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1 Armed Conflict, Internally Displaced Persons, and Protection Mechanism in Kachin State Case Study: Laiza, Myanmar-China border, Kachin state, Myanmar Zaw Lut MAIDS, Faculty of Political Sceience Chulalongkorn University, Bankok Abstract This paper will review the armed conflict, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and Protection Mechanism in Kachin State, Myanmar. There are thousands of IDPs in Kachin state and northern Shan state due to the armed conflict between Kachin Independent Army and Myanmar government military ignited on June 9, 2011. The violence took place because the Kachin Independent Army did not recognize the Myanmar Border Guard Force proposal and passing Shwe gas pipeline through one of the Kachin brigades. The IDPs need humanitarian assistance, lack of legal protection as the government still blocks the international humanitarian provided by UN agencies and other non-UNG agencies. The peace negotiation process is still fragile and blurry as the two of the parties prefer to use forces. The political situation is unpredictable now. There are less presence of international humanitarian aids providers and no legal protection and unsecured human security for IDPs. Key words: Armed conflict, Internally Displaced Person, Human Security and Protection
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Armed Conflict, Internally Displaced Persons, and Protection Mechanism in Kachin State Case Study: Laiza, Myanmar-China border, Kachin state, Myanmar(from ICIRD conference)

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Page 1: Armed Conflict, Internally Displaced Persons, and Protection Mechanism in  Kachin State Case Study: Laiza, Myanmar-China border, Kachin state, Myanmar(from ICIRD conference)

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Armed Conflict, Internally Displaced Persons, and Protection Mechanism in

Kachin State

Case Study: Laiza, Myanmar-China border, Kachin state, Myanmar

Zaw Lut

MAIDS, Faculty of Political Sceience

Chulalongkorn University, Bankok

Abstract

This paper will review the armed conflict, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and

Protection Mechanism in Kachin State, Myanmar. There are thousands of IDPs in Kachin

state and northern Shan state due to the armed conflict between Kachin Independent Army

and Myanmar government military ignited on June 9, 2011. The violence took place

because the Kachin Independent Army did not recognize the Myanmar Border Guard

Force proposal and passing Shwe gas pipeline through one of the Kachin brigades. The

IDPs need humanitarian assistance, lack of legal protection as the government still blocks

the international humanitarian provided by UN agencies and other non-UNG agencies.

The peace negotiation process is still fragile and blurry as the two of the parties prefer to

use forces. The political situation is unpredictable now. There are less presence of

international humanitarian aids providers and no legal protection and unsecured human

security for IDPs.

Key words: Armed conflict, Internally Displaced Person, Human Security and Protection

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Introduction

The eruption of armed conflict between Myanmar military and Kachin Independent Army

(KIA) on June 9, 2011 in Kachin state affected human security of IDPs and the State fails to

give protection to the IDPs in non-governmental controlled area (NGCA). The armed conflict

in Kachin state is the result of political economy interest of Myanmar government and

Chinese state owned investments in Myanmar. There are two Chinese State owned mega

projects; namely Myitsone dam (6000MW) by China Power investment Cooperation

(International River, 2011) which is suspended in 2011 by the President Thein Sein in his

presidency term and Shwe Gas (China National Petroleum Cooperation) dual pipe lines

which runs from Western coast of Arankan State through Central part of Myanmar and

northern Shan State where one of KIA brigades is located, to Kunming, Yunan, China (Shwe

Gas, 2009).

Whenever, there is armed conflict, non-combatants civilians become victims and are forced

to displacement. Due to the armed conflict, over 100,000 civilians have become internally

displaced persons in Kachin state and northern Shan state1. Majority of IDPs who are taking

refuge in NGCA get less international humanitarian assistance as government still does not

allow the international humanitarian providers and UN agencies to get in there. In some

reports and documents, the IDPs seem to receive basic human needs but in reality, IDPs do

not get all human basic needs (food, shelter, clothes). Sometimes, IDPs in some camps along

the Myanmar-China border have some social conflicts with, and local people and Chinese

people who are doing farming along border area.

