Articulating Our Ignorance: Hopeful Skepticism and the Meno Paradox by Larry Briskman

ARTICULATINGOUR IGNORANCE:Hopeful Skepticism and

LARRY BRISKMAN* the MetlO

IN AN ESSAY entitled "The Legacy of the Meno" Marjorie Grene tells usthat "Popper has paid no serious heed to Meno's question" (l)-that is,to the paradox of learning, or of the search for new knowledge, articulatedin Plato's dialogue of the same name. In the course of her discussion shenot only repudiates, as Popper himself has done, (2) Plato's solution to thisproblem, she also takes Popper's own views on scientific method to task,asserting that "on either view, Plato's or Popper's, there is really no suchthing as learning." (3) A student of Popper's philosophy might be forgivenfor gasping in response to such a claim-for if Popper's theory of scienceis anj^hing, it is, surely, a theory of the growth of scientific knowledge,and hence a theory of empirical learning. How could anyone, one mightwonder, hold that Popper's philosophy entails the non-existence of sucha thing as learning? Well, perhaps one could argue as follows: genuine learn-ing always involves discovery-the learning of what was previously un-known-but Popper, in his classic The Logic of Scientific Discovery, tellsus that in his view "every discovery contains 'an irrational element', or a'creative intuition,' in Bergson's sense." (4) The critic might thus be temptedto conclude that, for Popper, learning is irrational-or, rather, that althoughthere may be a psychology of learning there can be no logic (or methodo-logic) of learning, no logic (or methodology) of discovery.

Something of this line of reasoning has, I think, rubbed off on Grene,for she says of Plato and Popper that "neither in the one case nor the other

* Larry Briskman is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh,Scotland).fEarlier versions of this paper were read to the Philosophy Department colloquium atDartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire in the summer of 1977; to the DepanmentalSeminar at Edinburgh in February 1978; and to the Philosophy Club at St. Andrews Univer-sity in May 1980.

201

202 Et cetera FALL 1985

is there any reasoned account of learning or discovery. There is either, forPlato, nothing new, or, for Popper, novelties thrown up so far as one knowsat random." (5) In other words, I want to suggest that Grene is able to seePopper's philosophy as entailing the non-existence of learning because sheidentifles, not unreasonably, genuine learning with the successful searchfor new knowledge and cannot see in Popper any rational theory of thissearch. That is, although she freely admits that Popper has a rational theoryof the elimination of candidates for new knowledge, she denies that he hasany rational theory of their generation, or of their discovery, and, as impor-tantly, of how they can come to be recognized as candidates for newknowledge. In essence, she fails to see any Popperian solution to the Menoparadox. The time is ripe, I think, to supply one.

But flrst, some preliminaries: it might be thought that what distinguishesPopper's approach to science from that of other philosophers is his fallibil-ism-his denial of the possibility of scientific certainty and his assertionof the conjectural nature of every part of scientific knowledge. But thisis a mistake, for the overwhelming majority of contemporary philosophersof science-including most of the proponents of probabihstic inductivelogic-are also fallibilists. Wherein lies the difference between them andPopper? The answer becomes clear as soon as one realizes that there arein fact at least two, very different, ways in which one can be a fallibilist.First, one can be what might be termed a justiflcationalist fallibilist-thatis, one can hold that (a) science aims to prove or justify its hypotheses;but that (b) such proof or justification can never be perfect; so that (c) cer-tainty in science can never be reached. On this view one does not rejectthe aim of justifying, or trying to make certain, one's scientific hypothesesor beliefs; one only recognizes that the pursuit of this aim has limited,or partial, scope for success. Popper's fellibilism is quite different to thishisis a critical, not a justificationalist, fallibilism. (6) That is. Popper rejectsnot only the possibility of attaining certainty (as do all fallibilists), but alsothe quest for it. His fallibilism rests not so much on the impossibility ofperfect proof as on the constant possibility of detecting our errors, andon the conscious adoption of methodological policies designed to help usdo so. As David Miller has noted, for Popper "the conjectural characterof scientific hypotheses lies not so much in the fact that they cannot beshown to be right as in the fact that they may be shown to be wrong." (7)Thus, the distinguishing feature of Popper's approach to science lies notin his fallibilist or conjecturalist epistemology, but in his falsiflcationalistor criticalist, anti-justificational, methodology.

Now the traditional debate in the theory of knowledge has been betweenthose who believe, optimistically, in the possibility of attaining knowledgeby rational means ("dogmatists"), and those who, pessimistically, deny thispossibility ("skeptics"). How are we to situate Popper's philosophy withinthis traditional debate? The question is a difficult one, for Popper's

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philosophy in effect proposes a shift in the very terms of the debate, inits presuppositions. In so far as the traditional optimists hoped to distin-guish rational knowledge from mere belief on the basis of justification.Popper must qualify as a pessimist (or skeptic), for as already mentioned,he denies not only the possibility of successflilly justifying our knowledgeclaims but also the fruitfulness of the very search for such justification.But in so far as the traditional pessimists held that all cognitive claimsare, rationally, on a par (relativism) and that the rational search for knowledgeand truth is mere chimera ("methodological nihilism"). Popper must qualifyas an optimist. In the context of the traditional debate Popper's view mightbest be characterized as a hopeful, or Socratic, skepticism. For, like Socrates,Popper is optimistic about the search for truth but pessimistic about ourattaining it (or, at the very least, knowing that we've attained it); (8) andfor Popper this "third view" between traditional optimism and traditionalpessimism is to be forged by shifting the main problem of the theory ofknowledge away from that of iht justification of belief to that of the criticalimprovement of conjectural theories a shift which is designed precisely toenable us to be skeptical and yet anti-relativistic; to be "pessimistic" andcritical as to the truth of our present scientific knowledge and yet optimis-tic as to science's search for truth.

The problem of the present paper can now be stated: Can we offer aPopperian solution to the Meno paradox? That is, a solution to the Menoparadox which is simultaneously non-justificationalist (and hence skepti-cal) and yet non-relativistic (and hence rational, optimistic)? Much of theburden of the paper will be precisely to show why this question is a problemor, rather, expresses a problem; and to generate desiderata for an adequatesolution to it. I shall proceed as follows: First (in Section I) I shall introducewhat I take to be the fundamental problem of traditional, justiflcationalistsolutions to this problem and its shortcomings. Then (in Section II) I shallindicate how a rejection of this solution seems at once to throw us intoeither a skepticism or a relativism. Thirdly (in Section III) I will showhow the Meno paradox might be used to buttress or support the justiflca-tionalist solution to the problem of diversity as against Popper's hopeful,or Socratic, skepticism. Finally (in Section IV) I shall outline a solutionto the Meno paradox which is simultaneously non-justificationalist andanti-relativistand hence Popperian. My thesis, in a nutshell, is three-fold:flrst, that (pace Marjorie Grene) there exists a Popperian, Socratic skepti-cal solution to the Meno paradox; second, that this solution is clearly prefer-able to the rival justiflcationalist solutions; and third, that such a solutionthus provides an independent means for avoiding relativism.

The central problem confronting the traditional theorist of knowledgeis, I maintain, an eminently practical one. It results from the fact that differ-


ent men, in the same or different cultures, and at the same or differenttimes, make diverse (conflicting and competing) claims about the world.The problem which this diversity raises is this: how can any of the dis-putes which may arise in its wake be adjudicated (non-violently)? Which,if any, of the diverse claims are rationally acceptable? (9) The traditional,justiflcationalist answer to these questions is that any claim may be saidto be part of our knowledge and to be rationally acceptable if and onlyif it is possible to justify it, to prove that it is true, or at least highly prob-able. Otherwise it is but mere doxa, opinion. It may even be true opinion,but until it is justified (or proven; or probabilified) the rational man shouldsuspend his judgment and keep himself from coming out in favor of anyof the parties to the dispute. Now already in antiquity skeptics had pointedout that the demand for justiflcation leads to an infinite regress-for sinceall proofs start from assumptions it is impossible to prove all assumptions(or to probabilify all assumptions). This simple logical fact forced justiflca-tionalists into involving "self-evident" or "self-justifying" foundations forknowledgethat is, statements which we could somehow definitely "see"to be true (or at least "see" to be true with high probability) independentlyof all proof, and which could thus serve as the starting-point for eitherstrict justification (proof) or for its weaker, probabilistic, variant (and, hence,as the starting-point for knowledge). The justificationalist solution to theproblem of diversity amounted, then, to the idea that all genuine intellec-tual disputes can be adjudicated with reference to this self-evident founda-tion. If one of the diverse claims can be justified on its basis then it, andit alone, is rationally acceptable knowledge. If none of them can be so justi-fled then all are mere doxa, and the rational man then suspends hisjudgment.

