34
Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 , G.R. No. 83988, September
29, 1989G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR
PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP),petitioners,vs.GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND,respondents.Ricardo C.
Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.PADILLA,J.:This is a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and
the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to
direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the
implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the
people.Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as
citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila;
while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights
(ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association whose members are all
members of the IBP.The factual background of the case is as
follows:On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility
and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region.1As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.Petitioners aver that,
because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of
the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars
and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety
increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply
officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down
allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for
ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and
for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the
air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he
had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car
subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search
warrant.Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give
the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or
seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution;2and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while
not killed, had been harassed.Petitioners' concern for their safety
and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints
as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to
show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military
indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against
unlawful search and seizure or other rights.In a case filed by the
same petitioner organization,Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police,3it was held
that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their
rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real
parties in interest.The constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those
whose rights have been infringed,4or threatened to be infringed.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in
anyparticular caseis purely a judicial question, determinable from
a consideration of the circumstances involved.5Petitioner
Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been
stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military
manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right
against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable
the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's
right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case.6Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds,7or simply looks into a vehicle,8or flashes a light
therein,9these do not constitute unreasonable search.The setting up
of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other
areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC
to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense
and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In
this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so
clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance
of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic
conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at
the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of
the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and
an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
howeverreasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.True, the
manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by
the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power
is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community.Finally, on 17 July 1988, military
and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and
a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police
and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National
Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police
Director.10WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988
September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
D E C I S I O NPADILLA,J.:I.THE FACTSOn 20 January 1987, the
National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive
to the social, economic and political development of the National
Capital Region.As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila,and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For
Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought thedeclaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the
alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the
National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the
protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the
checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of
the Constitution.
II.THE ISSUEDo the military and police checkpoints violate the
right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures?
III.THE RULING[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the
petition.]NO,military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the
right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures.xxx.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or
simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do
not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit
of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of
public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings
in cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to
mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise
in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which
are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating
economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times.Between the inherent
right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search
which is howeverreasonablyconducted, the former should
prevail.True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that
all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But,at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.FIRST DIVISION
185 SCRA 665G.R. No. 76005. April 23, 1993.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.RODELIO C. EXALA, RESTITUTO B.
BOCALAN and JAIME P. FERNANDEZ, accused, RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN,
accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Amador E. Mostajo and Presbiterio Velasco, Jr. for accused
-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; "STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT A
MILITARY OR POLICE CHECKPOINT, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WHICH HAS
BEEN UPHELD, IS ONE OF THE INSTANCES WHERE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CAN
BE EFFECTED WITHOUT PRIOR ARREST OR WARRANT. There are indeed
instances where search and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be
the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already been upheld
by this Court. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these
checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few
questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is
because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief
of those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a
law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been
instruments in the commission of an offense. However, lest it be
misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with the
general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his
person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except by
virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest.
The case before Us is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful
"stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.
2. ID.; ID.; THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
MAY BE WAIVED, AS IN THIS CASE. Their submissive stance after the
discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any
protest on their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubt
on their professed innocence but also confirms their acquiescence
to the search. Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against
unreasonable search and seizure. In one case We held ". . . When
one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of
his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining
thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p.
361). The right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either
expressly or impliedly."
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST MADE UPON DISCOVERY
OF ACT OF DISPATCHING IN TRANSIT OR TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA IN
VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED, IS LAWFUL AND
REQUIRES NO WARRANT; AN INSTANCE OF WARRANTLESS ARREST UNDER SEC.
5, PAR. (A), RULE 113, 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AS
AMENDED. The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it
was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in their
possession. There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made
while a crime was committed. This is one of the situations
envisioned by Sec. 5, par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, when a warrantless arrest may be
made. The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit
or transporting marijuana, in violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A.
6425, as amended.
4. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT OF FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS BY TRIAL COURT
RELATIVE TO CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; CASE AT BAR. Factual
conclusions by the trial court relative to the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and are generally sustained
by the appellate court unless some material facts have been
overlooked or misconstrued as to affect the result. There is none
in this case on appeal.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; OBJECTION ON THE LEGALITY OF SEARCH AND
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN THE COURSE OF SEARCH IS
WAIVED WHEN NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, AND THE COURT IS
BOUND TO ADMIT THE EVIDENCE. We turn to the legal question on the
admissibility of the marijuana as evidence in the light of
Bocalan's contention that it was seized without a valid search
warrant. Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest,
Bocalan argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This
issue was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan never
objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the ground that
the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is
deemed to have waived his objection on the legality of the search
and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course
thereof. In view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit
evidence.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; MATERIALITY OF OWNERSHIP OF PROHIBITED DRUG IN
A PROSECUTION FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS
AMENDED. Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused is
charged with the unlawful transportation of marijuana. Section 4,
Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not require that one be the
owner of the prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted for
dispatching in transit or transporting a prohibited drug.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT AN
ORDINARY CHECKPOINT IS ILLEGAL FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS
ENVISIONED IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS. I do not agree that in the
interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may be stopped at
any time by the authorities and searched without warrant on the
chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That
possibility is not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill of
Rights. In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even
any suspicion to justify the search. The search is made as a matter
of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing
that a crime is about to be committed, is actually being committed,
or has just been committed and the searching officer has personal
knowledge that the person being searched or arrested is the culprit
. . . I realize that this view would result in the inadmissibility
of the seized marijuana as evidence against the petitioner and in
his inevitable acquittal. But as I have always maintained, we
cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the
justification that, after all, the articles seized are illegal.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J p:
The admissibility of the evidence seized from the accused at a
checkpoint after being stopped for routine inspection is put to
test in this appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite City finding inter alia accused-appellant Restituto B.
Bocalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art.
II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as "The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972."
On 2 November 1982, at about 8:15 in the evening, a private jeep
driven by accused-appellant Restituto B. Bocalan was stopped at a
police checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection regarding
unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items. With Bocalan were
his co-accused Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala. Pfc.
Ricardo Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep
and asked the occupants if there were firearms inside. They
answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the
vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He noticed a black leather
bag measuring about one (1) foot wide and two (2) feet long with
its sides bulging. He asked what it contained. There was deadening
silence. Nobody answered. Instead, the three (3) accused, Restituto
B. Bocalan, Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala, suddenly
became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened. He
found what he excitedly described as "marijuana, marijuana,
napakaraming marijuana!" At this juncture, the three (3) remained
motionless in their seats and appeared petrified with fear. They
were brought to the police station that same night for further
investigation. 2
After laboratory examination, the bag was verified to contain
more than two (2) kilos of Indian hemp otherwise known as
marijuana. 3
Thereafter, Rodelio C. Exala, Restituto B. Bocalan and Jaime P.
Fernandez were accordingly charged for violation of Sec. 4, Art.
II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
After trial, Bocalan was held guilty as principal and sentenced
to life imprisonment. A fine of P25,000.00 was also imposed. 4 The
other two (2) were convicted as accomplices and received lighter
penalties. Fernandez appealed to the Court of Appeals. Exala did
not.
Bocalan, whose punishment is reviewable only by this Court, is
now before Us assailing his conviction; hence, We deal only with
him in this appeal.
Appellant Bocalan seeks exculpation by imputing ownership of the
bag to Exala alone. 5 Bocalan claims that while on the way to
Cavite City, he and Fernandez offered Exala a ride. Exala accepted
the offer and requested Bocalan to make a detour to Salitran,
Dasmarias, Cavite, where he was to pick up some clothes. They
agreed and Exala got the bag which he kept beside him all the time
until their apprehension at the checkpoint. 6
Bocalan further contends that the trial court erred in admitting
the bag as evidence against him since it was obtained through a
warrantless search. The protestations of Bocalan are devoid of
merit. We agree with the trial court that the conduct of Bocalan
was not only unusual but also contrary to normal human experience.
8 He alleged that he knew Exala only by face and had no personal
association with him; 9 yet, on that eventful day of 2 November
1982, he agreed to detour to Salitran which was some fifteen (15)
to twenty (20) kilometers out of his way. Thus, his contention that
it was Exala who owned the bag containing the marijuana is hardly
credible.
On the other hand, Exala declared that it was he who did not
know the contents of the bag as it was already in the jeep when he
boarded it. Exala asserted that it was either Bocalan or Fernandez
who owned the bag. Exala swore that Bocalan and Fernandez offered
him P5,000.00, later raised to P10,000.00, to take the blame alone,
but he refused. 10
Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged
with the unlawful transportation of marijuana. 11 Section 4, Art.
II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not require that one be the
owner of the prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted for
dispatching in transit or transporting a prohibited drug. The law
simply provides thus
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to
thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed."
Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence to prove that Bocalan
was directly involved in the unlawful dispatch in transit or
transport of marijuana. The evidence of the prosecution,
particularly the testimonies of Pfc. Ricardo Galang and Pat.
Rosauro de Guzman, belies the defense of Bocalan and establishes
beyond cavil that he was caught in flagrante delicto of
transporting the prohibited drug; that he was the driver of the
jeep owned by his father that carried the stuff; and, that he was
in fact the owner of the bag. The trial court noted that Bocalan
picked up Fernandez and Exala one after the other to accompany him
to the place where the bag of marijuana was taken and to help him
bring the marijuana to Cavite City. 12 Regardless of the degree of
participation of Fernandez and Exala, Bocalan is correctly punished
for his direct involvement in the crime.
Such factual conclusions by the trial court relative to the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and are
generally sustained by the appellate court unless some material
facts have been overlooked or misconstrued as to affect the result.
