Artisanal Mining In The DRC - Report

CHUNGUZA ASSOCIATES S.A. Suite 1, Mec Complex, Avenue D’Aroha, Providence, Mahe, Seychelles

ARTISANAL MININGI Purpose and Tasking

The client has asked a number of serious questions about the business of artisanal mining in

the DRC. Specifically these questions include

1. Who is behind the artisanal miners on the DRC domestic side?

2. Who is smuggling the precious metals out of Katanga? & how do they do it?

3. Is it only limited to metals or are we talking uranium as well?

4. Whom do they sell it to?

5. Proceeds from the sales – personal enrichment only or political distribution? – Who

sees the money at the end?

II. Background to Artisanal MiningArtisanal mining in the DRC is a long-established and flourishing business,

RESTRICTED USE WARNINGThis report was prepared by the originator, Chunguza Associates, S.A. The recipient agrees that reports and information received from the originator are strictly confidential and intended solely for the private and intended use of the recipient. Any other use and any communication, publication, or reproduction of the reports or any portion of their contents without the written consent of the originator is strictly forbidden. The recipient agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the originator against any damages or claims resulting from such unauthorized use.

There is a wealth of literature on this subject as it has been the subject of UN and

international study in the pursuit of ‘blood minerals’ and has provided the cash reserves

which made the various Congolese wars possible. There are several international

organisations set up to assist artisanal miners as well. Three important background studies

are appended as Annex 1-3. They should be read as they give much fuller picture of the

trade.

Artisanal mining is also part of the political process in the region including Rwanda, Uganda

and the DRC with an occasional effort by Zimbabwe to gain a foothold in the business. This

mining cannot be separated from or understood except as part of the core politics of Central

Africa. The true importance of the artisanal mining came to the fore during the war with

Rwanda and Uganda which followed the accession of Laurent Kabila to the Presidency.

According to the presentation made by the CASM (Commission on Artisanal and Small-scale

Mining) in late 2007 (attached Annex 1) in 1985 the export orientated economy relied on

mining which accounted for 75% of exports, 25% of fiscal revenues and 25% of GDP, with

production of copper exceeding 400,000 tonnes annually. Over two decades later, the DRC

is once again in the spotlight of the international mining industry and Large Scale Mining

(LSM) companies are rapidly expanding their operations in the DRC. However, the often

overlooked fact is that 80% of Congolese mineral production is still undertaken by

vulnerable, impoverished and largely illegal artisanal miners.

The truth is that the current mining industry in the DRC is characterised by very poor

geological knowledge, and the true extent of mineral resources is unclear due to a lack of

modern exploration. The country has substantial reserves of copper, cobalt, cadmium,

diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, uranium, germanium, columbite-tantalum

(coltan), bauxite, iron ore and coal. It is estimated that the DRC contains 80% of the

world's columbite-tantalite (coltan) reserves, 49% of its cobalt reserves, and 10% of its

copper reserves; while the gold potential is substantially under unexplored. Most of the

known mineral wealth is concentrated near the country's eastern borders, and south

into Katanga where it shares the rich Copperbelt of the Lufilian Arc with neighbouring

Zambia. In the south-central area of the country there is a large, prolific diamond

area within the Kasaï Craton; along and adjoining the northeasterly Angolan kimberlite

trend.

By 2001, the mining sector’s contribution to GDP had declined to a depressing 7%.

Fortunately legitimate mining companies have shown an increasing interest in the DRC

with inward investment growing year on year (based on increased metal demand

particularly from Asia and buoyant international commodity mineral prices). Although

from the outside it would appear that progress has been slow, In 2006, 57% of the state

budget (US$2.2 billion) came from international aid and 80% of the country’s

economy was ‘underground’ and informal. The transitional government did make some

rather commendable efforts to reignite and increase investment in the mining sector; for

instance, with the help of the World Bank, the DRC implemented a new Mining Code in

2002, Mining Regulations in 2003 and more recently a Mining Plan in 2006.

