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Art. 74 - 253 ; Use of Surnames ; Adoption

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    G.R. No. 182839, June 02, 2014PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner , v . JOSE GARCIA AND CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR.,

    BOBB GARCIA AND JI!! GARCIA AND HEIRS O" ROGELIO GARCIA NA!EL# CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILOGARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, "ER!IN GARCIA, HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, I!ELDA GARCIA AND

    JANE GARCIA, Respondent.D E C I S I O N

    BRION, J.We resolve this petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the decision2 dated September 26, 2007 and theresolution3 dated a! 6, 200" of the #ourt of $ppeals %#$& in #$'(.). #* +o. 7136.

    -hese challenged #$ rulings reversed and set aside the decision of the )egional -rial #ourt %RTC &, ranch 23, )o/as,sabela, dismissing #ivil #ase +o. ranch 23'00'6 for lac of cause of action.

    T$e "%&'u%( B%&)*+oun

    -he facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefl! summaried below.

    -he sub4ect of the present case is a parcel of residential land with all its improvements %subject property & located in arrio5lango, allig, sabela. -he land is covered b! -ransfer #ertificate of -itle %TCT & +o. -'22 under the name of ose(arcia Sr. %Jose Sr.& who ac8uired the sub4ect propert! u+-n* $- /%++-%*e with 9iga!a (arcia. 9iga!a died on anuar!21, 1"7.

    -he marriage of ose Sr. and 9iga!a produced the following children: +ora, ose r., obb! and imm!, all surnamed(arcia, who are the respondents in the present case.

    Sometime in 1", the spouses )ogelio and #eledonia (arcia %Spouses Garcia& obtained a loan facilit! from thepetitioner, ;hilippine +ational an % petitioner bank), initiall! for ;10,000.00. -he loan was secured b! a )eal

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    properties was dul! registered and inscribed on their titles and was thus binding on the whole world.

    n the course of the proceedings, +ora, ose r., obb! and imm! e/ecuted an S;$ dated a! 31, 16 authoriingose Sr. to act as their attorne!'in'fact during the pretrial of the case.

    T$e Ru(-n* o '$e RTC

    -he )-# dismissed the complaint for lac of cause of action. -he court held that the sub4ect propert! was a con4ugalpropert! since it was ac8uired b! ose Sr. during his marriage with his now deceased wife. $s a con4ugal propert!, it ispresumed that upon the death of his spouse, one'half of the propert! passed on to ose Sr., while the other half went toose and his children as co'owners and as forced heirs of his deceased spouse. Without the consent of the children, thetrial court ruled that the con4ugal propert! could onl! be transferred or encumbered to the e/tent of ose Sr.=s share in thecon4ugal partnership, plus his share as an heir in the other half pertaining to the estate of his deceased spouse.

    -he )-# nevertheless declared that b! virtue of the S;$ e/ecuted b! +ora, ose r., obb! and imm! in this suit, the!are alread! estopped from 8uestioning the mortgage and from alleging lac of consent or nowledge in the transaction. theld ose Sr. liable as an accommodation part! and upheld the petitioner ban=s right to collect the debt.

    -he respondents disagreed with the )-# ruling and elevated the case to the #$ via an ordinar! appeal.cra1awred4gcT$e Ru(-n* o '$e CA

    5n September 26, 2007, the #$ upheld the trial court=s finding that the sub4ect propert! was con4ugal, but reversed andset aside its ruling in so far as it declared valid and binding the $mendment of )eal

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    findings of the trial court and absent an! indication that these courts committed a serious error in its findings, this #ourt isbound b! these courts= findings.6

    oreover, even if we were to review the factual issues raised b! the petitioner ban, we still find no reason to depart fromthe #$=s ruling.

    The Subject Property is Conjugal a. All property acquired during marriageis presumed conjugal 

    Since ose Sr. and 9iga!a were married prior to the effectivit! of the >amil! #ode, their propert! relations were governedb! the con4ugal partnership of gains as provided under $rticle 11 of the #ivil #ode. Bnder $rticle 160 of the #ivil #ode,Call propert! of the marriage is presumed to belong to the con4ugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertainse/clusivel! to the husband or to the wife.D

    n his testimon!, ose Sr. admitted that at the time he ac8uired the land through sale, he was alread! married. -hematerial portion of his testimon! is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar!# on '$e e%'$ o 7ou+ -e - 7ou %n 7ou+ -e e:e+ on % -e&e o (%n;A# e, -+.# Where is that land situatedEA# n #entro, ?istrict 2, alligF,G sabela.# s that land titled in !our namesEA# Hes, sir.

    ////# ou %n 7ou+ -e %&

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    e/clusivel! belonged to ose Sr. $s stated earlier, the petitioner ban failed to overcome the legal presumption that thedisputed propert! was con4ugal. -hus, the conclusion of both lower courts that the sub4ect propert! was con4ugal propert!holds. >actual findings of the #$ affirming those of the trial court are binding on this #ourt unless there is a clear showingthat such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.12

    The conjugal partnership was conerted into an implied ordinary co!ownershipupon the death of "igaya

    Bpon the death of 9iga!a on anuar! 21, 1"7, the con4ugal partnership was automaticall! dissolved and terminatedpursuant to $rticle 17%1& of the #ivil #ode,13 and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided under $rticle 777of the #ivil #ode, which states that CFtGhe rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of thedecedent.D

    #onse8uentl!, the con4ugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinar! co'ownership between the survivingspouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.1 -his resulting ordinar! co'ownership among theheirs is governed b! $rticle 3 of the #ivil #ode which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar!

     $rt. 3. e (-/-'e'o '$e o+'-on $-&$ /%7 >e %((o''e 'o $-/ -n '$e -:--on uon '$e 'e+/-n%'-on o '$e &o=one+$-. %e (-/-'e, >7 /%n%'eo '$e %/e %+'-&(e, 'o '$e o+'-on $-&$ /%7 >e %((o''e 'o $-/ -n '$e -:--on uon '$e 'e+/-n%'-on o '$e &o=one+$-. He $% no +-*$' 'o e(( o+ %(-en%'e % &on&+e'e, e&--&, o+ e'e+/-n%'e %+' o '$e '$-n* -n &o//on 'o'$e e?&(u-on o '$e o'$e+ &o=one+ >e&%ue $- +-*$' o:e+ '$e '$-n* - +e+een'e >7 %n %>'+%&' o+ Ie%(o+'-on -'$ou' %n7 $7-&%( %@u-&%'-on.3 $n individual co' owner cannot ad4udicate to himself or claim title to an!definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition b! agreement or 4udicial decree. ;rior to that

    time all that the co'owner has is an deal or abstract 8uota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common b!all the co'owners. What a co owner ma! dispose of is onl! his undivided ali"uot  s#are, which shall be limited to theportion that ma! be allotted to him upon partition. Fe$p#asis supplied G.

    n the present case, ose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the en'-+e sub4ect propert! after the death of 9iga!a, butbefore the li8uidation of the con4ugal partnership. While under $rticle 3 of the #ivil #ode, even if he had the right tofreel! mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed propert!, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entirepropert! without his children=s consent. $s correctl! emphasied b! the trial court, ose Sr.=s right in the sub4ect propert!is (-/-'e on(7 'o $- $%+e -n '$e &on@u*%( %+'ne+$- % e(( % $- $%+e % %n $e-+ on '$e o'$e+ $%( o '$ee'%'e $-&$ - $- e&e%e oue5 $%+e. $ccordingl!, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it e/tends to theundivided shares of his children %+ora, ose r., obb! and imm!& because the! did not give their consent to thetransaction.17

     $ccordingl!, the $mendment of )eal

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    G.R. No. 11904, Au*u' 0, 2013BOBB TAN, Petitioner , v. GRACE ANDRADE, PROCESO ANDRADE, JR., CHARIT A. SANTIAGO, HENR

    ANDRADE, ANDRE6 ANDRADE, JAS!IN BLAA, GLOR ANDRADE, !IRIA! ROSE ANDRADE, AND JOSEPHANDRADE, Respondents.

    G.R. No. 1201

    GRACE ANDRADE, CHARIT A. SANTIAGO, HENR ANDRADE, ANDRE6 ANDRADE, JAS!IN BLAA, !IRIA!ROSE ANDRADE, AND JOSEPH ANDRADE, Petitioners, v. BOBB TAN,Respondent .

