Asean Dollar

8/11/2019 Asean Dollar

1/41

ASEAN DOLLAR : A Common Currency Establishment

for Stronger Economic Growth of ASEAN Region1

Aman Agarwal2

Indian Institute of Finance, Delhi, INDIAIIF Business School, GGS Indraprastha University, Delhi, INDIA

J. H.W. Penm3

School of Finance and Applied Statistics, Faculty of Economics and CommerceThe Australian National University, Canberra, AUSTRALIA

Wing-Keung Wong4

Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, SINGAPORE

Lynn M. Martin5

University of Central England, UNITED KINGDOM

________________________The authors gratefully acknowledge the technical support of Australian National University, NationalUniversity of Singapore, Indian Institute of Finance and IIF Business School. We would like to thank KantiSwarup [IIF, India], R. D. Terrell [ANU, Australia], Donato Masciandaro [Bocconi University, Itlay]Roberto F. Ocampo [AIM, Philippines] and J.D. Agarwal [IIF, India] who have reviewed our work andhave given us their valuable comments. The views and reviews presented in the paper are views andopinions of the authors, based on our research and experience and do not depict institutional or countriesviews or of the institutions the authors are associated with. All errors and omissions are our own.

1 Paper invited to be delivered as Special address in the Editorial Forum at the International Conferenceon Business, Banking and Finance, The UWI Department of Management Studies, and The UWI -Institute of Business, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, April 27-29, 2004.

2 Professor & Director, IIF Business School (GGS Indraprastha University), Delhi, INDIA. The authoris also Honorary Professor of Uzbekistan, Tashkent State University of Economics, UZBEKISTAN;Adjunct Professor of Finance & Director (Offg), Indian Institute of Finance, Delhi,INDIA; AssociateEditor, Finance India, Delhi, INDIA and Secretary & Treasurer, Jyoti Foundation, Delhi, INDIAContact: Director, IIF Business School, [GGS Indraprastha University], 4, Community Center II,Ashok Vihar, Phase II, Delhi 110052. INDIA, Phone: 0091-11-27437917, 27451212; Fax: 0091-11-27454128; Email: [email protected] OR [email protected] OR [email protected]

3

Research Fellow, School of Finance and Applied Statistics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce,Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T. 0200, AUSTRALIA, Phone: 0061-2-61250535, Fax:0061-2-61250087, Email: [email protected]

4 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, NationalUniversity of Singapore, 1 Arts Link, SINGAPORE 117570. Phone 0065-68746014, Fax 0065-67752646, Email: [email protected]

5 Professor & Director (EU Asia Programmes), Business School, University of Central England,Birmingham, B42 2SU, UNITED KINGDOM. Phone +44-121-3317796 / 6440, Fax +44-121-3316366, Email: [email protected]


2/41

Agarwal, Penm, Wong & Martin "ASEAN DOLLAR : A Common Currency Establishment forStronger Economic Growth of ASEAN Region"

2

ABSTRACT

The current optimal strategy for ASEAN countries is to assess whether the necessary

environments exist for the establishment of a well-integrated common financial market

for the ASEAN area, and consequently support for a single currency. The currency is for

discussion purposes termed the ASEAN Dollar. In this paper we focus on a practical

application, involving two components: 1) The six convergence criteria that we propose

each ASEAN country should meet in order to become eligible for the ASEAN Dollar;

and 2) Establishment of the ASEAN Economic and Currency Community (AECC).

Further, measurement of the evolution of financial market integration in the ASEAN

countries will be investigated. Patterned vector timeseries modelling will be utilised to

set up and monitor economic and financial integration indicators. Those economic and

financial integration indicators will be applied to measure the following three broad

financial categories in the ASEAN countries: a) credit and bond market integration and

cointegration to establish the nature of short and long-term co-movement; b) Stock

market integration and cointegration to establish the nature of short and long-term co-

movement; and c) Exchange rate market integration and cointegration to establish the

nature of short and long-term co-movement. Subsequent evaluation of key indicators of

economic and financial integration will also be undertaken.

Keywords: ASEAN Dollar; Convergence Criteria; Market Integration;Common Currency; ASEAN; Financial Markets; Consolidation;

ASEAN Monetary Union

JEL Classifications: G10, F30, F36


3/41


3

I. Background

Globalization has altered the economic frameworks of both developed and developing

nations in ways that are difficult to comprehend. The persistent rise in the dispersion ofcurrent account balances of the world as a whole, wherein the sum of surpluses match the

sum of deficits has grown substantially since the World War II. Also the emergence of

unregulated global markets appears to have moved towards a more stable and growth

oriented economic globe. The economic regions which have emerged in the last three

decades showing stable growth with regards to trade and co-integration have been the

North America Free Trade Agreement Zone (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and the

ASEAN. Though there has been emergence of economies like China and India for both

trade and economic development in the last decade, however the above mentioned three

regions have by far had a cumulative co-integrated growth factor. The US has led the

countries in the North America Free Trade Zone to undertake free trade activities, and

has achieved significant results. The European Union has achieved considerable

economic integration and inaugurated the European Single currency (Mundell, 1997,

Agarwal 2003, 2002). The ASEAN countries comprise Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,

Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

These countries are striving to establish the free trade zone, although the level of

economic integration is still low in the ASEAN region.

The recent developments where there is a move towards the ASEAN countries having

agreed to strengthen the existing cooperative monetary framework with China, Japan and

India is a positive step towards a stronger financial setup and socio-economic growth.

The agreed monetary arrangements will involve a network of monetary exchange within

the ASEAN+3 countries. Also, the ASEAN countries have agreed with China to establish

a China-ASEAN free-trade-zone within the next ten years. Nothing is particularly

innovative in these two regional agreements, as they only propose to use the existing

monetary framework within the ASEAN countries. This is similar to the way EU

Institutions had increased trade associations between the region in the 1970s and 1980s


4/41


4

(Agarwal 2003, 2002, 2001). However the ASEAN countries have their own problems to

resolve. For example, the wealth gap between rich and poor in many ASEAN countries is

very large. Also the ASEAN countries experienced the worst ever 1997 Asian financialcrisis. There has been an inconsistency in the recovery from the 1997 crisis within the

ASEAN region countries. Overall the ASEAN countries have experienced low economic

growth, a somewhat unstable social and political environment and heavy foreign debt.

Since each member country of ASEAN needs to solve its own internal problems, this

leads to a lower expectation for immediate regional co-operation and to disparate

collaboration policies with non-ASEAN countries. Notably Singapore alone has signed

free-trade-zone agreements with Australia, Japan and the USA respectively. None of the

other ASEAN countries have been involved in these three agreements. This is indicative

that future developments within ASEAN may be uncertain.

Further, Japan has recently signed the Tokyo Declaration and Activity Plan with the

ten ASEAN countries. The Japanese Government will provide those countries with US$

3 billion to establish a trade-free zone before the end of 2012. The aims are to (1)

develop human resources; (2) strengthen technical skills in the ASEAN region; and (3)

decrease the development gap amongst the ASEAN countries. Considering the above

facts, we see that a great attention has been paid to global economic issues in the last

decade. This has been a natural byproduct of the increasing inter-dependencies of all

national economies. This has accentuated in recent years due to the emergence of several

developing countries as global economic forces, the reorganization of production process,

change in nature and location of development and finance. One can clearly observe this

with the economic growth and self sufficiency attained by India, China and quick re-

emergence from crisis of the ASEAN countries (Agarwal & Agarwal, 2004).

II. Scope of the Proposal

The current optimal development strategy for the ASEAN countries could be to plan and

establish a common financial market for the ASEAN region, to be underpinned by a


5/41


5

single currency and formation of a monetary union. The common currency proposed in

the paper is denoted as the ASEAN Dollar. There are extensive research and academic

papers in support of the positive contribution of a single currency. The US$, EURO andINR (Indian Rupee) have shown their proved strength and sustained economic growth in

the regions they have been used. Therefore theoretical advocacy is not re-iterated here,

and we focus on a practical application. The expected advantage of an ASEAN Dollar is

an improvement in the economic strength of each ASEAN member country, resulting in

an improvement in their long-term economic growth. Some of the other observed benefits

in Europe, US, India and other integrated economies have been increases in trade of both

goods and services; in house investment growth (among countries in union / region);

reduction in transactional costs (in cross-border business); reduction in volatility in

exchange rates and financial markets and finally more stable socio-economic growth.