Moreover, legal protection mechanism merely exists in NGCA. The properties of some IDPs

left behind were destroyed, burnt down during the war and currently the IDPs’ land being

grasped and transformed into business purpose in Nam San Yang area as the whole village

has been abandoned over two years2. Documentation issue is also one of the challenges for

IDPs in NGCA. There are three categories of documentation issues 1) could bring

documentation, 2) have documentation but ran into the camp during shooting, 3) originally

do not have any documentation. IDPs don are not only losing livelihood and properties but

1 Security Risk for Kachin IDPs and Refugees. http://www.freeburmarangers.org/2013/05/25/security-risks-for-

kachin-idps-and-refugees/ 2Burmese government army troop burnt down Kachin civilian in Nam San Village. http://kachinnews-

at.blogspot.com/2013/01/burmese-government-army-troops-burnt.html

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also losing hope to return as the peace negotiation is still uncertain to reach an agreement. In

this context, both conflict parties need to consider for IDPs in their peace negotiation process,

Myanmar government need to allow the international humanitarian aid providers and UN

agencies to help IDPs in the NGCA and should provide more legal protection as well as for

pre-resettlement process after ceasefire agreement.

This paper will review the armed conflict in Kachin state and explore the impacts of socio-

political situation of IDPs along the China-Myanmar cross border due to the armed conflict

Kachin state. The paper use 3 main sources of information: survey of four IDP camps in

Laiza area, Myanmar-China cross border, secondary sources and human security indicators.

Armed conflict in Kachin State

This section will highlight how the political and economic interest cause the current armed

conflict between KIA and Myanmar government military began in Kachin state on June 9,

2011. There are many Chinese foreign direct investments (CFDI) on hydropower projects,

Jadeite mining and rubber farming, seasonal fruit farming and gold mining in Kachin state.

And also the state is geopolitical important to communicate and trade with China and India

(Sherman, J. 2003, p.233) Moreover, KIA doesn’t recognize the proposal of Myanmar

government Border Guard Force (BGF) proposal which was announced before 2010

nationwide election. These natural resources riches, geopolitical strategic location and

political competition are the main sources to ignite the war in Kachin state in 2011. The

location, investments on natural resource and the political implication of Kachin state will be

explored more below.

Kachin state that is located at the northern part of Myanmar geopolitically connected two

giant countries China in the east and India in the west and rich of natural resources. As it is

much closed with China, many CFDIs have been in Kachin state since before 1994 ceasefire

agreement. The salient CFDIs are in mega hydropower projects, natural resource extraction

and land renting for farming. There are total of 13 hydropower dams which are basically

located along Nmai River, Mali River and the Ayeyawaddy River with the total installed

capacity of 18,814.26 MW across the Kachin state. Among 13 hydropower dams, seven

proposed hydropower dams namely Myitsone (6000MW), Lasa (1900 MW), Khaunglanghu

(2700 MW), Yenam (1200 MW), Pisa (200 MW), Wusok (1800 MW), Chibwi (2800 MW)

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and Chibwi Nge (99 MW) are located in KIA control area (Earth Right, 2008. p.16).

Myitsone dam (6000MW) with the expected cost of USD $3.6 billion, with the height of 152

meters, 152 meter in length approximately and included 766 square kilometer water reservoir

with the depth of 290 meter deep, is located in the middle of the Kachin state. And the other 6

cascade dams which are designed to build at the up of the Nmai and Mali rivers are totally

situated in KIA controlled area. According to the International River report, the profit

between China and Myanmar government will be not equal in profit sharing of Myitsone

project. While only 20% of the revenue round about USD $ 500 million annually goes to

Myanmar the others 70% of revenue by China and 10% of the revenue will be distributed as a

brokerage fees. Moreover, 90% of electricity will send back to China while only 10% of

electricity will be used in domestic. KIA opposed the dams because geopolitically the dams’

locations are threatening for their strategic route in the area and consequently the new

military will come to exist along the dam sites for the sake of dam security. The outbreak of

war might happen any time if two parties’ military are so closed in the same area. As 90% of

the electricity and 70% of revenue going into China, the project is not worthwhile to

implement. Moreover, downstream impact will be huge and unpredictable for the whole

Myanmar which agricultural country and depending Ayeyawarddy river for agribusiness.

Therefore, the Myitsone project will give negative impacts to the public socially,

environmentally and politically.

