Arguments Used by the Activist Portion of the US Public to Assess the US Intervention in Libya

Arguments Used by the Activist Portion of the US Public to Assess the US Intervention in Libya

David J. LorenzoCollege of DiplomacyNCCUSeptember 21, [email protected]@gmail.com

Outline

1) Introduction2) Types of Arguments3) Tests of Classification Schemes4) Reclassification5) Conclusion

Purpose of the Study

Understand the views of the activist portion of the public on the proposed intervention in Iraq by examining the arguments the public employed (derived from letters to the editor, contributions to online discussions on the websites of major newspapers)

Understand the structure of those viewsTest current understandings of the public’s

stance on foreign policy issues.

Background: Libya

Americans generally have a poor view of Libya and Gaddafi, going back to the 1970s. Polls in March showed that around 75% of those polled had an unfavorable view of Gaddafi.

Americans in general, however, were also ambivalent regarding the “Arab Spring” Some were happy about democratization and the

prospect that some of the conditions that create terrorists were going away

Others thought that the removal of traditional regimes, particularly in Egypt, would just serve to remove our allies and leave openings for radical Muslims.

Libya

On March 16, the president announced the US would intervene along with NATO and with the support of UN resolutions supporting an international effort to protect Libyan rebels from Gaddafi’s forces.

On the whole, as measured by polling services, the American public supported this move: Support was in the 55-60% range and definite opposition

around 35% However, large margins (around 65%) opposed long-range

democracy building efforts and slightly more (around 70%) opposed sending ground troops.

Background: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Before the 1970s, scholars were only marginally interested in public opinion with regard to foreign policy: Prominent scholars and public intellectuals such as

Walter Lippmann, Gabriel Almond and George Kennan believed such opinion was amorphous, constantly changing, ill-informed and molded by elites.

Many scholars also did not believe that policymakers took public opinion into account when making foreign policy decisions.

Public Opinion

This changed in the 1970s, in response to scholarship on the public’s views regarding Vietnam:

Evidence that the public’s views could be resolved into different positions that were coherent, relatively stable and rationally structured across views.

Evidence that policymakers did take public opinion into account. The most obvious example was Johnson’s decision not to run for reelection, due in large part to opposition to the war in Vietnam.

Methodology of Current Scholarship

Use responses to large scale opinion polls by Roper, Chicago Council Survey, etc.

Large N, statistical studiesAttempt to detect structures based on

binaries or continua, in the form of views on multi-lateralism/unilatiralism; military/non-military, etc. The result is often a typology, with a 2 x 2 set of boxes, that depicts general orientations, or sets of continua which, when put together, form a multi-dimensional map.

My Study

Gather arguments that the activist portion of the public has made (rather than examine responses to questions that have been furnished to the general public)

Classify those arguments with regard to their important elements (including the binaries they use)

See if those arguments fit into the schemes scholars now provide

Hypotheses

Hypotheses that arguments do not fit current typologies because

they incorporate elements important to decisionmaking that are not included in the typologies.

That not all arguments are connected to one another; therefore public opinion is much “lumpier” than now depicted.

The theoretical basis for these hypotheses is the general understanding that American political culture is constituted by multiple traditions (liberalism, civic republicanism, Christianity, various racist narratives) that produce very different analyses of the world and embrace different values.

Results

170 contributions, totaling 208 arguments, from The Washington Post, The New York Times, Fox News, The Daily Show, The Orange County Register, CNN, Huffington Post.com, The Los Angeles Times, The Chicago Tribune, Yahoonews, com, USA Today, The Houston Chronicle, (Iowa) Press-Citizen, The Des Moines Register, The Tennessean, The Nation and PennLive.com

171 arguments against, 37 arguments for11 argument sets: 8 argument sets against, 3

argument sets for intervention.Exploration of these arguments in a

qualitative fashion

(1) Take Care of America First [30 arguments]

The first argument against intervention holds that the US should attend to its own problems rather than intervene. To intervene means to divert essential time, attention and resources away from addressing domestic troubles.

Some adherents of this argument hold that the Libyan gambit is a diversionary tactic, meant to distract the public from the failure of the current administration to fix economic and fiscal problems.

America First

Most of those who deployed this argument held the more straightforward view that the policy decision itself would result in the expenditure of time and resources better utilized to address domestic concerns.