These substantial benefits can be attained due to

I) elimination of the costs of currency exchange;

II) improvement of market operations by pricing goods and labour using a

single currency; and

III) adoption of a single currency to prevent tax cheats and tax avoidance.

IV)

formation of monetary union

V) increasing labour markets

After a long period of fostering the concept, the ASEAN countries could expect that the

initiation of the ASEAN Dollar would exhibit the following the above mentioned

strengths along with

I) an integrated regional economic and financial framework;


6/41


6

II) a forward-looking progressive attitude shared by the leaders of all

ASEAN member countries, whereby those leaders are willing to give

up the power of issuing their own currency, and transfer this power tothe proposed Central Bank for the ASEAN countries; and

III) an application of advanced forecasting techniques, as proposed by us,

will establish whether the conditions needed to sustain an ASEAN

Dollar Community are likely to prevail.

III. Establishment of the ASEAN Economic and Currency Community (AECC)

3.1 Organisational Structure

The adoption of the ASEAN Dollar will result in the replacement of the existing ASEAN

currencies by the ASEAN Dollar. This adoption has been agreed to in principle, and

therefore there should be little impediment on its implementation. To achieve this

adoption careful planning is indispensable, and sustained adverse impacts on the ASEAN

markets needs to be understood and avoided. AECC will be responsible for this currency

adoption activity, and the position of the AECC in this process is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1Flowchart of the position of the AECC in the adoption process

for the ASEAN Dollar

ASEAN member countries

Brunei DarussalamCambodiaIndonesiaLaosMalaysiaMyanmar

PhilippinesSingaporeThailandVietnam

establish

ASEANEconomic andCurrencyCommunity

(AECC)

adopt ASEANDollar


7/41


7

3.2 Responsibility

The AECC will also aim among other things, to reduce the wealth gap between poorer

people and richer people by undertaking development and coordination. The members ofthe AECC will come from the ASEAN countries, and it is proposed that the AECC

should set up an executive committee. The executive committee may be led by a

Chairperson, and comprise various agencies to reflect the tasks assigned to the AECC.

Thus it might establish a Standing Development group, a Forecasting Methodology

Advisory group, a Secretariat group, and a Legal and Planning group, and such other

groups as are needed to achieve AECC objectives and associated tasks. All group leaders

may be appointed with scholars and specialists in the ASEAN region. It will also need to

undertake competency based training (CBT) and workshops to regularly provide specific

skills required by government officials and identified as necessary for job-seeking

workers. Figure 2 below shows the possible structure of the AECC and relevant

activities.


8/41


8

Figure 2

Possible Structure of the AECC

A) AECC executive committee

A.1. Standing Development Group

A.1.1 Statistics Team

A.1.2 Monetary System Team

A.1.3 Scope: research in budget, government loans and taxation

A.1.4 Finance Team

A.1.5 Scope: research in currency, interest rate and exchange rate

A.1.6

Economics Team

A.1.7 Scope: research in price, inflation and economic growth

A.1.8 Trade Team

A.1.9

CBT Team

A.2. Secretariat Group

Scope:budget planning and preparation, meeting arrangements, work

plans and task implementation, and Miscellaneous tasks

B) Special responsibility

B.1. Forecasting Methodology Advisory Group

B.2. Legal and Planning Group

Scope: Central Bank preparatory office, Single market, Legal procedure

examination, ASEAN Dollar simulation planning and Miscellaneous tasks

3.3 Specific Tasks of the AECC

3.3.1 Establishment of the Legal status of the ASEAN Dollar

The AECC may need to make various innovative proposals, and then invite Treasurers

and Ministers of Finance of each ASEAN countries or local equivalents to meet with the

President of the Central Bank to make final decisions on the proposals. After an

agreement is reached, individual ASEAN countries may complete necessary legal

procedures, so that subsequent actions may be recognised by all ASEAN countries. For


9/41


9

instance, all agreements may need to be guaranteed to remain effective until the official

adoption of the ASEAN Dollar. Also the implementation of relevant policies may need to

be supported by the relevant legal systems. Thus the AECC needs to ensure the relevantlegal framework is adopted in each ASEAN country.

3.3.2 Establishing the qualifications required of countries wishing to participate in

the ASEAN Dollar scheme

The economic environment of the ASEAN region is different from that of the European

Union. In the course of establishing the qualifications required of countries wishing to

participate in the ASEAN Dollar scheme, the AECC may encounter many statistical

complexities, some currently unknown and some which cannot be fully quantified. It is

estimated that at least several years may be required to ascertain exactly what type of

statistical information may need to be collected, and to achieve the necessary statistical

returns. After data collection, analysis and forecasting, a reliable quantitative model for

the ASEAN economic framework can then be established. It is proposed that the original

six ASEAN countries will initially participate in the single ASEAN currency. After a

reasonable period to facilitate the development of appropriate systems, the remaining four

ASEAN countries may then join the single ASEAN currency.

Reflecting their varying historic traditions, ASEAN member countries have different

economic, monetary and banking frameworks. After the ASEAN Dollar is adopted,

central monetary policy will have different impacts on each of the member countries.

Thus unexpected difficult economic circumstances may arise. When those difficulties

occur, the ACEE needs to monitor the situation and assist member countries to avoid

unnecessary friction. The key economic cost from formation of a currency union by a

group of countries is the loss of national autonomy in the monetary policy, as projected in

almost all economic integrations. Under such consortiums, the scope of independent

monetary policies by the member countries of the region reduces to the minimum. The

economic loss from giving up an independent monetary policy may not be very large for


10/41


10

such countries as the record of developing countries in conducting independent national

monetary policies to minimize cyclical fluctuations in the economic activities is in itself

minor. The singular currency and joint monetary policy would enable bring forth greatermacro-economic stability from countries having less hold (Barro 2001). Considering this

the member countries need to develop policies which encourage a stable monetary

situation and which control turbulent domestic circumstances. The ASEAN countries

should certainly refer to the Maastricht Treaty which stipulates six criteria that countries

in the EU must meet to become eligible for adoption of the EURO. All quantitative

figures need to be re-assessed to ensure relevance for ASEAN conditions and to

introduce flexibility with a fair variation of 5 to 10% in the conditionality should be

permitted; so that violation of the type of Germany and France recently in case of EU

does not surface and distract the decision making and cooperative process. These six

criteria which are vital are

a. The ratio of a countrys planned or actual government deficit to GDP must not exceed

3 percent;

b. The ratio of a countrys government debt to GDP must not exceed 60 percentage

points;

c. A countrys currency must have stayed within the normal 15% fluctuation margins

for at least two years, without devaluing further against the currency of any other

member;

d. A country's inflation rate must not exceed by more than 1.5 percent the average

inflation rate of the three best performing members;

e. A member must have had an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not

exceed by more than 2 percent points that of, at most, the three best performing

members.

f. Management of the money supply within the ASEAN Dollar community to facilitate

the achievement of criteria a) to e).


11/41


11

3.3.3 Improvement of guidance mechanisms for a number of countries

Although the Euro has been officially inaugurated, it seems to have lost part of its

coverage because three EU countries have still not officially adopted it. It is possible thata similar situation could arise when the ASEAN dollar is officially inaugurated. Thus the

AECC needs to improve its guidance mechanisms for those member countries which

might not wish to or be able to meet all criteria to become eligible for adoption of the

ASEAN Dollar. The AECC should adopt procedures to assist countries wishing to

improve their economic operations, and thus meet criteria to become eligible for the

ASEAN Dollar.

