U.S. Supreme CourtLoving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)Loving v.
VirginiaNo. 395Argued April 10, 1967Decided June 12, 1967388 U.S.
1APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF
VIRGINIASyllabusVirginia's statutory scheme to prevent marriages
between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications held
to violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.388 U. S. 4-12.206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d 78,
reversed.Page 388 U. S. 2MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the
opinion of the Court.This case presents a constitutional question
never addressed by this Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted
by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons
solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[Footnote 1] For reasons which seem to us to reflect the central
meaning of those constitutional commands, we conclude that these
statutes cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.In
June, 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro
woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the
District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their
marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their
marital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958, of the
Circuit CourtPage 388 U. S. 3of Caroline County, a grand jury
issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia's
ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 199, the Lovings
pleaded guilty to the charge, and were sentenced to one year in
jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period
of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and
not return to Virginia together for 25 years. He stated in an
opinion that:"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And, but
for the interference with his arrangement, there would be no cause
for such marriage. The fact that he separated the races shows that
he did not intend for the races to mix."After their convictions,
the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On
November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the state trial court to
vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that
the statutes which they had violated were repugnant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. The motion not having been decided by October
28, 1964, the Lovings instituted a class action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
requesting that a three-judge court be convened to declare the
Virginia anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin
state officials from enforcing their convictions. On January 22,
1965, the state trial judge denied the motion to vacate the
sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia. On February 11, 1965, the three-judge
District Court continued the case to allow the Lovings to present
their constitutional claims to the highest state court.The Supreme
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the
anti-miscegenation statutes and, afterPage 388 U. S. 4modifying the
sentence, affirmed the convictions. [Footnote 2] The Lovings
appealed this decision, and we noted probable jurisdiction on
December 12, 1966, 385 U.S. 986.The two statutes under which
appellants were convicted and sentenced are part of a comprehensive
statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial
marriages. The Lovings were convicted of violating 258 of the
Virginia Code:"Leaving State to evade law.-- If any white person
and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of
being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married
out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as
man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in 20-59, and the
marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been
solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as
man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage."Section 259,
which defines the penalty for miscegenation, provides:"Punishment
for marriage.-- If any white person intermarry with a colored
person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in
the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five
years."Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme
are 20-57, which automatically voids all marriages between "a white
person and a colored person" without any judicial proceeding,
[Footnote 3] and 20-54 and 1-14 which,Page 388 U. S. 5respectively,
define "white persons" and "colored persons and Indians" for
purposes of the statutory prohibitions. [Footnote 4] The Lovings
have never disputed in the course of this litigation that Mrs.
Loving is a "colored person" or that Mr. Loving is a "white person"
within the meanings given those terms by the Virginia statutes.Page
388 U. S. 6Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and
punish marriages on the basis of racial classifications. [Footnote
5] Penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery, and
have been common in Virginia since the colonial period. [Footnote
6] The present statutory scheme dates from the adoption of the
Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the period of extreme
nativism which followed the end of the First World War. The central
features of this Act, and current Virginia law, are the absolute
prohibition of a "white person" marrying other than another "white
person," [Footnote 7] a prohibition against issuing marriage
licenses until the issuing official is satisfied thatPage 388 U. S.
7the applicants' statements as to their race are correct, [Footnote
8] certificates of "racial composition" to be kept by both local
and state registrars, [Footnote 9] and the carrying forward of
earlier prohibitions against racial intermarriage. [Footnote 10]IIn
upholding the constitutionality of these provisions in the decision
below, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia referred to its
1965 decision inNaim v. Naim,197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, as stating
the reasons supporting the validity of these laws. InNaim,the state
court concluded that the State's legitimate purposes were "to
preserve the racial integrity of its citizens," and to prevent "the
corruption of blood," "a mongrel breed of citizens," and "the
obliteration of racial pride," obviously an endorsement of the
doctrine of White Supremacy.Id.at 90, 87 S.E.2d at 756. The court
also reasoned that marriage has traditionally been subject to state
regulation without federal intervention, and, consequently, the
regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state control by
the Tenth Amendment.While the state court is no doubt correct in
asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to the State's
police power,Maynard v. Hill,125 U. S. 190(1888), the State does
not contend in its argument before this Court that its powers to
regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so in light ofMeyer v.
Nebraska,262 U. S. 390(1923), andSkinner v. Oklahoma,316 U. S.
535(1942). Instead, the State argues that the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of the Framers,
is only that state penal laws containing an interracial elementPage
388 U. S. 8as part of the definition of the offense must apply
equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each
race are punished to the same degree. Thus, the State contends
that, because its miscegenation statutes punish equally both the
white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these
statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications, do not
constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race. The second
argument advanced by the State assumes the validity of its equal
application theory. The argument is that, if the Equal Protection
Clause does not outlaw miscegenation statutes because of their
reliance on racial classifications, the question of
constitutionality would thus become whether there was any rational
basis for a State to treat interracial marriages differently from
other marriages. On this question, the State argues, the scientific
evidence is substantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court
should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its
policy of discouraging interracial marriages.Because we reject the
notion that the mere "equal application" of a statute containing
racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from
the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial
discriminations, we do not accept the State's contention that these
statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for
concluding that they serve a rational purpose. The mere fact of
equal application does not mean that our analysis of these statutes
should follow the approach we have taken in cases involving no
racial discrimination where the Equal Protection Clause has been
arrayed against a statute discriminating between the kinds of
advertising which may be displayed on trucks in New York
City,Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,336 U. S. 106(1949),
or an exemption in Ohio'sad valoremtax for merchandise owned by a
nonresident in a storage warehouse,Allied Stores of Ohio,Page 388
U. S. 9Inc. v. Bowers,358 U. S. 522(1959). In these cases,
involving distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has
merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the
discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state
legislatures. In the case at bar, however, we deal with statutes
containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal
application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy
burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has
traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to
race.The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress
about the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate
that the Framers did not intend the Amendment to make
unconstitutional state miscegenation laws. Many of the statements
alluded to by the State concern the debates over the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill, which President Johnson vetoed, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted over his veto. While these
statements have some relevance to the intention of Congress in
submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be understood that
they pertained to the passage of specific statutes, and not to the
broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment. As for the
various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we
have said in connection with a related problem that, although these
historical sources "cast some light" they are not sufficient to
resolve the problem;"[a]t best, they are inconclusive. The most
avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended
them to remove all legal distinctions among 'all persons born or
naturalized in the United States.' Their opponents, just as
certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of
the Amendments, and wished them to have the most limited
effect."Brown v. Board of Education,347 U. S. 483,347 U. S.
489(1954).See alsoStrauderPage 388 U. S. 10v. West Virginia,100 U.
