On Praxeology and the Question of Aristotelian Apriorism By Geoffrey Allan Plauché March 9, 2006 This apriori character does not mean anything dark or mystical, it is based on the simple facts which we just mentioned: every state of affairs which is in the sense explained general and necessary is in our terminology apriori. –Reinach (1983:5) I. Introduction To many the notion of the a priori, particularlysynthetic a priori , is of something dark and mystical, intimately tied to Kantian metaphysics and epistemology. Moreover, the first reaction of many to the notion of Aristotelian apriorism would likely be that it is an anachronism to speak of such a thing, that apriorism is completely alien to Aristotle's thought. But Kant does not have a monopoly on the a priori. Indeed, the terms a priori and a posteriori were employed centuries before Kant, and by an Aristotelian no less! Thomas Aquinas, in Summa Theologica I.2, in his critique of Anselm's ontological argument, defines the a priori in very Aristotelian terms as what is prior absolutely. What I aim to show in this essay is that there is an altogether different brand of apriorism within the Aristotelian tradition broadly conceived. Within the tradition of Austrian philosophy, this Aristotelian apriorism can be traced at least from Franz Brentano and his students to the realist phenomenology of the early Edmund Husserl, Husserl's student Adolf Reinach, and Johannes Daubert. Among the Austrian economists, Carl Menger can be seen as developing economics as an Aristotelian a priori discipline. Ludwig von Mises developed this apriorism into the formal method of praxeology, and though he appears to 1
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
uncertainty and expectation. The idea that one could simultaneously and
without circularity reduce every one of these concepts to the singleconcept of action, that they all be defined by purely logical means in terms
5 In his later work (see Mises 2002), Mises does indeed soften this language, leaving it an open question
whether praxeological propositions are analytic or synthetic, and in this work he does not explicitly say
that they are tautologies but he still argues that the propositions are all implied in the action axiom.
Gordon (1993:101) argues on behalf of Mises: “Even if all the theorems of geometry are restatements of
the axioms used in their proofs, it does not follow that we can at once grasp the theorems when we learn
the axioms. The distinction Mises draws here resembles Aquinas's separation of propositions 'self-
evident in themselves' from those 'self-evident to us'.” And, in footnote 26 on the same page: “Aquinasuses this distinction in his criticism of St. Anselm's argument for the existence of God.” But Aquinas
himself got this from Aristotle and while one may be able to apply an Aristotelian framework to better
understand what Mises means in this regard, it does nothing to make Mises an Arisotelian or a Thomist
– the balance of his methodological self-interpretation remains primarily (neo-)Kantian – or to help
explain how the conceptual building blocks of praxeology are discovered in a Kantian or Misesian
framework; Mises simply does not tell us and I doubt any Kantian could.
of this single concept, is decisively to be rejected. Indeed Austrian
economics seems to be like other a priori disciplines in that it involves a
multiplicity of concepts connected together not hierarchically but rather ina dense holistic network of mutual connections whose order is not capable
of being antecedently established. (Smith 1996:316)
Praxeology reformulated in light of the insights of the Austrian philosophers will,
according to Smith, consist of a multitude of non-logical concepts and synthetic a priori
propositions. It does seem problematic for Mises that these praxeological concepts appear
to spring forth fully formed and fully armed from the action axiom, like Athena from the
brow of Zeus, as its implications are unfolded. It is not clear, however, that Smith realizes
that due to the nature of the discipline the concept of action would still have to be the
central axiom around which the discipline is woven.6 This is because the subject matter of
praxeology is the myriad manifestations of human action. While it may be the case that
not all the concepts employed in praxeological theory are (directly) reducible to the
single action axiom without remainder , it seems unavoidable that they all involve a
significant element of human action. Moreover, it does not obviously follow that these
concepts are not ultimately connected to the action axiom in a hierarchical framework
even if they are not originally formed by a given individual by way of pure deduction
from the action axiom (see section III.2 below).
Hans-Hermann Hoppe has attempted to salvage Mises's account of praxeology by
showing how (he thinks) it transcends the idealist/realist dichotomy, or at least come
6 Smith also argues, contra the Austrian economists, that the action axiom is not irrefutable. He points outthat an alien could deny that human beings act. This is true if the action axiom is defined as the fact that
human beings act. But even so, any attempt by a human being to refute the action axiom would still be
self-defeating. In any case, the Austrian economists and I would argue that the action axiom is
universalizable to all volitional beings, in which case a denial by an alien that human beings act would
hinge upon a separate claim, viz. the denial that human beings are volitional beings. The truth of the
action axiom is thus not in question, and it remains irrefutable.
apriorism. He wrote: “Now the crucial question arises: how have we obtained the truth of
this axiom? Is our knowledge a priori or empirical, 'synthetic' or 'analytic'? In a sense,
such questions are a waste of time, because the all-important fact is that the axiom is self-
evidently true[.]”