In addition, one of the Chinese huge and crucial energy projects which is implementing in

Arakan State, is indirectly giving social and political impacts to Kachin state. Energy security

is one of important challenges for the industrial and developed and developing countries. The

Shwe gas dual pipelines (Oil pipeline 1,100 kilometer long and Gas pipeline 2,800 kilometer

long) from Arakan State will transmit oil and gas from Arankan Coast, Myanmar and Africa

and Middle East to Kunming, Yunan, and Southern China for China energy security.

According to the Shwe Gas Bulletine, 2009, Myanmar government will harvest US $ 80

million annually from the project. The Shwe gas dual pipeline is passing through in the

conflict zone where many ethnic armed group station in northern Shan state including one of

the KIA brigades. Additionally, one of the land transport projects for economic cooperation,

800 kilometer long high-speed railway from Kyauk Hpyu, Arakan to Ruili, China will travel

parallel with dual pipeline in the conflict zone as well (Arakan Oil Watch, 2012). In order to

have safety of the pipelines and railway routes, the government need to negotiate with the

ethnic armed groups. However, the government has no tradition to negotiate with the ethnic

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armed group for the purpose of investment and eventually it leads to armed conflict. Current

armed conflict between KIA and Myanmar government on 2011 is partially related with the

Shwe gas pipeline project. However, the economic incentive is not only the drivers of the

conflict but also the political disagreement between the two parties is one of the root causes

as well.

The KIA has been waging for war against the Myanmar government military over 52 years

now for federal state. In 1994, KIA took ceasefire agreement with government until the 2011.

During the ceasefire agreement period, both parties did fail to work on political solution

except economic investment on natural resources and some local development projects. “The

ceasefire agreement were backed up the promises of economic development through the “

Master Plan for the Development of Borer Areas and National Races,” launched in 1989 and

upgraded to a ministry in 1994, and the “allocation” of business interests by the government”

(Sherman, J. 2003. p.231). One of Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) Education

Department staffs and the leader of current peace negotiation group stated “Myanmar

government didn’t hold any political dialogue with us excepting inviting to participate in the

National Constitutional Process and did some development projects. We just waited for 17

years in vain for political dialogue” (Interview, Sumlut Gam, 17.6.2013). After 2008

Myanmar Constitution was institutionalized in May, 2008, the government started working

on ethnic armed groups according to the 2008 constitution which illustrated all the armed

group in Myanmar must be under ministry of defense. In April 2009, the government held

nationwide meeting with ethnic armed groups for Border Guard Force proposal which is the

implementation of 2008 Constitution. According to the One of the members of Internally

Displaced Persons and Refugees Relief Committee (IRRC), KIA asked the government to

transform KIA into Kachin State Force which was not unacceptable for the government and

next appeal to form “Union Army” in which include all the ethnic armed groups, was a

failure as well. In August, 2010, KIA didn’t accept the government BGF proposal until the

last meeting in which several high position persons from the both side military to get

confirmation on the government BGF proposal and both side agreed to stay like before 1994

ceasefire agreement period. The current peace talk after 2011 breakout has two different

dimensions, 1) the government peace negotiation group wants ceasefire agreement but 2)

KIA side wants political dialogue before ceasefire agreement. Though two parties keep

holding for peace negotiation, allowing third parties like UN, China and the public, they are

still in the second phase of peace negotiation; “substantial negotiation” (Guinard, C. 2002.

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P.12). One side have been proposed to withdraw some of frontline militaries in the meeting

but the government groups still need time to implement the other side proposal. On the other

hand one of the most crucial Chinese energy projects is located in the conflict zone, Shwe

Gas dual pipelines that is going to transmit oil and gas from Myanmar and around the world

into China on July, 2013. The solution of government towards the ethnic armed group is

somehow widely regarded as a farce because the government is seeing the ethnic armed

conflict under the theory of “Greed and Grievance” and also member of peace groups are

keeping changing one after another after several peace talks.

Armed conflict induced Internally Displaced Persons

Armed conflict induced IDPs a phenomenon is not new to Myanmar as it is the world longest

civil war running country. The outbreak of 2011 war between KIA and Myanmar government

military has caused thousands of IDPs in Kachin State and Northern Shan State during the 23

months of fighting. These IDPs are not voluntarily migrants who are being forced to leave

their places. These IDPs tried “to avoid the effects of the armed conflict, inter-state conflict”

which is Political driver of forced migration (Black, Richard, W. Neil Adger, Nigel W.