S. 303,100 U. S. 310(1880). We have rejected the proposition that
the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state
legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the
theory advanced by the State, that the requirement of equal
protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses
based on racial classifications so long as white and Negro
participants in the offense were similarly punished.McLaughlin v.
Florida,379 U. S. 184(1964).The State finds support for its "equal
application" theory in the decision of the Court inPace v.
Alabama,106 U. S. 583(1883). In that case, the Court upheld a
conviction under an Alabama statute forbidding adultery or
fornication between a white person and a Negro which imposed a
greater penalty than that of a statute proscribing similar conduct
by members of the same race. The Court reasoned that the statute
could not be said to discriminate against Negroes because the
punishment for each participant in the offense was the same.
However, as recently as the 1964 Term, in rejecting the reasoning
of that case, we stated "Pacerepresents a limited view of the Equal
Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the
subsequent decisions of this Court."McLaughlin v. Florida,
supra,at379 U. S. 188. As we there demonstrated, the Equal
Protection Clause requires the consideration of whether the
classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and
invidious discrimination. The clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of
invidious racial discrimination in the States.Slaughter-House
Cases,16 Wall. 36,83 U. S. 71(1873);Strauder v. West Virginia,100
U. S. 303,100 U. S. 307-308 (1880);Ex parte Virginia,100 U. S.
339,100 U. S. 334-335 (1880);Shelley v. Kraemer,334 U. S.
1(1948);Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,365 U. S.
715(1961).Page 388 U. S. 11There can be no question but that
Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions
drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted
conduct if engaged in by members of different races. Over the
years, this Court has consistently repudiated "[d]istinctions
between citizens solely because of their ancestry" as being "odious
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality."Hirabayashi v. United States,320 U. S. 81,320 U. S.
100(1943). At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands
that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal
statutes, be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny,"Korematsu v.
United States,323 U. S. 214,323 U. S. 216(1944), and, if they are
ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of
the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth
Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two members of this Court have
already stated that they"cannot conceive of a valid legislative
purpose . . . which makes the color of a person's skin the test of
whether his conduct is a criminal offense."McLaughlin v. Florida,
supra,at379 U. S. 198(STEWART, J., joined by DOUGLAS, J.,
concurring).There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this
classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial
marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial
classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures
designed to maintain White Supremacy. [Footnote 11] We have
consistently deniedPage 388 U. S. 12the constitutionality of
measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race.
There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause.IIThese statutes also deprive the
Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.Marriage
is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very
existence and survival.Skinner v. Oklahoma,316 U. S. 535,316 U. S.
541(1942).See also Maynard v. Hill,125 U. S. 190(1888). To deny
this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of
the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's
citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be
restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed
by the State.These convictions must be reversed.It is so
ordered.Page 388 U. S. 13[Footnote 1]Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides:"All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."[Footnote 2]206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d
78 (1966).[Footnote 3]Section 257 of the Virginia Code
provides:"Marriages void without decree.-- All marriages between a
white person and a colored person shall be absolutely void without
any decree of divorce or other legal process."Va.Code Ann. 20-57
(1960 Repl. Vol.).[Footnote 4]Section 20-54 of the Virginia Code
provides:"Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term 'white
persons.'-- It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in
this State to marry any save a white person, or a person with no
other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the
purpose of this chapter, the term 'white person' shall apply only
to such person as has no trace whatever of any blood other than
Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood
of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall
be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now
in effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored persons
shall apply to marriages prohibited by this chapter."Va.Code Ann.
20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).The exception for persons with less than
one-sixteenth "of the blood of the American Indian" is apparently
accounted for, in the words of a tract issued by the Registrar of
the State Bureau of Vital Statistics, by "the desire of all to
recognize as an integral and honored part of the white race the
descendants of John Rolfe and Pocathontas. . . ." Plecker, The New
Family and Race Improvement, 17 Va.Health Bull., Extra No. 12, at
25-26 (New Family Series No. 5, 1925), cited in Wadlington,
TheLovingCase: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical
Perspective, 52 Va.L.Rev. 1189, 1202, n. 93 (1966).Section 1-14 of
the Virginia Code provides:"Colored persons and Indians defined.--
Every person in whom there is ascertainable any Negro blood shall
be deemed and taken to be a colored person, and every person not a
colored person having one fourth or more of American Indian blood
shall be deemed an American Indian; except that members of Indian
tribes existing in this Commonwealth having one fourth or more of
Indian blood and less than one sixteenth of Negro blood shall be
deemed tribal Indians."Va.Code Ann. 1-14 (1960 Repl.
Vol.).[Footnote 5]After the initiation of this litigation, Maryland
repealed its prohibitions against interracial marriage, Md.Laws
1967, c. 6, leaving Virginia and 15 other States with statutes
outlawing interracial marriage: Alabama, Ala.Const., Art. 4, 102,
Ala.Code, Tit. 14, 360 (1958); Arkansas, Ark.Stat.Ann. 55-104
(1947); Delaware, Del.Code Ann., Tit. 13, 101 (1953); Florida,
Fla.Const., Art. 16, 24, Fla.Stat. 741.11 (1965); Georgia, Ga.Code
Ann. 53-106 (1961); Kentucky, Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. 402.020 (Supp.
1966); Louisiana, La.Rev.Stat. 14:79 (1950); Mississippi,
Miss.Const., Art. 14, 263, Miss.Code Ann. 459 (1956); Missouri,
Mo.Rev.Stat. 451.020 (Supp. 1966); North Carolina, N.C.Const., Art.
XIV, 8, N.C.Gen.Stat. 14-181 (1953); Oklahoma, Okla.Stat., Tit. 43,
12 (Supp. 1965); South Carolina, S.C.Const., Art. 3, 33, S.C.Code
Ann. 20-7 (1962); Tennessee, Tenn.Const., Art. 11, 14, Tenn.Code
Ann. 36-402 (1955); Texas, Tex.Pen.Code, Art. 492 (1952); West
Virginia, W.Va.Code Ann. 4697 (1961).Over the past 15 years, 14
States have repealed laws outlawing interracial marriages: Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.The
first state court to recognize that miscegenation statutes violate
the Equal Protection Clause was the Supreme Court of
California.Perez v. Sharp,32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17
(1948).[Footnote 6]For a historical discussion of Virginia's
miscegenation statutes,seeWadlington,supra,n4.[Footnote 7]Va.Code
Ann. 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).[Footnote 8]Va.Code Ann. 20-53 (1960
Repl. Vol.).[Footnote 9]Va.Code Ann. 20-50 (1960 Repl.
