Army Chemical Review #1 (2003)

January 2003 1

January 2003THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS

Articles

Departments

Chief of Chemical

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Editor’s Farewell

Submitting an Article to CML

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The Chemical Corps and the Coast Guard—Interoperability in Action

The Chemical Corps and Its Emerging Role in Homeland Security

The Stryker Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV)Vanguard for NBC Transformation

The Chemical Officer’s Critical Role in the Targeting Process

CBRN Defense in the Objective Force:Insights From Army Transformation War Game 2002

A New Decontamination Training Aid

The Battle of Wilson’s Creek—Its Relevancy to Today’s Chemical Officers

The History of Military Mask Filters

Turning a Negative JRTC Chemical Trend Into a Positive

The Future of Decontamination Operations—An Analysis of Decontamination Foam 200

Anthrax Decontamination

All BNCOC Graduates to Get 40 Promotion Points

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Lieutenant Commander Dennis E. Bransonand Petty Officer Jaime Bigelow

Lieutenant Colonel Jon Pool

Lieutenant Colonel Bryan J. McVeigh

Major Pete Lofy

Major Neal Dorroh

Ms. Jocelyn Morris and Mr. James M. Cress

Major Thomas A. Duncan II

Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Walk

Captain Carlos E. Gonzalez

Captain Michael C. Firmin

Captain Lindsey Nagtzaam

Staff Sergeant Marcia Triggs

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BG Patricia L. Nilo

Chief of ChemicalThe Chemical Corps was born out

of the need to protect soldiers from theeffects of new and devastating weaponsused in the trenches of the Western frontduring World War I. Although chemicalwarfare provided a battlefield advantage,it did not prove to be a decisive weaponin the outcome of the Great War. TheChemical Warfare Service (as it was thencalled) equipped and trained the forceswith a fierce resolve. Consequently, theprotective equipment and trainingprovided by the first chemical soldiersproved sufficient to contain the threatposed by the chemical agents employed.

Today, the threat is much broaderthan the chlorine and phosgene used in the early 1900s.Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)warfare is less well defined, more likely in a variety ofgeographic scenarios, and can be the decisive factor inthe outcome of any conflict. CBRN offensive technologiescontinue to advance and proliferate into the hands ofterrorists and rogue nation states, who are more prone toemploy CBRN weapons as a means to tip the balance ofpower than at any point in recent history. However, onething has not changedthat fierce resolve of the DragonWarrior to protect the forces. In the past year and a half,as we recover from the devastation of 9-11 and anthraxletters, I have witnessed tremendous achievements byour Regiment. I continue to be in awe of the talent of thechemical community and the determination with whichevery mission is accomplished. Let me tell you about afew of our great success stories.

Recently, we gained approval of the Installation ForceProtection Operational and Organizational Plan, whichfurther defines the Chemical Corps’s new and expandingrole in force protection and homeland security. This plandelineates the Army’s force protection operationalcapabilities, requirements, and organizational structurerequired to prevent, deter, defend, and respond to aterrorist threat against Army installations.

Chemical doctrine has been even more fully engagedever since Transformation made its debut, and doubly sosince 9-11. More than 75 percent of our current doctrineis under revision. As the list of potential operationalenvironments changes, we must continually adapt ourdoctrinal procedures to deliver responsive support to themaneuver forces and the homeland security mission. Thisyear’s doctrine continues to work with the joint staff andsister services to develop publications at the joint,multiservice, and Army levels.

Within the coming months, you willsee our new capstone Army fieldmanualFM 3-11, NBC DefenseOperations; the latest avoidance andprotection doctrineFMs 3-11.3, NBCContamination Avoidance, and 3-11.4,NBC Protection; and new comprehensivemanuals covering NBC reconnaissanceand biological defenseFMs 3-11.19,NBC Reconnaissance, and 3-11.86,Biological Defense Tactics, Techni-ques, and Procedures. We have workedhard to incorporate doctrinal changes,emerging issues, and technologies intothese manuals. Additionally, we aremoving toward a Web-based doctrine

system where you’ll have quick access to the latestavailable doctrine. Web-basing will also allow doctrinalchanges to keep pace with the changing operationalenvironment and threats. I challenge each of you tocontinue to provide input to these publications and ensurethat we are sending the best information to our soldiers inthe field.

One of our training challenges today is to adapt ourCold-War training management to meet today’s worldenvironment. As the Army transitions to a lighter and morelethal force, we must be able to adapt our training systems.Our training developers are constantly updating andrefining this process in a job where we never get ahead.This is a critical mission to ensure that chemical soldiersmeet the challenges of the contemporary operationalenvironment. Several areas were added to the training ofour newest Dragon Soldiers. These include NBC roomoperations, consequence management, and mass casualtydecontamination training. This new and forward-lookingtraining will produce Dragon Soldiers capable ofsucceeding in any operational environment.

A few more successes in the training arena are theaddition of several courses in support of homeland defense.The Installation Emergency Responder Trainers Courseis designed to provide installation law enforcement,emergency medical services, medical, fire fighting,emergency operations center, and emergency rescuepersonnel the basic skills and knowledge needed to reactto a terrorist chemical, biological, or radiological attack.The Installation Planner’s Course is a one-week coursedesigned to familiarize installation planners, installationoperations center personnel, emergency disaster planningofficers, and emergency response working group memberswith the procedures for preparing an installation to respond

(Continued on page 4)

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CSM Peter Hiltner

Regimental Command Sergeant MajorThis is my first article for the Army

Chemical Review as your ninth Regimen-tal Command Sergeant Major (RCSM).To begin, I would like to share a little ofmy background with you. First, I am asoldier, an NCO with more than 25 yearsof active duty service. I am honored tobe your RCSM and happy to be here atthe Chemical School. I did not accomp-lish all this on my own. I have been blessedwith great role models and leaders—myfellow soldiers, officers, NCOs, andcivilians.

I joined the Minnesota NationalGuard in 1969 and completed Basic andAdvanced Infantry Training at Fort Lewis,Washington. I completed my tour of duty with the NationalGuard in 1975, and in 1978, I reenlisted and became anactive-duty military police (MP).

I attended one-station unit training (OSUT) at FortMcClellan, Alabama, and afterwards was assigned to the55th MP Company in Korea. My roommate was the Bri-gade Soldier of the Year, and he was the first of manyrole models I would encounter. He taught me about theSoldier of the Month Boards and correspondence courses.I heeded his advice and, after two years, won a fewboards, scored high on my skill qualification test, graduatedfrom the Primary Leadership Development Course(PLDC), and was an E4 (P). I thought becoming a PLDCgraduate was a great achievement, but I refocused mypriorities when I saw others receiving awards. I decidedthen to never take a nonchalant approach to any militaryschool or to my military career again.

At Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, I served as a game war-den and an MP desk sergeant. I gained some experienceas a supply sergeant and competed for the Post NCO ofthe Year Board, but lost. I also completed some collegecourses and finished several correspondence courses.

In 1982, I changed my MOS to chemical. I went tothe transition course and was the Distinguished HonorGraduate; that was the pivotal point in my career. Upongraduation, I was assigned to the 82d Engineer Battalionin Germany. I continued taking correspondence courses,was promoted to E6, and became the 7th EngineerBrigade NCO of the Quarter.

In 1985, I returned to Korea and spent 12 months withthe 4th Chemical Company, 2d Infantry Division. I was thesmoke platoon sergeant. I took 23 (54E) soldiers and turnedthem into a platoon of highly motivated smoke soldiers. Later,I made the E7 promotion list and became the 2d InfantryDivision and the 8th U.S. Army NCO of the Quarter.

As a sergeant first class, I continuedtaking correspondence courses, finishedmy bachelor’s degree, and graduated asthe honor graduate from both the Techni-cal Escort Course and the AdvancedNCO Course. I was an instructor at theTechnical Escort Course for about twoyears and served at the EOD School. Icompleted another tour in Germany in theInspector General’s Office at VII Corpsand deployed to Desert Storm. When Ireturned, I moved to Fort Rucker, Ala-bama, assigned to the 46th EngineerBattalion (Combat)(Heavy).

In 1993, I attended the first sergeant’scourse and became the first sergeant for

the Chemical NCO Academy at Fort McClellan. In 1996,I moved to the 11th Chemical Company, which was taskedto provide decontamination support to the 1996 Olympicgames in Atlanta, Georgia. In 1997, I returned to Koreaas first sergeant for the 4th Chemical Company.

In 1998, I attended the U.S. Army Sergeants MajorAcademy. Upon graduation in 1999, I was assigned asthe CSM for the 82d Chemical Battalion. In 2000, Ireturned to Korea as the CSM of the 23d ChemicalBattalion; in 2001, I became the brigade sergeant majorof the 23d Area Support Group, Camp Humphreys, Korea.And now I am your RCSM.

As you can see, my story is not all that unusual. As Istated before, I did not make it on my own; I had thesupport and guidance of many. I looked good because thesoldiers around me were good. Likewise, I was neversatisfied with just passing scores or with just meeting thestandard. I wanted to be all that I could be and give theArmy my best.

Does this sound like something you want to do? If itis, then my advice to you, regardless of where you are inyour military career, is the following:

• Enroll in correspondence and college courses. Youwill gain knowledge and obtain promotion points.

• Commit yourself to the Army. It is not a job; we arenot in it for the money. Give the Army 110 percentevery day.

• Become the next Soldier of the Quarter; getinvolved in something positive.

• Try to earn membership in the Audie Murphy orSergeant Morales Club.

• Graduate from every class you attend, and withhonors, if possible.

(Continued on page 4)

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to a CBRN incident. Finally, the Emergency Assessmentand Detection Course deals with the fundamental conceptsimportant to National Guard civil support team memberswho support the Incident Command System.

Our best defense against CBRN warfare remainsour ability to prepare for and protect ourselves againstthe toxic effects of these weapons. By defeating theeffects of CBRN weapons, we in effect make themobsolete. Our combat development folks are makinggreat strides in our ability to defeat the effects of CBRNagents. Developments in the area of decontaminationare particularly noteworthy. A two-step approach hasbeen used to define requirements for future decontami-nation systems, the first of which was a decontaminationperformance demonstration (DPD) held in July 2001. TheDPD was a market survey in which companies from theworld over were invited to the Chemical School toshowcase their decontamination technologies. The equip-ment was operated by our chemical soldiers, whichfostered a direct two-way exchange of ideas betweenthe customer (you) and the industry professionals. Agreat deal was accomplished during the DPD, and ourcombat developers took the lessons learned from thesoldiers and industry and went back to work definingthe key performance parameters (KPPs) for futuredecontamination systems.

These KPPs were the yardstick by which perfor-mance of prototype systems chosen to participate inthe April 2002 decontamination limited objective experi-ment (LOE) were measured against. During the LOE,we experimented with promising equipment to see if itnot only fixed our historical problem areas but furtherenhanced capability while reducing workload and logis-tical support requirements. Several pieces of equipmentwere identified that possess the ability to greatly improveour capability with little or no modification. These sys-tems represent real-time solutions that are available foracquisition now. We are taking everything we learnedthroughout this two-step approach and writing therequirements for the next generation of decontaminationsystems. This approach underpins requirements definition,thereby ensuring we take maximum advantage of state-of-the-art technology available. We are focusing our efforton getting the systems developed and proven out throughtesting to get enhanced capability into your hands as soonas possible.

Additionally, there has been a tremendous amount ofeffort to provide the most efficient and versatile chemicalforce structure to combat commanders of the future.Work in support of Total Army Analysis 11 changes willpotentially restructure chemical units to be capable ofexecuting a wider variety of tasks from homeland securityto major contingency operations.

When you become an NCO, “take care of yoursoldiers.” This means that you are responsible for someonebesides yourself. You will learn when to say yes and whento say no. Respect your soldiers and listen to what theyhave to say. Your soldiers are a reflection of you. Withoutthem, you cannot succeed. Just as important, take careof your family. Find the balance.

As your RCSM, I want to continue to improve thecommunication with the units in the field and the soldiersand civilians throughout the chemical community, supportthe heritage of the Corps, be a role model to all, share thegreat work we do as chemical soldiers, and improveidentified weaknesses, where possible. I intend to shareDA’s vision of people, readiness, and transformation witheveryone:

• People/soldiers, not equipment, are the centerpiecesof our formation. We will take care of soldiers,civilians, and leaders. I always keep in mind thatwe have been trusted with our nation’s greatestasset—its sons and daughters.

• Readiness is our mission. The Army has a non-negotiable contract with the American people tofight and win our nation’s wars. We must maintainnear-term training and readiness to ensure that weare prepared at all times to carry out ourobligations. This is our daily mission; we willcontinue to work hard and improve our readiness.As NCOs and leaders, we are the standard bearersfor readiness.

• Transformation is an imperative. ArmyTransformation represents the strategic transitionwe will have to undergo to shed our Cold-Wardesigns to prepare ourselves for the crises andwars of the twenty-first century.In closing, this is a very critical time for our country.

We will encounter many challenges that we will conquerby working together. This includes everyone.

Our nation is counting on us, the Chemical Corps andour partners in CBRN Defense, to protect our forces andour homeland from the deleterious effects of CBRNassaults. We must maintain our fierce resolve to supportour combat commanders with the best-trained soldiersand leaders, the best doctrine, the best equipment, andour finest intellectual effort for the challenges of tomor-row. You’re doing tremendous things Dragon Soldiers!Drive on.

ELEMENTIS REGAMUS PROELIUM!Dragon Soldiers . . . Rule the Battle

(Chief of Chemical, continued from page 2)

(Regimental Command Sergeant Major, continued frompage 3)

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As the first U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) officer assigned to the U.S. Army Chemical School, Fort LeonardWood, Missouri, this past year has been an exceptional journey down paths less traveled for a U.S. CoastGuardsman. I am also becoming accustomed to being asked why the USCG would station a guardsmanalmost 500 miles from the nearest coast. The answer is simple. I represent the USCG’s National Strike Force(NSF)—a specialized organization designed to facilitate preparedness and response to oil and hazardous-substance incidents to protect public health, welfare, and the environment.

Established in 1973 under the Federal Water PollutionControl Act of 1972 (primarily as a pollution responseteam), the NSF has evolved into a rapidly deployableresource for hazardous material (HAZMAT), petroleum,and biochemical response. Its extensive training andexperience with a wide spectrum of cases has propelledthe NSF into new areas of responsibilities (such asweapons of mass destruction/chemical, biological,radiological, and nuclear [WMD/CBRN] responses). Bybuilding a bond between the NSF and the Chemical Corps,we hope to become better equipped to meet the newresponsibilities.

National Strike ForceThe NSF consists of three regionally based “strike

teams”: the Atlantic Strike Team (AST) in Fort Dix, NewJersey; the Gulf Strike Team (GST) in Mobile, Alabama;and the Pacific Strike Team (PST) on Fort Hamilton inNovato, California. The NSF Coordination Center(NSFCC) in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, supports eachof these teams and is also home to the Preparedness forResponse Exercise Program (PREP) staff, the PublicInformation Assist Team (PIAT), and the NationalInventory of Oil Spill Removal organizations. TheNSF employs nearly 200 active-duty, civilian, and reserveUSCG personnel.

The NSF is on call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,and can deploy by land, sea, or air. During a recent Housesubcommittee hearing, the NSF Commander, CaptainScott Hartley, said:

“As the name implies, we are a national assetequipped and trained to conduct hazard assess-ment, source control, contamination reduction,release countermeasures, mitigation, decontami-nation, and response management activities, in

By Lieutenant Commander Dennis E. Branson and Petty Officer Jaime Bigelow

The Chemical Corpsand the Coast Guard—

Interoperability in Action

support of a federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC),during oil and HAZMAT releases occurring herein the United States.”

National Response System (NRS)The NSF is an integral part of the existing NRS—a

network of numerous federal, state, and local agenciesthat prepare for and respond to oil and hazardous sub-stance releases, including chemical and biological terrorismincidents. The NRS activates immediately upon notificationfrom the National Response Center or any agencyinvolved in an incident.

Federal On-Scene CoordinatorThe FOSC is the central figure in the NRS. Under

the National Contingency Plan (NCP), the FOSC leadslocal preparedness efforts (in coordination with state andlocal agencies and private industry) and provides thefederal lead during an actual response. Through the areacommittee process, response protocols are developed,joint priorities are established, and response resources areidentified through an interagency collaborative process.In the event of an actual incident, the FOSC wouldestablish a response organization using the IncidentCommand System (ICS) while incorporating federal, state,local, and private resources into a single response structure.As part of a Unified Command System (UCS),the USCG’s FOSC works closely with local officials (forexample, the cognizant fire chief) and representatives fromthe state to aggressively respond to an incident. Ifnecessary, the FOSC has access to the Oil Spill LiabilityTrust Fund (for oil spills) or the Superfund (for HAZMATreleases).

Special TeamsBeyond the local response community, the FOSC also

has access to special federal teams, which include the

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CWO Leon, Atlantic Strike Team member, near Ground Zero of theWorld Trade Center, September 2001

NSF; the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s)emergency response team; the Department of Energy’sradiological emergency response team; the NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s scientificsupport coordinators; and Department of Defense (DOD)resources, including the Navy’s supervisor of salvage, tosupport a local response. For planning, coordination, andinteroperability, the FOSC is supported by representativesfrom more than 15 federal agencies at the regional levelthrough the regional response teams, which inturn have a mirror organization for national coordination,planning, policies, and interagency coordination known asthe National Response Team (NRT). The EPA is the chairand the USCG is the vice chair of the NRT. All of theserelationships, roles, capabilities, and responsibilities areextensively outlined in the NCP.