In 2005 a special National Assembly Commission (the Lutundula Commission) highlighted

that some of the industrial mining contracts agreed and negotiated during the period of

the transitional governments might need to be renegotiated and finally in May 2007 the

government announced that it intended to review sixty-three mining contracts approved

from 1996 to 2003. The process involved experts from Open Society Initiative for Southern

Africa (OSISA), the Carter Centre and the Rothschild Cabinet. It opened the door to

more than just a review of contracts; it opened the door to renegotiation under pressure,

which not the original intent. Many of these contracts have been renegotiated and several

key large-scale miners have been disenfranchised in the process. Some, like Freeport

McMorans’ copper and cobalt project remain to be finally resolved.

The DRC’s economic collapse, social instability, and resource plunder have resulted in a

proliferation of clandestine artisanal mining activities in the DRC, and today the situation in

the sub-sector could be described as utterly chaotic with little respect for law and order in

almost all mining areas in virtually all provinces. In addition, the two wars, foreign army

invasions and occupations, militia activity, and ethnic conflict have created large numbers

of internally displaced people (IDPs) and ex-combatants (including DDRRR

(Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reinsertion, Reintegration) beneficiaries)

who have few livelihood options. In some areas, such as Orientale, up to 80% of the

miners are ex-combatants (militia and soldiers), a livelihood which is keeping them from

rejoining militia forces. Also the prolonged presence of violent militia in many rural areas

forced many farming communities to abandon their traditional agro-pastoral livelihoods and

rely on coping strategies such as ASM to secure an alternative source of income.

At present, this disorganised and recalcitrant sector probably provides a vital livelihood to

many thousands of people dispersed throughout the country, and collectively probably

constitutes over 80% of the entire mining sector production Office des Douanes et

Accises (OFIDA) does not have accurate statistics on mineral production. In addition,

escalating global mineral commodity prices, continued national economic decline,

parastatal mismanagement, and staff retrenchments have exacerbated the problem and

swelled the numbers of artisanal miners. However, as there is currently no enabling

legislation or policy sympathetic to ASM, and because virtually all of these miners

work casually, seasonally, or are migrant workers from other parts of the country or

neighbouring countries, it is impossible to determine the actual number of workers in

the ASM sector.

By region:

Kasaïs: All previous studies indicate 1 million in the Kasais alone. 500,000, around

Tshikapa perhaps 300,000. The miners & negociants association in Mbuji-Mayi cite

1.3 million members. A further 200,000 diggers have been deported from Angola

back to the DRC.

Katanga: Estimates indicate around 150,000. Kolwezi 30,000; Fungurume & environs

10,000; Likasi 20,000; Likasi-Kawama-Lubumbashi 30,000; Lubumbashi-Kipushi

10,000; north of Pweto & environs 10,000; Kalemie 10,000; others possibly 20,000).

Sud Kivu & Maniema : Estimated at around 200,000.

Nord Kivu: Perhaps 200,000 spread across a variety of minerals.

Orientale (east): 60-150,000 on the OKIMO concessions in Haut Ulélé and Ituri.

Orientale (west): in the diamond fields could be 100,000.

There are at least two million people, perhaps 3% of the population (estimated as

62.6 million in 2005), directly dependent on this extremely arduous, hazardous, and

precarious activity for their livelihood. Allowing each miner five dependents, it can be

assumed that up to one fifth of the population probably survive through ASM. When

the ubiquitous middlemen and associated businesses are considered, artisanal mining

emerges as one of the most important elements of the Congolese economy.