3.3.4

Establishment of Core member countries

The AECC may assess ASEAN member countries to determine their eligibility for the

ASEAN Dollar. After the eligibility assessment model is established, it needs to be

approved by a meeting of Treasurers and Finance Ministers of all ASEAN countries and

the President/Governor of the Central Bank for the ASEAN Dollar. Further, this model

needs to be incorporated into the legal systems of the ASEAN region. All those member

countries with sufficiently strong economic circumstances may be eligible for the

ASEAN Dollar. They can also become core member countries as a demonstration of what

is required of other intending countries. Subsequently those remaining countries can

improve their economic operations, and thus qualify to adopt the ASEAN Dollar. Our

findings in the paper suggest that Malaysia might be the first country qualified to adopt

the ASEAN Dollar as a forerunner of others. The other countries, once able to adopt the

ASEAN Dollar, would in turn be the forerunners.

IV. Establishment of the ASEAN Bureau of Statistics

ASEAN Bureaus of Statistics (ASEANBS) may be ultimately responsible for all

statistical and financial data collection, data analysis and data assessment in all ASEAN

member countries. ASEANBS may assess the existing statistical agencies in all ASEAN

member countries, and then assist those statistical agencies to establish a statistical


12/41


12

system and procedures necessary to ensure that all statistical information required

demonstrating achievement of criteria. Statistical and financial data need to reflect the

current economic situation and future economic outlook, and thus may be crucial anddecisive factors in the successful implementation of the ASEAN Dollar. Therefore a

central statistical agency at the highest level is required to undertake statistical work to

support the ASEAN region. The establishment of the ASEANBS is one of the most

important tasks which must precede the operation of the ASEAN Dollar.

V. Monetary and tariff arrangements

In order to implement the ASEAN Dollar plan, support from a sound monetary and tariff

policy is also necessary. Three concurrent approaches are needed as follows:

5.1. Tariff reduction

5.1.1 Remove existing Tariff barriers

The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) has been agreed, and signed by ASEAN member

countries, and is now being implemented. Tariffs may be completely abolished by 2010

for ASEAN-6 (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and

Thailand), and by 2015 for the newer members (Viet Nam, Laos, Myanmar and

Cambodia - with flexibility on some sensitive products until 2018).

When this process is completed in the ASEAN region, travel, goods, technology, labour

and capital can freely flow without any restrictions. The achievement of AFTA may

result in:

a. Simulation tasks being simplified and thus being completed more speedily

b.

The year 2010 being designated as ASEAN Dollar Year, which should be a

target year for the inauguration of the ASEAN Dollar.

5.2 Control government expenditure and so decrease the issue of government bonds


13/41


13

In preparation for the implementation of the ASEAN Dollar, all ASEAN member

countries need to minimise their budget deficits even if they meet the six criteria

described in Section 3.2.2, reduce government expenses, and decrease the issue ofgovernment bonds. Those tight fiscal measures may bring disharmony to people living in

the ASEAN region, and may possibly lead to strong reaction, such as large-scale strikes.

However a strong fiscal policy is a needed measure for the success of monetary policy

and stable economic growth in the region (Agarwal 2003, 2002, 2001). Although adverse

responses have been experienced in Euro zone countries on this issue. In order to lessen

the adverse impacts on the ASEAN region before introducing the ASEAN Dollar, this

paper proposes a variety of measures to support those ASEAN countries, in particular, to

strengthen the psychological preparedness of people to adapt to various changes that may

occur in the ASEAN countries.

5.3 Issues arising from tariff removal

5.3.1 Harmonisation amongst ethnic groups and employment opportunities

Due to long-term economic circumstances resulting in large gaps between richer and

poorer people in the ASEAN region, harmonisation amongst ethnic groups is a very vital

aspect in the formulation and implementation of the ASEAN Dollar. Reconciliation is the

most effective tool to achieve benefits amongst various ethnic groups in the ASEAN

region. Reconciliation, indicated by greater equity in the treatment of different ethnic

groups, may encourage cooperation, harmony, consistent and fair treatment, and thus

becomes a goal to achieve within and between each of the ASEAN countries.

Expectations of better employment opportunities for disadvantaged ethnic groups are

intended to be significantly improved as part of this reconciliation process.

5.3.2 Arrangements for streamlining of tariffs

The streamlining of tariffs needs to be part of arrangements in the implementation of the

ASEAN Dollar. Otherwise the ASEAN governments may raise loans because of

unaffordable monetary capacity. The proposed measures support tariff streamlines by:


14/41


14

a) Setting limits to government budget deficits and bond issues

According to the Maastricht Treaty, the budget deficit of any Euro membercountry should not exceed 3% of GDP, and the government bond issue should not

exceed 60% of GDP. In reality, two core countries - France and Germany - have

already violated those two limits. The European Central Bank warned that both

France and Germany should follow the regulations to reduce their increasing

budget deficits, as otherwise the reputation of the Euro would be damaged.

However both France and Germany ignored this warning and the EU

conditionally accepted their violation. Consequently these two regulations have

lost their effectiveness. In the course of implementing the ASEAN Dollar, it is

necessary to carefully plan the limits of the budget deficit of a member country.

The AECC should propose to use the two most important criteria a reduction in

conflicts between ethnic groups and an improvement in employment opportunities

and then establish an independent budget deficit limit for each member country.

b) Principles of introducing new taxes:

In the implementation of the ASEAN Dollar, the harmony principle can be

adopted when introducing new taxes. For instance, this implies imposing property

tax, and death duties with a major impact on wealthy people. Wealthy people may

necessarily have to pay those taxes, and cannot shift their burden to other people.

For those ASEAN countries which have already imposed those taxes, it might

require an increase in current tax rates.

The paper only introduces examples to illustrate the principles to be adopted in

practice. The economic and monetary teams of the AECC need to undertake

detailed investigation of all these areas to provide useful and valuable approaches

and to seek the approval of these approaches by the AECC, and then to implement

the agreed strategy. Further, simulations need to be undertaken as part of this


15/41


15

program to accurately assess the impact on the economy and the general public.

The paper suggests conducting such simulations in Malaysia first. A comparison

of likely outcomes, with actual results, may lead to a report including appropriateimplementation plans for the remaining ASEAN countries.

VI. The ASEAN Central Bank (ACB)

6.1 The special status of the ACB

The ACB is proposed to be a Central Bank across the ASEAN region, following the

model of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve Board. It will be the

third monetary institution at the international level without specific government

monitoring. In the establishment of the AECC, the role of the ACB must be to become a

steadfast and independent institution whose mission is to undertake long-term planning

so that ASEANs external monetary policy supports and strengthens the ASEAN Dollar.

6.2 The organisational structure of the ACB

Analogous to the ECB, the organisational structure of the ACB is briefly shown in Figure

3.

Figure 3

The organisational structure of the ACB

Governing Council

Executive Board

National Central Bank

(of member Countries)


16/41


16

6.2.1 Governing Council

The Governing Council (GC) will be the highest authority of the ACB. The members of

the GC comprise representatives of the AECC member countries, members of theExecutive Board, the Governors of the Central Banks of all ASEAN member countries

and two Non-voting members each from World Bank and IMF as observers. In principle,

the Management Meeting (MM) of the GC will be called monthly with a quorum of two

thirds of all members, where no crucial issues are to be decided. The Chairperson of the

MM will be elected in turn in each calendar year. A flowchart of the decision process of

the MM is shown in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4.

Flowchart on issues

a) Every attendee has one vote, and all voting is related to the

external monetary policy of the AECC.

b.1) For general issues, a decision can be made with at least two thirds

of for votes. The Chairperson has normal voting rights, and can

cast a deciding vote.

b.2) For special issues, the decision will be linked to the number of

capital shares held by each country in the ACB. The voting rights

will be proportional to the number of ACBs capital shares held by

each voter. This number of ACBs capital shares will be adjusted

once every five years. One model describing the allocation of

capital shares is outlined below

c) The ACB may announce the decisions made by the MM.


17/41


17

6.2.1.1 The main activities of the MM

The main activites of MM should bea. Approve the qualifications of each of the ASEAN member countries which

meet the criteria to become eligible for the ASEAN Dollar

b. Approve the title of the ASEAN Dollar

c. Establish the external monetary policy of the ACB

d. Establish the ACBs capital amount and share distribution principle.

