ARMS SALES, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

ARMS SALES, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

An Examination of the Impact of the Legislative Veto on

American Foreign Policy in the Middle East from 1974 to 1983

Lydia A. Boyer

International Relations 395

May 7, 2010

Submitted to the Mount Holyoke College International Relations Committee

Primary Advisor: Sohail Hashmi Second Advisor: Jon Western Third Reader: Jeremy King

Abstract

This paper examines the history of the legislative veto as a separation of powers

mechanism in the American government and its influence on American foreign policy making

decisions in the Middle East. Its theoretical foundation lies in the tension between the legislative

and executive branches, which must work together to make foreign policy as a result of the

shared power given by the United States Constitution. As both the President, the head of the

executive branch, and the members of Congress both rely on election from the American public

and support from American interest groups, which use their monetary and informational support

in exchange for policy support in Washington DC. The legislative veto, officially in practice

from the 1930s to 1983, had a distinct impact on foreign policy because of its reversal of the

legislative process, which enabled public interest groups to have a greater influence on foreign

policy. Its impact can be easily seen on Foreign Policy in the Middle East because the legislative

veto provision was included in the 1974 renewal of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

During the 9 year period until the legislative veto was ruled unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha,

five large arms sales to Middle Eastern countries illustrate the larger trend of public policy

changing government policy making through the legislative veto. The five sales studied in this

paper illustrate the influence of lobbying groups, particularly the American Israeli lobby as a

general group, in being able to change foreign policy arrangements already negotiated by foreign

policy actors in the US government and demonstrate that sales were altered, withdrawn, or

resubmitted with amendments in favor of pro-Israeli policies.

Table of Contents

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1

Chapter 1: The Legislative Veto ......................................................................................................4

Chapter 2: American Foreign Policy Making ................................................................................23

Chapter 3: Case Studies of American Arms Sales to the Middle East ..........................................44

Case Study #1 -1975: Sale of Hawk Missiles to Jordan ....................................................49

Case Study #2 - 1976: Sale of C-130 Hercules Transport Planes to Egypt .......................62

Case Study #3 - 1976: Package Sale to Iran, Saudi Arabia and others ..............................72

Case Study #4 - 1978: Package Sale to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia ............................87

Case Study #5 - 1981: Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia .................................................104

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................117

Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................................120

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Introduction

The United States underwent significant changes during the twentieth century as it took a

prominent role in global affairs, but as the role of the country changed, its government had to

find a way to adapt to the new challenges. One of the adaptations that the government began

utilizing in the early 1930’s was known as the legislative veto and it allowed the American

government to reorganize how policy was made. The mechanism took a prominent role in both

foreign and domestic policies and changed the structure of government. As a result, other

changes took place in how the government made foreign policy, the greatest of which was a

more powerful executive branch. By the 1970’s Congress was fed up with the expansion of

executive powers that allowed the President to conduct foreign policy almost unilaterally, and

often against the will of the legislature. As a result, Congress began using the legislative veto as

a mechanism to take back control in many areas of foreign and domestic policy. In foreign

policy, this meant that Congress was attempting to regain its powers over trade, declaration of

war and committing of troops, and commitment of foreign aid.

The more active role that Congress took in the 1970’s and early 1980’s developed the

legislative veto process as a direct result of the increased use of the legislative veto on new laws

passed by Congress. The impact was not necessarily apparent by looking at a general survey of

the laws though because the legislative veto seemed to be used very infrequently. In American

foreign policy in the Middle East, however, the legislative veto made a very clear impression

because it opened up Congress to more lobbying efforts and gave special interest groups a

greater ability to push their agendas. The clearest example of this process can be seen in arms

sales between the U.S. and countries in the Middle East with the greatest rallying of lobbying

coming out around sales to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. By giving more power to

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Congress, the legislative veto provision would allow for a frenzy of activity by voters to rally

around an issue while it was under review on Capitol Hill with a resultant increase in

participation.

In order to demonstrate that there was a general increase in participation by lobbying

groups, and most notably in the case of Middle East arms sales, the Israeli lobby, this paper will

look at how the legislative veto works, the process of American foreign policy making and the

role of lobbies before looking at a series of arms sales from 1975 to 1981, which demonstrate the

increased participation by special interest groups. The two other main results of the legislative

veto from the same period were that Congress used it as a means to reassert its power and check

the President, even if the legislature did not wish to stop an activity, and it served as a

mechanism to allow for increased debate of the Cold War, which most likely perpetuated the

mentality of the Cold War through this period. While these two issues may overlap with the

increased participation by lobbying groups, they are not the focus and were sometimes used by

the public to push a point of view where the argument could be furthered by using either the need

for a stronger Congress or the Cold War mentality.

Overall, the conclusion that I have come to is that lobbying the United States government

to influence American foreign policy in the Middle East became more important during this

period than it had been before because of the changes in the American role in the region.

Throughout the period of 1975 to 1981, the United States was taking a more dominant role as the

major peacemaker and mediator between the Arabs and the Israelis and it brokered many of the

peace agreements. As a result, advocates for both the Arab and Israeli sides wanted to ensure that

their government understood what was at stake during the entire process and procuring arms for

the states they sympathized with became a fundamental part of their advocacy. While early on,

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the American Jewish lobby was much more successful in asserting its influence, the rise of the

Arab lobby, especially with its connection to Arab oil, began to take a bigger role.

The issue, as will be seen from the case studies, is that the points of view lobbied for by

the interest groups do not always make the most sense based upon the conditions abroad and

while groups may be informed about specific foreign policy issues, they espouse a bias by

advocating for a certain position as though the issue existed in a vacuum. Congressmen, who are

not as educated on international issues, can be swayed by the presentation of information by

interest groups as facts rather than a single interpretation of events. The other challenge about

very active interest groups is if they have motivated donors and voters, elected officials will feel

pressure to vote in certain ways to ensure their self-interest in re-elections, which bureaucrats in

the executive department are not subjected to. The dilemma that emerges is one where wealthier

and more prominent groups are able to levy greater influence over Congress regardless of where

American interests actually are because they are able to impact elections through donations and

campaigning for or against an incumbent based upon their voting record on specific issues.

In sum, the legislative veto is a mechanism that allowed for greater participation by the

public in foreign policy formation in the Middle East and created a contained environment for

interest groups to lobby their issues. Foreign state leaders also took advantage of the ability to

lobby the U.S. government, but they were already able to do so through diplomatic channels; the

difference being that they began lobbying Congress during this period as well as the President

and executive departments. In the Middle East, arms sales demonstrates this increase in

participation despite that an arms sale was never vetoed. The active role of interest groups in the

U.S. that focuses on Middle East policy has thus persisted to this day.

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Chapter 1: The Legislative Veto

The legislative veto developed during the twentieth century to address the need of the

national government to widen its scope while retaining efficiency within both the legislative and

executive branches. The legislative veto, also called a congressional veto, developed throughout

the twentieth century in order to address these challenges in the federal government. Proponents

have held that it is a constitutional method of delegating power from Congress to the more

capable executive while retaining both the separation of powers and the ability for one branch to

perform a check on the others’ power. However, opponents argue that it violates basic

constitutional prescriptions for inter-branch interactions. In the case of arms sales, the veto

opened up the number of groups that could assert influence over the sales as well as acting as a

means for the executive and legislative branches to work together more efficiently. This section

will look first at the veto itself and then the development of the veto as it was attached to laws

relating to the foreign sale of arms.

The development of the legislative veto was a result of both branches working together to

develop a mechanism that would provide both branches of government with increased flexibility

and the ability to streamline as they fulfilled constitutional duties. Opponents and proponents

have existed in both parts of the government and at different times each branch seems to have

benefited more from the legislative veto. Generally, these laws allow the executive branch to

take actions that normally Congress is responsible for under the constitution while providing a

means for Congress to retain oversight on any decision made.

In order to understand how the legislative veto became a part of American foreign policy

making, the mechanism itself and its context needs to be understood. The constitutional power

given to Congress and the President overlaps in specific ways and the legislative veto sought to

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mediate these conflicting powers. This section is divided into three parts: an introduction to the

legislative veto and how it works; the history and development of the legislative veto from its

inception until its official death in the 1983 Supreme Court ruling and then a brief synopsis of

the key ways that the veto makes an appearance in American foreign policy and then how it

functioned in arms sales between 1974, when it first appeared, and 1983 when it was removed

from practice.

The Veto Mechanism

There are several different types of legislative vetoes that vary slightly from one another.

In order to understand the entire mechanism behind a legislative veto, these different definitions

of the scope of the veto in addition to the narrow and broad definitions must be spelled out. The

general definitions of the veto describe the most basic way that it works. James M. Lindsay

describes legislative vetoes as all “shar[ing] the same kind of basic quid pro quo: Congress

delegates authority to the President, but reserves the right to veto the President’s actions by

passing a simple (one-house) or concurrent (two-house) resolution, neither of which is subject to

a presidential veto”.1 This basic definition is expanded on by Louis Fisher who notes that

committee vetoes or “even a committee chair’s veto” as the actions that qualify as legislative

vetoes.2 In summary, the most basic definition of the legislative veto is that Congress may veto

the action of the executive in a specific context where the actions being taken stem from

delegated authority from Congress. However, each veto provision is slightly different because, as

Lindsay alludes to, they are all attached different onto specific laws, so the process for using a

legislative veto depends on how it was incorporated in a particular case.

1 Lindsay, James M, Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore

and London): 1994, 105. 2 Fisher, Louis, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive 4

th Ed. (Texas A&M Press: College

Station): 1998, 91. [Fisher 1998]

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As a result of the individual attachment of veto provisions, each veto functions differently

in practice. Fisher identifies them as working in one of two ways: congressional approval before

the action is taken or disapproval after the action is taken but within a certain period of time.3

Both of these mechanisms fall into what has been termed a “report and wait” provision, but they

are not all the same because some provisions require an explicit approval from Congress while

others give Congress a specific period of time during which they may disapprove of the actions.

If Congress does not disapprove, then the action continues as the executive branch intended.4

The general similarity between these approvals or disapprovals is that “these legislative actions

are not presented to the president for his signature or veto”.5

The veto developed for many reasons, but the most prominent was for Congress and the

President to compromise on how the executive branch could take more discretionary action

while still allowing Congress' monopoly legislating. In foreign policy, constitutional gaps

between the authority given to the legislature and the executive, as well as new demands on the

federal government abroad caused the legislative veto to become the tool that allowed executive

departments to fulfill specific needs while maintaining Congressional oversight. The rationale

was that the bureaucracies would be more efficient at the tasks because of their expertise.

The Development and End of the Legislative Veto

The legislative veto developed from the need to close gaps in policy making power

between Congress and the President. The twentieth century marked an expansion in the Federal

government, which caused the original design of the government to impede lawmaking and

3 Fisher, Louis. “A Political Context for Legislative Vetoes” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 93 No. 2 (Summer

1978), 241. [Fisher 1978] 4 Franklin, Daniel Paul. “Why the Legislative Veto Isn’t Dead” Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 16, No. 3,

Leadership and National Security Policy (Summer 1986), 492. 5 Fisher 1978, 241.

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implementation because the expanding legislative demands on Congress. By the 1930’s, “the

President wanted Congress to delegate additional authority to the White House; Congress wanted

to control that authority without having to pass another public law”.6 The legislative veto

emerged as the most efficient way to accomplish both of these goals; and as a result, Congress

was able to pass a single piece of legislation that delegated powers to the president, but the law

would contain a provision that allowed for Congress’ approval or disapproval of the actions that

the executive took with the new power. The first real example came in 1932 when Congress gave

President Hoover the opportunity to reorganize the executive branch by submitting a proposal to

Congress, which it could then have the option to veto.

The legislative veto was initially used very sparingly but over time, it became a more

frequent addition to statutes. The majority opinion in INS v. Chadha (1983), which ruled the veto

unconstitutional, highlighted the increase in frequency that the veto was being added into

legislation. The decisive opinion in the case states that:

Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional

veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from

1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49, nineteen statutes;

between 1950-59, thirty-four statutes; and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the

year 1970 through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions were

included in eighty-nine laws.7

The increased use of the veto alerted both politicians and scholars to many issues that were

present in balancing powers that were divided between Congress and the President and prompted

the start of the debate of the veto's constitutionality. The arguments made were that the veto as a

6 Fisher 1998, 91.

7 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha. 462 U. S. 919 (1983).

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provision in laws weakens one of the branches relative to the other or allows too great an

increase in power.

American history has demonstrated that there are periods of increased presidential power

and periods of increased congressional power. The 1970’s marked a period of Congressional

resurgence and a desire for the body to reassert itself against the growing power of the

president.8 The veto became more prominent during the 1970's as Congress attempted to reassert

its authority over the executive because Congress viewed the veto as an essential tool to

maintaining its authority. This point is illustrated by Jessica Korn, who writes that "[o]bservers

in the 1970's and 1980's who viewed the legislative veto as "by far" Congress' "most powerful

weapon" for reacting against the aggregation of foreign policy making power in the presidency."9

She continues to say that "[t]his conviction implied that Congress needed extra-constitutional

mechanisms to combat the rise of extra-constitutional presidential powers."10

She further notes

that Congress had been the more dominant branch during the nineteenth century, but declined

during the twentieth century. By the 1970’s, the veto had changed from a political idea that was

infrequently practiced and instead “it began to be touted as a necessary congressional control

tool”.11

As legislative vetoes became more frequently attached to legislation, both critics and

advocates began to submit their opinions about how it violated the constitution or was justified

as a constitutional interpretation, though it also seemed tied to the attempt by Congress to

reassert itself in creating foreign policy.

8 Grimmett, Richard F., “Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress,” Congressional Research Service

Reports and Issue Briefs, June 1, 1999, Online at: http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm. 9 Korn, Jessica, The Powers of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative Veto,

(Princeton University Press: Princeton): 1996, 7 10

Ibid. 11

Ibid., 41

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Opponents described the veto as a violation of the separation of powers because it

violates the “presentment clause” of the Constitution that appears in Article I Section 7. The

clause stipulates that:

every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House

of representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall

be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take

effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be re-passed

by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives.12

One-house vetoes further violate this principle because they allow action to be taken by a single

house, while the Constitution stipulates in Article I it says, “All legislative powers herein granted

shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of

Representatives”.13

Opponents of the legislative veto utilize a very strict interpretation of the

Constitution, which is rooted in the non-delegation principle that Congress is unable to give

away any of its legislative power. The non-delegation doctrine believes that the Constitution

delegated the power to Congress and that delegated powers cannot be further delegated.14

The

violation of bicameralism and the presentment clause were what brought down the legislative

veto, but not actually the strict interpretation that yielded the non-delegation principle.

Proponents have a different interpretation based in the U.S. Constitution and court

decisions. The general attitude is: first, that “the legislative veto is an essential means of

controlling the bureaucracy and maintaining representative government”; and second, that if

Congress were to delegate “lawmaking power to independent and executive agencies” it should

retain an ability to ensure that it approves of the actions being taken as a means of maintaining

12

U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 7. 13

INS v. Chadha. 14

Fisher 1998, 32.

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inter-branch oversight.15

Furthermore, in practice the non-delegation principle has not been

upheld by the Courts, which should allow the delegation of legislative power. The catch twenty-

two that emerges is that if Congress does delegate power to the executive by a majority vote (all

that is required to pass a new law), they would have to secure a two-thirds majority in order to

override the action taken by the executive with the delegated authority. Proponents of the veto

find it problematic that they may delegate power with a simple majority, but may only reassert

Congressional institutional power through a larger majority once they have delegated a task. If

delegating authority is constitutional, then proponents argue that there must also be a provision

that allows Congress to reclaim delegated powers.16

Justice White, in his dissenting opinion from INS v. Chadha illustrates how the

presentment clause is not violated: all three actors (the Senate, the House of Representatives and

the President) must approve of an action in order for it to take effect and the disagreement of any

of these actors would prevent it from becoming law. The Presentment Clause is not violated, but

rather the traditional order is changed because the President (or executive actor) introduces the

action and looks for Congressional approval. If one body of Congress disapproves, then the

action cannot occur. A one-house veto simply expedites the process because without both

houses, the action cannot pass. The second congressional body does not need to actually vote for

the action to have failed. Even though the order is changed, “the requirements of Article I are not

compromised by the congressional scheme.”17

The process is simplified in these cases, which is

where the argument that it creates a more efficient government is based.

The most compelling dimension of the argument by proponents of the veto is that it

creates a more efficient government. Justice White writes that “the history of the separation of

15

Fisher 1978, 241; INS v. Chadha Dissenting Opinion of Justice White. 16

Fisher 1978, 243-44. 17

INS v. Chadha Dissenting Opinion of Justice White

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powers doctrine is also a history of accommodation and practicality.” He continues to say that

“the Court, recognizing modern government must address a formidable agenda of complex

policy issues, countenances the delegation of extensive legislative authority to the executive and

independent agencies”. Historically, interpretations of the constitution have allowed for extra-

constitutional powers to be outlined and authorized if they contribute to efficiency and practical

functioning of the government in practice.

The debate over the legislative veto reveals the complexity of the federal government law

making process, especially in areas where the Constitution gave shared powers. The two

interpretations stem from an attempt to negotiate how to divide powers between the different

branches of the government because they are not specified. Gibson notes that “so many critical

functions are not specifically delegated in the constitution,” which causes confusion over whose

jurisdiction those actions are.18

These undesignated functions or new developments in federal

responsibilities are never explicitly addressed in the Constitution, but some would argue that they

can be extrapolated through the “elastic clause”, which is discussed in the next section.

The two main opinions that were given in INS v. Chadha attempt to reconcile these two

opinions about how and why the veto emerged and was struck down. In foreign policy

formation, there are many areas that overlap and emerge as being unclear about whether the

executive or legislative branch has the dominant power as delegated by the Constitution. As a

result, the veto seemed like an effective compromise because it maximized both governmental

efficiency while also adapting to changes in the needs of the federal government. As this paper

will discuss in further detail later on, the veto also made certain aspects of policy formation more

18

Gibson, Martha Liebler, Weapons of Influence: The Legislative Veto, American Foreign Policy and the Irony of

Reform, (Westview Press: Boulder): 1992, 9. [Gibson 1992]

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transparent and accessible to American citizens and foreign governments who could then lobby

the government more effectively.

The Legislative Veto and American Foreign Policy

The legislative veto acts as a constraint on foreign policy formation because foreign

policy construction is shared by the legislative and executive branches. This section will discuss

the Constitutional powers granted by the Constitution for foreign policy making and discuss the

legal developments within the United States and highlight the areas of contention in foreign

policy making where the legislative veto has been included in foreign policy provisions.

Congress’ powers from the Constitution for foreign policy making are in Article I Section

8. The Constitution gives explicit powers for Congress to: “regulate Commerce with foreign

nations”, “declare war, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning

Captures on Land and water”, and “To raise and support armies, but no Appropriation of Money

to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years”.19

This section also contains the “elastic

clause” or the “necessary and proper clause”, which provides Congress with the power “to make

all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,

and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in

any Department or Office thereof”.20

This clause allows for Congress to make laws or delegate

powers to any part of the government in order to ensure that the government continues to

function. It would allow for more power delegation if there are new demands on the government

or to assign new powers that the Constitution would not have accounted for. It also serves as the

19

U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 4, cl.11, cl. 12, cl. 13. 20

U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

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basis for Congress asserting its right to delegate in the legislative veto context, though

maintaining oversight is a less intuitive extrapolation.

The President is also given powers by the Constitution for conducting foreign policy. In

Article II Section 2, the Constitution says that “The President shall be Commander in Chief of

the Army and Navy of the United States”, “He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and

Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties”, he “shall appoint Ambassadors”, and then in Section 3,

it says “he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” and that “he shall take Care

that the Laws be faithfully executed.”21

The final part does not explicitly relate to foreign policy,

but it does mean that the executive branch must carry out the laws that Congress passes, which

includes foreign policy legislation. It also means that if a law has a legislative veto provision

attached to it, the executive branch must acknowledge and accept Congress’ check on the action.

Essentially, the President that signs legislation with a legislative veto accepts the condition and is

agreeing to abide by it. In foreign policy, this can be challenging if the President takes action that

the Congress then rejects because the executive has tied himself to a decision that has not

received official authorization.

The President appears to have fewer powers in the area of foreign policy according to the

Constitution than the Congress and the powers that are given to the executive seem to be joined

with oversight by the legislature. However, the executive maintains a larger implicit role because

the President must sign or veto all bills passed by Congress, including those relating to foreign

policy. The interactions have also developed because the “the constitutional roles of Congress

and the President, defined by experience, have changed during the course of the nation’s

history”.22

The practical implementation of the Constitution has resulted in an evolution of the

21

US Constitution, art. II, § 2 and art. II, § 3. 22

Gibson 1992, 10.

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balance of powers. For example, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936), the Supreme Court

ruled that the President was the highest authority in foreign affairs, despite clearer constitutional

role given to Congress.23

The next section is going to focus more on the potential for conflict between branches in

foreign policy making and highlight the areas where the legislative veto is most likely to appear.

The areas where there is the greatest overlap in authority are in war powers, trade, foreign aid

and treaty and negotiation power, but the focus here will be mainly on trade, specifically arms

transfers.

Congress has jurisdiction over all trade powers while the President is given the authority

over negotiations and treaties. It is possible for there to be an overlap in negotiations and trade

because the executive may make trade promises as a part of negotiating. In the 1970’s the

executive was also given the power to negotiate trade agreements, which were then subject to

Congressional review, generally in the form of a legislative veto, in several laws including the

Trade Expansion Act of 1974 and the Arms Export Control Act (A.E.C.A.) of 1976.24

Conflicts

can then arise over who receives arms and in what quantity. In the Middle East, issues over trade,

especially arms transfers, are particularly salient because of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the

prominent role played by Arab oil-producing countries in American interests in the region. Arms

sales are particularly troubling for some because of the possibility that the transfers could disrupt

the regional balance of military power enough to cause another Arab-Israeli war or enable a pre-

emptive Arab attack on Israel that could lead to the destruction of the Jewish state.

23

Howell, William G., Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action,(Princeton University

Press: Princeton) 2003, 20. 24

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1983, "Arms Sales, War Powers, Aid: Hill Weighs Foreign Policy Impact of

Ruling," July 2, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1266-67.

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Asymmetrical information between the branches makes it particularly difficult to reach

some compromises in foreign policy. In general, the executive has significantly more

information and Congress does not have the ability to obtain as much nuanced information about

every issue. Furthermore, if Congress attempts to review every action taken by the executive

branch, then Congress then becomes more open to pressures of special interest groups because

Congressional members do not have enough information themselves and are more likely to be

swayed by convincing arguments by interested groups who are able to provide easy

explanations.25

William G. Howell identifies this asymmetry in information between the

President and the rest of the federal government, especially in foreign affairs. Howell says that

“presidents, on a whole, have access to more information about public policy and its

implementation than any other branch of government. An enormous bureaucracy exists, in large

part, to advise the president on policy matters."26

This is obvious in foreign affairs, Howell

continues, because there is “a massive network of national security advisers, an entire

intelligence community and diplomats and ambassadors stationed all over the globe [who] report

more or less directly to the president."27

Much of the information that Congress and the general

public receive is what the executive branch chooses to release, which means that Congress

cannot have as complete of an idea about foreign policy making as the executive branch.

Furthermore, information that is potentially crucial for decision-making often remains classified;

details of arms transfers are usually not released to the entire Congress. As shown in the 1981

25

Fisher 1978, 250 26

Howell, 103. 27

Ibid.