The informal mining situation has also worsened through the influx of migrant workers from

neighbouring countries (e.g. In 2003 Operação Brilhante, conducted in Lunde Norte

province of Angola, expelled around 200,000 Congolese diamond mining garimperos many

of whom turned up in sites like Kahemba and Tembo close to the border) who tend to work

on the mineral belts nearest to the border with their home country. In addition, a worrying

fact claimed by many experts is that the number of people seeking to work in this sector in

DRC (as with many other parts of Africa) is expected to rise dramatically over the next ten

years. This view is based largely on the current national population growth, continued

under-performance of the economy with respect to the rural populace, and the

expectation that the formal sector will not be able to meet job creation demands resulting

in continued rural under-employment.

Throughout the DRC many rural people face dwindling livelihood choices in an

increasingly marginal environment and hence ASM has become the only real option. To

those not familiar with the hardships and realties of ASM, the lure of winning ‘valuable

rocks’ from their lands and rising above subsistence levels is very appealing, and many

desperate rural and urban people still continue to flock to the ASM sites to seek their

fortune. However, despite the richness of many of the ASM sites and the apparent

productivity of some miners (orpailleurs, diggers or creuseurs), the vast majority continues

to live in poverty. The excessive formal and illegitimate ‘taxes’ levied on production

means that the miners and labourers receive very little daily pay, and most also become

trapped, either through debt-bondage, or because they have travelled far and abandoned

their homes and farms and have no means to return to their previous livelihoods or seek

an alternative source of income.

Although the range of minerals exploited by artisanal mining in the DRC is highly

varied, it still encompasses all the typical dangerous practices seen elsewhere such as

unstable open pits, unsupported deep shafts and galleries where diggers may remain

underground for days, child labour, rapid and high levels of migration between sites

with significant community impacts, social disruption, environmental devastation, health

concerns, debt-bonding, et cetera. Despite these challenges, the ASM sector does have the

potential to economically empower disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and

contribute to the Congolese development strategies.

The problems of the miners are important but the key difficulties lie with the distribution of

the mined products and the movement of those to international markets. The artisanal

miners are just pawns in a much larger and more profitable game.

III. Artisanal Mining During the WarThe artisanal mining industry came to its current state during the war between the DRC and

Uganda and Rwanda, It funded both sides of the conflict and was a reason for the difficulties

in arranging any reasonable peace in the Eastern provinces of the country. It would be

illustrative to examine how these parallel structures developed and the problems they

engendered. The battle for the coltan industry is probably the best example.

The initial disruption, predominantly affecting the eastern Democratic Republic of the

Congo, began with the 1994-1995 refugee crisis in the region, spawned by the war in

neighbouring Rwanda. The sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees, including

members of the Interahamwe, created a new demographic dynamic in the subregional

population, abruptly disturbed the delicate balance of the ecosystems and generated a new

security situation along the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and

Rwanda.

The situation further deteriorated in 1996 with the war between the Zairian forces and the

Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), the rebel movement

led by the late Laurent- Désiré Kabila and supported by the Angolan, Rwandan and Ugandan

forces. This AFDL-led conquest of then eastern Zaire fundamentally altered the composition

of the regional stakeholders and the distribution of natural resources. Previously, the

distribution norm was (via legal and illegal channels) through locally based Congolese,

mostly civilian-managed, business operations. However, these traditional modes were

quickly overtaken by new power structures. Along with new players came new rules for

exploiting natural resources. Foreign troops and their “friends” openly embraced business

in “liberated territories”, encouraged indirectly by the AFDL leader, the late President

Kabila.

In August 1998, fighting erupted again in the northern, western and eastern parts of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, this time between Rwandan and Ugandan troops and the

Congolese army, with the assistance of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean armies, as well

as Sudanese and Chadian forces. The last two countries have since withdrawn their soldiers

from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth

The illegal exploitation of resources by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda took different forms,

including confiscation, extraction, forced monopoly and price fixing. Of these, the first two

reached proportions that made the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo a very

lucrative business. Prior to defining the type and manner of illegal exploitation, however, it

is important to examine the pre-existing structures which facilitated this process.

