Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn, J. Bélanger START (Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism) and ICPVTR.

Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn, J. Bélanger

START (Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism) and ICPVTR

An Inseparable Counterpart of the War on Terrorism (cannot “kill them all,” do not want to “kill them all”)

The Penal and Political Problems Involved in Detention (occupation, prevention of escapes, of riots)

Importance of Militants’ Deradicalization in the Overall Counterterrorism Campaign

The Need for Release and Re-Integration: Ex-detainees as potential allies in Counter-radicalization

Preventing Radicalization (Robert Reid, Jose Padilla, Christian Ganczarski, and Pierre Richard Robert all radicalized in prisons).

Why are detainees susceptible to radicalization?

Humiliation and Anger Quest for a Ideology that Promises

Significance Radical Ideology Promises Significance

Through Violence Against One’s Detractors (Real or Imagined)

Disaffection with Militancy and Terrorism, Openness to Alternatives

ETA detainees who deradicalized in prison (Reinares’ 2011 data)

In Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq Contain a strong element of religious counter-

narrative Darth of Empirical Data Concerning Their

Success The present Empirical Attempt to Assess a

Deradicalization Program: First of Its Kind

Separation of moderate LTTEs from the hard core No explicit counter-ideological narrative (implicit

approach) Restoration of the detainees sense of significance in

various ways (e.g., “beneficiaries”, rather “prisoners,” or “detainees,”)

Setting up conditions for individual focus rather than collective LTTE focus (spiritual programs like Yoga, and Arts activities).

Vocational Ed courses designed to prepare the detainees/beneficiaries for integration into society.

The Possibility of Self Deception Objective Evidence for the Critics Affordance of Improvement (Discovering what

works and what doesn’t)

Have the detainees/beneficiaries deradicalize in Rehab?

Did the Rehab Program Work? (Perhaps the detainees deradicalize over time but NOT because of the rehab program)

2058 participants (169 women; 1889 men); Mean age = 27.74 years; SD = 6.68 1906 individuals in Rehabilitation vs. Administer a series of tests to detainees early on

in the incarceration period (December, 2009) and then nine months later (September, 2010)

Rehabilitation group

Possibilities of Alternative Interpretations: Time and historical events in the interim

Away from the atmosphere of battle; Away from the LTTE organization.

• A need for a control group

So the LTTE Detainees Have Deradicalized

But is it Because of the Program?

Rehabilitation group

Control group

At Time 1, equal to the Rehab Group on All Relevant Characteristics: Psychological, Attitudinal and Demographic

Random Assignment Would Be Ideal..

Tested at Same Times as Rehab Group

The control group a No-Rehab group (FU-OMT) Omantei (N=152) (handicraft, meditation)

What makes it a good control group. Equality to the Rehab group on:

(1)Support for armed struggle, (2) Negative attitudes toward Sinhalese(3) Meaning in life(4) Emotions (anger, shame, sadness)(5) self-embeddedness(6) social-dominance(7) Need for closure

Tested at Same Times as Rehab Group (December 2009 and September 2010)

Rehab group Mage = 27.57; No Rehab group Mage = 30.28

Rehab group Meducation = 1.91 (SD 1.10); No Rehab group Meducation = 1.50 (SD= 1.01) What makes it for a less than perfect control

group (they were a higher risk category, involved in anti social crimes and in recruiting, the rehab group involved in more peripheral activities)

Was it Just the Friendly Attitude of the Center Staff?

Thus, not the effect of time as such, or separation from the battle or the LTTE organization that itself accounts for the change

Nor the initial level for support for violence, because initially the same in both groups

Not the mere friendliness of the staff Nor the several relevant psychological variables,

because the rehab and no rehab groups were equal on those

Hence, cautiously, though not conclusively, we may say that exposure to the rehab programs did the trick.

Implication, expose even the hard core to rehab programs

Importance of Re-integration of Beneficiaries A Two Way Street of Pacification Importance of Follow up Research