Vol.).[Footnote 10]Va.Code Ann. 254 (1960 Repl. Vol.).[Footnote
11]Appellants point out that the State's concern in these statutes,
as expressed in the words of the 1924 Act's title, "An Act to
Preserve Racial Integrity," extends only to the integrity of the
white race. While Virginia prohibits whites from marrying any
nonwhite (subject to the exception for the descendants of
Pocahontas), Negroes, Orientals, and any other racial class may
intermarry without statutory interference. Appellants contend that
this distinction renders Virginia's miscegenation statutes
arbitrary and unreasonable even assuming the constitutional
validity of an official purpose to preserve "racial integrity." We
need not reach this contention, because we find the racial
classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect
the "integrity" of all races.MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.I have
previously expressed the belief that "it is simply not possible for
a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the
criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor."McLaughlin
v. Florida,379 U. S. 184,379 U. S. 198(concurring opinion). Because
I adhere to that belief, I concur in the judgment of the
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G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO
MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH
98, QUEZON CITY,respondents.Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for
petitioners.CORTES,J:Primarily, the issue raised in this petition
is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social
Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and
order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is
whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have
the right to strike.The antecedents are as follows:On June 11,
1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the
officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing
non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to
the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to
return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered
to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.It appears
that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the
union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions
of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on
check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same
salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees
of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and
after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair
labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-241].The courta quo, on June 11,
1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p.
71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an
opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in a four-page
order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted
the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond,
after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As
petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order
was also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners
filed a petition forcertiorariand prohibition with preliminary
injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court,
through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court
of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof,
but during its pendency the Court of Appeals on March 9,1988
promulgated its decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137].
Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In the
meantime, the Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic.
Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals
was also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143]. Hence, the instant petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp.
12-37].Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from
staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they
filed with the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25,
1989 and to maintain thestatus quo[Rollo, pp. 151-152].The Court,
taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental
reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined and the
case submitted for decision.The position of the petitioners is that
the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case
initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the
writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the
Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations
Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.On the other
hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the
employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules
and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the
right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has
jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin
the employees from striking.In dismissing the petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by
petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of
the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike,
and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had
jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing
with their strike.Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by
the Court in deciding whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in
excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case and
enjoined the strike are as follows:1. Do the employees of the SSS
have the right to strike?2. Does the Regional Trial Court have
jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin
the strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to
return to work?These shall be discussed and resolvedseriatimIThe
1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].By
itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all
workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to
strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission,
it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization
shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l)
and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that
"[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec.
8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution
recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is
silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to
strike.Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law
becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A
reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the
right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.Thus,
Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision
that "[tlhe right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the
apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla,
Vice-President of the Commission, explained:MR. LERUM. I think what
I will try to say will not take that long. When we proposed this
amendment providing for self-organization of government employees,
it does not mean that because they have the right to organize, they
also have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are
only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to
the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of
Rights, there is a provision that the right to form associations or
societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the
strikes coming from employees exercising government functions, that
could be done because the moment that is prohibited, then the union
which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that
provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875,
workers, including those from the government-owned and controlled,
are allowed to organize but they are prohibited from striking. So,
the fear of our honorable Vice- President is unfounded. It does not
mean that because we approve this resolution, it carries with it
the right to strike. That is a different matter. As a matter of
fact, that subject is now being discussed in the Committee on
Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to this
problem. We know that this problem exist; that the moment we allow
anybody in the government to strike, then what will happen if the
members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will happen to
those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of
discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the
right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to
strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p.
569].It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No.
875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974,
expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including
instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but excluding
entities entrusted with proprietary functions:.Sec. 11.Prohibition
Against Strikes in the Government. The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared
to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in their
terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to
any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to
strike or to join in strike:Provided, however, That this section
shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions
and not those employed in proprietary functions of the Government
including but not limited to governmental corporations.No similar
provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it
recognized the right of employees of government corporations
established under the Corporation Code to organize and bargain
collectively and those in the civil service to "form organizations
for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment
by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that
"[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government owned and controlled
corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is
silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, for
such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil
Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.On
June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the
right of government employees to organize, the President issued
E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the
right to organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof,
it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be
observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum
Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date
April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees ...
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result
in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was
thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of any
legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing
their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they
are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum
Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture,
it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is
not at issue].But are employees of the SSS covered by the
prohibition against strikes?The Court is of the considered view
that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he
civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters"
[Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government
employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under
R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO
v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of
the SSS was illegal.The statement of the Court inAlliance of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment[G.R. No.
60403, August 3, 1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes the
rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector
and government employees with regard to the right to strike:The
general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms
and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by
law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as
amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended).Since the terms and conditions of government employment
are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions
from their employers.The principle behind labor unionism in private
industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through
compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the
minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare
legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through the process of
collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and
conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis
supplied].Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of
Civil Service, in his position paper submitted to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court
inAlliance, to wit:It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission
that by reason of the nature of the public employer and the
peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily
regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as
not applying to public employees and civil service employees. It
has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the private
employer, protects the interest of all people in the public
service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are
present in private labor relations could not exist in the relations
between government and those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also
quoted in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313,
January 17,1985,134 SCRA 172,178-179].E.O. No. 180, which provides
guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however,
relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and
conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law.
Thus:.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or
improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be
the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees'
organizations and appropriate government authorities.The same
executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the
settlement of labor disputes in the public sector to wit:.SECTION
16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever
applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints,
grievances and cases involving government employees. In case any
dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available
remedies under existing laws and procedures, the parties may
jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor- Management]
Council for appropriate action.Government employees may, therefore,
through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress
for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which
are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which
are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the
dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service
may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work
stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4,
Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the
Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took
effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions
of employment in the government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and
controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law
and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing
changes thereof."IIThe strike staged by the employees of the SSS
belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an
injunction may be issued to restrain it.It is futile for the
petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional
Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction
enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself
provides that terms and conditions of employment of government
employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over
unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16].
Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.This being
the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike
the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not been
granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council,
and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor
dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.Neither
could the courta quobe accused of imprudence or overzealousness,
for in fact it had proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a
writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike to
prevent any further disruption of public service, the respondent
judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the
unresolved controversies emanating from their employer- employee
relationship to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for
appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].IIIIn their "Petition/Application
for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and reiterated in their
reply and supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS
unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due the individual
petitioners and they pray that the Court issue a writ of
preliminary prohibitive and mandatory injunction to restrain the
SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof and to compel
the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental reply, petitioners
annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated May 5,
1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not
preventively suspended and who are reporting for work pending the
resolution of the administrative cases against them are entitled to
their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and
affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems Promotion
Board.The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this
Court, it is Our view that petitioners' remedy is not to petition
this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of
the aforesaid order, if it has already become final.WHEREFORE, no
reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the
instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of
the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is
AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and
Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.SO
ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 95445 August 6, 1991MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG and other
teacher-members so numerous similarly
situated,petitioners-appellants,vs.THE HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR., in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 18, HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports and the HON. ERLINDA LOLARGA in
her capacity as Manila City Schools
Superintendent,respondents-appellees.G.R No. 95590 August 6,
1991ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), ENRIQUE D. TORRES,
RODRIGO G. NATIVIDAD, FRANCISCO A. NERECINA, EVA V. FERIA, LUCIA R.
