensationsofobjectscanhave some meaning
to the cognizer. This takes us to
theconceptofmindinthecognitiveprocess.IIIThe concept of mind has a
long history in Indianphilosophical scenario. However, my task here
is notto present an elaborate analysis of the development ofthis
concept but rather to situate its role in the cognitiveprocess.
Mind is considered both as object of
cognitionandalsoamaterialmeansforcognitioninNyyaliterature.Itissixthinthelistofobjectsofcognitionenumeratedinthe
Nyya-stras.12 Gautama establishes the existence
ofmindonthebasisofthenon-simultaneityofcognitionsbydierentsense-organs.13Itisamatterofcommonobservationthateventhoughseveralsensibleobjectsareincontactwiththeirrespectivesense-organsatoneandthesametime,thereisnosimultaneouscognition
of these objects. From this we conclude
thatthereissomeinstrumentalcauseotherthanthevesense-organs that is
responsible for all our cognitions, and
thatinstrumentalcauseisnoneotherthanthemind.Ifmerelythesense-objectcontactwereabletobringthecognitions,independentlyofmind-sensecontact,thenweshouldhavesimultaneouscognitions,whichisnotthecase.Hencewehavetoadmittheexistenceofmindasaninstrumentthatconnectsthesensationswiththecognizer.Anexampleofour
everyday behavior may serve to contradict this
view.Imaginethatwearewatchingaprogramontelevision.Apartfrom
cognizing the visual images, we are also cognizingauditory
sensations simultaneously. This apprehension
ofsimultaneityamongcognitions,accordingtoNyya,isduetothefactthatmindcomesincontactwithdierentsensesinsucharapidsuccession;itlookslikeapprehensionofacircleofre-brand.14Whenare-brandmovesrapidlyinacircle,
there is a succession among several cognitions ofthe re; but
because it moves with extreme rapidity, weperceive continuity in
the circle of re as if it is a singleSPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2
PAGE13APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND
PHILOSOPHIEScontinuous circle of re. The fact of non-simultaneity
ofcognitions also suggests that there is only one mind in
abody.ToquoteVtsyyana,Iftherewereseveralminds,itwouldbepossibleforseveralsense-organstobeincontactwith
several minds simultaneously; whereby there shouldbe several
cognitions appearing (through these
contacts)atoneandthesametimebutthisneverhappenshencethe conclusion
is that, inasmuch as cognitions of
thingsappearonlyoneafteranotherandneversimultaneouslythereisasinglemind(inonebody).15Anotherargumenttodemonstratetheexistenceofmindisbasedoninternalperceptions
of our cognitions. It is a fact that
cognitionsofpleasure,pain,aversionandthelikearedierentfromthe
objects of the external senses; still, they are objectsof cognition
and hence they need an instrument for themanifestations of such
cognitions. Such an instrument isnone other than the mind.16 The
fact that our feelings arealso successive and not simultaneous
supports the ideathat there is only one mind in one body. Even our
eortsthat are based on our feelings appear only one after
theother.Havingestablishedtheexistenceofmind,weneedtolookatthenatureofmind.AccordingtoNyya,mindisanon-physicalsubstance.Itisasubstancebecauseithasqualitiessuch
as conjunction, and it is non-physical because it isnot constituted
by any of the physical elements of earth,water, etc. Further, it is
atomic in magnitude. If the mindis something non-atomic in
magnitude, then it is quitepossible for the mind to come in contact
with
severalsense-organsatoneandthesametimethroughitsdierentparts,givingrisetosimultaneouscognitions.Thefactthatourcognitionsarealwayssuccessiveandnotsimultaneousestablishesthatthemindisatomicinmagnitude.17Withregardtothelocationofthemind,Upaniadsconsidertheheartastheseatofthemind,18whereastheNaiyyikasare
more general in stating that the mind lies within thebody.19 Here
the term lies should not be taken literallyin the sense of a
container and contained. Uddyotakarawhile commenting on this
explicitly states that all that
ismeantbythemindlyingwithinthebodyisthatthemindnever functions
except through the body.20 Of course,the functioning of the mind
has meaning only when it isconnected with the self. Thus, according
to the Nyya,mindisaninstrumentalcauseofcognitionthroughwhichall
cognitions, both external and internal objects,
getactualized.Ifwetakeselftobethecognizerofcognitions,thenmindisthematerialmeansofcommunicatingtotheselftheimpressionsaswellassensationsbroughtthroughsense-objectcontact.Asimplecognitiveprocesssuchasperceptionleadingtoa
denite cognition involves, to begin with, the contactof the
sense-organ with the object. Of the ve externalsenses, the sense of
sight and sense of touch can giveus perception of substances, while
the sense of
smell,senseofsound,andsenseoftastecangiveusperceptionof qualities.