13 There is none in this case on appeal.
We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the
marijuana as evidence in the light of Bocalan's contention that it
was seized without a valid search warrant. Since the search was
conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not
incident to a lawful arrest.
This issue was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan
never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the ground
that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently,
he is deemed to have waived his objection on the legality of the
search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course
thereof. 14 In view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the
evidence. 15 But even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver,
still appellant's contention deserves scant consideration.
There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. 16 An
illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at
military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has
already been upheld by this Court. 17 Vehicles are generally
allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped
and extensively searched it is because of some probable cause which
justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an
offense. 18 However, lest it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not
intended to do away with the general rule that no person shall be
subjected to search of his person, personal effects and belongings,
or his residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the
occasion of a lawful arrest. 19 The case before Us is an incident
to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or
police checkpoint.
The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with
"Operational Bakal" the main object of which was to search for
unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of
unauthorized persons passing through it. 20 When the jeep carrying
the contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down
and the occupants were asked routine questions. In the course
thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the sides of which
were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of
the accused answered. At that moment, the demeanor of the accused
changed; they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were
concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly appeared
to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar
apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused, which
did not appear normal, provided the probable cause justifying a
more extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and the
discovery of the prohibited stuff. Significantly, there was no sign
of any protest or objection to the search. The accused remained
silent even after their arrest.
Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of
marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their part when
arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their professed
innocence 21 but also confirms their acquiescence to the search. 22
Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure. 23 In one case 24 We held
". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to
have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed.,
Vol. I, p. 361). The right to be secure from unreasonable search
and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly" (emphasis supplied).
The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was
made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in their possession.
There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime
was committed. This is one of the situations envisioned by Sec. 5,
par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, when a warrantless arrest may be made. 25 The accused were
caught in the act of dispatching in transit or transporting
marijuana, in violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as
amended.
The alleged contradiction between the sworn statements of Pfc.
Galang and Pat. de Guzman was explained in their separate
testimonies and, in any event, has been resolved by the trial court
as a factual issue. We find no reason to reverse its findings.
Anent the argument that the three (3) accused should not have
been assigned different levels of liability, suffice it to say that
whether a principal, co-principal or conspirator, accused-appellant
would have been meted out the same penalty imposed by the trial
court.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision
appealed from finding accused-appellant RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the same is AFFIRMED,
with costs against him.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent, for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinions
in Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665/178 SCRA 211, and People v.
Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, and the following additional
observations.
I am opposed to checkpoints as regular police measures aimed at
reducing criminality in general. I do not agree that in the
interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may be stopped at
any time by the authorities and searched without warrant on the
chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That
possibility is not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill of
Rights.
In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any
suspicion to justify the search. The search is made as a matter of
course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing
that a crime is about to be committed, is actually being committed,
or has just been committed and the searching officer has personal
knowledge that the person being searched or arrested is the
culprit.
I will concede that checkpoints may be established at borders of
states or at "constructive borders" near the boundary for the
purpose of preventing violations of immigration and customs laws.
But in the interior of the territory, the requirements of a valid
search and seizure must be strictly observed. The only permissible
exemption is where a crime like a bank robbery has just been
committed or a jailbreak has just occurred, and the authorities
have to seal off all possible avenues of escape in the area. In all
other cases, I submit that the checkpoint should not be
allowed.
I realize that this view would result in the inadmissibility of
the of the seized marijuana as evidence against the petitioner and
in his inevitable acquittal. But as I have always maintained, we
cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the
justification that, after all, the articles seized are illegal.
That is putting the cart before the horse. I would rather see some
criminals go unpunished now and then than agree to the Bill of
Rights being systematically ignored in the oppressive checkpoint.
Respect for the Constitution is more important than securing a
conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused.
GUANZON v. DE VILLAG.R. No. 8050830 January 1990
PONENTE:Gutierrez, Jr., J.
PARTIES:1. PETITIONERS:EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA
DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES,
GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD
ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN,
VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO,
ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA
ESTARES, BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO
GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO,
LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA.
RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO,
ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN and JAIME
BONGAT
2. RESPONDENTS:MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL.
JESUS GARCIANATURE:Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
InjunctionPROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:Supreme Court:Original Petition for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
FACTS:
The forty one (41) petitioners, claiming to represent the
citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before th[e]
Court, filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
to prohibit the military and police officers from conducting Aerial
Target Zonings or Saturation Drives in Metro Manila. In their
petition, they claim that the saturation drive or aerial target
zoning that were conducted in Tondo, Manila were unconstitutional.