    D E C I S I O NPERLAS=BERNABE, J.

     efore the #ourt are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 assailing the ?ecision2 dated ul! 26, 200 and)esolution3 dated arch 3, 2006 of the #ourt of $ppeals %#$& in #$'(.). #* +o. 71"7 which affirmed with modificationthe udgment dated $pril 6, 2001 of the )egional -rial #ourt of #ebu #it!, ranch 1 %)-#& in #ivil #ase +o. #

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    denied the $ndrades= claim that the sub4ect transaction was an e8uitable mortgage since their allegation that the purchaseprice was unusuall! low was left unsupported b! an! evidence. $lso, their averment that the! have been in continuouspossession of the sub4ect properties was belied b! the testimon! of $ndrew $ndrade %$ndrew& who stated that obb! wasalread! in possession of the same. 22cralaw virtualaw librar!

    +evertheless, the #$ ruled that the sub4ect properties belong to the con4ugal partnership of )osario and her late husband,;roceso, Sr., and thus, she co'owned the same together with her children, the $ndrades.23 n this respect, the sale wasvalid onl! with respect to )osario=s pro'indiviso share in the sub4ect properties and it cannot pre4udice the share of the

     $ndrades since the! did not consent to the sale.2 n effect, a resulting trust was created between obb! and the $ndrades2 and, as such, prescription andJor laches has !et to set in so as to bar them from instituting the instantcase.26 $ccordingl!, the #$ ordered obb! to reconve! to the $ndrades their share in the sub4ect properties.27cralawvirtualaw librar!

    n view of the #$=s pronouncement, the parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. >or the $ndrades= part,the! sought the reconsideration of the #$=s finding as to its characteriation of the sub4ect transaction as one of sale,insisting that it is actuall! an e8uitable mortgage.2" $s for obb!=s part, he maintained that the sale should have coveredthe entiret! of the sub4ect properties and not onl! )osario=s pro'indiviso share.2 oth motions for reconsideration were,however, denied b! the #$ in a )esolution30dated arch 3, 2006.

    Ience, the present consolidated petitions.Iue Beo+e '$e Cou+'

    -he present controvers! revolves around the #$=s characteriation of the sub4ect properties as well as of the sub4ect

    transaction between )osario and obb!.

    n (.). +o. 172017, the $ndrades submit that the #$ erred in ruling that the sub4ect transaction is in the nature of a sale,while in (.). +o. 1710, obb! contends that the #$ erred in ruling that the sub4ect properties are con4ugal in nature.

    T$e Cou+'5 Ru(-n*

     A. Characteri#ation of the subject transaction.

    Settled is the rule that when the trial courtKs factual findings have been affirmed b! the #$, said findings are generall!conclusive and binding upon the #ourt, and ma! no longer be reviewed on )ule petitions.31 While there e/istse/ceptions to this rule L such as when the #$=s and )-#=s findings are in conflict with each other 32 L the #ourt observesthat none applies with respect to the ruling that the sub4ect transaction was one of sale and not an e8uitable mortgage.)ecords readil! reveal that both the )-# and the #$ observed that there is no clear and convincing evidence to show that

    the parties agreed upon a mortgage. Ience, absent an! glaring error therein or an! other compelling reason to holdotherwise, this finding should now be deemed as conclusive and perforce must stand. $s echoed in the case of !$po v.C!:33cralaw virtualaw librar!/ / / >actual findings of the #ourt of $ppeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable b! this #ourt L and the!carr! even more weight when the #ourt of $ppeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court, and in the absence of an!showing that the findings complained of are totall! devoid of support in the evidence on record, or that the! are soglaringl! erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand.3cralaw virtualaw librar!#onse8uentl!, the $ndrades= petition in G.R. No. 1201 must therefore be denied.

    $. Characteri#ation of the subject properties.

    With respect to the nature of the sub4ect properties, the courts a "uo were at variance such that the )-#, on the onehand, ruled that the said properties were e/clusive properties of )osario,3 while the #$, on the other hand, pronouncedthat the! are con4ugal in nature.36 n this regard, the conse8uent course of action would be for the #ourt to conduct a re'e/amination of the evidence if onl! to determine which among the two is correct, 37 as an e/ception to the proscription in)ule petitions.

    ;ertinent to the resolution of this second issue is $rticle 160 of the #ivil #ode3" which states that CFaGll propert! of themarriage is presumed to belong to the con4ugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains e/clusivel! to the husbandor to the wife.D >or this presumption to appl!, the part! invoing the same must, however, preliminaril! prove that thepropert! was indeed ac8uired during the marriage. $s held in Go v. %a$ane:3cralaw virtualaw librar!/ / / $s a condition sine "ua non for the operation of F$rticle 160G in favor of the con4ugal partnership, the part! whoinvoes the presumption must first prove that the propert! was ac8uired during the marriage.

    6

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    n other words, the presumption in favor of con4ugalit! does not operate if there is no showing of en the propert!alleged to be con4ugal was ac8uired. oreover, the presumption ma! be rebutted onl! with strong, clear, categorical andconvincing evidence. -here must be strict proof of the e/clusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proofrests upon the part! asserting it.0 %#itations omitted&#orollaril!, as decreed in 'alde( v. C!,1 the presumption under $rticle 160 cannot be made to appl! where there is noshowing as to when the propert! alleged to be con4ugal was ac8uired:/ / / -he issuance of the title in the name solel! of one spouse is not determinative of the con4ugal nature of the propert!,since there is no showing that it was ac8uired during the marriage of the Spouses #arlos *alde, Sr. and osefina 9.*alde. -he presumption under $rticle 160 of the +ew #ivil #ode, that propert! ac8uired during marriage is con4ugal, doesnot appl! where there is no showing as to when the propert! alleged to be con4ugal was ac8uired. -he presumptioncannot prevail when the title is in the name of onl! one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.oreover, when the propert! is registered in the name of onl! one spouse and there is no showing as to when thepropert! was ac8uired b! same spouse, this is an indication that the propert! belongs e/clusivel! to the said spouse.

    n this case, there is no evidence to indicate when the propert! was ac8uired b! petitioner osefina. -hus, we agree withpetitioner osefina=s declaration in the deed of absolute sale she e/ecuted in favor of the respondent that she was theabsolute and sole owner of the propert!. / / /.2cralaw virtualaw librar!n this case, records reveal that the con4ugal partnership of )osario and her husband was terminated upon the latter=sdeath on $ugust 7, 17"3 while the transfer certificates of title over the sub4ect properties were issued on September 2",17 and solel! in the name of C)osario *da. de $ndrade, of legal age, widow, >ilipino.D 5ther than their bare allegation,no evidence was adduced b! the $ndrades to establish that the sub4ect properties were procured during the coverture oftheir parents or that the same were bought with con4ugal funds. oreover, )osario=s declaration that she is the absoluteowner of the disputed parcels of land in the sub4ect deed of sale was not disputed b! her son ;roceso, r., who was a

    part! to the same. Ience, b! virtue of these incidents, the #ourt upholds the )-#=s finding6 that the sub4ect propertieswere e/clusive or sole properties of )osario.

    esides, the #ourt observes that lac#es had alread! set in, thereb! precluding the $ndrades from pursuing their claim.#ase law defines lac#es as the Cfailure to assert a right for an unreasonable and une/plained length of time, warranting apresumption that the part! entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.D7cralaw virtualaw librar!

    )ecords disclose that the $ndrades too 1 !ears before filing their complaint for reconve!ance in 17. -he argumentthat the! did not now about the sub4ect transaction is clearl! belied b! the facts on record. t is undisputed that ;roceso,r. was a co'vendee in the sub4ect deed of sale," while Ienr! was an instrumental witness to the ?eed of

     $ssignment and 5ption to u!0 both dated ul! 26, 1"3. 9iewise, )osario=s sons, ;roceso, r. and $ndrew, did not8uestion the e/ecution of the sub4ect deed of sale made b! their mother to obb!.1 -hese incidents can but onl! lead tothe conclusion that the! were well'aware of the sub4ect transaction and !et onl! pursued their claim 1 !ears after the sale

    was e/ecuted.

    ?ue to the above'stated reasons, obb!=s petition in G.R. No. 11904 is hereb! granted.