As is well known, two main schools arose to supply the needed justiflca-tional foundation: intellectualism (or rationalism) and empiricism. Intellec-tualists sought to ground knowledge in a reliable faculty of "reason," or"intellectual intuition"; empiricists in a reliable faculty of "sense," or in"experience." Yet neither program can, I submit, really succeedif for noother reason than that skeptics can always demand a justiflcation for assum-ing the reliability (that is, either the known truth or the high probabilityof truth) of any proposed justificatory foundation, and hence reopen theinfinite regress. More specifically, however, modern intellectualism has beenin disarray since the times of Newton and Kant. On the one hand, thetritunph of Newtonian over Cartesian physics, coupled with Descartes' claimto have based his physics only upon dear and distinct ideas guaranteedtrue by our God-given intellectual intuition, undercut confidence in theCartesian "Natural Light of Reason"; on the other hand, the Kantian anti-nomies showed that we could argue with equal intuitive cogency for con-tradictory propositions. The conclusion seemed inescapable: "pure reason"cannot be a reliable guide to the truth.


Modern empiricism has (historically) fared much better, largely as a resultof Newton's insistence that his discovery of the laws of motion and of gravi-tation had been based upon experience and induction. (10) Yet Humeshowed that justiflcational empiricism is actually inconsistent withinductivism-since the latter requires the acceptance of a principle whosejustification cannot, without circularity, rest upon experience. But this meansthat not only is empiricism unable to provide a rational justification forthe acceptance of causal laws (and so fails to exhibit natural science as arational enterprise from the justificationalist's viewpoint); from experience,empiricism can provide no account of how such learning can be rational.For given Hume's result, the justiflcational empiricist is forced to concludethat learning from experience is only possible on pain of inconsistency.Moreover, there is the further problem of how we are to linguistically expressthe contents of our sense experience in such a way as to incorporate onlythis experience. A solution to this problem is just as crucial to the justiflca-tional empiricist's enterprise as is a solution to the problem of induaion-forproofs, and hence justifications, can only proceed from linguistically formu-lated premises. If, therefore, our most basic empirical propositions alreadyexpress more than the contents of our sense experience, then the empiri-cist has failed to provide, by his own criterion, a reliable foundation (ofeither known truth or high probability of truth) from which justificationmight proceed. And to make matters worse, there is here an absolutelydevastating trade-off between these two problems-in that the closer wecome to a solution to this last problem the harder it becomes to solve theproblem of induction. Intuitively speaking, the more reliability the em-piricist manages to obtain at the level of the linguistically formulated em-pirical basis, the larger is the logical gap between it and what he hopesto justify on its basis (e.g., the universal laws of mathematical physics).

The seeming insolubility of these and similar problems have combined,I think, to drastically undermine the plausibility of traditional justiflca-tionalism. But it is important to realize why this view maintains itsphilosophical glitter-for in the absense of some sort of reliable epistemo-logical authority to which we can appeal, how are we to go about tryingto adjudicate rationally and non-violently between competing knowledgeclaims? Yet in response to this difficulty justiflcationalism explains toomuch-for it actually makes the empirical fact of diversity itself highly prob-lematic. For if there does exist an adequate (i.e., self-evident) justificatoryfoundation with reference to which all disputes can be adjudicated, how,then, is the continuing existence of diversity and disputes to be explained?Traditional justificationalists were apt to reply with theories of prejudice(or error): diversity and disputes continue, they argued, because peopleare irrationally "blinded" either by their prejudices (Bacon) or by theirWillfulness (Descartes) from seeing the self-evident (or Manifest) founda-tion. But these theories, in their turn, simply raise the problem of how


we are now to know when we are not prejudiced (or Willful). For unlesswe can know this, we can never know when we are actually in possessionof that very foundation of "self-evident" truth (or "self-evident" high prob-ability of truth) with reference to which we were supposed to adjudicatebetween diverse claims. In other words, there here emerges a second devas-tating trade-off for the justificationalist: without an unproblematically (or"self-evidently") self-evident foundation he cannot solve the problem of diver-sity; but with such a foundation he cannot explain why there should becontinuing diversity (and hence a continuing problem) in the flrst place.

IIA reasonable response to the overwhelming problems confronting the

various attempts to specify justificatory foundation is, I believe, to rejectits existence. Yet in so doing we are not only left with the problem of diver-sity unsolved; we also appear to be driven into some version of either skep-ticism or relativism. For if it is maintained that a substantive claim deservesthe honorific "knowledge" if, and only if, it is possible to justify it; andif, in virtue of the seemingly insoluble problems confronting the justiflca-tionist, such justification is declared to be impossible; then so., too, mustknowledge be impossible. Hence we seem driven into skepticism. Alterna-tively, if the assertion that one view deserves to be accorded greater in-tellectual status than another-or is better than another-turns upon thefact that one is justifled while the other is not; and if once again justiflca-tion is declared to be impossible; then so, too, must it be impossible todiscriminate between diverse claims. Hence all such claims must be ac-corded equal intellectual status-must be seen as rationally on a par-andso we seem driven into relativism. In this way we can, following Popper,see many traditional skeptics and .elativists as disappointed justiflcational-ists-as justiflcationalists who hold that justification is (alas) impossible.

Now it must be admitted that most philosophers flnd both skepticismand relativism to be highly implausible (and perhaps even contradictory)positions. Take relativism flrst: the main plank of cultural (or historical)relativism is just that the intellectual products of all cultures (or of all histor-ical periods) must, faute de mieux, be accorded equal intellectual status.Yet it ought to be obvious that very few cultures actually uphold culturalrelativism, and that such a relativism is by and large the intellectual prod-uct of our culture (of our anthropology, sociology, philosophy, etc.)-justas historical relativism is, by and large, a product of specific historicalperiods. But this means that the cultural (or historical) relativist must, ifhe is to be consistent, acknowledge that the anti-relativist position is theintellectual equal of relativism. In other words, no relativist can coherentlyargue for the intellectual superiority (or preferability) or relativism withoutimplicitly denying the very doctrine which he seeks to defend. It seemsto follow that relativism cannot be rationally defended, and most


philosophers flnd highly implausible-as well as rationally unacceptable-any thesis which, by its own lights, is rationally indefensible. (11)

Similar considerations apply with respect to skepticism: the skeptic's asser-tion that knowledge is impossible seems highly implausible since, afterall, we do seem to know certain things. Moreover, skepticism is (like rela-tivism) often thought to be inconsistent, since the skeptic must be claim-ing to know that knowledge is impossible. My own view of this matter,for what it is worth, is that not only is skepticism consistent, but that itis true. In other words, I accept the skeptical argument that the attemptto justify any substantial knowledge claim must inevitably lead to an in-finite regress, so that the search for such justiflcation must be fruitless.But I do not assume that the inflnite regress argument justifies this claim;rather it lays down a challenge which the justiflcationalist must meet-thechallenge of specifying an adequate justificatory foundation for stoppingthe regress-and which, as far as I can see, he has so far failed to meet.In other words, I accept the skeptical position tentatively-as a so-far un-criticized conjecture-not as a piece of justified episteme: for should a justi-ficationalist come up with a theory of the justificatory foundations ofknowledge which, after much critical effort, could not be faulted, then Iwould be prepared to abandon my skepticism. But until then skepticism,which rests upon denying the assumption of any adequate justificatory foun-dation, remains a viable conjecture. (12)

In any case, the point I want centrally to make here is not that skepti-cism is true, but rather that justificationalists have often employed the seem-ing implausibility of skepticism (and relativism) in order to argue, in a"transcendental" fashion, that the problems confronting them simply mustbe solvable. To see this, remember that arguments which appeared to leadus into these implausible positions crucially hinged upon denying the pos-sibility of justification. But if this denial leads to such wildly implausibleconclusions then, by a kind of "logical principle of the re-transmission ofimplausibility," so too must this denial be implausible (and this in spiteof the fact that the failure of every attempt to overcome the infinite regressargument, but specifying an adequate justificatory foundation, seems tomake it plausible!). (13) In other words, since (for example) skepticism doesseem a highly implausible thesis (to repeat, we do seem to know certainthings), its rejection, in the presence of the traditionally uncontroversialpremise that what distinguishes knowledge from merely true opinion isjustification, immediately yields the conclusion that an adequate justifica-tory foundation simply must exist (since justification must be possible). (14)

At this point, however, we seem to have reached a highly unsatisfactoryimpasse: paraphrasing Wesley Salmon's delightful remark that one man'smodus ponens is another man's modus tolens, it would appear as if the skep-tic's modus ponens has now become the justiflcationalist's modus tollens.Yet surely we have the right to expect more of the justiflcationalist than


has so far been offeredfor whereas the skeptic has a whole host of in-dependent arguments against the possibility of justification, in that he hasindependent arguments against the adequacy of every proposed justifica-tory foundation, the justificationalist's "transcendental" argument that anadequate justificatory foundation simply must exist appears to rest solelyupon his rejection of skepticism. But given that the present question atissue is precisely the acceptability or otherwise of skepticism and justifi-cationalism, we would appear to have the right to demand that the justifica-tionalist not simply beg the question in dispute by merely declaring that,since skepticism is felse, an adequate justificatory foundation exists. In otherwords, we want the justificationalist to himself offer an independent argu-ment (independent, that is, of his rejection of skepticism) for the existenceof such a foundation. My claim is, then, that the Meno paradox appearsto offer the justificationalist an opportunity for just such an independentargument-at least with respect to one version of skepticism (namely, Socraticor hopeful skepticism).