To support such claim, they specifically alleged that there is no
specific target house to be search and that there is no search
warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in
their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification
cards. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by banging
on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the
point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered
to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their
tattoo marks. The petitioners claim that in all these drives, the
following acts were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the
night or early morning hours, police and military units without any
search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one
residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in
Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian clothes and without
nameplates or identification cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by
banging on the walls and windows of their homes, shouting, kicking
their doors open (destroying some in the process), and then
ordering the residents within to come out of their respective
residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded
like cows, the men are ordered to strip down to their briefs and
examined for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being
conducted by the raiders, some of the members of the raiding team
force their way into each and every house within the cordoned off
area and then proceed to conduct search of the said houses without
civilian witnesses from the neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the
raiders ransack their homes, tossing about the residents belongings
without total regard for their value. In several instances, walls
are destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the raiders illegal effort
to fish for incriminating evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with
increasing frequency that their money and valuables have
disappeared after the said operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and
unwelcome intrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to
waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are
interrogated and verified. These arrests are all conducted without
any warrants of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor under the
conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded men
are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the
expiration of the period wherein they can be legally detained
without any charge at all. In other instances, some arrested
persons are released without charge after a few days of arbitrary
detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point
them at the residents during these illegal operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spot beatings,
maulings and maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further verification by the
raiders are subjected to mental and physical torture to extract
confessions and tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2 -4)
In their defense, the respondents, represented by the Solicitor
General, alleged that the accusations of the petitioners were total
lies. Respondents contend that the Constitution grants to
government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for
the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning
were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements
coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted.
They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months
ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media
joined the operation to witness and record such event.
PERTINENT ISSUES:1. Whether or not the saturation drives
performed by respondents involved acts which violated human
rights.
2. Whether or not the original action for prohibition is the
proper remedy.ANSWER:1. Yes.
2. No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. ON SATURATION DRIVES AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTSWhen
saturation drives may be conducted without having to secure search
warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights Where there is
large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may
go out in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences or
buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny
or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without
violating the Bill of Rights.
Duty of the court to stop the transgression and encroachment
upon the rights of the individual Where a violation of human rights
specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the
duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where even
the awesome power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of
the individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial action
even in cases such as the present petition where the petitioners do
not complain they were victims of the police actions, where no
names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given, and
where the prayer is a general one to stop all police saturation
drives, as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually
happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were
actually committed. This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of
barangay officials for the thousands of residents to submit
themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification. We
cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the
petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken without
some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain
abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions,
including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong
in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas.
Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do
not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes
necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not
violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the
petitioners would limit all police actions to one-on-one
confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests
against specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign
if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices
because all concerted drives where a show of force is present are
totally prohibited.
2. ON VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND REMEDYThe present petition
is an improper remedy The remedy is not an original action for
prohibition brought through a taxpayers suit. Where not one victim
complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is
not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the
executive departments and for trial courts. Well-meaning citizens
with only second-hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on
indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military,
and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of
all remedies for all evils. The rules of constitutional litigation
have been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of
rights. They should be followed. If our policy-makers sustain the
contention of the military and the police that occasional
saturation drives are essential to maintain the stability of
government and to insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines
on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved,
they should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights
abuses and identifying violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A
high level conference should bring together the heads of the
Department of Justice, Department of National Defense and the
operating heads of affected agencies and institutions to devise
procedures for the prevention of abuses.
No permanent relief can be given Under the circumstances of this
taxpayers suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can
order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through
an orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this
time. Further investigation of the petitioners charges and a hard
look by administration officials at the policy implications of the
prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that
some abuses were probably committed and could be committed during
future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged
banging on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of
half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks,
the violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of
squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to the
conscience.
DISPOSITIVE:The Supreme Court remanded the petition to the
Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City where the
petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and
where specific erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.
The Supreme Court likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human
Rights, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National
Defense, and the Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary
Integrated National Police for the drawing up and enforcement of
clear guidelines to govern police actions intended to abate riots
and civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and subdue
terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court enjoined the acts violative
of human rights alleged by petitioners as committed during the
police actions until such time as permanent rules to govern such
rules are promulgated.Alvero vs Dizon CaseDigestAURELIO S. ALVERO
vs ARSENIO P. DIZON, et al.,
G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946
FACTS:
The petitioner has been accused of treason; that at the hearing
on his petition for bail, the prosecution presented, as part of its
evidence, certain documents which had been allegedly seized by
soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by Filipino
Guerrillas in the petitioners house. The Petitioner further
contends that the seized documents should be returned as it
obtained by means of force and intimidation or through coercion,
those are not his personal papers but part of the files of the New
Leaders Association, which was proven to be an organization created
for the purpose of collaborating with the enemy. Lastly, the
presentation of the seized documents in the trial is tantamount to
compelling him to testify against himself, in violation of his
constitutional rights.
ISSUES:Whether or not the seized documents are legal?