The capital amount of the ACB may be tentatively set at ten billion US Dollars under the

assumption that the ACB may be established in 2010. This capital amount may become

valid on the approval of the MM. To establish the share distribution principle, this paper

may follow the Euros distribution approach. The weighting principle will use a uniform

distribution approach, which utilises the population of each ASEAN member country at

the end of 2009, and the average growth rate of the GDP of each ASEAN country from

the period 2003 through to 2009. The capital amount may be paid in by the Central Bank

of each ASEAN country. Those ASEAN countries meeting the ASEAN Dollar criteria

may pay first. The total payment may be the receivable capital of the ACB. For those

remaining ASEAN countries, their distributed payment amount may be held back, and

they may make their payment after they meet the ASEAN Dollars criteria. Note the

ASEAN Dollar may not be inaugurated before 2010.

6.2.2 Executive Board

a) Members

The Board may consist of six non-continuing members appointed from the

Governors of the Central Banks of the ASEAN countries meeting the ASEAN

Dollar criteria. If the number of those ASEAN countries is less than six, then the

vacant membership(s) wont be filled until any of the remaining ASEAN

countries meet the criteria. The term of each member may be eight years. The


18/41


18

members appointed may select a President and Vice-President respectively with a

term of four years. The President and the Vice-President can only be selected for

one term.

b) Activities

b.1 Implement the external monetary policy approved by the Governing Council;

b.2 Formulate the monetary policy for the ASEAN region;

b.3 Promote the circulation of the ASEAN Dollar;

b.4 Stabilise the exchange rates of the ASEAN Dollar;

b.5 Stabilise interest rates in the ASEAN region;

b.6

Operate the remaining financial instruments;

b.7 Publish Monthly Bulletins including relevant statistical data and annual

reports;

b.8 Adjust the money supply and monitor its annual growth.

6.2.3 National Central Banks

The existing National Central Banks (NCBs) of the ASEAN member countries may be

the core agencies to implement the monetary policy approved by the ACB. In the course

of introducing the ASEAN Dollar, the current organisational structures of NCBs may

remain, however their activities may necessarily change.

a. After the inauguration of the ASEAN Dollar, the forex and credit risks in the ASEAN

should reduce. Governments and private industries can rely on the ranking

information provided by the credit assessment institutions to attract money inflows in

the international capital markets. In particular the ASEAN bond markets have not as

yet reached a healthy market rating. ASEAN investors are likely increase their

dependence on the ranking information provided by the credit assessment institutions,

and then understand the appropriate assessment on shares and bonds. Consequently in

future the role of issuing shares and bonds may be undertaken by ASEAN markets,


19/41


19

replacing local banks which now provide industry and business with money. The role

of banks is expected to change from that of lenders to that of investment advisors.

Thus banks may need bank managers with backgrounds that can ensure they canadjust to the new financial environment.

b. Currently the US Dollar, the Euro and the Japanese Yen are a set of popular

currencies used in the ASEAN region. After the inauguration of the ASEAN Dollar,

the ASEAN countries will have to progressively adjust their trade settlement

currency, financial assets and foreign reserve levels, and ultimately will all use the

ASEAN Dollar as their preferred denominated currency.

c. After the inauguration of the ASEAN Dollar, it is likely to become a focus for

international capital flows in the region. In the short-term, the ASEAN Dollar may

attract capital outflow from the USA and Europe to the ASEAN. The increased

capital flow, may assist banks to become more efficient, fee structures may adjust,

and these developments may increase the competitiveness among banks. In order to

decrease the operational costs, banks may undertake merger and cooperative

activities, and thus increase the monitoring responsibility of the ACB.

VII. Foreign Exchange Policy

7.1 Floating exchange rate

With the launch of the ASEAN Dollar, it is proposed for it to follow the international

currencies such as the USD, the Euro, the British Pound, the Indian Rupee and the

Japanese Yen, in adopting a floating exchange rate approach (in a managed float, as in all

these cases). The paper suggests the use of sophisticated forecasting techniques to

produce a balanced exchange rate between the ASEAN Dollar and a basket of currencies

having USD, EURO, JPY and few others. To begin with, the exchange rate the ASEAN

Dollar has to be fixed against the basket of currencies for its formal launch into the

international financial markets. The first exchange rate may heavily affect the future

movements of the ASEAN Dollar exchange rate, and thus should be carefully structured.

The strategy used by the ECB to launch the Euro as the currency in use before launching


20/41


20

it physically into circulation is good and sound. Thus, the sound foreign exchange rate

policy may be crucial in the process of establishing the ASEAN Dollar. This policy aims

to improve the overall economy in the ASEAN region, rather than seeking to competewith international currencies such as the US Dollar and the Euro. The international

capital flows have a profit-seeking feature, which may create fluctuations in ASEAN

forex markets. In order to cope with this quickly changing environment, the ASEAN

Dollar needs to work towards a stable exchange rate. It should unify the ASEANs

financial market movements, and promote an integrated ASEAN economic structure to

avoid unnecessary competitiveness. It will also need to establish a role in the

international currency scheme, with acceptable status. The ten ASEAN countries have

different business cycles and economic features, and the ASEAN Dollar needs to

overcome the possible conflicts that could arise for a unified ASEAN currency, if

economic interests of individual countries were separately promoted. Thus the paper

suggests that the ASEAN Dollar should use the experience of the international major

currencys forex policy to gain the confidence of international investors. The ASEAN

Dollar will also maintain a stable exchange rate to sustain a confidence in the ASEAN

Dollar.

7.2 Review of the Euro movements

The Euro became the official currency in the European Monetary Union on 1 January

1999. The exchange rate of that day was 1 Euro: 1.16675 US Dollar, and soon the

relative weakness of the Euro became a feature of foreign exchange markets. According

to the European Central Bank (ECB) Monthly Bulletin, the average monthly value of the

Euro relative to the US Dollar fell to the lowest rate of 1 Euro: 0.853 US Dollar. The

Euros weakness up to that period confounded earlier general expectations that it would

trend upwards relative to the US Dollar (see ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 2001).

Three member countries of the European Union Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden

have refused to join the Euro. Initially the Euro was designed so that the budget deficit

should not exceed 3% of the GDP, the government bond issue should not exceed 60% of


21/41


21

the GDP, and the annual growth rate of the money supply (M3) was set to the reference

value of 4.5%. Those three items were all crucial. After the introduction of the Euro, the

ECB wished to attract investors to the European financial markets, and relaxed therestriction on the annual growth rate of M3. Consequently this three-month calculated

index increased to a maximum of 8.1% in February 2003, and led to spillover effects on

the Euros exchange rate. Brailsford et al (2004) suggest that those foreign reserves of the

ECB could be used to influence movements in the Euros exchange rate. The amount of

foreign reserves currently required to again achieve a targeted Euro exchange rate, quite

specifically the initial rate existing on 1 January 1999, was estimated. The paper

proposed by Brailsford et al (2004) was initially presented at the 2002 European

Financial Management meetings held in London. On 23 May 2003, the Euros exchange

rate increased to 1 Euro: 1.1837 US Dollar and on 2ndApril the exchange rate is 1 Euro :

US Dollar. This outcome provides valuable experience for the ASEAN Dollars exchange

rate after the introduction of the ASEAN Dollar, namely how to achieve a targeted Euro

exchange rate which continues to meet exchange criteria.

7.3 Forecasting techniques

We aim to investigate the time-series relationship between the estimated integration

levels, market-based measures of capital flows and market volatility. As the relationships

between these three variables are expected to be both non-contemporaneous and cross-

country in nature, a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework is utilised. In addition, a

number of unique features of the variables create estimation problems. First, the

stationarity properties of the variables in time-series need to be carefully considered. We

develop a procedure that allows the estimation with a mixture of I(0) and I(1) processes

within the context of a vector autoregressive and moving-average (VARMA) framework.

