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British Foreign Policy i. From 1895 down to 1914 ‘ a revolution in British diplomacy ? ‘ Ending ‘ Splendid Isolation ‘ and old hostilities, especially with France
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Page 1: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

British Foreign Policy i. From 1895 down to 1914 ‘ a revolution in British diplomacy ? ‘

Ending ‘ Splendid Isolation ‘ and old hostilities, especially with France

Page 2: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

INTRODUCTION TO BR. FOREIGN POLICY 1895-1914• Next few slides are a general introduction to Br.

Foreign Policy at the end of the 19thc and beginning of the 20thc.

• Explain key terms and concepts• Look at Br.’s position in the World and also her

worries and fears• Then go on to look at relations with USA, France

and Russia.• Germany separate slide programme • So too entry in Great War

Page 3: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

Key Terms in Foreign Policy i.• Foreign Policy or Foreign Affairs is about ‘ the

relations between a country and other States or countries ‘.

• The conduct of Foreign Policy is often called

‘ Diplomacy ‘ and those conducting relations between countries – ‘ diplomats ‘.

• In Foreign Policy each country tries to forward or pursue its own ‘ national interests ‘. Sometimes these national interests coincide with those of some other nations , but often they conflict with the national interests of other countries.

Page 4: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

Key Terms in Foreign Policy ii.• When the national interests of countries coincide they often form

either an ‘ entente ‘ or an ‘ alliance ‘. • The word ‘ entente ‘ means ‘ an understanding ‘ – both sides

recognise each other’s interests and try to avoid clashing with them. Both sides try to settle differences between them in order to improve relations. But no military commitments.

• The word ‘ alliance ‘ means something stronger. In an alliance both sides agree to support each other militarily against a third or fourth country if there is a conflict.

• Diplomacy aims to settle conflicts of national interest peacefully , but sometimes it fails to do this and war results. As Clausewitz wrote ‘ War is politics by other means ‘ – what cannot be settled by diplomatic talks ( negotiations ) has to be settled by force of arms.

Page 5: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

Britain’s National / Imperial Interests

• Europe : • Prevent Europe being dominated by one Power by

preserving the ‘ balance of power ‘ in Europe. • Keep the part of Europe closest to Britain- Belgium and

northern France out of the control of any big Power. • Naval control of the Channel, North Sea and

Mediterranean . Naval Supremacy to defend UK + Empire.

• Overseas : Imperial Interests• Control sea routes to India and Australia i.e. Med., Suez ,

• Keep Russia from threatening India , Middle and Far East

• Remain World’s greatest Naval and Imperial Power

Page 6: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

Position of Britain 1890’s

• In the 1890’s Britain still saw herself , and was seen by others , as the greatest World Power :- why?

• Br had the World’s greatest Navy - the size of the next two put together *- and she controlled the Seas

• She was the centre of a World Empire covering almost a quarter of the World’s land surface and in every continent. Empire imp. –providing cheap food ; market for Br. Exports; huge potential in manpower and material resources ; made Br., a World Power – gave her internat. status ; made British feel a superior race born to rule.

• Britain was a leading Industrial Nation• She was the World’s greatest trading nation• She was the centre of World Banking and Finance• Br saw herself as a World Power rather than a European

Power

Page 7: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

The British Empire in 1910Empire important to Br., in many ways :- major source of trade – cheap food imports from the Empire and many exports went back to the Empire ; made Br., a World Power with World interests and influence ; huge sources of manpower and raw materials ; millions of Britons emigrated to the ‘White Dominions’ ; provided naval bases in every ocean ; gave Br., a feeling of pride and superiority but also a sense of responsibility for the undeveloped parts of the Empire – part of the imperial ideal was to bring Civilisation to these backward areas –’ the White Man’s Burden ‘ as the poet Kipling called it. Empire also affected F.Policy – made it vital to keep command of the seas ; control key areas like the Mediterranean and Suez ; meant Br., had to safeguard not only herself but an empire scattered across the World ; faced threats from France in North Africa , Russia in Middle and Far East. Hence Gmy’s naval ambitions were a threat to Br’s Imperial interests as well as Home Defence and her Trade Routes.

1900

Page 8: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

YET , growing worries by 1900• Br Govts., and Business conscious of growing economic

competition from Germany and the USA - by 1900’s Br no longer the leading World Economy.

• Isolated - no allies , but in Europe most major counties belonged to one or other of two great alliance systems

• Traditional enemies - France - still a rival in Africa ; Russia - still a rival in India, China , the Middle East

• Other nations building powerful navies - hence Br’s need to adopt the *‘ Two Power Standard ‘

• Emergence of other powerful countries - Germany, USA , and ise of Japan

• Br. entered 20thc less confident than been in the 19thc.