mTo see this, recall first Meno's paradox: in order to search for something

we must know what we are looking for, otherwise we cannot know if orwhen our search has been successful. Now apply this seeming truism tothe special case of searching for knowledge: in order to search for knowledgewe must know what we are looking for; but this seems to entail that wemust already know the knowledge and so don't need to search for it. Alter-natively, if we don't already know the knowledge then we don't know whatwe are looking for and so can't search for it. So either we can search forknowledge but needn't, or else we need to search for knowledge but can't.Plato sums up the argument as follows: " . . . a man cannot inquire eitherabout that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; forif he knows, he has no need to inquire, and if not, he cannot; for he doesnot know the very subject about which he is to inquire." (15)

While the problem of diversity is the flindamental problem of the tradi-tional theory of knowledge, the Meno paradox is, I submit, no mereSophism, but the fundamental problem, not only of traditional methodol-ogy, but of methodology tout court. The reason for this is simple: method-ology is, I take it, the theory of rational inquiry; and the aim of anymethodological theory is to provide us with rules, or heuristics, to helpguide us in our search for knowledge and truth. It follows that everymethodological theory must, at least implicitly, contain a solution to theMeno paradoxfor it must explain how it could be possible to rationallysearch for that which we do not know; to rationally search for the truthwhen we are ignorant of it. For should it turn out to be impossible to con-duct such a search then methodology itself becomes impossible.

Remember that the conclusion of the argument leading to the Meno


paradox was that we can search for knowledge only if we don't need tosearch. It follows that we can rationally search for knowledge only if wedon't need to search-for the set of rational search procedures must be asub-set of the set of all search procedures. So the fundamental problemof every methodological theory, every theory of rational inquiry, must beto show how we both can rationally search for knowledge arid need to. Nowthe dominant methodological tradition basically follows, with variations,the theme of Plato's own solution to this problem. According to Plato weboth can rationally search for knowledge and need to: we can rationallysearch precisely because we do already know it-all of it (innately and un-consciously); while we need to rationally search precisely because we don'talready know it-any of it (explicitly and consciously). Hence the rationalsearch for knowledge is really the attempt to "bring out" that which is already"there" (that is, learning-either recollection or deduction). This is Plato'stheory of anamnesis. Seventeenth century methodologists proposed similarviews: Descartes, for example, held in effect that we can rationally searchfor knowledge because we clo already have itsome of it (innately, throughthe clear and distinct ideas open to our God-given Reason); and yet thatwe need to search for it-the rest of it (since the Natural Light only im-mediately illuminates a small portion of t^hat which can be known). In histheory we search for this knowledge through deduction from that whichis innately or intuitively known. (16) Empiricists, on the other hand, alsoheld that we are able to rationally search for knowledge just because wedo already have it-some of it (immediately through the senses); and yetthat we need to search for itthe rest of it (since the senses only give usa knowledge of observable effects, not of their underlying causes; aknowledge of appearance, not of reality). For them we search for suchknowledge through induction from that which is given by the senses. Inother words, the methodological tradition has it that in order to rationallysearch for knowledge we must already have some foundation of knowledgefrom which to begin. Then, and only then, will we be able to recognizethat for which we searchby its recollective, deductive, or inductive rela-tion to that very foundation. (17)

I want to claim that, given all this, the justificationalist is in a positionto structure the following argument: if it is possible to rationally searchfor knowledge, it can only be because we are able to recognize that for whichwe search; but as we have just seen, we can only recognize that for whichwe search by its relation to a foundation of knowledge; therefore, if it ispossible to rationally search for knowledge there must be a foundation ofknowledge.

Now many traditional skeptics (for example, the Pyrrhonians) actuallyaccepted this argument-that is, they agreed with the justificationalist thatthe rational search for knowledge hinges upon a foundation of knowledge.But, they argued, the failure of every attempt to stem the infinite regress


shows that, rationally, there is no such foundation. They thus concludedthat, rationally, the rational search for knowledge is itself impossible. Pyrrhon-ian skeptics thus urged that we should give up the chimerical rational searchfor knowledge altogether, and instead find happiness in "qtiietude" (ataraxia).Thus, the above justificationalist argument is no argument at all againstthe Pyrrhonian skeptic.

But the situation is quite different if we consider the Socratic, or hope-fiil, skeptic like Popper, who wants both to maintain that we can rationallysearch for knowledge and yet deny the existence of any (justificatory) foun-dation of knowledge. For if the conclusion of the above justificationalistargument is correct, then it follows that Popper wants the impossibleand so his position must be inconsistent! Moreover, this argument doesnot simply presuppose the falsity of Socratic, or hopeful, skepticism-itis thus an independent argument against such a skepticism. There arises,then, the following crucial problem for Socratic skepticism: can we offera solution to the Meno paradox which is c7-justificational?-that is, whichdoes not require that in order to rationally search for knowledge there mustbe some foundation of knowledge from which to begin? Since I take it,in agreement with the first premise of the above justiflcationalist argument,that we can only rationally search for knowledge if we are able to recog-nize that for which we search, it follows that our problem is to find a theorywhich meets the following two requirements: first it is Socratic (in thatwe can rationally search for knowledge); and second, it is skeptical (in thatwe do not require the existence of any foundation of knowledge in orderto recognize that for which we search). In sum, can we solve the Menoparadox along Socratic-skeptical lines?

The position we have so far reached in this section is that the justifica-tionalist can offer a solution to the Meno paradox, and that if his type ofsolution is the only possible one then Popper's hopeful, or Socratic, skep-ticism is inconsistent. Hence, it behooves the hopeful skeptic to offer anon-justificational solution to the Meno paradox. However, this problem,no matter how serious it may be, is not half as serious as one with whichthe justificationalist can now be confrontedfor if we accept the justifica-tionalist's solution to the Meno paradox and couple it, not with his sup-posedly "pure and secure" foundation or starting-point, but rather withthe seemingly more realistic idea that such starting-points are simply cul-turally or historically supplied, then we immediately land up in a culturalor historical relativism. To see this remember that for the justificationalistthe justificatory foundation of knowledge functions also as the starting-point in the rational search for knowledgein that one can only rationallysearch on its basis since without it one has no ability to recognize thatfor which one searches (and a rational search clearly presupposes this abil-ity). But this means that one cannot possibly relinquish this starting-pointin the course of the search, for this would be to give up the search altogether.


No wonder then that traditional justiflcationalists were so concerned withguaranteeing the epistemological "purity" of our starting-point-for if itwere infected with the slightest error this would necessarily condemn oursearch to failure. But if we couple the above view not with the justifica-tionalist's "epistemologically privileged," error-free starting-point, but withthe rather more plausible assumption that our starting-points are simplyculturally or historically supplied, then it follows that both knowledge andthe rational search for it must be either relative to a culture (cultural rela-tivism) or else relative to specific historical periods (historical relativism).

It might be thought that this result is not really terribly worrying since,after all, the search for knowledge obviously does go on (and must go on)within cultures, or within specific historical periods. But to think this is,I believe, to miss entirely the import of the above result: for the crucialelement in the argument is just that, given the justificationalist's solutionto the Meno paradox, such culturally or historically supplied starting-pointscannot rationally be relinquished in the course of the search, for this wouldbe to give up the rational search itself. But this means that having adoptedsuch a starting-point (or "framework") we are, in a sense, rationally stuckwith it-fov we cannot give it up and rationally search for a new starting-point, since in giving it up we would have relinquished our very abilityto rationally search (for we would have relinquished our ability to recog-nize that for which we search, and a rational search presupposes this abil-ity). In other words, we land up in the CoUingwoodian, or Kuhnian, viewthat "rationality," "knowledge," and the "rational search for knowledge" areall relative to the acceptance of a framework (of either absolute presup-positions or paradigms) whose own claims to truth cannot be coherentlydiscussed, and whose overthrow and replacement by another cannot berationally explained, but can at best be explained by appeal to non-rational-for example, social or historical-"forces." In this way, an acceptance of thejustificationalist's solution to the Meno paradox, coupled with a rejectionof his "epistemologically privileged," error-free foundation or starting-point,leads the relativist to conclude that we must give up the chimerical rationalsearch for objectively true knowledge, and instead find happiness in the cul-tural or historical "consensus"-which, non-rationally, somehow keepschanging. (18)