    6HERE"ORE, the #ourt hereb! %a& GRANTS the petition of obb! -an in (.). +o. 1710@ and %b&DENIES the petitionof (race $ndrade, #harit! $. Santiago, Ienr! $ndrade, $ndrew $ndrade, asmin laa, iriam )ose $ndrade, andoseph $ndrade in (.). +o. 172017. $ccordingl!, the ?ecision dated ul! 26, 200 and )esolution dated arch 3, 2006of the #ourt of $ppeals in #$'(.). #* +o. 71"7 are hereb!REERSED and SET ASIDE, and the $pril 6, 2001 ?ecisionof the )egional -rial #ourt of #ebu #it!, ranch 1 in #ivil #ase +o. #

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    GE!!A RE!ILN C. AILA %n "AREAST BANK TRST CO.,)espondents. 

    S

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    over said parcel in favor of respondent >ar

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    rights, the ?ela ;eas sought the reconve!ance of the propert! as well as the grant of their claims for moral and e/emplar!

    damages, attorne!s fees and the costs.F1G

     

    Served with summons, (emma specificall! denied the material allegations of the foregoing complaint in her 1 ul! 1"

    answer. aintaining that the realt! was the e/clusive propert! of $ntonia who misrepresented that her husband was stil

    alive, (emma averred that the former failed to pa! the ;20,000.00 loan she obtained from $guila on its stipulated 7 ul!

    16 maturit!@ that approached to help prevent the e/tra4udicial foreclosure of the mortgage constituted on the propert!,

    she agreed to settle the outstanding obligation to $guila and to e/tend $ntonia a ;0,000.00 loan, with interest pegged a

    10O per month@ that to pa! bac the foregoing accommodations, $ntonia agreed to the use of the propert! as collateral

    for a loan to be obtained b! her from >

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    corroborative evidence, presented the testimon! of one $lessandro $lmoden F22G who claimed to have referred $ntonia to

    (emma for the purpose of obtaining a loan. ! wa! of defense evidence, on the other hand, >

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    >

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    the matter during his cross'e/amination, even $lvin admitted that his sole basis for sa!ing that the propert! was owned b!

    his parents was $ntonias unilateral pronouncement to the effect. F3G #onsidering that the presumption of con4ugalit! does

    not operate if there is no showing of en the propert! alleged to be con4ugal was ac8uired,F36G we find that the #$ canno

    be faulted for ruling that the realt! in litigation was $ntonias e/clusive propert!.

     

    +ot having established the time of ac8uisition of the propert!, the ?ela ;eas insist that the registration thereof in the name

    of $ntonia ). ?ela ;ea, of legal age, >ilipino, married to $ntegono $. ?ela ;ea should have alread! sufficientl!

    established its con4ugal nature. #onfronted with the same issue in the case Rui( vs. Court of !ppeals,F37G this #ourt ruled

    however, that the phrase married to is merel! descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean

    that the husband is also a registered owner. ecause it is liewise possible that the propert! was ac8uired b! the wife

    while she was still single and registered onl! after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner

    constitute proof that the same was ac8uired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed con4ugal in

    nature. Since there is no showing as to when the propert! in 8uestion was ac8uired, the fact that the title is in the name of

    the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging e/clusivel! to said spouse.F3"G

     

    *iewed in light of the paraphernal nature of the propert!, the #$ correctl! ruled that the )-# reversibl! erred in nullif!ing

     $ntonias +ovember 17 sale thereof in favor of (emma, for lac of the li8uidation re8uired under $rticle 130 o

    the 1a$ily Code.F3G -hat $ntonia treated the realt! as her own e/clusive propert! ma!, in fact, be readil! gleaned from her

    utiliation thereof as securit! for the pa!ment of the ;20,000.00 loan she borrowed from $guila.F0G

     ?espite (emmas

    forfeiture of the right to present evidence on her behalf, her alleged alteration of the 7 a! 16 eed of Real -state

    ort/a/e to shorten the maturit! of the loan secured thereb! was also properl! brushed aside b! the #$. -he double lie

    inherent in $ntonias assertion that the same deed was altered b! (emma to shorten the maturit! of the loan to 17

    instead of 1" is instantl! evident from paragraph 1 of the document  which, consistent with 7 ul! 16 maturit! date

    provided in the Pro$issory Note she e/ecuted,F1G specificall! stated that %t&his contract is for a period of -hree %3& months

    from the date of this instrument.F2G

     

     $ntonias evident lac of credibilit! also impels us to uphold the #$s re4ection of her version of the circumstances

    surrounding the e/ecution of the +ovember 17 eed of !bsoluteSale in favor of (emma. n disavowing authorship of

    the signature appearing on said deed, F3G $ntonia contradicted the allegation in the ?ela ;eas complaint that she was

    misled b! (emma into signing the same document. FG -he rule is well'settled that 4udicial admissions lie those made in

    13

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/187490.htm#_ftn44

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    the pleadings are binding and cannot be contradicted, absent an! showing that the same was made thru palpable

    mistae.FG $longside that appearing on the eed of Real -state ort/a/e she admitted e/ecuting in favor of $guila

     $ntonias signature on theeed of !bsolute Sale was, moreover, found to have been written b! one and the same person

    in Auestioned ?ocument )eport +o. "2'"02 prepared b! Menaida -orres, the + ?ocument or all of $ntonias denial of her receipt of an! consideration for the sale of the propert! in favor of (emma, F7G the evidence

    on record also lend credence to (emmas version of the circumstances surrounding the e/ecution of the assailed

    +ovember 17 eed of !bsolute Sale. #onsistent with (emmas claim that said deed was e/ecuted to facilitate the loans

    she obtained from >

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    of an !ffidavit of !dverse Clai$ with the )egister of ?eeds of ariina on 3 arch 1" and the annotation of a Notice of

    0is Pendens on -#- +o. 337"3 on 10 ?ecember 1. -hemortgage directl! and immediatel! sub4ects the propert!

    upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor ma! be, to the fulfilment of the obligation for whose securit! it was

    constituted.F7G When the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee conse8uentl! has the right to foreclose

    the mortgage, sell the propert!, and appl! the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the unpaid loan. F"G

     

    >inall!, the resolution of this case cannot be affected b! the principles that bans lie >

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    highest bidder. $fter the lapse of one !ear without the propert! being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice'president,consolidated the ownership thereof b! e/ecuting on une 6, 16 an $ffidavit of #onsolidation of 5wnership and a ?eedof $bsolute Sale.FG

    n the meantime, arcelino ?ailo, r. died on ?ecember 20, 1. n one of her visits to the sub4ect propert!,respondent learned that petitioner had alread! emplo!ed a certain )oldan rion to clean its premises and that her car, a>ord sedan, was raed because rion allowed a bo! to pla! with fire within the premises.

    #laiming that she had no nowledge of the mortgage constituted on the sub4ect propert!, which was con4ugal innature, respondent instituted with the )egional -rial #ourt, ranch 2, San ;ablo #it!, #ivil #ase +o. S;'2222 %7&for Nullity of Real -state ort/a/e and Certificate of Sale, !ffidavit of Consolidation of 2&ners#ip, eed of Sale,Reconveyance &it# Prayer for Preli$inary 3njunction and a$a/es against petitioner. n the latters !ns&er &it#Counterclai$, petitioner pra!ed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the propert! in 8uestion was thee/clusive propert! of the late arcelino ?ailo, r.

     $fter trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a ecision on 5ctober 1", 17. -he dispositive portion thereof readsas follows:WI $#-5+:1. -he declaration of the following documents as null and void:

    %a& -he ?eed of )eal rancisco, San ;ablo #it!, covered b! $); +o. '01'1236 entered as ?oc. +o. 06@;age +o. "3, oo +o. , Series of 16 of +otar! ;ublic 5ctavio . Ma!as.

    %d& -he assessment of real propert! +o. '01'1236.2. -he defendant is ordered to reconve! the propert! sub4ect of this complaint to the plaintiff.5+ -I< S $#-5+

    1. -he defendant to pa! the plaintiff the sum of ;0,000.00 representing the value of the car which was burned.5+ 5-I #$BS $#-5+1. -he defendant to pa! the plaintiff the sum of ;2,000.00 as attorne!s fees@

    2. -he defendant to pa! plaintiff ;2,000.00 as moral damages@3. -he defendant to pa! the plaintiff the sum of ;10,000.00 as e/emplar! damages@

    . -o pa! the cost of the suit.-he counterclaim is dismissed.S5 5)?

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    disposition or encumbrance which must have the authorit! of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. n theabsence of such authorit! or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .

    ;etitioner argues that although $rticle 12 of the >amil! #ode re8uires the consent of the other spouse to themortgage of con4ugal properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse frome/ercising full ownership over the portion of the con4ugal propert! pertaining to him under the concept of co'ownership.F12G -hus, petitioner would have this #ourt uphold the validit! of the mortgage to the e/tent of the late arcelino ?ailo, r.sshare in the con4ugal partnership.

    n Guian/ v. Court of !ppeals,F13G it was held that the sale of a con4ugal propert! re8uires the consent of both thehusband and wife.F1G n appl!ing $rticle 12 of the >amil! #ode, this #ourt declared that the absence of the consent ofone renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the con4ugal propert! pertaining to the husband whocontracted the sale. -he same principle in Guian/  s8uarel! applies to the instant case. $s shall be discussed ne/t, there isno legal basis to construe $rticle 3 of the #ivil #ode as an e/ception to $rticle 12 of the >amil! #ode.

    )espondent and the late arcelino ?ailo, r. were married on $ugust ", 167. n the absence of a marriagesettlement, the s!stem of relative communit! or con4ugal partnership of gains governed the propert! relations betweenrespondent and her late husband.F1G With the effectivit! of the >amil! #ode on $ugust 3, 1"", #hapter on Conju/aPartners#ip of Gains in the >amil! #ode was made applicable to con4ugal partnership of gains alread! established beforeits effectivit! unless vested rights have alread! been ac8uired under the #ivil #ode or other laws.F16G

    -he rules on co'ownership do not even appl! to the propert! relations of respondent and the late arcelino ?ailo, reven in a suppletor! manner. -he regime of con4ugal partnership of gains is a special t!pe of partnership, where thehusband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties andthose ac8uired b! either or both spouses through their efforts or b! chance. F17G Bnlie the absolute communit! of propert!wherein the rules on co'ownership appl! in a suppletor! manner, F1"G the con4ugal partnership shall be governed b! therules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is e/pressl! determined in the chapter %on con4ugal

    partnership of gains& or b! the spouses in their marriage settlements.F1G -hus, the propert! relations of respondent and herlate husband shall be governed, foremost, b! #hapter on Conju/al Partners#ip of Gains of the >amil! #ode andsuppletoril!, b! the rules on partnership under the #ivil #ode. n case of conflict, the former prevails because the #ivi#ode provisions on partnership appl! onl! when the >amil! #ode is silent on the matter.

    -he basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the nowledge and consent of his wife, arcelino?ailo, r. constituted a real estate mortgage on the sub4ect propert!, which formed part of their con4ugal partnership. !e/press provision of $rticle 12 of the >amil! #ode, in the absence of %court& authorit! or written consent of the otherspouse, an! disposition or encumbrance of the con4ugal propert! shall be void.

    -he afore8uoted provision does not 8ualif! with respect to the share of the spouse who maes the disposition orencumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co'ownership under $rticle 3 of the #ivil #ode does. Where the lawdoes not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. F20G -hus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct indeclaring the nullit! of the real estate mortgage on the sub4ect propert! for lac of respondents consent.

    Second, petitioner imposes the liabilit! for the pa!ment of the principal obligation obtained b! the late arcelino

    ?ailo, r. on the con4ugal partnership to the e/tent that it redounded to the benefit of the famil!.F21G

    Bnder $rticle 121 of the >amil! #ode, F-Ghe con4ugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . %3& ?ebts and obligationscontracted b! either spouse without the consent of the other to the e/tent that the famil! ma! have been benefited@ . . . .>or the sub4ect propert! to be held liable, the obligation contracted b! the late arcelino ?ailo, r. must have redoundedto the benefit of the con4ugal partnership. -here must be the re8uisite showing then of some advantage which clearl!accrued to the welfare of the spouses. #ertainl!, to mae a con4ugal partnership respond for a liabilit! that shouldappertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed ob4ective of the new #ivil #ode to show the utmostconcern for the solidarit! and well'being of the famil! as a unit. F22G

    -he burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the con4ugal partnership of gains lies with thecreditor'part! litigant claiming as such.F23G -i incu$bit probatio "ui dicit, non "ui ne/at  %he who asserts, not he who deniesmust prove&.F2G ;etitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained b! the late arcelino ?ailo, r. to finance theconstruction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his famil!, without adducing ade8uate proof,does not persuade this #ourt. 5ther than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case tocompel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained b! the late arcelino ?ailo, r. redounded to the benefit of the famil!#onse8uentl!, the con4ugal partnership cannot be held liable for the pa!ment of the principal obligation.

    n addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorousl! asserted that thesub4ect propert! was the e/clusive propert! of the late arcelino ?ailo, r. +owhere in the answer filed with the trial courtwas it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the famil!.

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    SO ORDERED.

    DAID . PELAO %n LORENA B. PELAO,

    G.R. No. 141323

    ;etitioners,   ;resent: 

    ;B+5, C#air$an,TT

       $BS-)$'$)-+

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    ;ere thereupon ased 9orea to sign on the first and second pages of the deed but she refused,

    hence, he instituted on $ugust ", 11 the instant complaint for specific performance against her and her 

    husband ;ela!o %defendants&.

     

    -he defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action,

    citing Section 6 of )$ 666 otherwise nown as the #omprehensive $grarian )eform 9aw which too

    effect on une 10, 1"" and which provides that contracts e/ecuted prior thereto shall be valid onl! when

    registered with the )egister of ?eeds within a period of three %3& months after the effectivit! of this $ct.

     -he 8uestioned deed having been e/ecuted on anuar! 10, 1"", the defendants claimed that

    ;ere had at least up to September 10, 1"" within which to register the same, but as the! failed to, it is

    not valid and, therefore, unenforceable.

     

    -he trial court thus dismissed the complaint. 5n appeal to this #ourt, the dismissal was set aside

    and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

     

    n their $nswer, the defendants claimed that as the lots were occupied illegall! b! some persons

    against whom the! filed an e4ectment case, the! and ;ere who is their friend and nown at the time as

    an activistJleftist, hence feared b! man!, 4ust made it appear in the deed that the lots were sold to him in

    order to frighten said illegal occupants, with the intentional omission of 9oreas signature so that the deed

    could not be registered@ and that the deed being simulated and bereft of consideration is voidJine/istent. 

    ;ere countered that the lots were given to him b! defendant ;ela!o in consideration of his

    services as his attorne!'in'fact to mae the necessar! representation and negotiation with the illegal

    occupants'defendants in the e4ectment suit@ and that after his relationship with defendant ;ela!o became

    sour, the latter sent a letter to the )egister of ?eeds of -agum re8uesting him not to entertain an!

    transaction concerning the lots title to which was entrusted to ;ere who misplaced and could FnotG locate

    it.

     

    ?efendant ;ela!o claimed in an! event, in his ;re'trial brief filed on arch 1, 16, that the

    deed was without his wife 9oreas consent, hence, in light of $rt. 166 of the #ivil #ode which provides:

     

     $rticle 166. Bnless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a

    spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband

    cannot alienate or encumber an! real propert! of the con4ugal partnership without the

    wifes consent . . .

     

    it is null and void.

     

    -he trial court, finding, among others, that ;ere did not possess, nor pa! the ta/es on the lots,

    that defendant ;ela!o was indebted to ;ere for services rendered and, therefore, the deed could onl! be

    considered as evidence of debt, and that in an! event, there was no marital consent to nor actual

    consideration for the deed, held that the deed was null and void and accordingl! rendered 4udgment the

    dispositive portion of which reads: 

    WI

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    -he court further orders that the ?eed of $bsolute Sale, %$nne/ $& of the

    complaint and %$nne/ #& of the plaintiffs otion for Summar! udgment is declared null

    and void and without force and it is liewise removed as a cloud over defendants title and

    propert! in suit. . . .F2G

     

    -he )-# ?ecision was appealed b! herein respondent ;ere to the #$. ;etitioners failed to file their appellees

    brief. -he #$ then promulgated its ?ecision on $pril 20, 1 whereb! it ruled that b! 9orenas signing as witness to the

    e/ecution of the deed, she had nowledge of the transaction and is deemed to have given her consent to the same@ that

    herein petitioners failed to adduce sufficient proof to overthrow the presumption that there was consideration for the deed

    and that petitioner ?avid ;ela!o, being a law!er, is presumed to have acted with due care and to have signed the deed

    with full nowledge of its contents and import. -he #$ reversed and set aside the )-# ?ecision, declaring as valid and

    enforceable the 8uestioned deed of sale and ordering herein petitioner 9orena ;ela!o to affi/ her signature on all pages

    of said document.