Page 9: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

Attitude of Britain in FP 1895• On the one hand pride in her industrial , naval and imperial

power. Wish not to be closely involved in the affairs of Europe - especially any continental wars – preferred to be free to act on her own. But also worried about the future

• In 19thc only been three big powers - Br , Fr and Rs by early 20th at least five such powers. Fear that Br.Empire might be simultaneously attacked by several Powers across the World.

• How could Br go on defending herself and her world wide empire without becoming over stretched , or without joining one of the Alliance Systems ? Was a realisation that Br., could not be strong everywhere. But how could she defend her National Interests without being tied into alliances ? ( bit like attitude to EU to-day ?)

Page 10: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

British Foreign Policy 1890’s i• In 1895 Britain had no ententes and no alliances with any other

European or World Power. Most European Nations did e.g. Germany was allied with Austria , and France was allied with Russia.

• Britain’s position outside the European or Continental Alliance System was nicknamed ‘ Splendid Isolation ‘. The gave Br., great freedom to act as it chose , but it also had its dangers.

• BUT by the 1900’s Br. Statesmen were becoming worried that Br., could not remain completely isolated for much longer. E.G.

• The South African War 1899-1902 made Br.,aware of the dangers of isolation. Should she be attacked by hostile European Powers whilst her Forces were defending the Empire – she had no allies

• This realisation that she must not remain so isolated , was to bring about a ‘ diplomatic revolution ‘ for Britain in the 1900’s and eventually lead to her intervention in a great European war in 1914.

Page 11: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

Br. ForeignPolicy• A series of events between 1895 and 1904 showed the dangers for Britain of

being too isolated and encouraged the moves towards ‘ ententes ‘ and even one ‘ alliance ‘

• Some of these international events were :- • Venezuela Dispute 1896 dispute between Br., Guiana and Venezuela in

South America led the USA to threaten war with Britain should Br., use force.• Far East disputes – old dispute between Br., and Russia over the NW frontier

of India ; but added to by disputes over China.

• Fashoda Incident 1898 – Br., nearly became involved in war with France on the Upper Nile - Fr., expedition faced Br.Army which had just conquered the Sudan . Fr / Br., long rivals in that part of Africa. Fear of war and since Fr., allied to Russia –Br., rival in Far East – then danger of Fashoda = major European war 1898. But last time Br.-Fr., came close to war with each other.

• South African War 1899-1902 – Br., found many European countries hostile to her during this war with the Boers . Made Br., realise how vulnerable she was to attack from Europe. Gmy. Was pro-Boer ; fear that Fr and Rs., might attack br. Or Empire whilst Br. Forces tied up in S. Africa. Luckily didn’t.

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British F.Policy Worries 1900• Other reasons too made Br., reduce her isolation :-• All the other major European Powers were allied to another

Power.• French-British relations hostile – disputes over the Nile,

Egypt, Morocco.• Russo-British relations hostile – disputes over India , Persia

and China.• Britain growing increasingly suspicious of Germany as

Germans began to build a large Fleet to match their large Army , and station this fleet in the North Sea.

• Anglo-American relations suspicious as Venezuelan dispute showed

• Br., also aware that other countries were overtaking her in economic growth ; population and other resources.

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Improving relations with USA

To avoid any chance of war with the USA , Br., settled all outstanding differences with the USA over Venezuela and Alaska - in the Hay-Paunceforte Treaty 1901.

In effect , Br., accepted America’s dominance in the Americas . The agreement was an understanding that war between Br., and the USA was unthinkable. Instead a ‘ special relationship ‘ had begun which has lasted.

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Problem of France and Russia i• France was Britain’s traditional enemy in the

1890’s – been constant wars between them for centuries. Since 18thc Br and Fr struggled to control much of the World beyond Europe and were still rivals in Africa.

• Br and Russia were also old rivals especially in the Middle East , India and China.

• So improving relations with these two countries would be difficult but in 1894 it was made even worse when France and Russia made an alliance with each other.

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Problem of Russia and France ii• The Franco-Russian Alliance 1894 worried Br. Meant that two

old enemies now allied. Russia threatened the Br.Empire in the Far East , France threatened her close to home. Both had navies as well as armies. Attack by both would force Br., to divide her Navy and Army over thousands of miles. Worrying !

• Already it led Br., to adopt the ‘ two Power Standard ‘ for the Royal Navy ie. the R.N. should be bigger than the next 2 largest navies put together ! Impressive idea but expensive too !

• Br., needed an ally – someone who could tie down either Fr. Or Rs. • Germany one possibility. Gmy., could fight Fr., or Rs.., in Europe.

But if she won that would strengthen Gmy., at a time when Br., was already becoming worried by her naval plans. Anyway Gmy., not willing to fight Russia in the Far East.

• So Lord Lansdowne ( Br. Foreign Secretary ) looked for an ally outside Europe and found one in Japan in 1902.