Whether or not the documents seized should be admitted as
evidence in the trial court?
HELD.No. The petition for Certiorari with Injunction is
absolutely no merit.
RATIONALE:The right of the officer and men of the United States
Army to arrest the petitioner as a collaborationist suspect, and to
seize his personal papers is unquestionable. Also, proclamation of
General Douglas McArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United
States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of
the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the
enemy, in violation of the allegiance.
EXCEPTION:Important exception to the necessity for a Search
Warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a
lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is
being committed or after its commission. The right to search
includes in both instances that of searching the person of him who
is arrested, in order to find and seize things arrested with the
crime as its fruits as the means by which it was committed.
The Petitioner consented to the presentation of the seized
documents, as part of the evidence for the prosecution, at the
hearing in his petition for bail and at the trial of the case on
the merits, without having insisted that the question of the
alleged illegality of the search and seizure of said papers and
documents should first have been directly litigated and established
by a motion.
COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATIONNot violated by the use of evidence
of articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure.
Thus, the petitioner is estopped from questioning their
admission.
PURPOSE: (Adam vs New York)The purpose of the constitutional
provisions against unlawful searched and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful
invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law
acting under legislative and judicial sanction, and to give remedy
against such usurpations when attempted. G.R. No. L-342 May 4,
1946
AURELIO S. ALVERO,petitioner,vs.ARSENIO P. DIZON, ET
AL.,respondent.
Albert and Albert for petitioner.First Assistant Solicitor
General Reyes and Assistant Solicitor General Alvendia for
respondents.DE JOYA,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariwith
injunction originally filed in this court.
In the petition it is alleged that petitioner Aurelio S. Alvero
has been accused of treason, in criminal case No. 3 of the People's
Court; that at the hearing on his petition for bail, the
prosecution presented, as part of its evidence, certain documents
which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States
Army, accompanied by Filipino guerrillas, in the petitioner's
house; that petitioner immediately objected to the presentation of
said documents, and called the attention of the respondent judges
to the fact that he had filed a petition, in which he protested
against the procedure of the government in the seizure of said
documents, and asked for their return to the petitioner; that the
respondents permitted the prosecution to present said documents as
evidence, which were considered, upon the termination of the
presentation of the evidence for both parties, in denying said
petition for bail; that the petition filed on December 1, 1945, for
the return of the documents allegedly seized illegally in
petitioner's house, was not considered by the respondents, before
the commencement of the trial of petitioner's case, on the merits,
due perhaps to an involuntary oversight; that at the commencement
of the trial of said criminal case No. 3, and during its course,
the prosecution again presented, as evidence, against the
petitioner said documents which had been taken from his house, and
petitioner renewed his objection thereto, and asked for their
return to him, alleging that their seizure was illegal and that
their presentation would be tantamount to compelling him to testify
against himself, in violation of his constitutional rights; that in
deciding the question so raised, the respondent judges, in open
court, stated that the prosecution might in the meanwhile continue
presenting said documents, without prejudice to the final
resolution of said petition, when the prosecution should finish
presenting its evidence; that in concluding the presentation of its
evidence and resting the case, after offering said documents as
part of its evidence, the petitioner again raised the question of
the admissibility of said documents, and the respondent judges then
ordered the substantiation of said allegations of petitioner, and
set for hearing his petition for the return of said documents; that
said petition was heard on February 16, 1946, and at said hearing,
the petitioner and his wife testified, without any contradiction
that, on February 12, 1945, on the occasion of the arrest of the
petitioner by soldiers of the United States Army, the latter
searched the house of the petitioner and seized, among other
things, the documents which he had in his house; that when said
petition for the return of said documents was submitted for the
consideration and decision of the respondent judges, the latter, on
February 26, 1946, issued an order denying said petition, and
admitted as competent evidence the documents presented by the
prosecution, marked as Exhibits A, C, G, H, K, L, P, R, R-1, R-2,
U, Z, CC, DD, FF, HH; that on the same date that said order was
issued, denying the petition for the return of said documents,
petitioner asked for the reconsideration of said order, which was
also denied. (Petition, pars. 1-12.)
And herein petitioner now claims that the respondent judges, in
denying the petition for the return of said documents, acted
without jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse in the exercise of
their discretion, alleging that even the seizure of documents by
means of a search warrant legally issued, constitutes a violation
of the rights guaranteed in paragraphs 3 and 18 of section 1 of
Article III of the Constitution, and, consequently, when their
seizure cannot be justified by the corresponding search warrant,
the court should order their immediate return; that the petitioner
has no other speedy and adequate remedy for the protection of his
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, other than this petition
forcertiorari, as the right of appeal granted by law to a person
accused of a crime, is costly and highly prejudicial to the
petitioner, as it presupposes that the prosecution has established
the guilt of the accused by means of legal and competent evidence,
as alleged in the last three (3) paragraphs of the petition.