Specifically, two procedures are implemented, the zero-non-zero (ZNZ) patterned VAR

modelling, and the ZNZ patterned vector error-correction modelling (VECM). Further,

due to the size of the relationships being estimated (to illustrate, there may be 4 variables

x 25 economies x 12 lags), some structure needs to be imposed on the VAR. To establish


22/41


22

relationships between the variables, balanced state-space modelling is used to conduct

analysis of the impulse response function, and tests of cointegration and Granger

causality. A bootstrapping procedure is used to create greater insight into the distributionsof the estimates and proposed projections obtained from the VAR and other models.

We plan to conduct the modelling by using a structural three-stage approach. In the first

stage, the VAR for each economy need to be constructed for preliminary analysis. In the

second stage economies with (expected) similar characteristics need to be grouped into

clusters, thereby substantially reducing the size of the system. The VARs constructed in

the first stage constitute building blocks for the block diagonal part of the VAR for each

cluster. The interconnecting off diagonal blocks between each economy in a cluster is

then to be estimated to produce a VAR for each cluster. Analogously we can construct a

final VAR for all economies in the third stage, with the VAR for each cluster providing

the block diagonal building blocks for the final VAR. In this way the final VAR can then

be established, and indeed the basis for decomposition into interactive or independent

groups developed. Under this approach, the problem of scale reduces to a manageable

size and one that can be confidently handled.

The spill-overs can be identified from the off-diagonal coefficient entries of the ZNZ

patterned VAR models with the relevant variables included in the models.

Fourth, we aim to conduct PPP testing and currency cointegration to assist with assessing

the practicability of a currency union to underpin an integrated stock market in the Asia-

Pacific. PPP has important implications for explanation of exchange rate movements and

exchange rate forecasting in the long-term. If, for example, the PPP of a local currency is

shown to be out of line in the long-term, then the currency can be expected to appreciate

or depreciate against the foreign currency in the long-term. Many theoretical and

empirical models have been built on this theory, but a survey of empirical testing

provides inconclusive evidence of its existence. In general, most studies tend to reject


23/41


23

PPP in the short-run while in the long-run there is both evidence supporting and rejecting

PPP (MacDonald, 1995). One factor contributing to these mixed results relates to the

procedure used in testing. In recent years the theory of cointegration has been widelyapplied to tests of PPP. If the individual variables involved in the PPP relationship,

namely the nominal exchange rate and the ratio of domestic to foreign prices, are non-

stationary, but a specific linear combination of them is stationary, then PPP is claimed to

hold.

For currency cointegration, Aggarwal and Mougou (1996), and Tse and Ng (1997)

conducted cointegration investigations among selected Asia-Pacific currencies which did

not include Australia. Their findings indicated that cointegrating vectors exist among

these currencies. The more successful a currency union becomes, the more integrated will

be the movements of these currencies. These results suggest evidence supporting the

formation of a currency union.

However previous researchers tested for cointegrating relations in full-order VECM

modelling. The full-order structures contain nonzero elements in all their coefficient

matrices. The important area of application involves modelling forex market movements

and the interaction between relevant monetary variables. There is a high probability that

the model structures will involve zero entries in the coefficient matrices. Specifically, in

tests of indirect causality and/or Granger non-causality in the framework of a VECM, the

power of causality detection is crucially dependent upon finding zero coefficient entries

where the true structure does indeed include zero entries. This VECM, with allowance for

possible zero entries in the coefficient matrices, is referred to as a ZNZ patterned VECM.

Recent advances have shown how ZNZ patterns can be explicitly recognised in a VECM.

The results of simulations and applications of this approach have revealed that the

selected optimal patterned VECM provides an effective means of detecting cointegrating

relations and Granger causal relations from the coefficient matrices.


24/41


24

In this proposed market ZNZ patterned VECM modelling will be utilised to investigate

PPP testing and currency cointegration including the Australian Dollar. In addition, some

important techniques developed for linear models can be extended to non-linearmodelling. For example we have applied a computationally efficient tree-pruning

algorithm in conjunction with model selection criteria to select the optimal patterned

VECM with ZNZ patterned cointegrating and loading vectors for an I(1) system (Penm et

al 1997, 1999). This algorithm is suitable for studies of seasonal, temporary and

fractional cointegration, and has been extended to an I(2) system (Brailsford et al 2002).

In Penm et al (2000) we have proposed procedures using a neural network approach, in

conjunction with model selection criteria, to select the optimal ZNZ patterned model. The

optimal parsimonious model is then used as the basis for capturing non-linear

relationships and conducting forecasting. With these methods applied to financial

structures of currency systems, the modelling of such financial structures using optimal

neural networks will lead to a better understanding of PPP investigation and currency

cointegration, and result in a better understanding of the nature of market integration.

7.3.1 Establish a floating region for the exchange rate

The floating region of the ASEAN Dollar exchange rate will be a 5% upper and lower

tolerance limit centred on the exchange rate on the first day of the introduction of the

ASEAN Dollar. Money supply and foreign reserves in the ASEAN region will be used as

adjustment instruments, and forecasting techniques will be used to formulate adjustment

approaches. If the exchange rate fluctuations in the forex markets exceed tolerance limits,

forecasting techniques can predict these changes, and money supply and foreign reserves

can be used to adjust the fluctuation size. Fluctuations can then be held within the

floating region, and the stability of the ASEAN Dollar exchange rate can be achieved.

7.3.2 Fixed exchange rate

The currency exchanges among the ASEAN member countries will use a fixed exchange

rate approach. We assume that the ASEAN Dollar will be introduced in the year 2012.


25/41


25

On the first day of the introduction to the ASEAN Dollar, the exchange rate between the

ASEAN Dollar and the basket will be locked in. The fixed exchange rates among the

ASEAN countrys currencies will also be fixed before the end of 2011. The fixedexchange rates between the ASEAN Dollar and the ASEAN countrys currencies will be

calculated, and then used to undertake currency exchanges. Subsequently the calculated

exchange rates will be locked in. In the ASEAN region, Malaysia is likely to be the

simulation country for the ASEAN Dollar. Malaysia has used the fixed exchange rate for

a long period, and has valuable experience. Thus Malaysia is capable of leading the

remaining ASEAN currencies to the fixed exchange rate between the Malaysian and

ASEAN currencies. The approach will be applied to other countries when they are

qualified to join the ASEAN Dollar. If an ASEAN country initially insists on the use of

the floating exchange rate between its national currency and the ASEAN Dollar, this

country must adopt a fixed exchange rate before their formal introduction to the ASEAN

Dollar. No exception is to be allowed.

7.3.3 Currency exchange

We assume that the ASEAN Dollar may be introduced on 1 January 2012. The ASEAN

Dollar shall co-exist with the existing currencies of those ASEAN countries meeting the

ASEAN Dollar criteria. The existing currencies will be used in cash transactions only.

The ASEAN Dollar must be used as the denominated currency in transactions on the

capital market for government loans and bond issues in the ASEAN region. This two way

accounting system may be undertaken within the next three years. From 1 January 2015

the ASEAN Dollar, in note or coin forms, may start replacing the old existing currencies

of those ASEAN countries. This replacement task may be completed before 1 July 2015.

On 1 July 2015 the old existing currencies may become non-acceptable, when the

ASEAN Dollar will become the only official ASEAN currency.

7.3.4 The relationship between the ASEAN Dollar and those ASEAN countries not

joining the ASEAN Dollar.


26/41


26

In the course of implementing the ASEAN Dollar when the ASEAN countries join the

ASEAN Dollar, the exchange rate between the ASEAN Dollar and the existing

currencies of those countries not joining the ASEAN Dollar must be clearly settled,through not necessarily fixed. No confusion is to be allowed, or otherwise the spillover

effects could damage the financial markets supported by the single ASEAN currency, and

invoke adverse competition. Several pre-crisis studies have shown that cross-market

linkages are weak, which negates any justification to treat the Asian countries as a block

in a mean-variance maximization objective. For instance the study of Eun and Shim

(1989) finds week linkages between Hong Kong and Japan by using variance

decomposition and impulse response functions using a Vector Auto Regression model

(VAR) to assess the strength and innovations from one market to the others from

December 1979 to December 1985. The findings of Lee, Petit, and Swankoski (1990)

study investigating the daily return relationships among Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong,

Japan and Taiwan from January 1980 to December 1988 suggests that the returns on the

Asian exchanges are segmented. Also a continuation work of Eun and Shim, Chowdhury

(1994) uses a VAR to study the stock market interdependencies in four Asian countries

(Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan) from January 1986 to December 1990. The

authors do not find significant links between these four stock markets; though the first

two were responsive to financial and technological innovations in the US and Japan.