CARRASCO, LEO R. RAMBOYONG, ZENEIDA PEREZ, MARIA ACEJO AND OTHER
SIMILARLY SITUATED PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TOO NUMEROUS TO BE
IMPLEADED,petitioners,vs.HON. ISIDRO CARIO in his capacity as
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management,respondents.Free Legal Assistance Group, Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity & Nationalism and Union of
Lawyers and Advocates for petitioners in G.R. No. 95590.Gregorio
Fabros for petitioners in G.R. No. 95445.NARVASA,J.:pThe series of
events that touched off these cases started with the so-called
"mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among
them members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on
September 17, 1990 to "dramatize and highlight"1the teachers'
plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities
to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the
latter's attention.The petition in G.R. No. 95590 alleges in great
detail the character and origins of those grievances as perceived
by the petitioners, and the attempts to negotiate their
correction;2these are more briefly, but quite adequately and with
no sacrifice of relevant content, set forth in the petition in G.R.
No. 954451, portions of which are quoted hereunder without
necessarily affirming their objective truth or correctness:3.
Together with other teachers embracing the Teachers and Employees
Consultative Council (TECC) and the Alliance of Concerned Teachers,
the petitioners, in accordance with their Constitution and By-Laws,
resolved to engage in mass concerted actions, after peaceful
dialogues with the heads of the Department of the Budget and
Management, Senate and House of Representatives in public hearings
as well as after exhausting all administrative remedies, to press
for, among other things, the immediate payment of due chalk,
clothing allowances, 13th month pay for 1989 arising from the
implementation of the Salary Standardization Law, the recall of
DECS Order 39 s. 1990 directing the oversizing of classes and
overloading of teachers pursuant to the cost-cutting measures of
the government, the hiring of 47,000 new teachers to ease the
overload of existing teachers, the return of the additional 1% real
property taxes collected by local government units to education
purposes to be administered by the Local School Boards, and
consequent recall of DBM Circulars Nos. 904 and 9011 and local
budget circular No. 47 consistent with RA 5447 and the new
Constitution mandating that education shall enjoy the highest
budgetary priority in the national budget, and other equally
important demands; The dialogues and conferences initiated by the
petitioners and other teacher organizations were as early as March
14, 1989, March 14, 1990, April 23, 1990, May 28, 1990, June 5,
1990, September 3, 1990 and September 14, 1990 with the Civil
Service Commission, the Senate and House of Representatives,
Department of Budget and Management and the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, but all these did not result in the
granting of the demands of the petitioners, leaving them with no
other recourse but to take direct mass action such as the one they
engaged in three weeks ago.4. On September 14, 1990, the
petitioners and other teachers in other cities and municipalities
in Metro Manila, staged a protest rally at the DECS premises
without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands. No response was made by the
respondent Secretary of Education, despite the demonstration, so
the petitioners began the ongoing protest mass actions on
September, 17,1990. ...3September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which
was also a regular school day. There is no question that the some
800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their
classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition in G.R.
No. 95590,4they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning
whence they proceeded to the National Office of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly. At
about 1:00 o'clock p.m., three representatives of the group were
allowed to see the respondent Secretary of Education who "brushed
aside their grievances," warned them that they would lose their
jobs for going on illegal and unauthorized mass leave. Upon leaving
said respondent's presence, they were handed an order directing all
participants in the mass action to return to work in 24 hours or
face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did
not comply and to hire their replacements.5Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with
more teachers joining in the days that followed. In its issue of
September 19, 1990, the newspaper Manila Standard reported that the
day previous, the respondent Secretary of Education had relieved
292 teachers who did not return to their classes. The next day,
however, another daily, Newsday, reported that the Secretary had
revoked its dismissal order and instead placed 56 of the 292
teachers under preventive suspension, despite which the protesters'
numbers had swelled to 4,000.6On the record, what did happen was
that, based on reports submitted by the principals of the various
public schools in Metro Manila, the respondent Secretary of
Education had filedmotu proprioadministrative complaints against
the teachers who had taken part in the mass actions and defied the
return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave misconduct,
gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law,
absence without official leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day
preventive suspension. The respondents were served copies of the
charge sheets and given five (5) days to submit answer or
explanation. Later, on October 8, 1990, the respondent Secretary
constituted an investigating committee of four (4) to determine and
take the appropriate course of action on the formal charges and
designated the special prosecutors on detail with the DECS to
handle their prosecution during the formal hearings.7On October 11,
1990, the respondent Secretary of Education rendered the first of
his now questioned decisions on the administrative complaints. In
Case No. DECS 90-002, he found twenty (20) respondent teachers
guilty of the charges preferred against them and dismissed them
from office, effective immediately.8In the other investigations
that followed and as of December 3, 1990, 658 teachers were
dismissed, 40 were suspended for one (1) year, 33 for nine (9)
months, and 122 for six (6) months; 398 were exonerated.9Earlier,
on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 95445 had filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 18, a petition10for
prohibition, declaratory relief and preliminary mandatory
injunction to restrain the implementation of the return-to-work
order of September 17, 1990 and the suspension or dismissal of any
teacher pursuant thereto and to declare said order null and void.
Issuanceex-parteof a temporary restraining order was sought, but
seeing no compelling reason therefor, the Regional Trial Court
instead set the application for preliminary injunction for hearing,
and heard the same, on September 24, 1990. Thereafter and following
the submission of memorandums by the parties, said Court rendered
judgment declaring the assailed return-to-work order valid and
binding, and dismissing the petition for lack of merit.11Review of
said judgment is sought in G. R. No. 95445.G.R. No. 95590 is a
parallel original proceeding for prohibition, mandamus and
certiorari grounded on the same state of facts and instituted for
substantially the same purposei.e.,the invalidation of the
return-to-work order of the respondent Secretary of Education and
all orders of suspension and/or dismissal thereafter issued by said
respondent against the teachers who had taken part in the mass
actions of September 17, 1990 and the days that followed.Both cases
were ordered consolidated by Resolution issued on October 25,
1990,12and separate comments were filed by the Solicitor General on
behalf of the public respondents, in G.R. No. 95445 on October 31,
1990, and in G.R. No. 95590 on December 5, 1990.13On November 20,
1990 the parties were heard in oral argument on the petitioners'
united pleas for a temporary restraining order/mandatory injunction
to restore thestatus quo anteand enjoin the public respondents from
continuing with the issuance of suspension orders and proceeding
with the administrative cases against the teachers involved in the
mass actions.Said pleas were denied by the Court in its Resolution
of December 18, 1990,14and a motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 was likewise denied.In two
separate but identically-worded motions filed on their behalf by
Atty. Froilan M. Bacungan,15the following persons, to wit: Florita
D. Guazon, Elisea G. Lazo, Gonzala G. Sioson, Esperanza Valero,
Nenita Pangilinan, Ramon David, Aurora Bosi, Encarnita David,
Socorro Sentin, Crispulo Santos, Rodriguez Bagana, Rodolfo D.