Consequently, herein petitioner asks for the annulment of the
order issued by the respondent judges, on February 26, 1946, in
said criminal case No. 3, entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Aurelio S. Alvero, the return to him of the documents presented by
the prosecution, mentioned above, and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. .In their answer filed on March 21, 1946,
herein respondents have substantially admitted the allegations made
and contained in the first twelve (12) paragraphs of the petition,
except the portions alleging that the documents in question had
been obtained by means of force and intimidation or through
coercion; and that certain soldiers of the American Army took
certain personal properties of herein petitioner, at the time the
search was made; and that the acquisition of said documents was
manifestly a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights and
that their admission, as evidence for the prosecution, would be
tantamount to compelling petitioner, as accused, to testify against
himself all of which portions have been expressly denied by the
respondents.
Respondents have also expressly denied the allegations contained
in the remaining three (3) paragraphs of the petition.
And as defenses, respondents allege (1) that petitioner himself
has admitted the legality of the seizure of the documents in
question in his motion for reconsideration, dated February 26,
1946; (2) that petitioner has not proven that said documents had
been illegally seized for him; (3) that the seizure of the
documents in question took place, on February 12, 1945, in Pasay,
Rizal, which was then still a combat zone, and that the seizure of
certain papers in the house of the petitioner was made by soldiers
of the United States Army of Liberation or its instrumentalities;
(4) that said seizure was effected lawfully under the terms of the
proclamation of the Commander in Chief of the United States
Liberation Forces, dated December 29, 1944, in which he declared
his purpose to remove alleged collaborators, when apprehended, from
any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines
and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war; (5) that
the documents in question had been properly admitted as evidence
for the prosecution in criminal case No. 3, as herein petitioner,
as accused in said case, had expressly waived his right to object
to their admissibility, particularly Exhibits A, FF, HH and P; (6)
that petitioner's evidence of alleged ownership, relative to
Exhibits C, G, H, K, I, P, R, R-1 and R-2, is altogether
insufficient, and petitioner himself has expressly admitted that
said documents are not his personal papers but part of the files of
the New Leaders' Association, which was proven to be an
organization created, for the purpose of collaborating with the
enemy; (7) and that none of the exhibits referred to in the
petition has been satisfactorily identified by the petitioner as
included among the papers allegedly wrongfully seized from his
house and belonging to him.
Considering the allegations made by the parties in their
respective pleadings, and their supporting papers, as well as the
admissions made therein, the following facts appear to have been
sufficiently established:
(1) That on February 12, 1945, while the battle for Manila was
raging, soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by men of
Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed herein petitioner under arrest,
having been suspected of collaboration with the enemy, and seized
and took certain papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal;
(2) That on or about October 4, 1945, petitioner was accused of
treason, in criminal case No. 3 of the People's Court; after which,
on December 1, 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of
the papers allegedly seized and taken from his house;
(3) That petitioner also filed a petition for bail, at the
hearing of which the prosecution presented certain papers and
documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and said
petition was denied;
(4) That at the trial of the case on the merits, the prosecution
again presented said papers and documents, which were admitted as
part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits, as described in
the petition forcertiorari, filed in this court;
(5) That herein petitioner had failed to object properly to the
admission of said papers and documents at the hearing on said
petition for bail, and at the trial of the case on the merits, in
not having insisted that the question of the legality of the search
and seizure of the papers and documents taken from his house should
have been litigated and finally decided first, and thus practically
waived his objection to their admissibility, as evidence for the
prosecution;
(6) That at the hearing on his petition for the return of the
papers taken from his house, held after they had been admitted as
part of the evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing on the
petition for bail and at the trial of the case on the merits,
herein petitioner had failed to identify satisfactorily the
documents now in question, and his ownership thereof; and
(7) That petitioner himself in his petition for reconsideration,
dated February 26, 1946, admitted the legality the legality of the
seizure of the documents taken from his house, and at the hearing
on his petition for bail, he himself called for some of the
documents in question.
The right of officers and men of the United States Army to
arrest herein petitioner, as a collaborationist suspect, and to
seize his personal papers, without any search warrant, in the zone
of military operations, is unquestionable, under the provisions of
article 4, Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to
the Laws and Customs of War on Land of the Hague Conventions of
1907, authorizing the seizure of military papers in the possession
of prisoners of war (Wilson, International Law, 3d ed., 1939,
p.524); and also under the proclamation, dated December 29, 1944,
issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the
United States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain
citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and
comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance due the
Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, when apprehended, from any position of political and
economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint
for the duration of the war. (41 Off. Gaz., No. 2, pp. 148, 149.)
As a matter of fact, petitioner himself, in his motion for
reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946, expressly admitted the
legality of the seizure of his personal papers and documents at the
time of his arrest.