These findings were corroborated by other similar studies from Chan, Gup and Pan

(1992), Defusco, Geppert and Tsetsekos (1996), Liu and Pan (1997) and Agarwal and

Agarwal (2001).

VIII. The Policy of the ASEANs International Trade

The policy of ASEANs international trade may be initialised and driven by the AECC.

The policy should be an extension of the ASEANs foreign exchange policy. The aim is

to maintain a balanced international income and expenditure account, a balanced ASEAN

current and capital accounts, and a stable exchange rate of the ASEAN Dollar. The scope

of section 8 consists of the various economic activities undertaken between ASEAN


27/41


27

residents and foreign residents over a specific period. Decision about international trade

policy may depend on movements of the international balance sheet. The ASEAN Bureau

of Statistics need to regularly complete this balance sheet, and analyse the dynamics ofthe international income and expenditure. Details are provided in the following table -

monthly balance of payments.


28/41


28

Table 1

Monthly Balance of Payments

Items Current month

balance

Previous

month balance

+ or

%

Reasons/Comments

For change

A. Current AccountGoods; export f.o.b

Goods: imports f.o.b

Balance on Goods

Services: credit

Services: debit

Balance on Goods and Services

Income: credit

Income: debt

Balance on Goods services, and income

Current transfers: credit

Current transfer: debit

B. Capital Account

Capital account: credit

Capital account: debit

Total, group A plus B

C. Financial Account

Direct investment abroad

Direct investment in ASEAN

Portfolio investment assets

Equity securities

Debt securities

Portfolio investment liabilities

Equity securities

Debt securities

Other investment assets

Monetary authorities

General government

Banks

Other sectors

Other investment liabilities

Monetary authorities

General government

Banks

Other sectors

Total, groups A through C

D. Net Errors And Omissions

E. Reserves

Note: 1. Services denote invisible trade, which comprises1.a) Transport services including passenger transportation, goods transportation, and others such

as airport and international harbour fees1.b) Tourism


29/41


29

1.c) Other services including communications, building, insurance, finance, informationtechnology, patent charges, triangular trade, operations and leasing, commission charges,personal, cultural and leisure services and government services.

2. Income includes the investment income received from the forex assets of the ACB, and the

investment income including share income from the non-ASEAN region by the ASEANresidents.

3. Expenditure includes share income in the ASEAN region by the foreign residents andinterest paid to foreign residents in the ASEAN region by international monetaryinstitutions.

4. The ASEANBS will complete this preliminary balance of payments within the last ten daysof each month, and submit it to the AECC for approval

5. Women are particularly welcome to be involved in editing this balance of payments.Women are cautious, responsible and generally have a clear mind.

8.1 The use of the foreign reserves

The ACB is to be responsible for the use of the foreign reserves, which is the most

important item in Table 1. First the ACB needs to ascertain the safe level of the foreign

reserves. Unless it is absolutely necessary, the foreign reserves should not go below this

safe amount with 5% variation. The amount of the foreign reserves in excess of this safe

level is called the buffer amount. The ACB can use the buffer amount to achieve its

policy targets. One approach is for the ACB to distribute and loan (the excessive

amount) to privately operated business and industry in the following priority order.

a.

The new export-oriented industry, which uses foreign exchange to purchase

overseas skills, equipment and plant. This industry may have the first priority

for use of the buffer amount of the foreign reserves

b. Import-replacement industry, which produces goods for the domestic market

to substitute for imported goods. If this industry needs to purchase overseas

skills, equipment and plant, then this industry may have the second priority

c. On-going and established industry which produces goods for the domestic

market. If this industry needs to purchase overseas skills, equipment and plant,then this industry may have the third priority.

d. Any other as the ACB may decide.


30/41


30

The ACB can set different loan interest rates for those three above-mentioned industries.

If an industry cannot obtain the foreign exchange loans because there is an insufficient

amount of buffer foreign exchange, the industry can reserve loan rights until the bufferforeign reserves become available.

8.1.1 Special bonus

Firms which undertake to establish, or operate, business in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,

and Myanmar may be offered a special bonus. The ACB should provide interest-free

foreign exchange loans to such firms for purchases of overseas skills, equipment and

plant. The ACB should also introduce the concept of a single market to avoid

unnecessary business overlapping and competition.

8.2 Free Investment

The ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Investment held its 17 thmeeting in Indonesia

from 27th

-28th

January 2003. Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Myanmar,

Singapore and Malaysia agreed to open their manufacturing industry to all ASEAN

member countries from 1st January 2003. Investors in manufacturing industry from the

ASEAN region may be treated as local citizens. In addition, Vietnam, Laos and

Cambodia agreed to adopt this approach from 1st January 2010. From 2020, those

agreements will be applied to investors from all industries and promote free flows of

capital, skilled workers, experts and technology. The zero tariffs and the ASEAN Dollar

are scheduled to be introduced in 2010. Those approaches will provide attractive

elements in the process of free investment in the ASEAN, and accelerate overall

progress. Further, the foreign exchange loans provided by the ACB are expected to speed

up the development of ASEANs manufacturing industry, and thus add a new group of

participants to ASEANs international trade.

8.3 Free channels of international money to the ASEAN


31/41


31

Singapore and Brunei are two international financial centres in the ASEAN region.

Brunei operates a favored tax system to offshore companies and free of foreign exchange

control. Thus Brunei has quickly developed into a new international financial centre, andoutperforms Singapore. A large amount of international money has been attracted to

Brunei, and a large number of international companies are registered in Brunei. Those

companies can avoid taxes required in their original registration country, without paying

company tax in Brunei. Thus those companies carry a lighter tax burden than those

registered in other ASEAN countries, and even pay lower tax than Hong Kong. Measures

deserving of note are as follows

a.

Permit a company to use a Chinese title

b. Not require registration of a companys capital

c.

Allow for protection by the international commercial laws

d. Permit an offshore company to develop and operate business and investments

e. Obtain the support of the internationally large banks to provide all financial

services.

The ASEAN region comprises a large hinterland, and thus has an excellent potential to

undertake the development of finance, insurance and investments.

IX. Measurement of the evolution of financial market integration

As a further study, we aim to produce indicators for the ASEAN region. Research will be

undertaken on complex and evolving systems of financial market integration, which often

comprise a large number of interacting components. The results will improve

understanding of the behaviour in ASEAN financial markets and produce improved

indicators of financial integration.

In the next phase of our study, we intend to empirically evaluate the usefulness of the

indicators according to three criteria. First, the economic impact of the indicators and the


32/41


32

consistency with market developments. Second, the availability of data needed for

constructing the indicators and the ease with which these indicators can be regularly

updated. Third, the reliability of the data on which the indicators are based. After theevaluation, recommendations will be made on measuring financial integration in the

ASEAN region.

In addition to point estimates for the indicators, we will also produce confidence

intervals, which will be generated using double bootstrap and/or moving block bootstrap

procedures. Such a development is likely to enhance the usefulness of the indicators. A

comparison will be undertaken between the indicators produced by the improved

methodologies and those reported in previous studies.

Economic and financial integration indicators will be applied to measure the following

three broad financial categories in the ASEAN countries:

A) Credit and bond market integration and cointegration to establish the nature of short

and long-term co-movement;

Traditional tests for capital and bond market integration have been focused on the

examination of interest rate differentials among regional markets using the

covered, uncovered or real interest rate parity conditions. This approach works

well for financial markets under a common currency where there is no risk of

currency movements. For testing integration of capital and bond markets in

different currency areas, however, approximations will be required for the

expectations of future currency movements that are involved in the above parity

conditions. Such approximation often yields significant measurement errors

(Cavoli, Rajan and Siregar, 2003).