A. Pre-existing structures that facilitated illegal exploitation

Illegal exploitation by foreigners aided by the Congolese began with the first “war of

liberation” in 1996. The AFDL rebels, backed by Angolan, Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers

conquered eastern and southeastern Zaire. As they were advancing, the then AFDL leader,

the late Laurent-Désiré Kabila, signed contracts with a number of foreign companies.

Numerous accounts and documents suggest that by 1997 a first wave of “new businessmen”

speaking only English, Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili had commenced operations in the eastern

Democratic Republic of the Congo...Theft of livestock, coffee beans and other resources

began to be reported with frequency. By the time the August 1998 war broke out,

Rwandans and Ugandans (top officers and their associates) had a strong sense of the

potential of the natural resources and their locations in the eastern the Democratic Republic

of the Congo. Some historians have argued that Ugandan forces were instrumental in the

conquest of areas such as Wasta, Bunia, Beni and Butembo during the first war.

Numerous accounts in Kampala suggest that the decision to enter the conflict in August

1998 was defended by some top military officials who had served in eastern Zaire during the

first war and who had had a taste of the business potential of the region. Late in September

1998, they were already engaged in discussions with General Salim Saleh on the creation of

a company that would supply the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo with

merchandise, and on the import of natural resources.

There are strong indications that, if security and political reasons were the professed roots

of the political leaders' motivation to move into the eastern Democratic Republic of the

Congo, some top army officials clearly had a hidden agenda: economic and financial

objectives. A few months before the 1998 war broke out, General Salim Saleh and the elder

son of President Museveni reportedly visited the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

One month after the beginning of the conflict, General James Kazini was already involved in

commercial activities. He knew the most profitable sectors and immediately organized the

local commanders to serve their economic and financial objectives.

Financial and commercial links.

During the early months of the rebellion, the financial setting and networks were already in

place. At the heart of the financial setting was the Banque de commerce, du

développement et d'industrie (BCDI) located in Kigali. There was an understanding between

the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, President Museveni on the collection and use of

financial resources during the time of the AFDL rebellion.

Transportation networks

Illegal activities also benefited from the old transportation network that existed prior to the

1998 war. This network consists of key airlines and trucking companies, a number of which

aided AFDL troops in their war against the Mobutu regime. The pattern of transport

remains similar today: merchandise or arms are flown in and natural resources or their

products are flown out. For example, Aziza Kulsum Gulamali, a businesswoman operating

within the region for some time, utilized this network even in the 1980s. She contracted Air

Cargo Zaire to transport arms to the FDD Hutu rebels in Burundi and smuggled cigarettes on

the return flight.

Since 1998, aircraft also flew from the military airports at Entebbe and Kigali, transporting

arms, military equipment, soldiers and, for some companies, merchandise. On the return

flights, they carry coffee, gold, diamond traders and business representatives and, in some

cases, soldiers.

Mining sector

In the mining sector, direct extraction was carried out in three ways, namely (a) by

individual soldiers for their own benefit; (b) by locals organized by Rwandan and Ugandan

commanders; and (c) by foreign nationals for the army or commanders' benefit.

In a number of cases soldiers were directly involved in mining in Watsa. In September 1999,

the UPDF local commander demanded the extraction of gold on the pillars of the Gorumbwa

mine galleries in which dynamite was used. .On 9 September, the galleries collapsed, leading

to the death of a number of Congolese miners. Some months later, Ugandan soldiers who

came to mine in the same area contracted respiratory disease.

Local Congolese have been mining for years for their own benefit. The novelty of their

involvement lies in the fact that some of them were used as “convincible labour” to mine

gold, diamonds or coltan. In the Bondo locality within Equateur Province, young men from

12 to 18 years were recruited by Jean-Pierre Bemba. The Ugandan allies trained the recruits

and shared with them the idea that the Ugandan army was an “army of development” that

aimed at improving ordinary people's living conditions. After the one-hour morning physical

training session, they were sent to gold mines to dig on behalf of the Ugandans and Mr.

Bemba.