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Airborne Warning and Control System (A.W.A.C.S) case study, however, the President may

choose to declassify certain information in order to make his case for the sale.28

Congress is also influenced by both its voters and interest groups. While neither pressure

is consistent across all issues or periods of time, it is clear that both have an influence. Gibson

writes that “it is very difficult without constituency pressure to convince a large enough number

of overburdened legislators to oppose the President successfully. Constituent pressure, then, is

critical to motivating individual legislators to oppose the executive on foreign policy."29

Furthermore, opposition from interest groups, especially those who contribute to congressional

campaigns regularly or have key constituents they are able to influence, have the same

opportunity to motivate congressional members. Gibson asserts that “public opinion pressure” on

Congress is crucial for mobilizing the legislators to oppose an executive action.30

Congressional

opposition to executive action can then cause Congress to threaten the use of a legislative veto to

change policy in favor of its own interests. Further discussion of how public interest groups can

exert pressure on Congress over foreign policy issues can be found in the next chapter.

As is evident, there is a large area of foreign policy making that has the potential to cause

disputes between Congress and the executive over whose power is being used. The argument

over the exercise of constitutional power is what gives way to the legislative veto.31

Gibson

simplifies the potential for a legislative veto to occur by looking at factors that she identifies as

contributing to motivation for Congress to act: institutional motives, electoral motives and

congressional will. She divides actions into five groups and identifies how intense the factors are

28

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981, "First Notice Sent: Debate Over A.W.A.C.S. Sale Not Yet in Full Bloom

as Begin Visits Washington," September 12, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1757. 29

Gibson, Martha Liebler, “Managing Conflict: The Role of the Legislative Veto in American Foreign Policy,”

Polity ,Vol. 26 No. 3, (Spring 1994), 447. [Gibson 1994] 30

Gibson 1994, 448. 31

Ibid., 444.

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on Congress. The highest likelihood that Congress will exercise a legislative veto comes when

all three factors are high.32

In cases where Congress decided to include a legislative veto provision to foreign policy

legislation, it is because Congress believed that they will be giving up too much power if they do

not retain oversight authority. Justice White identifies twelve statutes that have provisions for

“congressional review” and a possible veto in the realm of foreign policy; even more than these

exist.33

Many of the provisions cited by Justice White have to do with trade, foreign assistance

and war powers, and several of them have a common thread: they have to do directly with hot

topics in Middle East foreign relations like foreign assistance, arms transfers and oil policies.34

During the period of time when the use of the legislative veto was increasing, Middle

East foreign policy from the United States revolved around how to get involved in the region and

whether to get more involved with both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Strategically, the

Middle East is important to the United States because of its oil reserves, which the U.S.

depended on domestically, as evident by the 1973 oil crisis when the O.P.E.C. embargoed oil,

and abroad to support U.S. military endeavors. Ideologically, the U.S. aligned itself with Israel

and committed itself to the idea of Israel’s existence on moral and value-based grounds. The

clear conflict of interest over strategic and ideological concerns meant that the U.S. had to

carefully balance its policy between the two in order to prevent domestic upheaval or another

violent outbreak in the Middle East.

Due to the ongoing conflict in the region, the question the U.S. has to ask itself about its

involvement is first, how should it get involved: militarily, financially or diplomatically? Then,

once it decides to get involved in a particular issue or in response to an emergency, it must make

32

Ibid., 447-49. 33

INS v. Chadha, Dissenting Opinion of Justice White. 34

INS v. Chadha, Dissenting Opinion of Justice White, Congressional Quarterly Weekly 1983, 1757.

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many decisions about how. The polarized nature of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict in the

Middle East also isolates American policy makers as being either for or against each side. The

legislative veto was used most when opposing interests in the region faced one another. Arms

sales provided a fertile ground for debate over regional foreign policy and a domestic means for

interest groups to try and affect outcomes.

Arms Sales and the Legislative Veto

The legislative veto did not begin affecting the oversight used by Congress on arms sales

until 1974, which was a direct result of a Congressional understanding that escalating transfers

could lead to more involvement in foreign countries, as had happened in Vietnam.35

The reason a

provision was added to address arms sales was because Congress did not feel that the executive

branch was adequately consulting the legislature on matters of foreign policy before the actions

were essentially completed.36

The intent of the veto provision in arms transfer legislation was

that Congress was trying to reassert itself in foreign policy, and the result was that its increased

engagement in the arms sale process opened it up to a politically charged issue that dealt directly

with foreign states and cleavages within the American public. This section is going to briefly

trace the development of the legislative veto in arms sale legislation and how it developed

between 1974 and 1983.

The foundation of the legislation for arms sales are rooted in the A.E.C.A. which is

updated periodically by Congress. In 1974, the A.E.C.A. that came into being was Public Law

93-559. The A.E.C.A. is linked to several other articles of legislation including many that relate

35

Franck, Thomas M. and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy By Congress, (Oxford University Press: New York

and Oxford): 1979, 98. 36

Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy: Strengthening the

Legislative Side, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982. Committee Print 5. 37.

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to foreign assistance, but it provides the foundation for the reporting of military weapon sales as

well as the legislative veto in this particular case.37

The foundation for the veto in this case was

laid by including a reporting requirement and then a waiting period that the executive would

have to wait before proceeding during which Congress could debate the merits of the sale and, if

so motivated, block the sale by passing a concurrent resolution.

The first incarnation of the A.E.C.A. in 1974 included a specific amendment that allowed

for the legislative veto. In section 36(b) of the A.E.C.A., there is an explicit reporting

requirement for any sales of weapons greater than $25-million prior to being implemented by the

executive branch.38

Furthermore, in the earliest stages of the law, the framework laid out gave

Congress twenty days within which to assess and pass a concurrent resolution to veto the law. If

after the twenty day period both houses had failed to do so, then the transfer would proceed.39

The A.E.C.A. has seen several changes to the threshold for reporting a sale, the reporting

requirement in terms of when it needs to be implemented and how long the waiting period is

since the act first took hold.

The provision in the A.E.C.A. started out in 1974 as a part of the so-called Nelson-

Bingham Amendment. The act was a direct result of Congress' desire to become more pro-active

in determining what countries received weapons and determining if the decisions could cause the

United States to become militarily involved abroad like it was at the time in Vietnam.40

Prior to

1974, "the law merely required the Secretary of State to report 'significant' arms sales semi-

annually to Congress".41

The problem at this juncture was that it was unclear what "significant"

37

Ibid. 38

Ibid., p. 69. 39

Ibid. 40

Franck and Weisband, 98-99. 41

Ibid., 99. A footnote in Franck and Weisband's work here refers to the language of the law and points to The

Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2776, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320, Sec. 36 as the source

of the language "significant". This is the same section that would be amended to contain the reporting requirement

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meant and how it could be systematically applied. Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-W.I.) and

Representative Jonathan Bingham (D-N.Y.) both introduced the amendment as a floor

amendment and were successful in having it attached to the bill because Congress had been

looking for a means of re-asserting some of its authority over the executive.42

The provision in

this case required that all of the sales over $25-million be reported, that the executive wait

twenty days and that Congress could disapprove by a concurrent resolution. It also stipulated that

the report to Congress must be made before the President could issue an official letter of offer for

the sale to a foreign state and it must include the terms of transfer as well as all of the weapons

involved.43

The early stages of the law lasted until nearly the end of the Ford Presidency when

Congress chose to revise certain dimensions of the law to favor Congressional oversight more.

The architecture of the law as drawn up in the Nelson-Bingham amendment continued in

its basic form with the required report before official action could be taken and disapproval only

by concurrent resolution. Minor changes were made in subsequent revisions, like increasing the

period for Congress to review the proposals from twenty to thirty days. The 1976 revisions

changed the threshold from $25-million to $7-million and also mandated that the Administration

provide more information to Congress to help assess the sales and alleviate the discrepancies in

information available to the two sides.44

Another modification was made by way of an unspoken

agreement that there would be a "pre-notification" twenty days before the letter was actually

submitted so that Congressional staff members can research and understand the issue fully before

the Congressmen must move to vote against a potential sale.45

A few more small modifications

were made in 1981 when the reporting requirement changed the minimum value of the sales that threshold in 1974 and would continue to be the location of the legislative veto in future amended versions of the

A.E.C.A., which came out of the Foreign Military Sales Act. 42

Ibid. 43

Ibid., 99. 44

Ibid., 103. 45

Ibid., 104.

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must be reported into two categories: individual sales and package sales. This modification

required that "individual weapon or military equipment sales" valued at $14-million or above

had to be reported while packaged sales of the same materials of $50-million or above were

required to be sent to Congress.46

The development and changes in the actual legislation for a legislative veto relating to

arms transfers were related to the context in which they were passed, but also to capture highly

controversial deals. For example, the initial $25-million cusp for reporting sales was proposed by

Senator Nelson because it was the cost of a single squadron of F-5E's, the sale of which would be

likely to raise controversy.47

As the conditions changed, so did the laws, but in the period

between 1974 and 1983, the congressional oversight on arms sales gave an increased amount of

power to interest groups who sought to influence the sale. The veto mechanism itself was what

opened the floodgates to a change in how policy making would work.

Conclusions about the Legislative Veto

The legislative veto emerged from the American tradition of interpreting the constitution

and its death revealed that the two traditional methods of interpreting the constitution are still

alive and well. The veto attempts to expedite the policy making process throughout the American

government as well as enable Congress to assert some of its Constitutionally delegated control

while being able to delegate authority to the more efficient executive. In foreign policy, it pitted

the executive and legislative branches against one another for influence.

The legislative veto, which makes it appearance most heavily during the 1970’s,

demonstrates that Congress and the President were attempting to compromise over foreign policy

46

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1983, "Congress Loses Major Foreign Policy Tool," June 25, Washington, D.C.:

CQ Press, 1265. 47

Franck and Weisband, 99.

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powers and the laws with the legislative veto provisions were necessary for the division of labor

to be spread the most efficiently. The evolution of the executive branch as the primary

formulator of foreign policy led Congress to move to a secondary position and exercise oversight

powers. This was particularly true in Middle East policy: the executive began to implement all

the different levels of involvement, especially on military involvement and arms trades while

Congress seemed to retain its power of the purse over aid programs. Despite its short prevalence

at the forefront of foreign policy, the legislative veto influence Middle East policy because it

forced more interactions between the branches and altered the inter-branch dynamics, and

opened the door for lobbying and interest groups to impact the debate and, to a more limited

degree, policy outcomes.

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Chapter 2: American Foreign Policy Making

The mechanism of foreign policy making that were laid out in the American constitution

have developed to address the changing needs of the government. Scholars who have studied

Middle East policy have different understandings of what motivates policy makers and which

policy makers have more influence. According to Steven L. Spiegel, the most important factor in

making Middle East policy is the role of the President and the surrounding elite. In reality, the

model that stresses the “Presidential elite” most ignores many other key factors, especially the

public pressure on the federal government, in policy making. All of the approaches are important

because different policy decisions can be motivated by factors or executed by actors that other

models dismiss. What is illustrated by the experience of arms sales to Middle Eastern countries,

however, is that the pluralist model has the strongest sway because voter and interest group

participation in the legislative process became very effective. The effectiveness supports that the

public pressure on the government, especially from the Israeli lobby, was taken very seriously

and was a result of methodical and effective government petitioning.

This chapter is going to lay out the way that Americans make foreign policy by revising

the separation of powers in foreign policy and demonstrating how the branches of the

government must work together on policy formation. Second, it will discuss what the American

national interest is, how it guides foreign policy and what American interests are in the Middle

East. Finally, it will discuss why and how interest groups get involved in policy making in

Washington, and what tools they are able to use to influence policymaking. The material

presented in this chapter will serve as the basis for understanding the arms sale case studies

presented later.

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The Making of American Foreign Policy

The making of foreign policy is a bureaucratic process that involves both the executive

and the legislative branches of the U.S. government. The Constitution delegates power to each

branch of the government; in foreign policy the power is shared by the executive and legislative

branches in order to prevent the supremacy of one over another. The division of power between

the branches is straight forward, but has also been adapted to respond to the growing complexity

of foreign affairs. The making of foreign policy is divided into the constitutional powers and the

methods used to implement them.

As demonstrated by the explanation of power sharing in the previous chapter, the

branches of the American government share the responsibilities in foreign policy making. By

balancing the foreign policy making power between the executive and the legislative branches,

neither is able to make policy without working with the other. The parity between the executive

and the Congress means that the both branches must be privy to many parts of foreign policy

making. In order for Congress to make an arms transfer, they must send a bill to the President for

his signature. In the same vein, the President must get funding from Congress in order to

maintain the armies and be able to continue any missions that the military is sent on. As a result,

the government works in tandem to forge foreign policy. Both parts of the government rely on

one another, but have more command of specific dimensions of policy making. In general, the

dominant power oscillates between the Congress and the executive over history, which can

influence why specific policies are made are certain points in time.48

A result of the executive and legislative working relationships is that the two branches do

not always get along and have to forge compromises to make sure that foreign policy is approved

of by both. However, different methods are available to both parts of the government, which

48

Grimmett.

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25

changes how the branches interact. Richard F. Grimmett identifies twelve ways that foreign

policy is made within the two branches and highlights how the branches respond to actions taken

by the other. Grimmett’s analysis is useful for approaching each action by Congress or the

President and using it to identify inter-branch interactions that promote collaboration or are

possible areas of tension.

Table 2.1: Methods of Making Foreign Policy49

Executive Methods Legislative Methods

1. Responses to Foreign Events 1. Resolutions and Policy Statements

2. Proposals for Legislation 2. Legislative Directives

3. Negotiations of International Agreements 3. Legislative Pressure

4. Policy Statements 4. Legislative Restrictions/Funding Denials

5. Policy Implementation 5. Informal Advice

6. Independent Action 6. Congressional Oversight

Grimmett’s analysis demonstrates the policymaking power balance between the branches

and despite that the executive and legislative branches have been given the tasks of administrator

and legislator, respectively, they sometimes exchange roles in order to create policy. Foreign

policy creation rests in the tools that Congress and the President employ and how they react to

policies formed by the other. The division of labor in this case creates an environment within

which the branches of government must negotiate with one another; this kind of negotiation

process has led to the development of compromises, including the addition of legislative veto

provisions in foreign policy legislation.

The President and the executive branch, often acts as the initiator and the actor that

implements policy, but it can only do so with the agreement of Congress. Examining the six

main ways that Grimmett identifies that the executive formulates policy illustrates the

overlapping nature of foreign policy formation. In the case of the legislative veto and foreign

49

Ibid.

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26

policy in the Middle East the most relevant methods that the executive branch can use are

negotiating international agreements, making policy statements as overall policy guidelines and

determining how to implement policy.50

In this particular study one of the most important ways that the President and the rest of

the executive branch can make foreign policy is by negotiating international agreements.

International agreements are more complicated because there are conditions for whether they are

submitted to Congress as a whole, to a single body or neither at all. However, some are not

submitted to Congress at all. The conditions have to do with the agreement and what exactly the

goals are and which branch is seen to have had the power over the negotiations taking place. For

example, the Iranian Hostage Agreement of 1981 was not submitted to Congress for approval,

but other agreements require Congressional approval because they are negotiated by the

executive as a result of delegated power from Congress.

These treaties can also include foreign trade and military and economic assistance. While

the power of trade was given to Congress, often the executive branch does the actual negotiating

for practical reasons. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was engaged in a bout of

shuttle diplomacy and while he was in Jordan, King Hussein made it clear that the Hashemite

Kingdom felt vulnerable in the region with an army that was not equipped with modern

equipment likes its neighbors and that it wished to make the purchases necessary to ensure its

own security.51

After several months of studying the Jordanian Armed forces, the Department of

Defense was given permission by the White House to negotiate the arms sale agreement with

Jordan.52

The negotiation was under the auspices of an international agreement because it was a

50

Ibid. 51

Franck and Weisband, 100. 52

Ibid.

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part of the larger scheme of Middle East Policy, but as a result of the 1974 Nelson-Bingham

Amendment, the deal was subject to congressional review before it could proceed.

The executive branch has some latitude in interpreting policy and how that policy is

implemented on a daily basis. Often Congress will pass legislation or delegate authority to the

executive for foreign policy that will have certain criteria or objectives, but it is left up to the

parts of the executive following the policy how they implement it. For example, in the A.E.C.A.,

Congress only stipulated two provisions for arms sales: first, that Congress is notified of the sale,

and second, that a procedure exist for Congressional disapproval. The executive is then left to

interpret the rest of the Act because they are able to make the daily decisions about which states

to sell weapons to and what kind of arms are sold. One of the issues that has been cited with

arms sales that led to the legislative veto's inclusion in the legislation is that Congress is not

included in the early decision making process. Critiques of the executive branch by Congress

generally fall into this category: in the implementation of action in foreign policy, Congress is

not consulted until the action is essentially completed or if "they need something such as

authorization, appropriation or approval of a treaty."53

By essentially implementing policy

independently, the executive maintains its ability to influence policy formation as it sees fit.

Congress is also able to take actions that affect foreign policy; however, they seem to be

more limited than the executive despite broader powers from the Constitution. The first is that

Congress can issue legislative directives, which establish new programs, set objectives and

guidelines, authorize and direct the executive branch to undertake specific activities and can

earmark funding for specific projects.54

All legislative directives require a Presidential signature

or a two-thirds majority in Congress to override a Presidential veto in order to take effect as law

53

Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy: Strengthening the

Legislative Side, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982. Committee Print 5. 37. 54

Grimmett.

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because they are creating new legislation. Congress is able to delegate authority to the executive

to make foreign policy through legislation as well as reassert control over specific endeavors,

especially through their funding allocations. This ability to delegate authority was used to give

the executive the power to submit arms sales under the A.E.C.A. of 1976.

More informal methods of foreign policy formation are used by Congress, such as

legislative pressure and informal advice. Legislative pressure often comes in the form of

Congress threatening to enact legislation to change the course that the executive branch is taking

in foreign policy formation.55

Informal advice can come in many forms, like legislative pressure,

and it seems to be the result of meetings between the executive and members of Congress where

there are no decisions being made, informal contacts between members of the two branches and

congressional letters.56

These informal practices can influence how the President and other parts

of the executive branch factor Congress into their foreign policy actions. It seems most likely

that pressure against policy emerges over controversial action or when the electorate is the most

involved.tillma

Finally, Congress uses oversight powers to exercise a check on executive power, which

means that many parts of the executive are subject to oversight from the committees that they are

under.57

Congressional committees conduct hearings and investigations to ensure that policies

are being properly carried out by the executive branch. The Department of State is overseen by

the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The

Armed Services Committees oversees the Department of Defense and the Intelligence

Committees oversee the Central Intelligence Agency and the rest of the intelligence community.

On a whole, Congress has reporting requirements for the executive so that they are not excluded

55

Ibid. 56

Ibid. 57

Ibid.

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from international agreements. Most international negotiations and agreements have to be

submitted to Congress for approval, which enables Congress to retain oversight executive

negotiation.58

Congress has also attempted to expand their oversight capabilities by including reporting

requirements in legislation, like the Case Act of 1972, which “required presidents to report every

‘international agreement, other than a treaty’ to Congress within sixty days.”59

The Case Act was

expanded in 1977 and 1979 “that reduced the reporting period to twenty days and expanded the

scope of the act to include international agreements brokered by executive agencies and

departments.”60

The Case Act only required that the agreements be reported and did not provide

Congress with any authority to change the agreements. In cases where the reporting requirement

is followed by the ability for Congress to take action, a legislative veto emerges.

Since policy formation and implementation are both multi-branch functions, foreign

policy is not a simple equation that yields a particular output. Instead these factors contribute to

the dynamic outputs that depend on a myriad of surrounding conditions. The methods of making

foreign policy by the legislative and executive are the skeleton of the practice, but the rest of this

chapter will focus on where the other conditions and driving forces come from.

The American National Interest and the Middle East

Understanding American foreign policy can be challenging, especially in the Middle East

because of the number of competing American interests in the region. The foundation for

understanding American foreign policy is the national interest of the U.S. is and identifying the

general undercurrents that are constantly present in the national interest. This section is going to

58

Ibid. 59

Howell, 104. 60

Howell, 104.

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briefly discuss what factors contribute to the national interest, how it is defined in terms of

foreign policy and what American interests are in the Middle East.

The national interest is based on the overall interests of the state and serves as the

foundation for foreign policy decisions because it serves as an outline for what goals the

government wishes to pursue. Seth P. Tillman notes that “the term ‘national interest’ connotes a

selfish and unprincipled, or at least amoral, approach to the conduct of foreign

relations.”61

However, this view is a narrow understanding of national interest. Tillman expands

this notion by including “principled behavior, regard for the law, loyalty to friends and

commitments, ethical restraints, and ethical imperatives – as well as the seeking of geopolitical

and economic advantage.”62

Donald E. Nuechterlein also explains that the national interest is

made up of a series of basic interests: defense, economic, world order and ideological interests.

Every state weighs these interests and follows them based upon their individual priorities.63

The

ultimate national interest for the U.S. then comes from evaluating all of the basic interests

against American values and the global environment.

The basic foundations of American interests come from a realist point of view of the

world. The U.S., especially in terms of its Middle East interests, takes a strong realist stance

where it does act to maximize its power in terms of state-to-state relations. Especially during the

period that this paper is looking at between 1974 and 1983, the Cold War was still ongoing and

the U.S. was concerned with containing Soviet influence. It also assumes that all states act

rationally, seek out their own interests first and always to act to maximize their own power in

terms of other states. However, certain idealistic principles have also come into the American

61

Tillman, Seth P., The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles, (Indiana University Press:

Bloomington): 1982, 43. 62

Ibid. 63

Nuechterlein, Donald E., National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities, (Westview

Press: Boulder): 1978, 4-5.

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national interest, specifically helping to reduce and end conflict, especially in the Middle East

where conflict tends to break out regularly.

In the Middle East, the U.S. has had a clear set of interests since the end of the Second

World War when it became the hegemonic power in the region. Different scholars have

identified similar sets of interests, generally in the context of the Cold War and the status of the

U.S. as the hegemonic power in the region, which the U.S. follows to determine its Middle East

policy. Tillman asserts that the U.S. has four fundamental interests in the Middle East: “reliable

access, on reasonable terms, at tolerable prices, to the oil of the region, especially the Arabian

peninsula; the survival and security of the state of Israel; the avoidance of confrontation and

advancement of cooperation with the Soviet Union; and the fulfillment, so far as possible, of

certain principles, including the peaceful settlement of international disputes.”64

Cheryl A. Rubenberg identifies very similar U.S. interests in the Middle East: preventing

a shift in the global balance of power, ensuring the security and Western freedom of access to the

region’s oil supplies, assuring access to the region’s market for American goods, and securing

the environment for American investment opportunities.65

Rubenberg also explicitly specifies

that the U.S. sees Israel as a "strategic asset" in the region because it can act as a buffer against

Soviet influence, contrary to the argument that Israel actually makes the Arab states more

inclined to work with the Soviets because Israel is so closely tied to the United States.66

Janice J. Terry also attempts to tackle this subject and develops a slightly different set of

four main interests. She summarizes the four historical goals of American foreign policy in the

Middle East as securing the free flow of oil, improving relations with friendly

64

Tillman, 51. 65

Rubenberg, Cheryl A,. Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination, (University of Illinois

Press: Urbana and Chicago): 1986, 2. 66

Ibid.