Bacsal, Ruben Bersamina, Rodolfo Arroyo, Irene Gadil, Rebecca
Roldan, Rosita Samson, Priscilla Avendia, Arturo Cabuhat, Rosalinda
Caoili, Angelina Corpuz, Purisima Lena, Elsie Somera, Dedaica
Jusay, Teresita Partoza, Gloria Salvador, Catherine San Agustin,
Nestor Aguirre, Lorenzo Real, Celia Ronquillo, Vicente Carranza,
Jessie Villanueva, Yolanda Alura, Clara Alvarez, Danilo Llamas,
Ladera Panita Myrna, Sena, Zenaida Ligon, Daisy S. Conti, Danilo
Caballes, Susan Maragat, Roberto Manlangit and Elizabeth T.
Aguirre, seek leave to withdraw as parties in G.R. No. 95590. These
movants claim that they are such parties although not individually
so named in the petition in said case, being among those referred
to in its title as "other similarly situated public school teachers
too numerous to be impleaded," who had been administratively
charged, then preventively suspended and/or dismissed in the wake
of the mass actions of September 1990. They assert that since this
Court is not a trier of facts, they have opted to appeal the
questioned decisions or actuations of the respondent Secretary of
Education to the Civil Service Commission where they believe they
will have "... all the opportunity to introduce evidence on how
(Secretary) Cario violated their constitutional rights to due
process of law ... security of tenure and ... peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances ...."An
opposition to the first motion was filed16which, briefly, contended
that, as this Court had already found that the petitioners had gone
on an unlawful strike and that public respondent Cario's acts
wereprima facielawful, the motion was either an attempt at
forum-shopping or meant to avoid the "inevitable outcome" of issues
already pending final determination by the Court.The Court's
Resolution of December 18, 1990,supra, denying the petitioners'
plea for restoration of thestatus quo anteand to restrain/enjoin
further suspensions of, and the initiation or continuation of,
administrative proceedings against the teachers involved, is based
on the following postulates:(1) the undenied indeed, the pleaded
and admitted fact that about 800 teachers, among them the
individual petitioners and other unnamed but "similarly situated"
members of the petitioning associations in both cases,
unauthorizedly absented themselves from their classes on a regular
schoolday, September 17, 1990, in order to participate in a "mass
action" to dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the
alleged failure of the public authorities, either to implement at
all or to implement in a just and correct manner, certain laws and
measures intended to benefit them materially;(2) the fact, too,
that in the days that followed, more mass actions for the same
purpose were undertaken, notwithstanding a return-to-work order
issued by the respondent Secretary of Education; more teachers
joined the so-called "peaceful assemblies" on September 18, 1990
and the number rising to 4,000 on September 19, 1990;17(3) that
from the pleaded and admitted facts, these "mass actions" were to
all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the
teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons;(4) that this court had already definitively ruled that
employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the
private sector, do not have the right to strike, although
guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress for
the betterment of employment terms and conditions and to negotiate
with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such
working conditions as are not fixed by law;18(5) that upon the
foregoing premises, it wasprima facielawful and within his
statutory authority for the respondent Secretary of Education to
take the actions complained of, to wit: issue a return-to-work
order, prefer administrative charges against, and place under
preventive suspension, those who failed to comply with said order,
and dismiss from the service those who failed to answer or
controvert the charges;19The Court has not since been presented
with any consideration of law or established fact that would impair
the validity of these postulates or preclude continued reliance
thereon for the purpose of resolving the present petitions on their
merits.The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the
petitioners have a right to strike, which it is clear they do not,
however justifiable their reasons, nor whether or not there was in
fact such a strike, it being equally evident from the pleadings
that there was, and there being no dispute about this. What
therefore, is brought before the Court is the question of whether
or not any rights of the petitioners under the due process clause
of the Constitution as it applies to administrative proceedings
were violated in the initiation, conduct, or disposition of the
investigations complained of.Indeed, what the petitioners in G.R.
No. 95590 proclaim about denial of due process being their
"paramount complaint" ... "central to their prayer for
interlocutory relief'20could as well be said of the merits of their
main cause as of their plea for a restraining order pendente lite
or a preliminary injunction.There are, however, insuperable
obstacles to the Court's taking up that issue and resolving it in
these cases. Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by this Court
in the exercise of its review jurisdiction; and this, for the
obvious reason that it is one of fact. The petitions and subsequent
pleadings of the petitioners allege facts and circumstances which,
it is claimed, show denial of due process, citing as supposedly
"representative samples"21among others: (a) that teachers were
dismissed on the sole basis of unsworn reports of their principals
and without evidence of their alleged failure to obey the
return-to-work order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to specify
the particular charges or offenses allegedly committed; (c) that
some teachers were not furnished sworn complaints, and others were
suspended without any formal charges; (d) that teachers who
attempted to return within a reasonable time after notice of the
return-to-work order were not accepted back; and similar
allegations.These are however denied and disputed by the public
respondents, who set forth their own version, initially in their
separate Comments in both cases and, later and in greater detail,
in their Consolidated Memorandum of December 3, 1990,supra, from
which the following passages are quoted:(6) Petitioners in G.R. No.
95545 and G.R. No. 95590admit engaging in a strike(referred by
semantic interplay as "concerted activity" or "mass
action")directed against public respondent Cariobeginning September
17, 1990, MPSTA Petition, pp. 3, 9; ACT Petition, pp. 1516).To
avoid the disruption of classes, public respondent Cario, also on
September 17, 1990, issued a 'return to work order' reminding
striking workers thatin law, they cannot engage in strike and
warning them that dismissal proceedings will be instituted against
them if they do not return to work with 24 hours from their
walkout(MPSTA Petition, p. 4; ACT Petition, p. 15) and a memorandum
to DECS officials instructing them to notify the striking teachers
to return to work within 24 hours from their walkout and to
initiate dismissal proceedings against those who defy the return to
work order as well as to hire temporary replacements, MPSTA
Petition, p. 4; ACT Petition, pp. 15-16).The striking teachers who
did not heed the return-to-work order were administratively charged
and preventively suspended for ninety days for grave misconduct,
gross neglect of duty, insubordination, refusal to perform official
duty, absence without leave beginning September 17, 1990 and other
violations of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.All of
striking teachers were served with the suspension orders and the
change sheets notifying them of the charges and giving them five
(5) days from receipt of the charge sheets within which to file
their respective answers.With the filing of the administrative
complaints and the receipt of the answers of some of the teachers
involved, public respondent Carino on October 8, 1990 issued a
Memorandum forming an Investigation Committee composed of Atty,
Reno Capinpin of DECS Administrative Services as Chairman Dr.