In Kalima, RPA commander Ruto enrolled two teams of local Congolese to dig coltan; these

Congolese worked under the heavy guard of Rwandan soldiers. In the Kilo-Moto mineral

district, Ugandan local commanders and some of the soldiers who guarded the different

entry points of the mining areas allowed and encouraged the local population to mine. The

arrangement between the soldiers and the miners was that each miner would leave at the

entry/exit point one gram of gold every day. On average 2,000 individuals mined this large

concession six days a week. It was well organized that the business ran smoothly. On

average 2 kg of gold are delivered daily to the person heading the network.

The last pattern of organized extraction by the occupying forces involved the import of

manpower for mining. Occupying forces brought manpower from their own countries and

provided the necessary security and logistics. In particular, Rwanda utilized prisoners to dig

coltan in exchange for a sentence reduction and limited cash to buy food. There were 1,500

Rwandan prisoners in the Numbi area of Kalehe. These prisoners were seen mining coltan

while guarded by RPA soldiers

The illegal exploitation of natural resources goes beyond mineral and agricultural resources.

It is actively occurring also in respect of financial transactions, taxes and the use of cheap

labour. Local banks and insurance companies operating in Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani, Bunia

and Gbadolite deal directly with Kigali or Kampala. A system of tax collection — enforced in

some cases — has been implemented by MLC, RCD-ML and RCD Goma with their

established Ugandan and Rwandan counterparts. In the rebels’ own words, these taxes are

aimed at “financing or supporting the war effort”.

Indeed, part of the funds collected is sent to Kigali (in the case of RCD-Goma). In the case of

the former RCD-ML and MLC, not only was part of the taxes sent to Kampala but also

individual colonels would claim direct payment from RCD-ML. In Bunia and Bukavu, people

protested, demonstrated and denounced this practice of abuse. In areas controlled by

Bemba, peasants carrying palm oil on bicycles have to pay taxes on the bicycles.

The use of child labour was also rampant in the occupied territories. Some children were

reportedly mining gold in the Kilo Moto mines. In Equateur Province, some children were

seen in the diamond mines. There are very young MLC recruits at Gbadolite airport and in

the city.

Modes of transportation

Illegal activities have benefited from the evolution of the means of transportation in the

region. Prior to the second war most exchanges of goods and products were conducted

through road transportation. To a large extent, smugglers utilized Lake Kivu and Lake

Tanganyika to smuggle goods and products to and from the Democratic Republic of the

Congo and, in limited circumstances, used aircraft. An increasing number of aircraft are

utilized to transport products and arms into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while

transferring out vast quantities of agricultural products and minerals, in particular to

Kampala and Kigali. The other novelty of increased air transport has been the use of aircraft

leased by the army for commercial and non-military functions.

This change in mode of transportation was accompanied by a change in players as well as a

redefining of transportation companies. Traditional and well-established companies such as

TMK saw their share of the market erode while others simply disappeared (Air Cargo Zaire).

At the same time, new companies emerged and expanded, such as Air Navette and Jambo

Safari; they are owned or controlled by the relatives and friends of generals, colonels and

Presidents. At the other end, outsiders who entered the region with the AFDL “conquest” of

Kinshasa during the first war, by transporting troops, remained and consolidated their

position. Most flights to and from Equateur and Orientale Provinces originate from the

Entebbe military airport. This raised the issue of revenue loss to the treasury due to the

fact that products entering or leaving the Democratic Republic of the Congo by air to and

from Entebbe military airport were not checked, and taxes were not levied by the customs

services.

The essence of the institutionalisation of trade in minerals was that it was conducted with a

hands-on control by the African presidents.

The Role of the Presidents

President Paul Kagame has been one of the two main beneficiaries of the use of illegal

miners in the DRC... His position in the State apparatus with regard to the exploitation of

the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the continuation of the

war has evolved, yet his role has remained pivotal. This role can be situated on three levels:

his relations with the Rwandan business community operating in the Democratic Republic of

the Congo control over the army, and the structures involved in the illegal activities.