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The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902 i

•The only alliance Br., made before 1914 was with Japan in 1902.

•The Anglo-Japanese Alliance made by the Foreign Secretary , Lord Lansdowne, in 1902 was a proper alliance. It also had major implications.

•Terms :- Br., and Japan would help each other if either was attacked by more than one Power. However, to begin with it only operated in the Far East – so only a limited move away from ‘ splendid isolation ‘ and not in Europe.

•Meant that Japan could counter Russia in the Far East allowing Br., to keep more warships at home to fight France.

Page 17: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902 ii

• Did it mark the end of ‘ splendid isolation ‘ ?• Yes , and No ! • It did in sense that Br., had made her first formal

alliance with another country for decades.• She was now committed to war if Japan should be

attacked by two Powers.• In 1905 the alliance was extended beyond Far East.• BUT the alliance only applied initially to the Far East • Br., still kept out of the European Alliance system• The A.-Jap. Alliance was aimed to allow Br., to stay out

of the European Alliance System.

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The Russo-Japanese War 1904-06 i

• Although the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was meant to ease Br., worries about Russia / France , at first it worsened them !

• Outbreak of war between Russia – France’s ally ; and Japan – Britain’s ally ; posed the real threat of a Br.,-French war in 1904.

• If France had helped Russia by declaring war on Japan then Br., would have had to help Japan causing a war between Br., and Fr., and Br., and Rs. Both French and British statesmen were horrified by this idea.

• The Fr.,especially saw Germany not Britain as their main enemy and feared that war with Br., would make them an easier target for their real enemy Germany.

• Following a successful visit of King Edward VII to Paris , Lord Lansdowne and the Fr., For. Minister – Cambon – reached an understanding about improving Fr. / Br., relations.

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The Entente with France 1904

The ‘ Entente Cordiale ‘ of 1904 between Britain and France marked another stage in the ‘ revolution in foreign policy ‘. For hundreds of years Fr., had been Br., enemy ( no one imagined that 10 years later a million Britons would die fighting with the French ! ) .

The 1904 Entente was NOT an alliance , BUT it was a settlement of many outstanding colonial disputes spoiling French-British relations.

Terms :- Fr., recognised Br., dominance in Egypt and the Sudan ; Br., recognised Fr., dominance in Morocco. Other differences in S.E. Asia and the fishing grounds were also settled.

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The Russo-Japanese War 1904-06 ii• The Russo-Japanese War upset things in another way

too.

• The Russians were badly beaten. Their Fleet was sunk by the Japanese at Tsushima and their Army besieged in Mukden.

• The defeat of their ally made France even keener on the Anglo-French Entente , and with the Russian threat reduced Br., could now hope for a settlement with Russia too – came 1907. All this good for Britain.

• But it also showed that Germany – not Fr., or Rs., was now emerging as the main threat to Br.,’s interests.

Page 21: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

Anglo-Russian Entente 1907

•Russia had been defeated by Japan , lost her Fleet and had had a revolution at home – so by 1907 she was anxious for an - Understanding – an entente – with Britain.

•The 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente negotiated by Sir Edward Grey settled disputes in Afghanistan , Persia and Tibet. It was NOT an alliance and NOT intended to be one. Br., still hoped to keep out of European entanglements.

•It eased Br.,’s worries about a Russian threat to India and the Middle East.. BUT – these ‘ ententes ‘ although they were not alliances or intended to be alliances –worried Germany. She feared ‘encirclement ‘.

Page 22: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

Br., draws closer to France 1904-14

• The 1904 Br/Fr Entente was a settlement of outstanding problems NOT an alliance. Even in 1914 Br.,still did NOT have an alliance with France.

• But a series of events after 1904 pushed Br., closer to Fr. – closer than was originally intended , but even in 1914 there were those in the Liberal Govt. who wished to keep out of any Fr v Gm war.

• What caused this Br drift closer to France ? It was more negative than positive i.e. growing fear of Germany rather than love of France was the main motive. For details of reasons why Br began to fear Gmy see other slide programme.

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Outline of reasons why Br, drew closer to Fr, 1904-14

• See reasons for the 1904 Entente ( earlier slides )• German attempts to disrupt the Entente esp. in the two

Moroccan crises of 1906 and 1911 ( see later slides )• Growing fear of Gmy caused partly by :-

the Kaiser’s behaviourAnd partly by

the Naval Race

Growing military and naval co-operation ( but NOT commitments ) with France

Page 24: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

First Moroccan Crisis 1905/06 i

• The Kaiser and the German Foreign Office were determined to weaken the 1904 Anglo-French Entente

• France had long had ambitions to extend her influence in Morocco in North Africa ( see map )

• With France’s ally, Russia , weak in 1905 ( following her

defeat in Russo-Japanese War ) the Kaiser took the opportunity to stir up trouble in Morocco

Morocco

Page 25: AS History - British Foreign Policy 1.1

First Moroccan crisis 1906 ii• Gm. Kaiser visited Morocco in 1905 and

encouraged M. to resist French control.• Gmy demanded an international conference to settle

future of Morocco. Hoped at this to separate Br., and Fr., and end their ‘ entente ‘

• Conference held at Algeciras 1906 , but at it Grey, new Br. Foreign Minister , gave full support to France and it was Gmy who left Algeciras humiliated. Br., organised Europe against Gmy.