“Please explain to me- because I really want to know- how children can be allowed to go to sleep hungry in this country every night, how people cannot afford to go to, or take their children to, a doctor or dentist in this fine country every day and the government can't seem to remedy this. But we can afford to spend millions in other countries to drop bombs. I think someone needs to explain it to these children and their parents. I am disgusted by this. So tired of seeing us addressing another nation's issues before our own. Where is our nation- building?” (“Mrs.,” NYT, March 28, 2011)

(2) The US is no Better than the Rest of the World

[10 arguments]

This argument takes a counter-exceptionalism position. It rejects the notion that the US can make the world better because it has something good and unique to offer. The US is no shining “city on a hill” and, therefore, has no mission to play in making the world better, freer, or safer for democracy. As with the world at large, the US is a mixture of good and bad, and it acts in the same ways as do others

“The next time someone claims ‘civilian massacre’ or ‘genocide’ or the like, how about a photo? Gaddafi's troops indeed killed his "own people" - rebels who took over large cities. If American rebels took over Chicago, our troops would also kill our ‘own people.’”

(3) Interventions Abroad Harm US Institutions

[10 arguments]

“Harm” arguments have a long pedigree, dating back to Early National warnings that the US must be careful not to follow in the footsteps of Rome in moving from a republic to an empire. Mead labels this argument a part of the “Jeffersonian” tradition.

The argument holds that an activist US foreign policy necessitates particular mindsets and institutional adjustments that endanger our republican form of government. The military and the executive branch become too strong, realpolitik replaces republican virtue and citizens are seduced by the prospect of wielding power in the world rather than attending to the needs of their community

(4) The World is a Jungle [28 arguments]

Arguments that emphasize the problematic nature of the world (generally in contrast with the US) put forward several overlapping propositions.

The first is that problems are all around us and will always be with us. There are lots of bad people in the world and there is no way the US can resolve all the problems they create.

Second, these arguments often point to problematic areas in which the US did not or has not intervened in the past and question whether intervening in Libya will either a) create a policy precedent

Third, some of these arguments hold that because there are so many bad people and the problems they create cannot be resolved, it is neither pragmatically smart nor morally correct for us to use human or other resources to attempt to resolve those problems. In some versions, no problems can be solved and, therefore, we should not intervene. In other versions, the argument is that because we cannot intervene everywhere, we should intervene nowhere.

World is a Jungle

The following was written in response to Obama’s address:

“My God, Does he really think there are not already countless serious problems just about everywhere that have already “stained the conscience of the world” many times over?

And does he not know that following the implied principle here would require America’s constant, disastrous overcommitment to solving those problems?

This is sheer craziness!”

(5) Oil and Corporate Interests [32 arguments]

“Oil”/Corporate interest arguments hold that the only reason for the US intervention in Libya is the presence of oil reserves. This judgment renders the endeavor illegitimate. These arguments take two forms.

One form holds that the US government is the actor, pursuing a realist (and therefore immoral) policy to secure energy supplies.

The other variant holds that the government is no more than a puppet of oil and other corporate interests (such as arms manufacturers). The object of the exercise is to help maximize corporate profits.

“Thought we were supposed to be ‘spreading democracy’ in the Middle East. Oh. Wait. I forgot. It's just about OIL.”

(6a) Irony [44 arguments]

Irony arguments hold that US intervention will produce results directly opposed to US intentions. There are two equally numerous variants of this argument here.

The first variant holds that in assisting the Libyan rebels, the US will be arming, aiding and placing into power the kinds of Islamic militants and terrorists the US has been fighting for the past two decades. This type of blowback argument is often tied to narratives in which US aid to the Afghan resistance in the 1980s resulted in the triumph of the Taliban and the rise of Al Qaeda:

“Libya could very well turn out like our folly supporting rebels in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. We arm them, support them, assist them with money, then years later they are trained terrorists who kill thousands of us as they did on 9-11.”

(6b) Irony

The second variant holds that military intervention in Libya is ironic because such an intervention, if it is meant to save lives, will only result in the loss of more lives. Some arguments make their point by asserting that using the military to kill people as a way of saving lives makes no sense; others provide a more sophisticated analysis:

“The President has succeeded in creating a civil war in which many Libyans will die. By leveling the sides -- degrading Gadhafi's military and strengthening the rebels, he has ensured that it will be prolonged and bloody.”

(7) The US is acting as a Hegemon [10 arguments]

“Hegemon” arguments hold that the Libyan intervention, as with those in Iraq and Afghanistan, are merely operations in which the US pursues, consolidates and exercises its power; therefore, this action should be opposed.