If the Federal Response Plan (FRP) is activated foran incident, the NRS folds into Emergency SupportFunction #10 (for HAZMATs) for further coordination offederal resources to assist the local municipalities andstates. Upon activation of the FRP, the USCG also sup-ports Emergency Support Function #1 (concerningtransportation). The NSF activated to support EmergencySupport Function #1 during the World Trade Centerattacks when USCG assets coordinated and participatedin the evacuation of more than one million people from lowerManhattan following the collapse of the Twin Towers.

All the NRS authorities are predesignated andpreauthorized and are consistent with PresidentialDecision Directives 39 and 62. These executive direc-tives mandated that the federal government use existingsystems for WMD rather than create new ones.Accordingly, the NRS should be a key component of thenew Department of Homeland Secur-ity’s Emergency Preparedness andResponse Directorate.

NSF Capabilitiesand Emergent Skill Sets

Incident ManagementOrganization Sustainability

As subject-matter experts in theICS, NSF personnel provide highlytrained, multicontingency incidentmanagement teams (12 to 16 people)to support OSCs for nationally signi-ficant incidents (for example, theWorld Trade Center) and/or locallysignificant incidents. Incident man-agement support includes qualifiedpersonnel to support staffing of theemergency operations center, disasterfield office (DFO), and regional

operations center (ROC) during FRP responses and ICStechnical expertise to support national and regional incidentcommand teams. The inherent expertise and experiencein working and training the ICS/UCS model is somethingthat the Chemical School could gain immediate benefitfrom in the new cooperative interservice relationship.

Response and Consequence Management

During the World Trade Center cleanup and theWashington, D.C./Boca Raton, Flordia, biologicalremediation, members of the NSF proved they have thetechnical expertise and specialized response skillsnecessary to support OSCs from the earliest “assessmentphase” through disposal and case closure. NSF teamspossess equipment not readily available in the private orpublic sector (for example, stainless steel HAZMATtransfer pumps and high-capacity oil pumps, new oil-skimming systems or containment boom which industrynow has an adequate inventory). Other response and on-scene support capabilities include—

• HAZMAT teams that provide oil/HAZMAT sourcecontrol, bulk liquid lightering, environmentalassessment, and removal/oversight in a hazardous-atmosphere environment. Currently, theNSF has three Level A teams with the ability toconduct Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration-compliant Level A and B entries.Also, efforts are now underway to expand thecurrent fielding strength for additional entry teams.

• Oil response teams with the capability to supportbulk oil removal operations. The NSF currently hasthree Level B/C teams (environmental assessmentteam, communications group, and logistics group).

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• Incident management teams whose knowledge andexperience include ICS positions throughout thecontinuum of ICS staffing for FRP responses. Theyhave a limited ability to support OSCs during conse-quence management operations under the FRP andNCP responses and to support USCG incidentcommanders during non-NCP/FRP responseoperations.

• Public information assist teams made up of speciallytrained personnel who provide mobile crisis mediarelations and crisis communications assistance.

• Environmental assessment teams that providetechnical expertise in air monitoring; special-monitoring, applied-response technology sampling;and shoreline assessment evaluation.

• Removal oversight teams that monitor materialremoval operations according to the FRP missionassignment or direction from the OSC.

Interoperability

A key strength that has clearly contributed to thesuccess of the NSF is that the teams are trained, manned,and equipped so the personnel on each team areessentially interchangeable. On virtually every major eventin which a strike team deploys, personnel from the otherteams come in to assist and augment operations.Everybody assigned to a team is sent to the annual NSFtraining drawdown (affectionately referred to as NSF“boot camp”) that is held in the late summer/early fall.Other training opportunities are offered jointly so trainingis consistent and the teams remain interoperable. Lookingto the future, the NSF and the Officeof Marine Safety Response are leadinga multiagency review of the NRS’sspecial teams to enhance theirinteroperability. The Federal Bureau ofInvestigation’s (FBI’s) HAZMATResponse Unit, the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency, the Office ofHomeland Security, and the Centers forDisease Control have acceptedinvitations to participate. This reviewwill—

• Assess the special teams’ indivi-dual and collective responseassets and capabilities.

• Project the role the teams willplay in future operations.

• Identify gaps that may currentlyexist and a strategy for filling inthose gaps.

The Way Ahead Is A Two-Way Street

In the wake of the 11 September attacks (and the resultant high-threatenvironment), the USCG has an even greater need to partner with its sisterservices within DOD, especially in the WMD/CBRN arena. The corporateresources and joint environment of the Chemical School and the U.S. ArmyManeuver Support Center (MANSCEN) at Fort Leonard Wood affords theUSCG the opportunity to interface and exchange information regarding WMD/CBRN and consequence management with each of the services. Not onlycan the USCG benefit from the equipment, training, and doctrinal resources,but it can do so in a highly cost-effective manner (for example, low, localper diem; lodging; and airfares). From the USCG’s perspective, our forcescould be involved in a WMD or NBC event in a variety of scenarios, primarilyunder our mission as part of the FRP, but also in executing defenseoperations and port security. The USCG has traditionally had outstandingresponse capabilities to address toxic industrial chemicals through theNSTs, but it must be understood that military chemical and biological agentsare different in a variety of ways and must be addressed as such. Under thecontinually emerging National Security Strategy, it will become even morecritical for the USCG to interface with the joint services and participate in alike manner to exchange information and coordinate responses to accomplishits goals.

Internal Training and Professional Development

Through the formal relationship bridge provided bythe USCG liaison position, the NSF now has anon-the-ground “conduit” into DOD training andprofessional development. This information bridge hasalready yielded results as evidenced in the just-in-timetraining conducted in January 2002. (See inset article, “TheWay Ahead Is A Two-Way Street.”) The NSF is capableof providing limited technical training to USCG and otherNRT-member agencies in support of preparedness andconsequence management activities, specifically inrelation to the ICS.

Exercise Coordination

The NSF facilitates the planning, coordination,execution, and participation of players in response-preparedness exercises to strengthen local, state, federal,and industrial coordination (about six to eight exercisesper year). For years, the focus of these drills, conductedby the NSF coordination center’s PREP staff, has beenon oil and accidental HAZMAT spills/releases. With thenew threat environment, the need for multiagency WMDexercises (see inset article, “Port Rio Grande,” page 8) isanother excellent example of how the NSF can partnerwith the organic exercise capabilities and contacts.

ConclusionMany paradigms have clearly shifted within the NSF

and federal response community as a whole. Overall, theNSF strike teams have made dramatic leaps forward inadding to their response capabilities as proven at the WorldTrade Center cleanup and during the biological remediation

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incidents in Boca Raton and Washington. Despite theseadvances, there are clearly many hurdles ahead. Thecritical (and most likely immediate) WMD/CBRN shortfallwould appear to be in the training arena. As the primarytraining resource for all DOD NBC personnel, theChemical School, in conjunction with MANSCEN, hasthe capability of developing programs of instruction fortraining the NSF and other team USCG personnel. InJanuary 2002, MANSCEN’s Directorate of TrainingDevelopment worked directly with the 84th ChemicalBattalion/Chemical School to conduct a just-in-time trainingcourse for more than 30 NSF personnel. The three-daytraining gave NSF response personnel hands-onexperience with chemical, biological, and radiologicalequipment and classroom instruction on military agentsand included informational briefings from the NationalGuard’s 7th CST and the FBI. “They have an expertise

Port Rio Grande

It looked like a scene from a Hollywood movie as emergency responders worked to curb the effects of asimulated chemical terrorist attack during a drill on USCG Island, Alameda, California. The joint service exercise,dubbed “Port Rio Grande,” was sponsored by the USCG Integrated Support Command (ISC) Alameda and wasone of the largest WMD drills ever held on a USCG installation. Participating units included the ISC Alameda,USCG Cutter Munro, the PST, Training Centers Yorktown and Petaluma, Western Region Auxiliary, USCGInvestigative Service, and staff from the Pacific Area and Eleventh District. One thing that made the exerciseunique was the involvement of DOD assets from the U.S. Army’s 464th Chemical Brigade and the CaliforniaNational Guard’s 9th Civil Support Team (CST). Delegates from the FBI, EPA, Red Cross, Alameda City FireDepartment, and Alameda County HAZMAT represented federal and local agencies.

About 300 personnel participated in Port Rio Grande, which had been in the works for more than threemonths. Lieutenant Commander Dennis Branson, the exercise director and WMD liaison to the ChemicalSchool, explained, “Our main exercise objective was to provide a shipboard environment to test agencyinteroperability in responding to a WMD attack.” Petty Officer First Class Martha Sturm, an ISC participant,said that the exercise provided a great learning opportunity. She added, “This is all new to us, but we need to beaware of situations like this and learn how to handle them.” In addition to their roles as first responders, ISCpersonnel operated the command and control of the incident and provided security as the CG Cutter Munro was“hit” with a simulated nerve gas explosion. Immediately after the incident onboard the Munro, a second scenarioerupted involving a toxic industrial chemical device in a building on the island. Throughout both events, ISCpersonnel also stood by with their own organic mass decontamination and medical-treatment equipment asback up to the responding DOD/USCG decontamination and medical teams caring for the simulated casualties.As the island was sealed off and the terrorists (played by team USCG personnel) were taken out by ISC forceprotection personnel, responders from the 464th, 9th CST, and PST moved in to identify the agents, bring outthe “victims,” and perform decontamination/medical care. All this was accomplished under the direction of theincident commander, Captain Jim Hass, commanding officer of ISC Alameda. “This was new ground for manyCoast Guard men and women, as the Coast Guard works on how to best address and respond to the nation’sWMD threat,” concluded Hass. The exercise, which used the ICS, provided valuable insight into each agency’srole and the capabilities that could be brought to the table. Brigadier General Patricia Nilo (commandant, U.S.Army Chemical School, Fort Leonard Wood) summed up her observations of the day’s events. “We’re in kind ofthe crawling phase with all this. The only way you get better is to practice at it.” Even though Port Rio Grandeyielded important insights, honed skills, and improved doctrine, the nation’s road to adequate WMD responseis still a long one.

in hazardous material that we don’t have,” said BG Nilo,“and we have expertise in warfare agents that they don’thave.”

BG Nilo further expressed that the USCG alreadyknew how to handle spills involving industrial chemicals.“They work with these materials all the time in ports,”Nilo said. “They’re already well-grounded, more so thanmany of our young Army students just starting out.”

For more information on the NSF, please visit our Website at www.uscg.mil/hq/nsfcc/nsfweb/

Lieutenant Commander Branson is the Coast Guard liaison officerto the U.S. Army Chemical School. He has more than 13 yearsexperience in the marine safety field.

Petty Officer Bigelow is a public affairs specialist with thePublic Assistance and Information Team in Elizabeth City, NorthCarolina.

January 2003 9

The tragic reality of terrorism hasbrutally shown our nation that we nolonger live in a secure world. The U.S.Army Chemical Corps has insistentlyvoiced the possibility of chemical,biological, radiological, and nuclear(CBRN) threats to the homeland forsome time now. Unfortunately, therecent events within our homeland arenow making our voices heard. As ournation and the Army continue to lookto the future, the Chemical Corps mustcontinue to be a key and essentialplayer in Army Transformation.

The U.S. Army Chemical School(USACMLS) was and is the De-partment of Defense (DOD) nuclear,biological, and chemical (NBC) focalpoint for training and doctrine. Theschool is moving toward becoming theDOD CBRN full-spectrum defenseand response center of excellence. Tothis end, USACMLS would becomethe nation’s recognized leader inCBRN responder training and devel-opment of doctrine, training methods,organizational structure, and equip-ment requirements.

The Army’s role in homelandsecurity (HLS) is still being defined.However, USACMLS is proactivelymoving toward a full-spectrumChemical Corps that can respond tothreats against our national securityboth on the battlefield and within thehomeland. This includes a fullspectrum of protection for U.S. forcesthat Brigadier General (BG) Patricia

The Chemical Corpsand Its Emerging Rolein Homeland Security

By Lieutenant Colonel Jon Pool

L. Nilo, commandant, USACMLS,calls “fort-to-port” support.

The idea of full spectrum is a mustfor the future architecture of theChemical Corps. The current size ofthe Corps does not allow for dedicatedtroops to support a homeland defenserole. The Army’s role in supportingother federal agencies in defense ofour homeland will present much of thesame dilemmas faced on the modernbattlefield. The Chemical Corps’svision of full spectrum can be seen inFigure 1.

The modernization of the Chemi-cal Corps cannot be just a restruc-turing of current assets; it must be acomplete redesign of the Corps. We

must look at concepts that ask thefollowing questions: Do we incorpor-ate hazardous-material (HAZMAT)training into the program of instructionfor all chemical soldiers? Do we goto structured battalions with numberedcompanies and a robust battalionsupport section? Do we give recon-naissance companies their ownorganic decontamination? Despite thehardships of such a restructure, wemust continue advancing or facebecoming irrelevant to the Army andour nation.

Vigilant Warriors 2002In April 2002, USACMLS parti-

cipated in Vigilant Warriors 2002(Army Transformation War Game) at

Note:This article was written in April 2002 and does not reflect events which have occurred since that time.

Figure 1. Chemical Corps Full-Spectrum Mission

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the Army War College. Past Armytransformation war games focused ontwo major theater scenarios. How-ever, this year, a third scenario wasadded—HLS. The objectives ofVigilant Warrior 2002 were to—

1) Inform senior leaders of futureconflicts in the context ofmultiple crises; demonstrate thestrategic contribution of theObjective Force.

2) Illustrate the need to maintain astrategically responsive, full-spectrum joint force.

3) Recommend force projectionand sustainment concepts andcapabilities suitable for amultiple-crises, globalenvironment.

4) Refine strategic theater,operational, and tacticalconcepts and capabilities in ajoint and combined context.

5) Examine command and control/leadership and campaignplanning challenges in thecontext of a multiple-crises,global environment.

6) Explore Army capabilities, roles,missions, and organization forHLS.

7) Examine the role of the Armystrategic Reserve and themobilization base.

The sixth Objective has particularrelevance for the nation and ourCorps. During exercise VigilantWarriors, I was a member of the HLSpanel. The panel was comprised ofrepresentatives from the U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) schools of the variousbranches of the Army, Department ofthe Army staff, Office of the Chiefof the Army Reserve, the NationalGuard (NG) Bureau, sister servicesincluding the Coast Guard, a formerambassador, and a former FBI specialagent-in-charge. The panel waschaired by MG Anders Aadland,then commander of the U.S. Army

Maneuver Support Center, andsupported by BG Edgar Stanton,commander of the U.S. Army SoldierSupport Institute, and BG EdwinRoberts, deputy commanding general/Army National Guard, HeadquartersTRADOC.

Vigilant Warriors 2002 startedwith the Army deploying to variousconflicts around the world. From aHLS standpoint, the panel had toaddress the needs of the Army tosupport both deployment and HLSmissions. The initial situation, set inthe year 2019, presented to theHLS panel was—

• Worldwide crises requiringReserve Component (RC) call-up, Civil Reserve Air Fleet/Voluntary Intermodal SealiftAgreement activation,mobilization base ramp-up, andplacing significant demands onthe U.S. industrial base.

• Viable threats against criticalinfrastructure terrorists,criminals, and others.

• DOD being responsible fordefending the United Statesagainst land, air, and seaattacks.

• DOD augmenting other U.S.government elements forinfrastructure security andsupport to civil authorities.

Mission End StateA strategy for protecting the U.S.

homeland is to deter aggression and,if deterrence fails, to defend againstattacks by responding rapidly tominimize effects and by maintainingessential capabilities.

During the month before theattack, a smaller representative groupmet at a war game staff exercise(STAFFEX) to set a starting pointfor the exercise. We did three thingsduring the STAFFEX that are impor-tant to note. The first was to decideto play the current concept forNorthern Command (NORTHCOM).

This unified command was to haveDOD responsibility for support toHLS. While the current concept forNORTHCOM does not show assignedforces, the game allocated forces atthe start of the exercise. Those forcescaused considerable discussion andincluded the following chemicalforces:

• Three chemical brigades—oneas a chemical command indirect support to NORTHCOMand two as regional responsecommands dividing the countryinto east and west regions alongthe same lines as the currentcontinental U.S. Armies (Firstand Fifth Army).

• Ten chemical battalions toprovide chemical responsecapabilities within the tenfederal regions; eight CBRNrapid-response teams (RRTs)(new Chemical Force Structure,TAA 09) to provide regionalresponse to military installations.

• A chemical biological (CB) RRTto provide technical medical andnonmedical advice to federaland state agencies.

The decision to designate certainunits as HLS units was not withoutargument. Tasking the NG in partor parcel with the HLS mission wasnot without a majority of oppo-nents. The most important questionaddressed command and controlof the NG in support of HLS.NORTHCOM would seem the likelyheadquarters, but should the NG beactivated or remain in Title 32 statusto facilitate possible missions of a lawenforcement nature? The only pre-vailing view was that a dual head-quarters arrangement (NORTHCOMand a state adjutant general) wouldnot be a functional working rela-tionship, especially if the event wasoutside the geographic location of thestate.

