Republic of the Philippines
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA,
petitioner, vs.JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.MENDOZA, J.:This is a petition for
certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic
Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually
specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes.Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives.
They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker
of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority
Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging
violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
"constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount
to a violation of the Constitution.The law originated in the House
of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third
reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996
to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third
reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill.The bicameral conference committee
submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996.
At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of
the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his
sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep.
Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco
objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll
call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of
a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his
motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the
sponsor thereafter proceeded.Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo
registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following
Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique
Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced
that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until
the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened
thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on
November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by
Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:MR.
ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the
conference committee report.THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any
objection to the motion?MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?THE
DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.(Gavel)MR.
ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want
to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished
sponsor.THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for
one minute.(It was 3:01 p.m.)(3:40 p.m., the session was
resumed)THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.MR.
ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is
adjourned until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.(It was 3:40
p.m.)On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress
as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and
by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed
into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.Petitioners claim that there are actually four different
version of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's
interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the
proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep.
Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators of the sound system; (2)
the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription
Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3)
the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription
Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and
(4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners,
the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the
audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13
in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript
certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line 17 appears
only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times;
and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou
better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of
the quorum," which appears in the other versions.Petitioners'
allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is
no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that,
in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit,
without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon
by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this
proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts.Only the
proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners'
principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because
it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these
rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that
"each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker
De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and
spurious.More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in
violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the
House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report
to the House, did not call for the years or nays, but simply asked
for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo
from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule
XIX, 112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question,
"What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's
motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, 4
the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to
act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report
approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123,
and Rule XVIII, 109, 5 the Chair suspended the session without
first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a
point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep.
Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the
session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation
at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the
session.Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified
by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from
formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a
reconsideration.Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the
certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been
properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1
to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other
departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed
membership of the Court.The Solicitor General filed a comment in
behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed
a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the
principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine.
They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine.
Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the
adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of
the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they
implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to
three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all
events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became
R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary
precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere
motion, were faithfully observed.In his supplemental comment,
respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198
is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry
rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering
the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of
Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the
Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal
was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of
petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8After considering the arguments of the
parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.
This case is therefore dismissed.First. It is clear from the
foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure
of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim
that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly
in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.Petitioners
contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules
of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially
enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on
its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision
that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was
invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its
business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite
the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial
review.But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was
a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate,
courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure
to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.'"In United States v. Ballin,
Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of
the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is
no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and
within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any other body or tribunal."In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was
held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of
its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional
restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional
quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety
and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds
in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business,
or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution."In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v.
Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore
entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made
the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not
the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the
courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States
Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid
for noncompliance with rules."In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows:
"The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the
rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary
for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to
its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has
acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an
unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative
department for the court to set aside such action as void because
it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its
own rules of procedure."In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so passed, no
inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have
or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their
procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final
passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We
think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for
non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the
respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or
suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to
follow them."Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule
in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three
readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house
of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency
the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation
of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of
violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that
the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature
because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been
approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this
contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:We have no
constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read
a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate
upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its own
rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The
provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision
for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed
measures. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction,
and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the
legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage
through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the
governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even
though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the
legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no
reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was
actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature,
and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act
of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v.
State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W.
187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill,
54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.We conclude this survey with the useful
summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting
on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of
proceedings. He wrote:Rules are hardly permanent in character. The
prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other
than members of the legislative body the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved. 18In this
case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those
of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look
into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House
have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.Petitioners must realize that
each of the three departments of our government has its separate
sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the
delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due
regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere
comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry
into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must
accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.Second.
Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's
sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under
Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other
branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this
statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to
the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and,
therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before
courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which
arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has
broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to
the political departments to decide, such as those relating to
national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with
political questions such as those which arise in the field of
foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1,
this Court's functionis merely [to] check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion
for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no
power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21If, then,
the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call
for the exercise of our Art. VIII. 1 power.Third. Petitioners claim
that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They
claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when
the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.What happened is
that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The
Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: "There being none, approved." At the same time the Chair
was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . .
. Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to
the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair,
symbolized by its banging of the gavel.Petitioners argue that, in
accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for
the approval of the conference committee report should have been
stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case
is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the
fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.No rule of
the House of Representative has been cited which specifically
requires that in case such as this involving approval of a
conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the
Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approval was by no
means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was
the way the conference committee report on the bills which became
the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee
report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were
approved.In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to
the rules of the House. The point was answered by Majority Leader
Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair
Mr. Tolentino said:Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects
means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here
seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that
if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate,
then the voting comes in.xxx xxx xxxMr. Speaker, a point of order
was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his
attitude is nor on his point of order. I should just like to state
that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the
Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or
constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my
mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying
"Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair
announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was
any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been
proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the
House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial
compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he
can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in
favor and how many are against. 22Indeed, it is no impeachment of
the method to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages,
the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is
the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that
is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our
deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the
constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage
its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of
the problem." 25Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and
the nays ofthe Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances; upon the last and third
readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the
original bill the votes of the members by yeas and nays had already
been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the
process.Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking
reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension
and subsequent adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear,
however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to
settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that
day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that
the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday
of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if
there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he
did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House
shows.ADJOURNMENT OF SESSIONOn motion of Mr. Albano, there being no
objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four
o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.It was
3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)This Journal
was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its
approval except Rep. Lagman.It is thus apparent that petitioners'
predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting
the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted
on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the
passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or
substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to
precedence. 30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep.
Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put
an end to any further consideration of the question. 31Given this
fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that
in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker
of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed,
the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power
as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself
said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts
by Art. VIII. 1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32Here, the matter
complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House
with which the Court should not he concerned. To repeat, the claim
is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had
already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence
of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so
doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34At any
rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier
found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e.,
petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that
day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the
manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did
not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings.
35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to
the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had
been conducted. Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the
conference committee report. 37Fourth. Under the enrolled bill
doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House
and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy
and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno,
joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure,
there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases
[Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies
a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the
Senate.But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary,
this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers
of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule,
this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths
vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had
not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts." 39 This
Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which
embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:The truth is
that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check
at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store
by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a
second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction.
Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The
sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking
the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities
with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent,
careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government. 40This Court has refused to even look into allegations
that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions
which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference
committee:[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures
for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis
than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government. 41It has refused to look into
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill
in violation of Art. VI. 26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42In other
cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was
otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress.The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of
evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text
writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the
following considerations:. . . As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States,
carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively,
with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine,
when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 45To
overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate
the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule
of evidence.Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to
warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a
change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be
assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill
rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and
Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in
the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new
members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.)
Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership
of the Court.Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the
law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of
November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report
on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that
day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution,
Art. VI, 16(4) provides:Each House shall keep a Journal of its
proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present, be entered in the Journal.Each House shall
also keep a Record of its proceedings.The Journal is regarded as
conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other
matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals
have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States
v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy
for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most
permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights
acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law
shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time,
by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already
noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal.
Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for
this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because
the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to
seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real
or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in
excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48
may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the
enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240.
In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume
that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief
that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 49WHEREFORE, the
petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.SO
ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., concurs in the result.
Bellosillo and Panganiban, JJ., took no part.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate OpinionsVITUG, J., concurring:When the 1987
Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the
determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the
Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed, could
not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the
awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The
term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our
jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or
despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent
a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patent
disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the
judgment of Congress under whose province the specific
responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do
otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the internal
affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of
government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended
by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial
deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted
principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches
of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old
rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial
power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction
over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be
deemed to be political questions provided, however, that grave
abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely
political issues is shown to have attended the contested act.All
taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs.
Secretary of Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc.,
235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.ROMERO, J.,
separate opinion:In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal
of the instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent
which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am
somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I cast
today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and
inconsistent with, my firm stance in Tolentino.The landmark case of
Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a
similar challenge to the constitutionality of a significant tax
measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues,
both substantive and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of
which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant
decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely
disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most
especially those touching upon substantive issues. My main
objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on
what I perceived was a substantial breach and disregard by the
Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the
procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill which, in my
opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by
hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the
precept that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement
of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the
position then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to
otherwise sound principles of law which did not, however, fit the
facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much
because I found these principles unwise or obsolete, but rather
because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe
did not call for their application.When I differed from the
majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was very
careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be
discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor
matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not
materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself.