Arnell, Stefan Dercon, Andrew Geddes, and David Thomas, 2011. P. s6). According to the

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1998, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are

defined as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave

their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the

effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights or

natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized

State border.” The armed conflict has enormously negative impacts to the social, economic,

and political sphere of the local people especially the IDPs’ life being in the displacement and

losing all their properties left behind.

Majority of the IDPs are taking refuge under the area of Non-governmental controlled area

(NGCA) however, some of the IDPs take refugee under governmental control area. One of

the reasons why majority of IDPs are in NGCA is that they feel safer to stay under NGCA

because most of their home residents are near the NGCA and were informed before the

conflict. Some did not get any warning message whether they are near with Myanmar

government administration area or in KIA area. When the battle broke out, they had to run

into the forest in the interval of the shooting. Mrs. Bawk Ra who is from Madi Yang village

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mentioned “Before the conflict Myanmar military very often come into my village and stayed

at my home without saying any words. I come to know there might be something going

wrong with the politics. And I ask one of KIA soldiers who frequently come to the village to

let us know ahead about the situation” (Interview, Mrs. Bawk Ra, 20.6.2013). However, most

of them did not get warning message before 2 days or 3 days. Some of IDPs had to sleep in

the forest 2 days or 3 days as all the public transportation to Laiza were cut off but some IDPs

could come into Laiza by their own vehicle or friends’ vehicle before the battle. Most of

IDPs with children, old people didn’t bring any extra clothes and other properties with them

while they came into the Laiza because they could not carry them on food as they need to run

fast to escape from the shooting. Some they could bring some rice but left in the jungle as it

became very heavy to carry. Most of IDPs arrived in the Laiza had only the clothes they had

on their body.

And another reason why the IDPs didn’t take refuge in the GCA is they fear the Myanmar

military’s inhumane treatment as some of them had experienced and the government

sometimes accused the Kachin civilians as a member of Kachin Armed group then arrested,

treated inhumanely while interrogation. For example, Mr. Brang Shawng who is an IDP at

Jan Mai Kawng camps, Myitkyina in GCA is accused of having contact with KIA , violation

of 17/1 Unlawful Association Act and arrested and put him custody almost two years. On 19

July 2013, he was sentenced two years by state court in Kachin state moreover, 76 Kachin

civilians are accused of violation of act as well.3

Myanmar government blocked the International humanitarian aids due the security reasons.

Therefore, sometimes, they are facing hardship for daily survival and livelihood, education,

standard health care system. The Human Security of IDPs does not secure at all. The main

concept of “Human Security” “Freedom from fear” which entails to be secure from any kinds

of violence and “freedom from want” which is socially and economically secure is not

working out for IDPs in Laiza (United Nation Development Program (UNDP), 1994). The

following Human Security indicators will used to analyze IDPs humanitarians assistance

standard.

3 Nyein Nyein, Irrawaddy, 19 July 2013. Kachin Farmer Brang Shawng imprisoned 2 years

http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/40456

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Human security indicators

As peace negotiation, process is still unstable and unpredictable to get ceasefire, the situation

of the IDP camps along the Myanmar-China border is hard to regard as post conflict period or

still emergency period because KIA will not sign ceasefire unless they got political solution.

In addition, Myanmar military, which take control around Laiza and KIA area, have

reinforced on this month. However, the study will use seven dimensions of human security

framework to analyze the current situation of social issues and services. Though “education”

is not part of human security, A4 education approach “Availability, Accessibility,

Acceptability, Adaptability” will be part of this framework, since thousands of IDPs students

are in the camps along the China cross border. Katarina Tomasevks, the first United Nations

Special Rapporteur on the right to education develop this A4 education framework. It has

been used in “A Human Security assessment of the Social Welfare and Legal protection

situation of Displaced persons along The Thai-Myanmar border” (Thabchumpon, N.,

Moraras, B., Laocharoenwong, J. & Karom, W., 2011) to measure the education status of

students in the temporary camps along the Thai-Myanmar border.