The second decision was to playan office of HLS. This cabinet-level

January 2003 11

office managed the HLS interagencyprocess. The office controlled theCoast Guard, Immigration andNaturalization Service, Border Patrol,Customs Service, Critical Infra-structure Assurance Office, NationalDomestic Preparedness Office, Na-tional Intelligence Fusion Center, andother HLS offices. The model wasSenate Bill-S 1534 IS, Department ofHomeland Security Act, introduced bySenators Lieberman and Specter.

The third decision was to play thesuggested Army TAA 09 ChemicalForce Structure. This force structurewould be the full-spectrum conceptand would include the three chemicalbrigades for HLS. These threebrigades would be full spectrum andcapable of contributing to the warfight, if called on. The structure of thefull-spectrum brigade will be discussedlater.

War Game Issues/InsightsDuring the war game, the HLS

team addressed scenarios that in-cluded threats to the infrastructure,cyber attacks, numerous attacks invol-ving explosives, and one biologicalattack. These scenarios raised severalissues and insights that the HLS panelhad sent to a senior seminar group fordiscussion. Several of these issues/insights are important to the Army’ssupport of HLS and the ChemicalCorps’s future concept.

Currently, all federal agenciesare responsible for protecting theircritical infrastructure. However, thereare thousands of facilities that can belisted as critical infrastructure for theUnited States. It became very evidentto the group that DOD currentlywould be called on to assist in theprotection of this infrastructure. Theproblem was that even with divisionsof troops, only hundreds of structurescould be protected. The group iden-tified a need for prioritizing criticalinfrastructure and the need for federalagencies to look at a surge capability,possibly contracted, to protect thisinfrastructure.

When terrorist events unfolded inthe game, it was evident thatgovernors would call on their NG forassistance. As the game expandedand RC (U.S. Army Reserve and NG)units were mobilized for support ofthe overseas conflicts, high-demand,low-density specialties (particularlymedical, CBRN response, and militarypolice) were soon an issue, not onlybecause they were not availablewithin the military or to the governors,but because they were also takenfrom their corresponding jobs withinthe civilian community. This could bean issue for the HLS chemicalbrigades if they are all in the RC. Ifthey are in the NG, then the dualcommand and control issue is onceagain raised.

Linked, widescale terroristattacks against the homeland promp-ted requests for military assistance.A military presence was desired toreassure the public and deterterrorists. The posse comitatus lawwas an issue. The group suggestedthat the President should issue anexemption of posse comitatus (whichnormally prevents federal troops fromenforcing civilian domestic laws). Theexemption can be issued in the eventstates are no longer capable (orwilling) to protect their citizens. Oneinsight was that prior agreement byexecutive and congressional leaderswhere circumstances might justifyexemption, and possibly even somelegal changes, would facilitate militaryand civilian planning and execution.

The issue was raised that a reviewof the desired Army end strength musttake place if the Army is to be a majorsupporter of HLS. Vigilant Warriors2002 resulted in partial mobilization ofthe RC, but still resulted in a shortageof personnel to support all missionsworldwide. A valid concern was thatthe U.S. population would findhomeland protection more importantthan foreign peacekeeping abroaddespite our commitments to othercountries. The question will only be

answered with an agreed upondefinition of the Army’s role in HLS.

In Foreign Affairs, volume 81,no. 3, Secretary of Defense DonaldH. Rumsfeld states, “The Departmentof Defense has known for sometime that it does not have…enoughchemical and biological defenseunits…. But in spite of theseshortages, the department postponedthe needed investments, whilecontinuing to fund what were, inretrospect, less valuable programs.That needs to change.” The ChemicalCorps’s strength played in VigilantWarriors 2002 was about 6,000 morechemical troops than currently exist.

Future Chemical CorpsStructure

The concept of the ChemicalCorps used during the war gamewas a full-spectrum chemical brigade.This concept brigade will have theforces to conduct its mission in anyenvironment. Technology will be acornerstone of the creation of theseunits. Figures 2 and 3 (page 12) areconceptual designs of the full-spectrum brigade and battalion.

A new chemical force structurefor TAA 09 used in Vigilant Warriorswas the CBRN-RRT. These 26-soldier teams will be pre-positioned ordeployed to support/augment theinstallation’s response to a CBRNattack. TRADOC has approved theoperational and organizational (O&O)concept of the unit (see Figure 4, page12), which will have the necessaryequipment to respond to all fourhazards, to include HAZMATs suchas toxic industrial chemicals andmaterials. The specific equipment willbe technology-driven. An Armyspecial medical-augmentation re-sponse team would assist the CBRN-RRT. These teams already exist at theArmy regional medical centers.

The other chemical unit allocatedto NORTHCOM was the CB-RRT.It is a TDA organization the Armycreated in 1998, as directed by PublicLaw 104-201. The 18 soldiers with

CML12

civilian and contractor augmentationhave standing memorandums ofunderstanding and memorandums ofagreement with Army and Navyorganizations to augment the staff ofthe CB-RRT based on deploymentneeds. The mission of the CB-RRTis, on order, to deploy and establisha robust and integrated capabilityto coordinate and synchronizeDOD’s technical assistance (medicaland nonmedical) to respond in bothcrisis and consequence managementto a weapons of mass destructionincident or designated nationalsecurity special event.

ConclusionThe U.S. Army Chemical Corps

is headed in the direction that it musttake to be viable for the future. Ourstructure cannot be rigidly focused atone threat or one theater of operationor only on military warfare agents.Our Corps must be, in every sense, afull-spectrum corps. We must be ableto conduct the missions that we mightbe asked to perform.

To that end, we need to be ableto detect, identify, survey, monitor,mark, sample, warn/report, and hazardpredict/model all forms of CBRNmaterial that pose a threat on thebattlespace or at home. We also need

to be able to conduct decontamina-tion of terrain; fixed sites; equipment;and personnel, to include casualties.

We must not wait on technologyto begin our transformation. Newtechnology may well determine theequipment of the future. However, theCorps must start to restructure withcurrent technology, which may in-clude items currently under develop-ment by program managers orcommercial off-the-shelf items. Thefuture of the Corps begins now!

Figure 2. Draft Proposal for a Full-Spectrum Brigade

Chemical Battalion (Full Spectrum)Allocation:1 per division-sized unit1 per corps (GS role)1 per area support group1 per FEMA region 512 personnel

HHC

X

32 NBCRS16 Tactical decon systems16 Decon mission modules32 Obscuration UGVs4 UAV-NBC sensor and collector packages at battalion HHC

32 Portable bio/TIC/TIM detectors8 Strategic decon systems64 Level A32 Thermobaric UGVs

Figure 3. Draft Proposal for a Full-Spectrum Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel Pool is the TotalForce integrator for homeland securityat the U.S. Army Chemical School, FortLeonard Wood, Missouri. His previousassignments include brigade chemicalofficer, 420th Engineer Brigade; plansofficer, 464th Chemical Brigade;adjutant, 490th Chemical Battalion; S3,468th Chemical Battalion; and opera-tions officer, 460th Chemical Brigade.LTC Pool has worked homeland securityissues since 1997, including serving asan interagency city training coordinatorfor the Domestic Preparedness Pro-gram. He was the first operations officerfor the “one-of-a-kind” CB-RRT, wherehe had numerous domestic and overseasdeployments.

Attached to existing chemical company fortraining/readiness/oversight

Tm cdr O3 74B00Tm NCOIC E8 54B5O

Ops off O2 74B00Ops NCOIC E8 54B5OOps NCO E7 54B4ONBC NCO 2 E6 54B3O

NBC NCO 2 E7 54B4ONBC NCO 2 E6 54B3ONBC NCO 2 E5 54B2ONBC NCO 2 E4 54B1O

Supply NCO E6 92Y4OAdmin NCO E5 7IL2ODecon NCO E6 54B3ODecon NCO E5 54B2ODecon SPC 2 E4 54B1O

8 Teams CONUSSchofield BarracksFort LewisFort CarsonFort HoodFort CampbellFort StewartFort BraggFort Drum

Survey Sec0—0—8—8

Command Sec1—0—1—2

Support Ops Sec0—0—6—6

Operations1—0—4—5

Total Personnel Bill: 168

CBRN-RRT(SRC 03-XXXA000)

CBRN-RRT2—0—19—21

CMCO

Figure 4. Force Protection O&O Concept for the CBRN-RRT

Allocation:1 per corps-sized unit1 per theater1 per CONUSA (1st/5th) 1,622 personnel

96 NBCRS48 Tactical decon systems48 Decon mission modules96 Obscuration UGVs12 UAV-NBC sensor and collector packages at battalion HHC

96 Portable bio/TIC/TIM detectors24 Strategic decon systems192 Level A96 Thermobaric UGVs

HHC

X

CONUSANBCRS

TICTIMUGVUAV

continental United States ArmyNuclear, Biological, and Chemical ReconnaissanceSystemtoxic industrial chemicaltoxic industrial materialunmanned ground vehicleunmanned aerial vehicle

January 2003 13

In wake of the 11 September 2001 terroristattacks, the Army’s ability to detect and identifyNBC hazards became the center stage of ArmyTransformation. A key element in this transformationis the Army’s Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) NBCreconnaissance force. The mission profile for the SBCTNBC forces is to—

• Sense the battlefield through reconnaissance anddetection of radiological, chemical, biological, andtoxic industrial chemicals/toxic industrial materials(TICs/TIMs) hazards.

• Shape the battlefield by developing and providingNBC situational awareness and contributing to thecommon operational picture specifically to NBCcontamination and indicators of NBC use.

• Shield and sustain the forces by providing forceprotection and retaining dominant maneuver.

The NBCRV will transform the way we defend againstNBC attacks in the future.

The NBCRV is one of 10 Stryker configurations. It ispowered by a 350-horsepower diesel engine, has eightrun-flat wheels with a central tire inflation system, andincorporates a vehicle height management system and aclimate-control overpressure system. The NBCRV isequipped with a remote weapons station that supports theM2 .50-caliber machine gun, M6 smoke grenade launcher,and an integrated thermal weapons sight. It hosts thecommon Stryker communications suite that integrates theSingle-Channel Ground-to-Air Radio System, theEnhanced Position Location Reporting System, the ForceXXI Battle Command Brigade and Below System, andthe Global Positioning System. The NBCRV provides 14.5-millimeter ballistic protection and is manned by a crew offour—a driver, a vehicle commander, and two surveyors.

As a system of systems, the NBCRV represents asignificant improvement to existing NBC reconnaissanceand surveillance systems within the Army. The NBCRVbuilds on the battle-proven Fox M93A1, integrating manyof its proven capabilities and providing increased state-of-the-art technological capabilities to detect and identifyNBC hazards. Legacy systems integrated into the NBCRV

include the Double-Wheel Sampling System, theAutomated Chemical Agent Alarm, the AN/UDR-2Radiac, and the Fox “tail” assembly used to collect solidsamples. The NBCRV also integrates several evolutionaryNBC systems not found in the Army today. These systemsinclude the—

• Chemical Biological Mass Spectrometer (CBMS),Block II. The CBMS II will provide the capabilityto concurrently detect and identify chemical andbiological agents and TICs/TIMs. This systemidentifies all significant chemical agents in either aliquid or vapor state.

• Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS).The JBPDS will provide the capability to detect andidentify biological warfare agents. It will alsocollect and store suspect samples for laboratoryconfirmation.

• Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical AgentDetector (JSLSCAD). The JSLSCAD will providethe capability to scan the surrounding atmospherefor chemical warfare agent vapors. It is alightweight, passive, and fully automatic detectionsystem that furnishes the NBCRV with on-the-move, 360-degree coverage from a variety oftactical and reconnaissance platforms at distancesup to 5 kilometers while moving.

• Chemical Vapor Sampling System (CVSS). TheCVSS will automatically capture chemical vaporsamples for theater Army medical labs and thecontinental U.S. “Gold Seal” encounterverifications.

• Metsman Meteorological System. The Metsmanwill measure relative wind speed and direction, airtemperature, barometric pressure, relative humidity,and ground temperatures.

By Lieutenant Colonel Bryan J. McVeigh

CML14

• Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Sensor ProcessingGroup (NBCSPG). The NBCSPG will provide boththe vehicle commander and the primary surveyor adedicated workstation which monitors and controlsall NBC sensors and devices. The NBCSPGsoftware will automate the NBC reconnaissancemission from detection through reporting. It willinterface with the Joint Warning and ReportingNetwork for NBC reporting using the vehicle’scommand, control, communications, computers,intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissancesystems. It also will provide an electronic record ofall NBC-mission data to support mission playbackand permanent archival.

The development of the NBCRV is a cooperativeeffort between the product manager for the interimarmored vehicle combat support and the product managerfor NBC defense systems. Together they are responsiblefor the system of systems integration of the NBCRVindividual sensors. The Army’s Program AcquisitionStrategy supports procurement of 42 NBCRVs during thenext six years to support the six SBCTs and the training

base. The Army is scheduled to accept the first of fourdevelopmental NBCRVs in April 2003. The Army Testand Evaluation Command will conduct productionqualification testing on these platforms ensuring that theymeet the criteria to enter low-rate initial production,demonstrate effective integration of the sensor suite, andshow the ability to maintain effective overpressure. The2d Interim Combat Regiment (2ICR) is the first unitscheduled to field the NBCRV in May 2005.

The NBCRV will provide the Army with a system ofsystems that will effectively blend proven legacy systemsand state-of-the-art technological capabilities to detectand identify NBC hazards. As an integral part of theStryker family of vehicles, the NBCRV will provide anessential foundation for the Army’s TransformationCampaign Plan to the Objective Force.

The Stryker’s sensing systems

Lieutenant Colonel McVeigh is currently serving as the productmanager for interim armored vehicle combat support. He holdsa master’s in systems acquisition management from the NavalPostgraduate School and is a graduate of the Command andGeneral Staff College.

January 2003 15

Analyzing intelligence information

The “targeting process” may seem like just a meansof destroying an enemy target. However, if youask the intelligence officer (G2/S2), he or she knows

it’s much more. The targeting process, or targeting,according to FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms andGraphics, is “the analysis of enemy situations relative tothe commander’s mission objectives, and capabilities atthe commander’s disposal, to identify and nominatespecific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplishthe commander’s purpose….”

The staff chemical officer’s (ChemO’s) piece of thetargeting process entails examining enemy coursesof action (COAs) and friendly vulnerabilities to nuclear,biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks to identify areasof interest. The staff, including you, the ChemO, will usethe results of the targeting and intelligence preparation ofthe battlefield (IPB) process to help analyze friendlyCOAs during the military decision-making process(MDMP). (See Captain John F. Fennell’s article in theFebruary 2002 issue of CML Review.) For the ChemO,the results of the targeting process will help focus theNBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke effortsfor the commander. The ChemO’s ability to become partof this process (at all echelons) could make or break aunit on the battlefield.

In this article, I will explain the targeting processfrom the perspective of the ChemO and provide tech-niques for the officer to become an integral part of thiscritical process. Even though much of this article dealswith the MDMP, I will focus on the aspects of targetingas it falls within the framework of the MDMP.

FM 6-20-10, Tactics,Techniques, and Proce-dures for the TargetingProcess, describes targetingas a “…complex and multi-disciplined effort that re-quires coordinated inter-action among many groups.These groups working to-gether are referred to as thetargeting team and include,but are not limited to, the firesupport, intelligence, opera-tions, and plans cells.” Thismanual goes on to say that

targeting “…must focus assets on enemy capabilities thatcould interfere with the achievement of friendlyobjectives.”

Though the ChemO and NBC-defense assets are notmentioned here specifically, the input of NBC personneland factors into this process is vital—not only to themission of destroying the enemy but also to the missionof surviving the conditions of the battlefield.FMs 101-5-1 and 6-20-10 address mainly destroyingenemy targets, once identified. The portion of the targetingprocess the ChemO is concerned with comes within theframework of the IPB and collection managementprocess, as described in FM 34-130, IntelligencePreparation of the Battlefield.

FM 34-130 (pages 1-5, 9) describes the targetingprocess as it applies to target identification and col-lection management. The word “target” is not necessarily(for the ChemO’s purpose) something to be destroyed,but rather it is something or some area to be observedand reported on. The presence or lack of a target willhelp drive the commander’s decision-making process. Theresult of the targeting process is the election of namedareas of interest (NAIs). The ChemO can use theseNAIs to focus NBC defense and smoke operations.

Another by-product of the IPB and targeting processis the collection plan. This plan assigns NAIs to specificunits for observation. These NAIs are monitored andreported on as instructed in the reconnaissance andsecurity (R&S) plan.

A more focused guide to the IPB process, for theChemO, is FM 3-14, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

(NBC)Vulnerability Analy-sis. Chapter 1 further definesthe ChemO’s role in IPB, andit discusses NAIs and IPBproducts.

Thus far, I have focusedon the doctrinal basis of thetargeting process. Now I willshow the targeting processusing a scenario. This scena-rio will explore targeting fromthe ChemO’s perspective andgive some techniques on howto get you, the ChemO, in-volved in the overall MDMP.