These sense-organs are capable of
receivingsensationsoftheirrespectiveobjectsonlywhentheyareincontactwiththeirrespectiveobjects.Thiscontactbetweenasense-organanditsobjectistermedassamyoga.Amongthedierentsensoryinputsreceived,themindcomesintocontact
with only one sensory input at a time
dependingontheselectiveattentionofthecognizersothatonlyonesensationreachesthecognizeratonetime.Thesensationsoreceivedfromthemindisanapprehensionoftheobjectassomethingindeniteanduncharacterized.Itisasimpleapprehensionoftheexistenceandattributesofanobjectwithout
any corresponding judgment of it. According toNyya this cognition
is termed in as nirvikalpaka. It is aconscious state but not a
self-conscious state. To be
self-consciousistocognizecognitionexplicitlyascognitionofthis or
that object. In the case of a perceptual
judgment,thisisanapple,therststepisthecontactofthesensewith the
object, which immediately leads to a
simpleapprehensionoftheappleassomethingasindenite.Theapprehensionofanindeniteobjectbeingassociatedwithacertainclassnameinourpastexperiencerevivestheword-imageansweringtothatname.Withthisweremembertheclass-nameoftheperceivedobjectandcallitbythatname.It
is here that we have determinate perceptual cognitionof the object
expressed as this is an apple. In Nyyaterminology this is known as
savikalpaka cognition.21
Thisdoesnotaddanythingthatisnotcontainedintheobject;rather,itbringsachangeintheperceptiveconsciousnessof
the object. There is a development from the feeling
ofsomethingtheretoanarticulatedexpressionofthefeelingofadenitecognitionofanobject.Indianthinkersingeneralhaverecognizedtheimportanceofmindinthiscognitiveprocesssincetimeimmemorial.InBrhadrayakaUpaniad,wehavethefollowingverse:My
mind was elsewhere; I did not see it. My mind waselsewhere, I did
not hear it. It is through the mind
thatoneseesandhears.22Commentingonthis,ankaracryasays,Thereisamindapartfromtheexternalorganssuchastheear.Foritiswell-knownfactthatevenwhenthereisaconnectionbetweentheexternalorgan,the
object and the self, a man does not
perceivethatobject,whichmaybejustinfront,andwhenasked, Have you
seen this form? he says,
MymindwaselsewhereIwasabsentminded,Ididnotseeit.Similarlywhenasked,haveyouheardwhat
I have said he says, I was absent-minded,I did not hear it.
Therefore it is understood
thatsomethingelse,viz.theinternalorgancalledmind,which joins itself
to the objects of all the
organs,exists,intheabsenceofwhichtheeyeandotherorgansfailtoperceivetheirrespectiveobjects.23This
clearly indicates the importance of mind in thecognitive process.
There can be no cognition unless
themindrespondstotheinuencesofthesurroundingworld.Atanymomentofinattentionorabsent-mindednesswedonot
perceive sounds or things other than those in
whichweareengrossed,althoughthesoundsorthingsmaybeacting on our
sense. Thus, in a cognitive process such
asperception,mindmustbeincontactwiththeobjectthroughthemediumofthesense-organsontheonehand,andwiththeselfontheother,andinthissensemindseemstobealiaisonbetweentheobjectsandsenseorgansononehandandwiththeselfontheother.However,cognitionssuchaspleasureandthelikearedirectlyapprehendedbytheselfPAGE14
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ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES
throughtheinstrumentalityofmind.Ineithercase,theroleofthemindisindispensable.NOTES1.
Buddhi upalabdhijnamityanararthantaram, Nyya-stra.1.1.15, trans. M.
M. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana (Delhi:
MotilalBanarsidas,1981),7.Nyya-bhsya,3.2.3,trans.GanganathJha,TheNyya-strasofGautamawiththeBhyaofVtsyyanaandthe
Vrika of Uddyotakara, Vol. III (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidas,1984),1269.2.
Nyya-stra.1.1.15&3.2.1-55,trans.Vidyabhusana,7.&10527.3.