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Arab/Turkish/Persian regimes, preventing the region from being a sphere of interest for other

states, and supporting the coexistence of the state of Israel.67

Yakub Halabi, like Terry, takes a

slightly different interpretation of similar interests. He identifies the U.S. dependence on oil as

crucial, especially the perception that the Americans could not fight another prolonged war

without Middle Eastern oil, and the shock of the 1973 oil embargo on the American economy,

which pushed the government to look for ways to bring the money Americans spent on oil back

into the American economy through trade.68

What Tillman, Rubenberg, Terry, and Halabi illustrate with their assessment of American

interests in the Middle East is that there are clear American interests in the region though they

are articulating same ideas in different frames. For example, Terry manages to combine the

economic interests in the region, like Rubenberg’s points about access to economic markets for

exports and environments for American investment opportunities, by highlighting the importance

of good relations with friendly governments. Overall, however, the American interests in the

region can be summarized as: protection of access to Middle Eastern oil; containment of Soviet

influence; protection of the state of Israel and its security; peaceful settlement of regional

disputes; and protection of U.S. access to the economic markets of the Middle East for exports

and investment opportunities. With the understanding that these are the American national

interests at stake in the region, it then follows that interest groups would seek to heighten those

that affect them most whether it be oil corporations wanting to see more favorable

circumstances, arm manufacturers wanting additional markets for their weapons or supporters of

67

Terry, Janice J., US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups, (Pluto

Press: London): 2005, 23. 68

Halabi, Yakbu., US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From Crises to Change, (Ashgate Publishing Company:

Burlington, VT): 2009, 6, 29, 63-65.

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Israel wishing to see additional foreign assistance to ensure that the state is able to defend itself

in a generally hostile region.

Why and How Interest Groups Influence Foreign Policy Making in Washington

American policy towards the Middle East has, for the majority of the twentieth century,

been very complicated and had so many factors contributing to it that it is almost impossible to

determine what single factor is the most important. Instead, it is easier to look at how actions

have shaped the outcome of policy, and attempt to understand each factor and its impact. The

role of interest groups and forces outside the American government attempting to influence both

the executive and legislative branches are well-documented over the years and provide a great

amount of information.69

As this paper is discussing, the activity of these public interest groups

seems to have increased with the success that they found working in the legislative veto

framework because they were able to identify specific target actions that the government was

taking and mobilize their cause. This section is going to discuss the formation of American

policy towards the Middle East and discuss how the public is able to influence the decisions

made by the government in formulating this policy.

Different scholars have taken different approaches to understanding how and why the

U.S. government forms its policy towards the Middle East. Steven L. Spiegel identifies the main

four that studies have pointed to as systems theory, bureaucratic and organizational theory, the

pluralist model and the presidential elite model.70

Each model can be supported and refuted by

examining different decisions at different points of time. What these models demonstrate,

however, is the major players and constraints on foreign policy formation: the systems theory

69

Terry, 1. 70

Spiegel, Steven L. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy from Truman to

Reagan (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London): 1985, 383-393.

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focuses most heavily on the international system developing the framework that foreign policy

must respond to; the bureaucratic and organizational theories stresses that the policies come out

of the "permanent" members of the government; the pluralist model focuses on the effects of

interests groups, mainly pro-Israeli groups, on influencing Congress to make policy; and the

Presidential Elite model maintains that the President and his immediate advisers create policy.71

All of these models can be used effectively to describe circumstances, but none are sufficient for

explaining interest groups entirely and how they are able to exert pressure on the government or

influence policy changes. Even Spiegel's pluralist model is limited because it ignores interest

groups outside of the pro-Israeli lobby.

For the purposes of this paper, there is an underlying assumption that Congress does play

a role in Middle East policy despite its lack of presence in many analyses of American Middle

East policy. Since Congress does in fact play a role, it follows that interest groups who focus on

lobbying Congress would be able to influence outcomes, especially if they are given specific

opportunities like legislative veto procedures that can offer short campaigns against specific

policies. Spiegel also acknowledges, although by mistake, that these interest groups and lobbies

can play an important role; he says, “Domestic politics affects the timing and handling of

decisions more than their actual content. Presidents try to avoid antagonizing Israel’s supporters

in an election year, especially a Presidential year.”72

The backhanded acknowledgement of the

influence of any group to effect even just the “timing and handling” of a decision means that

they are influential enough in the process to begin with.

In order to discuss interest groups and how they are able to influence policy, one must

identify what their interests are before examining the means by which they attempt to pressure

71

Ibid. 72

Ibid., 386

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35

the government to adopt favorable policies. As the previous section discussed, there are specific

American interests in the Middle East, and there are groups that advocate positions that are

related to these interests (see table 2.1).

Table 2.2: Advocates of American National Interests in the Middle East

American National Interest in the

Middle East

Interest Groups Associated with Supporting

specific American Interests

1. Protection of access to Middle Eastern

oil

Oil companies, Arab governments

2. Containment of Soviet influence American government officials, pro-Israeli interest

groups

3. Protection of the state of Israel and its

security

Pro-Israeli interest groups, conservative American

Christians, Israeli government

4. Peaceful settlement of regional disputes American government officials, Arab

governments, Israeli government, pro-Israeli

interest groups, pro-Arab interest groups, oil

companies, multinational corporations, the

international community73

5. Protection of U.S. access to economic

markets and investment opportunities in the

region

Oil companies, multinational corporations,

American government officials, Arab governments

As Table 2.2 shows, there are numerous groups both inside of the United States and

outside of it that wish to see specific interests pursued and some even have multiple interests in

the region. Given the number of different groups that have interests in the region, it is difficult to

imagine all of their own interests aligning as well. For example, Arab governments and the

Israeli government both ask for very different criteria for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-

Israeli dispute, the most salient conflict in the region. As a result of these groups having their

own interests align with aspects of American interests, some of them decide to advocate their

positions to the American government in order to pressure the government to adopt policies that

73

International community here refers to the collective interests stated by a majority of states. The United Nations

General Assembly has dedicated time, energy and resources to working towards a solution of the Arab-Israeli

conflict since the international organization was founded. Formal statements made through General Assembly

resolutions call for a peaceful settlement of the disputes and a more permanent peace, which serves as the basis for

claiming that the international community at large has a vested interest in ending the regional conflict.

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36

the group feels coordinates more closely with their own. Furthermore, the American government

is attempting to make policy on a broad level that protects the interests of the American people.74

In order for interest groups to be successful, they have to organize themselves and utilize

the most effective means of pressuring the government in order to gain influence in policy

making. As the case studies will demonstrate, the legislative veto procedure opened the debate

for arms transfer in such a way that interests groups could gain a stronger voice in Congress. The

next few paragraphs will explain how interest groups are able to apply pressure to the

government in order to have their interests pursued more heavily.

To start with, Congress is the target of these groups, which is explained by David D.

Newsom in his book The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy. What Newsom argues is that the

public is very important to a government’s success therefore the “public dimension” of foreign

policy consists of the statements made by government officials and the spaces outside of

government where ideas develop and apply pressure on policies.75

The nexus of the public and

government comes together in Congress, because Congress provides the most opportunities to

reach legislators who can affect policy.76

Like the foundational argument of this paper, Newsom

also argues that the 1970’s provided a period where Congress became more susceptible to the

pressures of interests groups because the attempt to contain the executive branch increased the

Congressional role in policy making and necessitated an increased number of hearings, which

provided a venue for interest groups to “give their views and present information on international

events, countries, personalities and policies.”77

74

Tillman, 43. 75

Newsom, David D., The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy, (Indiana University Press: Bloomington and

Indianapolis): 1996, ix. 76

Ibid., ix, 201. 77

Ibid., 201.

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Congress is particularly susceptible to the interests of motivated members of society’s

interests for several reasons. First, individual politicians agree with the views put forward by the

groups. Second, interest groups are able to provide funding for re-election campaigns because

they have members that are engaged in the political process and can help them win votes even if

they do not belong to the same district. This can be particularly important for members of the

House of Representatives who must run for re-election every two years. Other means of aiding

campaigns out of district are also common, but are often related to the allocation of funding

towards getting a politician elected or re-elected. Third, these groups tend to have motivated

members who vote, which can make the difference in many of the small elections. Fourth, many

of the organizations that seek to influence policy making in Congress are part of the Washington

network and aid Congressional staffers in obtaining information and understanding of the issues

coming before their representative’s committees or onto the floor. The information provided

generally will espouse a specific point of view, but information that is readily available to

staffers can trump the potential bias it holds. Additionally, members of interest groups are also

frequently participants in Congressional hearings as witness who can testify about the issue up

for debate.78

All of these reasons together are what make Congress susceptible to their influence.

A successful interest group must establish both its cohesive community at its foundation

and a functional means of influencing Congress by targeting the areas that the legislature is most

vulnerable in order to incur the most access and leverage. Tony Smith discusses this in the

context of ethnic lobbies, though it appears that it would hold true for non-ethnic interest groups

as well. In order to be most effective in terms of applying pressure to the government, Smith

78

The information from this paragraph can be gleaned from multiple sources. Among those that contributed to these

reasons that Congress is susceptible to influence from interests groups are: Richard H. Curtiss A Changing Image,

Janice J. Terry US Foreign Policy in the Middle East, David D. Newsom The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy,

and Tony Smith Foreign Attachments. Discussion of some of these points can also be found in the reports on the

Arab and Israeli Lobbies from the Congressional Quarterly Weekly from 1975.

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argues that the interest groups must vote actively, contribute to campaigns, and establish an

organization that:

Formulates the strategy for getting precise pieces of legislation passed, provides

unity to the ethnic community, builds alliances with other social forces towards

the common political goals, and monitors [decision-making] to ensure that friends

are rewarded, opponents punished, and feedback accumulated so that the

organization be become ever more effective.79

The key components of a successful ethnic lobby, according to Smith, also specifically target the

three area in which Congress is most accessible and vulnerable to outside forces that were

identified above.

Voting is a surprisingly easy method of employing change. Terry explains that most

Americans don’t vote, which means that “a very small proportion of highly motivated and

mobilized citizens can, and do, have a disproportionate impact.”80

She continues to explain that

out of every 100 Americans, 70 percent of them are eligible to vote, but ultimately only eleven of

the original 100 are needed for a candidate to win an election.81

Others have commented on

specific groups and how their turnout may give them disproportionate representation. Robert

Goldwin provided campaign advise to President Ford when he sought re-election in 1976;

Goldwin pointed out that American Jews, while only three percent of the population, would

provide between four and five percent of the vote. On the other hand, black Americans were

79

Smith, Tony. Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy

(Harvard University Press: Cambridge and London): 2000, 94. 80

Terry, 8. 81

Ibid. The full argument that Terry makes is that for every 100 American, only 70 percent (70 people) are eligible

to vote. Of that 70 percent (70 people), only 60 percent (42 people) are registered voters. Of the registered voters,

only about 50 percent (21) actually vote. Since a candidate only needs 50 percent to win, they effectively only need

eleven votes.

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eleven percent of the population but only made up five percent of the total vote.82

Based upon

these analyses, it is clear that voting is a very powerful tool that interest groups can use and as a

result, representatives in Congress are unlikely to vote against policies that a large portion of

their constituents support.

Next, campaign contributions play a powerful role in an interest group’s ability to

influence Congress. Campaign support is not limited to the races in one's own district; instead,

individuals can give to races in any district, which means that if enough of an effort is made,

people outside of a district can influence how people inside the district vote.83

Campaign

donations are not a tool limited to individuals; businesses and business groups also donate money

to campaigns for the same reason of having members of Congress who are sympathetic to and

willing to represent their views. An interest group, if organized well enough into a lobbying

organization, which will be discussed shortly, is able to allot its energies to discrediting members

of Congress or support opponents effectively enough to affect the outcome of the election.

Richard H. Curtiss, in A Changing Image, outlines several examples where efforts by the pro-

Israeli lobby were able to turn the tide in races for re-election against Senators and

Representatives that opposed their interests.84

Smith takes a slightly different approach than

Curtiss and examines the actually quantitative numbers of campaign donations and the ties that

the money establishes between communities and representatives.85

The large sums of money

necessary to run for office are often solicited by members of Congress as much as interest groups

82

Ibid, 9. 83

Smith, 101. 84

See Curtiss, Richard H. A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. (American

Educational Trust: Washington D.C.): 1986, Chapter 33. Examples include Senator William Fulbright,

Representative Paul McCloskey, Representative Paul Findley, Senator Charles Percy and several others. 85

Smith, 101-109.

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attempt to use campaign donations to gain influence over members of Congress; the result is a

symbiotic relationship that revolves around finances.86

Finally, and perhaps the largest and most important part, is the organization of the group

into a "lobbying" organization that is effectively able to do three things: ensure organizational

unity of the community, form and maintain alliances with other social forces, and advocate

policy positions while monitoring the actions of government officials in regards to their stances

on the formulation and implementation of policy.87

The first is straight-forward: there must be an

ideological consensus within the community that is not predicated on a single leader so that it

can be maintained over a longer period of time.88

The pro-Israeli lobby is very successful is this

regard because the need to work together is built into their community: "although differences

exist in politics and ideology among American Jews, few are prepared to voice dissent publicly

for fear that such divisions might be exploited by enemies."89

The collective nature of the Jewish

community is also helped with the sympathy that they receive from outside because many

Americans feel sympathy for the oppression Jews suffered in Europe over the past few hundred

years and especially in the first half of the twentieth-century and guilt because Americans did not

do more to prevent or stop the Holocaust.90

Just by these examples, it is clear that the Jewish

lobby is an exceptional case because no other interest group has the same circumstances, but its

exceptionalism is what makes it the perfect example of how the general agreement within the

community, or at least the disinclination to dissent, helps the interest group apply pressure

politically by appearing to be a single, unified group.

86

Ibid., 104. 87

Ibid, 109. 88

Ibid, 110. 89

Newsom, 186. 90

Ibid., 185.

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The second important thing that a lobbying organization must do to apply pressure to is

make connections the various forces in Washington in order to establish a network that will gain

it access to those that it is interested in applying pressure to. Newsom describes how Washington

works as being through networks: "The Rolodex becomes an instrument of influence. Skillful

representatives of interest groups find members interested in their cause, often starting with

congressional staffs."91

Newsome also uses the term the "iron triangle", which refers to the

connections between the Department of Defense, defense contractors, and congressional

committees as an example of the entrenched role that interest groups can have.92

"The ultimate

objective," Newsom says, "is [for interest groups] to become so valuable that members of

Congress will call these advocates as often as the advocates call them."93

Ultimately, the more

effectively that a group can network, the more effective they can be as a lobbying organization

because they will have more access to venues to have their message be heard by influential

people.

The network then becomes the means for disseminating the message that the lobby wants

to convey. The intended message can come through a number of forms: providing information

on topics coming before congress for staffers, testimony at Congressional hearings, letter writing

campaigns, media statements, publishing of reports for the general public and providing records

of representatives’ attitudes on the issues. The last task, recording how members of Congress

vote on issues and public statements they make means that these organizations can provide

information to members of their groups when it comes time for voting. The multiple ways that

these groups are then able to assert influence is not static because there are so many different

methods, they can react to the circumstances around them. For example, with a network on both

91

Ibid.,. 203. 92

Ibid. 93

Ibid.

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Capitol Hill and among its members, a group can mobilize to target specific members of

Congress or their staff to have letter writing or phone campaigns to influence an upcoming vote.

With access on both sides, groups can interact dynamically to assert pressure during times when

debates are coming up that relate to their issues by targeting the individuals that they see as being

most influential and mobilizing their members as needed.94

On a daily basis, the lobby needs to become indispensible to the members of Congress so

that the Congressmen see specific groups as so useful that supporting their causes has an intrinsic

benefit. That then creates a situation where there will be members of Congress that are as

dedicated to the issues of the groups as the members of the group themselves.95

Lobbying groups

have several methods they can pursue in order to achieve this situation, but one of the most

effective appears to be providing information and reports to Congressional staffs. In some cases,

Congressional staffs will call on the lobbying groups for information before using sources

provided to them by the U.S. government such as the Library of Congress, Congressional

Research Service, committee staff or administration experts.96

If a relationship like this develops,

it is then possible that the lobbying group becomes the main source of information for some

members of Congress and is able to discreetly influence their opinions on issues of foreign

policy based upon the presentation of information in their favor.

Ultimately, measuring the influence of a group on Congress is difficult because there are

so many factors that contribute to it, especially in the case of Middle East policy, but it is clear

that special interest groups can gain a foothold and apply some pressure, especially when

rallying against specific issues. By rallying against specific issues, there is a clear goal that these

interest groups are hoping to achieve and a distinct period of mobilization. The legislative veto

94

Smith, 122-128. 95

Ibid., 123. 96

Ibid., 123-124.

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procedure opened up this type of situation in the case of arms transfers because the sales had not

been previously open to commentary by the public in a governmental setting like Congressional

hearings.

Conclusion about American Policy Making in the Middle East

In conclusion, American Middle East policy emerges from a complex domestic process

that makes it very difficult to assess what impacts it quantitatively, but taking into account the

different approaches that explain the multiple ways to understand how American Middle Eastern

policy can be made; there are many ways to effect change. By adding a legislative veto to

existing legislation about arms transfers abroad, the Congress opened the door for a greater role

for lobbying and special interests groups by formalizing a venue in which they could raise their

issues and forcing the executive branch to build their cases more strongly.

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Chapter 3: Case Studies of American Arm Sales to Middle East States

Arms sales became a prominent part of American foreign policy in the Middle East

during the 1960’s and 1970’s. As a result, they became subject to the legislative veto. Initially, it

seemed as though it was more efficient for the executive to be able to negotiate these trade

agreements because they were nuanced and often took into account more than just the

transaction, but in the 1970’s with Congress’ attempt to reassert itself in the foreign affairs arena,

Congress had a legislative veto attached to the A.E.C.A. A by-product of the institution of

congressional oversight was that arms sales were more open to commentary by the American

public and for interest groups attempting to sway the outcome. Controversial sales arose in more

regions than just the Middle East, but the Middle East seems reflected in literature as the region

where arms sales were the most impacted by the legislative veto.

Arguments given in favor of the arms sales that will be presented here generally argue

that they are an example of soft power in foreign policy where the U.S. hopes to influence its

ideal outcome by supplying another country with weapons that they see as necessary.

Additionally, arms transfers worked to directly counter Soviet influence in the region, a more

general foreign policy approach to the world popularized through containment, because it meant

that these countries would continue to seek U.S. arms and would pursue policies that made them

look favorable to the United States. Arms transfers to Arab states also had the goal of promoting

good relations behind it and making political gestures, which would help keep Arab states

friendly towards the United States and helped keep the Middle Eastern markets open for U.S.

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goods and investment; a development not overtly discussed because of negative perceptions in

the U.S. of pursuing policy that is based on economic interest.97

To summarize the earlier discussion, the legislative veto became a fixed part of arms

sales in 1974 with the addition of the Nelson-Bingham Amendment. This amendment was added

onto the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, which was a direct result of Congressional

frustration of learning about arms sales to Persian Gulf countries in 1973 after they had already

been essentially completed.98

In its earliest form, it required that military equipment sales over

$25-million be reported to Congress and that a 20-day period be allotted for Congress to block

the sale by concurrent resolution and it only covered government-to-government sales.99

As the

starting point for legislative veto action in arms sales, the basic functioning of the law remained

the same but the reporting threshold, the time allotted to Congress after notification and even a

pre-notification period all became parts of the veto mechanism over arms sales. Similar

amendments were added to other acts so that no arms sales could be enacted by the President

without Congressional oversight, which included the A.E.C.A. and various Foreign Aid Acts.

The clear result of these changes was that the amount of time that Congress got to

examine each sale became longer. By the time that the 1981 A.W.A.C.S sale was proposed by

President Reagan to Congress, the administration had provided more than the allotted time for

Congress to consider the deal. There was even more communication in the later deals than the

earlier deals, but the result was that the discussion meant that there was more time for interest

groups to become involved and constituents to petition their representatives in Congress.

97

This is discussed in Chapter 2 and a broader discussion of American interests in the Middle East, both economic

and otherwise, can be found there. 98

Mortsolf, Larry A., “Revisiting the Legislative Veto Issue: A Recent Amendment to the Arms Export Control

Act,” The DISAM Journal,. (Summer 1986) Vol. 8, 11-12 99

Ibid., 12

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A sizable sampling of arms sales is essential for examining the effects of the veto on arms

sales and to determine which factor was the most influential under the provision. Of the arms

sales that were negotiated to the Middle East between 1974 and 1983, from the addition of the

Nelson-Bingham Amendment to the A.E.C.A. to the ruling by the Supreme Court in INS v.

Chadha, there were twelve arms sales worth noting. Of these twelve, half were subject to a

significant amount of debate in Congress while the remaining six are relevant because they

demonstrate the flocculation in outcome and the influence of outside events as well as why

certain issues were more focused on.

The primary sales, which this paper is focusing on are: the 1975 Hawks deal with Jordan,

the 1976 sale of C-130’s to Egypt, the 1976 package that included sales to Iran, Israel and Saudi

Arabia, the 1978 package for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel and the 1981 A.W.A.C.S. sale to

Saudi Arabia. These sales generated the greatest opposition and Congressional debate around

American interests in the Middle East. The major debate around the 1977 sale to Iran of

A.W.A.C.S. is excluded because the underlying factors in that debate were not regional interests

but a demonstration by Congress of its ability and willingness to utilize the legislative veto to

rebalance power between the branches.

The minor sales and debates include the 1975 missile sale to Kuwait, the 1977 sale of

additional C-130’s to Egypt, the 1979 package of jets, tanks and arms to Yemen, the 1980 engine

sale to Iraq, the 1980 sale of M60 tanks to Jordan and the return in 1982 to the issues of Jordan

and Hawk missiles. All of these sales were standalone sales and were not explicitly part of

foreign aid packages or deals, which meant that they did not depend on the success of the rest of

the conditions of the bill. As a result, the issues were more clear-cut and dealt only with the issue

of the sale, or sales in two of the cases, in question.

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Three outcomes were possible for the proposed sales. The first was that the sale was not

blocked by the legislative veto provision and allowed to continue as proposed. The second was

that the deal was altered, either by attaching extra provisions or changing the quantity of

equipment sold, before Congress either allowed the resolutions to die on committee or their

failed when they came to a vote. The third was that the deal was withdrawn by the administration

before a concurrent resolution could be passed against it. In the large cases, the opposition of the

Israeli lobby was prominent against the sales to Arab countries and had a considerable influence

on the process and, in some cases, the outcome. The clearest indication of pro-Israeli lobby

influence is in cases where the deal was altered or withdrawn because Israeli security was cited

as one of the main reasons for opposition.

Table 3.1 – Outcome of Arms Sales to the Middle East 1974-1983

Deal Outcome Opposition

1975 Jordan – Hawks (I) Withdrawn Israeli Lobby

1975 Jordan – Hawks (II) Pass Israeli Lobby

1975 Kuwait – Missiles Pass None

1976 Egypt – C-130’s Pass Israeli Lobby

1976 Multinational Package Pass Israeli Lobby

1977 Iran – A.W.A.C.S. (I) Withdrawn Cold War, Congress Oversight

1977 Iran – A.W.A.C.S. (II) Pass Cold War, Congress Oversight

1977 Egypt – C-130’s Pass None

1978 Multinational Package Pass, Altered Israeli Lobby

1979 Yemen – Package Pass Cold War

1980 Iraq - Engines Suspended100

Congressional Oversight

1980 Jordan – Tanks Pass Israeli Lobby

1981 Saudi Arabia –

A.W.A.C.S.

Pass, Altered Israeli Lobby, Cold War

1982 Jordan – Hawks (III) Re-debated101

Israeli Lobby

100

The Carter Administration suspended the sale to Iraq at the time despite that it was not blocked because of the

Iran-Iraq War. 101

The debate in 1982 over the Jordanian arms sale was focused on whether Jordan would be allowed to obtain

mobile Hawk missiles or F-16’s that could deploy Hawk missiles. The debate was an extension from the 1975 sale

because of the conditions that were attached to that sale to ensure that the missiles were immobile. More

information can be found in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Volume 40 on page 339.