Alberto Mendoza, representing the Division Supervisors, Atty.
Evangeline de Castro, representing the City Superintendent of
Schools of Manila, and Atty. Isaias Meleto representing the
National PPSTA Organization, as members. Copy of the aforesaid
Memorandum is hereto attached as Annex "I."The committee was
authorized to meet everyday, even as Special Prosecutors from the
Department of justice on detail with the DECS were designated to
handle the prosecution during the formal hearings.
(Ibid.)Petitionersin GR No. 95545' and 'G.R. No. 95590'admit having
received the charge sheets and notices of preventive
suspensionwherein they were given five days from receipt of the
charges within which to file their answers (MPSTA Petition, p. 4-1
ACT Petition, p. 16, Annexes x , to , AA ).xxx xxx xxx...Many
striking teachers received their preventive suspension orders and
the charge sheets from their respective principals when they
visited their schools. Many refused to receive and sign receipt
therefor; others tore up the preventive suspension orders and
charge sheets in front of their principals.Instead, they took the
occasion to belittle and insult the substitute teachers who took
over their classrooms temporarily.The striking teachers were given
a period of five days to file their Answers in line with Sec. 8,
Rule III of Rules on Administrative Disciplinary Cases in CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 46, s. 1989. The motion for extension of
time to file Answer was denied by DECS Task Force because it was
dilatory the alleged reason being that Atty. Fabros is handling
2,000 cases of teachers. The DECS was constrained by Sec. 38(d) of
P.D. 807 and Sec. 8 of the Memorandum Circular mentioned which
mandate that administrative cases must bedecided within 30 days
from the filing of the charges. Another reason was thatmany refused
to receive the notice of charges. Also, to delay the resolution of
the cases was to their disadvantage.Moreover, another reason
proferred was that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila still
had to act on the petition before it. However,the Motion was filed
AFTER the RTC Manila had already dismissed the
Petition.Nevertheless, answers to the administrative complaints
started pouring in at the DECS, as prepared personally by the
striking teachers or by their lawyers.After initial assessments of
the reports coming in from the principals of the schools concerned
and the answers of the striking teachers, the DECS Special Task
Force prepared on October 9, 1990 and submitted to respondent
Secretary Carino the Guidelines and Criteria as to the nature of
the evidence to be assessed and the corresponding penalty to be
imposed against the striking teachers, which was approved by
respondent Secretary Carino on the same day. A copy of the
aforesaid Guidelines and Criteria is hereto attached as Annex "2."
Thereafter, the DECS Special Task Force proceeded with its task of
investigating the cases against the striking teachers.Those
whorefused to signthe DECS return-to-work order, the preventive
suspension orders and the charge sheets,some even tearing up the
documentspresented to them by their principals were considered by
the DECS Special Task Force as having waived their right to be
heard; their cases had to be resolved on the basis of the records.
Nevertheless, the DECS Special Task Force summoned the principals
concerned, who then testified under oath confirming their reports
on the absences of the striking teachers. Some clarificatory
questions were asked of them on the manner of the service of the
DECS orders and the situation obtaining in their schools.For those
who answered the charge sheets, the DECS Special Task Force set the
administrative cases for hearing.Many of the striking teachers
refused to appear at the hearings but preferred to submit their
case on the basis of their answers.With regard to those who
attended the hearings, each of the absent or striking teachers was
investigated and asked questions under oath on their answers and
the reasons for their absences and/or joining the teachers' strike.
Some teachers reiterated their answers to the charge sheets, either
giving justifiable reasons for their absences on the days mentioned
or maintaining their stubborn stand that they have all the right to
absent themselves from classes in the exercise of their
constitutional right to join mass action to demand from the
government what are supposedly due them. Still the DECS Special
Task Force was not satisfied with their written answers and
explanation during the hearings. The principals of the striking
teachers were summoned and they confirmed under oath their reports
of absences and/or on teachers joining the strike.After having
conducted fully their investigations, the DECS Special Task Force
submitted in series their investigation reports and recommendation
for each category of striking teachers to respondent Secretary
Carino. The investigation reports, together with their supporting
documents, submitted by the DECS Special Task Force indicated
clearly the manner and conduct of the administrative hearings, the
nature and weight of the evidence adduced, and the correspondingly
penalty or exoneration recommended.On the bases of the
investigation reports and recommendations of the DECS Special Task
Force, and after evaluating the reports and its documents attached,
respondent Secretary Carino promulgated the decisions either for
exoneration, suspension or dismissal. Copies of the DECS decisions
of exoneration, suspension or dismissal were forwarded to the
principals of the striking teachers concerned. Those exonerated
were allowed to resume their duties and received their back
salaries. Some of the teachers either suspended or dismissed have
already received the copies of the decisions, either personally or
through mail.xxx xxx xxx22This copious citation is made, not to
suggest that the Court finds what is stated therein to be true and
the contrary averments of the petitions to be false, but precisely
to stress that the facts upon which the question of alleged denial
of due process would turn are still in issue, actively
controverted, hence not yet established.It is not for the Court,
which is not a trier of facts, as the petitioners who would now
withdraw correctly put it, to make the crucial determination of
what in truth transpired concerning the disputed incidents. Even if
that were within its competence, it would be at best a monumental
task. At any rate, the petitioners cannot-as it seems they have
done lump together into what amounts to a class action hundreds of
individual cases, each with its own peculiar set of facts, and
expect a ruling that would justly and correctly resolve each and
everyone of those cases upon little more than general allegations,
frontally disputed as already pointed out, of incidents supposedly
"representative" of each case or group of cases.This case
illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court,
especially when numerous parties desparately situated as far as the
facts are concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and
generalization of what should be alleged with particularity becomes
unavoidable. The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the
administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to take part,
assert and vindicate their rights therein, see those proceedings
through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the Civil
Service Commission; or if, pending said proceedings, immediate
recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary because the
respondent Secretary or those acting under him or on his
instructions were acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, to apply, not directly to the
Supreme Court, but to the Regional Trial Court, where there would
be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting corrective
relief.Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order
of recourse through the judicial hierarchy; they by-pass the rungs
of the judicial ladder at the peril of their own causes.23This
Court is a court oflast resort. Its review jurisdiction is limited
to resolving questions of law where there is no dispute of the
facts or the facts have already been determined by lower tribunals,
except only in criminal actions where capital penalties have been
imposed.WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without
prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual
petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters
complained of. The motions to withdraw,supra, are merely NOTED,
this disposition rendering any express ruling thereon unnecessary.