Thus:As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether
or not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the
reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been
"saved" by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no
cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the
enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the
procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their
subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and
phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating more to form
and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and
substance of the law itself .Certainly, courts cannot claim greater
ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules
on legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes
are over facts whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three
readings, or whatever not over the meaning of the constitution.
Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court
to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures
would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.Such a
rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes
in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through
Congress, catching both legislators and the public unawares and
altering the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.This
issue I wish to address forthwith. 4As regards the principle that
the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal
legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually of one
mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's
review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:I wish
to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution which provides that "(j)udicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." We are also guided by the principle that a
court may interfere with the internal procedures of its coordinate
branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5I differed, however, from
the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this
respect, I showed that the introduction of several provisions in
the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the
pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the
conference committee but that the Constitutional proscription
against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise
breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial
review would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution.
This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle
which should have justified the Court in questioning the actuations
of the legislative branch.At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my
continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in the
Tolentino dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I
raised in my dissent would not hold true in the instant
petition.For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House
of Representatives allegedly violated by respondents in the instant
petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct
of the House's business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to
the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the
passage of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's
intervention. Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way
complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced in
Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in
attacking the validity of the law is merely with respect to the
fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively prevented from invoking
the question of quorum and not that the substance thereof offends
constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not now feel
called upon to invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill
theory should not be conclusive as regards "substantive changes in
a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through
Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted under the circumstances
of instant petition.PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:I concur in
the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr.
Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal of the case at bar.
Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged
non-justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as
the applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of
what I perceive as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the
1987 Constitution and the winds of changing time.IWith due respect,
I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are
non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the
principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the
case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules
of procedure by legislators.Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891
case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the issues before the
Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional
rules. 2 It held:xxx xxx xxxThe Constitution, in the same section,
provides, that "each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the
House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:Rule
XV3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names
of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining
the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb.
14, 1890)The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule.
The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and
not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker
or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither
do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a
rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the
courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its
rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode
or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and
it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would
be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to
the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and
in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal.Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to
pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they
are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was
found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental
right; and (3) its method has a reasonable relationship with the
result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did
not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of
the principle of separation of powers.Ballin was followed in 1932
by the case of US v. Smith. 3 In Smith, the meaning of sections 3
and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz:xxx xxx
xxx3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator
voting in the majority may move for a reconsideration on the same
day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next two days
of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a notification of
the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall have been sent
to the President before the expiration of the time within which a
motion to reconsider may be made, the motion to reconsider shall be
accompanied by a motion to request the President to return such
notification to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on a
nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to the
nomination, and shall be a final disposition of such motion.4.
Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be
returned by the Secretary to the President until the expiration of
the time limited for making a motion to reconsider the same, or
while a motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise ordered
by the Senate.It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member
of the Federal Power Commission has been confirmed by the US
Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the US President
who then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate, however,
reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the
President to return its resolution of confirmation. The President
refused. A petition for quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith.
The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction
over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction
although "the question primarily at issue relates to the
construction of the applicable rules, not to their
constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected the Senate
interpretation of its own rules even while it held that it must be
accorded the most sympathetic consideration.xxx xxx xxxSixth. To
place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction
different from that adopted by the Senate itself when the present
case was under debate is a serious and delicate exercise of
judicial power. The Constitution commits to the Senate the power to
make its own rules; and it is not the function of the Court to say
that another rule would be better. A rule designed to ensure due
deliberation in the performance of the vital function of advising
and consenting to nominations for public office, moreover, should
receive from the Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the
reasons, above stated, against the Senate's construction seem to us
compelling. We are confirmed in the view we have taken by the fact,
since the attempted reconsideration of Smith's confirmation, the
Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of
immediate notification to the President as tantamount to
authorizing him to proceed to perfect the appointment.Smith, of
course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls
within the test spelled out in Ballin.Smith was followed by the
1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4 Christoffel testified
before the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of
Representatives. He denied he was a communist and was charged with
perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial
that the committee had no quorum when the perjurious statement was
given. Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's charge
to the members of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they
had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that xxx xxx xxx
. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at
least thirteen members of the said Committee, and that "at least
that number must have been actually and physically present . . . If
such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did meet at
the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947, and
thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them left
temporarily or otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack
of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain there
would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the existence of
that Committee as a competent tribunal provided that before the
oath was administered and before the testimony of the defendant was
given there were present as many as 13 members of that Committee at
the beginning of the afternoon session . . . .