It ought to be obvious that the justificationalist can now structure another"transcendental" argument in response to all this: since the rejection ofan "epistemologically privileged," error-free, foundation or starting-pointhas led us into such rationally incoherent relativisms, it follows that sucha foundation simply must exist. But his debate has now shifted to one withthese relativists, and so seemingly he is now in need of a new independentargument-namely, one against these versions of relativism. On the otherhand, the Socratic skeptic-like Popper-faces the problem of having tooffer a non-justificational solution to the Meno paradox: that is, a solution


in which the rational search for knowledge does not require the existenceof any foundation of knowledge. But this means that if the Socratic skep-tic can solve this problem then he will actually have produced an indepen-dent means for avoiding these versions of relativism. To see this, rememberthat the versions of relativism at issue (Collingwoodian and Kuhnian) havebeen seen to result from the justificationalist solution to the Meno para-dox (J) that the rational search for knowledge crucially hinges upon a foun-dation or starting-point of knowledge, since without such a foundation onehas no ability to recognize that for which one searches; together with therather plausible premise (RPP) that such a foundation or starting-pointis simply culturally or historically supplied. It follows that, in this argumen-tative context, one has only two ways of avoiding such relativisms (R): eitherreject (J) or reject the (RPP). Justificationalists have to reject the (RPP),but their only argument against it is the "transcendental" one that since(R) is false, the (RPP) must be false. On the other hand, if we accept the(RPP) and reject the (J) then we needn't land up in (R). But the Socraticor hopeful skeptic has to reject (J), for otherwise his position is inconsis-tent. It follows that if such a skeptic can actually solve the Meno paradoxin a way other than (J), and if this solution can be shown to be preferableto (J), then it will offer a way of avoiding (R) which does not presupposethe falsity of (R)-/or the Socratic skeptic's reason for rejecting (J) is not thatit leads to (R), but rather that an acceptance of (J) would make his ownposition inconsistent. It follows that the Socratic or hopeful skeptic is,perhaps, paradoxically, in a better position to avoid Collingwoodian andKuhnian relativism than is the episteme-mindtd justificationalist.

To sum up this section: Pyrrhonian skeptics accept the justificationalists'view that in order to rationally search for knowledge we must have somefoundation of knowledge from which to begin; reject the existence of sucha foundation; and so conclude that the rational search for knowledge isimpossible. Socratic or hopeful skeptics, like Popper, also want to denythe existence of such a foundation, but want simultaneously to assert thepossibility of the rational search for knowledge; hence, they must find aoM-justiflcationalist solution to the Meno paradox. Moreover, acceptingthe justificationalist solution while denying the existence of a culturallyor historically transcendent foundation of knowledge leads, as we have seen,to certain versions of relativism. So, the problem for the hopeful skepticis: can we solve the Meno paradox in such a way that a) contra the Pyrrho-nian skeptic, we can rationally search for knowledge; and b) contra the justi-ficationalist, we can search without a foundation of knowledge; so that c) wecan, unlike the justificationalist, deny the existence of a culturally or his-torically transcendent foundation without falling into relativism?

IVIt is often said that a well-formulated problem is halfway to a solution.


Now not only do I think this true, but in our particular case somethingstronger (and stranger) can be said: namely, a well-formulated problem isvirtually all the way to a solution! In other words, I have already given(implicitly) a basis for a Socratic-skeptical solution to the Meno paradox.But I had better not run ahead of myself; so let's take things slowly.

The position reached so far is that any Socratic skeptical solution to theMeno paradox must meet the following two requirements or desiderata:first, (Di) it must show {contra the Pyrrhonian, and in agreement with thejustificationalist) that we can rationally search for knowledge; and second,(D2) it must show [contra the justificationalist) that this can be donewithout assuming any fotmdation of knowledgein that we are able to recog-nize that for which we search in the absence of any such foundation.Moreover, any solution meeting these two desiderata will have, as a bonus,the unintended (or undesigned) consequence of enabling us to deny theexistence of a culturally or historically transcendent foundation forknowledge without falling into Collingwoodian or Kuhnian relativisms.That is, we will be able to accept the rather plausible premise (RPP) thatour starting-points in the rational search for knowledge are, indeed, sup-plied to us either culturally or historically without this entailing that oursearch is confined within the framework of such starting-points, so that wecannot rationally search for new, improved, and better frameworks.

So far, so good. But notice what has happened: we began by generatingthe problem facing the Socratic skeptic. This problem resulted from thefact that the justificationalist can offer a solution to the Meno paradox-the fundamental problem of methodology-but that an acceptance of thissolution is impossible for the Socratic skeptic, since in accepting it he wouldrender his own position inconsistent. But since such a skeptic (unlike thePyrrhonian) wants to say, in agreement with the justificationalist, that wecan rationally search for knowledge, he too must solve the Meno paradox.Since he can't accept the justificationalist solution, he needs to find a non-justificationalist solution. But such a solution, as we have seen, needs tosatisfy the following two desiderata: flrst, (D,) it must show that we canrationally search for knowledge; and second, (D2) it must show that sucha search does not require the existence of any foundation of knowledge inorder for us to recognize that for which we search. Now clearly any theory(T) satisfying (Di) and (D2) will be a Socratic skeptical solution to theMeno paradox. It will thus be what we are looking for. But at the presentmoment we do not yet have such a (T), and so need to search for it. Butthis means that we have already explained how it could be possible to recog-nize that for which we search without assuming the existence of any foun-dation of knowledge! In other words, we have already explained how itcould be possible to satisfy (D2).

To see this, look at (D,) and (D2): on the one hand, (Dj) and (D2) enableus to recognize that for which we search-namely, a Socratic skeptical solu-


tion to the Meno paradox. But secondly, (Dj) and (D2) do not yet consti-tute such a solutionthey only lay down desiderata which any theory mustmeet in order to constitute such a solution. Thus we both need to searchfor such a theory and can search for it rationally-sinct (Di) and (D2)enable us to recognize that for which we search. Thirdly, (Di) and (D2)are no foundation of knowledge, and this for at least two reasons (a) wedo not yet know if any theory can satisfy (Dj) and (D2); but more impor-tantly, (b) (Di) and (D2) are not knowledge at all (and so clearly no foun-dation of knowledge), but desiderata on our search for it. In other words,since we are searching for knowledge it can only be the resultants of the5earcA-the theories-which constitute contributions to our knowledge; notthe desiderata on the jearcA-these supply, not knowledge, but "criteria" forrecognizing contributions to our knowledge. It follows that (Di) and (D2)have the following three properties: (1) they enable us to rationally searchfor a Socratic skeptical solution to the Meno paradox in that they enableus to recognize that for which we search; (2) they allow such recognitionin a way consistent with our needing to search for such a solution; and (3) theydo not constitute any foundation of knowledge, since they are not knowledgeat all. The reason for this is that they are not the resultants of our searchfor knowledge, but rather desiderata on the search itself. (19)

So the situation is this: in generating the problem which the justiflca-tionalist's solution to the Meno paradox raises for the Socratic skeptic, wehave simultaneously generated desiderata which a Socratic skeptical solu-tion to the problem must meet. But in generating such desiderata we havegenerated an ability to recognize that for which we search while neverthe-less needing to search-in that we haven't yet found a theory satisfyingthese desiderata. But to do this, all we basically need now do is to general-ize from our very search for a Socratic skeptical solution to the Meno para-dox. That is, this search has been one which began by generating a problem,moved from the problem to desiderata on its solution, and thence to thepresent attempt to formulate a theory satisfying these desiderata.

Well, here is the theory: (a) we begin (as good skeptics) by rejecting theassumption of any "epistemologically privileged" error-free foundation orstarting-point; from this it follows that (b) whatever our starting-point inthe search for knowledge is, we cannot assume it to be "epistemologicallyprivileged" or error-free; since we assert (b) there is no difficulty whatsoeverin equally asserting (c)the (RPP)-namely, that such a starting-point ismerely culturally or historically supplied; but now (d) since our starting-point cannot be assumed to be error-free, and since knowledge involvestruth, our starting-point cannot be assumed to be a starting-point ofknowledge. Since our starting-point cannot be assumed to be one ofknowledge, and since (e) we search for knowledge (and so search for truth),it follows that (f) we ought to try to expose whatever errors there may bein our culturally or historically supplied starting-point. How can this be


done? The answer is two-fold: first, (g) we can employ some substantivepart or sub-set (Si) of our starting-point in order to show that it is incon-sistent with some other substantive part or sub-set (S2) of our starting-point. Secondly, (h) on the assumption that we are here dealing with astarting-point that claims to be about the world, we can employ some sub-stantive part or sub-set Si of our starting-point as a "tool" for interactingwith the world in order to empirically test some other substantive part (S2)of our starting-point. In other words, we can employ S, as the assump-tions behind an empirical test of S2. (20)

But, it will be argued, unless we already know the truth (or at least somepart of the truth) the most that procedure (g) can ever accomplish is toshow that Si is inconsistent with S2; and the most that procedure (h) canever accomplish is to show that Si and certain "reports of observation" areinconsistent with S2. These procedures will thus never reveal the errorsin our starting-point. Quite true, but what they will reveal is that theremust be some error somewhere, either in Sj, or in S2, or in our "report ofobservation" (or even, perhaps, in our reasoning). Now this means that(i) by such procedures we are able to uncover/)ro6/ews-either in our sub-stantive starting-point or in our "report of observation" (or even, perhaps,in our reasoning); and as already shown (j) such problems will come withdesiderata on their solution. In fea, they will come with a variety of desiderataon their solution. For example, if we restrict ourselves to (g)-type methodsfor uncovering error in our starting-point, then any such revealed problem(or inconsistency) can be formulated as, for example, "the problem of S2(for S,)" or "the problem of Si (for S2)" (or even, perhaps, as "the problemof Sj and S2 (for logic)")-and each different way of formulating the prob-lem is equivalent to specifying different sets of desiderata on a solutionto it. But we have already seen (k) in specifying desiderata on a solutionto a problem we are both able to recognize that for which we search (namely,a theory satisfying these desiderata), and yet need to search for it. So ingetting to (k) we have gotten to a Socratic skeptic solution to the Menoparadox. (21)