• Worsened Br. / Gm., relations ; strengthened Fr./ Br., relations.

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Second Moroccan Crisis 1911

• 1911 Gm Kaiser tried again to use Morocco to disrupt the Anglo-French Entente.

• Gm sent a gunboat-Panther-to Agadir and demanded territory in French Africa. Br., saw this as Gmy using its growing naval power outside of Europe, perhaps establishing a base in Morocco and trying to break the Br.-Fr. Entente.

• Lloyd George made famous Mansion House Speech warning Gmy ( and Fr.) that Br., must be consulted.

• Led to further anti-German feeling in Br., ; anti-Br., feeling in Gmy and an acceleration of the Naval Race in 1911-12.

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Kaiser’s behaviour and the Naval Race • SEE OTHER Br.FP slide programme e.g. • Kaiser’s attitude during S.African War ; the two

Moroccan crises ; support for Gm Naval expansion• Germany’s building of a great High Seas Fleet from

1898 onwards• Especially ‘ Dreadnought Race ‘ after 1906• Kaiser’s 1908 interview – spoke of Gmy need for a

‘growing’ navy to meet her ‘growing’overseas interests – frightened Br., readers of the D.Telegraph.

• Actual and potential threat a large , hostile Gm Navy close to Br., and threat to her national interests.

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Br/Fr Military and Naval Co-Operation i • Although there was never a formal alliance between Br

and Fr which would have had ‘ military commitments ‘ ie each side promising to support the other in a war , the period after 1906 did see growing Br/Fr co-operation though this was kept secret.

• Unofficial military talks were held between Fr and Br generals as early as 1906 about where a Br Army might operate if Br ever supported Fr in a war.

• In Br 1907 saw the creation of a British Expeditionary Force ready to go to Fr if it should ever be necessary

• 1908 saw the creation of the part-time Territorial Army

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Br/Fr Military and Naval Co-Operation ii

• Since the Br/Jap Alliance of 1902 , and the Br/Fr Entente 1904 , the Royal Navy had been concentrating its battleships in Home Waters ( I.e. Channel and North Sea ) to counter fear of the growing Gm Navy

• After 1906 there was a naval understanding with the Fr that the RN would concentrate in the Channel / N. Sea ; whilst the Fr Navy concentrated on the Mediterranean.

• This was formalised in a 1912 Naval Agreement though the Agreement made it clear that it was NOT a commitment by Br to go to war , the 2 sides would only ‘ consult ‘ with each other.

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Effect of the Military/Naval Understandings i

• Some contemporaries and historians have criticised Grey for allowing these military and naval understandings.

• They argued that although there was no alliance with France , this co-operation drew Br too close to Fr., angered Gmy , and even worse , put Br under a ‘ moral obligation ‘ to help Fr should a Fr-Gm War occur. Br may not have had any formal military or naval commitment to Fr , - not technicaly committed to go to war in Fr’s defence -but she increasingly had a moral obligation by 1914.

• BUT against this is the fact that it made sense for Br to do

these things anyway even without the Fr Entente

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Effect of the Military/Naval Understandings ii

• Given Gmy’s growing Fleet and her apparent hostility to Br , it made sense for the Royal Navy to concentrate in the North Sea and Channel where the most direct threat of a Gm sea attack or invasion would come.

• The military/naval understandings with Fr prepared Br in case she ever had to intervene in a Fr-Gm War , but the wording made it very clear that she was not committed to military intervention - no formal alliance - whatever the circumstances. But whether she had a moral commitment now to Fr., is more debateable.

• Still , these understandings did lead Br generals/admirals to prepare both physically and mentally for a possible war with Gmy.

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Conclusion • Certainly the years after 1900 saw a remarkable change in

Br F.P. compared to 1890’s – almost a ‘ revolution ‘.

• From near isolation before 1900 Br now had Ententes with the USA , France and Russia plus a formal Alliance with Japan. The Fr entente was further supplemented by military and naval understandings after 1906.

• Old enmity with Fr and Rs had significantly reduced,whereas relations with Germany with whom Br had much in common in 1900 had significantly worsened.

• YET , Br was NOT absolutely committed to France , nor against Germany . Even in 1912-14 Br still hoped to avoid fighting a war in Europe and hoped for an understanding with Gmy as well as Fr.