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed
the jury to assume there was a continuous quorum simply because it
was present at the start of the meeting of the Committee. Under the
House rules, a quorum once established is presumed to continue
until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed
jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr.
Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as "what rules the
House had established and whether they have been followed." It
held:xxx xxx xxxCongressional practice in the transaction of
ordinary legislative business is of course none of our concern, and
by the same token the considerations which may lead Congress as a
matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its
committees do not control the issue before us. The question is
neither what rules Congress may establish for its own governance,
nor whether presumptions of continuity may protect the validity of
its legislative conduct. The question is rather what rules the
House has established and whether they have been followed. It of
course has the power to define what tribunal is competent to exact
testimony and the conditions that establish its competency to do
so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that was given it
the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency
were satisfied even though the basis in fact was not established
and in face of a possible finding that the facts contradicted the
assumption.We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute
which defined it. As a consequence of this conviction, petitioner
was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years.
An essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to
inflict such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime
charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of
the crime charged in the instant indictment is the presence of a
competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the
jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee must
consist of a quorum, and we agree with the trial court's charge
that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that there were "actually and physically present" a majority
of the committee.Then to charge, however, that such requirement is
satisfied by a finding that there was a majority present two or
three hours before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face
of evidence indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law
that a quorum need not be present when the offense is committed.
This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of the
Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is
that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of
the crime charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent is
no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a body can be the
instrument of criminal conviction.The minority complained that the
"House has adopted the rule and practice that a quorum once
established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no
quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in effect,
invalidates that rule . . . ." The minority view commanded only the
vote of three (3) justices.The US Supreme Court pursued the same
line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v. United States. 5
Yellin was indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer
questions put to him by a sub-committee of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of
contempt of Congress on four counts. The conviction was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he
assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally
denied his request to be heard in executive session. He alleged
there was a violation of Committee Rule IV which provides that "if
a majority of the Committee or sub-committee, duly appointed as
provided by the rules of the House of Representatives, believes
that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might
endanger national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or
the reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall
interrogate such witness in an executive session for the purpose of
determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such
interrogation thereafter in a public hearing." in a 5-4 decision,
the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:xxx xxx
xxxYellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial
review when he discovers at trial that his rights have been
violated. This is especially so when the Committee's practice leads
witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy
of the Committee's rules, which must be distributed to every
witness under Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation is
that the Committee actually does what it purports to do, adhere to
its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon those rules,
simply because the witness was deceived by the Committee's
appearance of regularity, is not fair. The Committee prepared the
groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's case meticulously. It is not
too exacting to require that the Committee be equally meticulous in
obeying its own rules.It additionally bears stressing that in the
United States, the judiciary has pruned the "political thicket." In
the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed
jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-apportionment of the
Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine,
a tool for maintenance of government order, will not be so applied
as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts cannot reject as
'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action
denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority."In the
Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to
categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This
power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous
power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law
where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by
the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary
vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond
dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political
question defense. Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated
this defense when it provided:xxx xxx xxxThe Supreme Court may
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty
days from its filing.A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.The CONCOM did not
only outlaw the use of the political question defense in national
security cases. To a great degree, it diminished its use as a
shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to
penetrate the shield with the new power to review acts of any
branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 7 I posited the following postulates:xxx xxx xxxSec. 1.
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.Former Chief
Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in the
Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the reach of
judicial power as follows:xxx xxx xxx. . . In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.This is the background of
paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute political question.The
Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court
is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to
deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of
this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of
government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or
wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this
Court against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.It is, however, theorized that this provision
is nothing new. I beg to disagree for the view misses the
significant changes made in our constitutional canvass to cure the
legal deficiencies we discovered during martial law. One of the
areas radically changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is
the imbalance of power between and among the three great branches
of our government the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary.