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As can be seen in Table 3.1, the arms sales had a series of different outcomes, each with

different factors pressing on the results. The most frequent opposition to a sale was the Israeli

lobby, generally because it was concerned with Israeli security. Cold War politics and the

general Cold War mentality played a role in several of the sales because Congress was concerned

with U.S. military secrets being leaked and combating Soviet influence in the region. Several

deals, however, had no opposition because they did not pose enough of a threat to any particular

set of interests for Congress to take more than a quick survey and they did not warrant the

introduction of resolution against them.

The five sales that prompted significant debate in Congress were examined to determine

the influences that lead to the outcome. The following sections will outline the general

information about the sale, arguments used by the supporters, arguments used by the opposition,

the underlying American national interests involved in the sale, and the outcome of the

legislative veto proceedings. Each case study also deals with the roles played by interested

parties, which included domestic interest groups and the involvement of foreign governments.

Then the conclusions that can be drawn from each case will be discussed and how they

contribute to the big picture of the effects of the legislative veto in American Foreign policy and

how the veto gave the Israeli lobby greater influence over foreign policy during this period.

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Case Study #1

1975: Sale of Hawk Missiles to Jordan

The proposal by the Ford Administration to sell a package of weapons to Jordan in 1975

was the first case that allowed for the Nelson-Bingham amendment to come into effect and give

Congress the ability to conduct oversight on the arms sales of the executive branch.

The Department of Defense notified Congress, on behalf of the entire executive branch,

of the intended sale on July 10, 1975.102

The contents of the sale were fourteen batteries of Hawk

ground-to-air missiles, eight batteries of Vulcan anti-aircraft guns and 300 shoulder-fired Redeye

anti-aircraft missiles, which totaled to $354-million.103

Under the Foreign Aid Act for the fiscal

year of 1975 (Public Law 93-559), Congress must be notified of an arms sale more than $25-

million and it could veto the sale by concurrent resolution within 20 days of the notification. If

no Congressional action was taken, then the sale could proceed.104

This deal was discussed

earlier in the year, at which time the Ford Administration had told the press and the Israelis that

they would be selling the Hawk missiles to Jordan, but that the sale would not exceed $100-

million.105

The letter of notification to Congress included the Hawks and Vulcan's, but not the

Redeye's, which is presumably because the total was less than the $25-million threshold.106

In

Congress, resolutions to block the sale were introduced almost immediately. Senator Clifford P.

Case (R-N.J.) introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 50 (S. Con. Res. 50) on July 11 on the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Representative Jonathan B. Bingham (D-N.Y.)

102

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1975, "Weapons Sale to Jordan." July 19, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1554.

[CQW 1975a] 103

Ibid. 104

Ibid. 105

"Jordan to Buy Big Guns From U.S.?" Daytona Beach Morning Journal, July 12, 1975, page 1. 106

Ibid.

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introduced House Concurrent Resolution 337 (H. Con. Res. 337) on July 14 on the House

International Relations Committee. 107

Proponents of the sale came mainly from the State Department and Department of

Defense. Alfred L. Atherton Jr., the Assistant Secretary of State, and Lt. General H.M. Fish,

representing the Department of Defense, presented the argument for the sale to the Congressional

committees. Their argument was broken down by demonstrating the need to supply Jordan so

that it did not go elsewhere for weapons, supporting Jordan as a moderate state in the region and

supporting its policies, helping Jordan achieve “adequate air defense”, which it had been asking

for since 1973, and noting the sale was very small given the number of arms already present in

the region and therefore the transfer would not risk upsetting the military balance.108

Furthermore, the proponents added that the delivery would be phased over several years and not

constitute an immediate delivery. The reason for the timing of the sale was that King Hussein

had been seeking more advanced military equipment for several years, and Jordan had not

participated in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war with Syria and Egypt. The Jordanian government had

been seeking the more advanced military equipment to make up for their lack of sufficient air-

defense capabilities compared to their neighbors who were able to take advantage of the lack of

protection to use the air and land-space for military maneuvering.

Assistant Secretary of State Atherton represented many of the views of the

Administration in front of the Congressional committees during the hearings. In a statement to

Congress, Atherton said that:

Jordan was virtually the only Mideast nation without an adequate air defense

system. Since 1970, he continued, it had watched ‘with mounting anxiety’ the

107

CQW 1975a, 1554. 108

Ibid.

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buildup of sophisticated aircraft and modern defense systems among its neighbors

and had asked Washington as far back as December 1973 for assistance in

acquiring an up-to-date system.109

Having already put the sale off for more than a year, the administration felt it was time to act.

Atherton went on to say:

Further delay on our part in responding to Jordan’s request to obtain American air

defense equipment would have created a situation in which the United States was

discriminating against one of its closest friends, who moderate policies and

independent existence we have traditionally supported.110

Atherton’s assessment was the opinion held by the Ford Administration and demonstrated the

American interests in continuing to promote good relations with Arab states in the region.

Three main members of Congress took positions against the sale - Representative

Bingham, Senator Case and Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) - but each for slightly different

reasons. Representative Bingham took the position that the sale would destroy the strategic

military balance between Jordan and Israel. He added that he would support a “reasonable” sale,

but that this sale was a drastic increase from previous support of Jordan.111

Senator Case also

questioned the strategic balance, but he added concerns about the defensive nature of the Hawk

missiles because they were mobile and further questioned the ability of Jordan to keep the

weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists (despite the fact that the Palestinian Liberation

Organization had been expelled from the country in September 1970).112

Senator Javits

commented on the “odd timing” of the sale because the administration was currently in the

109

Ibid. 110

Ibid. 111

Ibid. 112

Ibid.

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process of surveying its Middle East policy, including the aid package for Israel. Senator Javits

recommended waiting to complete the sale with Jordan until the reassessment was complete in

order to “proceed even-handedly” with Jordan and Israel.113

Additionally, Israel voiced its reservations privately over the sale.114

The concerns were

not made public initially, but the Israeli Lobby in the United States, headed by American Israel

Public Affairs Committee (A.I.P.A.C.), nonetheless got involved in attempting to block the sale.

In a study published in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly, the Israeli Lobby listed among its

successes the “blocking of the proposed sale of a large air defense system in Jordan.”115

The

report went on in its study to say:

A house source called [A.I.P.A.C.'s] involvement ‘helpful’ in preventing the sale

of anti-aircraft equipment to Jordan. Besides its Senate testimony, it mailed

information to members of Congress on the possible impact of the sale. It also

described this in mailings to Jewish groups across the country. One House aide

estimated that it helped round up an additional 40 co-sponsors to a resolution (H

Con Res 337) opposing the sale, which had more than 125 co-sponsors.116

This networking done by A.I.P.A.C. and other Jewish lobby groups enabled the Congressmen in

the case of the Jordanian sale to be able to organize more easily against it.

Furthermore, there is an argument that, at the very least in 1975, the Israeli lobby was

able to tap into a network of congressional staffers who were already interested in Jewish

interests, and specifically Israel. Some of the members of Congress with staff predisposed

towards Israeli interests include Senator Case and Representative Bingham, the two responsible

113

Ibid. 114

Daytona Beach Morning Journal. 115

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1975, "Israel Lobby: A Strong but Nebulous Force," August 30, Washington,

D.C.: CQ Press, 1871. [CQW 1975c] 116

Ibid., 1872.

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for introducing the resolutions, in their respective committees, to oppose the sale.117

Beyond just

the aides, there was also a significant increase in the number of Jewish members in the 94th

Congress from the 93rd

Congress, from 14 to 23.118

Senator Javits, one of the three Jewish

members of the Senate and was openly opposed to the sale, though he was the least candid about

protecting Israel’s security of the three main opponents to the Jordanian deal.119

The end result of the proceedings was that the resolution proposed in the House, H. Con.

Res. 337, was passed on July 24, which meant that if the Senate passed its resolution the sale

would have been blocked by the legislative veto. As a result, the Ford Administration withdrew

the proposal on July 27 in order to prevent the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from passing

S. Con. Res. 50 and completely blocking the sale. In the hours before the sale, it appeared that

the Senate committee had a majority required for passing their resolution and the sale would

have been blocked.120

After the withdrawal of the sale notification, the issue was not over because the Ford

Administration still wanted to secure the sale to Jordan. Despite the fact that the sale seemed

dead after it was removed from Congress on July 28, the debate continued in media outlets

where speculation on the sale and the influences that prevented it from being passed the first

time. Debate continued on over three main issues: first, if the sale were resubmitted and passed,

if it would pose a security threat to Israel; second, if the U.S. did not acquiesce, then Hussein

would turn to the Soviet Union for arms; and finally, if the U.S. were to refuse a sale to a state

that had been up to this point a friendly state, then U.S.-Arab relations could change

significantly.

117

Ibid., 1872-3. 118

Ibid., 1872. 119

Ibid. 120

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1975, "Jordan Arms Sale," August 2, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1717.

[1975b]

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The argument that King Hussein himself had emphasized in July during the debate of the

sale, which he continued through August, was that the sale of these missiles would allow him to

protect his sovereignty. In a New York Times article from July 11, 1975, King Hussein made a

statement that he was interested in procuring the sophisticated military weapons from the U.S. in

order to enable his armed forces to protect Syria in the event of an Israeli offensive attack that

flanked Syria through Jordanian territory.121

However, those opposed to the sale in Congress,

spearheaded by Representative Bingham, conveyed that King Hussein acknowledged that his

abstention from the 1973 war was based on his lack of “adequate” air defense and that selling the

weapons, which Jordan claimed it required would make it more difficult for Jordan to abstain

again or even encourage the country to participate in a first strike.122

Hussein took a more direct step on September 8, to emphasize the security needs of his

country by writing a direct letter to the members of Congress. It was sent to all 100 senators and

fifty strategic House leaders. In his letter, Hussein discussed the fact that Jordan had no air

defense system, unlike all other Middle East countries, which meant that the entire country was

vulnerable to the Israeli air force. Furthermore, he wrote:

All of Jordan’s vital installations are vulnerable to attack by Israeli planes, its

capital of Amman is within range of Jerusalem’s artillery and the Israelis violate

Jordanian air space with impunity. Jordan’s request for anti-aircraft missiles is

purely defensive.123

With more discussion, Hussein’s security concerns became more apparent: if the current peace

talks did not bring a peace settlement to fruition, then in all likelihood the region would descend

into another war and the undefended Jordanian skies would enable Israel to launch a pre-emptive

121

De Onis, Juan, "Hussein Says Jordan Will Protect Syria," New York Times, August 8, 1975, page 2. 122

"Middle East; Jordanian Knot," The Economist, August 2, 1975. 123

De Borchegrave, Arnaud. "A Letter From Hussein," Newsweek, September 8, 1975.

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strike against Syria. To Hussein, peace would not be a possibility without enough defenses to

dissuade the participants from returning to war.124

Furthermore, the monarch was unable to

ensure the sovereignty of his government over its own territory, which he viewed as critical to

the preservation of his own regime that had been challenge already by more radical forces in the

region. His confrontation with the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1970 had led to

Hussein exiling the organization from the country.125

Overall, Hussein framed his argument in

the context of Jordanian security needs, and made overtones that he would agree to conditions

placed on the missiles by the U.S. government to ensure that some kind of air defense did exist.

Hussein’s argument did not quell the opposition, which continued to insist that the Hawks

would destabilize the military balance. Representative Bingham described the potential missiles

as the agent that would make it “more difficult for Jordan to stay out” of another Arab-Israeli

conflict since air-defense was the stumbling block that had prompted its most recent abstention.

Israeli dissent itself appeared in American media: one such letter to the editor appeared in

Aviation Week and Space Technology in which Israeli resident Steve Arbel expressed the

security concerns of Israelis by attacking President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger and

their lack of understanding of Israeli insecurity. The examples he cited all were uses of American

weapons by Arab states against Israelis before speculating that the future sales contemplated by

the U.S. would all be used to attack Israel.126

While the letter appeared before the initial Hawk

proposal was submitted, its content rang true and the opposition to the sale continued to stress

Israeli insecurity and to deny Israeli military superiority, despite the contradictory assessment

that Israel controlled the strongest and most advanced military in the region.

124

Ibid. 125

Kaplan, Stephen S., "Gromyko and Israeli meet for Rare Talk on Mideast," New York Times, September 25,

1975, page 29. 126

Arbel, Steve, “Mideast Arms Supply,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 9, 1975, page 2.

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The second issue was the implication that King Hussein himself made that if the Hawk

missiles would not be sold that he would have no choice but to turn to the U.S.S.R. for weapons.

While the threat seemed initially to have validity, it became clear in August that the sovereign

was hesitating to follow through on it. In early August, Hussein stated in interviews that he

would take whatever the Americans offered and secure the rest from other countries, but his

second choice was Western Europe; not the Soviet Union.127

Although Western Europe might

remain the second choice behind the U.S., Hussein said that he would still most likely turn to the

Soviets. One of the problems with purchasing from the Soviets for Hussein, however, was that

the Soviets might wish to station technicians in Jordan, which would be a stipulation that he

would oppose.128

Speculation continued over whether Jordan would turn to the U.S.S.R., but

upon resubmission of the sale, it fell to the wayside.

The final issue that was heavily debated during this time was the impact that the sale, or

the lack of one, would have on U.S. relations with Arab states in the Middle East. As a backdrop

to the sale, Secretary Kissinger was working to negotiate another peace agreement to disengage

the Egyptian and Israeli armies in the Sinai, but Arab states questioned the validity of the U.S.’s

role as mediator in the conflict since it had only recently become an arbiter in the conflict, rather

than the supporter of only a single side. In late August, this difficulty was described in direct

relation to the Hawk sale; if the U.S. administration was unable to sell missiles to Jordan because

of the opposition of Israeli supporters in Congress, then the administration would not be able to

widen its influence among Arab leaders because it would not have the ability to provide the

countries with their wants or needs. Hussein expressed concerns on the same account because he

saw the veto of the sale as a sign that Israeli influence in the U.S. would prevent the U.S. from

127

“Jordan; Not From Russia,” The Economist, August 9, 1975. 128

Markham, James M., "Hussein says He May Buy Soviet Arms," New York Times, August 8, 1975.

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truly acting as a peacemaker that would be able to make Israel concede on key points that the

Arabs stressed as being the key to forging an Arab-Israeli peace, like returning the occupied

Arab territories.129

The dilemma for the American government was then how to balance its

interests in the region with the black and white views held by both sides that the U.S. was not

taking their concerns seriously enough.

The debates that took place throughout the month of August, gave way to the

resubmission of the sale in September. In order to ensure that the sale would move forward,

Secretary of State Kissinger, Under Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, Senator Case and

Representative Bingham all met to ensure that the deal would be amenable to all of the parties

involved.130

Senator Case said that the compromise would prevent the missiles from becoming a

security threat to Israel and as a result, he would discontinue his promotion of a resolution to

block the sale in the Senate; Representative Bingham also dropped his resolution in the House

when Senator Case altered his position.131

The ultimate compromise established that the missiles

would be installed permanently where they would be unable to act offensively against Israel in

order to ensure that they would only be used defensively. Despite the attempts of Senator Case

and Representative Bingham, there was no reduction in the number of missiles that would be

sold. In addition to the Hussein letter discussed earlier, President Ford sent a letter to Congress

on September 17 to affirm the promise that the missiles would be used defensively as was

outlined in the compromise, as well as prohibiting Jordan from placing the missiles under a

bilateral or multilateral force, which would prevent their use in another Arab-Israeli war.132

By

129

De Borchegrave. 130

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1975, "Hawk Missiles for Jordan," September 20, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press,

2019. [CQW 1975d] 131

Gwertzman, Bernard, "Israeli Rules Out Any Nuclear Use of U.S. Missiles," New York Times, September 18,

1975, page 1. [Gwertzman 1975a] 132

CQW 1975d, 2019.

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September 22, the end of the 20 day period marking Congress’ veto period, no further action had

been taken and the sale was approved.

The largest issue in September was the publically and privately conveyed messages by

King Hussein. On September 18, following the announcement of the inter-branch compromise of

the U.S. government over the sale, Hussein announced that he would not accept the missiles

because the limits on their use were “insulting”, especially when the U.S. was discussing selling

missiles to Israel that could carry nuclear warheads.133

However, within twenty-four hours, King

Hussein had privately informed the State Department that he would in fact be purchasing the

weapons. The public statement and private change in policy were part of a face-saving technique,

but they highlighted the problems for the U.S. government in attempting to satisfy both the

Israeli supporters while attempting to pursue a balanced policy that would give it influence over

the Arabs.134

The formal statement by Hussein may been issued to ensure that he was able to

defend against criticism from other Arab leaders that he was succumbing to pressures in the U.S.

government by Israeli supporters, but regardless of the reasoning, it did allow Hussein to ensure

that the agreement for selling the weapons did not include the stipulations agreed to between the

U.S. executive and legislative branches in the actual text. Rather, he was able to assert those

separately and in a less public format.135

The outcome in the international politics is a clear demonstration of the influence that

Congress was successful in asserting in the foreign policy formation process, which was the goal

of the veto itself, but it also demonstrates the influence that could be played by interest groups

who have sympathetic ears in Congress. One of the most alarming discussions that appeared in

133

Willenson, Kim, Rich Thomas and Bruce Van Voorst, "Tipping the Balance?," Newsweek, September 29, 1975. 134

Smith, Terence, "Jordanians Stung by Missile Affair; Officials Complain about U.S. Treatment in Deal for Hawk

Batteries," New York Times, September 26, 1975, page 5. [Smith(a)] 135

Gwertzman, Bernard, "Congress, Despite Ford's Plea, Delays Action on Sinai Technicians," New York Times,

September 26, 1975, page 1 [Gwertzman 1975d]; Smith (a).

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the media in August was the connection between Senator Case and Representative Bingham and

A.I.P.A.C. Furthermore, the Congressional Quarterly Weekly published articles that studied the

Israeli and Arab lobbies in the United States and discussed their goals and involvement in recent

events right after the failure of the Hawk missile sale to Jordan in August, which demonstrated

that their involvement and influence was growing.

The links between Senator Case and Representative Bingham and A.I.P.A.C. came out in

an article in August in the New York Times by David Binder, who asserted that aides to the

Congressmen shared confidential information about the sale of the Hawks to A.I.P.A.C. that was

presented to their committees because they wanted Morris Amitay, the A.I.P.A.C. president, to

convey his opinion of the sale to them.136

Within days of the notification by Case and

Bingham’s staff, A.I.P.A.C. had compiled a report, which it then provided to the entire Congress

as well as to the Jewish Community. Within a day of the reporting being distributed A.I.P.A.C.,

as well as the thirteen other organizations that were prominent in the Jewish community, began

lobbying against the sale through phone calls and mailings to ask their Congressmen to

disapprove of the sale.137

Senator Case, in a letter also published in the New York Times later that

month, asserted that the information sharing between his aides and A.I.P.A.C. was not true;

furthermore, he said that any shared information was not confidential because the Nelson

Amendment does not allow for the Administration to classify the information on the arms sales

and that the information the committee received was also provided in the Congressional

Record.138

In sum, nothing conclusive can be said about the sharing of information in the early

136

Binder, David,. "The Israel Lobby in Washington is Small and Effective," New York Times, August 8, 1975, page

2. 137

Ibid. 138

Case, Clifford, "Letter to the Editor: About an Alleged Leak," New York Times, September 20, 1975, page 18.

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days of this sale except that the A.I.P.A.C. position did seem important to some members of

Congress; specifically those who introduced the resolution to block the sale.

The Israeli Lobby also had garnered enough attention at this time that it was profiled in

the Congressional Quarterly Weekly. Throughout the article, there is no definite causation

between its efforts and policy outcomes but its influence appeared to be gaining more support. In

the very beginning, the article cites the “blocking of a proposed sale of a large air defense system

to Jordan” among the successes “attributed to the Jewish Lobby”, which included A.I.P.A.C. and

a number of other organizations.139

The study makes several further references to the Jordan

Hawk sale, one of which quotes an anonymous “House source” who describes A.I.P.A.C. as

“helpful” during the veto proceedings surrounding the sale to Jordan because A.I.P.A.C. was

able to testify to the Congressional committees, it mailed information on the ramifications to

Israel if the sale proceeded, and it helped to organize additional support, possibly up to 40 co-

sponsors, to block the sale.140

The article also discussed A.I.P.A.C.’s ability to use the Capitol

Hill “network” to influence policy because there were staff aides who were sympathetic to the

cause already and thus able to bring connections between Congressmen and A.I.P.A.C. or other

Jewish interest organizations.141

Among the Senators with staff members sympathetic to Israeli

issues were Case and Bingham who spear-headed the moves to block the sale.142

Congressional reaction to the Israeli lobby at this point was varied. While some have

clearly found its involvement “helpful”, it had been more of a nuisance to others. Senator Frank

Moss (D-U.T.) described the lobby as “strong and persuasive”, but not “overbearing” whereas

139

CQW 1975c, 1871. 140

Ibid., 1872. 141

Ibid., 1872-3. 142

Ibid., 1872.

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Representative Edward J. Derwinski (R-I.L.) called it “an over-presence” during the debate on

the Jordan arms sale.143

In sum, the issue of the 1975 sale to Jordan of Hawk missiles demonstrated the power

that lobby and interest groups had attained as well as the increased access that both American

groups and foreign leaders had to attempt to influence Congress. Given Congress’ new ability at

the time to veto arms sales, this particular case demonstrates the beginnings of a larger trend

where groups mobilize on behalf of the sale and against the sale in attempts to sway Congress,

which ultimately has the final say. In 1975, the Israeli lobby demonstrated that it was the most

powerful player to be contended with because Israeli security concerns dominated the debate of

the sale itself and ultimately it was the content that protected Israel from the Hawk missiles that

allowed the sale to pass.

143

Ibid., 1873.

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Case Study #2

1976: Sale of C-130 Hercules Transport Planes to Egypt

The next challenge to a Middle Eastern arms transfer came in 1976 when the Ford

Administration proposed to sell C-130 Hercules transport planes to Egypt. The Ford

Administration submitted the proposal of the sale on March 25, 1976 of six C-130 Hercules

transport planes, including spare parts, and also provided for training some Egyptian military

officers in the United States.144

The Foreign Aid Act (Public Law 93-559) gave Congress the

right to veto, by concurrent resolution, a proposed arms sale over $25-million within 20 days of

notification.145146

Six resolutions were introduced in the House to block the sale, but they were

all rejected in the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Political and

Military Affairs.147

There were hearings in both the aforementioned House Subcommittee and

also on the Senate Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on April 6 and April 2,

respectively.148

The argument that the Administration gave for the sale was very simple: if the U.S. were

to supply arms to Egypt, it would then be politically feasible for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat

to continue his moderate policies towards Israeli, which would benefit both Israel and the Middle

East peace process. President Sadat’s willingness to negotiate the two Sinai agreements already

144

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1976, "Kissinger Requests $1-Billion in Military Aid for Turkey," April 3,

Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 749 [CQW 1976a]; Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1976, "C-130 Aircraft:

Kissinger Backs Controversial Sale to Egypt," April 10, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 857. [CQW 1976b] 145

CQW 1976a, 749. 146

Despite that the sale was labeled under the Foreign Aid Act, it was still an arms sale because Egypt would be

purchasing the planes from the US government. 147

CQW 1976b , 858; Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1976, "House Panel's Approval: C-130 Sale to Egypt,"

April 17, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 934. [CQW 1976c] 148

CQW 1976b , 858.