What, then, is the basic message of the Socratic skeptical methodology,or theory of rational inquiry, so far articulated in (a)-(k)? Basically it is this:wherever we start from, we cannot assume it to be a starting-point of knowl-edge; therefore, we ought to try to reveal whatever errors there may be inour starting-point; this we do by applying to our starting-point the "criti-cal" methods (g) and (h); as a result of this we may be lucky enough togenerate problems (or inconsistencies); these problems will then come witha variety of desiderata on their solution; and we then search for knowledgein the form of theories satisfying these desiderata. So the above theory(a)-(k) might be dubbed "the theory of the desiderated search for solutionsto problems in our starting-point"; or, for short, "the theory of the desideratedsearch for knowledge" (TDSK). For in searching for solutions to problems


in our starting-point we are searching for knowledgein that we are search-ing for some replacement of, or modification to, our starting-point whichcan no longer be confronted with the same problem, and therefore withinwhich the same error cannot be revealed. But if the same error cannot berevealed in our new starting-point then there is some slight hope that ournew starting-point is, indeed, a starting-point of knowledge.

Of course, TDSK entails that we cannot assume that our new starting-point is a starting-point of knowledge, so that we shall have to continuethe search even given our new starting-point. But it is possible that ournew starting-point is one of knowledge (that is, that it is one of truth) evenalthough TDSK requires that we not assume so. So TDSK is not only aSocratic skeptical theory of the rational search for knowledge; it can, more-over, be made the basis of a Socratic skeptical theory of knowledge: for wehave reached a starting-point of knowledge (K) when, and only when, how-ever long we continue the rational search for knowledge in accordance withTDSK, we fail to reveal a problem in our starting-point which is such asto desiderate a search for a new starting-point. Of course this theory ofknowledge makes the notion of "knowledge" highly non-effective (in thelogician's sense)-since we can never know that we have reached a starting-point of knowledge, because however long we have actually conducted thesearch in accordance with TDSK, we haven't yet concluded the search-for TDSK itself entails that we not assume K to be a starting-point ofknowledge. We thus reach a very surprising result: TDSK is skeptical parexcellence, since it begins by rejecting the assumption of any "epistemologi-cally privileged," error-free foundation or starting-point; on the other hand,TDSK is, in a sense, anti-skeptical, since it enables us to define a non-effective Socratic-skeptical notion of knowledge which is such that the attain-ment of knowledge is possible, although we can never assume that we'vereached it and shall never know if we've reached it. (22)

Another important result can also be derived from TDSK: for TDSKnot only solves the Meno paradox in a Socratic-skeptical fashion, it alsosolves what Agassi has called "the second-order Meno paradox." To see this,recall the conclusion of the argument leading to the Meno paradox. Thiswas that we can search for knowledge only if we don't need to search: fromwhich it followed that we can rationally search for knowledge only if wedon't need to search. Now this is the fundamental problem of methodology,or of the theory of rational inquiry, precisely because any such theory wouldhave to show (1) that we can rationally search for knowledge-so thatmethodology is possible-and yet that (2) we need to search-so thatmethodology is necessary (needed; required). But now apply all this to thespecial case of searching for a solution to the Meno paradox itself, of search-ing for a theory of the rational search for knowledge: then we get the ratherplausible conclusion that we can rationally search for a theory of rationalsearching only if we don't need to search (since we must already have it.


in some way or other-either explicitly or, at the very least, implicitly).A solution to this second-order problem would thus have to show (1')

that we can rationally search for a theory of rational searching, and yetthat (2') we need to search for it. But TDSK does precisely this-for onthe one hand, TDSK is a theory of rational searching; on the other hand,we needed to search for TDSK in that prior to its articulation we didn'talready have it (all we had were the desiderata which it needed to satisfy).But on the third hand, we were able to search for TDSK rationally justbecause we were lucky enough to discover a problem which generated thedesiderata which it needed to satisfy. To put it another way, the search forTDSK was itself a search which (i) began by discovering a problem;(ii) moved thence to desiderata on its soltuion; and (iii) moved thence toa theory (i.e., TDSK itself) which satisfies these desiderata (more on thisbelow). But any search which proceeds in accordance with (i)-(iii) is, fromthe viewpoint of TDSK, a Socratic-skeptical rational search for knowledge]Hence, TDSK explains the search for itself as having been a rational search;and yet equally explains why we needed to search for it (since we didn'thave it in any way at all, but rather had a problem in accepting the justifica-tionalist solution to the Meno paradox). Thus TDSK shows how we both(1') can rationally search for a theory of rational search (i.e., for TDSK)and yet (2') need to search for such a theory. TDSK thus solves the second-order Meno paradox.

Now this result is not trivial, and for a very important reason: no justifica-tionalist solution to the Meno paradox can solve the second-order Meno para-dox. To see this, the following argument will have to suffice. All justifi-cationalist solutions to the Meno paradox rest upon the idea that the rationalsearch for knowledge is a search from some foundation or starting-pointof knowledge, by some rules for conducting the search (deductive, induc-tive, or maieutic), to that for which we search. It follows that the attemptto rationally search/or the rules,/row the foundation, without already havingthe rules, cannot be possiblefor having the rules is as necessary a pre-condition for the rational search as is having the foundation. It follows thatno justificationalist solution to the Meno paradox can solve the second-order Meno paradox-it could never explain how we both could rationallysearch for the rules of rational searching and yet need to search, (since wedon't already have them). So if the justificationalist did need to search forhis own rules of rational searching, and if his search was a rational search(that is, if it satisfied (Dj)) then it follows that it must have been a non-justificationalist rational search. But that there are such searches is pre-cisely what the Socratic skeptic requires in order that his second desidera-tum (D2) be satisfiable. It follows that either the justificationalist didn'tneed to search for his rules of rational searching-so that he fails to solvethe second-order Meno paradox-or else that if he did need to search forthem, and was able to search for them rationally, then his own search for


his rules of rational searching must have satisfied both (Di) and (D2), andso was itself a Socratic-skeptical search.

This result has an important corollary: for the failure of all justification-alist solutions to the first-order Meno paradox to solve the second-orderMeno paradox can be taken to indicate that these solutions do not actuallysolve the problem of the Meno at all; they merely shift it. The very sameproblem now arises in a new placewith respect to the search for thejustificationalist's solution to the first-order Meno paradox (J). So in theface of his failure to solve the second-order Meno paradox the justifica-tionalist finds himself impaled on one of the horns of the following dilem-ma: either (1) we can rationally search for (J), in accordance with (J), onlyif we don't need to search for it; or (2) we can rationally search for (J), needto search, and so our rational search for (J) is not a "(J)-type" rational search.To admit (1) is to admit that (J) merely shifts the Meno paradox on to thesearch for itself; to admit (2) is to admit the existence of non-justificationalistrational search, and hence to admit the possibility of a non-justificationalist,Socratic skeptical solution to both the first-order and the second-order Menoparadox. In other words, the justificationalist has to admit either that hecan't solve the Meno paradox (in that he merely shifts it) or else that theSocratic skeptic can. (23) A dilemma-for TDSK, so far as we know, solvesthe second-order Meno paradox and so doesn't merely shift the problemon to the "needful rational search" for itself. So the failure of (J) to solvethe second-order Meno paradox, in the face of TDSK's success in doingso, provides a powerful independent argument against (J). Now rememberthat Collingwoodian and Kuhnian relativisms could be seen to result froman acceptance of (J) coupled with the rather plausible premise (RPP) thatour starting-points in the rational search for knowledge are merely culturallyor historically supplied. Since TDSK's success in solving the second-orderMeno paradox provides a powerful independent argument against (J), itequally provides such an argument against the typical relativist claim thathe who accepts the (RPP) must immediately embrace relativism. But thenTDSK provides an independent means for avoiding relativismindependent, that is, of both rejecting the (RPP) and of merely presup-posing the falsity of relativism. (24)