The Chemical Officer’s Critical Rolein the Targeting Process

By Major Pete Lofy

CML16

At 0200 on 15 December, an NCO awakes youfrom a deep slumber and tells you the S2 isholding a targeting team meeting and the

executive officer (XO) wants you there. The results ofthis meeting will support the defensive mission your unitis conducting in two days. As you walk into the tacticaloperations center (TOC) to the S2’s area, you noticethe S2, the fire support officer (FSO), and the supportingengineer officer are already there.

The S2 gives the targeting cell a quick update onthe enemy situation and orients the group to the maphe’s using to build the intelligence picture. He elaborateson possible threat COAs. Then he identifies the NAIsthat he’s developed, based on some key terrain and roadintersections. He says he thinks that these areas will becritical to the enemy’s attack. His assistant is takingnotes and assigns unit responsibility for NAIs, based onthe location of the NAIs and the current array of friendlyforces. This will become the basis for the collection orR&S plan. When the S2 completes his briefing, anengineer officer steps to the map and details currentfriendly mobility and countermobility operations andwhere he thinks the enemy will employ his mobilityassets to defeat us. He then elects many of these areasfor NAIs. This will ensure that someone is watching allof our obstacles and possible enemy breach points.

Now you give the group a quick update on theenemy’s NBC capabilities. Putting yourself in theenemy’s shoes, based on the S2’s possible threat COAs,you visualize and vocalize where NBC strikes mayoccur. You know the disposition of friendly forces andbasically how the unit will operate to defend the area.Both you and the S2 agree that for the enemy to besuccessful, he must locate and make the tank reserveineffective. The enemy doesn’t have to destroy thereserve, just take it out of the fight. You predict thathe’ll use persistent chemical agents on top of the reserveand along the reserve’s ingress routes to neutralize theunit’s combat effectiveness. You also surmise that theenemy may use nonpersistent agents along the frontlines to disrupt our defensive synchronization.

Based on these assessments, you nominate severalNAIs to be added to the list. You nominate critical roadintersections along the reserve routes. You know that ifthese intersections get “slimed,” the tankers will haveto use other routes to support the defense. You alsonominate the reserve assembly area and critical battlepositions located forward. Finally, you nominate theunit’s support area, knowing that any attack in or aroundthat area will disrupt sustainment operations.

By the end of the meeting, the team has successfullyidentified and recorded the critical NAIs. The meeting

breaks up and the staff officers go their separate ways.The S2 will use these critical NAIs to develop otherIPB products, namely the event template. The FSO willtake the NAIs (eventually targeted areas of interest[TAIs]) and begin developing artillery targets. Soon thestaff will assemble to analyze friendly COAs, asproposed by the operations officer (S3). Your input tothe IPB process and development of the NAIs and eventtemplate will be critical for this analysis.

Before the COA analysis meeting, you return toyour area to war-game use of the NBC assets availableto you. You verify the unit’s task organization and thatyou have an NBC reconnaissance squad (Fox), adecontamination platoon, and a smoke platoon availablefor your unit’s use. You will now use the NAIs identifiedat the targeting meeting to mission these units.

You start with the reconnaissance squad. Since noorganic unit is near NAI 14 (possible persistent chemicalstrike), you place the Foxes where they can observeand report on this NAI. This also allows them the freedomof maneuver to conduct reconnaissance missionselsewhere in your area of operations. You will soondevelop specific instructions for them and place thoseinstructions in the R&S plan and the operations order(OPORD).

Since the three most likely locations for a persistentchemical strike seem to be near or on the reserve, youdecide to place the decontamination platoon near thelocations. If the tank company is unable to have “eyes”on NAI 13, you could task the decontamination platoonto cover it. Your analysis of your COAs and war gamingshould bring that out later. You will also mission them toestablish decontamination sites and man-associatedlinkup locations. Specifically, you tell them to be preparedto conduct terrain decontamination at NAIs 13 and 14,the likely persistent strike locations (see figure).

Finally, you will task your smoke assets. Thecommander’s guidance stated that we had to providesome force protection for resupply assets that will beusing RT BLUE. He is concerned that the unit adjacentto us will not be able tostop dismountedenemy units frompenetratingour sectorfrom thee a s t .

16 CML

January 2003 17

Using your assessment of the enemy’s capabilities andknowing friendly unit dispositions, you begin to plansmoke targets along RT BLUE. You will write into theOPORD, in the NBC Annex, that the smoke platoonwill smoke along RT BLUE, from 0.5 kilometer forwardof NAI 14 to the north for 1 kilometer. Limiting theadvance of the smoke will ensure that B Company isnot hampered in its observation efforts.

Following the MDMP, you are ready to give yourinput to the OPORD. You use the NAIs to writespecific instructions for the subunits, to includesupporting NBC assets. When the NBC leaders arrivefor the OPORD brief, you provide them copies ofthe operational graphics, the OPORD, and the R&Splan. You elaborate on their responsibilities, as describedin the NBC Annex. Finally, you ask each element’sleader to conduct reconnaissance of the area and returnfor a brief back. It’s then that you will finalize thelocations of the NBC units, the smoke plan, the locationsof decontamination sites, etc.

Early in the morning on the day of the defensivebattle, an artillery strike occurs on NAI 13. C Company(tank) reports the strike, as they were tasked in theR&S matrix with watching the area. The reportstates,“Several artillery rounds impacted, with little orno explosions. No one was near the intersection, so nodamage was done to any friendly forces.” This reportgoes to the TOC via the operations and intelligence(O&I) net. The S2, who operates that net, immediatelysummons you, the ChemO. “Hey, ChemO, what do youmake of this?” You immediately recognize this as theanticipated persistent nerve-agent attack. You informthe battle captain of your analysis and the S2 concurs.You immediately inform your NCO to contact thesupporting NBC units and tell them to send one Foxto NAI 13 to verify the attack. Though this is nothow Foxes are doctrinally employed, you decide toaccept some risk so that one Fox can still monitorNAI 14. You also instruct the NCO to tell the decon-tamination platoon to prepare a squad for terraindecontamination of NAI 13 and vehicle decontaminationof one Fox and possibly more vehicles. At the sametime, the battle captain is informing units of thepossible strike and telling them to stay clear. An MPsquad moves forward to assist with traffic control. Thebattle captain also declares RT BLUE the primary routefor resupply and movement forward of the reserve.

Sometime after dawn, the remaining Fox reportsanother “low-detonation” strike at NAI 14. Your wargaming tells you that the enemy wouldn’t slime bothroutes with persistent chemical (p-chem), as this wouldtake routes away from his attack. You know that theenemy will use p-chem strikes to shape the battlefieldand is not likely to attack through his own p-chem strike.You immediately move the remaining Fox (near NAI14) forward to investigate. You also inform the smokeplatoon and B Company that a possible nonpersistentstrike has occurred to their rear and that they should goto mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) 4 gear.The Fox vehicle at NAI 14 confirms traces of GB nerveagent, validating your assessment.

When the enemy hits your unit’s battle positions at0800, your battalion is ready for the fight. All units areback to MOPP2 gear, except the decontamination andreconnaissance units cleaning up the p-chem strike atNAI 13. RT ORANGE should be open for business inabout two hours. Your planning and assessment havepaid off. You were able to focus friendly NBC assetsusing the NAIs established during the targeting meeting.Their placement on the battlefield led to quick responsesand minimal time at elevated MOPP levels. The unit’smission is a success, and the enemy is defeated in detail.

17January 2003

R & S Plan (extract)

NAI

11

12

13

14

Assigned

B Company

A Company

C Company

1/1/53 CM (Fox)

Monitor

T-72s

Low-detonationartillery strike

Low-detonationartillery strike

Low-detonationartillery strike

Low-detonationartillery strike

Trigger

FSE

Possiblenonpersistent

chemical

Possiblenonpersistent

chemical

Possiblepersistentchemical

Possiblepersistentchemical

Example of an R & S plan and associatedoperational “sketch”

CML18

Does this scenario seem impractical? It shouldn’t be. The ChemO [you] must be an integral part ofthe staff MDMP and targeting process. Missing

out on the MDMP, specifically the targeting process,means missing out on the opportunity to aid thecommander in identifying his or her vulnerabilities andfocusing NBC assets to support success on the battlefield.Is it always possible for you to be present at the targetingmeeting? No, but synchronizing your efforts with the S2early in the MDMP will accomplish nearly the same task.The targeting process does not have to be a stand-aloneprocess. It can be, and is, rolled up in the overall MDMP.Where/when in the MDMP targeting occurs is up to yourstaff and MDMP facilitator.

To summarize, you should lend your expertise inmatters dealing with NBC operations during the earlystages of the MDMP. Specifically, your input to thetargeting process will aid the commander in identifyingunit weaknesses and arraying friendly forces tocompensate for those weaknesses. Your input to targetingshould be—

• An assessment of the enemy’s NBC capabilities.

• An assessment of friendly units’ vulnerabilities to anNBC attack, based on the current array of forces.

• COAs for enemy use of NBC capabilities.

• Specific locations for the employment of enemyNBC weapons.

• A nomination of NAIs based on the previous fouritems.

Upon completion of the targeting process and duringthe analysis of friendly COAs, you should be able to—

• Anticipate enemy COAs.

• Task-organize and array friendly NBC defenseassets (reconnaissance/decontamination/smoke) tocounter the threat COA.

• Give missions (task and purpose) to the friendlyNBC defense assets, using the developed NAIsand other IPB products (like the R&S plan and theevent template) as a basis for the plan.

At the completion of the MDMP, the staff producesan OPORD (or in some cases an OPLAN). You shouldprovide appropriate products of the MDMP to thesupporting NBC defense assets. They should be, at aminimum the—

• OPORD, or at least critical portions thereof. Thecritical portions must include the mission,commander’s intent, subordinate unit tasks, support,and NBC annex.

• Operations overlay, including NAIs and criticalroutes.

• R&S plan, if NBC assets are involved (may be partof the OPORD).

• NBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and smokeplan and associated overlays (if not in the NBCAnnex already).

A critical note to make here is that nowhere havewe discussed chemical NAIs. Only the NAIs of thesupported unit exist. There is no need to burden theexecutor of the R&S plan (often a high-speed cavalryscout) with several sets of NAIs. Chemical NAIs willalmost always become lost in the fog of war. To talk tothe combat soldier, you must be on his or her “net.”

You now have (if you didn’t before) a basis foryour place, as the ChemO, in the targeting process.How involved you get in the process is often up to youor your boss. You should now know how to use theproducts of targeting to focus the assets available toyou and influence the battle. If you are having doubtsabout how you fit in, see the S2 and XO. They shouldget you started in the direction to becoming an integralpart of the combat staff.

Major Lofy is the chemical plans officer for III (U.S.) Corps atFort Hood, Texas. His previous assignments include squadronChemO, 2/2 ACR, 3-4 CAV; regimental ChemO, 3d ACR; NBCreconnaissance platoon leader and company XO, 92d ChemicalCompany; and commander, 89th Chemical Company, 3d ACR.He served on the faculty of the Chemistry Department (UnitedStates Military Academy, West Point) after receiving hismaster’s in physical/analytical chemistry from the Universityof Utah.

On 20 April 2002, approximately 600 personnel from across the Army and the Department of Defenseassembled at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to participate in Army Transformation War Game 2002. Thisyear’s war game focused on the Army’s missions, tasks, and capabilities within a joint context in the year2020. Participants were divided among four major working groups: Caspian Basin, Sumesia (fictional state),homeland security, and the rest of the world. This article provides insights gained from the Caspian Basin (seemap) with regard to the Objective Force; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense; andtheir implications on doctrine organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, andfacilities (DOTMLPF).

Scenario: In January 2020, a fictional state,Anfar, invades Azerbaijan to seize a number ofoil fields and a pipeline. The Azeri governmentrequests support from the United Nations (UN),which in turn passes a UN Security CouncilResolution. This resolution authorizes theformation of a combined joint task force (CJTF).Despite technological advances, the UnitedStates still depends heavily on foreign oil.Therefore, the CJTF is formed around anAmerican Army corps and Azeri forces. TheRussians and Turks, though members of thecoalition, are not contributing forces but haveagreed to allow the United States to utilize theirports, railways, and other critical infra-structure. Iran, an ally of Anfar, is poised alongthe Azeri border to intervene if necessary.

In February 2020, elements of an Iranianmechanized division, disguised as peacekeepingtroops, cross the border into Azerbaijan. The 23dArmored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), conducting ascreen along the Azeri-Iranian border, engages theIranian division and forces the Iranians to withdraw.Several hours after the initial attack, soldiers fromthe 23d ACR begin complaining of flu-like symptoms—high fever, chills, and headaches. Other soldiers are

By Major Neal Dorroh

vomiting and have diarrhea. At the same time, theIranian government announces that Iranian soldiersalong the Azeri-Iranian border are exhibitingsymptoms consistent with a biological attack andaccuses the CJTF of violating the Biological WeaponsConvention (BWC).

At the end of the day, CJTF and threat repre-sentatives meet to discuss what really happened andto assess the results. On 6 February 2020 at 0300,

CBRN DefCBRN DefCBRN DefCBRN DefCBRN Defenseenseenseenseensein the Objectivin the Objectivin the Objectivin the Objectivin the Objective Fe Fe Fe Fe Forororororce:ce:ce:ce:ce:

Insights FInsights FInsights FInsights FInsights Fromromromromrom ArmArmArmArmArmy Ty Ty Ty Ty Trrrrransfansfansfansfansformation Wormation Wormation Wormation Wormation War Game 2002ar Game 2002ar Game 2002ar Game 2002ar Game 2002

January 2003 19

CML20

the Iranians released approximately 50 pounds ofstaphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) from twounmanned aerial vehicles loitering over the Azeri-Iranian border. SEB is an incapacitating toxin thathas no human vaccine for treatment. Symptoms persistfor three to ten days. The Iranians employed the toxinin their effort to break contact with the 23d ACR. TheIranians accused the CJTF of violating the BWC toshift blame, gain international support, andpotentially disintegrate the coalition. Representativesfrom the CJTF and the threat assessed that the 23dACR was degraded to 60 percent combat effectivenessfor ten days, after which, the soldiers returned to duty.

Although the above scenario occurred during a wargame, there are several insights that can be gained fromthe vignette. First, sensors will be just as important in2020 as they are today. However, future sensors must bemore capable than current sensors in the number andtypes of hazards they can detect, the time required todetect a hazard, and the ability to detect hazards fromstand-off distances.

Additionally, sensors must be integrated into the futurecombat system (FCS) during the system’s engineeringprocess to effectively preserve combat power, sustainoperational tempo, and minimize casualties. They cannotbe added as an afterthought. Sensor integration not onlycontributes to effective warning and reporting, but it alsoensures that hazard information is directly inputted intothe common operational picture via the command, control,computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance system. As situational awarenessincreases, survivability increases as well.

Finally, sensors must be lightweight. The FCS isconstrained by weight and cubic meters because oftransporting requirements. Currently, the FCS isconstrained to 20 short tons or less to be C-130 trans-portable, thus supporting the needs of the combatantcommanders.

Also, individual and collective protection is vital toprotecting the force. In the past, protection has exclusivelyfocused on countering the effects of chemical warfareagents (for example, nerve, blister, and blood). However,chemical warfare agents represent only a small fractionof the potential hazards a soldier may face. Toxic industrialchemicals, radiological material, toxins, materiel-eatingmicrobes, and naturally occurring diseases pose a threatto U.S. troops as well.

Filters are not the panacea for Objective ForceCBRN survivability. Many chemical compounds (forexample, ammonia) can defeat carbon-based filters. Someenvironments, particularly subterranean, are oxygendeficient. Therefore, a combination of filters, over-pressure, and rebreathers is necessary to protect soldiersand preserve combat power.

Decontamination has always been a labor- andresource-intensive operation. In the Objective Force,decontamination must be multifunctional and userfriendly. For example, a Legacy Force heavy decon-tamination platoon consists of 20 personnel and 10vehicles. Despite its size, the platoon is designed toperform vehicle and equipment decontamination only,not personnel, casualty, terrain, or fixed site. Additionally,the platoon requires significant augmentation.

In the future, a decontamination unit must be capableof multiple decontamination missions with fewerpersonnel. Initially, this concept would require a materielsolution. However, this concept impacts all DOTMLPFdomains. For example, in the past, personnel decon-tamination was a unit’s responsibility; however, ObjectiveForce units will be much leaner than their Cold Warpredecessors and may not be able to decontaminatethemselves.

In conclusion, the principles of CBRN defense-contamination avoidance, protection, and decontami-nation have endured and will endure until theObjective Force is fielded. Regardless of which tech-nologies are incorporated into the FCS, the requirementto detect hazards, protect soldiers, neutralize hazards,and maintain situational understanding will persist. Thefielding of the Objective Force will not eliminate the unseenhazards that populate the battlespace but will drive theChemical Corps and the Army to seek out and harnessnew technologies that are more effective and moreefficient than today’s capabilities.

Major Dorroh is the commander of A Company, 84thChemical Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He hasserved in numerous stateside and overseas assignments.Major Dorroh is a graduate of the Chemical Officer Basicand Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms and ServicesStaff School, the Defense Language Institute, and the CanadianCommand and Staff College. He holds a bachelor’s in biologyfrom the University of North Alabama, Florence, Alabama,and a master’s in West European studies from IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, Indiana.