     

    ;etitioners moved for reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied per )esolution dated ?ecember

    17, 1. -he #$ found said motion to have been filed out of time and ruled that even putting aside technicalit!,

    petitioners failed to present an! ground bearing on the merits of the case to 4ustif! a reversal or setting aside of the

    decision.

     

    Ience, this petition for review on certiorari  on the following grounds:

     

    1. -he #$ erred in ignoring the specific provision of Section 6, in relation to Section of ).$. +o. 667 otherwise

    nown as the #omprehensive $grarian )eform 9aw of 1"" which too effect on une 1, 1"" and which provides that

    contracts e/ecuted prior thereto shall be valid onl! when registered with the )egister of ?eeds within a period of three %3&

    months after the effectivit! of this $ct.

     

    2. -he #$ erred in holding that the deed of sale was valid and considering the ;10,000.00 ad4udged b! the tria

    court as ;eres remuneration as the consideration for the deed of sale, instead of declaring the same as null and void for

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    being fictitious or simulated and on the basis of $rt. 1, ;ar. 2 of the +ew #ivil #ode which prohibits agents from

    ac8uiring b! purchase properties from his principal under his charge.

     

    3. -he #$ made a novel ruling that there was implied marital consent of the wife of petitioner ?avid ;ela!o.

     

    . ;etitioners should have been allowed to file their appellees brief to ventilate their side, considering the

    e/istence of peculiar circumstances which prevented petitioners from filing said brief.

     

    5n the other hand, respondent points out that the #$, in resolving the first appeal doceted as #$'(.). S; +o.

    3"700F3G brought b! respondent assailing the )-# 5rder granting herein petitioners motion to dismiss, alread! ruled that

    under ).$. +o. 667, the sale or transfer of private agricultural land is allowed onl! when the area of the land being

    conve!ed constitutes or is a part of, the landowner'seller retained area and when the total landholding of the purchaser'

    transferee, including the propert! sold, does not e/ceed five %& hectares@ that in this case, the land in dispute is onl! 1.3

    hectares and there is no proof that the transferees %herein respondent& total landholding inclusive of the sub4ect land wil

    e/ceed hectares, the landholding ceiling prescribed b! ).$. +o. 667@ that the failure of respondent to register the

    instrument was not due to his fault or negligence but can be attributed to 9orenas un4ustified refusal to sign two pages of

    the deed despite several re8uests of respondent@ and that therefore, the #$ ruled that the deed of sale sub4ect of this

    case is valid under ).$. +o. 667.

     

    )espondent further maintains that the #$ correctl! held in its assailed ?ecision that there was consideration for

    the contract and that 9orena is deemed to have given her consent to the deed of sale.

     

    )espondent liewise opines that the #$ was right in den!ing petitioners motion for reconsideration where the!

    pra!ed that the! be allowed to file their appellees brief as their counsel failed to file the same on account of said counsels

    failing health due to cancer of the liver. )espondent emphasied that in petitioners motion for reconsideration, the! did not

    even cite an! errors made b! the #$ in its ?ecision.

     

    -he issues boil down to the 8uestion of whether or not the deed of sale was null and void on the following

    grounds: %a& for not compl!ing with the provision in ).$. +o. 667 that such document must be registered with the

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    )egister of ?eeds within three months after the effectivit! of said law@ %b& for lac of marital consent@ %c& for being

    prohibited under $rticle 11 %2& of the #ivil #ode@ and %d& for lac of consideration.

    We rule against petitioners.

     

    -he issue of whether or not the deed of sale is null and void under ).$. +o. 667, for respondents failure to

    register said document with the )egister of ?eeds within three months after the effectivit! of ).$. +o. 667, had been

    resolved with finalit! b! the #$ in its ?ecision dated +ovember 2, 1 in #$'(.). S; +o. 3"700. FG Ierein petitioners no

    longer elevated said #$ ?ecision to this #ourt and the same became final and e/ecutor! on anuar! 7, 1. FG

     

    n said decision, the #$ interpreted Section , in relation to Section 70 of ).$. +o. 667, to mean thus:

     . . . the proper interpretation of both sections is that under ).$. +o. 667, the sale or transfer of a

    private agricultural land is allowed onl! when said land area constitutes or is a part of the landowner'seller 

    retained area and onl! when the total landholdings of the purchaser'transferee, including the propert!

    sold does not e/ceed five %& hectares.

     

     $side from declaring that the failure of respondent to register the deed was not of his own fault or negligence, the #$

    ruled that respondents failure to register the deed of sale within three months after effectivit! of -he #omprehensive

     $grarian )eform 9aw did not invalidate the deed of sale as the transaction over said propert! is not proscribed b! ).$

    +o. 667.

     

    -hus, under the principle of law of the case, said ruling of the #$ is now binding on petitioners. Such principle was

    elucidated in Cucueco vs. Court of !ppeals,698  to wit:

     9aw of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. t is a term

    applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a 8uestion and remands the case

    to the lower court for further proceedings, the 8uestion there settled becomes the law of the case upon

    subse8uent appeal. t means that whatever is once irrevocabl! established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, et#er correct 

    on /eneral principles or not , so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be

    the facts of the case before the court.

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    ;etitioners not having 8uestioned the ?ecision of the #$ dated +ovember 2, 1 which then attained finalit!, the ruling

    that the deed of sale sub4ect of this case is not among the transactions deemed as invalid under ).$. +o. 667, is now

    immutable.

     

    We agree with the #$ ruling that petitioner 9orena, b! affi/ing her signature to the ?eed of Sale on the space

    provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.

     

    Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected b! mere consent, which ma! either be e/press or implied. F7G  $ wifes

    consent to the husbands disposition of con4ugal propert! does not alwa!s have to be e/plicit or set forth in an! particular

    document, so long as it is shown b! acts of the wife that such consent or approval was indeed given. F"G n the presen

    case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that 9orena signed onl! as an instrumental witness

    circumstances leading to the e/ecution of said document point to the fact that 9orena was full! aware of the sale of their

    con4ugal propert! and consented to the sale.

     

    n their ;re'-rial rief,FG petitioners admitted that even prior to 1"", the! have been having serious problems

    including threats to the life of petitioner ?avid ;ela!o, due to conflicts with the illegal occupants of the propert! in

    8uestion, so that respondent, whom man! feared for being a leftistJactivist, offered his help in driving out said illegal

    occupants.

     

    Iuman e/perience tells us that a wife would surel! be aware of serious problems such as threats to her husbands

    life and the reasons for such threats. $s the! themselves stated, petitioners problems over the sub4ect propert! had been

    going on for 8uite some time, so it is highl! improbable for 9orena not to be aware of what her husband was doing to

    remed! such problems. ;etitioners do not den! that 9orena ;ela!o was present during the e/ecution of the deed of sale

    as her signature appears thereon. +either do the! claim that 9orena ;ela!o had no nowledge whatsoever about the

    contents of the sub4ect document. -hus, it is 8uite 

    certain that she new of the sale of their con4ugal propert! between her husband and respondent.

     

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    Bnder the rules of evidence, it is presumed that a person taes ordinar! care of his concerns. F10G ;etitioners did

    not even attempt to overcome the aforementioned presumption as no evidence was ever presented to show that 9orena

    was in an! wa! lacing in her mental faculties and, hence, could not have full! understood the ramifications of signing the

    deed of sale. +either did petitioners present an! evidence that 9orena had been defrauded, forced, intimidated or

    threatened either b! her own husband or b! respondent into affi/ing her signature on the sub4ect document. f 9orena

    had an! ob4ections over the conve!ance of the disputed propert!, she could have totall! refrained from having an! part in

    the e/ecution of the deed of sale. nstead, 9orena even affi/ed her signature thereto.

     

    oreover, under $rticle 173, in relation to $rticle 166, both of the +ew #ivil #ode, which was still in effect on

    anuar! 11, 1"" when the deed in 8uestion was e/ecuted, the lac of marital consent to the disposition of con4uga

    propert! does not mae the contract void ab initio but merel! voidable. Said provisions of law provide:

      $rt. 166. Bnless the wife has been declared a non co$pos $entis or a spendthrift, or is under 

    civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber an! real

    propert! of the con4ugal propert! without the wifes consent. f she refuses unreasonabl! to give her 

    consent, the court ma! compel her to grant the same.