To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commission strengthened some more the independence of courts. Thus,
it further protected the security of tenure of the members of the
Judiciary by providing "No law shall be passed reorganizing the
Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members." It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.More,
it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the
Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked with screening the list
of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The power of confirming
appointments to the judiciary was also taken away from Congress.
The President was likewise given a specific time to fill up
vacancies in the judiciary ninety (90) days from the occurrence of
the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) days from
the submission of the list of recommendees by the Judicial and Bar
Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further
insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics,
the Supreme Court was given the power to "appoint all officials and
employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law." And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other
branches of government more watertight, it prohibited members of
the judiciary to be ". . . designated to any agency performing
quasi judicial or administrative functions." While the Constitution
strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the powers
of the two other branches of government, especially the Executive.
Notable of the powers of the President clipped by the Constitution
is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim
martial law. The exercise of this power is now subject to
revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the exercise of said power may be reviewed by this Court
in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.The provision
defining judicial power as including the "duty of the courts of
justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government"
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-a-vis the other
branches of government. This provisionwas dictated by our
experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and
more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government.
. . .xxx xxx xxxIn sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the
duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from
passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our
distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what
it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in
stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations
not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The
Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past
that petrifies the present.I urge my brethren in the Court to give
due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision
as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will
not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government
abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it
with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheath the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator
Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of
judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should
not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.IIAgain with due respect, I dissent from the majority
insofar as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the
dismissal of the petition at bar.An enrolled bill is one which has
been duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by the
proper officers of each House and approved by the President. 9 It
is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding
officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received
in due the sanction of the legislative branch of the government,
and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented
to him.The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no
written Constitution controlling the legislative branch of the
government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their
nature as judicial as emanating from the highest tribunal in the
land are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same
veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be
collaterally attacked. 10 In England, the conclusiveness of the
bill was premised on the rationale that "an ad of parliament thus
made is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom
acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended,
dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by
the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it
requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation.
11Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important
mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or
affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in
favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes
validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in
the journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been
compliance with one or more of the constitutional requirements. 12
Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which
holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it
has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however,
can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
that the constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been
violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence
are allowed to be received. 13 Some limit the use of extrinsic
evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 14These variants developed
after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill. The
modern rationale for the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in
Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:xxx xxx xxxThe signing by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate,
in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by
the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is
a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers,
to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due
form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and
that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented
to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and
is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill
not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty
of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon the assurance, and to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.The principle of separation of powers is thus the
principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also
justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult
questions of evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent
the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty
on laws passed by the legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17
"if the validity of every act published as law is to be tested by
examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two houses
of the legislature, there will be an amount of litigation,
difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation,
and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of the law."
The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the
ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to
mistake, if not fraud.These justifications for the enrolled bill
theory have been rejected in various jurisdictions in the United
States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado cited
some of the leading American cases which discussed the reasons for
the withering, if not demise of the enrolled bill theory, viz:xxx
xxx xxxEven in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive
presumption of validity originally attributed to that doctrine has
long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On
the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that "(u)nder
the "enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole
expository of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence
and valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to
inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of
which journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to
furnish the evidence.In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al.,
the Supreme Court of Florida declared(1) While the presumption is
that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative offices and
filed with the secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet
this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from the
legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and
signed by the legislative officers, contains provisions that have
not passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious and
not a part of the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the
case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So.
72, 73:This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the
journals speak they control, and against such proof the enrolled
bill is not conclusive.More enlightening and apropos to the present
controversy is the decision promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs.
Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are
extensively reproduced hereunder.. . . In arriving at our decision
we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a long line of
decisions of this court which created and nurtured the so-called
"enrolled bill" doctrine.xxx xxx xxx[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky
Constitution sets out certain procedures that the legislature must
follow before a bill can be considered for final passage. . . .xxx
xxx xxx. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in
Kentucky, a court may not look behind such a bill, enrolled and
certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if there are
any defects.xxx xxx xxx. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in
question violated this provision, yet the bill was properly
enrolled and approved by the governor. In declining to look behind
the law to determine the propriety of its enactment, the court
enunciated three reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule.
First, the court was reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the
legislature, an equal branch of government. Second, reasons of
convenience prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature
to preserve its records and anticipated considerable complex
litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General
Assembly and expressed a preference for accepting the final bill as
enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the legislature. .