January 2003 21

The Maneuver Support Battle Lab (MSBL), workingwith the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC),has been investigating the concept of an individualdecontamination training aid to enhance the nuclear,biological, and chemical (NBC) survivability training ofservice members. Service members who have reacted toan NBC event are typically in mission-oriented protectiveposture (MOPP) gear. They are eager to reduce theirMOPP status as soon as possible, and the individual skindecontamination kit is a tool that allows them to do it.

The services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and MarineCorps—use the M291 decontamination kit to decon-taminate skin through physical removal, absorption, andneutralization of toxic agents. The Soldier’s Manual ofCommon Tasks lists a step-by-step procedure for self-decontamination using the kit. This task, 031-503-1013(Decontaminate Yourself and Individual EquipmentUsing Chemical Decontamination Kits), is taught ininitial-entry training and is included in the annualsustainment training conducted by the unit.

The M291 was fielded without a training aid, so theoperational kits are used for training. Recently, variousunits and training activities have expressed the desire fora kit to offset the need to use operational kits for training.The ECBC began a project to see if an effective trainingaid could be developed using safe, environmentally friendlymaterials. The contents of the training aid would have tobe approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration(FDA), reasonably representative, and less expensivethan the operational decontamination kit.

The ECBC developed the XM90 to solve this training-aid problem. This skin decontaminating simulation-training packet is packaged in blue packets and has“Training Aid” stamped on the packet to prevent it frombeing confused with the M291. The kit uses FDA-approved talc and charcoal, and service members find itbetter to train with than the black powder that is in theoperational kit.

On 26 August 2002, the last in a series of limitedobjective experiments was conducted at Fort LeonardWood, Missouri, on Range 290. The MSBL conductedcomparison trials over three days with the soldiersalternating between the M291 and XM90 kits. Theircomments included, “The XM90 is not as messy orabrasive as the M291 decon kit.”

The M291 with the charcoal particulate material isessential if you get contaminated and you only have afew minutes to remove the toxic agents before they be-come life threatening. However, for training purposes—to learn how to don your MOPP gear mask and apply thedecon kit contents to your hands, face, and neck—theXM90 can be used at half the cost to the units. Onceapproved, units will be able to order the training aidsthrough unit supply.

A NewDecontaminationTraining Aid

By Ms. Jocelyn Morris and Mr. James M. Cress

Ms. Morris is a combat development experimentation analyst,Maneuver Support Battle Lab. She was previously a trainingspecialist, Doctrine, Training, Leader Development,Organization, Materiel, and Soldiers Integration Branch, U.S.Army Chemical School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Mr. Cress is a liaison officer from the Soldier, Biological, andChemical Command, Natick Soldier Center, serving at theManeuver Support Battle Lab. He previously worked as aproject officer, Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. ArmyChemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama.

Dragon soldiers conduct simulated decontamina-tion with prototype training kit.

CML22

BG Nathaniel Lyon

The days of staff rides to the Civil War battlefields of Chickamauga and KennesawMountain are history for the Chemical Corps since its move from Fort McClellan, Alabama,to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The question now is how can we achieve, in Missouri, thetraining value that a staff ride offers?

There are Civil War battlefieldsnear Fort Leonard Wood that offerChemical Corps officers the chanceto study the art and science ofwarfare. Only Virginia and Tennesseehad more Civil War battles, skirmishes,and raids than Missouri.1 The Battleof Wilson’s Creek (also known as theBattle of Oak Hills) is one ofMissouri’s most historically relevantbattles. It was the second battle ofthe Civil War and was fought only twoweeks after the first Battle of Bull Run(also known as the first Battle ofManassas). During this battle, thefederal army lost 24 percent of itscombat power (258 dead, 873wounded, 186 missing or captured)while the southern forces had a 12percent casualty rate (279 dead, 951wounded).

Union Brigadier General (BG)Nathaniel Lyon was the first generalto die in the Civil War. Five Union menwere awarded the Medal of Honor.This battle played a significant role

in Missouri remaining under Unioncontrol for the rest of the Civil Warbecause it kept President Lincolnfocused on maintaining control of thestate. But the outcome of the battle isnot the only thing that makes itrelevant for soldiers to study. Thisarticle explains how the Battle ofWilson’s Creek can be used as atool to professionally developofficers on the strategic, opera-tional, and tactical levels of war;elements of combat power;principles of war; tenets of Armyoperations; and battle command.

Strategic, Operational, andTactical Levels of WarFM 3-0, Operations, defines

the levels of war as “doctrinalperspectives that clarify the linksbetween strategic objectives andtactical actions.”2 The Battle ofWilson’s Creek was a direct resultof the Union’s leadership definingits strategic objectives and thenrefining them into operational and

The Battle of Wilson’s Creek—Its Relevancy to Today’s

Chemical Officers

The Battle of Wilson’s Creek—Its Relevancy to Today’s

Chemical Officers

By Major Thomas A. Duncan II

tactical actions. “Strategy is the artand science of developing andemploying armed forces and otherinstruments of national power in asynchronized fashion to securenational or multinational objectives.”3

January 2003 23

To answer how the nationalstrategy relates to Wilson’sCreek, we must examinewhy the state of Missouriwas important in 1861.

One reason Missouriwas strategically importantwas that the Mississippi andMissouri Rivers flowedthrough the center of thestate and its eastern border.Control of the Mississippiwas critical to WinfieldScott’s Anaconda Plan.The plan was “a strategy bywhich the U.S. militarychief [Scott] sought toslowly strangle the Con-federacy by blockading, orotherwise dominating, theocean and river ports.”4 If the Unioncontrolled the state of Missouri, itwould have a significant advantage inthe struggle for control of theMississippi River Valley. Seizing itwould split the Confederacy in half.

Missouri was also relevantbecause of its production of corn (thirdin the nation), hemp (second in thenation), lead (first in the nation),livestock (second in the nation), and2 million pounds of wool (annually).5

Clearly, Missouri was a strategiclocation and a major source of thematerials needed to fight a war. Thisled to operational and tactical actionstaken by strategic planners on bothsides in Missouri.

The operational level of war isdefined as a major operation that is a“series of tactical actions (battles,engagements, strikes, and others)conducted by various combat forcesof a single, or several services,coordinated in time and place toaccomplish operational and some-times strategic objectives in anoperational area.”6

In June 1861, both sides in theconflict began major operations thatresulted in a series of battles as eachsought to gain the advantage over the

other. Claibourne Jackson, governorof Missouri, and Major General (MG)Sterling Price were the key leadersof Missourians with undeclaredsouthern sympathies. BG Lyon’sUnion forces, moving from SaintLouis, forced Jackson and Price fromthe official seat of state power—thestate capital at Jefferson City. Federaloperations attempted to preventJackson’s State Guard from joiningreinforcements coming north fromTexas, Louisiana, and Arkansas.These operations resulted in battlesand engagements at Booneville,Carthage, Dug Springs, and Wilson’sCreek.

Teaching our officers thestrategic and operational reasoningbehind the actions that led to Wilson’sCreek is a fantastic example of howthese thought processes shaped whereand how battles are fought to achieveour national objectives.

“Tactics is the employment ofunits in combat.”7 Examining thetactics used during the Battle ofWilson’s Creek allows us to developan understanding of the fundamen-tals of the science and art of war.Chapter 4 of FM 3-0 begins with thefollowing quote from Frederick theGreat: “The art of war owns certain

elements and fixed principles. Wemust acquire that theory and lodge itin our heads—otherwise, we willnever get far.” He understood thatthere are underlying tenets andprinciples in warfare and a leadermust study and understand theseconcepts to be successful on futurebattlefields.

Elements of Combat Power“Maneuver, firepower, informa-

tion, protection, and leadershipcomprise the elements of combatpower.”8 “Information enhancesleadership and magnifies the effectsof maneuver, firepower, and protec-tion.”9 I will examine the element ofinformation to demonstrate how it canbe applied during a Wilson’s Creekstaff ride.

On 9 August 1861, ConfederateBG McCulloch, southern commanderat Wilson’s Creek, received inac-curate information, which led him tomake decisions that put his army atrisk. He was told that BG Lyonwas getting ready to abandon the cityof Springfield. That informationcombined with the possibility of astorm caused McCulloch to decide tostay at his campsite on the creekinstead of advancing to Springfieldthat night.10

CML24

At the same time, BG Lyonreceived accurate information fromhis scouts. His patrol of federalDragoons encountered an enemyelement within 5 miles of Spring-field. The patrol not only confirmedthe approximate location of theconfederate army, but it alsodetermined that members of theelement it encountered were from aTexas unit. This confirmed thepresence of the Missouri StateGuard and reinforced the suspicionthat elements from Texas, Arkansas,and Louisiana had linked up. Lyonthen realized he could not withdrawfrom Springfield with his predomi-nantly infantry force; the nearestrail station was a 120-mile march toRolla, Missouri; and the enemypossessed a large number of caval-rymen. This critical information wasa key factor in Lyon’s decision toattack. He hoped to seize the initia-tive and attempt to defeat McCullochand Price’s forces.11 To understandLyon’s logic, we must understand theprinciples of war and how they wereapplied at Wilson’s Creek.

Principles of WarThe principles of war are

objective, offensive, mass, economyof force, maneuver, unity of com-mand, security, surprise, and simpli-city. FM 3-0 defines offensive as“seize, retain, and exploit the initia-tive.”12 It also states, “Commandersuse offensive actions to imposetheir will on the enemy.” I will usethe offensive principle of war todemonstrate how these foundations“of army operational doctrine”13

can be taught using this particularbattle.

BG Lyon’s informational advan-tage allowed him an opportunity toseize the initiative on 10 August 1861.One of his commanders, ColonelFranz Sigel, came up with a plan thatrelied on surprise and audacity (twocharacteristics of offensive opera-tions). Sigel proposed that the Unionforces split into two elements: Lyon

would move across the plains to makecontact with McCulloch’s forceswhile Sigel attempted to envelophim, “interdicting the enemies with-drawal routes.”14 Lyon agreed toSigel’s plan and ordered the attack atdaybreak on 10 August.

At about 0500, Lyon’s forcesattacked. They completely surprisedthe enemy and quickly seized themost prominent terrain feature ontheir axis of advance—the hill thatlater became known as Bloody Hill.This hill overlooked the encamp-ment of the Missouri State Guard(under the command of MG Price)and McCulloch’s southern forces.When Sigel heard Lyon’s attack atthe northern end of the enemy’s camp,he began firing his cannons intothe southern end. At this point in thebattle, Lyon and Sigel had theinitiative. Even though they wereoutnumbered 10,125 (southern) to5,400 (federal), accurate and timelyinformation allowed Lyon to under-take offensive operations and seizethe initiative early in the fight.15

Tenets of Army Operations“The tenets of Army operations—

initiative, agility, depth, synchro-nization, and versatility—build onthe principles of war. They furtherdescribe the characteristics ofsuccessful operations. These tenets

Colonel Franz Sigel

are essential to victory but do notguarantee success; however, with-out them the risk of failureincreases.”16

I have mentioned initiativeseveral times in this article. “Initia-tive is setting or dictating the termsof action throughout the battle oroperation.”17 McCulloch’s forcesawoke and began eating breakfastonly to be attacked from the northand the south simultaneously andwithout warning. This certainly setthe “terms of action” early in thebattle. Lyon’s ability to seize andexploit the initiative at the outset ofthe battle probably led to the federalforces’ initial success.

Battle CommandGeneral George S. Patton wrote,

“You can never have too muchreconnaissance.”18 That was true inPatton’s time and is still true today.“Battle command is the exercise ofcommand in operations against athinking, hostile enemy.”19 Eachcommander’s ability to see himself,the enemy, and the terrain must bestudied to maximize the use of a staffride. There are many aspects of battlecommand that can be discussed, butthis article focuses only on thevisualization aspect.

The key to conducting a staffride and the reason it cannot bereplaced with a PowerPoint® pre-sentation is that it allows the studentsto see how the terrain helped shapethe outcome of the battle. Mis-sion, enemy, terrain, troops—timeavailable, and civil considerations(METT-TC) help lead commandersthrough a thought process thatenables them to better see thebattlefield.

Doctrinally, leaders use METT-TCto assist in visualizing the battle-field. To demonstrate how METT-TCis used for training, I will brieflydescribe how each area relates toWilson’s Creek, using the staff rideas the training tool. For the sake of

January 2003 25

simplicity, I will use Lyon’s perspec-tive as the example.

Mission. Lyon believed his missionwas to hold Springfield. “The general[Lyon] appreciated the great calamitythat would befall the people of theUnion proclivities residing insouthwestern Missouri if the Unionarmy were to evacuate the area.Besides, he observed that Spring-field was the place to defend SaintLouis.”20 Being outnumbered almosttwo to one, Lyon knew he could nothold Springfield without maneu-vering to gain the advantage.

Enemy. Lyon knew the enemywas poorly equipped, inexperienced,and at the end of its supplies. Aquick strike might force the armyto withdraw from southwesternMissouri.

Terrain. Bloody Hill and Wilson’sCreek dominated the battlefield.Lyon immediately realized this andtook appropriate actions. He en-sured control of the high ground(Bloody Hill), anchoring his leftflank against the creek. Although he

failed, Lyon ordered Captain Plum-mer’s 1st Infantry across the creekto ensure that McCulloch’s forcescould not use it to screen theenemy’s movement and flank itsarmy. He also used his army’sknowledge of the terrain to facilitateSigel’s envelopment of McCulloch’ssouthern forces.

Weather shaped the outcome ofthe battle. The chance of rain the nightof 9 August delayed the Confederateand State Guard advance on Spring-field. Exhaustion caused by theAugust heat also contributed to Priceand McCulloch not pursuing thefederal forces when they withdrewfrom the battlefield.

Troops. Lyon had several elementsin his command whose enlistmentswere about to expire. The first was the1st Iowa, whose enlistment expired on14 August 1861.21 He knew that—

• The numerical odds against himwould increase every day hedelayed an attack and that hisforce was predominantlyinfantry.

General Lyon leads his men into action in this illustration from Harpers Weekly.

• Withdrawal from Springfieldinvolved marching to Rolla,Jefferson City, or Kansas Citywith a large enemy-mountedforce potentially cutting off hisroute of march.

• There were no reinforcementscoming and his supply line reliedon maintaining a clear route toRolla.

Time Available. The timing of thebattle was driven by Lyon’s desire toavoid withdrawing to Rolla in the faceof a strong enemy, McCulloch’sproximity to Springfield, and theimpending enlistment expiration formuch of his force. He also useddarkness to screen his movement anddawn as a time to attack to surprisethe enemy.

Civil Considerations. McCulloch’sforces had camped at Wilson’s Creekbecause of the civilian populationlocated there. He learned from hisscouts that there were a number ofripening cornfields at that location.22

Lyon’s concern for the citizenswho supported the Union caused

CML26

him to not give up southwesternMissouri. Local inhabitants alsoplayed a role in providing intelligenceto both sides. Civilians on the battle-field informed Lyon’s scouts thatTexans were located with MGPrice’s Missouri State Guard. Thisindicated to BG Lyon that BGMcCulloch’s forces had linked up withMG Price. These examples demon-strate that the Battle of Wilson’sCreek is an excellent case study forunderstanding how an army’s involve-ment with civilians can actually shapewhy, where, and when battles arefought.

Medals of HonorThere are many reasons to

study and conduct staff rides atWilson’s Creek National Battlefieldbesides these doctrinal applications.The Medal of Honor was estab-lished during the Civil War. Therewere five recipients in this battle:Nicholas S. Bouquet, Lorenzo D.Immell, John M. Schofield, WilliamM. Wherry, and Henry Clay Wood.All received the Medal of Honor forvarious acts of bravery during thebattle.23 I believe it is useful toremind ourselves that the reason wehave one nation today and thefreedoms we enjoy is because of theheroism and self-sacrifice of thosewho served before us. Many heroesfrom our past discovered their truestrength on a battlefield in Missouri.This fact is often not discussed, andmany dismiss it as being irrelevant.

While I have focused on theUnion Medal of Honor recipients, letthere be no doubt there was heroismon both sides of the battle. SeveralConfederates were recognized forhonor in the official dispatches of thebattle. The Confederate “Dispatches”served the same purpose as medalsawarded by the Union.

ConclusionWhy is the Battle of Wilson’s

Creek relevant to today’s chemicalofficers? The answer to this ques-tion has many pieces. This article justscratched the surface of what canbe gained by an in-depth study ofany battle, past or present. Wilson’sCreek can be used as a vehicle toprofessionally develop officers on thestrategic, operational, and tacticallevels of war; elements of combatpower; principles of war; tenets ofArmy operations; and battle com-mand. These lessons can be learnedif an individual is willing to analyzethe battle and walk the battlefield.A study of this or any other battleis never wasted time for a leaderor commander.