The most important exception to the necessity for a search
warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a
lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is
being committed or after its commission. The right to search
includes in both instances that of searching the person of him who
is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed.
(Agnello vs. United States, 269 U. S., 20.)
When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found
in his possession or in his control may be seized and used in
evidence against him; and an officer has the right to make an
arrest without a warrant of a person believed by the officer upon
reasonable grounds to have committed a felony. (Carroll vs. United
States, 267 U. S., 132.).
The majority of the states have held that the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, which is also guaranteed by state
constitutional provisions is not violated by the use in evidence of
articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure.
(People vs. Defore, 242 N. Y., 13; 150 N. E., 585.)
It is true that on December 1, 1945, herein petitioner filed a
petition, demanding the return of certain papers and documents
allegedly seized and taken from his house at the time of his
arrest; but when he consented to their presentation, as part of the
evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing on his petition for
bail and at the trial of the case on the merits, without having
insisted that the question of the alleged illegality of the search
and seizure of said papers and documents should first have been
directly litigated and established by a motion, made before the
trial, for their return, he was and should be deemed to have waived
his objection to their admissibility as part of the evidence for
the prosecution; since the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination may be waived. (Weeks vs. United States, 232 U.
S., 383; Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States, 251 U. S., 385;
Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S., 298; People vs. Carlos, 47
Phil., 626, 630, 631.)
At the hearing on his petition for bail, petitioner himself
requested the production of the document marked as Exhibit A, which
was a letter sent by him to Dr. Jose P. Laurel; the document marked
as Exhibit HH, which was a memorandum to Col. Suzuki, dated
December 30, 1944; and the document marked as Exhibit P, which was
a memorandum on Nippongo classes. And he is now, therefore,
estopped from questioning their admission.
Furthermore, petitioner could not properly identify many of said
documents, such as Exhibit FF, nor satisfactorily establish his
ownership thereof; while the prosecution has sufficiently
established the fact that some of the papers now in question, such
as Exhibit C, had been received at the Office of the CIC of the
United States Army in the City of Manila, since February 11, 1945,
that is, one day prior to the seizure of certain papers and
documents in the house of the petitioner. And with reference to
Exhibits C, G, H, K, L, P, R, R-1 and R-2, petitioner himself
admitted that they are not his personal papers but part of the
files of the New Leader's Association. And it is well established
rule in this jurisdiction that in a petition for the production of
papers and documents, they must be sufficiently described and
identified, otherwise the petition cannot prosper. (Liebenow vs.
Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., 39 Phil., 60, 67, 69; Rule 21,
section 1, Rules of Court.)
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security
in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of
the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when
attempted. (Adams vs. New York, 192 U. S., 585.) But it does not
prohibit the Federal Government from taking advantage of unlawful
searches made by a private person or under authority of state law.
(Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 383; Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256
U. S., 465.)
As the soldiers of the United States Army, that took and seized
certain papers and documents from the residence of herein
petitioner, on February 12, 1945, were not acting as agents or on
behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
and that those papers and documents came in the possession of the
authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the Office of
the CIC of the United States Army in Manila, the use and
presentation of said papers and documents, as evidence for the
prosecution against herein petitioner, at the trial of his case for
treason, before the People's Court, cannot now be legally attacked,
on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures, or
on any other constitutional ground, as declared by the Supreme
Court of the United States in similar cases. (Burdeau vs. McDowell,
256 U. S., 465; Gambino vs. United States, 275 U. S., 310.)
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the petition
forcertiorariwith injunction, filed in this case, is absolutely
without merit, and it is, therefore, hereby denied and dismissed
with costs. So ordered.
Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, and Hilado, JJ., and Buenaventura,
Santos, Santiago and T. Santos, JJ., concur.Separate
OpinionsPERFECTO,J.,concurring:
We concur in the decision, but we wish to make of record our
express disagreement with the doctrine as stated in the following
paragraphs of said decision:
The majority of the states have held that the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, which is also guaranteed by state
constitutional provisions is not violated by the use in evidence of
articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure.
(People vs. Defore, 242 N. Y., 13; 150 N. E., 585.).
But it does not prohibit the Federal Government from taking
advantage of unlawful searches made by a private person or under
authority of state law. (Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 383;
Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465.)
We also disagree with the following pronouncement in the other
concurring opinion:.
La traicion implica renuncia y privacion de la garantia contra
irrazonables registros y secuestros, diligencias previas a la
conviccion o absolucion, actuaciones estas finales del proceso.
The theory is erroneous and retrogressive. It violates the
spirit and the letter of the Constitution. There is no reason,
either legal or moral, for depriving an accused of treason of the
benefits of constitutional guarantees. Even those convicted of the
most heinous crimes remain under the pale of the Constitution, and
cannot be punished, including those sentenced to death, except in
accordance with the due process clause of our fundamental law.