Table 1.2 general human security framework and A4 educational frame work for the right to education

Types Indicators Instruments

Education

Availability Availability of education services and programs (e.g. basic

education, post-secondary education, vocational training, adult

Education/non formal education, etc.)

Teacher retention and recruitment

Adequacy of school infrastructure, supplies and equipment

Accessibility Economic status

Gender

Ethnicity, religion, language

Acceptability Teacher quality

Learning standards

Accreditation

Adaptability Flexibility of with the environment and structure

Relevance of education to the reality of IDP lives

Economic

Security

Stability of

income

Unemployment

insecure income

Job security Poverty

Food

Security

Availability Types and amount of food per day (rice, oil, salt, meat, fish, etc.)

Accessibility Places they can get food

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Foods around them are affordable

Nutrition quality Quality of rice, meat, fish, vegetables etc.

Other nutrient food (bread, milk, juice etc.)

Heath

Security

Availability Basic health care services (e.g. medicine, sufficient and qualified

nurses/doctors etc.)

Accessibility Accessible clinics or health care system near the camps or within the

camps

Times they can access the clinic.

Prevention and

treatment

Seasonal flu, malaria, tuberculosis, HIV, AIDS, diarrhea etc.

Awareness Personal hygiene

Environmental

Security

Sufficient water supply,

sanitation, reforestation, coping pollution, natural, man-made disasters.

Environmental degradation, pollution, water scarcity, man-made/natural

disaster

Personal

security

Protection Fear of violence

Level of crime

Efficiency of legal and judicial institutions

Prevention of harassment, sexual and gender-based violence

Prevention of domestic violence and child labor

Prevention of being recruiting to be soldier

Freedom of movement and locating new residential place

Community

security

Protection

Fear of multiregional conflict

Fear of internal conflicts

Protection from unfavorable traditional practices

Abolishment of ethnic discrimination

Political

security

Protection

Respect for basic human rights

Source: A Human Security assessment of the Social Welfare and Legal protection situation of Displaced persons along The Thai-Myanmar border, June 2011 & Human Development Report 1994

Education

The education in four camps in Laiza area, need more school infrastructures, qualified

teachers, and volunteer teachers and all the school are free of charge and Metta, shalom

distributed the school materials, such as school infrastructures, classroom materials and

textbook materials. The IDP students inside Laiza have chanced to join the local school no

matter who they are, which grade they are, they can get into school free of charge and

without any education documentation. However, the IDP students far from Laiza schools are

facing the overcrowded the classroom, poor school infrastructure, not enough teachers and

the school could run only primary school and nursery school. On 9 July 2013, the new

secondary and high school open for 1725 IDP students with 107 teachers are from KIO

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educational teachers, agricultural department staffs, Nurses and other volunteer teachers at

Alen Bum, which is the former KIA, headquarter for IDP students in Laiza area but there are

inadequate of teachers, school materials4.

However, the students’ further higher education will end up there, as the government does not

accept KIO education officially and no vocational training, adult formal education are not

available yet. Nevertheless, after passing KIO high schools, the student can join the Kachin

Theology collage in Myitkyina and Kunming University, Kunming, Yunan, China.

Furthermore, KIO is planning to run a university at the region for their students’ further

higher education. No matter how they are planning for higher education program, it totally

depends on the human capacity and political stability.

Economic Security

The IDPs in four camps in Laiza area are suffering economically exploited, as they are not

allowed to go far from the camp for several days for camp security reason and personal

security reason. Most of IDP do not have any income and have no job since they are stranger

in the area, some camps located in the forest and trading goods have been no function around

the conflict area. Nevertheless, some of the IDPs who have no kids in the family went into

China side for day laboring at Chinese coffee plantation, pepper plantation and some worked

the banana plantation run by Chinese businesspersons around the Laiza area. There has been

labor exploitation by the businesspersons. Actual day labor rate inside China is 100 Chinese

Yuan but the IDP workers got 20-50 Chinese Yuan per day. In some working site, they have

no time for lunch and need to work overtime but IDP do not get any overtime wages. One of

the IDPs from No. 3 market camp, Laiza stated “I have only low quality of rice, salt,

sometimes, bean, oil are included in distribution, the rest I need send my own. Therefore, I

need do any piece of work no matter how much I get because I need buy oil, onion, garlic,

vegetables, and so on by myself. I worked at the banana plantation another side of Laiza.