President Kagame has close relationships with top Rwandan businessmen. For instance, he

maintains good relations with Modeste Makabuza, “owner” of Jambo Safari. He is also close

to Alfred Khalissa, the “founder” of BCDI and former manager of BCD. The same sources say

that President Kagame is very close to Tibere Rujigiro, who is known for generous financial

support to RPF during the 1990-1994 war. Mr. Rujigiro is one of the shareholders of Tristar

Investment, with very close ties to RPF. This close aide to President Kagame has business

relationships with Faustin Mbundu, who is known for his arms dealing activities. What all

these businessmen have in common is their direct involvement in the exploitation of natural

resources in the areas that Rwanda controls. Different sources have told the Panel that

each of these businessmen has at a certain point benefited from the President's “help”.

President Kagame, when he was Minister of Defence, reorganized or approved the

reorganization of the Rwandan army and the Ministry of Defence, which subsequently led to

the creation of the Department of External Relations in which the Congo desk is located.

This unit has been the cornerstone of the financial transactions of RPA. The former Minister

of Defence must have been aware of the functioning of RPA as well as the daily operations

of the army.

In September 1998 the then Vice-President, during a meeting with various officials of RCD

and RPA top commanders, informed the participants that there was a need to raise $50

million to make it possible to reach Kinshasa in two months. Finally, when faced with the

question of the involvement of RPA in the exploitation of the resources of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, the President announced in a radio interview that private Rwandan

citizens were carrying out commercial activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The President has admitted in the past that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo was self-financing. All these elements combined suggest the President's degree of

knowledge of the situation, his implicit approval of the continuation of the illegal

exploitation of the resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and somehow his

complicity as well as his political and moral responsibility.

President Yoweri Museveni. President Yoweri Museveni's role in the exploitation of the

natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the continuation of the war

can be situated at the following levels: his policy towards the rebel movements, his attitude

towards the army and the protection provided to illegal activities and their perpetrators.

He has shaped the rebellion in the area controlled by Uganda according to his own political

philosophy and agenda. He opted for a more decentralized authority and only intervened

when major problems arose, but he had a very good knowledge of the situation on the

ground.

Messrs. Mbusa Nyamwisi and Tibasima, former first and second Vice-Presidents close to

General Salim Saleh and General Kazini, are more inclined to business and the extraction of

natural resources. In December 1999, a report was handed over to the President of

Uganda, specifically pointing out the embezzlement of $10 million by Mr. Nyamwisi and $3

million by Mr. Tibasima. Another report was handed to President Museveni in February

2000, specifically denouncing the collusion between Trinity Group and Mr. Tibasima and the

impact on the collection of customs duties. President Museveni chose to appoint the

leadership of his Congolese Liberation Front to those who were the accomplices of illegal

cartels.

President Museveni was also informed of the situation on the ground, the exploitation being

carried out and the involvement of officials of MLC and RCDML, including the conflict

between Hemas and Lendus. The President's family has also been very involved in business

in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the occupied zones. General Salim Saleh and his

wife, shareholders in Victoria and Trinity, have confidently carried out their activities

undisturbed. So, overall, it is clear that when the information is passed to the President and

he chooses not to act, he appoints the very people who carry out criminal activities, and

when his family members get away with their commercial endeavours, he does everything

top assist and protect them.

I. Artisanal Mining Since the WarWith the official end of the war in the East it was hoped that the smuggling of illegally-

obtained minerals from the DRC would stop. Just as the low-level war hasn’t stopped the

illegal mining has continued. Indeed, it has grown. The Rwandans and the Ugandans (to a

lesser degree) have used their proxies in the DRC to continue the illegal mining just as their

proxy armies continue the battles. They are joined by the DRC national army (FARDC) who

also engage in this business and by the troops of the United Nations who are there as

‘peacekeepers’. The same buyers visit the mine sites and the small villages. They carry their

wares by car and then by truck to Rwanda or Uganda where local merchants, working under

the control and protection of the Rwandan and Ugandan presidents and their entourages,

factor the minerals to international buyers with offices along the borders. The goods are

then shipped by air to Europe, India and China by the factors.