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was a signal that he was ready to make peace with neighboring Israel.149

By selling support

equipment, the U.S. would not be arming Egypt for another war with Israel.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was very involved in this deal and appeared before the

Congressional committees in order to support the sale. Many of his statements in support of the

sale were in response to dissent, but he demonstrated a strong political point in favor of the sale

that promoted both the peace process in the region and also the need for the U.S. to continue

promoting an active policy to contain Soviet influence. First, he stated that this would be the only

sale to Egypt for the year, which was a direct in response to sale opponents. Second, he said that

any future sales would depend on the progress that had been made in making peace between

Israel and Egypt. Third, Kissinger stated the sale would not be the first step towards a supplier

relationship with Egypt where the U.S. would begin committing regularly to the state. Fourth, he

said Egypt had begun rebuilding towns along the Suez Canal, which demonstrated that they

wanted to rejoin the world economy by re-opening the canal. Tourism in the area could resume,

which was a sign that its military encampment on its western border was at an end. Fifth,

Kissinger stated that Egypt had broken with the Soviet Union, its main supplier of weapons,

which meant that it needed to get its military equipment from somewhere else. Sixth, he believed

that if Sadat was able to continue on this path, he would need a strong signal from the U.S. And

finally, Kissinger asserted that the sale would counter the skepticism of other Arab states that

Sadat’s policy would yield returns.150

The arguments that Kissinger made about the Soviet Union and reinforcing Egypt’s

position in the region were particularly strong. After Egypt’s “abrogation of its friendship treaty

with the Soviet Union” the U.S. needed to make it attractive to “politically powerful interests

149

Ibid., 857. 150

CQW 1976b, 857; CQW 1976c, 934.

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within Egypt, including the military” to continue on the policy path they are on.151

Furthermore,

the formal severing of relations with the Soviet Union meant that Egypt was no long able to

maintain its military force. Kissinger told the committee that “it is inconceivable that Egypt will

simply let its military establishment run down. The only question is where they’re going to get

the equipment from and what the foreign policy consequences are on the different sources of

supply.”152

If the U.S. remained attuned to Egypt’s national security needs, then it would be

easier for Egypt to continue its investment in the peace process. By promoting these interests,

Kissing stated that the sale would have an effect on other states that had been “skeptical that

[Sadat] can derive sufficient benefit from this new policy” for Egypt’s advantage; the sale would

then be the first step in developing a much needed U.S. policy where Arab states believed that

the U.S. “took their concerns seriously and were prepared to treat their legitimate needs fairly

and with sympathy.”153

Kissinger’s compelling arguments garnered early support for the sale from Senators

George McGovern (D-S.D.), Mike Mansfield (D-M.T.), Charles H. Percy (R-I.L.) and John

Sparkman (D-A.L.). It also allowed Kissinger to woo Senators Hubert H. Humphrey (D-M.N.)

and Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) to support the sale. The Senators who opted to support the sale did

so on the conditions that there would be no precedent of sales in the future, there would be no

further sales in 1976, and that training of Egyptian military officials would be very limited in

terms of number and there would be restrictions on the tactics and use of specific weapons.154

That does not limit the objections to the sale in general. The concerns of the opponents

covered three main areas: the move to sell arms to a major Israeli adversary and what that could

151

CQW 1976b, 857. 152

Ibid. 153

Ibid. 154

Ibid., 857-8.

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mean for the regional peace process; the political implications of selling to Egypt and its dubious

relationship with the Soviets, and the question of whether arms were the best course of action.

Major opponents included Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-N.Y.), Representative

James H. Scheuer (D-N.Y.) and Senator Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.).

On the first point, it was strongly noted in Congress that this sale would be the first to an

adversary of Israel, which had participated in all four Arab-Israeli wars to date. One of the major

questions raised was that while Egypt was demonstrating an interest in the peace process at

present, how long would such an interest last?155

Another issue is that an arms sale could not

guarantee U.S. control or even influence over Egyptian policy towards Israel, which could in

turn lead to the Egyptians using American supplied arms to threaten Israel.156

Representative

Scheuer made a speech on March 11 in which he expressed his doubts about the efficacy of

using arms sales to control the conflict; he said that “[b]y supplying arms to both sides of the

conflict, the United States will in some sense have more control over the conflict…Did the

supply to both India and Pakistan either endear us to either side or avoid armed conflict between

them?”157

Another example discussed on the floor was the conflict between Greece and Turkey

in Cyprus; selling arms to both sides had not proven to be effective foreign policy for controlling

the outcomes.158

In light of contemporary examples, opponents had good reason to question the

movement towards supplying both sides of the conflict with arms.

The second issue that came up repeatedly was the big question of what the sale would

mean for American relations with Egypt over the long-term. Representative Rosenthal expressed

this on March 16 when he said, “My opposition is not predicated on the precise equipment

155

Ibid., 857. 156

Ibid., 857-8. 157

Ibid., 858. 158

Ibid.

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involved, but on the meaning of the sale in the present context…and that is the establishment of a

military supply relationship, something which I firmly believe is dangerously wrong at this

time.”159

Rosenthal went on to question how broken the Egyptian-Soviet relationship was

because Soviet shipments had continued after the 1973 war through third parties and Soviet

civilians were still working in Egypt. “Nothing has been done to change the Soviet Union’s

status as Egypt’s largest trading partner.”160

Not only did Rosenthal question the political meaning, but he questioned the content

when he discussed other economic relations between the U.S. and Egypt. He said, “I supported

and voted for a program of significant U.S. economic and agricultural assistance. This year alone

we will be providing Egypt with nearly $1-billion to rebuild a faltering economy.”161

Scheuer

echoed similar sentiments to those of Rosenthal on the topic of the type of support the U.S. was

offering to Egypt. “What Egypt needs today,” Scheuer said, “is tractors, not tanks and planes.

Her people live in abject poverty. [The Egyptian government] should be concerned with

improving social services – not preparing for war.”162

This third concern voiced by the objectors

demonstrated the mentality that Kissinger had attempted to counter by stressing the need to take

Arab security concerns in the region seriously in order to have any chance of improving

relationships between the U.S. and Arab states as well as aiding Israel in improving its relations

with its neighbors.

The final outcome was that the sale passed through unaltered. The House International

Relations Committee “gave the green light” to the sale of the six planes by rejecting the six

159

Ibid. 160

Ibid., 857. 161

Ibid., 858. 162

Ibid., 858.

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proposed resolutions by a voice vote.163

Clearly the easy end to the proceedings meant that the

deal was less controversial by the time it was submitted than it was initially, and that perhaps the

most interesting and telling dimension of this sale was the debate it sparked before its

submission.

The public commentary on the sale occurred before the deal was actually submitted to

Congress because the Ford Administration was taking great care to ensure that the proposed sale

would not alienate American Jews, who would be critical for a victory in the election that year.

As early as March 5, 1976, New York Times articles discuss that the Ford administration was

moving “slowly, given the sensitivity of Israel and its supporters to proposed lifting of [the]

military embargo against Israel.”164

Additionally, the Administration made a possible list of

items it would sell to Egypt after the C-130’s, pending Congressional approval, available to the

Israelis.165

What is clear throughout the news articles from the time of the sale, however, is that

the administration believed that it needed to act carefully to prevent “provoking Israeli

supporters on Capitol Hill into blocking the sale.”166

The opposition to the sale was not touting Israel’s immediate insecurity as strongly as it

did in the Jordan case, but the dissenters were focused on the long term security implications in

the region. As is noted in another New York Times article from March 20:

Opponents of the sale…have acknowledged that the sale of C-130’s will not

affect Israel’s security. But they have expressed concern about the long-range

163

CQW 1976c, 934. 164

Gwertzman, Bernard, "Key U.S. Plans to Sell Egypt Wide Range of Material," New York Times, March 5, 1976,

page 3. [Gwertzman 1976b] 165

Ibid. 166

Gwertzman, Bernard, "Key Legislators Told of Desire to Let Cairo Purchase C-130's," New York Times, March 4,

1976, page 1. [Gwertzman 1976a]

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implications. They argue that the C-130 sale will inevitably be followed by a

gradual escalation until Egypt receives arms such as modern jet fighters.167

The concern was that Egypt had already attained military parity, if not superiority, because

numerically the Egyptian army has more equipment and personnel.168

Little attention was given

by the opponents to the actual ability of the military, which had yet to ever actually defeat Israel

in combat.

Consistently during this period of debate, the opponents of the sale are considered to

mainly be American Jews, pro-Israeli members of Congress and the Israeli government itself.

News and media sources focused on and discussed the attempt of the Administration to balance

their encouragement of Sadat’s policies with the Jewish interests in the United States and policy

towards Israel. Furthermore, the attention by high level officials given to the American Jewish

leaders demonstrated the influence of the Jewish community over the issue because members of

the executive believed that pro-Israeli supporters would be able to block the sale in Congress by

applying pressure on the elected representatives. The fight continued to remain over the

symbolism of the sale, which fits into the concern raised by the American Jewish community that

the sale would be a gateway to a closer military relationship with Egypt.

In mid-March, Senator Javits, along with three others, proposed the compromise which

partly led to the success of the sale: the stipulation that the sale would be the only sale to Egypt

for the year. However, there were other components to the discussion at that point. The first was

that the Senators wished to see a study done to determine whether the sale could take place

through a commercial outlet rather than from the U.S. government, which would symbolically

demonstrate that the U.S. government was not committing to selling to one of Israel’s prime

167

Gwertzman, Bernard, "Administration Decision to End Arms Embargo on Egypt by Sale of C-130's," New York

Times, March 20, 1976, page 7. [Gwertzman 1976e] 168

Ibid.

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adversaries.169

However, the difficulty with selling the C-130 planes to Egypt through private

businesses was that the Administration had already announced its intention to sell the planes

under the Foreign Military Sales Act, which meant that the sale would be from the Pentagon to

the Egyptian Air Force itself and could not be substituted by a private company.170

The focus of

the Senators opposed to the sale was that the symbolic value was too significant if the U.S.

government itself were to sell the planes, and they therefore believed that the Ford

Administration could honor its commitment to Egypt by selling the planes privately, thus

avoiding the problems that would come with a symbolic sale between the governments.171

Furthermore, a private transaction would not imply Congressional approval and would not reflect

poorly upon members of Congress who were concerned that their districts would be unhappy

with the sale regardless of the vote their representative had cast.172

The election consideration was no small concern because the reports at the time

demonstrate the power and influence that American Jewish leaders held. On March 8, American

Jewish leaders sent a telegram to President Ford to voice their concern over the sale and said that

they would be launching a major effort to discourage the Administration from pursuing the

sale.173

On March 9, President Ford planned on meeting with Max Fisher, a Republican

fundraiser, who had worked with political candidates and the Jewish communities for elections;

in this case, Fisher wished to express his concerns that Ford’s action to sell arms to Egypt would

hurt his chances among Jewish voters in the upcoming election.174

This meeting was not the only

169

Gwertzman, Bernard, "Pro-Israel Senators Offer Compromise on Cairo Sale," New York Times, March 11, 1976,

page 1. [Gwertzman 1976d] 170

Gwertzman, 1976e. 171

Ibid. 172

Ibid. 173

Gwertzman, Bernard, "U.S. Jews Warning Ford of Selling Planes to Egypt," New York Times, March 9, 1976,

page 1. [Gwertzman 1976c] 174

Ibid.

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opportunity that the Jewish Leaders had to meet with President Ford and convey their opinions:

on March 17, thirteen American Jewish leaders met with the President at the White House to

discuss the impending sale to Egypt. 175

This type of access to high ranking officials in addition

to Congressional support meant that the efforts would have the best chance for success.

The actual actions taken by American Jews in opposition to the sale began after the

official announcement and were described in a Newsweek article as a “blitz” that “was

impressive.”176

The efforts included the aforementioned telegram and meetings with the

President in addition to the general campaign taken on by the members of the community

lobbying their leaders and the sharing of information that emphasized the long-term threats that

the community saw as threatening Israel.

Ultimately, the pro-Israeli lobby had the largest impact on the sale because it got one of

its most explicit concerns addressed: the sale of the C-130’s would be the only sale to Egypt for

the year. Secretary Kissinger himself agreed to this condition with the Congressional committees

to ensure that there would be no further sale offers made in 1976.177

Ultimately, however, the

Administration made the decision to form the compromises because Kissinger viewed the

potential of the Israeli lobby successfully blocking a sale as “setting a dangerous precedent”.178

In sum, the Israeli lobby successfully opened up what the Ford Administration thought

would be an uncontroversial sale to a process of negotiation because of the possibility that

Congress could block the sale. As a result of this particular sale, it is clear that even a sale that is

175

Benjamin, Milton R., Nabila Megalli and Michael Elkins, "Middle East: 'You Have to Have Faith," Newsweek,

March 29, 1976. 176

Ibid. 177

CQW 1976b, 858. 178

Gwertzman, Bernard, "Kissinger and 3 Senators Meet on Egypt Arms Issue," New York Times, March 26, 1976,

page 7.

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generally viewed as benign could be politicized through the legislative veto proceedings and

allowed access to be given to special interest groups like the Israeli lobby.

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Case Study #3

1976: Package Sale to Iran, Saudi Arabia and other states.

The next controversial deal was in 1976 when President Ford submitted a proposal for a

package of arms sales on September 1, 1976 that would authorize weapon sales to eleven

governments that totaled to roughly $6-billion.179

The proposal included sales to Israel, Saudi

Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, Norway, Australia, West Germany, Morocco, Singapore,

Canada, Kuwait, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey.180

The largest of the

submitted sales were to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran for $241.4-million, $701.6-million and

$4,458-million respectively.181

The most controversial parts of the deal were the sales to Saudi

Arabia and Iran, which proposed the sale of 850 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, 650 Maverick

air-to-ground missiles and other “less controversial” material to the Saudis and 160 F-16 fighter

jets to the Iranians. The controversy was rooted in the fact that first, the Iranian sale prompted

the discussion of the U.S.'s role in providing arms to underdeveloped countries that then required

the presence of American personnel to use the equipment, and second, the Saudi sale would

significantly increase sales to the Arab state and would include offensive weapons.182

The package of arms sales were met with a strong response in Congress: on September 1,

Senator William Proxmire (D-W.I.) submitted twenty-four resolutions to block $5.3-billion

worth of the sales and on September 7, Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-W.I.) filed thirty-seven

concurrent resolutions to block the sales. The committee hearings where these sales were debated

took place over longer periods of time. There were four separate meetings of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee on September 16, 21, 24 and 28 to discuss the sales. The committee

179

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1976, "Sept. 30 Deadline: Resolutions to Block Foreign Arms Sales Introduced

in Senate," September 11, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 2463. [CQW 1976e] 180

"Arms Deals Outlined," New York Times, September 4, 1976, page 5. 181

CQW 1976e, 2463. 182

Ibid.

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addressed a single sale within the package at each hearing before voting on a separate day in

order to discuss the most controversial issues individually. While there were resolutions to block

sales to almost all of the countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia received the most attention, and those

sales were the most likely to be blocked by Congress. The two sales were debated separately,

which makes it easiest to examine the arguments for and against each sale separately while

remaining cognizant that they were presented together. The issues in the Iranian sale will be

discussed, and then the concerns around the Saudi sale. The Israeli sale will essentially be

neglected as it was when the sales were brought before Congress.

The Iranian sale’s strongest proponents were in the Ford Administration, which was

pushing the idea that the U.S. must protect its strategic interests in the Persian Gulf and take

steps to ensure that oil supplies remained steady for American consumers.183

These two issues, in

tangent with Iran’s political stability, were the trio of reasons pushed the strongest by the

administration. The precedent set by the sales to Iran in the previous years and the rapid

economic growth that the state was experiencing were the bases for the argument that it would be

able to absorb the new incoming weapons.184

Iran, which was undergoing rapid economic growth in the 1970’s, was viewed as both a

market for American companies and a key political ally in the Persian Gulf; their political

importance rested on their stable government and close relationships with U.S. companies.185

Another component in the argument for the sale was the previous decision by the Nixon

Administration in 1972 that the U.S. would “sell Iran virtually any conventional weapons it

wanted,” which could cause rifts in U.S.-Iranian relations if military arms sales were curbed. The

183

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1976, "Senate Hearing: Administration Witnesses Explain Controversial Arms

Sale to Iran," September 18, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2577. [CQW 1976f] 184

Ibid. 185

Ibid.

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concern is that any change in U.S. policy, specifically the U.S. changing its policies on arms

sales to Iran, would cause “a major crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations.”186

The overall decision to

continue selling arms to Iran, which was the largest single purchaser of American military

equipment, was based in the geostrategic and political calculations more than the balance of

power in the Persian Gulf because, as Under Secretary of State Philip Habib described at one of

the Congressional hearings on the sale, Iran’s importance is based on its location at the gateway

between the East and the West as well as the 1,200 mile border it shared with the Soviet

Union.187

The economic growth of Iran and the rising oil prices are both factors that contribute to

Iran’s ability to increase its purchase of arms, which has totaled $10.4-billion between 1972 and

1976.188

The major members of the executive branch that were present and arguing for the case

were Habib and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth. Habib stressed many of the

dimensions that had political implications. The three main points he explained at the September

16 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing were, first, that “the deal was not purely a

commercial venture devoid of U.S. foreign policy considerations”, which was emphasized by the

main ideas that administration were putting forward.189

Second, the U.S. would not sell weapons

to countries that had different interests than the United States and that the Shah of Iran

guaranteed that, in a situation where Iran went to war, Americans would not have to get

involved, even those needed for operating and maintaining the F-16’s.190

And third, Deputy

Secretary of Defense Ellsworth emphasized the point that “other countries of the region with

186

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1976, "Staff Study: Report Says United States Cannot Reduce High Level of

Arms Sales to Iran," August 7, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2123. [CQW 1976d] 187

CQW 1976f, 2577; CQW 1976d, 2123. 188

CQW 1976d, 2123. 189

CQW 1976f, 2577 190

Ibid.

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which we maintain close and friendly relations have not voiced any objections to the sale.”191

This argument went straight to the objections that had been voiced in earlier sales that that the

U.S. was promoting a regional arms race, which was a principle concern of the Senators on the

Foreign Relations Committee.192

Habib and Ellsworth were able to present the argument for the sale to Iran effectively

enough to win the support of Senators Hubert H. Humphrey (D-M.N.) and Senator Jacob K.

Javits (R-N.Y.) . While Humphrey’s initial description of the sale was “deplorable”, he was more

neutralized in his opposition to the sale because he “warmed” to the idea that the “deal was not

purely a commercial venture devoid of U.S. foreign policy considerations.”193

Javits was

convinced by Habib’s guarantee that the U.S. would not sell arms to countries with opposing

ideological views.194

While the bureaucrats were able to convince some of the Senators to support the sale,

they were not entirely successful. Senator Nelson explained that he did not believe that the

resolutions he introduced to the Senate would block the sale because he did not want to see all of

the transactions fail, but he did want to provide Congress with adequate time “to hold hearings

and call administration witnesses to explore in detail the underlying rationale for so extensive an

arms sale plan…at this particular moment.”195

Nelson also opposed the F-16 sale to Iran

particularly strongly and said that “it will take a great deal of convincing to prove to me that the

United States must commit itself this month” and furthermore added that “telling Congress that

this decision is in the national interest will just not wash.”196

Nelson’s ultimate point fits into the

notion that Congress was reasserting itself into foreign policy through the veto provisions, but 191

Ibid. 192

Ibid. 193

Ibid. 194

Ibid. 195

CQW 1976e, 2463. 196

Ibid.

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also that Congress needed to become more involved in the decisions that the administration was

making. Nelson also targeted the strategic interests involved in the sale because he pointed to the

fact that weapons sales were originally intended for military allies, like members of N.A.T.O.,

but they had begun to be sold to third world countries as the principle recipients.197

Nelson’s

continued to say of the transfer recipients, mainly third world countries, that: “such sales have

major foreign policy implications, but there is little if any evidence that the administration has

given adequate thought to the long-range diplomatic or military considerations of the weapons

transactions.”198

Nelson’s points stress the lack of discussion about the long term implications of

the sales, which correlates to the dearth of information provided by the administration on the

subject. The majority of the proponents’ arguments stress long-term geostrategic and political

implications of the sale, but they pay less attention to the escalating arms sales or the essential

carte blanche provided to Iran to purchase weapons.

In addition to Nelson, Senator Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) and Robert Mantel, a member of

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, also voiced concerns against the sales, particularly

the F-16 sale to Iran. Case’s concern was more logistical than content based. General Dynamics,

the maker of the F-16, would be responsible if the sale were to pass for not only manufacturing

the Iranian planes but also those for the United States and the European allies that were also

expecting F-16’s. The challenge would be ensuring that all the production was managed well

enough that none of it lagged behind and delayed all of the sales that had already been

negotiated, or jeopardized U.S. readiness in the event of a crisis.199

Deputy Secretary Ellsworth

addressed Case’s concern specifically during his testimony and explained that special

management would be required to “ensure that early production resources are properly

197

Ibid. 198

Ibid. 199

CQW 1976f, 2577

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allocated,” which was based on previous experiences. Case was not convinced by this argument

because his view was that it would take “extraordinary management” to ensure that U.S. needs

were not undercut by foreign sales.200

Mantel pushed for the framing of the debate of this

particular sale in the context of what the “incremental sales decisions” would mean for long-term

U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf.

In addition to the issues on the committee, there were concerns raised by a report released

by the Senate Foreign Assistance Subcommittee on August 1, 1976, which questioned some of

the U.S.’s strategic interests in selling arms that required U.S. personnel to operate, especially in

the Iranian case. The end result of the report was that there are certain lessons that both the

executive branch and Congress must remain cognizant of while deciding sales. Among these are

that if the U.S. chooses to sell weapons to a non-industrial state, then they are essentially

entering into a long-term partnership because the U.S. must provide the support for the

equipment that has been sold. Furthermore, if the U.S. is providing the support, then the

individuals that carry out the daily support have the possibility of becoming an essential hostage

to the Iranian intentions in the case of a crisis if the Iranian government wished to use the U.S.

equipment. The grey area that would arise would mean that there would be no clear delineation

for deciding whether the U.S. or Iranian government would be in charge of the decision making

process.201

The bigger question that came out of the report, and was considered during the

legislative veto proceedings of this sale, was whether the U.S. would be able to use leverage as a

supplier of arms to another country to influence the decisions that a country will make with the

200

Ibid. 201

CQW 1976d, 2123.

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arms because it could undermine American credibility as a “dependable” source of military

equipment in the eyes of other countries.202

The other sale that received the most attention in the package was Saudi Arabia of

Sidewinder and Maverick missiles. The sale would have other equipment as well, but the

missiles were the most heavily debated component by Congress. At the hearings dealing with the

Saudi Sale, the administration sent Alfred L. Atherton Jr., the Assistant Secretary of State for

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Eugene McAuliffe, the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for International Security Affairs to promote the sale.203

The sale to Saudi Arabia totaled

to $701.6-billion for the missiles and other equipment.204

The general arguments for the sale

centered on Saudi defensive needs, maintaining the balance in the region and keeping oil prices

from the Arab producers low after the discovering of what embargos could do to American

dependence. Atherton described Saudi Arabia’s defensive needs in terms of its ability to protect

its own oil fields from neighboring states, but the emphasis was on the Saudi view that radical

Arab states, like Iraq, were its biggest threat in the region. Iraq in particular was seen as a threat

with its Soviet military backing and strained relationship with Saudi Arabia.205

Furthermore, it

would support U.S. interests abroad because it would promote the moderate stance taken by

Saudi Arabia, which was supported by other moderate states in the region, and would help

endear the Americans to other Arab states. Finally, the aid of the U.S. to the Saudis to help

provide for their national security would mean that the Saudis would be more inclined to keep oil

prices lower, which would help American consumers who are dependent on petroleum in their

202

Ibid. 203

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1976, " Senate Hearing: Administration Witnesses Present Case for Selling

Missiles to Saudi Arabia," September 25, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2627. [CQW 1976g] 204

Ibid. 205

Ibid.