There was no rest time except for lunch. Actual working time is 8 hours but we need to work

overtime but we did not get overtime wages. We do not get what should get” (Interview, Mr.

Ja Naw, 22.6.2013).

4 KLN, July 10, 2013. KIO turns military headquarter into a bordering school.

http://kachinlandnews.com/?p=23429, http://www.kachinnet.net/news/684-alen-bum-hpaji-jawng-hpaw-akyu-

hpyi-hpawng-galaw-ai-lam

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As Laiza’s economy is depending on the border trading, the labor market and is based on

political stability and economic development. Even though, there is lots of labor exploitation

by Chinese businesspersons, the KIO still cannot solve the problem in their controlled area.

In the long run, lack of job opportunity and livelihood for IDP will socially and economically

affect the IDPs and their children future.

Food Security

Since the government, blocks the international humanitarian assistance, UN convoys to get

into the NGCA, the IDPs do not get sufficient food though it is not occurred food shortage.

Before any international assistant arrived, the IRRC that is founded in September 2, 2009

after Kokong conflict, took responsibilities for all the humanitarians helps for IDPs. Soon

after the conflict June 9, 2011, the IDPs from other places started arriving into Laiza from 16

June onwards but IRRC had got fund 3 million kyat (US $ 2,900) from KIO headquarter.

However, the Kachin people from China carried rice, clothes, non-food items and some

Chinese yuan cash donated to IDPs through the IRRC. The first international organization

that reached out to the IDPs is Health Unlimited from UK based in China and started

distributing non-food items including plastic roofs.

Due to the Myanmar government prohibition to go to NGCA, UN agencies and other non-UN

agencies are less present in the area. Nevertheless, on December 13, 2011, 7 UN convoys full

of humanitarian assistant arrived at Laiza5. Among seven convoys, five convoys that are from

government departments were not accepted by IRRC and turned back without dropping

anything. When there was no international and UN humanitarian assistance present, IRRC

and KIO fill the gap. Currently, the humanitarian assistance becomes less because there is

series of peace talk and least battle in Kachin state except in northern Shan state.

Humanitarian assistance will be needed for IDPs until they resettle down after ceasefire

agreement.

Food Security in the four camps in Laiza area is not match with Human security indicator.

Rice, salt and detergent are basically available for free of charge and quality of rice, nutrition

food are not in distribution list. Though, nutritious food are available in the camps private

5 Marcan-Marker M. December 2011. Kachin Refugee in Myanmar get UN Relief

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/2011121812374053120.html

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shop, in Laiza and China side, IDP cannot afford to buy it since they don’t have job for

regular income. To meet with the standard food, more humanitarian assistance, vocational

training and livelihood projects are needed.

Protection Mechanism in Kachin State

There is no legal bounded protection mechanism for IDPs. UN Guiding Principle for IDPs

1998 has not been institutionalized yet. Therefore, legal protection for the IDPs mechanism is

in dilemma. However, the international community must take into account to protect and

access humanitarian helps to the victims when the state is not willing to protect its citizen.

Two international bodies; International Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations Human Right

Commission for Refugee (UNHCR) have the most responsibility to give protection the

vulnerable IDPs. “The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial,

neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect

the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with

assistance”(International Review, ICRC, 2005). ICRC has the clearest mandate to protect and

assist humanitarian aids in situation of which IDPs are civilian victims of armed conflict.

Moreover, ICRC has the important role on acting as representation to the government and

non-state actors when human rights, International Humanitarian Law (IHL)6 are violated (A

global survey, 2002).

Legal protection

The religious conflict, identity conflict or ethnic conflict characterizes a nature of these new

confrontations that create a sharp increase of internally displaced persons who are in need of

safety and protection and who are not moving outside of the national border. The concept of

protection obtains full respects for the right of individual in accordance with the relevant

bodies international human rights, international humanitarian laws and refugee law (Hickel,

M. C., 2001). 1998 UN guiding principle for IDPs consisting of those three international

binding and legally not institutionalized is a good, clear and precise guiding principle for

6Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August, 1949. Art. 10. The provisions of the

present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of civilian persons and for their relief.