At each stage of the delivery process a local official extracts a ‘tax’ on each link of the chain.

Some of this ‘tax’ is paid to the provincial governors and some is kept as remuneration.

When the minerals reach the DRC borders the international buyers take delivery from the

factors. There are many Chinese companies which deal with the minerals (especially Norinco

China Non-ferrous Metals – both affiliated to the Northern Army). For diamonds the buyers

are usually Belgians with links to Pelikaanstraat in Antwerp or the Steinmetz-Gertler team

from Israel. There are a few Indian buyers, mainly from Rajasthan. Small amounts of

uranium are delivered but these are delivered primarily to the Gertler people and the

Rwandan Army for sale to North Korea and Iran. The North Koreans and the Iranians arrange

their own transport.

The financing of the transactions of the smaller metals (coltan, cassiterite, tantalum, etc.) is

in cash along the various steps of the chain. Coltan, for example, is traded in condensed milk

tin sizes. While they may add up to substantial volumes, each individual transaction is

usually very small. The normal transport for relatively short distance flights is by Antonov-12

aircraft designed to carry 12-14 tons but usually take off overloaded hoping to lose weight

with fuel over the journey. These can easily reach the UAE (especially Sharjah) which is also

a duty-free airport for making transfers to international scheduled aircraft. They sometimes

carry Nile perch as well.

Copper and cobalt are different commodities. Raw copper ores, or even tailings, are not that

rich in copper to make it worthwhile to ship in small loads. There is no real facility to ship

cathodes as they require a heavy lift to move and are too obvious. Cobalt is not much better

as both copper and cobalt have to be leached or roasted before they produce much of

value. Copper concentrate or cobalt oxide both require expensive processing to have value

in small amounts. That is why, in Katanga, artisanal miners need to move large quantities of

illegally-obtained ores before they can be turned into cash. To move large quantities

requires trucks and the permits to move these on the roads which are obtained from local

officials. Just as a tax is imposed on the miners on the trail to the market the local officials

tax the truckloads of ore. Unlike many of the ‘blood minerals’ of the eastern Congo which

move East to West, much of the stolen copper/cobalt pres from Katanga move south into

Zambia where they become invisible as they join Zambian copper and can be processed in

Zambian plants.

However, just as the final sales are made between local factors (protected by the Presidents

or their entourages) in Rwanda and Uganda the copper/cobalt ores leaving Katanga pass

through the hands of factors like Gertler or Katumba who use their influence with Katumbi

Chapwe (the Governor of Katanga) or Jean-Marie Dikanga Kazadi (the Minister of the

Interior) to arrange a safe passage South. Martin Kabwelulu, the Minister participates but is

not an active player. Mama Sifa (Kabila’s mother) used to have a role to play but, as her

power weakens, her revenue is reduced. John Numbi arranges for the police to look the

other way and to assist if needed. All of these receive remuneration, some of which goes to

the PPD party.

The Chinese are not active participants but guarantee the purchase as the ores reach the

border (as does Glencore who operate the facilities in which they will be processed.) It is

only uranium which moves East through the normal channels.

This system has operated for years and there is very little chance that the Mining ode will be

enforced an artisanal miners forced to stop. There are too any people who rely on this

quasi-industry for their survival. Moreover, there are leagues of bleeding hearts in the

international NGO community who are active in trying to improve the lot of the artisanal

miners, despite the fact that they are acting against the law. There is no winning in this

situation. If the crooks don’t stop you the good-hearted and socially-correct NGOs will.

Appendix I: CASM-ASM in DRC.pdf

Appendix II: Artisanal.pdf

Appendix III: Report of the Panel of Experts.pdf