No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J. (Chairman),
Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado
and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsGUTIERREZ, JR.,
J.,dissenting:In dissenting from the majority opinion, I draw
certain conclusions from the records which I feel should guide any
adjudication of the issues in these petitions.My first conclusion
refers to the denial of basic rights of an indispensably essential
segment of our society the teachers who educate our children.The
second refers to the cold hearted punishment which we allow to be
inflicted upon our poor school teachers. By skirting the
fundamental issue involved, the Court is denying the petitioners
fairness, substantive due process, and simple humanity. The
so-called investigations which led to the initial dismissals were a
farce. Instead of 90 day preventive suspensions, the Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) immediately imposed punitive
dismissals with no semblance of rudimentary due process. All other
civil service employees undergoing investigation are reinstated
after ninety days. Our teachers have been out of work for more than
ten (10) months without income while still undergoing
administrative investigation. The suspension is indefinite if not
permanent.Patience has its limits. There are times when even the
most constant and dedicated public servants must given vent to
their feelings and express their grievances at an unfeeling and
inept bureaucracy which seems to be incapable of attending to their
officials needs. Professional agitators may have infiltrated the
teachers and muddled their demands with such outlandish calls as
the closure of foreign military bases, a cap on the payments of
foreign debts and other issues not pressingly relevant to teachers.
But thebasic demandsare legitimate and few.Teachers need a decent
living wage, one in keeping with the dignity and worth of their
profession. Not only are their salaries unbelievably low but
payment is often unreasonably delayed. When the national government
gives a little increase, a corresponding amount is reduced from the
city share. Teachers have to beg for allowances to be restored. The
latest examples are the PERA adjustments. As of July 12, 1991, most
employees of the government had received andspenttheir PERA
allowances. Our public school teachers were still waiting. whatever
the payment signifies salary, bonus, allowance and even retirement
or death benefits the last one to receive what all government
employees are entitled to, is the public school teacher. It is no
small wonder that thousands of school teachers swallow their
dignity and accept employment as domestic servants overseas. I am
not aware of any government program which seeks to reverse the new
definition of "Filipina" as a domestic servant of foreigners whose
education is often lower than that of their maids. Neither am I
aware of any determined effort to see to it that school
teachersalwaysget their salaries, allowances, and benefits on
time.I mention the unconcern because it is what forced the
petitioners to engage in mass concerted action.We agree that
employees in the civil service may not engage in strikes, walk-outs
and temporary work stoppages like workers in the private sector.
(Social Security System Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,
175 SCRA 686, 698 [1989]). Employment in the Government is governed
by law. Government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The terms and conditions of employment are effected
through statutes and administrative rules and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements. (Alliance of Government
Workers, et al. v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1, 13
[1983]).The above rulings remain good law.In the first place, if
this Court uses the word "strike" to describe what the petitioners
staged, it tends to unfairly color and pre-judge their case.
"Strike" becomes a pejorative epithet that leads to a certain
result not so much because of facts but because of its semantic
connotations. The teachers were in the main not asking for terms
and conditions greater than those accorded by law. Their basic
demand was to be given on time what the law already provides for
them. It was only after certain elements penetrated their ranks and
in the heat of the peaceful assembly that such demands as closure
of military bases and laws increasing salaries formed part of the
leaders' statements. The concerted action was more of a peaceful
assembly, an exercise of speech by a gathering, not a strike.In the
second place, when Government is deaf, when bureaucracy denies to
our teachers the timely payment of the pittances provided by law,
should any ban still be enforced? And enforced in a peremptory and
oppressive manner? Should not the most basic freedom of speech and
assembly in these particular cases outweigh all considerations
which ban strikes by civil service employees?We agree with Justice
Cardozo inPalko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319 [1937] that freedom of
speech is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every
other form of freedom.We have cited with approbation Justice
Brennan's stressing a "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials". (New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254
[1964])Teachers have legitimate and pressing grievances. When
Government consistently fails to act on these grievances, the
teachers have a right tospeak in an effective manner. For speech to
be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended
recipients listen.I view the issue in these cases as more
transcendent than the simple one of whether or not public school
teachers may go on strike. To me, the issue is the freedom to
effectively speak. When the members of a noble profession are
demeaned by low salaries and inattention to their needs, surely
their freedom to speakin a manner and at a timeas is most effective
far outweighs conventional adherence to orthodox civil service
rules on proper conduct and correct behavior.My other point has to
do with an anomalous investigation procedure and considering the
nature of the offense, what is tantamount to cruel punishment.I
gather from the records andthe majority opinionthat the cases of
individual teachers are still being investigated and may be the
subject of appeals to the Civil Service Commission.If that is so, I
cannot understand why the petitioners remain suspended up to the
present. They should have been reinstated after 90 days of
preventive suspension. It is axiomatic that civil service employees
and even elected officials cannot be preventively suspended for
more than 90 days (Section 42, P.D. 807; Deloso v. Sandiganbayan,
173 SCRA 409 [1989]; Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354
[1989]).If the suspension is preventive, it has lasted too long. If
punitive, it is illegal and violative of due process.There are
anywhere from 800 to 2,000 teachers involved perhaps even more,
once the unwieldy procedures of DECS can arrive at accurate
figures.On October 8, 1990, the Department Secretary constituted an
investigating committee of four, repeat, four members to act on the
formal charges.Three days later, on October 11, 1990, the DECS
found 20 teachers guilty and dismissed them. On December 3, 1990,
658 teachers were dismissed, 40 were suspended for one year, 33 for
9 months, and 122 for six months. There were 398 exonerations. I
understand there were scores who had to hurriedly look for medical
certificates that they were "sick" while hundreds were urged to
cringe and grovel with humiliatingmea culpas.Even if the
investigating committee or committees were staffed by supermen and
superwomen, it is inconceivable that 658 capital sentences of
dismissal could be made in so short a time. Any officer who has
conducted an honest to goodness administrative investigation cannot
but conclude that the procedures which were followed violated the
norms of fair play and due process. The decisions were the products
of prejudgment based on perfunctory paper investigations. Surely
our public school teachers deserve better treatment.If subsequent
to the sentences of dismissal, the teachers were properly served
with summons, given time to secure the services of competent
counsel, allowed to defend themselves and cross-examine witnesses
against them, punished on the basis of reasoned decisions stating
the facts and the law, and otherwise given their rights to due
process, the initial illegal actions should be set aside and the
teachers reinstated in the meantime.Considering the circumstances
which led the teachers to engage in mass action, the penalty of
dismissal is too grave. It is punishment which is cruel.The
officers and men of the Armed Forces who started a coup at the
Manila Hotel were punished by being made to do a few push-ups. The
coup attempt in December, 1989 was almost successful. And yet, only
the officers are meted significant punishment. The enlisted men are
readily pardoned. I see no reason why similar treatment cannot be
given our public school teachers. Their only offense was to speak
out in an effective manner against studied neglect.Even if all
requirements of due process in administrative investigations are
followed and the evidence points unerringly to guilt, a public
school teacher should not be meted out a penalty harsher than a few
months suspension. In Labor Law, dismissals are imposed only
against a handful of leaders who committed acts of violence or
instigated illegal strikes. (De Ocampo, Jr. v. NLRC, 186 SCRA 360
[1990]) As earlier stated, the word "strike" under Labor Law should
not be used in pejoration to denigrate a peaceful assembly.I repeat
that equitable considerations call for compassion. Public school
teachers are the most hard-working, uncomplaining, easy to satisfy,
and dutiful segment of our public service. They are also the most
underpaid professionals with a take home pay of a little over one
hundred pesos a day,**which is the income of an unskilled laborer.