Nyya-bhya.3.2.19,trans.Jha,1332.4. Mind is a translation for the
Sanskrit term manas, which
isregardedasinnersenseinclassicalIndiantradition.5.
Soulisasynonymforself.6. Nyya-vrika.3.2.39.Ibid.,1370.7. Ichcha
dvea prayatna sukha duhkha jnani tmanolingam
iti.Nyya-stra.1.1.10,trans.Vidyabhusana,6.8.
Nyya-vrika.1.1.10,trans.Jha,220.9.
tmaarrendriyrthabuddhimanahpravttidoapretyabhvaphaladuhkhapavargstu
prameyam. Nyya-stra. 1.1.9, trans.Vidyabhusana,5.10. It is
interesting to note that in Nyya-stras 3.1.54-55, we
ndonlyvesense-organslistedonthebasisoftheircorrespondingobjects.Mind,whichisconsideredanorganofinternalperceptioninstra3.1.16,isnotmentionedalongwiththesesense-organs.However,Gangesopadhyaya,inhisTattvacintamani,enumeratessix
senses: the ve external and the one internal. S.
C.Vidyabhusana,HistoryofIndianLogic(Delhi:MotilalBanarsidas,1978),411.11.
Nyya-bhya.3.1.54,trans.Jha,1232.12.
Nyya-stra.1.1.9,trans.Vidyabhusana,5.13.
Jnyaugapadyatekammanah.Nyya-stras.3.2.56.Ibid.,127.14.
Altchakradaranavat tadupalabdhirusacrat.
Nyya-stras.3.2.58.Ibid.,128.15. Nyya-bhya.3.2.56,trans.Jha,1396.16.
manograham sukham duhkhamiccha dveo matih ktih,Viswanatha
Nyaypancanana, Bhsapariccheda 57, & Sktkaresukhdnam karaam
manocchate, Ibid., 85. Trans. SwamiMadhavananda (Calcutta: Advaita
Ashrama, 1977), 85 &175. Sukhdyupalabdhisdhanamindriyam manah
taccapratytmniyatatvtanantam paramurpam nityam ca.Annambhatta,
Tarkasamgraha, Section II. 9, trans.
SwamiVirupakshananada(Madras:SriRamakrishnaMath,1994),52.17.
Nyya-bhya.3.2.59,trans.Jha,1399.18. Aitareya Upaniad. III.i.2,
trans. Swami Gambhirananda,
EightUpaniads,Vol.II(Calcutta:AdvaitaAshrama,1992),63.19. Nantah
arravttitvnmanasah, Nyya-stras. 3.2.26, trans.Vidyabhusana,114.20.
Nyya-vrika.3.2.26,trans.Jha,1344.21. We do not nd explicit
reference to the distinction ofnirvikalpaka and savikalpa states of
perception in Nyya-stras, Nyya-bhsya, and Nyya-vrika. Vcaspatimira,
in hisNyya-vrika ttparyatka, interprets the words avyapadayaand
vyavasyatmakam present in the Nyya-stra denition ofperception to
mean nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, respectively.Later Naiyyikas,
following Vcaspati, distinguished
betweennirvikalpakaandsavikalpakaastwostagesofthesameperceptualprocess.
Indriyrthsannikarajanyamjnam
pratyakam.Taddvividhamnirvikalpamsavikalpamcheti.Tatraniprakrakamjnam
nirvikalpakam yathedamkincit saprakrakam jnamsavikalpakam yath
ditthoyam brhmaoyam symoyampcakoyamiti. Annambhatta, Tarkasamgraha.
Section IV,
32,transl.SwamiVirupakshananada(Madras:SriRamakrishnaMath,1994),79.22.
BhadrayakaUpaniad(withthecommentaryofSankaracarya),I.v.3, trans.
Swami Madhavananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama,1988),147.23.
Ibid.,148.Lost in Translation? The Upaniadic Story about Da and
Interpretational Issues in Analytic Philosophy Prasanta S.