Authors Note: I must give creditwhere credit is due. I was inspired towrite this article because of Dr. BurtonWright III (Doc). He was the first toteach me about the Battle of Wilson’sCreek. He also assisted me the firsttime I took students to the battlefield.Although he is no longer with us, helives on in those of us who were hisstudents.Endnotes:

1 Vincent Tyndall and Jewell Smith, TheBattle of Wilson’s Creek 130th AnniversaryReenactment Guide, Wilson Creek NationalBattlefield Foundation, Springfield,Missouri, Vincent Tyndall, Jewell Smith,1991, p. 32.

2 Department of the Army, Field Manual3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, June 2001,p.2-2.

3 Ibid.4 James M. McPherson, (ed), Bruce

Catton, (nar), The American Heritage NewHistory of the Civil War, Viking, PenguinGroup Publishing, 1996, p. 102.

5 “The Political and Strategic Situation inMissouri, 1861,” notes compiled forinstruction in the Chemical Captain’sCareer Course by Dr. Burton Wright, slides2-5.

Major Duncan is a small-group instructor/leader for the Chemical Captain’s CareerCourse at the U.S. Army ChemicalSchool, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.His previous assignments include numer-ous stateside and overseas leadershippositions. He is a graduate of the Chem-ical Officer Basic and Advanced Courses;Combined Arms Services and StaffSchool; Ranger, Airborne, and Air AssaultSchools; and the Total Instructor Train-ing Course. Major Duncan has a bache-lor’s in general studies with emphasis inbusiness and communications from theUniversity of Northern Iowa and amaster’s in environmental managementfrom Webster University.

6 FM 3-0, p. 2-3.7 Ibid, p. 2-5.8 Ibid, p. 4-3.9 Ibid, p. 4-10.10 Edwin C. Bearss, The Battle of

Wilson’s Creek, LITHO Printers andBindery, Cassville, Missouri, 1992, p. 38.

11 Ibid, p. 47.12 FM 3-0, p. 4-13.13 Ibid, p. 4-11.14 Ibid, p. 7-11.15 Bearss, p. 60.16 FM 3-0, p. 4-15.17 Ibid.18 Department of the Army, Field

Manual 3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, July 2001,p.13-0.

19 FM 3-0, p. 5-1.20 Bearss, p. 46.21 Ibid, p. 28.22 Ibid, p. 34.23 Tyndall, pp. 24-25.

Cannon and Bloody Hill photograph (page22) and portraits courtesy of The NationalPark Service and Wilson’s Creek NationalBattlefield, http://www.nps.gov/wicr/yrvisit.html

Map and engraving from The Battle ofWilson’s Creek , Christopher Phillips,National Park Civil War Series, EasternNational, 2001.

January 2003 27

The purpose of the protective mask is to form a seal around the face and force the wearer to breathethrough one particular hole in the facepiece. To protect the user, the air flowing through the hole must beeither supplied or filtered. Since it is difficult to supply clean air in a field environment, the military generallyuses filters to clean the air before the user inhales it.

The desire for new and better media for the soldier’s mask filter has long been the topic of research. Asresearch found new and better media, filters became smaller and easier to breathe through. In this article, Iwill discuss the basic theory of air filtration and the history of the U.S. military filters. From copying the ideabehind the British small box respirator filter to the latest improvements in filter technology, this articleidentifies the advances made.

By Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Walk

Air Filtration Theory SimplifiedAir flowing into the mask has both gaseous and

particle components, and the mask filter must clean both.The filtering of gas was the first major concern in gasfiltration, so I will discuss it first.

Carbon is one of the first medias used in filters. It,with a large surface area of its volume, is packed in a bedthat cleans the toxic gas components of the air flowingthrough the filter. Carbon filters clean the air similar tothe way that sand filters clean water for public consump-tion. Contaminated air enters from the outside, thecontaminants absorb on the charcoal, and the cleaned airpasses through. Simple? No. The technology to get thecarbon to efficiently clean the air of the maximum

amount of contaminants was long in coming. First,simple charcoal was used, but it was not efficient enough,so it was activated through one of several processes toeliminate any volatile compounds filling pores in thecarbon’s surface. This maximized the surface area of thecarbon particle, therefore, maximizing the capacity of thecarbon. This process worked for the organic chemicalsencountered, but many of the first agents released wereinorganic chemicals.

Inorganic chemicals—like chlorine, the first agent usedon a large scale in war—were not absorbed to a largeextent on the charcoal and required a reactive filter.Overall, the first masks used in war, like the “black veilrespirator,” used reactive filters. The first inorganic and

Canisters: left, World War I; center, World War II; right, present-day

CML28

organic filters used a combination of carbon (for theorganics) and soda lime (for the inorganics). Soda lime isa mixture of hydrated lime, cement, kieselguhr, sodiumhydroxide, and water. This combination worked well fora time, until the toxic smokes were released.

Toxic smokes released fine particles as fumes andrequired a different defensive measure—particle filters.Early efforts to stop particles used felt for filtering. Thisworked acceptably well but was not perfect, soexperimentation continued. A good, thick filter paperwould filter all particles, but it would increase breath-ing resistance to an unacceptable level. Later effortsincluded carbon-impregnated filter paper and thenasbestos-impregnated filter paper. After World War II,the asbestos—for health reasons—was replaced.

As time passed, additives were found to enhancethe removal and destruction of the inorganics and somehighly volatile organics. During World War I, the varioustypes of copper-impregnated carbon were called ranki-nite, copper carbonite, and whetlerite. Whetlerite wascarbon that was activated and then impregnated with

copper through a chemical process. Whetlerite wasnamed after J.C. Whetzel and E. W. Fuller, the scientistsinstrumental in its development. Tests showed thatcopper-impregnated charcoal provided twice the pro-tection of regular charcoal against phosgene (CG),triple the protection against hydrogen cyanide (AC), andten times the protection against arsine (SA). Whetleritewas the most effective impregnated charcoal, and theUnited States began putting it into some canisters at theend of World War I. By World War II, whetlerite A wasthe standard filter material—used in an 80 percentwhetlerite A and 20 percent soda-lime mixture (calledthe Type D mixture). By 1942, whetlerite AS was in usewith added copper and silver, improving protectionagainst SA. By 1943, chromium VI had been added tomake whetlerite ASC, with even better protection againstAC and cyanogen chloride (CK). This superior carbonwas used until the 1980s when it was determined thatwhetlerite ASC was hazardous waste. Note that whenused properly, it is ok. But, if whetlerite ASC was not dis-posed of properly, chromium VI pollution resulted. By1993, the Army had found a suitable nonhazardousreplacement—whetlerite AZC—containing zinc. This isthe current filling for the protective mask canisters.

World War IThe first U.S. filter canisters in World War I were

copies of the British small box respirator filter. Withoutlooking at an actual filter, the United States copied theidea and created the black-painted training filter. The TypeA canister was made like the British small box res-pirator canister, but it was one inch longer due to possiblypoor charcoal. It was filled with a mixture of charcoal(60 percent) and green soda lime (40 percent) held inplace by terry cloth and gray flannel with two heavywire screens on the top fastened by two wire springs.The adsorbents were placed in the can in five equal layers,alternating charcoal and soda lime. The canisterswere never used at the front and became the so-calledtraining canister.

The Type B canister mixed the two absorbents beforefilling the canister and provided better protection. Thissimplified the canister packing. This canister was paintedyellow. As time passed, additional changes were made tosubsequent models:

• The valve was changed to a removable type.• Two cotton pads separated the charcoal mixture.• The color of the soda lime was changed from green

to pink.• The size of the granules changed from 6 to 14 mesh

to 8 to 14 mesh.

The diagram in this 1942 document gives a sec-tional view of the gas mask canister. The principalstandard types of early masks shown are, left to right,the diaphragm mask, combat mask, training mask,and noncombatant mask.

January 2003 29

The Type J canister, painted green, reduced thevolume of absorbent by one-third, cut the life expectancyof the canister in half, but provided at least equal protectionduring its life. The Type L canister, also painted green,increased the absorbent volume by 25 cubic centimetersto eliminate leakage around an internal cotton pad. Thefinal canister developed during the war, the 1919 canister,was painted blue and used felt to filter the irritant smokes.It was later termed the Mark I (MI) canister. It had twoinlet valves on top of the filter protected by a rain shield.

Between the WarsThe MI was followed by the MII and MIII; both had

similar dimensions and inlet valves on top. As eachmodel was adopted, each improved the capability andlessened the breathing resistance of previous models. Thesimilar MIIR and MIIIR were identical to the MII andMIII except that the inlet valve was moved to the bottomof the canister.

In 1932, the MIV was the standard filter produced.It had a “sucked-on” cotton linter particulate filter anda mixture of charcoal and soda lime for the media.To make a “sucked-on” particulate filter, air was drawnthrough the filter’s outlet to draw the cotton fibers to amesh screen, much like a lint trap in a clothes dryer. Therewas also a pad at the bottom of the absorbents, follower,spring, yoke, and lugs on the chemical container. A similarfilter, the MV, substituted a felt particulate filter for thesucked-on particulate filter. It was considered “substitutestandard” and was not produced.

A radical design change resulted in the MVI. Thisfilter used a sucked-on sleeve-type filter with a metalbottom. It contained no pad at the bottom of the

The following is from an unsigned documentin the collection of the National Archives. It is areminder to World War I soldiers to carry theirmask with them at all times.

THE SOLDIER’S FRIENDThere are occasions when the best of us are

indiscreet, and make mistakes. Sometimes we getaway with it, but seldom in France. There is one thing,and only one thing, that can save us our present andfuture health, the health of our descendants, and inmany cases, our own lives. This is not a new thing Iam to tell you of; all of you know of it, and many ofyou have already used it. A great many of our firsttroops over here thought it unnecessary, andcompletely neglected to use it, or used it improperly,with the result that hundreds of them are in hospitals,suffering terribly, many of them totally disabled forfuture service; causing the government much troubleand expense, when it should and could have beenavoided. It was not because they did not know of thenecessary precaution, but because they did not realizeits value.

Soldiers, inexperienced in its proper use, haveneglected this vital protection, hoping to “get awaywith it,” or to get immediate medical treatment. “Anounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” but inthis case the cure may be of little assistance.

You have undoubtedly been warned that there arecertain things to be carefully guarded against “overthere.” I now want to emphasize one of these. It isimpossible to exaggerate its danger. Every man,temporarily or permanently, unable to “carry on” isaiding the enemy.

There is one, and only one sure protection, andthat is—The Soldier’s Friend. You have heard of theSoldier’s Friend. It is well known to the soldiers inAmerica, but it is far more popular here. This littleprecaution may cause slight inconvenience, but youget full, free movement when it is properly adjusted.It is slightly difficult to wear but practice makes onevery efficient in its use. Examine it frequently to besure there are no holes in it. Stretch it to see that therubber has not rotted. Try it on. Make sure that it fits.If there is anything wrong with it, get another.

And men, never misplace it. It may be dangerousto be without it, so, when you promenade with Mada-moiselle, take it along. Inspect it regularly. Be surethat it is always in good condition, ready forimmediate use. You can never tell when you will haveto use it. Never be without your Soldier’s Friend.

The Soldier’s Friend is his Small Box Respirator.

The M1919 (MI) canister and its components

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The MIV canister without a canister body

absorbents, follower, spring, yoke, or lugs on the chemi-cal container. The bottom of the canister actually contactedthe absorbents and was supported by lugs in its body.The MVII was similar to the MVI but used a cup filterand an integral bottom for the container. Both provedeffective in experiments; however, neither was produced.The MVIII was the next major filter canister produced.

The MVIII was similar to the MVI but had a multi-layer particulate filter. The MIX was designed to facilitatemass production. It was slightly shorter than the MVIIIand had smooth sides. It was filled with Type D fillingand had a cotton particulate filter impregnated with lampblack. The MIXA1 used a larger (2-inch diameter) inletand had a corrugated canister. The particulate filterwas upgraded to a cellulose filter with asbestos. TheMIXA2 used Type ASC charcoal and was identified byits yellow top. Tests showed that adding soda lime wasunnecessary, so it was deleted. The MIXA2’s defenseagainst CK was the best ever of any U.S. filter, andbecause of concerns that the enemy might use CK, morethan 1.2 million canisters in gas masks were changed outwith the forces in the field.

Adopting the lightweight protective mask early inWorld War II was partially the result of adopting aneffective lightweight canister. Lightweight mask andcanister experiments in the 1930s ultimately resulted inthe design and adoption of the M10 canister. The M10was designed as a radial flow canister, which meant thatwhile the air was drawn in through a hole in thebottom, the air flowed up the sides of the can andflowed in from the sides to the center along the radius ofthe cylinder. Through the adoption of the ASC charcoal,the filter could be constructed smaller and still havesufficient protection for field use, so it was adopted in1942. The M10A1 was similar but contained morecharcoal.

World War IIDuring World War II, the M2 training mask was

actually issued as an emergency measure for soldiers touse as a service mask before issuing the M5 assault mask.It was particularly popular with jungle fighters in theSouthwest Pacific area and with many of the airborneunits. The M2 training mask used the MI training filter,containing whetlerite A. When whetlerite ASC charcoalwas developed, the MIA1 training filter, containingwhetlerite ASC, was issued to replace the MI trainingfilter for use in combat.

In World War II, along with the development of theM5 assault gas mask, the Army developed the E3 combatcanister. This was an axial flow filter—air flowed throughthe can along the axis of the cylinder. It was originallymade of steel components and weighed 350 grams. Subse-quent to standardization as the M11 canister, the canisterwas redesigned with aluminum components. All originallyproduced steel canisters were not shipped overseas withM5 masks because of concerns about peripheral airleakage, but the steel cans were held for issue to the M8snout-type mask. At least 1,388,246 canisters were held

Comparison of the M11 canister (left) to the stan-dard C2 canister (right)

January 2003 31

in storage into the 1950s. Many of the steel canisters wereissued to the Office of Civil Defense for use with thesnout-type M16 (CD-V800) mask.

After World War IIAt the end of World War II, the Army had three

standard filter canisters for general use—the MIXA2, theM10A1, and the M11. In 1948, the M2-series masks weredeclared obsolete and the MIXA2 was removed fromthe inventory. This left the M10A1 and M11 as standard,and they remained standard for the next 40 years. Thecanister of the 1980s was pretty much the same as the1940s, except for the minor addition of a charcoal filter toprevent media leakage.

In the 1950s, the Army experimented with a varietyof masks testing various filter technologies. TheE13-series masks tested various configurations. TheE13R4 mask had integral cheek-mounted filters, soit did not require a separate filter. The final mask,adopted as the M17, was a slightly modified E13R10,with the soon-to-be-famous M13 filters mounted inthe cheeks. These filters were not usable in any othermask and were famed as the so-called “pork-chop-shaped” filters using a lightweight gas-aerosol filtermaterial. The filters could only be changed from theinside, and even then with difficulty. The original M13filters had a problem with contamination ruining thecharcoal media and were quickly replaced by the M13A1.The M13A1 was replaced in 1968 by the M13A2filters. Thereafter, the M13 and M13A1 filters wereknown as so-called “training filters” and were recognizedby either a black (M13 and early M13A1) or gold(M13A1) inlet ring. The M13A2 has a green inlet ring.

With the initiation of the XM29 mask program, byinternational agreement, the Americans were to developthe mask and the Canadians were to develop the filter.The Canadians quickly developed the C2 filter as theirpart of the bargain. It was a filter roughly similar in sizeto the M11 but with a NATO standard 40-millimeter filterthread to screw into the facepiece. Like the M11, theair passed first through a pleated or accordion-styleparticulate filter and then through a layer of impreg-nated charcoal before passing to the user. This filter wasused in all mask programs in the 1970s and afterwardsuntil the Joint Services General Protective Mask(JSGPM) Program.

When whetlerite ASC charcoal was required to bedisposed of as hazardous waste, the Army developed theC2A1 canister using whetlerite AZC charcoal. The C2A1canister had fewer disposal restrictions than the C2canister.

(Continued on page 33)

As noted, the JSGPM is attempting to push filtertechnology to new levels of effectiveness. Filters are beingdesigned to maximize effectiveness while minimizinginterference with the user. Much more on this excitingprogram will follow.

The FutureAs we have not yet developed the ultimate filter, more

will come. An interesting technological development wouldbe the creation of a filter that causes the catalytic de-struction of the contaminant instead of adsorption. Whenthis is successfully militarized and fielded, our soldierswould have a filter that never needs replacing. Who knowswhat technology will bring for the transformed force?

ConclusionThe Army’s filter canister program has provided much

of the impetus to the Army’s protective gas mask program.Through the development of improved filter media, thefilters gradually became lighter with similar protection totheir predecessors. As the filters became lighter, the masksbecame lighter as well. The JSGPM is again pushing tech-nology to ensure the best protection for our soldiers in theyears to come.References:

Fries, Amos A. and Clarence J. West, Chemical Warfare,McGraw-Hill Book Company: New York, 1921.

Grabenstetter, R.J. and F.E. Blacet, “Impregnation ofCharcoal,” Chapter 4, Military Problems with Aerosols andNonpersistent Gases, Division 10, Volume 1, Office of Scien-tific Research and Development, Washington, D.C., 1946.

Green, James, 1LT, and Stephen D. Noyes, 2LT, “GasMask Report,” Prepared for the Chief, Chemical WarfareService, 9 July 1944. Obtained from the National Archives,College Park, Maryland.