The final question for this section is: does the theory of the desideratedsearch for knowledge (TDSK)-i.e., (a)-(k)-satisfy the desiderata ((Dj) and(D2)) of a Socratic-skeptical solution to the Meno paradox? To determinethis, recall (Di) and (D2): (D,) requires that we can rationally search forknowledge; (D2) requires that this be done without assuming any foun-dation or starting-point of knowledge-in that we are able to recognize thatfor which we search in the absence of any such foundation. Now TDSKclearly does not assume any foundation of knowledge. In fact, it begins(a) by rejecting the assumption of any such foundation of starting-point,and proceeds to (d) wherein whatever our starting-point it cannot be as-


sumed to be a starting-point of knowledge. On the other hand, TDSK doesexplain how we are able to recognize that for which we search in the ab-sence of any such foundation or starting-point-for we can recognize it byseeing whether or not it satisfies the desiderata on a solution to a problemdiscovered in our non-knowledge starting-point. Thus TDSK clearly satisfies(D2). But what about (Di)? Well, so far as we know at present the onlyrequirement on satisfying (Di) is just that we be able to recognize that forwhich we search, but TDSK meets this requirement. Therefore, in so faras no further consequences of (Di) can be drawn which TDSK fails tosatisfy, TDSK can be conjectured to satisfy (Di). The result is that(1) TDSK is, as far as we know, a Socratic-skeptical solution to the Menoparadox; and (2) we can only claim (1) in a way consistent with Socraticskepticism itself. (25)

While the justificationalist tradition insists that in order to rationallysearch for knowledge we must have some foundation of knowledge fromwhich to begin our search, the Socratic tradition has been quite differentfrom this-for Socrates stressed that he knew nothing (except, perhaps, forthat he knew nothing) and yet he rationally searched for knowledge. Infact, his realization of his own (and especially others') ignorance was itselfthe product of his very search. But how, given the Meno paradox, couldone know nothing and yet rationally search for knowledge? How could webe ignorant and yet search for that of which we are ignorant?

The Socratic-skeptical solution to the Meno paradox which I havepresented clears all this up-for our ignorance, rather than being bliss, canactually be discovered and articulated; and in articulating it (in various ways,no doubtfor we are ignorant even here as to the correct way to articulateour ignorance!) we will generate desiderata which enable us to recognizethat for which we search-namely, contributions to our knowledge in theform of theories which can solve some of the problems which have beenrevealed in our non-knowledge starting-point. In other words, I want toassert, as opposed to Kuhn, Collingwood, and the justificationalists, thatit hardly matters where we start for wherever we start we cannot assumeit to be a starting-point of knowledge. What does matter is that we start-for in conducting the Socratic-skeptical rational search for knowledge (inaccordance with TDSK) we can modify or transform our initial starting-point out of all recognition. Thus, rather than being rationally caught as"prisoners" within the framework of our starting-point, we will be ableto rationally transform it, and to rationally search for new, improved, andbetter frameworks. (26)

Finally, what about the initial problem from which our discussionbegan-that is, the problem of diversity? All along I have described thisas the fundamental problem of the traditional theory of knowledge; and


have suggested that justificationalism has maintained its philosophical glitterprecisely because the problem of diversity appears to demand some sortof "epistemologically privileged" foundation of knowledge to wliich we canappeal in order to adjudicate between competing claims. Does the Socraticskeptic have anything to say about the problem of diversity? The answeris that he does-he suggests that it is the wrong problem, in that it immedi-ately begs for some sort of justificationalist answer, and that it ought tobe replaced with the Meno paradox as the fundamental problem, not onlyof methodology, but of epistemology as well. That is, the Socratic skepticholds that it is the rational search for knowledge which is primary, andthat it is out of the theory of rational searching that we will generate meansfor coping with the diversity. For so long as all of the parties to a disputeare prepared to undertake a Socratic-skeptical rational search for knowledge,each from their differing starting-points, there is the possibility that manyof the diverse lines of inquiry will find themselves effectively closed down.But how TDSK can be extended to yield a theory of the "rational closedown" of lines of inquiry is itself a matter which can only become cleargiven further inquiry. And in this place I have inquired for too long already.

NOTES AND REFERENCESL Marjorie Grene, "The Legacy of the Meno" in her The Knozuer and the Known (New

York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 17-35. The quotation is from p. 32. Grene followsMichael Polanyi in thinking the Meno paradox of crucial relevance to the theoryof knowledge in that it undermines any view which sees knowledge as wholly im-personal and explicit, and which ignores Polanyiite "tacit knowledge." For Polanyi'suse of the Meno paradox as part of his argument for "tacit knowledge" see, for example,his The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1966), Chapter 1.

2. In "On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance," in Conjectures and Refutations(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 3-30, Popper considers Plato's solu-tion to the Meno paradoxhis theory oi anamnesis, or recollectionto be an exam-ple of the mistaken doctrines that truth is manifest, or can be made manifest. Note,however, that although Popper's essay discusses Plato's theory, it fails to discuss (oreven to mention) Plato's proi/ew-that is, the problem of the search for knowledgeposed by Meno at 80(d-e). Thus, despite Popper's repudiation of Plato's solutionto the problem, Grene is quite right to suggest that "Popper has paid no seriousheed to Meno's question". In fact, the only place I know of in Popper's writing wherethe Meno paradox is mentioned is briefly in footnote 120, p. 1190, of his "Repliesto my Critics" in RA. Schilpp, ed.. The Philosophy of Karl Popper (LaSalle, 111.: OpenCourt, 1974). But in my view the solution he suggests there (prompted by DavidMiller) is simply not acceptable-it isn't "Popperian" enough in that it isn't skepti-cal enough! (Just to refresh memories, Meno's question was: "And how will you in-quire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as thesubject of inquiry? And if you fmd what you want, how will you ever know thatthis is the thing which you did not know?".)

3. Marjorie Grene, op.cit., p. 31.4. K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959) p. 32.


5. Marjorie Grene, op.cit., p. 31, my emphasis. For a criticism of the view that creativethinking involves "novelties thrown up . . . at random," see my "Creative Productand Creative Process in Science and Art," Inquiry, vol. 23, no. 1 (Spring 1980),pp. 83-106; to be reprinted in M. Krausz and D. Dutton, eds.. The Concept of Cre-ativity in Science and Art (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, forthcoming). In this con-text it is, I believe, of crucial importance to distinguish between the idea that noveltiesare thrown up blindly (that is, without any tacit, Polanyiite, foreknowledge of suc-cess) and the at first sight similar idea that they are thrown up at random. To denyrandomness is not to assert Polanyiite foreknowledge, for this denial is perfectly com-patible with the assertion of blindness. On this distinction see Donald Campbell's"Evolutionary Epistemology" in P.A. Schilpp, ed., op.cit., pp. 413-63; as well asPopper's Replies to My Critics, ibid., pp. 1061-2. See also Campbell's "Blind Varia-tion and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes,"Psychological Review, vol. 67 (1960), pp. 380-400.

6. As an example, from the viewpoint of justificationalist fallibilism progress at the levelof scientific hypotheses would be measured by the degree to which they approachedcloser and closer to whatever partial degrees of certainty were, in principle, attain-able for them. Clearly, such a view of progress is quite different to Popper's view-see for example, his "Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge"in Conjectures and Refutations, op.cit., p. 215-50.

7. David Miller, "Can Science Do Without Induction?," p. 115, in L.J. Cohen and M.Hesse, eds.. Applications of Inductive Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980),pp. 109-29. Miller's essay contains, I think, a rather interesting presentation of the"essence" of Popper's view of science; as well as a spirited defense of Popper's anti-inductivism.

8. Popper himself has once referred to his viewpoint as that of "hopeful skepticism"-inObjective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 100.

9. This way of putting the question makes clear, I hope, that the (traditional) epistemol-ogist is concerned with rational acceptability, not social acceptability; and that themeans of adjudication which he seeks aim to transcend (as it were) the merely social.If, following Gellner, we see the problem of diversity as itself becoming paramountprecisely when traditional, socially reinforced, belief systems begin to break downin the face of rival views, then it becomes clear that no solution to this problemcan be found simply in the appeal to a social consensus, or to traditional social forces.To put it another way, the question which interests the theorist of knowledge is anormative (not a descriptive/sociological) one: namely, how ought we to go aboutthe business of adjudicating between rival knowledge claims given that what wewant is only to believe the true, and not to believe the false? As we have alreadysuggested, and as we will see at the end of the paper, the Popperian "epistemolo-gist" proposes to shift this question on to methodology. But even his question remainsnormative, not descriptive/sociological.

10. See, for example, the General Scholium to Book III of the Principia: "Whatever isnot deduced from the phenomena is to be called a hypothesis, and hypotheses . . .have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular proposi-tions are inferred from the phenomena and afterwards rendered general by induc-tion. This it was that the impenetrability, the mobility, and the impulsive force ofbodies, and the laws of motion and gravitation, were discovered."

11. It might be thought that this is a crushing refutation of relativism. I am not so sure.On the one hand, the argument clearly shows that relativism cannot be rationallydefended and so, a fortiori, cannot be successfully rationally defended. But if weare to defeat relativism we must, I think, exhibit some version of anti-relativism whichcan be successfully rationally defended. For if no version of anti-relativism can beso defended then anti-relativism would appear to be in precisely the same boat as


relativism. But this, of course, is just what the relativist position entails! Therefore,in the absence of a defensible version of anti-relativism our "refutation" of relativismmay actually turn out to be a surprising "corroboration" of it.