Whether we consider the Action Axiom “a priori” or “empirical” dependson our ultimate philosophical position. Professor Mises, in the neo-
Kantian tradition, considers this axiom a law of thought and therefore a
categorical truth a priori to all experience. My own epistemological
position rests on Aristotle and St. Thomas rather than Kant, and hence Iwould interpret the proposition differently. I would consider the axiom a
law of reality rather than a law of thought, and hence “empirical” rather
than “apriori.” But it should be obvious that this type of “empiricism” is so
out of step with modern empiricism that I may just as well continue to callit a priori for present purposes. For (1) it is a law of reality that is not
conceivably falsifiable, and yet is empirically meaningful and true; (2) itrests on universal inner experience, and not simply on external experience,
that is, its evidence is reflective rather than physical; and (3) it is clearly a
priori to complex historical events. (Rothbard 1997a: 5-6 of the onlineversion. Italics in original.)
But surely, contra Rothbard, it is important to have an epistemological theory that
explains how we arrived at the truth of the action axiom, and surely it is important what
philosophical position one takes in this regard. If this is not already clear, exactly why it
is important will become so soon in what follows.
It is unfortunate that Rothbard possessed the same sort of impatience and
indifference as Mises in developing a full-bodied epistemological theory to support
praxeology. This paper is an attempt to sketch the outlines of such a theory. It might be
conjectured that Rothbard never developed such a theory because we can simply look to
Aristotle and St. Thomas for the answers, but it seems obvious that switching
philosophical foundations from the Kantian to the Aristotelian tradition will have
important implications for the status of praxeological concepts, propositions, and theories
(in terms of their justification, how they are discovered, and so forth) and yet in his
methodological writings Rothbard behaves as if there is no appreciable difference. For
Rothbard, as for Mises, the concepts of praxeology and economics appear to spring forth
fully formed and fully armed from the action axiom, like Athena from the brow of Zeus,
as its implications are unfolded.8 But this is not how concepts are formed and scientific
propositions deduced in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition.
2. Smith, Menger, Mises, and Aristotle
In examining the work of the Austrian philosophers and economists, Barry Smith
finds them to have the following ten theses in common with each other and with
Aristotle, at least implicitly; the last three deal specifically with the social sciences. Ten
theses of Austrian Aristotelianism (Smith 1996a:320-329, 1990a:265-275):
1. The world exists, independently of our thinking and reasoning activities.
2. There are in the world certain simple 'essences' or 'natures' or 'elements', as well
as laws, structures, or connections governing these, all of which are strictlyuniversal.
3. Our experience of this world involves in every case both an individual and a
general or universal aspect.4. The general aspect of experience need be in no sense infallible (it reflects no
special source of special knowledge), and may be subject to just the same sorts of
errors as is our knowledge of what is individual.
5. We can know, albeit under the conditions set in [4], what the world is like, at leastin its broad outlines, both via common sense and via scientific method.
6. We can know what this world is like, at least in principle, from the detached
perspective of an ideal scientific observer.7. The simple essences or natures pertaining to the various different segments or
levels of reality constitute an alphabet of structural parts.
8. The theory of value is to be built up on 'subjective' [or agent-relative] foundations,which is to say exclusively on the basis of the corresponding mental acts and
8 See, e.g., Rothbard (1997d), p. 11-13 of the online version.
It remains to describe exactly how praxeology is an exact science in the
Aristotelian sense. As Aristotle made clear for all time in Posterior Analytics I.3, there
can be no scientific demonstration except from true first principles. In this regard, on the
issue of scientific explanation or understanding, Aristotle can be classified as a
foundationalist. On the other hand, the case has been made by Roderick Long (2000) that
Aristotle was a negative coherentist with regard to knowledge and justification. Negative
coherentism holds that our beliefs count as knowledge and are epistemically justified so
long as they do not conflict with one another. For Aristotle, our reputable beliefs
(endoxa) count as knowledge so long as they can withstand dialectical scrutiny, i.e., so
long as they cohere in the manner just described, but the justificatory process ultimately
proceeds through dialectical ascent up from phainomena (observed facts or
“appearances”) and endoxa to first principles.13 Without first principles, then, both the
inductive and deductive processes would become mired in infinite regress or vicious
circularity. The action axiom is the primary first principle of praxeology and it can be
proven by demonstration, albeit not demonstration of the normal scientific kind but by
negative demonstration in a manner similar to the way Aristotle proves the Principle of
Non-Contradiction in Metaphysics IV.3,14 namely, by showing that the truth of the
concept must necessarily be assumed in any attempt to refute it. Even the concept of
human action, however, must be inductively formed from actual instances of action in
empirical reality, from introspection and extrospection of ourselves and others. The other
concepts employed in praxeology must also be inductively formed before they can be
Smith's view, then it should be plain by the end of the following paragraph that it is false.13 See also the passage from Nicomachean Ethics 1139b25-31, cited above.14 For more on this, see Rasmussen (1980) and the sources cited therein.