. .xxx xxx xxxNowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or
as a result of judicial whim. There are four historical bases for
the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a "record" and, as such, was
not subject to attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is
one of the three branches of government, the courts, being coequal,
must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid.
(3) When the rule was originally formulated, record-keeping of the
legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing of equities
required that the final act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy.
(4) There were theories of convenience as expressed by the Kentucky
court in Lafferty.The rule is not unanimous in the several states,
however and it has not been without its critics. From an
examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticism
as follows: (1) Artificial presumptions, especially conclusive
ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the
present case) produces results which do not accord with facts or
constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud,
forgery, corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and
electronic record-keeping devices now used by legislatures remove
one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards
the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to
provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government.
In light of these considerations, we are convinced that the time
has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.[2] This court is
not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare decisis.
The maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta movere," which simply
suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb settled points
of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a
nature as to require perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated
in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72
(1941).The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the
question to be decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights
and practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or
the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations
are whether there is clear error and urgent reasons "for neither
justice nor wisdom requires a court to go from one doubtful rule to
another," and whether or not the evils of the principle that has
been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result from
a change.Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not
grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been
discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with
it the rule it supports.[3] It is clear to us that the major
premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor record-keeping of the
legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are
the rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape recorders,
electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording equipment,
printing presses, computers, electronic voting machines, and the
like remove all doubts and fears as to the ability of the General
Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible records.It is also
apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate in today's
modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the number
and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if one is
mindful that the overriding purpose of our judicial system is to
discover the truth and see that justice is done. The existence of
difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit and we
reject any doctrine or presumption that so provides.Lastly, we
address the premise that the equality of the various branches of
government requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failing
and other errors of our copartners in government. We simply do not
agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that any
law contrary to the constitution is "void." The proper exercise of
judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which is
unconstitutional and to declare it void. Without elaborating the
point, we believe that under section 228 of the Kentucky
Constitution it is our obligation to "support . . . the
Constitution of the commonwealth." We are sworn to see that
violations of the constitution by any person, corporation, state
agency or branch or government are brought to light and corrected.
To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices
when confronted with violations of our constitution is not
acceptable to this court.We believe that a more reasonable rule is
the one which Professor Sutherland describes as the "extrinsic
evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a prima facie
presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption
may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
establishing that constitutional requirements have not been met.We
therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases
following the so-called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that
there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill
is valid. . . .Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys
its once unassailable respectability in United States. Sutherland
reveals that starting in the 1940's,". . . the tendency seems to be
toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the
adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption
of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative source of
information." 19It is high time we re-examine our preference for
the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v.
Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting,
first embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In
1963, we firmed up this ruling in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez, 21 thus:xxx xxx xxxHence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a
finished product which is patently distinct and different from
"urea" and "formaldehyde," as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde."
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the term "urea"
and "formaldehyde," and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements
in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea
formaldehyde," not the latter as a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof. But said individual statements do not necessarily
reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the
intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate
Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs.
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961];
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games and Amusement Board, L-12727
[February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that enrolled
bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President
(Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14,
1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive on which we cannot speculate without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.In the 1969 case of
Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled
bill doctrine, viz:. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to
discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and
credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the
official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would
be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to
determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-making,
with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative
process. The investigation which the petitioner would like this
Court to make can be better done in Congress. After all, House
cleaning the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be
suggested by the petitioner can best be effected by the occupants
thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the
attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock
Holmes.Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness
rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed:By what
we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as
holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled
bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To
what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a
failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question
which we do not now decide. All we hold is that with respect to
matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.In the 1974
case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled
bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after the Senate
President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We
ruled:xxx xxx xxxPetitioner's argument that the attestation of the
presiding offices of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal
department of the government, is neutralized in this case by the
fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill
to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the
invalidation for his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration
should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it
invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact
and indisputable in logic.As far as Congress itself is concerned,
there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The
law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by
both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of
the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In
other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures
of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935)
Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes law, be presented to the President." In Brown vs.
Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same
"makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage
and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is
not attested by the presiding officer, the proof that it has
'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional
requirement.Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is
not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate
President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean
that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the
validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No.
4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue.
It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of
the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity
of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a
case the entries in the journal should be consult