12. I should perhaps make clear here that when I assert that skepticism is true, I do notmean to assert that we can have no knowledge in Popper's sense-that is, that wecan have no tentative, fallible, conjectural, and improvable theories. What I do meanto assert is that (a) there does not exist any adequate, self-evident, justificatory founda-tion of knowledge; so that (b) we have no knowledge in the justificationalist's sense-that is, of warranted, grounded, or justified true beliefs; and moreover that (c) wecan never justify our theories-either by proving them or by probabilifying them.For an excellent analysis of the traditional debate between skeptics and justifica-tionalists (or "classical rationalists"), see William Berkson's "Skeptical I^tionalism,"Inquiry, vol. 22 (1979), pp. 281-320.

13. For an interesting discussion of the problems connected with the plausibility or other-wise of arguments, especially as relating to skepticism, see Joseph Agassi, "Criteriafor Plausible Arguments," Mind, vol. 83 (1974), pp. 406-16. I might mention herethat Agassi has discussed the Meno problem in his "The Logic of Scientific Inquiry,"Synthese, vol. 26 (1974), pp. 498-514, but he does not approach the issues in thesystematic way in which I have tried to do here.

14. In fact, this type of "transcendental" argument even appeals to philosophers as up-to-date as D.M. Armstrong. In his Belief, Truth, and Knowledge (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1973), he writes: "Thinking about the threatened regress in theclassical analysis of knowledge seems to lead to the conclusion that there must benon-inferential [i.e., foundational] knowledge" (p. 62, my emphasis). Armstrong hardlypauses to consider the possibility that perhaps one should instead reject (as Popperin effect suggests) the classical analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Rather,Armstrong proposes a form of the causal theory of knowledge which involves, roughly,the idea that p is non-inferential or foundational knowledge for X if, and only if,(i) X believes that p; (ii) "p" is true; and (iii) the very state of afSirs in virtue of which"p" is true causes X to believe that p. The main problem with this type of approach-apart from the fact that it continues to identify knowledge, and hence scientificknowledge, as a special kind of belief-is simply that the third condition, whichis after all an empirical hypothesis, cannot itself be known to be true in any specificinstance. In other words, we cannot know which p's are foundational, which not(even X cannot know which p's are foundation for himselfl); and so although wemight get here a foundation of sorts it can't be used justificationaily as a meansof solving the problem of diversity-for we never know which p's are the ones towhich we should appeal in order to adjudicate between competing claims. But inthat case, why bother with such a "foundation" at all? (For further discussion ofthis issue, see footnote 22.)

15. Meno (80e), Jowett translation. A similar paradox oflearning-the so-called "eristicparadox"-is articulated in thtEuthydemus at (275-278). The argument of the Menocan, quite clearly, also be formulated not in terms of searching for knowledge, butin terms of searching for truth. Thus: in order to search for the truth we must knowwhat we are looking for; but what we are looking for is the truth; therefore, in orderto search for the truth we must already know the truth. But then we don't haveto search for it. Alternatively, if we don't already know the truth then we don't knowwhat we are looking for, and so can't search for it. So either we can search for thetruth but needn't, or else we need to search but can't. So if we take it that in search-ing for knowledge we are also searching for the truth (which certainly seems to besomething Popper would accept), then an inability to search for the truth unlesswe didn't need to would entail an inability to search for knowledge unless we didn'tneed to. In other words, even if we forgot all about "knowledge" and simply made


it our aim to search for the truth, we would still have to solve the Meno paradox-for we would have to show how it could be possible that we both can (rationally)search for the truth and need to.

16. A propos of this, Descartes' Rule III (of his "Rules for the Direction of the Mind")in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I, translated by B.S. Haldane and G.R.T.Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 1-77) is as follows: "In thesubjects we propose to investigate, our inquiries should be directed, not to what othershave thought, nor to what we ourselves conjecture, but to what we can clearly andperspicuously behold and with certainty deduce; for knowledge is not won in anyother way" (p. 5); and he adds (p. 10) that "no science is acquired except by mentalintuition or deduction." Of course, the question naturally arises as to how, for Des-cartes, we are to obtain clear and distinct intuitions in the first place; for it is onlyafter we have done so that we can search for further knowledge by deduction fromthem. As far as I can see Descartes' view here (at least as presented in the Rules)is that clear and distinct ideas are always of "simple natures" (cf, pp. 40-1); that suchnatures "are known per se and are wholly free from falsity" (p. 42); and that "in orderto know these simple natures no pains need to be taken, because they are of them-selves sufficiently well known. Application comes only in isolating them from eachother and scrutinizing them separately with steadfast mental gaze" (pp. 45-6). Thus,"in connection with simple propositions the only precepts we give are those whichprepare our cognitive faculties for fixing before them any objects, whatsoever theyare, and scrutinizing them with keen intelligence, since propositions of this typedo not arise as the result of inquiry, but present themselves to us spontaneously^' (p. 48;my emphasis). It would thus appear as if, for Descartes, clear and distinct intui-tions are not so much obtained, as given; so that we don't have to search for them.However, this doesn't mean that methodology is completely silent about suchintuitions-for it gives us rules for breaking down "complexes" into the already known"simples," as well as rules for helping us to keep such intuitions from getting con-fused or indistinct.

17. A further quotation from Descartes' Rules (op.cit., p. 48) is apposite here: "In every'question' there must be something of which we are ignorant; otherwise there is nouse asking the question. Secondly, this very matter [i.e., that of which we are ignorant]must be designated in some way or other; otherwise there would be nothing to deter-mine us to investigate it rather than anything else. Thirdly, it can only be so desig-nated by the aid of something else which is already known" (my emphasis). Thisquotation shows clearly (a) that Descartes was aware of the Meno problem (compareit, for example, with the passage from the Meno (80e) quoted in the text); and (b) thatDescartes' solution assumes that the search for knowledge, the search for that ofwhich we are ignorant, can only rationally take place within an already given frame-work of knowledge.

18. See R.G. Collingwood's An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940),especially p. 48 where, in an important, long footnote, he suggests that absolutepresuppositions change not as a result of conscious thought but rather as a resultof being subjected to historical "strains": "if the strains are too great, the structurecollapses and is replaced by another." Kuhn tends to avoid such vague "Hegelianiz-ing" and to instead explain changes of paradigm with reference to the sociology ofthe scientific community. In the present context it is wonhwhile noting that Kuhn'stheory of normal science (that is, of uncritical research conducted within the frame-work of a socially supplied paradign) is precisely his solution to the Meno paradox.He writes: "Nature is vastly too complex to be explored even approximately at ran-dom. Something must tell the scientist where to look and what to look for, and thatsomething, though it may not last beyond his generation, is the paradigm with whichhis education as a scientist has supplied him." Kuhn fails to see that there may be


something between exploring nature randomly and exploring it "normal scientifi-cally" (that is, by taking the paradigm as given); and that is exploring it by tryingto critically test the paradigm. Such a "Popperian" exploration is not random; nordoes it take the paradigm as uncritically given. Moreover, if we are to take Kuhnat his word here then, since it is the paradigm which tells the scientist "where tolook and what to look for," it follows that in crisis periods, when some scientistsare looking for a new paradigm, nothing tells them "where to look and what to lookfor." But this means that not only is there no possibility of conducting a rationalsearch for new paradigms but, moreover, there is no way of rationally recognizinga new paradigm as a potential way out of the crisis. No wonder, then, that Kuhnfalls back on the sociology of the scientific community in order to explain the reso-lution of crises. (The quotation above is from Kuhn's important essay "The Func-tion of Dogma in Scientific Research," in A.C. Crombie, ed.. Scientific Change(London: Heinemann, 1963) pp. 347-69; reprinted in Barry Barnes, ed. Sociologyof Science (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 80-104. The quotation isfrom p. 96 of the reprint. See also, of course, Kuhn's classic The Structure of Scien-tific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).)

19. An explanatory analogy might be in order here. I have recently been involved in aconsideration of the Boundary Commission for Scotland's proposed new boundariesfor the Lothian Region's ten parliamentary constituencies. The Boundary Commis-sion does its work within rules laid down in a number of Acts of Parliament, andthese Acts specify certain requirements (or desiderata) on the Boundary Commis-sion's search for new constituency boundaries. For example, the Boundary Com-mission is charged with trying to get each constituency as near as possible to anaverage size of electorate; and with doing so in such a way as to follow, as far aspossible, the local authority electoral boundaries already in existence. Clearly theserequirements are not themselves constituency boundaries, but rather desiderata onthe Boundary Commission's search for such boundaries. Similarly in our case-(Di) and (D2) are not themselves knowledge (of a Socratic skeptical solution to theMeno paradox) but rather desiderata on our search for it.