Conceptual truth, then, is neither imposed on the world nor found in the world or read off
of it but rather is “the lens through which we view reality” and it is a lens “we cannot
peek around ...at reality-in-itself to see that it deviates from what our lens shows us about
it. What we know about reality just is what our lens shows us” (366). Hence, just as, in
the spirit of Wittgenstein, “whatever counts as thought must embody logical
principles[,]” so too “whatever counts as action must embody economic [or
praxeological] principles” (367).
I do not think the analytic/synthetic dichotomy is applicable to Aristotle. Such a
distinction was alien to him; as we have seen, for Aristotle knowledge, experience, and
praxis were analytically distinct but inseparable.17 Similarly, contra Smith, the
impositionist/reflectionist dichotomy is also not applicable to Aristotle and is foreign to
his thought. Smith (1990a) argues that Aristotle was a reflectionist, but I think this is a
mistake. Smith’s statement that the “knowing subject and the objects of knowledge are
for the reflectionist in some sense and to some degree pre-tuned to each other” may seem
to lend credence to Smith’s claim, for it is the nature of the passive intellect in Aristotle’s
thought that it is capable of receiving the forms or essences of thinkable objects. This
ignores other important aspects of Aristotle’s thought, however. As Smith tells it, on the
impositionist view the mind imposes its forms on the world in order to make it
intelligible, while on the reflectionist view it is rather the world that imposes its forms on
the mind as if the mind could have thought otherwise about it.18 But the reality of the
17 e.g., Posterior Analytics II.19, 99b35-100a9..18 It is possible that Smith might argue that Long and I misinterpret what he means by the reflectionist
view, that he means by it something more like the Wittgensteinian transcendence of the dichotomy
(because of the “pre-tuned” phrase above), but if this is the case then the reflectionist view is misnamed,
is described by Smith with some problematic language, is not the polar opposite of the impositionist
(e.g., Gutierrez 1971) who object that praxeology is vacuous. They are
quite right to insist that praxeological knowledge cannot exist without the
ability to apply praxeological concepts to empirical reality. Praxeologywithout thymology is empty. Their mistake lies in confusing this claim
with the entirely different claim that the content of praxeological
knowledge must be drawn from empirical reality, as though we acquiredthymological experience first and then came up with praxeological
principles by generalizing from that experience. On the contrary:
Thymology without praxeology is blind. “History speaks only to those people who know how to interpret it on the ground of correct theories”
(Mises 1996:863). Praxeological truths, with all their logical
interconnections, are implicit in thymological experience from the start.
To verstehen an action just is to locate it in praxeological space. Neither praxeology nor thymology is prior to the other; we do not acquire one first
and then use it to get to the other. “Light dawns gradually over the whole”
(Wittgenstein 1972:21). (Long 2004a:364)
As Long illustrates: “Praxeology defines the criteria of money, cost, preference, and the
like; but we have to use our intuitive understanding to recognize these criteria when they
actually show up, since the criteria fall under teleological or thymological kinds, not
physical ones” (358).
Long places Hoppe within the formalist camp, while others such as Lavoie fall
into the hermeneutical camp. It is not difficult to make the connection between Hoppe's
formalism and the Kantian elements in his thought. For Hoppe it seems we must engage
in prior reflective cognition before we can interpret the bodily movements of other
human beings as various kinds of actions, while Lavoie tends to interpret praxeology in
historicist fashion so as to undermine the universal and necessary validity of its laws.
Aristotle, on the other hand, as we saw above, does not make the mistake of so divorcing
Grassl, Wolfgang and Barry Smith, eds. 1986. Austrian Economics: Historical and Philosophical Background . New York: New York University Press.
Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. 1995 [1988]. Economic Science and the Austrian Method .
Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute; originally published in shorter version
as Praxeology and Economic Science; http://www.mises.org/esandtam.asp.Hülsmann, Jörg Guido. 2003. “Facts and Counterfactuals in Economic Law.” Journal of
Libertarian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 57-102;
Husserl, Edmund. 2001. Logical Investigations: Vols. I & II . International Library of Philosophy Edition. New York: Routledge.
Johnsson, Richard C. B. 2005. “Subjectivism, Intrinsicism, and Apriorism: Rand Amongthe Austrians?” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring): 317-
335.