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daily lives .206

The only fault in the argument presented by Atherton was in response to a

question asked by Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.); he asked, “Aren’t they also thinking about

arming themselves against an attack by Israel?”207

Atherton’s answer was the Saudis have only

“felt threatened by the Israelis because of the territorial results of the Arab-Israeli wars,” which

had clearly not actually encroached on sovereign Saudi territory.208

The largest influencing factor in the entire debate came from Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger who conveyed the consequences of vetoing the sale to Saudi Arabia. On September 28

Kissinger made a statement to the Foreign Relations Committee that blocking the Saudi sale

might lead to higher oil prices for American consumers, which would affect the constituents in

all of the Senators’ states.209

Kissinger’s statement seemed to be quite compelling because in the

end result, it did appear to prevent the committee from passing any of the resolutions to block the

sale to Saudi Arabia. However, Kissinger’s presentation of the facts appears to have been

exaggerated because he told reporters after the meeting with the committee that Saudi Arabia had

not actually “threatened to embargo oil shipments to the United States, as had been reported after

the September 24 vote,” but he did add that vetoing the Maverick sale “would have foreign

policy consequences that are out of proportion to the technical issues involved.”210

The larger

implications that Kissinger discussed were rooted in the possibility that blocking the sale could

stall the process of stabilizing and creating a more moderate mentality in the region.211

Kissinger’s involvement seems to have tipped the scales in favor of the Saudi sale, but the actual

content of his statements seemed to have the primary goal of getting the sale to go through

206

Ibid. 207

Ibid. 208

Ibid. 209

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1976, "8-6 Vote Reversed: Kissinger Wins Over Foreign Relations

Committee," October 2, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2711. [CQW 1976h] 210

Ibid. 211

Ibid.

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Congress, because it was vague and lacked specific reasons, except the threat of higher oil prices

for American consumers, to support it.

Opponents of the Saudi sale were very vocal as the opponents to the Iranian sale had

been. The strongest opposition came from Senator Javits because he was concerned, first, that

the U.S. would be breaking with aspects of its policy by selling Saudi Arabia potentially

offensive weapons; second, that the missiles could be transferred to other Arab states and used

against Israel in the event of another Arab-Israeli war; and third, arming both sides of the Arab-

Israeli conflict could have a dangerous outcome.212

Senator Humphrey also voiced his concern

over the sales to the Saudi government, which he said had reached a total level of $7.6-billion,

and he questioned when the United States would choose to limit how many arms it sold to the

state.213

In addition to the Senators who opposed the sale, Jewish groups spoke out strongly

against the sale for the same reason that Javits had voiced: the missiles could be used against

Israel if another war were to break out.214

The objections voiced by the Jewish community seem

to be linked to the initial rejection of the sale by an eight-to-six vote by the committee on

September 24.215

Furthermore, Javits had been involved in the deal from an earlier point because

he had been privy to the negotiations prior to the proposal submission that changed the number

of Mavericks to be sold to Saudi Arabia from 1500 to 650, which his statements imply he did on

behalf of the Jewish community.216

In addition to the Senators with specific interests, Nelson and

Proxmire’s arguments for introducing the resolutions in the first place still held in the Saudi case

as they had in the Iranian one: Congress needed time and a reason to debate and examine the

rational for the sales before they approved or disapproved them. Ultimately, it seemed that the

212

CQW 1976g, 2627. 213

Ibid. 214

CQW 1976h, 2711. 215

Ibid. 216

Ibid., 2712.

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Saudi sale was the most likely to be rejected by the Senate because of the public opposition to

the sale, specifically among the Jewish community, and the Senators who wanted to see more

Congressional oversight of the executive branch.

What emerged in these debates was that the main point of contention was the Saudi deal.

While there was controversy over the Iranian arms deal, it remained in the context of the

growing sales to the Iranians and the risks that the sales would jeopardize American military

secrets to the Soviets. At its core, the debate over state secrets and big picture policy decisions

for how many arms to sell to Iran was a government decision based mainly on information not

readily available; and while it did not spark a debate, it did not have the same mobilizing factor

among interest groups or in the media that the Saudi sale did. The Saudi deal, in contrast,

triggered the issue for American supporters of Israeli who feared seeing another Arab-Israeli war

where Saudi Arabia would become involved for the first time.

Examining the negotiations that took place both between the U.S. government and Saudi

Arabia as well as inside of the U.S. government, there were significant changes made to the deals

on several levels and specific groups levied the most pressure in the internal negotiations of the

American government. The first and most striking part of the deal that got attacked was the

quantities that the American government was willing to sell to Saudi Arabia. The second, which

is connected to the first, was championed by pro-Israeli groups in the U.S., both in and outside of

Congress, that the sale of any weapons to Saudi Arabia could generate a significant security

threat to Israel. Third, the concern of oil prices entered the debate because a statement made by a

Saudi minister that if the U.S. Congress blocked the sale, then the Saudis would respond with an

oil embargo.

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The issue of the quantities of weapons being sold to Saudi Arabia was an issue from the

inception of the sale; even before it was submitted to Congress. Saudi Arabia informed the

United States that it wished to purchase arms; they requested 2500 Mavericks, 1000 Sidewinders

and 1800 TOW missiles with the justification that they needed to protect themselves from

Soviet-backed Iraq and South Yemen. While the initial request was reported in the press in early

August, the deal that the Administration put forward shortly before it was submitted to Congress

was drastically reduced; 1500 Mavericks, 1000 Sidewinders and 1000 T.O.W.'s.217

The concept

behind reducing what the Administration would be willing to sell was based on what would go

through Congress. However, that did not stop dissent from Capitol Hill. The opposition to the

sale questioned the large number of missiles being sold, especially the Sidewinders, because the

Saudis only possessed 110 F-5E jet interceptors, which carry two Sidewinder missiles each, and

therefore the state could not possibly need 1000 of the missiles since they could only carry a

maximum of 220 at any given time.218

In an attempt to make a compromise, the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee opted to meet on August 27 in order to form a pre-notification compromise

that would enable the sale to go through, with the specific goal of reducing the number of

missiles that would be sold despite that the Administration had already reduced the number with

Congressional opposition in mind.219

The compromise was negotiated by Secretary Kissinger and Senators Javits, Case and

Humphrey, the first two of the three members of Congress being ardent supporters of Israel who

had lobbied heavily in opposition to the earlier sales to Jordan and Egypt. The result of their

negotiations was that the Maverick sales would be reduced from 1500 to 650, which was a

217

Gelb, Leslie H., "U.S. Ready to Sell Missiles to Saudis," New York Times, August 1, 1976, page 14. 218

Gwertzman, Bernard, "A Compromise is Sought on Arms Sales to Saudis," New York Times, August 27, 1976,

page 10. [Gwertzman 1976f] 219

Ibid.

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significant victory for Congress and the pro-Israeli lobby. However, Senator Javits noted that he

was opposed to any sale of Mavericks to Saudis but felt a “moral obligation” to support the sale

because of the compromise.220

The pre-notification alterations and compromise signifies that the

Administration realized the constraints on the sale would have to occur, but by working with

Congress directly there was a much smaller likelihood of Congress then preventing the

compromise. However, the leadership of Javits and Case in the negotiations demonstrates the

importance of having the involvement of strong pro-Israel leadership from the legislature to

offset some of the dissent from the sale since both Senators were strong supporters of Israel. This

particular issue might have seemed unrelated, but in fact is directly related to the next part of the

debate, which is one of the strongest.

The issue of Israeli security was linked to the Saudi sale because opponents framed the

issue in a starkly anti-Israel context. Representative Rosenthal described it very explicitly when

he said the “sale is another step towards making Saudi Arabia a confrontational state with

Israel.”221

This concern consistently permeated the debate and the framing of the arguments

against the sale. The reasoning for the weapons becoming a threat to Israel was because Saudi

Arabia could transfer these arms to hostile countries, like Egypt or Syria, to use against Israel or

even be used by Saudi Arabia if they decided to enter into armed confrontations with Israel in the

event of another Arab-Israeli war.222

Senator Javits also voiced concern in a hearing when he

asked, “Aren’t they also thinking about arming themselves against an attack by Israel?”223

The

Senator went on to make the obvious observation that it was foolish to arm both Saudi Arabia

220

"Efforts to Block Saudi Mavericks Collapses," Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 4, 1976, page 17. 221

“Arms Deals Outlined.” 222

Gelb, Leslie H. New York Times. August 1, 1976. 223

CQW 1976g, 2627.

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and Israel if they perceived a threat from the other.224

However, there was no acknowledgement

of other security risks to Saudi Arabia, like Iraq or South Yemen, by the opponents to the sale;

the concern focused on the offensive threat posed to Israel by the Saudis.

The third concern that arose during the deal was the threat of another oil embargo that

Saudi Arabia could persuade O.P.E.C. to begin. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud ibn Faisal made a

statement in late September that if anti-boycott legislation to deflect the economic ramifications

of the Arab boycott of Israel were to go through the U.S. Congress, then the Saudis would

embargo oil to the U.S.225

The timing of the statement came at a point when Congress was

discussing both the anti-boycott legislation and the arms sale to Saudi Arabia. One of the key

points that the Ford Administration had to emphasize to Congress was that if the U.S. did sell the

arms, there would be no increase in oil prices, but blocking the sale could lead to an increase in

petroleum prices as the anti-boycott legislation also could.226

The concern of oil prices was

encompassed by State Department testimony during the oversight procedures, which gave

another dimension to complicate the sale by involving another strong American interest.

Whether the Saudi threat to embargo oil was valid or not is not clear, despite Kissinger

reinforcing it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee between the September 24 and 28

votes, because statements made to the media appear to support both the possibility and the

impossibility of an oil embargo.227

Oil considerations also appeared to be enough of a concern

for Congressmen to change their votes on the resolutions and prevent the committee from

sending a resolution to block the sale to the Senate floor.228

224

Ibid. 225

Finney, John W., "U.S. Fights a Move in Congress to Bar Missiles for Saudis," New York Times, September 28,

1976, page 1. 226

Ibid. 227

CQW 1976h, . 2711. 228

Ibid.

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In sum, the Saudi sale demonstrates that there are two main factors that compete for

prominence in the Senate when it comes to Israel and the Arab states most closely neighboring it:

Arab oil and Israeli security. The first can affect all districts equally because higher oil prices

affect all Americans, while Israeli security specifically tends to be the concern of special interest

groups and lobbies. The two interests, as demonstrated here, were difficult to balance because

the active members of the pro-Israeli lobby pushed for a greater focus on Israeli security, but the

domestic concerns of the average citizens over rising oil costs were not really represented in the

debate.

The role of the lobby in this case was also particularly strong because it was an election

year, and while the lobby worked hard to block as much of the sale as they could, much of the

backlash wasn’t fully felt until the election campaign became more competitive in October.

Balancing these concerns, as a result, was much like walking a tightrope for the Administration

and Congress, especially with the need for the two branches to compromise over policy as a

whole, as the legislative veto mandates, because interest groups are able to interact at all stages

of the negotiation and evaluation process.

Another notable dimension of this package is that the Iranian deal was considered

acceptable, pending the evaluation of the levels of arms sales being sold to the state, and the

Israeli sale, which was one of the three largest next to the Saudi and Iranian deals, was hardly

scrutinized. Given the size of all of the sales, it is difficult to find a reason for some to be singled

out as controversial when all of them are so large without addressing all of them equally without

reorganizing the role played by Jewish groups applying pressure on Congress.

In all, the large package deal of arms was all passed without any of the sales being

blocked, but there was a considerable fight. Furthermore, the adjustments that were made to the

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deal were done before the official notification of Congress, but it involved both Senators who

advocated a very specific position, a pro-Israeli security viewpoint, and high-level bureaucrats.

Technically speaking, this deal qualifies as an unchanged deal that was able to bypass the

legislative veto process, but in fact, it was not conceived and produced solely by the executive

branch before its submission. It also demonstrates the ability of public interest groups to take an

issue and press it heavily with a logical framework of understanding and gather significant

sympathy and change Presidential action through Congressional conduits only accessible via the

legislative veto.

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Cast Study #4

1978: Package Sale to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia

In 1978 the Carter Administration submitted its second controversial arms sale, but the

first that gained the attention of the active interest groups in the U.S. On February 15, 1978, the

Carter Administration announced its intention to submit in April a package to Congress for the

sales of arms to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Administration also made very clear that

each sale depended on the others; if one were to be blocked by the legislative veto, then none

would proceed. Each proposed sale was an individual sale, but the Carter Administration knew

that linking the three transfers would increase the likelihood of the Egyptian and Saudi sales.229

Since the sales were linked politically they are in essence a single sale. The transfers would be

for 50 F-5E planes for Egypt, 15 F-15 and 75 F-16 planes for Israel, and 60 F-15 planes to Saudi

Arabia. The totals for each country are $400-million, $1.9-billion and $2.5-billion, respectively,

which gave Congress the authority to review and veto any of the proposed deals. The deal was

formally submitted on April 28 to Congress after the legislature had finished the Panama Canal

treaties; a task that Carter acknowledged by delaying the official submittal of the sale.230

However, prior to the sale submission, the announcement was made that the sale would be

submitted and allowed for both opponents and supporters to debate the merits of the sale and

begin rallying to each side.

Resolutions were introduced to block the Egyptian and Saudi sales in both houses of

Congress in early May and the legislators, including Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-

W.V.) called for the Administration to “drop the semantic buzz words ‘all or nothing

229

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1978, "The F-15 Flap: New U.S. Plane Sales to Middle East Will Test Hill

Feeling on Peace Moves," April 8, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 835. [CQW 1978a] 230

Ibid. 835; Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1978, "More for Israel? Congress is Expected to Force Changes in

Plan for Mideast Arms Sales," May 6, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1154. [CQW 1978b]

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package.’”231

Furthermore, members of both houses suggested that none of the deals would be

passed in their current forms. The Egyptian sale was controversial because it would mark the

first sale of weapons to the country in roughly twenty years and the previous controversy over

selling C-130 transport planes in 1976 demonstrated that arms transfers to Egypt didn’t need to

be offensive in nature to be controversial despite the ease with which additional C-130's were

sold to Egypt in 1977.232

The Israeli sale was controversial because Israel was granted fifteen F-

15’s and seventy-five F-16’s while they had requested thirty and 150 of each; the significance of

the sale numbers was that the U.S. was applying pressure to the Israelis, which pro-Israeli

supports saw as a threat to Israeli security, which depended on U.S. support.233

In the case of the

Saudi sale, the U.S. would be selling the “hottest U.S. fighter plane” to the Saudis for the first

time, and there were no restrictions being placed on the use of the F-15’s, which was perceived

as a potential threat to Israel.234

The argument used by the Administration was unique for each of the three cases because

each warranted different considerations, but one of the notable features that ran throughout the

deals was that the Carter Administration was not going to sell each state the total number of arms

that it had requested. Its rationale was that this was necessary in order to maintain the military

balance in the region, and also demonstrate the attempt to fulfill the campaign pledge of reducing

aggregate arms sales abroad. The proposed sale halved the number of planes being sold to Israel

and significantly reduced the number requested by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat from 120 to

fifty F-5E’s.235

In a statement made by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on April 23, 1978,

Secretary Vance said that “[t]he proposed sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been based upon

231

CQW 1978b, 1155. 232

CQW 1978a, 835. 233

CQW 1978b, 1155. 234

Ibid. 235

"A freer hand in the Middle East," The Economist, February 18, 1978.

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careful analysis of how to best meet their defense needs while maintaining the military balance

in the region,” which set the tone for the debate on the Hill when the proposal was submitted. It

also paved the way for Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to provide Congressional testimony

to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that explained the analysis and security

considerations of each sale.236

In addition to limiting the number of planes being sold to each country, the

Administration insisted on considering the planes as a package, which meant that if Congress

blocked only one of them, then the rest would be cancelled by the Administration.237

Secretary

Vance explained this consideration at the same time that he announced the sales submission to

Congress; he said “the responsibility of the President for the conduct of foreign affairs requires

that he reserve judgment on the ultimate action to be taken until he has had an opportunity to

review the action taken by the Congress on the proposals announced today.”238

The ongoing

struggle between the executive and legislative branches over the separation of powers and checks

and balances demonstrated itself here, but it was also a shrewd political tactic on the part of the

Carter Administration because they knew that the majority of the opposition would come from

the pro-Israeli community in the U.S., and that the opponents would be disinclined to penalize

Israel by preventing the sale to the Jewish state as a result of blocking the other sales. If

Congress were to disapprove of one of the sales, the Administration knew that in terms of

236

Remarks by the Secretary of State (Vance) to Reporters at the White House, April 23, 1978. "Proposals To Sell

Military Aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia," In Documents of American Foreign Policy: 1977-1980,

(Washington D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs): 1983, 581-2; and Statement by the Secretary of Defense (Brown)

Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 3, 1978, "Recommendations for Aircraft Sales to Egypt,

Israel, and Saudi Arabia," In Documents of American Foreign Policy: 1977-1980, (Washington D.C.: Bureau of

Public Affairs): 1983, 582-4. 237

CQW 1978a, 835. 238

Remarks by the Secretary of State (Vance) to Reporters at the White House, April 23, 1978 in Documents of

American Foreign Policy, 1977-1980, 581-584.

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forming a cohesive foreign policy, they would have to review all of the sales because Egypt,

Israel and Saudi Arabia were all primary players in the on-going Middle East peace process.

The third theme that permeated all the debates centered on whether Israel's regional

military supremacy and security concerns would be significantly altered by the sale. In each of

the sales there were specific considerations to be taken into account with how it could affect

Israeli security. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Brown

highlighted the fact that Israel’s armed forced had increased in strength by 150% and that it had

been, and would continue to be, the strongest military force in the region.239

Furthermore, Israel

had the capability at the time of the debate to defeat any potential combination of opponents

without too much difficulty.240

Dr. Joseph Churba, who had been the Air Force’s senior

intelligence analyst for the Middle East, echoed Secretary Brown’s sentiments and explained

that:

In the worst-case scenario – that is, a war simultaneously breaking out on

several fronts – with a Soviet airlift [to the Arabs] and in the absence of an

American airlift [to Israel] the Israelis would be able to defeat the

combination of Arab armies in a period of one to three weeks, sustaining

higher casualties the longer hostilities continued.241

The clear Israeli superiority that was expressed by current and former administration officials

was used to explain how the arms transfers would not have an adverse effect on Israel in an

effort to placate opposition among Congressmen and pro-Israeli groups that would organize

against the sale.

239

Statement by the Secretary of Defense (Brown) Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 3, 1978, in

Documents of American Foreign Policy, 1977-1980, 582. 240

Ibid. 241

CQW 1978a, 836-7.

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The argument continued throughout the veto proceedings with the executive departments

and agencies pushing the fact that Israel was far superior to the Arabs on a man to man level and

that the Arabs would not be able to obtain parity. Israeli supporters argued against the assessment

of the relative military strengths because the Arab states were modernizing their armies by

buying new technology with oil money, the clear numerical advantage based upon populations

and the shrinking gap between the armies’ capabilities.242

Little focus was paid by the opponents

to the clear air superiority of the Israelis. Neither the sale advocates nor adversaries paid very

much attention to the arguments used in previous debates of sales with similar concerns, such as

the Jordanian sale when Israeli superiority over Jordan had been clearly demonstrated by

territorial infringements, but Israeli supporters insisted that the sale would only encourage

offensive tactics by Jordanians. The military and security dimension was a major focus through

the Congressional review, though for the most part it was framed in the context of jeopardizing

Israeli security either by those advocating for the blocking of the sale or justifying why Israeli

insecurity should not be a concern. Minimal attention to Egyptian or Saudi security was

acknowledged in the Congressional debates except by officials from the Carter administration.

The Israeli deal had the least amount of opposition to its passing through Congress, but it

elicited debate because the proposal was for a much smaller quantity of planes than the Israelis

had requested. A similar tactic had been used in the late 1960’s when the Johnson Administration

had stalled on negotiating the sale of Phantom F-4 jets to Israel in order to apply pressure to

Israel to withdraw from the territory it occupied during the Six Day War in 1967.243

However, in

that case domestic pressure forced President Johnson to sell Israel the planes regardless, in

October 1968, despite the clear diplomatic message the administration wanted to send to Israeli

242

Ibid., 835. 243

Ibid.,. 840.

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about its territorial acquisitions.244

The request not only asked for more planes than the Carter

Administration was willing to propose but it also requested the Israel be allowed to co-produce

the planes with the U.S., which would help for Israel to increase its already successful domestic

arms production.245

The co-production requests would have Israel buying sixty F-16’s up front

and then sharing in the making of 200 more, which could, first, potentially cause problems with

existing co-production agreements that the U.S. have with Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands,

and Belgium, and second that Israel could learn production techniques that would allow them to

produce their own planes and prevent the U.S. from being able to control an greater influx arms

into the region by monitoring U.S. sales.246

Another concern for the Carter Administration in evaluating how many planes to propose

in the sale was Anthony Cordesman's assessment from October 1977 that challenged the need for

Israel to continue expanding its armed forces. The concern that Cordesman, the former secretary

of the Defense Intelligence Board, highlighted was that the Israeli armed forces was based on an

exaggerated Arab threat, and significantly larger than what was required for self-defense.247

Furthermore, the size and capabilities of the weapons in Israel’s arsenal would enable the state to

launch offensives against its neighbors before any international pressure could deter them. Israel,

when Cordesman wrote his evaluation, had a stockpile of weapons large enough to be able to

fight for a month without requiring American assistance to remain militarily viable.248

While Cordesman’s assessment seemed damning for Israel, Dr. Churba, who had testified

that Israel held the military edge in the region to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

questioned Cordesman’s evaluation. In Congressional testimony to the Senate Near East

244

Ibid.,. 840. 245

Ibid., 840. 246

Ibid., 840. 247

Ibid., 840. 248

Ibid., 840.

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Subcommittee in 1977, he challenged the numbers that Cordesman had used, and he emphasized

the fact that Israel had to assess its security conservatively because geographically its civilians

live on the front lines. The vulnerability of the Israeli population, Churba argued, required a

different mentality than if there was a territorial buffer zone between Israel and its enemies.249

Churba’s assessment of the Arabs was that their military prowess had increased greatly since

1973, which meant that they could now pose a much more serious threat to Israel.250

One of the most ironic dimensions of the complaints lodged against the proposed sale to

Israel was that it was that it was the only one that was not requested to be shrunk by Congress,

and was debated to have not been large enough despite criticism from Capitol Hill that President

Carter was not living up to his campaign promise of cutting aggregate arms transfers abroad. In

fact, members of Congress expressed their view that the sales would not go through as they were

unless specific changes were made and one of the compromise routes was to sell Israel the

quantity that they had originally requested, twenty-five F-15’s and 150 F-16’s, though co-

production appeared to remain off the table.251

President Carter, in an attempt to get all of the

deals to pass through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, offered on May 9 to add an

additional twenty F-15’s to the Israeli sale, which would bring the total to sixty because of other

deals already underway. The number sixty the Administration felt was adequate because it meant

that Israel would receive the same number of the particular plane model over the years as Saudi

Arabia would.252

The Israeli deal was the only one that received the consideration of an increase out of the

three packages, but even that increase was met with disdain by the Congressmen who were

249

Ibid., 840. 250

Ibid., 840. 251

CQW 1978b, 1155 252

Ibid., 1155

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known to be staunch Israeli supporters. Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) said that the offer gave

“practically nothing” because ultimately the planes “would be supplied anyway.”253

The irony in

this position is in the fact that the growing level of arms sales to the region was only eliciting

complaints from Congress about a Middle East arms race. Carter's platform during his campaign

to reduce the aggregate levels of the sales had been popular, but in practice it did not actually

appear to be amenable to Congress, at least in the case of Israel. The difference in how the Israeli

deal was handled versus the Egyptian and Saudi deals will soon become clear and can be

attributed to the lobbying efforts of pro-Israel supporters and the American Israeli lobby.