(8) Intervene Only to Defend US Security [7 arguments]

These arguments place US security as the sole criterion justifying intervention. If an intervention is not directly connected with security, generally as a response to an attack on the US, then the intervention is not warranted. In the arguments deployed in this rather small set, commenters assert that this criterion is not present:

“look the point is, we fight wars when we are attacked PERIOD. we have to get into everything, lets just let the libyans solve there own problems, we cant afford another war. dont u get it? we fought our revolution, let libya fight thers, every government falls eventually. if we just stay out of the middle east we would be so much better off. give me one LEGITIMATE reason why we should waste our money helping a nation that dosnt effect us.ok im all for freedom, but it wont come from a big nation helping some rebels. it comes from the smaller, struggling nation. PERIOD”

(9) Multilateralism [13 arguments]

The first argument set that supports the intervention consists of multilateralist arguments. Multilateralist arguments hold that it is legitimate for the US to participate in interventions if other nations have agreed that an intervention is needed. The multilateral component is understood differently by various commenters.

Some see the participation of other countries or the invitation to intervene as providing moral justification. Agreement by more than one nation that intervention is justified seems most important to these people

Others see multilateralism in more practical terms, as spreading out costs and risks

(10) Duty and Obligation [20 arguments]

The majority of those who provided arguments in favor of the Libyan intervention did so by invoking a duty or other principled obligation for the US to intervene.

The basis for that duty varies. Some cites a duty to prevent leaders from killing their citizens while rejecting the “oil” argument as grounds for opposition.

Others saw the matter as more complex and mixed a duty to protect with other factors, such as the obligation to support democracy and the duty to help citizens overthrow authoritarian rulers that the US had previously aided

American Security is at Stake [4 arguments]

This argument poses the same question as the “intervene only to protect US security” arguments, but provides a different answer. Whereas the purveyors of the former argument hold that the Libyan intervention does not address such interests, the proponents of this argument set do:

“As candidate Obama explained time and again, having more democratic regimes in Muslims countries in absolutely essential to our own security and economic well-being.”

Tests: Left-Right Spectrum

While straight ideology has not generally been a favorite of those who attempt to classify popular foreign policy views, a few scholars have recently argued that locations of people on the left and right of the political spectrum are important for understanding the public’s foreign policy positions.

We see in this instance that such an analysis does little work. Liberal and conservatives support the intervention and liberal and conservatives oppose it. Also liberals and conservatives use the same arguments.Liberal Conservative

Support Intervention (9), (10), (11) (9), (10), (11)

Oppose Intervention (1), (2), (3), (5), (6b), (7), (8)

(1), (2), (3), (4), (6a,b), (8)

The Drezner Realist/Liberal Internationalist Distinction

Drezner tests for the presence of realist positions in non-elite foreign policy opinion, as opposed to Liberal Internationalist positions.

In Drezner’s understanding, realists see the world in Hobbesian terms, emphasize national interests, and justify the use of force by reference to self-defense. Liberal internationalists have a more optimist view of the world and see legitimate foreign policy goals and the use of force as including the enforcement of international law and the promotion of democracy.

Realist/Liberal Internationalist

While this scheme identifies the opposing arguments posed by sets (11) and (6b), it does little to allow us to understand the impact of these arguments. Both realist and internationalist arguments in this scheme oppose and support the intervention.

The majority of the oppositional arguments are also missing here. These arguments are either not concerned with the core of realist and liberal internationalist analysis, or specifically reject such analysis.

Realist Arguments Liberal Internationalist Arguments

Support (11) (9), (10)

Oppose (4), (6a), (8) (6b)

Militant Internationalism/Cooperative Internationalism

This classification scheme comes from the influential studies by Wittkopf, as well as Holsti and Rosenau’s confirmatory study.

Here, orientations towards cooperative internationalism are crossed with orientations towards militant internationalism.

In the resulting 2 x 2 typology, Hardliners are those who approve the use of force to defend

American security in a world that tends to threaten the US and do not wish to have America’s hands tied by international organizations and are not favorable towards humanitarian, non-military interventions.

Isolationists wish to safeguard American values by withdrawing from the contaminating influence of the world.

Internationalists see the US as playing a leading role in the world and are open to playing that role and defending US interests unilaterally and multilaterally, by military means and by nonmilitary means.

Accomodationists see the role of the US as a multilateral player in the drive to help the world and further US interests primarily through humanitarian aid and other nonmilitary means.

MI/CI

The differentiations among arguments embedded in this scheme are only moderately helpful in allowing us to sort through these arguments. The contrast that is revealed between the deeply isolationist Argument sets (1) and (3) and the moral imperative to intervene contained in Argument set (10) is useful, as is the contrast in general between the Isolationist arguments and the internationalism of Argument set (9).

The Isolationist box is too narrowly constructed to encompass all the arguments that generally oppose activist policies. Holsti and Rosenau’s argument that thinking of Isolation and Cooperation as separate continua, such that more nuanced understanding of the different categories can be advanced, would not be helpful because such a fix would not necessarily expand the Isolationist box.

More importantly, this scheme also appears unable to account clearly for important oppositional understandings – (5), (6a) and (7) – that have nothing to do with the military/nonmilitary and cooperative/non-cooperative binaries.