     

    . . .

     

     $rt. 173. -he wife ma!, during the marriage, and within ten !ears from the transaction 8uestioned,

    as the courts for the annulment of an! contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when

    such consent is re8uired, or an! act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her 

    interest in the con4ugal partnership propert!. Should the wife fail to e/ercise this right, she or her heirs,after the dissolution of the marriage, ma! demand the value of propert! fraudulentl! alienated b! the

    husband.

     

    Ience, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and onl! upon an action brought

    b! the wife whose consent was not obtained. F11G n the present case, despite respondents repeated demands for 9orena

    to affi/ her signature on all the pages of the deed of sale, showing respondents insistence on enforcing said contract

    9orena still did not file a case for annulment of the deed of sale. t was onl! when respondent filed a complaint for

    specific performance on $ugust ", 11 when petitioners brought up 9orenas alleged lac of consent as an affirmative

    defense. -hus, if the transaction was indeed entered into without 9orenas consent, we find it 8uite puling wh! for more

    than three and a half !ears, 9orena did absolutel! nothing to see the nullification of the assailed contract.

     

    24

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    -he foregoing circumstances lead the #ourt to believe that 9orena new of the full import of the transaction

    between respondent and her 

     

    husband@ and, b! affi/ing her signature on the deed of sale, she, in effect, signified her consent to the disposition of their

    con4ugal propert!.

     

    With regard to petitioners asseveration that the deed of sale is invalid under $rticle 11, paragraph 2 of the +ew

    #ivil #ode, we find such argument unmeritorious. $rticle 11 %2& provides:

      $rt. 11. -he following persons cannot ac8uire b! purchase, even at a public or 4udicial auction, either in

    person or through the mediation of another:

     

    . . .

     %2& $gents, the propert! whose administration or sale ma! have been entrusted to them, unless the

    consent of the principal has been given@

     

    . . .

     

    n istajo vs. Court of !ppeals,F12G a landowner, luminada $biertas, designated one of her sons as the

    administrator of several parcels of her land. -he landowner subse8uentl! e/ecuted a ?eed of #ertification of Sale of

    Bnregistered 9and, conve!ing some of said land to her sonJadministrator. -herein, we held that:

     Bnder paragraph %2& of the above article, the prohibition against agents purchasing propert! in

    their hands for sale or management is not absolute. t does not appl! if the principal consents to the sale

    of the propert! in the hands of the agent or administrator. n this case, the deeds of sale signed b!

    luminada $biertas shows that she gave consent to the sale of the properties in favor of her son, )ufo,

    who was the administrator of the properties. -hus, the consent of the principal luminada $biertas

    removes the transaction out of the prohibition contained in $rticle 11%2&.F13G

     

    -he above'8uoted ruling is e/actl! in point with this case before us. ;etitioners, b! signing the ?eed of Sale in

    favor of respondent, are also deemed to have given their consent to the sale of the sub4ect propert! in favor of

    respondent, thereb! maing the transaction an e/ception to the general rule that agents are prohibited from purchasing

    the propert! of their principals.

     

    25

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    ;etitioners also argue that the #$ erred in ruling that there was consideration for the sale. We find no error in said

    appellate courts ruling. -he element of consideration for the sale is indeed present. ;etitioners, in adopting the trial courts

    narration of antecedent facts in their petition, F1G thereb! admitted that the! authoried respondent to represent them in

    negotiations with the s8uatters occup!ing the disputed propert! and, in consideration of respondents services, the!

    e/ecuted the sub4ect deed of sale. $side from such services rendered b! respondent, petitioners also acnowledged in

    the deed of sale that the! received in full the amount of -en -housand ;esos.

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    lots to herein respondent. Such act is a clear indication that the! intended to conve! the sub4ect propert! to herein

    respondent and the deed of sale was not merel! simulated or fictitious.

     

    9astl!, petitioners claim that the! were not able to full! ventilate their defense before the #$ as their law!er, who

    was then suffering from cancer of the liver, failed to file their appellees brief. -hus, in their motion for reconsideration of

    the #$ ?ecision, the! pra!ed that the! be allowed to submit such appellees brief. -he #$, in its )esolution dated

    ?ecember 17, 1, stated thus:

     ! movant'defendant'appellees own information, his counsel received a cop! of the decision on

    a! , 1. Ie, therefore, had fifteen %1& da!s from said date or up to a! 20, 1 to file the motion.

    -he motion, however, was sent through a private courier and, therefore, considered to have been filed on

    the date of actual receipt on une 17, 1 b! the addressee #ourt of $ppeals, was filed be!ond the

    reglementar! period.

     

    -echnicalit! aside, movant has not proffered an! ground bearing on the merits of the case wh!the decision should be set aside.

     

    ;etitioners never denied the #$ finding that their motion for reconsideration was filed be!ond the fifteen'da!

    reglementar! period. 5n that point alone, the #$ is correct in den!ing due course to said motion. -he motion having been

    belatedl! filed, the #$ ?ecision had then attained finalit!. -hus, in !balos vs. P#ile5 inin/ Corporation,F1"G we held that:

     

    . . . +othing is more settled in law than that once a 4udgment attains finalit! it thereb! becomes

    immutable and unalterable. t ma! no longer be modified in an! respect, even if the modification is meant

    to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the

    modification is attempted to be made b! the court rendering it or b! the highest court of the land.

     

    oreover, it is pointed out b! the #$ that said motion did not present an! defense or argument on the merits of 

    the case that could have convinced the #$ to reverse or modif! its ?ecision.

     

    We have consistentl! held that a petitioners right to due process is not violated where he was able to move for

    reconsideration of the order or decision in 8uestion.F1G n this case, petitioners had the opportunit! to full! e/pound on their

    defenses through a motion for reconsideration. ;etitioners did file such motion but the! wasted such opportunit! b! failing

    27

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    to present therein whatever errors the! believed the #$ had committed in its ?ecision. ?efinitel!, therefore, the denial of

    petitioners motion for reconsideration, pra!ing that the! be allowed to file appellees brief, did not infringe petitioners right

    to due process as an! issue that petitioners wanted to raise could and should have been contained in said motion for

    reconsideration.

     

    IN IE6 O" THE "OREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the ?ecision of the #ourt of $ppeals dated $pril 20,

    1 and its )esolution dated ?ecember 17, 1 are hereb!A""IR!ED.

    ERLINDA A. AGAPA, petitioner; s. CARLINA FCORNELIA . PALANG %n HER!INIA P. DELACR, respondents.

    D E C I S I O N

    RO!ERO, J.#

    efore us is a petition for review of the decision of the #ourt of $ppeals in #$'(.). #* +o. 21 entitled

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    5n ul! 11, 1"1, #arlina ;alang and her daughter Ierminia ;alang de la #ru, herein private respondents

    instituted the case at bar, an action for recover! of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the

    )egional -rial #ourt in Brdaneta, ;angasinan %#ivil #ase +o. B'26&. ;rivate respondents sought to get bac the

    riceland and the house and lot both located at inalonan, ;angasinan allegedl! purchased b! iguel during his

    cohabitation with petitioner.

    ;etitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered b! -#- +o. 101736 is registered in their

    names %iguel and elipe, inalonan, ;angasinan, under -#- +o. 101736 in the name of iguel

    ;alang, provided that the former %Qristopher& e/ecutes, within 1 da!s after this decision becomes final and e/ecutor!, a

    8uit'claim forever renouncing an! claims to annulJreduce the donation to Ierminia ;alang de la #ru of all con4ugalproperties of her parents, iguel ;alang and #arlina *allesterol ;alang, dated 5ctober 30, 17, otherwise, the estate of

    deceased iguel ;alang will have to be settled in another separate action@

    & +o pronouncement as to damages and attorne!s fees.

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    +o pronouncement as to costs.F7G

    Ience, this petition.

    ;etitioner claims that the #ourt of $ppeals erred in not sustaining the validit! of two deeds of absolute sale covering

    the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of iguel ;alang and u'-on o/one7, +oe+'7 o+ -nu'+7 shall be owned b! them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. t mustbe stressed that actual contribution is re8uired b! this provision, in contrast to $rticle 17 which states that efforts in the

    care and maintenance of the famil! and household, are regarded as contributions to the ac8uisition of common propert!

    b! one who has no salar! or income or wor or industr!. f the actual contribution of the part! is not proved, there will beno co'ownership and no presumption of e8ual shares.FG

    n the case at bar,

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    >urthermore, it is immaterial that iguel and #arlina previousl! agreed to donate their con4ugal propert! in favor of

    their daughter Ierminia in 17. -he trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their compromise agreement in

    effect partaes the nature of 4udicial confirmation of the separation of propert! between spouses and the termination of the

    con4ugal partnership.F12G Separation of propert! between spouses during the marriage shall not tae place e/cept b!