Kotarbinski, Tadeusz. 1965. Praxiology: An Introduction to the Sciences of Efficient
Action. New York: Pergamon Press.
Long, Roderick T. 2005a [Forthcoming]. Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the
Logic of Action. Routledge Studies in Twentieth Century Philosophy Series.
New York: Routledge; http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/long.pdf.Long, Roderick T. 2005b. “Praxeology: Who Needs It.” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies
Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring): 299-316.
Long, Roderick T. 2004a. “Anti-Psychologism in Economics: Wittgenstein and Mises.”The Review of Austrian Economics, 17:4, 345-369.
Long, Roderick T. 2004b. “Reason and Abstraction in Economics: Aristotle and Mises
versus Friedman.” Presented at the Austrian Scholars Conference 10;http://www.mises.org/asc/2004/long.pdf.
Long. Roderick T. 2003. “R.G. Collingwood: Historicist or Praxeologist?” Presented at
the Austrian Scholars Conference 9; http://www.mises.org/asc/2003/asc9long.pdf.
Long, Roderick T. 2002. “Why Does Justice Have Good Consequences?” AlabamaPhilosophical Society Presidential Address; http://praxeology.net/whyjust.htm.
Long, Roderick T. 2000. Reason and Value: Aristotle versus Rand . New York: The
Objectivist Center.Mises, Ludwig von. 2003 [1933, 1960]. Epistemological Problems of Economics.
Auburn, AL: The Ludwig von Mises Institute; http://www.mises.org/epofe.asp.
Mises, Ludwig von. 2002 [1978]. The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science. Irving-on-Hudson, NY: Foundation for Economic Education;
Reinach, Adolf. 1983 [1913]. “The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law.” Aletheia: An
International Journal of Philosophy, Vol. III: 2-142.
Reinach, Adolf. 1981 [1911]. “A Contribution Toward The Theory of the Negative
Judgment.” Aletheia: An International Journal of Philosophy, Vol. II: 15-
64.Rothbard, Murray N. 2004 [1962, 1970]. Man, Economy, and State, with Power and
Market. Scholar's Edition. Auburn, AL: The Mises Institute;
http://www.mises.org/rothbard/mes.asp.Rothbard, Murray N. 1997a [1957]. “In Defense of Extreme Apriorism. Southern
Economic Journal , Vol. 23, No. 1 (January): 314-320; Reprinted in The
Logic of Action One. Cheltenham,UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited:100-108; http://www.mises.org/rothbard/extreme.pdf.
Rothbard, Murray N. 1997b [1978]. “Praxeology: The Method of Austrian Economics.”
The Logic of Action One. Cheltenham,UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited:
58-77; http://www.mises.org/rothbard/praxeology.pdf.Rothbard, Murray N. 1997c [1973]. “Praxeology as the Method of the Social Sciences.”
The Logic of Action One: Method, Money, and the Austrian School . Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 28-57. Reprinted from Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, Maurice Natanson, ed. Evanston, U.: Northwestern University Press, pp.
Rothbard, Murray N. 1997d [1960]. “The Mantle of Science.” The Logic of Action One: Method, Money, and the Austrian School . Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 3-
23. Reprinted from Scientism and Values, Helmut Schoeck and James W.
Smith, Barry. 1996a. Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano. Chicago:
Open Court; http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/.Smith, Barry. 1996b. “In Defense of Extreme (Fallibalistic) Apriorism,” Journal of
Libertarian Studies, Vol. 12, pp. 179-192;http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/12_1/12_1_9.pdf.
Smith, Barry. 1994. “The Philosophy of Austrian Economics [A Review of Gordon
1993].” The Review of Austrian Economics Vol. 7, No. 2: 127-132;http://www.mises.org/journals/rae/pdf/rae7_2_7.pdf.
Smith, Barry. 1990a. “Aristotle, Menger, and Mises.” In Carl Menger and his Economic
Legacy. Bruce Caldwell, ed. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Smith, Barry. 1990b. “The Question of Apriorism.” Austrian Economics Newsletter.Auburn, AL: The Mises Institute, Fall 1990; http://www.mises.org/apriorism.asp.
Smith, Barry. 1984. “Acta Cum Fundamentis In Re.” Dialectica, 38, pp. 157-178;
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/acta/acta.htm.Yates, Steven. 1996. “Hans-Hermann Hoppe's Austrian Philosophy: Review of Economic
Science and the Austrian Method .” Reason Papers, No. 21, pp. 91-6;
http://www.reasonpapers.com/pdf/21/rp_21_11.pdf.Younkins, Edward. 2005. “Menger, Mises, Rand, and Beyond.” The Journal of Ayn Rand