Hardliner Isolationist Internationalist Accomodationist

Support Intervention

(11)* (9), (10)

Oppose Intervention

(8)* (1)*, (3) (6b)*

Mead’s Foreign Policy Traditions

Mead argues that the arguments of American foreign policy elites can be categorized in terms of important indigenous political traditions that important overlap with domestic political traditions.

Hamiltonians place importance on defending America’s economic interests and using power to promote trade and commerce.

Wilsonians favor the spread of democracy and freedom and the use of multilateral and, if possible, nonmilitary means.

Jeffersonians are skeptical of foreign involvement and fear that republican institutions will be harmed by a turn towards imperial ambitions.

Jacksonians value security and are reluctant to engage in foreign interventions unless national security is directly involved, given their belief that communities should take care of themselves. If national security is involved, they remain committed to action until the threat is eliminated.

Arguments According to Mead

Mead is better able to account for the oppositional arguments than most of the other typologies. They are, in this understanding, mostly Jeffersonian and Jacksonian, depending as they do on either a skeptical view of America or a skeptical view of the world. The opposition represented by the Wilsonian arguments is also useful.

The broad aggregation of many of the oppositional arguments into the Jacksonian category is deeply problematic. There is a logic connecting the America First, The World is a Jungle, The Irony of Supporting Potential Terrorists and Intervene only for Security arguments (be wary of foreign involvement and take care of yourself because the world is a Hobbesian place), but each set of arguments has its own internal logic that can cause friction with the others.

This scheme is also not able to account for Argument sets (2), (5), and (6b), which tells us it generally tracks arguments from the center to the right.

Hamiltonian Jeffersonian Wilsonian Jacksonian

Support Intervention

(9), (10) (11)

Oppose Intervention

(3), (7) (1), (4), (6a), (8)

Davis and Lynn-Jones Similarity/Difference Model

Davis and Lynn-Jones hypothesized that American foreign policy may oscillate between activist and non-activist stances depending upon understandings of the US as either exceptional or not exceptional with regard to the rest of the world.

In their understanding, seeing the world as the same as the home country tends to direct understandings in a non-activist direction, while seeing it as different (exceptional) tends to direct understandings in an activist direction. They also identify an anti-activist set of arguments that portrays the US as malignant.

Elsewhere, I have shown in the course of critiquing this argument that activist, even imperialist policies can be justified by understanding the world as similar to the home country. In turn, non-activist (or anti-imperialist) arguments could be derived from understanding the world as different from home.

Similarities/Differences

We see that this typology can account for many of the arguments in this data set, thereby establishing that understandings of the US in relation to the world form an important part of many argument sets. In particular, this scheme makes sense of those arguments that see the rest of the world as incorrigible and its inhabitants as savages, as well as the radical arguments that question American motives.

But this account does not otherwise appreciably increase our knowledge of the relations among these arguments. Reluctance to engage in this intervention is spread across all three positions that compare the US to the world. In terms of the original Davis/Lynn Jones model, the important divergence does not occur among adherents of difference, but among different followers of the doctrine of sameness.

The US is Exceptional

The World and the US are Similar

The US is Malignant

Support

Intervention

(9), (10)

Oppose

Intervention

(1), (3), (4), (6a)*

(2), (6b) (5), (7)

Conclusions

These arguments do not fit well into the typologies scholars have created: Inability to account for argumentsMix arguments that generate different positions in the same boxWrongly predict the positions arguments will generate

Sources of many problems:Attempts to uncover a universal structure where there probably is

noneUse of opinion polls that create an artifactual structureFocus on only conventionally defined mainstream arguments

General assessment:Public positions are more complex, nuanced and numerous than

thoughtFoundations of those positions are not always connected, in that

their interpretive material is found in various traditions that do not always think of the world in the same general ways.

Therefore, these positions are lumpier and cannot be analyzed and sorted by recourse to a few common binaries or continua.

Types of Arguments

Isolationist Lump: (1), (3): US should focus on itself and minimize engagement with the world

Radical Lump: (5), (7): US as presently constituted is problematic

Skeptical Lump: (4), (6a) the world is deeply problematic and resistant to solutions

Libertarian Lump: (2) The US should not impose itself on the world

Realist Lump: (8), (11) Foreign policy should be guided by the goals of protecting interests and security

Liberal Internationalist Lump: (6b), (9), (10): Foreign policy should adhere to liberal internationalist values

Current Literature

The current understandings are able to account for the Internationalist, Realist and some of the Isolationist arguments and relations among them. It has a much less sure grasp of the other arguments, the relationships among them, and the relationships among all the lumps taken together (including the disconnect among them).