     4udicial order or without 4udicial conferment when there is an e/press stipulation in the marriage settlements. F13G -he

     4udgment which resulted from the parties compromise was not specificall! and e/pressl! for separation of propert! and

    should not be so inferred.

    With respect to the house and lot,

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    CARPIO, J.%

    -he #ase

    -his petition for review on certiorar i1 assails the 16 arch 2012 ?ecision2 and the 2" une 2012 )esolution3 of the #ourt

    of $ppeals %#$& in #$'(.). #* +o. 322. -he #$ affirmed the 26 September 200" 5rder  of the )egional -rial #ourt of

    +asugbu, atangas, ranch 1 %)-#&, in #ivil #ase +o. 7"7.

    -he >acts

    5n 7 September 1", petitioner uan Sevilla Salas, r. %Salas& and respondent ilinvest@ %2& cash amounting to;200,000.00@ and %3& motor

    vehicles, specificall! Ionda #it! and -o!ota -amaraw >%collectivel!, RWaived ;ropertiesR&. -hus, Salas contended that

    the con4ugal properties were deemed partitioned.

    -he )uling of the )egional -rial #ourt

    n its 26 September 200" 5rder, the )-# ruled in favor of $guila. -he dispositive portion of the 5rder reads:

    32

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    Salas sees a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution:

    1. -he #ourt of $ppeals erred in affirming the trial court=s decision ordering the partition of the parcels of land

    covered b! -#- +os. +'22'$ and +'27 in Aueon #it! and as well as the propert! in anila covered b!

    -#- +o. 23373 between petitioner and respondent.

    2. -he #ourt of $ppeals erred in affirming the trial court=s decision in not allowing )ubina #. #orte to intervene in

    this case1"

    -he )uling of the #ourt

    -he petition lacs merit.

    Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this #ourt cannot order a division of the propert!, unless it first

    maes a determination as to the e/istence of a co'ownership.1 -hus, the settlement of the issue of ownership is the f irst

    stage in this action.20

    asic is the rule that the part! maing an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it b! a preponderance of

    evidence.21 Salas alleged that contrar! to $guila=s petition stating that the! had no con4ugal propert!, the! actuall!

    ac8uired the Waived ;roperties during their marriage. Iowever, the )-# found, and the #$ affirmed, that Salas failed to

    prove the e/istence and ac8uisition of the Waived ;roperties during their marriage:

     $ perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted b! FSalasG as the properties allegedl! registered in the name

    of F$guilaG are merel! photocopies and not certified true copies, hence, this #ourt cannot admit the same as part of the

    records of this case. -hese are the following:

    %1& -#- +o. -'6"76 L a parcel of land located at ;oblacion, +asugbu, atangas, registered in the name of actual findings of the )-#,

    particularl! if affirmed b! the #$, are binding on us, e/cept under compelling circumstances not present in this case.2

    34

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    5n Salas= allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend the hearing of $guila=s manifestation, we

    find the allegation untenable. -he essence of due process is opportunit! to be heard. We hold that Salas was given such

    opportunit! when he filed his opposition to the manifestation, submitted evidence and filed his appeal.

    5n both Salas and )ubina=s contention that )ubina owns the ?iscovered ;roperties, we liewise find the contention

    unmeritorious. -he -#-s state that Ruan S. Salas, married to )ubina #. SalasR is the registered owner of the ?iscovered

    ;roperties. $ -orrens title is generall! a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a

    strong presumption that it is valid and regularl! issued.2 -he phrase Rmarried toR is merel! descriptive of the civil status of

    the registered owner .

    26

     >urthermore, Salas did not initiall! dispute the ownership of the ?iscovered ;roperties in hisopposition to the manifestation. t was onl! when )ubina intervened that Salas supported )ubina=s statement that she

    owns the ?iscovered ;roperties.

    #onsidering that )ubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the ?iscovered ;roperties, she has no right to

    intervene in this case. -he )ules of #ourt provide that onl! Ra person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or

    in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversel! affected b! a

    distribution or other disposition of propert! in the custod! of the court or of an officer thereof ma!, with leave of court, be

    allowed to intervene in the action.R27

    n ?iUo v. ?iUo,2" we held that $rticle 17 of the >amil! #ode applies to the union of parties who are legall! capacitated

    and not barred b! an! impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under $rticle 36

    of the >amil! #ode, as in this case. $rticle17 of the >amil! #ode provides:

     $)-. 17. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marr! each other, live e/clusivel! with each other as

    husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned b!

    them in e8ual shares and the propert! ac8uired b! both of them through their wor or industr! shall be governed b! the

    rules on co'ownership.

    n the absence of proof to the contrar!, properties ac8uired while the! lived together shall be presumed to have been

    obtained b! their 4oint efforts, wor or industr!, and shall be owned b! them in e8ual shares. >or purposes of this $rticle, a

    part! who did not participate in the ac8uisition b! the other part! of an! propert! shall be deemed to have contributed

     4ointl! in the ac8uisition thereof if the former=s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the famil! and of the

    household.

    +either part! can encumber or dispose b! acts inter vivos of his or her share in the propert! ac8uired during cohabitation

    and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

    When onl! one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the part! in bad faith in the co'ownership

    shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. n case of default of or waiver b! an! or all of the common children or

    their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. n the absence of

    descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent part!. n all cases, the forfeiture shall tae place upon termination of

    the cohabitation. %

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    G.R. No. 1492 O&'o>e+ 20, 2014

    !ARIETTA N. BARRIDO, ;etitioner,vs.

    LEONARDO . NONATO, )espondent.

    ? < # S 5 +

    PERALTA, J.%

    >or the #ourtKs resolution is a ;etition for )eview filed b! petitioner arietta +. arrido 8uestioning the ?ecision1of the

    #ourt of $ppeals %#$&, dated +ovember 16, 2006, and its )esolution2 dated anuar! 2, 2007 in #$'(.). S; +o. 0023.

    -he #$ affirmed the ?ecision3 of the )egional -rial #ourt %)-#& ofacolod #it!, ranch 3, dated ul! 21, 200, in #ivil

    #ase +o. 03'12123, which ordered the partition of the sub4ect propert!.

    -he facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: n the course of the marriage of respondent 9eonardo *. +onato and

    petitioner arietta +. arrido,the! were able to ac8uire a propert! situated in amil! #ode. t ruled in

    this wise:

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    %1& to e8uitabl! partition the house and lot covered b! -#- +o. -'10361@

    %2& to reimburse oseph )a!mund and oseph 9eo +onato of the amount advanced b! them in pa!ment of the

    debts and obligation of -#- +o. -'10361 with ;hilippine +ational an@

    %3& to deliver the presumptive legitimes of oseph )a!mund and oseph 9eo +onato pursuant to $rticle 1 of the

    >amil! #ode.

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    %;0,000.00& e/clusive of interest, damages of whatever ind, attorne!Ks fees, litigation e/penses and costs: ;rovided,

    -hat value of such propert! shall be determined b! the assessed value of the ad4acent lots. %as amended b! ).$. +o.

    761&

    Iere, the sub4ect propert!=s assessed value was merel! ;",0"0.00, an amount which certainl! does not e/ceed the

    re8uired limit of ;20,000.00 for civil actions outside etro anila tofall within the 4urisdiction of the -##. -herefore, the

    lower court correctl! too cogniance of the instant case.

    -he records reveal that +onatoand arrido=s marriage had been declared void for ps!chological incapacit! under $rticle3610 of the >amil! #ode. ?uring their marriage, however, the con4ugal partnership regime governed their propert!

    relations. $lthough $rticle 1211 provides for the

    procedure in case of dissolution of the con4ugal partnership regime, $rticle 17 specificall! covers the effects of void

    marriages on the spouses= propert! relations. $rticle 17 reads:

     $rt. 17. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marr! each other, live e/clusivel! with each other as husband

    and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned b! them in

    e8ual shares and the propert! ac8uired b! both of them through their wor or industr! shall be governed b! the rules on

    co'ownership.

    n the absence of proof to the contrar!, properties ac8uired while the! lived together shall be presumed tohave been

    obtained b! their 4oint efforts, wor or industr!, and shall beowned b! them in e8ual shares. >or purposes of this $rticle, a

    part! who did not participate in the ac8uisition b! the other part! of an! propert! shall be deemed to have contributed

     4ointl! in the ac8uisition thereof if the formerKs efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the famil! and of the

    household.