Bandyopadhyay MONTANASTATEUNIVERSITYR. Venkata Raghavan
UNIVERSITYOFHYDERABADDon Wallace Freeman Dcruz
UNIVERSITYOFHYDERABADOVERVIEWIn the Bhadrayaka Upaniad, one of the
principalUpaniads, we nd a venerable and famous story wherethe god
Prajpati separately instructs three groups ofpeople (gods, humans,
and demons) simply by utteringthe syllable Da. What is remarkable
about this passageis the way this single syllable is interpreted in
dierentways,datt,dmyatanddayadhvam,bythethreegroups,witheachinterpretationconsideredcorrectbythespeaker,Prajpati.Thisstory,whichwaslargelyknownonlytoIndianreadersoftheUpaniads,becameafeatureoftheEuropeanimaginationofIndiain1922whenitwasreferencedinthesection
What the Thunder said in T. S. Eliots The WasteLand.1In this paper,
our concern is not with ethics but theoriesof meaning and
interpretation: How can all divergentinterpretations of a single
expression be correct,
and,indeed,endorsedbythespeaker?Asanexerciseincross-culturalphilosophicalreection,wewillconsidersomeofthe
leading modern theories of meaningthose of Grice,Quine, and
Davidsonin order to see if the
Upaniadicstoryreceivesanaturalhomeinanyofthem.Thestructureof our
paper will be as follows. We will rst narrate thestory from the
Bhadrayaka Upaniad (section 1). Wewill then discuss Paul Grices
(1957) account of meaning,followed by Quines (1960), which
challenges the formeraccount. In this connection, we will also
address DonaldDavidsonswork,which,inturn,contrarytoQuine,pleadsfor
the possibility of radical interpretation
(Davidson,1984)(section2).Then,wewillcomparetheviewsofGrice,Quine,
and Davidson with the Upaniadic story to
seewhetherthestorycanbeanalyzedintermsofanyoftheiraccounts(section3).Finally,weconcludethatthestoryisbestunderstoodthroughGricestheoryofmeaningratherthanQuinesorDavidsons.1.THEUPANISHADICSTORYPrajpatiisoneofthecreatorguresintheVedicliterature.ThestoryinBhadrayakaUpaniadisaboutPrajpatiandhis
three childrengods, human beings, and
demons.2Aftercompletingtheirstudyunderhimasvedicstudents,it was
time to say a respectful goodbye to their father.SPRING2015 |
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PHILOSOPHERS AND
PHILOSOPHIESEachposedaquestiontoPrajpati.Godsaskedhim,TheVenerable
Lord, please instruct us. Prajpati replied
byutteringthesyllable,Da,andasked,Haveyouunderstoodme?Daisnotawordinanylanguage,includingSanskrit(inwhichthestorywaswritten).Godsreplied,YesSir,wedid.
You told us to practice restraint (dmyat). Prajpatireplied, Yes,
you have understood me perfectly well.The gods are said to be
naturally self-indulgent and soPrajpati instructs them to practice
restraint.3 Then it
wastheturnofthehumans.Theyasked,TheVenerableLord,pleaseinstructus.Prajpatirepliedbyutteringthesamesyllable,
Da, and asked, Have you understood me?Humans replied, Yes, Sir, we
have understood you.
Youaskedustopracticecharity(datt).Prajpatireplied,Yes,youhaveunderstoodmeperfectlywell.Menarenaturallyavaricious
and so they are instructed to distribute theirwealth to the best of
their ability.4 Demons repeated
thesamequestiontotheirspiritualfather.Prajpatirepliedtothembyutteringthesamesyllable,Da,andasked,Haveyou
understood me? Demons replied, Yes, Sir, we haveunderstood you. You
asked us to practice
compassion(dayadhvam).Prajpatireplied,Yes,youhaveunderstoodme
perfectly well. Since the demons are by nature crueland prone to
inict injury on others, they are instructedto be compassionate and
kind to all.5What we notice
inthisstoryisageneralthemeofhowword-playandfancifuletymologyisalargerpartofUpaniadicliterature.2.MEANING,TRANSLATION,ANDRADICALINTERPRETATIONINANALYTICTRADITIONThe
role of meaning in its dierent shades, along
withotherissues,dominatedordinarylanguagephilosophy,aninuentialmovementinthemiddleoftwentiethcentury.Todevelophisversionofordinarylanguagephilosophy,Gricebeginsbydistinguishingwhathecallsnaturalmeanings(asinthosespotsmeanmeasles)fromwhathecallsnon-naturalmeaning(asThosethreeringsonthebellmeanthat
the bus is full). Since we are concerned with
non-naturalmeaning,wewillbeginwithhisdenitionofnon-naturalmeaning:AmeantsomethingbyxisroughlythesameasAutteredxwith