While it was not openly discussed as part of the Congressional debate of the Israeli sale,

Israel was the only one of the three states in question with an arms industry capable of producing

a plane that was comparable to the F-15 and F-16. For example, the Israeli build Kfir is

considered a “first-rate fighter” in terms of its capabilities.254

Furthermore, the industry is

successful enough that in 1978 Israel was attempting to begin exporting its fighter planes to other

countries such as Taiwan and possibly some South American states.255

The ability of the Israelis

to produce their own fighter planes brings into question the ability of U.S. arms sales to alter the

military balance, especially by limiting plane sales to Israel.

In sum, the Israeli deal was the least controversial despite that the information from the

time demonstrated that it was the least needy of the three states because it was the strongest

military power in the region with its own arms industry. Accounting for the superior military, the

ability for Israelis to build their own fighter planes and the historical precedence of never having

lost a war, Israel's focus on gaining more arms appeared like an aggressive stance. The

253

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1978, "The Vote: Senate Panel Deadlocks non Mideast Plane Sales; Fight

Moves to Floor," April 8, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1161. [CQW 1978c] 254

“Israel Protests too Much,” The Economist, February 18, 1978. 255

Kolcum, Edward H., "Israel Seeks Greater U.S. Aid," Aviation Weekly and Space Technology, March 13, 1978.

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Congressional interest in a greater sale to Israel is then the by-product of members of Congress

sympathetic to Israel and the effective campaign by pro-Israel groups in the U.S. to frame the

debate in terms of Israeli security and the necessity of a larger sale. More discussion of the

interest groups involved will come after the discussion of the Egyptian and Saudi sales.

Despite the best attempts of the Carter Administration to keep the Egyptian sale

uncontroversial, controversy was unavoidable. Initially the Egyptian deal received attention

because of its symbolic nature, like the C-130 deal had in 1976: it would mark the first sale of

"lethal" weapons in over twenty years.256

Soon the debate began to focus more on Israel's

security and the possibility of another Arab-Israeli war with the U.S. supporting both sides with

military supplies like it had with India and Pakistan. The number of factors involved in the

Egyptian sale inevitably made it more objectionable in Congress because an objective

assessment was hard to make and it seemed like any decision could have long term implications

on regional peace and security that were impossible to evaluate without being able to see future

events.

The overarching argument that the Carter Administration put forth was that Egypt had

acted as a moderate influence and Egyptian President Sadat was a key American partner in the

Middle East who continued to signal that his policy aligned with American interests, but that he

was interested in receiving some benefits for his drastic policy changes. By early 1978, President

Sadat had a good reputation among Americans and he had met with members of Congress to

appeal for arms, but asked only for the F-5E despite clearly being more interested in the F-15.257

After he had met with members of the House International Relations Committee, he received a

warm greeting, and was described by its members as a “man of peace”, which indicated a general

256

“A Freer Hand and in the Middle East.” 257

"Sadat asks for better U.S. arms in strong appeal to Congress," The Globe and Mail, February 8, 1978.

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understanding the Egyptian interests had shifted from wanting to take on more confrontations

with Israel.258

The Carter Administration used these actions by President Sadat to appeal to

Congressional approval of the sale. In a letter to the members of Congress on May 12, Carter

wrote:

It is my considered judgment that the aircraft sales to Egypt are essential to

President Sadat to continue his efforts for peace. At great personal and political

risk, President Sadat has taken an initiative which has created the best prospects

for peace in the Middle East in three decades. With similar risks, he has turned

away from the Soviet Union and placed his trust in the United States.259

The actions taken were discussed in the earlier sale of the C-130 in 1976, but the new

development was Sadat’s de facto recognition of Israel by travelling to the state and addressing

the Knesset as well as breaking with the Soviets; the latter meant that there were no arms or

materials coming into Egypt, which left its military in a position of being close to useless and

unprepared to fight another war.260

The Administration also highlighted Sadat’s desire to

continue working towards peace, despite that the F-5E had been promised after the signing of the

Sinai Agreement in 1975, but because of Congressional opposition, they were only sold C-130

transport planes. Despite this set-back, President Sadat had continued on his moderate path.261

Both Egypt and Israel's security concerns were discussion in the Congressional

proceedings though Israeli security was consistently taken more seriously. Egypt’s main security

threats were from neighboring Libya as well as from another possible war with Israel if the peace

258

Ibid. 259

Letter from the President (Carter) to Members of Congress, May 12, 1978, "Support for the Sale of Military

Aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia," In Documents of American Foreign Policy: 1977-1980, (Washington

D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs): 1983, 585. 260

Ibid. 261

CQW 1978a, 839.

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process continued to stagnate. Without Soviet support, Egypt's armed forces would continue to

deteriorate, which would put Egyptian security at further risk. Opponents of the sale argued very

simply: the Egyptians could use the planes to attack almost all of Israel, Egyptian superiority vis-

à-vis Libya had already been demonstrated in 1977 and Soviet supplies continued to flow into

Egypt.262

The majority of these arguments were circulated by memos written by A.I.P.A.C.,

which was attempting to rally Congressional support to veto the sale. The question of Egypt’s

acquisition of F-5E’s as a threat to Israel did not change the basic argument that Israeli

superiority would prevail because superior Israeli planes would be able to out-fly the F-5’s

easily.263

The arguments countering Egyptian concerns about Libya and the status of Soviet aid

were not actively responded to other than by the original arguments by the Administration.

Ultimately, the Egyptian deal did attract the ire of the pro-Israeli community in the U.S.

because it would be arming the Egyptians with weapons they could use against Israel, but the

dissent was much shorter lived than the dissent to the Saudi sale. It is possible that the Israelis

were content to see Egypt receive less-sophisticated planes, which the Egyptian President had

referred to as “tenth rate”; in actuality they are roughly third-rate next to the F-16, Israeli build

Kfir and the F-15.264

This slight seemed to have been enough to satisfy the Israelis along with the

assurances that the Israelis would retain military superiority, especially in the air, over Egypt,

which would mean another Israeli victory if another war broke out.

The Saudi sale got the most criticism of all of the sales because of the number of F-15’s

being sold to the Arab state. Despite the challenges to the quantity, the State Department

centered its advocacy for the sale on the needs of the Saudis to have defensive air capabilities to

protect their large sparsely populated territory, the possible threats to Saudi Arabia from Soviet

262

Ibid. 263

Ibid. 264

“Israel Protests too Much”

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armed states in the region, and as encouragement for the moderate approach that Saudi Arabia

took to regional and global issues. Opponents used a similar argument to the one that they had

used against the Egyptian sale, which focused on the threats that the planes would pose to Israel,

but it also incorporated a concern for the future that if the Saudis were able to purchase the F-

15’s, they would be interested in purchasing A.W.A.C.S. in the future.

The main focus on Saudi security was on threats coming from Soviet armed states like

Iraq, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and Soviet-backed states in the Horn of Africa.265

The biggest security challenge for the Saudis from these states was that the Saudis lacked the air

defenses to be able to protect their vast regions of sparse population because they lacked

adequate air defense. The F-15 would solve that problem because it was a defense interceptor

and equipped with radar to prevent and cut-off attack.266

The threat from Iraq was perceived as

the greatest risk to the Saudis by the Administration because the Iraqis were heavily armed by

the Soviets and they could attack the Saudi oil fields and challenge the free navigation of the

Persian Gulf.267

Security threats from Israel were dismissed because the two states did not have a

history of armed confrontation, and the Saudis would be unlikely to attack Israel, even with

pressure from other Arab states for the Saudis to join another Arab-Israeli conflict, because the

Israeli retaliation could destroy the entire F-15 fleet.268

Furthermore, the threat to Israel would be

much less because the Saudis were not purchasing multiple ejection racks for carrying additional

bombs, which meant that offensive capabilities would be extremely limited for the Saudi

planes.269

265

Statement by the Secretary of Defense (Brown) Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 3, 1978, in

Documents of American Foreign Policy, 1977-1980, 583. 266

Ibid. 267

CQW 1978a, 838. 268

CQW 1978b, 1155. 269

CQW 1978c, 1161.

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The move against the sale was incredibly strong and levied a host of issues, mainly

dealing with Israeli security, but also incorporating the implication for future sales, especially

A.W.A.C.S., and the exaggeration of the threats posed to Saudi Arabia by its Soviet-backed

neighbors. There were seven different reasons that opponents used as to why the sale would put

Israel at risk, mainly levied by A.I.P.A.C. through memos circulated on Capitol Hill. The first is

that the current Saudi Air Force already has the capability to cripple Israel with the Maverick

missiles that it purchased in 1976.270

Second, the Saudis could jeopardize Israeli security because

they would be unable to prevent F-15 secrets from being shared with other Arab states, which

would make Israel’s other adversaries more effective at countering the Israeli Air Force.271

Third, the F-15’s would give the Saudis the ability to strike preemptively against Israel.272

Fourth, the Saudis had said that their weapons and armed forces would be available to the Arab

cause, which didn't assure Israel that the new sophisticated weaponry would not be used against

it.273

Fifth, if the Saudi government were overthrown by radicals, then these sophisticated

weapons would be more likely to be used offensively and destabilize the region.274

Sixth, the

Saudis would have difficulty not actually transferring the weapons to other Arab states, or at

least using them against Israel, in the case of another Arab-Israeli conflict, despite that the Saudis

had never become directly involved, because the new technology would make the Saudi

equipment too valuable an asset for the other Arab states them to allow to not participate.275

And

seventh, the Saudi military capabilities had greatly increased over the previous few years with an

annual defense budget that has sextupled, which was enabled by the increasing oil profits.276

270

CQW 1978a, 838. 271

Ibid. 272

Ibid. 273

Ibid. 274

Ibid. 275

CQW 1978b, 1155. 276

CQW 1978a, 838.

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While not all of the reasons given were direct threats to Israeli security or individually able to

withstand debate, together they represented the view that the Saudi military capabilities were

rapidly changing and that the growth could result in a change in policy that could jeopardize

Israel's security in the future.

In addition to the concern for Israel’s security, the two most prominent objections posed

were the A.W.A.C.S. and the over-exaggeration of the threat of Saudi Arabia’s neighbors. In the

case of the A.W.A.C.S., opponents looked to the sale of F-15’s and then A.W.A.C.S. to Iran and

were concerned that a similar sale would occur in the near future.277

Challengers to the

assessment of Saudi security threats, and its validity as justification for a large arms transfer,

focused on Iraq and the assessment that the Iraqi Air Force would not attack the Saudis because

it would strain their relationships with the Syrians and the Iranians.278

A.I.P.A.C. continued to

say that Iraq was also unlikely to attack because the Iraqis would have to traverse a long distance

of rough terrain to reach any targets in Saudi Arabia that would be meaningful.279

Overall, the arguments lodged by the opponents, mainly A.I.P.A.C., had basis and value

in the context of the sale and the Administration responded to most of them, especially when it

came to emphasizing the defensive nature of the F-15 plane. Secretary Brown’s assessment to

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee highlighted three main reasons that the Saudi sale

would not be a threat to Israel. First, Saudi Arabia knew its capabilities, and, as was already

mentioned, it would not be likely to attack Israel and risk the destruction of their new planes.280

Second, Israel was already receiving its F-15’s, but delivery to the Saudis would not begin until

277

Ibid. 278

Ibid. 279

Ibid. 280

Statement by the Secretary of Defense (Brown) Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 3, 1978, in

Documents of American Foreign Policy, 1977-1980, 584.

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the early 1980’s, and even then the planes would be delivered over several years.281

And third,

Saudi Arabia did not have a history of attacking Israel, and it seemed unlikely that something

would prompt a change in the future that would cause the Saudis to reconsider their decision to

abstain from participating in the armed conflict. The expectation that the Saudis would only use

the aircrafts in their own territory and defensively was, according to Brown, what would most

likely occur.282

Ultimately, the Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee were unable to make a

decision about the sale and when they voted on Senate Concurrent Resolution 86 (S. Con. Res.

86) and the vote was split eight to eight.283

As a compromise, the resolution moved to the Senate

floor without a recommendation from the Committee because it had not been able to give a

single recommendation, even if Carter’s offer to increase the number of planes offered to Israel

was taken into account.284

The Senate voted 44-54 on the Resolution to block the sale, which

meant that the concurrent resolution failed and no further action would be taken in the House.285

At both committee votes, Senators were acknowledging the difficulty in deciding their votes

because of the complexity of the situation and the number of different factors that contributed to

casting the single vote ranging from considering oil prices to personal friendships.286

As is clear from the framing of the debate, Israel’s security was central to the arguments

against the sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia while the concern about oil prices and Saudi

Arabia’s influence over global petroleum prices remained less prevalent. What is clear by how

the debate was framed was that the Administration knew who its opponents would be before

281

Ibid. 282

Ibid. 283

CQW 1978c, 1159 284

Ibid. 285

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1978, "Jets for the Saudis: Middle East Plane Sales Backed by Senate Vote in

Major Carter Victory," May 20, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1263. 286

Ibid., 1263-64.

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submitting the sale proposal and it attempted to maximize its chances of being successful by

packaging the deal all-together, and also that the sway held by American Jews was prominent

enough in Congress to influence how the legislative veto debate would be framed.

The campaign taken on by the American Jewish community began before the official

submission of the sale to Congress. A.I.P.A.C. criticized the possibility of the sale of F-15’s to

Saudi Arabia, which had been discussed in the fall of 1977, as early as January 1978, which was

prior to the official announcement. At the same time a statement was made by Crown Prince

Fadh of Saudi Arabia that the sale of F-15’s would be a test of American friendship.287

After the

announcement of the sale by the executive branch, the Jewish community had mobilized against

the impending sales. In a Newsweek article from March 1978, David M. Alphem depicts a Jewish

community where the sermon centered on the political issues of the sale and then provided the

resources for the 1000 members of the synagogue to write their own copies a letter to send to

Congress against the sale.288

According the article, Jews throughout the United States were

having similar reactions and questioning whether their support of Carter over Ford had been

misguided in the previous presidential election.289

Carter’s stance that Israel must make concessions in the peace process in order to be

successful had caused Jews to regard Carter as unsympathetic to Israel, which risked key support

among the Jewish community for Carter and the Democratic party. According to the same

article, Alphem describes the Jewish community as being essential for Democrats because 80%

of Jews vote for Democrats as well as donate money and manpower to their campaigns.290

287

Gwertzman, Bernard, "Plane Sales to Israel and Saudis Pose Problems for Administration," New York Times,

January 24, 1978, page 6. 288

Alphern, David M., Hal Bruno, Henry W. Hubbard and Martin Kasindorf, “Carter and the Jews,” Newsweek,

March 20, 1978, page 26. 289

Ibid. 290

Ibid.

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Without that support, Carter's advocacy for the sale could have jeopardized the Democrat’s

ability to win the midterm elections later in 1978 as well as his own chances at re-election in

1980. The decline in support for Carter among Jews had made it easier for them to rally against

the sale because he did not seem to be considering Israel’s security as a foreign policy interest

that was as important as other interests in the region.

A.I.P.A.C. and other Jewish organizations worked tirelessly on the Hill to circulate

memos and present the facts in a manner sympathetic to Israel as well as testifying at the

Committee hearings. A.I.P.A.C.’s involvement permeated the reports published in the

Congressional Quarterly Weekly that described the sales and the memos appeared to be the

sources of information for the dissenting opinions and the movement against the sale. While in

some cases, the reports qualified the claims as extreme, in others the arguments were left

hanging without a rebuttal.

The leaders of the three countries were also factored in to some degree. For example,

Sadat’s continued willingness to work towards peace was factored in while the Saudi inclination

to turn to European producers if the U.S. failed was also noted as well as the threat of straining

relations in general. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s statements were often difficult to

digest and in some cases led to American Jews feeling as though he had failed as an Israeli leader

to capitalize on the political climate around him.291

In sum, this particular sale was particularly open to dissent from public interest groups

and statements from world leaders and demonstrates the influence that those outside Congress

can have on American foreign policy formation through the right to petition government.

291

Ibid.

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Case Study #5

1981: Sale of A.W.A.C.S. to Saudi Arabia

The final case that this paper is examining, the 1981 sale of A.W.A.C.S. to Saudi Arabia,

is probably the most well-known example of legislative veto proceedings to block an arms

transfer because the discussion lasted for almost all of 1981, there were many interest groups and

lobbies mobilized for and against the sale, and the proposal came to the closest to being blocked

by Congress that any other sale. In April 1981, the Reagan Administration made it public in

April that it intended to follow through on the Carter Administration’s intention to sell more

arms to Saudi Arabia. In June 1980, the Carter Administration made it clear that they would not

pursue selling weapons that could possibly make the F-15’s that had been sold to Saudi in 1978

offensive, but that the option might be considered in the future.292

By early 1981, it was clear that

new President Reagan intended to open up more sales to Saudi Arabia, specifically by accepting

the Saudi request to purchase A.W.A.C.S to enhance the F-15’s that they had purchased in 1978

as a means of increasing defensive capabilities. 293

The Reagan Administration made this

intention clear as early as March, at which time the issue began to be discussed on the

Congressional floor, which marked the start of the sale debate, and the discussion of a legislative

veto. Ultimately, the sale was submitted in the fall of 1981 and would pass after a fierce fight

between supporters and that continued through the whole spring and summer, and the fall once

the deal was announced. The battle to defeat the veto was difficult, but it also demonstrated

many of the forces at work in the process and how the lobbies of the executive branch and public

interest groups had developed since the first fight over a legislative veto in 1975.

292

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1980, "Saudi Arms Sale: No Action This Year," June 28, Washington, D.C.:

CQ Press, 1850. 293

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "A.W.A.C.S., F-15 Gear: Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia Faces Mounting

Opposition in Both Houses of Congress," April 11, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 632. [CQW 1981a]

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105

The package that the Reagan Administration announced in the spring would include five

A.W.A.C.S., in addition to long range fuel tanks, and 1000 advanced A.I.M.-9L Sidewinder

missiles, which were an upgrade from the previous missiles that Saudi Arabia had purchased.

The sale was split into two deals, where the A.W.A.C.S would be one and the fuel tanks and

Sidewinders would be a second, but Congress made it clear early on that the two sales would be

difficult to discuss individually.294

Furthermore, the A.W.A.C.S that the Saudis purchased would

replace the American A.W.A.C.S currently stationed in Saudi Arabia, which had been there since

September 1980, when the deliveries began in 1985.295

The Reagan Administration also began making attempts to neutralize the opposition prior

to official submission. By introducing the sale early, the Administration hoped that they could

win against the early opposition by having enough time to adequately discuss and alter the deal

to ensure that it would not be blocked in one of the houses of Congress. The early opponents

were very clear in their opposition, specifically they cited the understanding that members of

Congress had during the controversy over the 1978 sale of F-15’s to Saudi Arabia that the planes

would not have any offensive capabilities, the Saudis did not have the need of A.W.A.C.S for

their own self-defense (despite the current deployment of American A.W.A.C.S to the area), the

sale of A.W.A.C.S to Saudi Arabia would specifically threaten Israel, and they would create an

imbalance of power in the region.296

While there were many objections, the Administration gave earlier attention to the

concerns of the Jewish-American community and the Israelis by offering to give Israel an

addition $300-million in military aid. The increase in aid was meant to offset Israeli complaints

294

Ibid. 295

Ibid. 296

Ibid.

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106

and those expressed by the pro-Israeli American community.297

As another means of pacifying

the part of the American population who are specifically opposed to this particular sale,

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. met with thirty leaders of Jewish organizations in the

U.S. to address their concerns about the sale on April 23.298

The meeting was aimed at

encouraging the organizations to limit their opposition until they had a full understanding of the

plan that was being proposed, which the Administration did not announce in full in April because

it was still undergoing alterations to make as amenable as possible to all of the parties involved.

The Administration made the formal announcement of the deal on August 24. By a slim

majority, it appeared that both the House and the Senate would be able to defeat the deal by

passing the concurrent resolution in opposition, but the Reagan Administration was hopeful that

the Republicans in the Senate would be able to quell the opposition and push for the sale to move

through.299

Rather than keeping any information about the sale classified, the official

announcement of the deal also gave the official details, which meant that both opponents and

supporters could use concrete numbers for the first time in a legislative veto proceeding dealing

with arms transfers.300

The proposed sale totaled $8.5-billion and included: five E-3 A.W.A.C.S.,

101 conformal fuel tanks to boost the fuel capacity of the Saudi’s F-15’s, six to eight K.C.-707

tanker aircrafts, 1,177 A.I.M.-9L heat-seeking air-to-air missiles.301

The deal would be submitted

to Congress on September 9 for a “pre-notification” period, which was part of a “gentlemen’s

agreement” that President Ford had made with Congress when the A.E.C.A. (Public Law 90-

297

Ibid. 298

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "Administration Confirms Saudi A.W.A.C.S. Sale," April 25,

Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 735. [CQW 1981b] 299

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "Senate Battleground: Test of Administration Clout in Congress

Established By A.W.A.C.S. Announcement," August 29, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1655. [CQW 1981c] 300

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "A.W.A.C.S. Subject to Congressional Veto Under 1976 Law,"

September 12, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1757. [CQW 1981d] 301

CQW 1981c, 1655.

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107

629) was renewed so that Congress could have more time to review sales. James L. Buckley,

Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, who announced the deal, said that the

Administration would file the official notification on September 30302

to begin the Congressional

review process under the 1976 A.E.C.A.303

One of the notable actions that the Administration took when the sale proposal came out

was to change the information that was available during the pre-notification period by providing

all of the details of the sale in an unclassified form so that it could be fully debated. Normally,

most of the logistical information of a sale would be classified.304

Despite the full release of

information, the arguments for or against the sale continued to employ the same arguments used

when the deal was first announced.