    +either part! can encumber or dispose b! acts inter vivos of his or her share in the propert! ac8uired during cohabitation

    and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

    When onl! one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the part! in bad faith in the co'ownership

    shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. n case of default of or waiver b! an! or all of the common children or

    their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. n the absence ofdescendants, such share shall belong to the innocent part!.6&p#i n all cases, the forfeiture shall tae place upon

    termination of the cohabitation.

    -his particular ind of co'ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impedimentto marr! each

    other, e/clusivel! live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.12 t is clear,

    therefore, that for $rticle 17 to operate, the man and the woman: %1& must be capacitated to marr! each other@ %2& live

    e/clusivel! with each other as husband and wife@ and %3& their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is

    void. Iere, all these elements are present.13 -he term RcapacitatedR inthe first paragraph of the provision pertains to the

    legal capacit! of a part! to contract marriage.1 $n! impediment to marr! has not been shown to have e/isted on the part

    of either +onato or arrido. -he! lived e/clusivel! with each other as husband and wife. Iowever, their marriage was

    found to be void under $rticle 36 of the >amil! #ode on the ground of ps!chological incapacit!.1

    Bnder this propert! regime, propert! ac8uired b! both spouses through their wor and industr! shall be governed b! the

    rules on e8ual coownership. $n! propert! ac8uired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained

    through their 4oint efforts. $ part! who did not participate in the ac8uisition of the propert! shall be considered as having

    contributed to the same 4ointl! if said part!Ks efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the famil!

    household.16 

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    n the analogous case of *alde,1" it was liewise averred that the trial court failed to appl! the correct law that should

    govern the disposition of a famil! dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initiobecause of

    ps!chological incapacit! on the part of either or both parties in the contract of marriage.-he #ourt held that the court a

    8uodid not commit a reversible error in utiliing $rticle 17 of the >amil! #ode and in ruling that the former spouses own

    the famil! home and all their common propert! in e8ual shares, as well as in concluding that, in the li8uidation and

    partition of the propert! that the! owned in common, the provisions on coownership under the #ivil #ode should aptl!

    prevail.1 -he rules which are set up to govern the li8uidation of either the absolute communit! or the con4ugal partnership

    of gains, the propert! regimes recognied for valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the li8uidation of the co'

    ownership that e/ists between common'law spousesor spouses of void marriages.

    20

    Iere, the former spouses both agree that the! ac8uired the sub4ect propert! during the subsistence of their marriage.

    -hus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained b! their 4oint efforts, wor or industr!, and shall be 4ointl! owned b! them

    in e8ual shares. arrido, however, claims that the ownership over the propert! in 8uestion is alread! vested on their

    children, b! virtue of a ?eed of Sale. ut aside from the title to the propert! still being registered in the names of the

    former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notariation of a notar! public. t must be noted that without the

    notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document,21 maing it inadmissible

    in evidence unless properl! authenticated.22 Bnfortunatel!, arrido failed to prove its due e/ecution and authenticit!. n

    fact, she merel! anne/ed said ?eed of Sale to her position paper. -herefore, the sub4ect propert! remains to be owned in

    common b! +onato and arrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co'ownership.

    WI

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    efore us is a petition for review on certiorar i F1G assailing the ?ecisionF2G of the #ourt of $ppeals dated a! 31, 2000 in #$'

    (.). S; +o. 61, entitled SBS$+ )$)

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    / / /

     

    A: When !ou were able to find the source, incidentall! what was the source of that scentE

     $: When stand b! the window, sir, saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of m! sister %and

    witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room&.

     

    A: >or the record, rs. Witness, can !ou state the name of that person, if !ou nowE

     $: He - /7 $u>%n, -+, !%?-/o A(:%+e. A: f that a/imo $lvare !ou were able to see, can !ou identif! himE

     $: Hes, sir.

     

    A: f !ou can see him inside the #ourt room, can !ou please point himE

     $: Witness pointing to a person and when ased to stand and ased his name, he gave his name as

    a/imo $lvare.FG

     

    n the course of

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    -he issue for our resolution is whether

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    n 2rdoo vs. a"ui/an,F13G this #ourt held:We thin that the correct rule, which ma! be adopted in this 4urisdiction, is that laid down in Car/il 

    vs. State, 3 $9) 133, 220 ;ac. 6, 2 5l. 31, wherein the court said:

    -he rule that the in4ur! must amount to a ph!sical wrong upon the person is too

    narrow@ and the rule that an! offense remotel! or indirectl! affecting domestic harmon!

    comes within the e/ception is too broad. -he better rule is that, en an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally i$pairs, t#e conju/al relation, it co$es &it#in t#e

    e5ception  to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other e/cept in a

    criminal prosecution for a crime committee %b!& one against the other.

    5bviousl!, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directl! impairs the con4ugal relation between him and his

    wife

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    6HERE"ORE, the ?ecision of the #ourt of $ppeals is A""IR!ED. -he trial court, )-#, ranch 72, alabon #it!, is

    ordered to allow

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    -he court agrees with plaintiff that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not re8uired before the filing of the instant

    case considering that the above'entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the famil!. $s aptl! pointed out in the

    cases cited b! plaintiff, agbaleta v. (FoGnong, 9'03, $pril 2, 177 and ende v. FGiangon, 9'321, 5ctober 2",

    177, if one of the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise had

    been made b! plaintiff before filing the complaint, is not a ground for motion to dismiss.

    nsofar as plaintiff=s pra!er for declaration of default against defendants, the same is meritorious onl! with respect to

    defendants )emedios oreno and the )egister of ?eeds of Qaloocan #it!. $ declaration of default against defendant

    ban is not proper considering that the filing of the otion to ?ismiss b! said defendant operates to stop the running of theperiod within which to file the re8uired $nswer.

    ;etitioner filed a otion for ;artial )econsideration. 10 ;rivate respondent filed his #omment, 11 after which petitioner filed

    its )epl!. 12 -hereafter, private respondent filed his )e4oinder. 13

    5n a! 7, 2002, the )-# issued the second assailed 5rder den!ing petitioner=s otion for ;artial )econsideration. -he

    trial court ruled:

    )eiterating the resolution of the court, dated +ovember ", 2001, considering that the above'entitled case involves parties

    who are strangers to the famil!, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made b!

    plaintiff, is not a ground for a otion to ?ismiss.

     $dditionall!, the court agrees with plaintiff that inasmuch as it is defendant )emedios oreno who stands to be benefited

    b! $rt. 11 of the >amil! #ode, being a member of the same famil! as that of plaintiff, onl! she ma! invoe said $rt.

    11. 1

    / / /

    Ience, the instant ;etition for Certiorari  on the following grounds:

    . ;ublic respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac or in e/cess of 4urisdiction when he ruled that

    lac of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a ground for a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife

    when other parties who are strangers to the famil! are involved in the suit. #orollaril!, public respondent committed graveabuse of discretion amounting to lac or in e/cess of 4urisdiction when he applied the decision in the case of a/baleta v.

    Gonon/  instead of the ruling in the case of e Gu($an v. Genato.

    . ;ublic respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac or in e/cess of 4urisdiction when he ruled that

    a part! who is a stranger to the famil! of the litigants could not invoe lac of earnest efforts toward a compromise as a

    ground for the dismissal of the complaint. 1

     $t the outset, the #ourt notes that the instant ;etition for Certiorari  should have been filed with the #ourt of $ppeals %#$&

    and not with this #ourt pursuant to the doctrine of hierarch! of courts. )eiterating the established polic! for the strict

    observance of this doctrine, this #ourt held in 7eirs of 4ertuldo 7ino/ v. elicor  16 that:

     $lthough the Supreme #ourt, #ourt of $ppeals and the )egional -rial #ourts have concurrent 4urisdiction to issue writs

    of certiorari , prohibition, $anda$us, "uo &arranto, #abeas corpus and in4unction, such concurrence does not give the

    petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. $s we stated in People v. Cuares$a8

    -his #ourtKs original 4urisdiction to issue writs of certiorari  is not e/clusive.