In recent studies, VECM modelling has been utilised to measure capital and bond

market integration (Kleimeier and Sander, 2001). This concept is based on the


33/41


33

requirement that, if credit and bond markets are integrated, interest rates among

different countries should exhibit a long-term equilibrium relationship, despite the

presence of short-term deviations.

Although the adoption of the cointegration theory, and hence the VECM, has

significantly improved the efficiency of integration indicators for credit and bond

markets, further improvements are achievable by incorporating newly developed

modelling techniques, such as the zero-non-zero patterned VECM, the forgetting

factor and financial neural networks. As demonstrated by Penm et al (1997), the

zero-non-zero patterned VECM produce superior estimates to the traditional full-

order models, especially in small samples. The forgetting factor is a data

weighting process that gives more weight to recent observations and less to earlier

data. The estimates so obtained are superior to those from conventional methods

(Penm et al 2002). Some recently developed financial neural network techniques

are also expected to result in improvements in the estimation (Penm et al 2000).

B) Stock market integration and cointegration to establish the nature of short and long-

term co-movement; and

Over the past decade, financing through stock markets has increased its

importance in developing countries. Consequently, another measure of financial

integration of regional capital markets involves examining co-movement in stock

market returns. Tests for stock market integration have been focused on

correlation or Granger causality tests among returns in regional stock markets.

Recently, cointegration theory has also been utilised in examining integration in

international stock markets (Ratanapakorn and Sharma, 2002).

In this project, we intend to construct financial neural networks and VECMs to

examine the degree of integration in ASEAN stock markets. Implicit in this

process is the identification of the relevant influence of local and global risk


34/41


34

factors on the returns for each market. Research on these issues will contribute to

an improved understanding in the area of investors behaviour and finance.

Issues that we would like to address in this part of the project include the possible

existence of time varying risk premium and/or structural or evolutionary changes

in ASEAN stock markets (Bekert, and Harvey, 1995). The empirical findings

resulting from this examination will have important implications for the

estimation of financial integration indicators.

C) Exchange rate market integration and cointegration to establish the nature of short

and long-term co-movement.

An important element in regional financial integration relates to exchange rate

market integration in the region. Previous studies have attributed the presence of

risk premium in credit, bond or stock markets to exchange rate volatility. Hence,

the effect of currency movements on regional financial integration needs to be

investigated.

For currency markets, we propose to examine, with a systems approach, the

presence of long-term purchasing power parity conditions among regional

currencies (see Penm et al 2003); the short-term spill over effect of the

volatility among regional currencies; and the implications of currency volatility

on regional capital and equity markets.

For the spill over effect of currency volatility, we intend to examine empirically

the channels of spill over. This issue is complicated by the large number of

markets involved in the examination, combined with the possibility of time-

varying relationships. The investigation of time-varying relationships in spill

over will be another key component of this proposed project.


35/41


35

To examine the effect of currency volatility on regional capital and equity

markets, focus will be placed on market returns that will be decomposed into risk

free rates and risk premium factors. We intend to study the linkages between therisk premium and currency volatility, as well as co-movement between the risk

free rates in regional markets. Brailsford et al (2001) provided empirical evidence

of the influence of exchange rate movements in equity market fluctuations for

some Asian markets. The approach adopted in their study will also be useful for

this study.

X. Conclusion

Adverse shocks in the last one decade followed by sustained economic growth in most

Asian economies has regained the confidence in a stronger and stable Asia. The revival

has been sponsored by growth of exports, self sufficiency, conservative approach along

with the welcome of modern means of financing growth and consumption. A large

proportion is also contributed by increase in the government spending for infrastructure

development and growth. Given the attention paid to financing issues and the volatility in

capital flows observed in the last five years investment, bank lending and per capita

growth has not seen the expected rise. This weakness has been addressed due to some of

the negativity due to crisis-affected economies. Some may consider this as negative;

however, we believe it is a needed correction for a stable and strong foundation for

sustained growth in future.

Our research findings in the article titled A Proposal for A Common Financial Market

for the Asia-Pacific proposed the framework of a single currency in Asia-Pacific6.

Subsequently finance scholars have shown an enthusiastic response [Penm et al (2003)].

There are many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and the wealth gap between poorer

and richer nations is large, hence the progress of the establishment of a single currency in

6SSRN Networks - http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=322961


36/41


36

the Asia-Pacific will have difficulties. Consequently we can reduce the scope of research

initially, and start working on the ASEAN region, by selecting Malaysia as a prime

experimental country for the ASEAN Dollar. After a preliminary successful outcome isachieved, we can then progressively extend the approach to remaining ASEAN countries.

This strategy is likely to be the most effective. We use the experience of the introduction

of the Euro as a blueprint, and then undertake modifications according to the economic

situation of the ASEAN region. We also select the simulation approach, and

progressively incorporate experience gained in this way to improve its performance. Then

the ASEAN Dollar will be officially introduced. In particular, we use the monetary

arrangements, foreign exchange policy, international trade policy and forecasting

techniques (The Central Banks of China (Taiwan) Annual Report 2002) to demonstrate

the conception of the research.

Economic performance in the Asia-Pacific region (excluding Japan) has been impressive,

with real GDP increasing by over 6 percent in 2002, and the smaller relatively open

economies turnaround relative to 2001. This strong growth - at a time when the recovery

in industrial countries has been relatively week - has raised the issue of whether Asian

economies have become less reliant on demand from outside the region following the

WTO-linked opening of China and increased inter-regional trade. With the rapid export

growth seen in the first half of 2002 now slowing, the question of whether growth in Asia

has become more self-sustaining is important, particularly if the weakness in the global

electronics sector evident since mid-2002 persists.

In this literature, the theoretical models produce no general, univocal result regarding

the desirability of a structure with an independent central bank versus one with a

dependant monetary authority. In fact, considering the industrialized countries, while the

relationship between independence and control over inflation seemed sufficiently robust

and convincing (Cukierman, 1994; Berger, de Haan and Ejffinger, 2000; Alesina and

Gatti, 1995), the relationship between independence, on the one hand, and fiscal and real


37/41


37

variables(Cukierman, 1992), on the other, was far from certain. Hence, the theoretical

cost-benefit analysis of alternative monetary regimes could not be considered

conclusive. If we apply these models to the case of ACB, we have to conclude that theestablishment of a ACB could improve the inflation performances in the countries

member of the ASEAN Monetary Union, but we do have not at the moment have any

theoretical robust proof that the establishment of such independent central bank will

improve the fiscal discipline as well as more important in the area? the growth

performances. Though, the presence of FRB in US, ECB in Europe, RBI in India are

indicative of a positive signal.

Furthermore it would be nice to stress that the above theoretical conjectures have been

verified with comparative, institutional and empirical analysis. After constructing

indices of independence of the central banks7, and having historical alternative models

of independent and dependent monetary authorities (Toniolo, 1988), the literature

attempted to determine whether the degree of legal independence could be considered an

independent variable in explaining important macroeconomic phenomena: inflation,

deficits and public debt, income and growth (Alesina and Summer, 1993, Cukierman,

1994 and Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger, 2000). The empirical results confirmed the

theoretical thesis.

The question of whether The ASEAN Dollar should be allowed to proceed is vital. This

primarily rests on the judgment as to whether society is ready for greater economic

freedom, volatile competition and reduced controls. On the face of it, these decisions

seem to depend solely on those who govern society. However, it is society at large which

determines whether this will succeed, based on the natural law Survival of the fittest.

7 After the seminal central bank independence indices published by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini(1991) and revised in Masciandaro and Spinelli (1994), followed by Cukierman indicators (1992),different indicators were proposed; for a discussion see Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger, (2000).


38/41


38

References

1.