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appelleevs.ANDRE
MARTI,accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for
accused-appellant.
BIDIN,J.:pThis is an appeal from a decision*rendered by the
Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b),
Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)
(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as
follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant
and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the
"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley
Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he
was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and
the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and
inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was
placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was
sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment
(Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs
and/or Bureau of Posts,Mr.Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of
Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection.When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom.His curiousity aroused, he squeezed
one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried
leaves inside.Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the
gloves.He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and
took several grams of the contents thereof(tsn, pp. 29-30, October
6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to
the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6,
1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to
the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date,i.e.,
August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics
Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment
was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI
agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita,
Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were
placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top
flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers
from inside the gloves.Dried marijuana leaves were found to have
been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October
6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened
by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or
cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars
(tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and
of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledgingcustodyof the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7,
1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no
avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila
Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the
latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while
claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the
NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried
leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted
the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory
examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana
flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's
Brief, pp. 9-11,Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for
violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act.After trial, the courta quorendered the assailed decision.In
this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to
wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY
SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER
CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION
OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1;Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed
offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore
argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec.
3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter
which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but uponprobablecause,
to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment**to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court
may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme
Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in
this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down inMapp v.Ohio by
the US Federal Supreme Court(367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.
1081 [1961]), this Court, inStonehill v.Diokno(20 SCRA 383 [1967]),
declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a
defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the
ruling earlier adopted inMoncado v.People's Court(80 Phil. 1
[1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by
the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art.
IV) constitutionalized theStonehillruling and is carried over up to
the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.),
Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA
299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales,
145 SCRA 687 [1987];See alsoSalazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR
No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to,
the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State
acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character
since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered
and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that
his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure
has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private
individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State.
As this Court held inVillanueva v.Querubin(48 SCRA 345
[1972]:
1. This constitutional right(against unreasonable search and
seizure)refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government, included in which is his
residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have
the access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle.Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government,
which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling
and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616
[1886]; Emphasis supplied).
InBurdeau v.McDowell(256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed.
1048), the Court there in construing the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful
searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its
protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history
clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such
authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the
citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and
the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by
process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated inState v.Bryan(457 P.2d 661
[1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to
ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the
knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared
admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case ofWalker v.State(429 S.W.2d 121), it
was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon
the government and its agents, not upon private individuals
(citingPeople v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892
(1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen,
Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case ofBernas v.US(373 F.2d 517 (1967).
The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a
private citizen the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed
overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's
own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the
local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it
available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require
exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private
citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental
action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of
the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI
agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on
used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be
clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to
fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily
foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal
search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the
case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of
the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages.
Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure
on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery
of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN,
October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp.
119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing
the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later
summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened
the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the
care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents
made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to
the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look
at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed
that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part
of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202
[1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726
[1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
InGandy v.Watkins(237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held
that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the
specific request of the manager and where the search was initially
made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure
within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land
must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom?
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights
answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental
liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection
against whom?Protection against the state.The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state.Its
concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals.What the Bill of Rights does is to
declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas ,
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17,
1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest
or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935
Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in
the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was
procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's
Brief, p. 8,Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in
laying down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications
introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate
to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrestvis-a-visthe responsibility of the judge in the issuance
thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No.
13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The
modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the
restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure
is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did
not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and
seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree
with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of
the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an absurd
interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an
individual effected through private seizure equally applies, inpari
passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of
appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that
the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact
that his rights under the constitution while under custodial
investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully
examined the records of the case and found nothing to indicate, as
an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the
assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that
accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is
presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See.
5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith
and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is
clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant
refused to give any written statement while under investigation as
testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What
about the accused here, did you investigate the accused together
with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but
the accused availed of his constitutional right not to give any
written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original
Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not
contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As borne out by
the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that
appellant gave uncounselled confession while being
investigated.What is more, we haveexamined the assailed judgment of
the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the
testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which
was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second
assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error,
appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the
packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain
Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along
Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation,
Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00
for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to
leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp.
2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's
disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human
experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a
complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a
man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out
P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to
comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its
contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not
simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the
marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a
complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand,
would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the
packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere
say-so" (Decision, p. 19,Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed
to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative
self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo,
171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering
that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted
of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic
of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the
frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was
likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive
from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8,
1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21;Rollo, p.
93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342
[1968],citingDaggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130;see alsoPeople v.
Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]);
Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show,
appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his
complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the
German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should
have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original
Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as
the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption
that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this
point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial
court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly
Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend
in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and
inspect the packages. She refused and assures her that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.
Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs
and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the
gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to
the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations. The dried
marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the cellophane
wrappers.
The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower
court erred in admitting in evidence the illegalit