They deserve justice and compassion.CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I
vote to GRANT the petition, to set aside the questioned orders of
the Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports, to order
reinstatement of the petitioners, and to direct the payments of
their salaries and backpay.CRUZ,J.,dissenting:It appears to me from
my reading of theponenciaand the several dissents that the
petitioners have established aprima faciecase of arbitrariness on
the part of the government that would justify direct and immediate
action from the Court as an exception to the regular
procedure.While I do agree that there are many factual matters to
be ascertained and that this task belongs in the first instance to
the administrative authorities, I feel that precisely because of
the number and proximity of these issues, let alone the hundreds if
not thousands of teachers involved, this Court must grant the
petitioners at least temporary relief pending the termination of
the proceedings below. These proceedings have been dragging on for
months and will continue even longer, perhaps for years. In the
meantime, the petitioning teachers are out in the cold, without
employment or income and with only their hope, grown forlorn, I am
afraid, in the justice of this Court.I can understand Justice
Narvasa's concern over the disarrangement of the well-ordered
system of judicial review and the resultant heavy burden that will
be laid on the Court. However, I do not propose that we assume the
role of the trier of facts and encumber ourselves with the task of
deciding the hundreds of administrative cases being heard (or
better heard) below by the DECS or the Civil Service Commission. I
am not prepared at this point to say that the Court should simply
pronounce the dismissal of the petitioners as arbitrary and to
order their reinstatement with back salaries. I would instead join
Justice Padilla's suggestion that the teachers be ordered
reinstated in the meantime, without prejudice to their
investigation in accordance with the prescribed procedure.I am not
unaware of the decision of the Court in the SSS case prohibiting
members of the Civil Service from engaging in strikes and similar
acts. I submit, however that this ruling, assuming it to be
correct, is no license for the authorities to treat their employees
with disdain and to flatly ignore their legitimate complaints, with
the expressed threat that they would be removed if they should be
so rash as to insist on their demands. In my view, that is what
Secretary Carino has done.Government workers, whatever their
category or status, have as much right as any person in the land to
voice their protests against what they believe to be a violation of
their interests. The fact that they belong to the Civil Service has
not deprived them of their freedom of expression, which is
guaranteed to every individual in this country, including even the
alien. It would be ridiculous to even suggest that by accepting
public employment, the members of the Civil Service automatically
and impliedly renounce this basic liberty. This freedom can at best
be regulated only but never completely withdrawn.When their first
feeble complaints were not acted upon, the teachers had a light to
speak loudly and more insistently, and to show that their protests
did not come from only a disgruntled few but from a considerable
number of them. They did this through their mass action in hopes
that this way they would be better heard and ultimately heeded.
They were not. Instead, they were threatened with dismissal and
some were in fact dismissed. In effect, they were told to shut up
or face the consequences. I regard the return- to-work order as
merely secondary and incidental, for the primary purpose of the
DECS authorities was to break up the demonstration and muzzle the
demonstrators. unquestionably, these individual teachers could not
speak as effectively in their controlled classrooms. What the
Secretary sought was to deny the teachers the light to assemble and
petition the government for redress of their grievances on the
sanctimonious excuse that they were needed by their students.I for
one believe that the prohibition of members of the Civil Service
from striking which, significantly, is not found in the
Constitution requires a careful re-examination. It is so easy, as
the present case has demonstrated, to use it as a bludgeon to
silence complaint, however legitimate. Complaint is a weapon of the
worker, and it is more effective if manifested not by him alone but
with his co-owners. Under the present ruling, the workers in the
private sector may complain collectively and if necessary declare a
strike to enforce their demands, but this recourse is denied the
public employees even if their demands are no less valid. In this
sense, the freedom of expression of the civil servant is diminished
and his right to improve the conditions of his employment is
correspondingly reduced, and order because he belongs to the public
sector.It is so easy to say that the education of the youth should
not be disrupted but we should not forget that the protection of
freedom of expression is no less important. Indeed, the quality of
education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when
the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage
and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous
whispers. The classrooms should be an incubator of freedom, not
fear.PARAS,J.,concurringI concur. Public school teachers have the
right to peaceably assemble for redress of grievances but NOT
during class hours, for then this would be a strike, which is
illegal for them.FELICIANO,J.,dissenting:With regret, I find myself
unable to concur in the majority opinion. I would associate myself
with the reasoning and conclusions (though not necessarily with all
the adjectives and adverbs) of the dissenting opinion of Gutierrez,
J. as well as the conclusions reached by Padilla and Sarmiento,
JJ., in their respective dissenting opinion.Here I merely wish to
underscore the constitutional issue which appears to me to be
raised in the instant case by the contraposition of, on the one
hand, the prohibition against employees in the public sector going
on strikes and, on the other hand, the rights of free speech and of
assembly and petition of those same employees. InSocial Security
System Employees Association (SSSEA) v. Court of Appeals(175 SCRA
686 [1989]), the Court, through Cortes, J., pointed out that the
prohibition against strikes in the public sector is presently
founded upon Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1987, of the
Civil Service Commission dated 21 April 1987, and indirectly and
impliedly, upon Executive Order No. 180 dated 1 June 1987 which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the constitutional right of
government employees to organize themselves. The prohibition is
not, in other words, even statutory in nature but merely
administrative or regulatory in character and the Court took
explicit note of the absence of legislation either prohibiting or
allowing strikes, or even merely regulating the exercise of a right
to strike by government employees. The policy embodied in that
prohibition is admittedly a legitimate and important one: to
prevent or minimize the disruption and paralysis of the operations
of government, especially the essential services rendered by it to
society at large. At the same time, that the rights of free speech
and of peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances are
at least equally important and critical for the maintenance of a
free, open and democratic polity, is no