Agarwal, Aman (2003, 2002, 2001), Unified New Europe and the effect on the GlobalVillage, [Model for New Europe], FINANCE INDIA, Vol. XVII No 3, September 2003;Presented at EU Institute, Columbia University, New York, USA (17th April 2001), Invitedto deliver the Keynote Address at Universitys 15th year anniversary celebration conference -European Union, University Portucalense, Porto, PORTUGAL (8 November 2001), PanelSpeaker at conference on EU Enlargement & Deepening of Europeat Indian Institute ofFinance, INDIA (23rd July 2003)

2. Agarwal, J.D. (2004) "Volatility of International Financial Markets: Regulation and FinancialSupervision", FINANCE INDIA, XVIII No 1, March 2004; Invited to be delivered as theKeynote Speech at the 4th International Conference in Finance, organized by Faculty ofAdministration & Economics, University of Santiago de Chile, Val de Mir, CHILE, 7thJanuary 2004.

3. Agarwal, J.D. and Aman Agarwal (2001), Liberalization of Capital Flows, Banking System

& Trade: Focus on Crisis Situations, International Review of Comparative Public Policytitled International Financial Systems and Stock Volatility Volume 13, pp. 151-212. Invitedto present at 18th International Conference of Finance at Namur, BELGIUM (25th-28th June2001), at Florida International University, Florida, USA (26th September 2001), discussedwith FIU Finance faculty at Luncheon presentation, Florida, USA (27th September 2001), atPontific Catholic University of Rio de Janerio, Rio de Janerio, BRAZIL (22rd October 2001).Also Discussed at few conferences in USA and UK in April and May 2001.

4. Agarwal, J.D. and Aman Agarwal (2004) Globalization and International Capital Flows;ANANYA,Journal of National Institute of Financial Management (Invited Paper), 2004

(forthcoming issue); Invited to deliver the Keynote Address at the Two day NationalConference on Globalization Decadal Indian Experience, organized by ATMA MAYYIL

and the Institute of Technology, Kannur University, Kerela, INDIA on 17

th

January 2004(12:00 14:30).

5. Aggarwal, R. and Mougou, M. (1996). Cointegration among Asian currencies: Evidence ofthe increasing influence of the Japanese yen,Japan and the World Economy, 8, 3, 291-308

6. Alesina A. and Gatti R., (1995), Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at no Cost?,American Economic Review,Vol 85, pp. 196-200.

7. Alesina A. and Sachs J., (1988), Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the UnitedStates: 1948-1984,Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 20, pp 63-82.

8. Alesina A. and Summer L.H., (1993), Central Bank Independence and MacroeconomicPerformances: Some Comparative Evidence, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol.25, pp. 151-162.

9.

Alesina A. and Tabellini G., (2003), Bureaucrats or Politicians?, Harvard Institute ofEconomic Research, Discussion Paper No. 2009.

10.Alesina A., (1989), Inflation, Unemployment and Politics in Industrial Democracies,Economic Policy, Vol. 8, pp 55-98.

11.Bagheri F.M. and Habibi N., (1998), Political Institutions and Central Bank Independence: aCross-Country Analysis,Public Choice, Vol. 96, pp. 187-204.


39/41


39

12.Bekaert, G. and Harvey, C. (1995). Time-varying world market integration. Journal ofFinance, 50, 403-444.

13.Berger H., de Haan J. and Eijffinger S.C.W., (2000), Central Bank Independence: an

Update of Theory and Evidence, CESifo Working Paper, No. 255.14.Berger H., 1997, The Bundesbanks Path to Independence. Evidence from the 1950s, Public

Choice, Vol. 93, pp. 427-453.

15.Berger H., de Haan J., (1999), A State within a State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank,Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 46, pp. 17-39.

16.Bernhard W., (1998), A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence,American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, pp. 311-327.

17.Brailsford, T.J., Penm, J. and Terrell, R.D. (2001). The adjustment of the Yule-Walkerrelations in VAR modelling: The impact of the Euro on the Hong Kong stock market.Multinational Finance Journal, 5(1), 35-58.

18.

Brailsford, T.J., Penm, J. and Terrell, R.D. (2003). Price Elasticity of the Euro to ForeignReserves through European Central Bank Intervention. Accepted in December 2003, and toappear in December 2004.Finance India.

19.Brailsford, T.J., Penm, J. H.W. and Terrell, R.D. (2002). Selection of the optimal zero-non-zero patterned cointegrating vectors from an I(2) system. Working paper, The AustralianNational University.

20.Cavoli, T., Rajan, R.S. and Siregar, R. (2003), A Survey of Financial Integration in EastAsia: Trends, Issues and Implications, School of Economics, University of Adelaide.

21.Chan, K.C., Gup B.E., and Pan M.S., (1992), An empirical analysis of stock prices in majorAsian markets and the United States The Financial ReviewVol 31, pp 289-307.

22.

Chowdhury, A. R., (1994), Stock market interdependencies: Evidence from the Asian NIEsJournal of MacroeconomicsVol 16 No. 4, pp 629-651.

23.Cukierman A. and Webb S.B., (1995), Political Influence on the Central Bank: InternationalEvidence, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 9, pp. 397-423.

24.Cukierman A., (1992), Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence, CambridgeMA., MIT Press.

25.Cukierman A., (1994a), Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control, The EconomicJournal, Vol. 104, pp. 1437-1448.

26.Cukierman A., (1994b), Commitment through delegation, political influence and centralbank independence, in J.O. De Beaufort Wijnholds, S.C.W Eijffinger and L.H Hoogduin

(eds),A Framework for Monetary Stability,Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 55-74.27.

De Haan J. and Vant Hag G.J., (1995), Variation in central bank independence acrosscountries: some provisional empirical evidence,Public Choice, Vol. 85, pp. 335-251.

28.DeFusco, R. A., Geppert J.M., and Tsetsekos J.P., (1996), Long-run diversification potentialin emerging stock markets, The Financial ReviewVol 31, pp 343-363.


40/41


40

29.Dominick Salvatore (1997), The Common Unresolved Problem with the EMS and EMU,The American Economic Review, May, pp. 224-226.

30.Eggertsson G. and Le Borgne E., (2003), A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank

Independence, IMF Working Paper, No.144.31.Eun, C. S., and Shim, S., (1989) International transmission of stock market movements,

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol 24 No. 2, pp 241-256.

32.Franzese R.J., (1999), Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically ResponsiveGovernments, and Inflation,American Journal of Political Science, Vol.43, pp. 691-706.

33.

Goodman J. B., (1991), The Politics of Central Bank Independence, Comparative Politics,Vol.23, pp. 329-349.

34.Grilli V., Masciandaro D. and Tabellini G., (1991), Political and Monetary Institutions andPublic Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries,Economic Policy, Vol.13, pp. 341-376.

35.

Hayo B., (1998), Inflation Culture, Central Bank Independence and Price Stability,European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 14, pp. 241-263.

36.Keefer P. and Stasavage D., (2001), Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions:When are Independent Central Banks Irrelevant?, Mimeo.

37.Kleimeier, S. and Sander, H. (2001), European Financial Market Integration: Evidence onthe Emergence of a Single Eurozone Retail Banking Market, research paper, EuropeanCredit Research Institute.

38.Lee, I., Petit, R. R., and Swankoski, M., (1990), Daily return relationships among Asianstock marketsJournal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol 17 No. 2, pp 265-284.

39.Liu, Y. A., and Pan M. S., (1997) Mean and volatility spillover effects in the US and

Pacific-Basin stock marketsMultinational Finance JournalVol 1 No. 1, pp 47-62.40.

MacDonald, R. (1995). Long-run exchange rate modeling: A survey of the recent evidence,Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund,42, 437-89.

41.Masciandaro D. and Spinelli F, (1994), Central Banks Independence: InstitutionalDeterminants, Rankings and Central Bankers Views, Scottish Journal of Political Economy,Vol. 41, pp. 434-443.

42.Masciandaro D., (1995), Designing a Central Bank: Social Player, Monetary Agent orBanking Agent?, Open Econo

Asean Dollar

Documents