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humanitarian actors. Therefore, in this legal protection mechanism, both 1998 UN Guiding

Principle for IDPs and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) will used to analyze the legal

protection for IDPs in Kachin state.

In the Geneva Convention (IV, 27, 29, UN Guiding principle, 10, 11), Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War, 1949 describe to respect person and family, religious practices,

murderer, genocide, humanly treated and protect all forms of violence or threat, against the

sexual violence to the women and enforced prostitution or any forms of indecent assault.

However, one of the IDPs from Je Yang camp mention the experience “Five IDPs who

returned to the Ja Pu village to collect the oranges for selling, were killed with the suspicion

of KIA within one day in December, 2011. I dare not to enter to village and come back to the

camp. My home also burnt down by Myanmar military. We left all the properties behind.

Now, I have nothing except the things I have”(Interview, Mrs. Kai Ra, 25.6.2013). In this

case, no ICRC or UNHCR or any international protection mechanism exist. Protection for

persons such as education for the children, work, food, hygiene and public health, religion

and protection of property or personal belongings individually or collectively are in the

(Geneva IV, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, UN Guiding, 19, 21, and 23). And finally, Geneva the

fourth convention gives guarantee the free passage of humanitarian aids such as food,

medicine, clothes, and objects necessary for religious worship, means of shelter and other

supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population (Geneva IV, 23, UN Guiding, 18,

24). The government has the fundamental duty to give protection to IDPs but in the case of

Kachin conflict, the government is the actor to violate the Geneva Convention IV. The some

of IDPs in Laiza area have no official documentation, some lost on the way, some left at

village and some originally do not have. The government is still keep silent about officical

documentation as it is only department that can issue the official document, it will hard for

IDPs to travel into the GCA. IDP in Laiza areas have no shortage of food, medicine,

education provided by KIO. Though there is no food shortage, IDPs do not receive nutritious

food as the government hinders the international humanitarian assistance, UN agencies, and

non-UN agencies into the NGCA for sake of security.

Conclusion

The armed conflict happened in 2011 in Kachin state is based on the economic and political

incentives. As very crucial hydropower energy investments and Jadeite mining investment by

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Chinese investors and crony elite businesspersons are located in Kachin state and KIA

controlled area, the war is on “Greed and Grievance” to control the natural resources inflow

and outflow. Both Myanmar government and KIA depend on natural resource extraction and

selling for main revenue therefore both side are competed to gain more territory. The

government continues military assault into the ceasefire armed group territory, legitimate

border trade with China in order to control all the border area that the armed group has taken

over (Sherman J., 2003. P.225). The intension of making the armed group less possess of

territory and clear the forest by selling to Chinese investors is to wipe out the armed group bit

by bit by weakening in terms of geographical location and resource revenue. Eventually,

demanding the armed group to follow the unacceptable BGF proposal and announced war.

Myanmar government has been thinking the reason of forming armed group is based on

unequal distribution of resources and giving official economic opportunities that illegally the

armed group has before and expanding military into the ceasefire agreement area. The

government is using this bribing method to all the ethnic armed groups in order to surrender

the armed. No matter how the government is trying to conquer the armed group area, there

will be less success and fragile relationship unless the government holds political dialogue

with the armed group.

Majority of the armed conflict induced IDPs are fear of taking refuge in the GCA is one of

the loss of the government politically. It is no wonder why majority of IDPs ran into the

NGCA because the government that has primary duty to protect civilian is the key actor to

perpetuate the atrocity against the IDPs. Looting IDPs’ properties, burning down the villages

and killing extrajudicially and blocking international humanitarian assistance will gain more

distrust from the ethnic people and make them hard to have unity and union spirit.

Moreover, how thousands of IDPs are suffering the inhumanity treatment my military, the

government fails to implement the protection mechanism for the IDPs and strengthening the

law enforcement. Both parties need to pay attention more on root causes of the armed

conflict, IDPs and economic development which can harm environmentally, socially and

politically. Furthermore, the government and opposition party need to have sincerity in peace

negation process and political dialogue and the government should focus on more on political

dialogue than nationwide ceasefire agreement. If not, the entire current situation might turn

back into waging war nationwide.

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