The argument for the sale centered on the need for Saudi Arabia to defend its oil fields

against the Soviet Union, which was influential in Yemen, the Horn of Africa and Iraq as well as

to maintain the security of the Persian Gulf for the exporting of oil. Persian Gulf access was in

question in 1981 after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in the previous year.305

Furthermore,

U.S. had already deployed A.W.A.C.S to Saudi Arabia to help protect it. Even with the sale to

the Saudis of their own A.W.A.C.S, Americans would continue to be heavily involved with the

A.W.A.C.S until at least 1990 because the Saudi Air Force did not possess the skills to operate

the new planes alone.306

By September the dissent had coalesced into three main arguments: the sale was not in

the interest of the United States because the Saudis were opposed to the U.S. attempts to

302

The deal was delayed by a day and was actually submitted to Congress on October 1, 1981. 303

Ibid., 1655. 304

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "First Notice Sent: Debate Over A.W.A.C.S. Sale Not Yet in Full Bloom

as Begin Visits Washington," September 12, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1757. [CQW 1981e] 305

CQW 1981c, 1655 306

CQW 1981b, 735; Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "Hill Veto Battle Looms: Battle Joined on

A.W.A.C.S. Sale As Congress Notified of Deal," October 3, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1887. [CQW 1981h]

Boyer 108

108

influence peace in the region; second, there was the possibility that the Saudi royal family was

not as stable as it appeared, like the Shah of Iran; and third, that the Saudis might use the

A.W.A.C.S to coordinate an Arab attack on Israel.307

Furthermore, the sale opponents attempted

to appeal logically to the rationale of sale advocates by expressing their understanding that the

sale could be managed differently. For example, in the past it had been asserted that Saudi

Arabia was a moderate influence in the region that was both promoting peace and helping to

keep oil prices reasonable, but the objectors to the sale contended that Saudi Arabia had actually

been antagonistic in both cases. Senator Bob Packwood (R-O.R.), who was one of the main

organizing forces in the Senate against the sale, argued that “Saudi Arabia has swung a wrecking

ball through the Middle East, doing everything possible” to prevent peaceful solutions.308

What is particularly interesting about this sale was that at the time when the pre-

notification period began, the sale was opposed by a majority of both houses. On September 12,

the Congressional Quarterly Weekly reported that 252 House members, which was a slim

majority, had co-sponsored a resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 118 (H. Con. Res. 118),

to block the sale.309

Similarly, in the Senate, a list of fifty-one Senators was released on

September 17, which provided the names of the Senators opposed to the sale. Unlike the House

co-sponsorship, some Senators argued their actual presence on the list while others who were not

included said they would support the efforts to block the sale if such a move were made.310

With

such a strong opposition at its earliest stages it seems surprising that the deal was submitted in

the same form at the end of the pre-notification period.

307

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "Saudi A.W.A.C.S. Foes Claim Senate Majority," September 19,

Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1783. [CQW 1981f] 308

Ibid. 309

CQW 1981d, 1757 310

CQW 1981f, 1783

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109

On October 1st, the Reagan Administration submitted the proposal for the sale, which

officially opened the proceedings for the legislative veto. On the date of the sale announcement,

there were still 50 co-sponsors of the Senate resolution that supported preventing the sale and it

was assumed that the resolution to disapprove of the sale would be passed in the House.311

Hearings began immediately on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was visited by

Secretary of State Haig to discuss the sale on the same day.312

Secretary Haig acted as the

Administration messenger to send their arguments to the Foreign Relations Committee of the

Senate and persuade the opposed members that the sale to Saudi Arabia was in their interest as

well as the interest of the U.S..

Secretary Haig’s testimony covered a number of key points. First, all information that

the Saudis would gain from the sale via the A.W.A.C.S would be shared with the United

States.313

Second, none of the information could be shared “with any other parties without U.S.

consent”, which sought to reassure those concerned about a joint-Arab attack led by the Saudis

against Israel.314

Next, “only carefully-screened Saudi and U.S. nationals [would] be permitted to

be involved with these aircraft”, which targeted both the question of whether the Saudis would

be able to maintain the A.W.A.C.S secrets and the issue of the planes being used by Saudis with

dubious inclinations.315

Haig also explained that “given the shortage of Saudi air crews and

technicians…there [would] be an American presence in the aircraft and on the ground well into

the 1990’s.”316

Secretary Haig made it clear that the planes would be used defensively by

highlighting the guarantee that “there [would] be no operation of Saudi A.W.A.C.S outside Saudi

311

CQW 1981h, 1887 312

Ibid. 313

Ibid., 1888 314

Ibid. 315

Ibid. 316

Ibid.

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110

airspace”.317

Finally, Haig said that “there [would] be extensive and elaborate security measures

for safe-guarding equipment and technology” as an addition to the aforementioned screening of

the individuals that would be operating the planes.318

Haig also responded to concerns about

Saudi stability, especially in the wake of the Iranian revolution, which was on the minds of many

of the Senators; the sale, Haig said, would also work to increase Saudi stability by demonstrating

that its government's moderate policies were receiving favorable treatment from the West.319

Haig stressed the importance of the sale to U.S.-Saudi relations because the U.S. needed to keep

emphasizing the importance of Saudi friendship to the U.S. and Saudi support of U.S. policy in

the region to attempt to create a “strategic consensus.”320

As had been argued previously, Haig

also emphasized the role that Saudi Arabia played in O.P.E.C. and how the Saudis had been

emphasizing more moderate actions among the oil producers to keep oil prices lower.321

Unfortunately for Secretary Haig, his testimony was not met with the reaction that the

Administration was hoping for and it appeared that he had won no additional support on the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In fact, his testimony seemed to entrench the beliefs of the

sale opponents on the Committee. Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) expressed his concerns that the

sale would threaten Israel, and that the Administration could not actually effectively enact

enough controls to actually protect Israeli security.322

Joining Senator Pell in his dissent, Senator

Joseph R. Biden (D-D.E.) expressed his concern over the stability of the Saudi regime, which he

viewed as being easily overthrown, but he did acknowledge the risk that blocking the sale would

present to Saudi-U.S. relations.323

Senator Rudy Boschwitz also expressed his concern over the

317

Ibid. 318

Ibid. 319

Ibid. 320

Ibid. 321

Ibid. 322

Ibid. 323

Ibid.

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111

sale at a "test" of U.S.-Saudi friendship because he noted the long history of U.S. military

equipment sales to the Saudis as well as other "friendly gestures." He posed the question "What's

going to be the next litmus test?" to emphasize that the Saudis continued to put sales in the

context of questioning American commitment to the relationship.324

Boschwitz also contested the

Administration position that the Saudis were moderating O.P.E.C. because the Saudis had

opposed U.S. attempts to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.325

Finally, he also brought the

Saudi commitment to regional peace into question because the state had opposed the Camp

David Accords, which had been the first peace agreement between an Arab state and Israel.326

At

the end of the testimony, what was clear was that Haig had few new supporters and the same

questions remained despite the best attempts by the Administration to answer these questions.

One additional factor colored the discussion of the Saudi sale after Haig's testimony: the

event of an air raid on Kuwait by Iran, which had included an incursion into Saudi airspace.

Senator Charles H. Percy (R-I.L.) had pointed out that this raid demonstrated the need for Saudis

to have air security to protect their oil fields. The action was a part of the ongoing Iran-Iraq war

and the raid included flying over the Persian Gulf to a location close to Saudi oil fields. The

implications were greater for the threats to Saudi security because at the time, four U.S. operated

A.W.A.C.S were already present in Saudi Arabia and they had been able to monitor the military

incursion and assess it throughout. Without the A.W.A.C.S technology, Saudi Arabia might have

been blind to a potential risk so close to its most precious natural resource.327

Given the

proximity to the oil fields, the event demonstrates the Saudi need for long-range radar

324

Ibid. 325

Ibid. 326

Ibid. 327

Ibid.

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112

information that would provide the Saudi Air Force with enough time to deploy planes to

intercept interlopers and protect the oil fields.328

Another large event occurred in the region during the debate over the A.W.A.C.S:

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in Egypt. The reaction in the United States

was strong because Sadat had been a popular Arab leader with Americans and his death meant

there was no longer an Arab leader who was very close with American leaders. The assassination

gave the Reagan Administration a political opportunity to capitalize on the aspects of their

argument for the A.W.A.C.S sale that expressed the need to make sure that Arab friends would

be kept and not lost over an arms deal gone bad because the American government had just lost

its best friend among the Arab states. The discussion was able to shift the focus away from the

House and Senate calling for more joint control over the planes, which had dominated discussion

in the days prior to Sadat's death.329

However, the assassination of President Sadat did not

comfort all of the objectors, who responded that the death of the Egyptian was a sign that the

Arab governments were not stable enough to receive sophisticated U.S. arms and in the case that

a regime fell, there was no possibility of knowing whether the next government would be

friendly, as had been demonstrated with the new government in Iran.330

Despite Sadat's death, the House Foreign Affairs committee went ahead and voted in

favor of the resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 194 (H. Con. Res. 194), to block the sale to

the Saudis by a 28-8 margin.331

The result of the vote was not unexpected, but it demonstrated

that the Reagan Administration had probably won little additional support for its efforts to turn

the votes of the representatives. It also meant that the resolution would move to the House floor,

328

Ibid. 329

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "After Sadat Assassination: Panel Rejects A.W.A.C.S. Deal But Reagan

Gains Support Among Senate Republicans," October 10, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1942. [CQW 1981j] 330

Ibid. 331

Ibid.

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113

where it seemed likely to pass on October 14. As a result, the Reagan Administration would need

to continue focusing on the Senate, which would be the only body able to halt the block of the

sale.332

There was more hope for the Administration in the success of the deal because while the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee debated the deal itself and worked on Senate Concurrent

Resolution 37 (S. Con. Res. 37), which had 48 co-sponsors in favor of blocking the sale, the

Senate Armed Service Committee members Sam Nunn (D-G.A.) and John W. Warner (R-V.A.)

introduced a resolution, Senate Resolution 228 (S. Res. 228), which outlined the necessary

measures for the Administration to take if it were to sell A.W.A.C.S to a foreign state. The focus

of the resolution was six safeguards that a foreign state must accept in order to ensure the

defensive use of the A.W.A.C.S to allow the sale to go forward. In this case, the Reagan

Administration had already outlined these six safeguards to the Foreign Relations Committee.333

The introduction of Senate Resolution 228 gave a glimmer of hope to the Administration that it

did have some support in the Senate.

By October 15, the possibility of the sale getting through Congress looked dire for the

Reagan Administration, despite some support in the Senate with S. Res. 228. On October 14, the

House passed H. Con. Res. 194 by a wide margin; the vote was 301-111.334

The Senate Foreign

Relations Committee also passed S. Con. Res. 37, which meant that it would move to the Senate

floor. The close margin, 9-8, on the Senate Committee, however, meant that there was a

possibility of the resolution failing before the whole Senate.335

By this point in the process,

President Reagan only had the options to fight to the very end or to attempt to negotiate the deal

332

Ibid. 333

Ibid. 334

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "House Rejects Sale: Reagan Loses A.W.A.C.S. Votes, But Picks Up

Some Support Among Senate Republicans," October 17, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006. [CQW 1981k] 335

Ibid.

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114

further and hope that the Senate would not pass the resolution. However, the vote gave some

hope to the Reagan administration because they were able to persuade some members of the

Foreign Relations Committee to vote differently than anticipated.

The ability of the Reagan administration to lobby their point of view and convince

Senators was successful with three in this case: Senators S.I "Sam" Hayakawa (R-C.A.), Charles

Mathias Jr. (R-M.D.), and Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) all voted against the resolution while their

views had been previously unknown. Pressler was considered in the discussion after the vote as

the most surprising convert because he had been a cosponsor of the resolution, but he had

received a phone call from President Reagan that had changed his mind by addressing Pressler's

concerns about Israel's security. The October 7 call from Reagan made an overture to Pressler

that included selling the equipment needed to block the A.W.A.C.S radars to Israel in order to

ensure Israeli security.336

While some experts, including U.S. Air Force Major General Richard

Secord, had made it clear through testimony that Israel did not need the equipment because they

were already capable of jamming the signals and would not need new equipment to continue

doing so, the gesture still reassured Pressler and helped him come to the decision to change his

vote.337

The debate, once it moved to the Senate floor continued to repeat the same arguments,

including the threat it would pose to Israel, questioning the ability of the Saudis to keep the

secrets of the A.W.A.C.S, and how to set up a "joint control" scenario where the Saudis would

not be able to convert the A.W.A.C.S into offensive weapons without U.S. knowledge and

probable prevention.338

Many Senators were waiting until the last minute to make up their

decision, which prompted the Reagan Administration to allow a draft letter to be published in the

336

Ibid. 337

Ibid. 338

Ibid., 2007

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115

New York Times, which would have the ultimate draft sent to the Senate closer to the actual vote

that was scheduled at 5pm on October 28. Again, however, the debate stayed centered on the

Saudis agreeing to joint control of the A.W.A.C.S and constantly returned to finding a peace

settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict, which seemed to remain the largest stumbling block

despite the Saudis lack of direct participation in the conflict.

When it came down to the actual vote, the personal attention that Reagan had given to the

sale won, and the resolution failed on the Senate floor by small margin with the final vote being

48-52.339

Reagan also sent a detailed letter that outlined the specifics of how the planes would be

used and monitored to guarantee the safeguards that had been discussed would be enforced to

ensure regional security.340

The resolution's ultimate failure was a result of many Senators

waiting until the last minute to decide whether they were voting for or against the resolution and

specific members' decisions were seen as pivotal for others deciding how they vote. One of these

was Senator William S. Cohen (R-M.E.), whose father was Jewish. Cohen's announcement of his

decision during the debate on October 28 was "seen as a turning point" according to Senator

Alan Cranston (D-C.A.) because Cohen had voiced earlier concern about selling weapons to an

opponent of Israel and possibly negative ramifications in a resurgence of anti-Semitism and

"scapegoating" of Israel in the case of another Arab-Israeli war.341

In his speeches, however, he

demonstrated one of the key parts of the American-Israeli relationship, which is that Israel

needed its American supporters to continue existing and that while the U.S. could make other

339

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "Senate Supports Reagan on A.W.A.C.S. Sale," October 31,

Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2095. [CQW 1981n] 340

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1981, "Reagan Assures Senate About A.W.A.C.S. Sale," October 31,

Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2135-6. 341

CQW 1981n, 2095.

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116

regional choices, it needed to remain steadfast in that position and realize that Israel was not

bringing all of the conflict upon itself if another outbreak of armed conflict occurred.342

Ultimately, what we can tell from this sale is that the focus was mainly on the issues of Israeli

security, which appeared to trump the concerns over Saudi security. The main focus of the

dissent and the justifications that the proponents of the sale had to make were centered on the

Israeli opposition to the sale.

342

Ibid.

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117

Conclusion

As can be seen by the background and the case studies, the legislative veto had a definite

impact on the how American arms sales decisions were made from 1974 to 1983. The procedural

process of the veto enabled interested parties, both domestic and foreign, to apply pressure to the

legislative process and influence some of the outcomes. In this setting, not all interest groups

were equal and some enjoyed more success than others. What is clear, however, is that the

legislative veto in the A.E.C.A. changed a specific act of foreign policy that domestic business,

voter groups and foreign heads of state had strong points of view about. As an arena for policy

formation, the cases demonstrate that the lobbying efforts, especially by the Israeli lobby,

became more effective over time and had a great impact the longer the veto procedure was in

place. As a result, it appears that the legislative veto enabled lobbying to transform into a much

more effective practice in Washington and the networks established during this period were able

to persist even after the veto proceedings ended.

To summarize the findings, the case studies show that there were three possible outcomes

of the arms sales as a result of the veto: inaction or action failure by Congress allowing the sale

to proceed, alterations to the sale before Congress allowed the veto period to expire, or the

withdrawal of the sale prior to Congressional action to prevent the sale with a later submission

that accounted for the changes that Congress wished to see. Despite the very different

circumstances that existed with each case, the trend that three outcomes existed, and none of

them were the prevention of the sale, demonstrates that the numerous interests and lobbying

pressures from all of the involved parts of the government and lobbying groups caused members

of Congress to change their minds during the proceedings. The later deals especially demonstrate

the impact by interest groups because the debates were more complex and nuanced as well as

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118

continuing for longer as executive administration attempted to woo potential opponents earlier in

the process.

The examples presented in this paper also demonstrate that U.S. policy in the Middle East

is more complicated than can be explained simply by assessing American national interests in the

region or by attributing Congress to being entirely swayed by interest groups alone. Each of

these sales had the possibility of failing when they were put before Congress because the

distribution of influence is spread out, but that does not mean that some are more successful than

others. The two consistently biggest influences over the proceedings were the executive branch

and the American Jewish interest groups lobbying for a pro-Israeli stance. Both attempted to

frame the debate around the sales, but interestingly enough the Israeli lobby enjoyed more

success and often had the administrations on the defensive to justify their actions. The success in

being able to frame the debate, especially in the later deals, is why the Israeli lobby was the most

successful factor in influencing the sales, despite never having an outright victory.

Another interesting conclusion that comes from these cases is that the U.S. often acts

against its own national interest. The five main American interests in the region identified in this

paper are the protection of reasonable terms of access to Middle Eastern oil for the U.S., the

containment of Soviet influence in the region, the protection of the state of Israel and its security,

the peaceful settlement of regional disputes, and the protection of American access to Middle

Eastern markets in terms of exports and investments. Another interest that falls under the broader

terms of economic interests was the desire to have the Arab oil states recycle their petrodollars

into the U.S. economy through purchasing, which often took the form of large arms sales. The

clear trend that showed through the cases is that the interests based on humanistic qualities, like

protection of Israel and peaceful conflict resolution, were used to argue for specific policies more

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119

than the economic interests, which are generally viewed as purely selfish interests. Again, the

framing of the debate and which interests were highlighted most heavily by both sides of each

sale controversy demonstrate that specific U.S. interests in the Middle East were given

prominence over another, which is the by-product of the interests groups framing the debate.

Overall, what one can take away from this study is that the legislative veto created a new

arena for a period of time that allowed interest groups to hone their lobbying skills and created a

larger venue for lobbyist, corporations, and foreign heads of state and voter interests to be heard

during the legislative process.

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120

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Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1976. " Senate Hearing: Administration Witnesses Present

Case for Selling Missiles to Saudi Arabia." September 25, p. 2627. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

[CQW 1976g]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1976. "8-6 Vote Reversed: Kissinger Wins Over Foreign

Relations Committee." October 2, p. 2711-12. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW 1976h]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1977. "Carter Defers Sale of Radar Plane to Iran." July 30, p.

1567-69. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1977. "Case Study: Carter and Congress on AWACS."

September 3, p. 1857-63. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1977. "Sale Resubmitted: AWACS Sale to Iran." September

17, p. 1977. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1977. "Panel Avoids Urging Ban On Arms Sales to Iran."

October 22, p. 2258. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1978. "The F-15 Flap: New U.S. Plane Sales to Middle East

Will Test Hill Feeling on Peace Moves." April 8, p. 835-40. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW

1978a]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1978. "More for Israel? Congress is Expected to Force

Changes in Plan for Mideast Arms Sales." May 6, p. 1154-55. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

[CQW 1978b]

Boyer 123

123

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1978. "The Vote: Senate Panel Deadlocks non Mideast Plane

Sales; Fight Moves to Floor." April 8, p. 1159-61. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW 1978c]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1978. "Jets for the Saudis: Middle East Plane Sales Backed by

Senate Vote in Major Carter Victory." May 20, p. 1263-4. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1979. "Iran Aftermath: Carter Mideast Arms Sales Policies

Received Skeptically in Congress." March 3, p. 385-86. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1979. "War in Yemen: U.S. Overreaction Charged." March 17,

p. 470-72. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1979. "Liberals' Dilemma: After 'No More Vietnams,' What?."

March 17, p. 471. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1979. "Policy Reversal: Congress Likely to Approve New

Arms Sales to Morocco." October 27, p. 2427-28. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1979. "Planes for Morocco: Carter may Delay Asking For

Approval of Arms Sales." November 24, p. 2699. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1980. "New Aid Requests: U.S. Has Major Stake in Israeli,

Egyptian Military Buildup." February 16, p. 419-20. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1980. "Sale of Engines for Iraq Opposed." May 30, p. 1519.

Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1980. "Saudi Arms Sale: No Action This Year." June 28, p.

1825. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1980. "Israeli Sympathizers Wary: Controversy Looms Over

Tank Sales to Jordan." July 12, p. 1957. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1980. "Israel Backers Oppose Sale: Congress Unlikely to

Reject Sale of M-60 Tanks to Jordan." August 2, p. 2232. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1980. "Tank Sale to Jordan Approved." August 30, p. 2607.

Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Boyer 124

124

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1980. "A Little Body English: In a Bull Market for Arms,

Weapons Industry Lobbyists Push Products, Not Policy." October 25, p. 3201. Washington,

D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1980. "Facing Reagan: Arms Deals for Morocco, Somalia Still

Incomplete." December 13, p. 1980. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "AWACS, F-15 Gear: Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia Faces

Mounting Opposition in Both Houses of Congress." April 11, p. 632. Washington, D.C.: CQ

Press. [CQW 1981a]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Administration Confirms Saudi AWACS Sale." April

25, p. 735. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW 1981b]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Israeli Use of U.S. Arms An Old Dispute." June 13, p.

1036. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Lobbying and the Middle East: Supporters of Israel,

Arabs Vie for Friends and Influence In Congress, at White House." August 22, p. 1523-30.

Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Senate Battleground: Test of Administration Clout in

Congress Established By AWACS Announcement." August 29, p. 1655. Washington, D.C.: CQ

Press. [CQW 1981c]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "AWACS Subject to Congressional Veto Under 1976

Law." September 12, p. 1757. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW 1981d]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "First Notice Sent: Debate Over AWACS Sale Not Yet

in Full Bloom as Begin Visits Washington." September 12, p. 1757. Washington, D.C.: CQ

Press. [CQW 1981e]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Saudi AWACS Foes Claim Senate Majority."

September 19, p. 1783. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW 1981f]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Some Experts Say Disruption Likely: Saudi Arabia

May No Longer Wield Powerful Oil Weapon In Spite of Its Export Lead." September 26, p.

1843-49. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Boyer 125

125

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "OPEC: A Powerhouse in Some Disarray." September

26, p. 1846. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Strategic Reserve: Insurance Against a Disruption."

September 26, p. 1848. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Facing Senate Opposition, Administration Seeks

AWACS Sale Compromise." September 26, p. 1868. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW

1981g]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Hill Veto Battle Looms: Battle Joined on AWACS Sale

As Congress Notified of Deal." October 3, p. 1887-88. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW

1981h]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "After Sadat Assassination: Panel Rejects AWACS Deal

But Reagan Gains Support Among Senate Republicans." October 10, p. 1942. Washington, D.C.:

CQ Press. [CQW 1981j]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "House Rejects Sale: Reagan Loses AWACS Votes, But

Picks Up Some Support Among Senate Republicans." October 17, p. 2006-08. Washington,

D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW 1981k]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Oil Is Main U.S. Interest: Instability and Soviet

Pressure Seen as Persian Gulf Threats." October 17, p. 2009-11, 2014-16. Washington, D.C.: CQ

Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "U.S. Policy Based on Soviets and Oil." October 17, p.

2010. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "U.S. Actions to Defend Persian Gulf Are Limited by

Arab Pride and Fear." October 17, p. 2012-13. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Senate Nears Crucial Vote on AWACS Sale." October

24, p. 2054. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW 1981m]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Unchallenged In Congress: Commitment to Defend

Gulf Facing Military Obstacles And Uncertain Local Backing." October 24, p. 2059-66.

Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Boyer 126

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Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Senate Supports Reagan on AWACS Sale." October

31, p. 2095, 2097-2100. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. [CQW 1981n]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Post-AWACS Power Shift Seen As Unlikely." October

31, p. 2066. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Reagan Team May Draw Key Lessons From Difficult

Struggle Over AWACS." October 31, p. 2098-99. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Details of Saudi AWACS Package." October 31, p.

2100. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981. "Reagan Assures Senate About AWACS Sale." October

31, p. 2135-6. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1982. "Congress May Examine Jordan Arms Issue." February

20, p. 339. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1982. "Reagan Policy Renews Arms Sales Debate." April 3, p.

719-24. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1982. "Administration: Soviets Lead Arms Sales." April 3, p.

723. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1982. "Arms to the World: Controls on Arms Sales Lifted

After Failure of Carter Policy To Reduce Flow of Weapons." April 10, p. 797-802. Washington,

D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1982. "Congressional Role in Arms Sales Has Become

Scrutiny, Not a Veto." April 10, p. 798-99. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1983. "Jordan Arms Sale." March 5, p. 483. Washington, D.C.:

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Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1983. "Congress Loses Major Foreign Policy Tool." June 25,

p. 1265. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Boyer 127

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