20. Note that if we restrict our "error-revealing" methods to those specified by (g), thenthe position reached can be called "Socratic Skeptical Rationalism" (SSR). On theother hand, if we are willing (or able) to drop this restriction, and add the "error-revealing" methods specified in (h), then the position reached can be called "SocraticSkeptical Empiricism" (SSE). Clearly, there are problems which may arise for SSEwhich cannot arise for SSR-for example, the "problem of the empirical basis." Onthe other hand, there may be problems for SSR which can only be solved by shift-ing to SSE-if, that is, these problems result precisely from SSR's claim to complete-ness; that is, from SSR's very restriction of the allowable "error-revealing" methodsto those specified in (g).

21. I owe the idea that a problem (or inconsistency) comes with a variety of competingdesiderata on its solution of Jagdish Hattiangadi's seminal paper "The Structure ofProblems," Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 8, (Dec 1978), pp. 345-66; and Vol. 9(March 1979), pp. 49-76. The methodological theory sketched here-I hope to ex-tend, and explore it in depth, elsewhere-shares much in common with Hattiangadi'stheory. But there is one crucial difference: whereas Hattiangadi generates his theoryof scientific method for the historical structure of problems in science, I generatemine from the Meno paradoK-tht fundamental problem of methodology. Yet it wasHattiangadi himself who first alerted me to the crucial importance of the Menoparadox. Thus, whatever my approach will be able to achieve must be seen as theresult of a, joint effort-an effort which includes contributions not only fromHattiangadi, but also from Agassi, Jarvie, Bartley, and Bill Berkson as well. In otherwords, a joint effort of what might be dubbed "the skeptical left-wing" of the Pop-


per school. Feyerabend has moved even further to "the left"-he has dropped Socrat-ic skepticism altogether and moved into Pyrrhonian skepticism (hence, contraHattiangadi, I would argue that the title of Feyerabend's hook-Against Method-isno misnomer). For Hattiangadi's excellent review of Feyerabend-in which he claimsthat Feyerabend's book would have been better entitled "Against IntellecturalStandards"-see "The Crisis of Methodology: Feyerabend," Philosophy of the SocialSciences, Vol. 7 (1977), pp. 289-302. On the other hand, Lakatos moved very far to"the right"-his Methodology of Scientific Research Programs is justificationalist.Popper himself appears to me to occupy something like "the center"-wavering be-tween a thorough-going skepticism and various "whiffs of justificationalism."

22. This result explains, I suggest, a rather confusing aspect of Popper's writings-namely,his general denial that his philosophy is skeptical, coupled with his constant skepti-cal rejection of the assumption of any "epistemologically privileged," error-free foun-dation of knowledge. Note, however, that the notion of "knowledge" implicitly definedby the above Socratic skeptical theory of knowledge (SSTK) is quite different fromthe justificationalist notion of knowledge as "justified true belief-for knowledgeaccording to SSTK is (a) totally unjustified; (b) forever conjectural; (c) is the poten-tial resultant of a rational search for knowledge in which no justificationalist methodsare employed; and (d) does not consist of beliefs at all, but of linguistically formu-lated theories-thtse being the only resultants of the rational search. Note too thatit is even possible to define a weak Socratic skeptical notion of knowledge whichdoesn't even require truth: on this view we can call "knowledge" whatever has sur-vived the Socratic skeptical search for knowledge so far. Clearly, at any time t, such"knowledge" may contain theories which are inconsistent with each other, and sosuch "knowledge" will be unjustified, untrue, unbelief. Note finally an interesting con-sequence of all this-if one looks back at the criticism of Armstrong's "causal foun-dationalism" raised in footnote 14, one will see that that criticism rested basicallyon the fact that such a foundation would be non-effective (in the logician's sense),in that we could never know which p's were foundational, and so could never knowwhich to appeal to in order to settle disputes. But the Socratic skeptical notion ofknowledge which I have developed is also non-effective. Doesn't it follow, then, thatmy criticism of Armstrong hits my own theory? The answer is no: my theory isnot designed to solve the problem of diversity-which is both the fundamentalproblem of the traditional theory of knowledge and whose solution seems to requiresome sort of foundationalism. In that context a non-effective foundation is a disas-ter. Whereas my theory is a spin-off of my attempt to solve the fundamental problemof methodology, of the theory of the rational search for knowledge, in a Socraticskeptical fashion. Since the theory is designed to be skeptical it would be a disasterif it led to a notion of knowledge which was anything but non-effective. This showstwo things: first, that whoever desires a non-effective theory of knowledge can haveone without embracing any foundationalism at all; and secondly, that whether ornot a criticism hits a theory often depends on what problem it was trying to solve,and therefore which desiderata it was trying to satisfy.

23. It might not be clear why the justificationalist's admission of the existence of non-justificationalist rational search-in the special case of searching for a theory of ra-tional searching-should be equivalent to his admitting the possibility of a non-justificationalist, Socratic skeptical, solution to both the first-order and the second-order Meno paradox. The reason is this: for him to admit the existence of non-justificationalist "needflil searches" for his own theory of rational searching is, clearly,to admit the existence of a non-justificationalist solution to the second-order Menoparadox. But it is also to admit the existence of searches satisfying (Di) and (D2);and therefore to admit the consistency of (Di) and (D2); and therefore to admit thepossibility of finding some theory which will satisfy both (Di) and (D2). But to


admit this is to admit the possibility of a Socratic skeptical solution to tht first-orderMeno paradox.

24. At this point it will be well to counter a possible objection. Remember that my argu-ment from the second-order Meno paradox (i.e., (J)) cannot explain the "needfulrational search" for itself. Therefore, if the justificationalist wants to solve the second-order Meno paradox he must cling to the existence of non-justificationalist rationalsearches as well as to the existence of "J-type" rational searches. On the other hand,the Socratic skeptic need make no such concession to the justificationalist-for hecan have a unified theory of all rational searches. Here comes the objection: "surelythere do exist 'J-type' rational searches for knowledge-for example, the search fortheorums within an axiomatic system; or Kuhn's normal science; or the use of so-called 'local induction.' Therefore, although the Socratic skeptic may not be inter-nally forced (so to speak) to concede the existence of 'J-type' rational searches forknowledge, he is forced to concede their existence nevertheless." Reply: The Socraticskeptic need not deny the existence of such "J-type" rational searches for knowledge.What he does deny, however, is the possibility that the assumptions upon which suchsearches depend can themselves always be the resultants of "J-type" rational searches(since this would lead to a regress). It follows that if the search for such assumptionshas been a rational search then it must at some point have been a Socratic-skepticalone. In other words, the Socratic skeptic maintains that the assumptions upon which"J-type" rational searches depend must themselves in the end be supplied as a resultof a no-justificationalist rational search, if they are supplied as a result of a rationalsearch at all. So the possibility of rational "J-type" rational searches depends uponthe possibility of "o J-type" rational searches. Note too that the argument fromthe second-order Meno paradox entails that the program of inductive logic, whichaims to search for defensible rules of "inductive reasoning" for science, cannot itselfbe rationally carried out except as a non-inductivist search! But then whatever method-ology characterizes this search can simply be generalized to become one's theoryof the rational search for scientific knowledge itself; and such a theory could thennot possibly be claimed to be "tainted" with inductivist elements.

25. TDSK is, therefore, by no means the end of our search for a Socratic-skeptical solu-tion to the Meno paradox-many problems remain unresolved. But these cannot betackled here (I hope to do so on another occasion). Let me just indicate here how,for example, the claim that TDSK satisfies (Di) might be undermined. Imaginethat someone (e.g., an advocate of artificial intelligence) were to claim that (Di)-the possibility of a rarioMa/search for knowledge-entails the requirement that thesearch methods employed be mechanical; that is, computer programmable, Turing-computable. Then, as far as I can see, TDSK fails to satisfy this requirement sinceit enables the possibility of rational searches which start from a set of theories fTijand move, via the search, to resultants fr2J which are (a) inconsistent with [Tij and(b) unknown prior to being found. Such a shift as a result of the search wouldn't,I think, be possible if the only allowable search procedures were Turing-computablefunctions-for these, if consistent, could never map [Tij into IT2] unless [12] was,in effect, the next set of hypotheses in some effective enumeration and so knownprior to being found; and if inconsistent, let us get anywhere at all. Thus, if some-one could argue that (Di) entails "mechanicality" then TDSK would fail to satisfy(Di). Of course, anyone who claimed that (Di) did entail "mechanicality" would thenhave to explain how the search for knowledge in science-which does yield resul-tants [12] which are both unkown prior to being found and are inconsistent withstarting-points fTiJ-can be a rational search at all (i.e., how it can satisfy (Di) atall). We thus reach the following interesting result: if TDSK, or one of its later ver-sions, is a correct theory of the rational search for knowledge in science, then themind is not "mechanical"; alternatively, if the mind is "mechanical," and if the search


for knowledge in science uses the mind as its "hardware," then the "mechanist" mustmeet the challenge of specifying a set of algorisms which generate the historicaldevelopment of the resultants of the search, including not only its future, presentlyunknown, development but also the discovery of these algorisms themselves. (It will bereadily seen that the "mechanist" ca

Articulating Our Ignorance: Hopeful Skepticism and the Meno Paradox by Larry Briskman

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