“Letter,” Office of the Technical Director, EdgewoodArsenal, 14 April 1932, Subject: Structure and Status ofRecently Developed Canisters.

M11 (left), C2 (right), and the M13 “pork-chop-shaped” filter (center)

CML32

One of the most significant trends of the JointReadiness Training Center (JRTC) is the brigade/battalion chemical officer’s (ChemO’s) and

noncommissioned officer’s (NCO’s) understanding ofhow and where the intelligence preparation of thebattlefield (IPB) (FM 3-14, Nuclear, Biological, andChemical [NBC] Vulnerability Analysis) fits into themilitary decision-making process (MDMP), coupled withno NBC cell to assist in managing and focusing on theNBC threat. Furthermore, this trend is also compoundedby the lack of knowledge and understanding the unitcommander, S2, and S3 have of what the ChemO bringsto the fight. This negative trend can be reversed to apositive one with a simple training concept that ideallyshould begin at the Chemical Officer Basic Course(COBC).

This simple training concept will ensure that incomingChemOs, arriving at their first assignments as staffofficers, are prepared to conduct NBC duties. It also willenable them to smoothly integrate their own NBC battle-staff drills and analysis techniques within the tacticaloperations center (TOC) and its other BattlefieldOperating System (BOS) cells. In general, this conceptrequires that the ChemOs build their NBC cell conceptwithin the first four weeks in preparation for the last twoweeks (practical exercise) of COBC.

This concept is based on the assumption that theChemical Corps at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, strivesto build proficient NBC staff officers versus platoonleaders at the COBC. It also assumes that the ChemicalCorps will allocate the required funds to build NBC-relatedtools that the ChemO can take to the NBC cell. However,the lack of funds should not be the obstacle to halt this

simple concept. Many will argue that an officer shouldnot spend personal funds on training tools because theArmy should provide him with everything he needs. Iwould argue that the true professional is willing to investin his future as opposed to allowing the allocation of fundsto halt the progress to “sell NBC” to his projected newassignments.

This concept requires the ChemO to build anNBC-cell portable map board (PMB) and prepare NBCtools (NBC status sheets, precut simplified downwindpredictions) during personal time to minimize the impacton the current COBC teaching agenda. The PMB andNBC tools must be completed during the initial weekswhere the Chemical Corps strives to instill the requiredknowledge to become a proficient NBC staff officer. Thisensures that each ChemO would have the PMB and NBCtools status sheets in preparation for the practical exercisephase during the last two weeks of COBC.

The PMB and NBC tools will give the ChemO afew advantages when selling NBC to his first unit assign-ment. These advantages, in order of occurrence, are—

• The officer arrives at the new unit assignment witha custom-tailored PMB and NBC tool kit that hehas become accustomed to working within theNBC IPB analysis (FM 3-14) during the practicalexercise phase of COBC.

• The PMB introduces, up front, the concept of theNBC cell to the gaining unit with the understandingthat it is an essential requirement for the ChemOand NCO to manage NBC-related information andfoster NBC situational awareness for the unitcommander, key staff (S3, executive officer), and

TTTTTurururururning a Nening a Nening a Nening a Nening a NegggggaaaaatititititivvvvveeeeeJRJRJRJRJRTTTTTC Chemical C Chemical C Chemical C Chemical C Chemical TTTTTrrrrrendendendendend

Into a PInto a PInto a PInto a PInto a Positiositiositiositiositivvvvveeeee(A Simple Training Concept

for the Chemical Officer Basic Course)

By Captain Carlos E. Gonzalez

January 2003 33

other BOS cells (engineer, fire support, air defenseartillery, etc.).

• This concept ensures that the ChemO is able toconduct a continuous NBC IPB, produce therequired NBC data, and make NBC forceprotection recommendations to present to the unitcommander and staff so that feasible NBCguidance can be provided from the commander andstaff.

The last two weeks should be dedicated to buildingand refining the ChemO’s NBC analysis technique. Thisis accomplished by setting up a classroom to replicate aTOC with an S2 cell and an NBC cell with the ChemO’sown PMB to complete the cell. The instructor wouldprovide the required material for the ChemO’s NBC IPB(operations order, brigade-level Annex J, maps withgraphics, etc). The S2 cell will be manned by an actualS2 (preferably a captain) to add to the realism and assistthe ChemO in the joint effort to complete the NBC IPBprocess (FM 3-14). The small-group leader (SGL) willserve as a battalion commander and ask the difficultquestions to challenge the ChemO’s ability to articulatethe NBC environment.

The evaluated ChemO will conduct the NBC IPBand brief the SGL (battalion commander) on four sce-narios within a period of two weeks. The scenarios shouldbe based on one offensive operation, one defensiveoperation, one military operation other than war(toxic industrial material emphasis), and one jointoperation. These four scenarios will ensure that theChemO receives the opportunity to practice his analysis

and presentation skills in four different operationalenvironments. The criteria for feedback should focus onthe ability to clearly articulate the friendly and enemy NBCcapabilities and enemy NBC threat and make soundrecommendations on NBC force protection measures toenable the battalion commander to visualize the NBCthreat and give proper guidance (focused only onimproving the officer’s technique).

In conclusion, the goal of this article is to suggesthow to reverse a negative JRTC trend into a positive oneby focusing on the new ChemOs graduating from COBC.The creation of custom PMB and NBC tools, whileproviding feedback to each ChemO during a practicalexercise phase, will ensure that all ChemOs arrive at theirgaining unit prepared to be integrated as a chemical staffofficer and an NBC cell inside the TOC (versus the currentbattle-captain trend) and conduct effective NBC IPB togive the unit commander, staff, and BOS cells the rightdata to establish a feasible NBC force protection planand the correct doctrinal use of NBC assets (S/D platoons,NBCR Fox squads).

Captain Gonzalez is the chief of reconnaissance, U.S. ArmyChemical School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He hasserved in numerous leadership positions here in the statesand overseas. He is a graduate of the Chemical Officer BasicCourse, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the AirborneBasic Course, the Air Assault Course, the USMC Boot Camp,the USMC School of Infantry, and the Special ForcesAssessment and Selection Course. Captain Gonzalez has abachelor’s in criminal justice from the University of TexasPan American, Edinburg, Texas.

Lieutenant Colonel Walk is an Active Reserve chemical officer currently attending the Army War College. He previously served as WMDtraining officer and executive officer in the G-3, United States Army Reserve Command. Other assignments included chemical officerpositions in the 84th Ordnance Battalion and 60th Ordnance Group; acting battalion commander, 1st Battalion, 377th Regiment;commander, HHC, 59th Ordnance Brigade; and commander, 184th Chemical Detachment.

“New Mask Developed,” Armed Forces Chemical Journal, Vol. XI, No. 5, Armed Forces Chemical Association,Washington, D.C., September-October 1959.

Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, Chemical Corps Technical Committee, Edgewood Arsenal, 3 April 1952, Subject:Status of the Steel-Bodied Canister, Combat, M11 (E3).

O’Hern, Michael R., Thomas R. Dashiell, and Mary F. Tracy, “Chemical Defense Equipment,” Chapter 16, Textbook ofMilitary Medicine, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Office of the Surgeon General at TMM Publications,Washington, D.C., 1997.

Prentiss, Augustin M., Chemicals in War, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1937.Press Release 79-186, U.S. Army Armament R&D Command, 6 September 1979, Subject: Intensive Mask Development

Program Underway.

(The History of Military Mask Filters, continued from page 31)

CML34

The use of bleach as a decontaminator dates backto 1917 (World War I) when the Germans discoveredthat bleaching powder neutralized mustard agent.Eventually, this evolved into a substance calledsupertropical bleach (STB), which is easier to spreadand more stable in long-term storage than the old bleachingpowder. In 1960, decontamination solution number 2(DS2) was introduced. Both STB and DS2 are quiteeffective in decontamination operations and remain asthe foundation from which the Army developed itsdoctrine for chemical decontamination. Unfortunately,there are significant problems with DS2 and STB thatinclude training, environmental, and logistical con-cerns. A new solution called decontamination foam200 (DF-200) has been developed for decontami-nation operations. This new decontaminating foamsolution is superior to our current decontaminatingsolutions and could revolutionize the Army doctrineon decontamination operations.

The current threats to the United States areasymmetric means of attack on U.S. interests, both hereand abroad. The 11 September 2001 events, the anthraxattacks, and recent captured documents from Afghani-stan outlining the scope of terrorist chemical and biological(CB) weapons development are proof. Iraq used chem-ical weapons extensively during its war with Iran in the1970s. There is also a great amount of credible evidencethat Iraq stored chemical munitions in the bunkers alongthe allies’ most likely avenue of approach in OperationDesert Storm. When the allies destroyed these bunkers,they inadvertently released chemical agents onthemselves.

Most members of the U.S. Army Chemical Corpshave never trained with the decontaminating solutionsthat we are supposed to use to counter these threats.Recently I talked to one of the rare soldiers who hadtrained with DS2, and he described the results this

way: “I sprayed the DS2 on a small area of an armoredpersonnel carrier (APC) with an M13 (a handheldpressurized liquid sprayer). After 15 minutes, the paintstarted peeling off. Then I rinsed the DS2 off and had toend the training.” The Army’s mantra is “Train as youfight,” yet we cannot train with DS2 or STB. All chemicalsoldiers are required to go through the Chemical DefenseTraining Facility, which incorporates live nerve-agenttraining, allowing each soldier to gain complete confidencein his mission-orientated protective posture (MOPP) gear.However, no soldier has been able to gain this confidencewhile performing a decontamination operation.

The reason that soldiers do not train with DS2 is thatit is dangerous to handle. DS2 is a suspected teratogen(causes birth defects). Both DS2 and STB can causeburns and respiratory hazards and may damage thenervous system and liver if exposed to them for longdurations. When the two agents come in contact witheach other, STB may ignite spontaneously. In a real-worldsituation, STB may also ignite with a liquid blister agent.

The reactions with DF-200 are significantly differentbecause it essentially consists of the same ingredients thatmake up detergent and soap. The EnvironmentalProtection Agency lists all ingredients that are either List3 or 4 as “inert.” Recent skin tests using DF-100 (apredecessor of DF-200) were performed on elevenpeople of varying ages and sexes. Four different testswere performed, with the longest allowing the foam toremain on the test subject’s arm for 48 hours, unmolested.During these tests, four of the ten subjects experiencedno side effects, while the other six experienced eitherslight or mild irritation. After 24 hours, all subjects hadreturned to normal. Environmental concerns involving DS2and STB are just as extensive as the training and healthconcerns. While DF-200 resembles detergent, DS2resembles paint remover, which explains the results thatmy friend received when he used DS2 on the APC.

By Captain Michael C. Firmin

The Future of Decontamination Operations—An Analysis of Decontamination Foam 200

Most members of the U.S. Army’s Chemical Corps have never trained with thedecontaminating solutions that we are supposed to use to counter these threats.

January 2003 35

DS2 and STB are highly corrosive and incompatiblewith most metals, rubber sealants, plastics, fabrics, andelectronics. They are also combustible in certainenvironments. During decontamination operations, grossamounts of hazardous waste from DS2 and STB arecreated. Additionally, since both agents will corroderubber sealants and plastics, there is the possibility thatvarious vehicle seals and hoses will deteriorate andspring leaks after contact with DS2 and STB. Thisincreases the amount of waste and exacerbates theenvironmental damage. Both decontaminants have rigidstorage restrictions and are prohibited for use on aircraft.The environmental considerations for DS2 are so greatthat most countries will not allow it inside their borders.The shelf life for DS2 is ten years and can be extendedtwo more. DS2 has not been manufactured since 1992;therefore, by 2004 all existing DS2 will have passedits extended shelf life. In contrast, DF-200 is environ-mentally benign, meaning that it is nontoxic andnoncorrosive. As with DS2, DF-200 has a ten-year shelflife, but it remains noncorrosive after the shelf life hasexpired. Because DS-200 is environmentally benign afterit has exceeded its shelf life, it may be rotated into thetraining stock.

The logistics behind DS2 and STB are an S4’s worstnightmare. Using FM 3-5 (NBC Decontamination) as areference, a chemical unit that uses the M12 power-drivendecontamination apparatus (PDDA) will use approxi-mately 400 gallons of water at Station 1 (primary wash)for an M1 Abrams tank (this value is never stated, butmay be extrapolated from planning values stated in themanual). Following in sequence, Station 2 (DS2 appli-cation) will require approximately 15 gallons of DS2while Station 4 (rinse) will require 325 gallons of water.All together, this is 740 gallons of liquid weighing6,100 pounds. (STB will be needed at the contact timeand interior decontamination at Station 3, but not enoughto greatly affect the weight.)

The other consideration with this setup is the engineersupport needed. The current doctrine from FM 3-5requires 35 cubic feet of space per 250 gallons of liquidrunoff at Station 1. This would equate to 56 cubic feetper M1 tank. During training, chemical units rarelyreceive the engineer support they need because mostnonchemical commanders do not understand the greatamount of support needed to run a decontamination

site to standard. Therefore, these commanders do notproperly consider the chemical piece when they gothrough the military decision-making process.

A heavy decontamination company is equipped withnine tank and pump units for decontamination operations,giving the company a maximum water-carrying capacityof 10,800 gallons. This is enough water to decontaminate15 tanks before needing to resupply. If an adequate watersource is nearby, this may not be a problem. But in anarid environment, this becomes a critical issue.

A thorough decontamination site using the sameequipment and DF-200 could operate in the followingmanner. The M12 PDDA already has a foamingapparatus; therefore, Station 1 and Station 2 would becombined. The chemical unit would wash down thevehicle at the same time that it applies thedecontamination solution. The advantages of this methodare threefold; it—

• Requires less manpower, as Station 2 is no longerneeded.

• Needs no engineer support, as DF-200 is benignand does not create a hazardous runoff.

• Is less labor-intensive, as soldiers are no longerrequired to use mops to apply a decontaminationsolution.

At Station 3, DF-200 would replace STB but wouldbe used in the same manner. Potentially, Station 4 wouldno longer be needed. DF-200 dries to a white powderwithin an hour and can simply be brushed off the vehicle.Knowing this fact, in arid environments, a vehicle rinsemay not be necessary. However, it should be noted thatDF-200 might give a false positive reading to an improvedchemical agent monitor and an advanced chemical agentdetection alarm. Therefore, not utilizing Station 4becomes an assumed risk. In an environment wherewater is less of an issue, the vehicles may be rinsed.

Another advantage of DF-200 is that it is notcorrosive. With DS2, all tarps are stripped off thevehicles and buried at Station 1 of the decontami-nation site. If they are contaminated, this process couldinclude everything down to the vehicle’s seats.Although the complete effectiveness of DF-200 is notknown at this time, it is promising that the foam coulddecontaminate all surfaces it comes in contact with.

During training, chemical units rarely receive the engineer support they needbecause most nonchemical commanders do not understand the great amount ofsupport needed to run a decontamination site to standard.

CML36

A real world test of its capability occurred lastyear with the decontamination of anthrax sporesfrom the Hart Building in Washington, D.C. Forthis operation, EasyDECON foam (a version ofDF-200) was successfully used to sanitize thestairwells and elevators. It has been stated thatthis decontamination foam could be used to “washclothes.”

The effectiveness of DF-200 for military usewas proven in October 2000 when it was tested on threedifferent chemical agents—soman (GD), VX, andmustard (HD). The foam was also tested against onebiological agent, anthrax, which was chosen because itis considered to be the hardest biological agent to kill.The table at right shows the test results of these agents.

This chart shows that after 15 minutes of contact,the GD and VX have been destroyed, while only tracesof HD remain. Therefore, if the agent is known not to bemustard, the contact time required at Station 3 may bereduced in half. After one hour, all three agents wereneutralized.

With anthrax, the results were just as impressive.After 15 minutes of exposure, a seven-log kill (99.99999percent) of all anthrax spores was recorded. This is incontrast to DS2, which only recorded a one-log kill withanthrax.

The above facts are critical, especially when it comesto aviation decontamination procedures. Currently, theonly decontaminating agents approved for use on aircraftare soap and water, JP8, kerosene, and diesel fuels (FM3-5). None of these agents are as effective as STB orDS2. Each aircraft also has certain sensitive areas thatcannot be sprayed with a high-pressured hose, whichmakes the current decontamination methods using theM12 PDDA or M17A3 lightweight decontaminationapparatus ineffective. With the use of specializedequipment, DF-200 may be produced as a fog, which isextremely effective in decontaminating these sensitiveareas. The rest of the aircraft will be decontaminated inthe same way as the detailed equipment decontamination,providing the Army with something it has never hadbefore—an effective way of decontaminating aircraft.

Although a great improvement over STB and DS2,DF-200 is not without limitations. The most significantis that it has a freezing point of -7 degrees Celsius.In contrast, DS2 is effective down to -32 degrees Celsius.With the current equipment in the Army’s inventory, thisissue may remain unresolved. However, since waterfreezes at 0 degrees Celsius, using DS2 at lowtemperatures has its problems. An advantage of

DF-200 is that if it is dry, it may be brushed off the vehicle.Spraying water over DS2 may freeze the DS2 as well asany contaminant that has not been neutralized. This willcreate a hazard when the water melts and the contaminantstarts to desorb.

The current means of performing decontaminationoperations is outdated and impractical. Soldiers needto be able to train as they fight, something that theycannot do when it comes to decontamination opera-tions. With the development of DF-200, the ChemicalCorps is heading in the right direction. This new solutionfor decontamination operations must be adopted now toenable the Corps to go forward and protect our troops athome and abroad.References:

Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-5, NBC Decon-tamination, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 28 July2000, pp. 4-18 to 4-23, 7-8 to 7-14.

Formulations for the Decontamination and Mitigation of CBWarfare Agents, Toxic Hazardous Materials, Viruses, Bacteria andBacterial Spores, Abstract, Environmental Foam Technologies, 16November 2001.

Khidhir Hamza, Saddam’s Bombermaker, New York, Schribner,2000.

SFC Bradley Hicks, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center,Personal interview, 3 June 2002.

LTC Robert Serino, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, Personalinterview, 3 June 2002.

Sandia Decontamination Foam may be Tomorrow’s Best FirstResponse in a Chem-Bio Attack, News release, Sandia NationalLaboratories, 1 March 1999.

Skin Tests of the Safety of the MDF-100, bench test results. ModecIncorporated, March 2000.

Vickie Uhland, “Modec Hitches Wagon to Fear of Bioterrorism,”Rocky Mountain News, 2 January 2002, p. B-1.

Captain Firmin was a student in the Chemical Captain’s CareerCourse at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, when he wrote thisarticle. His previous assignments include chemical officer,1/327th Infantry Battalion, and platoon leader and executiveofficer, 63d Chemical Company, 101st Airborne Division, FortCampbell, Kentucky. CPT Firmin is a graduate of the Universityof Colorado at Boulder. He received his commission from theOfficer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia.

ChemicalAgent

GDVXHD

1 minute99.98 +/- 0.0191.20 +/- 8.5678.13 +/- 10.53

15 minutes99.97 +/- 0.0199.80 +/- 0.0898.46 +/- 1.43

60 minutes99.98 +/- 0.0199.88 +/- 0.0499.84 +/- 0.32

Percentage Destruction of Chemical Agentat Time Interval

January 2003 37

In October 2001, Washington, D.C.,fell victim to the largest bioterrorist attack in the history of the United

States, which resulted in its largestbiohazard decontamination ever. Theanthrax contamination caused clo-sure of several facilities, one of whichwas the Hart Senate Building.1 Inresponse to the attacks, officials fromthe Centers for Disease Control andPrevention (CDC), the Environmen-tal Protection Agency (EPA), and theU.S. Senate (the planning committee)began decontamination planning.Essential to the decontamination planwas the use of civilian decontaminantsand the four doctrinal decontami-nation principles:

• Decontaminate as soon possible.

• Decontaminate only what isnecessary.

• Decontaminate as far forwardas possible.

• Decontaminate by priority.

The CDC, EPA, and Senate’s planrequired efficient decontaminants.They consulted private agencies fordecontaminant products trying to findthe most efficient anthrax deconta-minant. Once the agencies possessingthe best decontaminants were selec-ted, the planning committee createdthe plan to decontaminate the build-ings. In February 2002, four monthsafter implementation, the plan todecontaminate the largest biohazardcontamination ended successfully.

Can the biological decontami-nants used in the Hart Senate Buildingwork for the Chemical Corps? Theanswer is yes! This article establishesreasons why.

Various biological decontaminantsare listed in FM 3-5, NBC Deconta-mination. Biological decontaminationis possible using standard deconta-minants such as decontaminationsolution number 2 (DS2) or nonstan-dard decontaminants like ethyleneoxide.2 The standard decontaminationplatoon only carries DS2 andsupertropical bleach. It is feasible toargue that during wartime, decon-tamination platoons will findnonstandard decontaminants difficultto procure.

To solve this problem, the Armyshould incorporate the civiliandecontaminant, Sandia foam—usedin the decontamination of the HartSenate Building—into its standarddecontaminants listed in FM 3-5. Theexpansion of this list will increasethe Chemical Corps’s inventory ofstandard decontaminants. The expan-sion will also increase flexibility indecontaminant choices for decontami-nation platoons, ultimately increasingoverall readiness.

Use of such an efficient decon-taminant in the Chemical Corps isnecessary in the event the Armyfaces anthrax contamination. Anthraxcan cause black cutaneous eschars ordry scabbing crusts.3 When used asan aerosol, anthrax causes inhalationfatalities; patients present signs andsymptoms resembling the flu, butsome die one to three days later. Asterile protein-based anthrax vaccinewith an effectiveness of 88 percentat 100 weeks (as required for mili-tary personnel) has been produced. 4

Unfortunately, supplies are limitedand are not available for civilian

Anthrax DecontaminationBy Captain Lindsey Nagtzaam

use. 5 Consequently, unvaccinatedcivilians lost their lives after inhalinganthrax on Capitol Hill during 17 to22 October 2001. 6

On 29 October 2001, followingthe deaths, Senate leaders agreed tobegin decontamination of the HartSenate Building. They inadvertentlyapplied the first decontaminationprinciple with their resolution—decontaminate as soon as possible. 7

Standing nine stories tall andencompassing 10 million cubic feet,the Hart Senate Building requireddecontamination in specific anthrax-contaminated areas. Senate MajorityLeader Tom Daschle, a recipient ofan anthrax-ridden letter, acted as thespokesperson for the anthraxdecontamination plan. He announcedthat the first plan to pump chlorinedioxide gas throughout the build-ing would cause “too many dangersinherent with using gas throughoutthe complex.” Chlorine dioxide gaswas not chosen to decontaminatethe entire building for the followingreasons:

• It can seep into rugs, drapes,and anywhere anthrax mayhave landed.

• It can cause damage toexpensive artwork andfurniture.

• It is time-consuming. 8

Instead, the planning committeesuggested a combined use of anantibacterial foam (Sandia foam) incontaminated areas and chlorinedioxide gas in the heating, ventilating,and air-conditioning (HVAC) system.9

By decontaminating affected rooms

CML38

Demonstration of the application of the newchemical-biological decontamination foamfrom a pressurized canister.

and the HVAC system, the com-mittee inadvertently applied thesecond decontamination principle—decontaminate only what isnecessary.

Senate leaders chose the HartSenate Building, by priority and need,to decontaminate first (fourth decon-tamination principle—decontaminateby priority). They chose this buildingover other contaminated civilian fa-cilities so government officials couldresume work. It remained closed forthe duration of the cleanup so allforms of anthrax life could beeliminated.

Applying the third decontami-nation principle—decontaminate asfar forward as possible—CDCworkers selected areas of highversus low contamination. Uponselection of the areas to bedecontaminated, the workers rana ground-level pipe into theHVAC system for chlorine di-oxide gas output. Crews kept theHVAC system filled with asmuch as 2,000 pounds of chlorinedioxide for 12-hour periods.After a 12-hour period, crewstested the HVAC system withtest strips similar to the smarttickets used in the BiologicalIntegrated Defense System(BIDS).10 If contamination wasfound during the test, the decon-tamination process was repeated.

In February 2002, the decon-tamination process ended suc-cessfully. Although this deconta-mination procedure was practicalfor use in the Hart SenateBuilding, it would not be apractical decontaminant for theArmy because the EPA haslimited its sale, distribution, anduse.11 However, the use of San-dia foam in the decontaminationof the Hart Senate Building wassignificant. It is a concoction of“ordinary household substances

such as those found in hair conditionerand toothpaste.”12 It resemblesshaving cream; can be applied as aliquid spray, mist, fog, or foam; andneutralizes a wide variety of chemicaland biological agents in mere minutes.It is also similar to a fire retardant thatcan be sprayed from handheldcanisters or trucks, which can bedispensed in an open area such as arunway.13 It can also be incorporatedinto the fire sprinkler systems of high-profile government or militarybuildings. Environmentally friendly,nontoxic, and noncorrosive, the foamhas proven to be effective against“viable anthrax spores and chemicalwarfare agents (VX, mustard, andsoman).”14

Sandia foam, DecontaminationFoam 200, can cost as little as $0.15per pound.15 This is an enticing pricefor an efficient decontaminant to addto the Army’s standard decontaminantinventory.

The efficient decontamination ofthe Hart Senate Building eased thefear of possible anthrax contamina-tion for its users. However, the threatof similar attacks to high-visibilitybuildings and personnel remainspossible. Anthrax mail attacks arenot to be forgotten nor are they anevent of the past only. Therefore,the military—particularly the Army—must stay abreast of developingbiological decontaminants. Ethyleneoxide and cold flame are two proposed

decontaminants that were notused in the decontamination ofthe Hart Senate Building.

The CDC, the World HealthOrganization, and the AmericanPublic Association recognizeethylene oxide as a provendecontaminant. The ChemicalCorps is also familiar with thisnonstandard decontaminantfrom tests conducted at FortDetrick, Maryland, more than50 years ago. Ethylene oxidecan be used to sterilize food,cosmetics, hospital surgicalequipment, and plastic devicesthat cannot be sterilized bysteam. Ethylene oxide can alsobe used to provide immediatedecontamination via a mobilesterilization unit. 16 Although notchosen for assistance in thedecontamination of the HartSenate Building, this deconta-minant is a feasible method foranthrax decontamination. Thedownfall of this decontaminantis its limited use in an airtightenclosure and its flammablequality.

The second proposeddecontaminant not used in the

January 2003 39

Hart Senate Building was cold flame.It is a dry decontamination devicedesigned by a team at Los AlamosNational Laboratory. This deviceionizes a mix of helium and oxygen,emitting a cloud of charged particles.17

The result is plasma, which lookssimilar to fire but is 70 degrees Celsiuscolder. Its content—a highly reactiveform of oxygen—neutralizes patho-gens such as anthrax. Cold flame wasnot used because the leader of theteam wanted to “clean things upwithout destroying them.”18

Devices neutralizing pathogensthrough ionization could cost theArmy millions of dollars due to theirintricate makeup. Although cost isone factor, another negative factor istheir lack of production. These devicesare not out of the developmentalphase and have not been manu-factured. There-fore, cold flame is notyet a worthy decontaminant for theArmy.

In preparation for future bio-terrorist attacks against the UnitedStates, the Chemical Corps could useSandia foam, chlorine dioxide, andethylene dioxide to expand its biolo-gical decontamination options. Ofthese decontaminants, the low-costSandia foam is the best alternativefor the Army. Learning from thesuccess of the civilian sector, thereis no question as to whether theArmy should incorporate it into theChemical Corps’s standard decon-taminants. The foam will proveeffective and change the world ofdecontamination as the ChemicalCorps knows it today. Deconta-mination with ethylene oxide isfeasible; however, because of itslimited use in an airtight enclosure,it is best left as a non-standarddecontaminant. The use of chlorinedioxide as a decontaminant is costlyand consumes significant manpower.This particular method is only

feasible for use in the civiliansector. Finally, cold flame has notproven to be an effective deconta-minant method because it is still indevelopment. To expand its biolo-gical decontamination readinessfurther, the Army could use cold flameonce it has been tested.

The civilian sector is not alone inbioterrorism decontamination. TheArmy is also affected when govern-ment officials are targets. If Armyofficials and civilian agencies collabo-rate on current biological deconta-mination techniques and methods,biological readiness will improve forboth.

Endnotes:1K. Foerstel, “Decontaminating Capital

Hill Is a Learning Experience,” CQ Weekly,59, retrieved May 10, 2002, from EBSCOInformation Services, p. 2668.

2Department of the Army, Field Manual3-5, NBC Decontamination, GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C., July2000, p. B-6.

3E. Green, “Treating Pressure Ulcers,”Potter, P.A. & Perry A.G. (eds.), Funda-mentals of Nursing, Mosby, Missouri,p.1545.

4“The Vaccine,” Anthrax VaccineImmunization Program, 1, retrieved June16, 2002, from LUKOL, p. 1.

5“Anthrax,” Johns Hopkins UniversityCenter for Biodefense Strategies, 2,retrieved May 1, 2002, from EBSCOInformation Services, p. 1-2.

6Washington and Virginia excerpt, CNN,retrieved May 1, 2002, from EBSCOInformation Services, p. 1.

7Foerstel, p. 2669.8J. Kluger, “Scrubbing Out the Spores,”

Time, 22,62-65, retrieved May 1, 2002,from EBSCO Information Services, p. 22.

9Foerstel, p. 2668.10Department of the Army, Field Manual

3-101-4, Biological Detection PlatoonOperations Tactics, Techniques, and Pro-cedures, Government Printing Office,Washington, D.C., September 2000, p. N-7.

11 “Chlorine Dioxide,” EPA PesticidePrograms, 1, 1-6, retrieved May 1, 2002,from EBSCO Information Services, p. 5.

Captain Nagtzaam was a student in theChemical Captain’s Career Course(Class 3-02) at Fort Leonard Wood,Missouri, when she wrote this article.Her previous assignments includeassistant brigade chemical officer, 2dAviation Brigade, Korea; battalionchemical officer, 2-227th AviationBattalion; platoon leader, 68thChemical Company; and chemicallogistics and plans officer for the 1stCavalry Division. Captain Nagtzaamreceived her undergraduate degree fromWidener University and her graduatedegree from Webster University. InMarch 2003, she will be assigned asthe chemical officer of the 101stAirborne Division Support Command.

12A. Gernsback, “Anthrax-ScrubbingBubbles,” Poptronics, 3,11-13, retrievedMay 1, 2002, from EBSCO InformationServices, p. 11.

13 J. German, “Sudsy Brew NeutralizedViral, Bacterial, Nerve Agents in Minutes,”Sandia, 1, 1-6, retrieved May 1, 2002,from EBSCO Information Services, p. 4.

14Gernsback, p. 11.15German, p. 1-6.16NewsRx.com, “Vacudyne,

Sterilization Services Offer ProvenMethod to Kill Anthrax,” TB & OutbreaksWeek, 11, 10, retrieved May 1, 2002, fromEBSCO Information Services, p. 1.

17F. Clines, “Cold Flame,” TechnologyReview, 1, retrieved May 1, 2002, fromEBSCO Information Services, p. 17.

18Ibid, pp. 17-18.

References:Costello, M.A., “Decontamination

Planning Includes a Variety of Issues,Experts Advise,” AHA News, 27, 45-47,retrieved May 1, 2002, from EBSCOInformation Services.

Headquarters, Department of the Army,Field Manual 3-101-4, Biological DefenseOperation, Corps/Company Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures, GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C., March1999.

NewsRx.com, “Sandia DecontaminantCleaning Up Anthrax Locations,” TB &Outbreaks Week, 4, 20, retrieved May 1,2002, from EBSCO Information Services.

Photohttp://www.sandia.gov/media/cbwfoam.htm

CML40

As of 1 August 2002, all soldiers who successfully complete the Basic Noncommissioned OfficerCourse (BNCOC) will be awarded 40 promotion points. They will no longer receive 4 promotionpoints per BNCOC week. This change will lessen administrative mistakes and level the playing fieldfor BNCOC graduates with similar military occupational specialties (MOSs), personnel officialssaid. “Clerks will no longer have to do the math,” said Sergeant Major Louisa Scott, chief of enlistedpromotions, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command.

“Under the current system, when soldiers complete both phases of BNCOC—common coreand MOS specific—they submit two Department of the Army Forms 1059 to their Personnel SupportBranch (PSB) for points,” Scott said. “The PSB clerk then decides how many points a soldier gets,”he added. For example, if Phase 1 is five weeks and three days and Phase 2 is two weeks and twodays, one clerk may give 32 points for eight weeks, but another clerk may give 28 points for sevenweeks. Scott said, “By implementing a 40-point standard there is no room for interpretation.”

“Some soldiers may have the perception that they will lose points because their particular BNCOCis longer than 10 weeks,” said Sergeant Major Gerald Purcell, personnel policy integrator with theArmy’s Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel (G1). “That’s not true. The point system will be applicableto every soldier in the MOS, and the cut-off score will reflect that,” he said. “Soldiers will still becompeting against others in their MOS, and everyone in that MOS will have 40 points,” Scott added.

“The soldiers most greatly affected are the ones who are in MOSs that have merged, such assome in the medical field and those that are planning to merge under the implementation of ArmyDevelopment Systems (ADS) XXI initiatives, which was designed to consolidate MOSs with similarfunctions,” Purcell said. Last year several medical skills were combined under the umbrella 91W.After the merge, some soldiers had promotion points based on a 12-week BNCOC while others hadpoints based on an 8-week course. Other potential merges include personnel administrative specialists(75B) and personnel services specialists (75H) who would be renamed as 42A.

There has been a proposal to merge light wheeled-vehicle mechanics (63B), heavy wheeled-vehicle mechanics (63S) and wheeled-vehicle repairers (63W). While the wheeled-vehicle repairerswould lose 32 points if the merger goes through, each of the soldiers, who would be competingbetween one another for promotion, would receive the same number of promotion points for BNCOCcompletion. “This eliminates inequities based solely on their BNCOC course length,” Purcell said.“We’re treating BNCOC as an equal element. So as we merge similar MOSs, no one is at adisadvantage,” he said.

In July, all personnel support battalions began converting the BNCOC points and adjustingpromotion points. “Soldiers will not have to do anything,” Purcell said.

All BNCOC Graduates to Get40 Promotion Points

By Staff Sergeant Marcia Triggs