Are We Winning 2010

8/3/2019 Are We Winning 2010

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A M E R I C A N S E C U R I T Y P R O J E C

B e r n a r d I . F i n e l

10REPORTAreWe

Winning?Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against

al Qaeda and Associated Movements

A T TE M P T E D C A R B O M B A T TA C K I N T I M E S S Q U A R E , N E W Y O R K , M A Y 1 , 2 0 1 0


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America needs a new national security vision for this new era and a

dialogue at home that is as robust as it is realistic.

A M E R I C A N S E C U R I T Y P R O J E C T

The American Security Project is organized around the belief that honest public discussion of national security

requires a better-informed citizenryone that understands the dangers and opportunities of the twenty-rst cen-

tury and the spectrum of available policy responses.

Security is a fundamental responsibility of government. In the new millennium, however, U.S. national security

policy has not kept pace with rapidly changing threats to American interests. Globalization has quickened, but

the United States has not built alliances or institutions to protect and advance American security. Terrorists have

expanded their reach and lethality, but the moral authority of the United States is at an all-time low. Changes in

the Earths climate are more evident every day, but the United States has failed to act, alone or with allies,

to avoid disaster.

America needs a new national security vision for this new era and a dialogue at home that is as robust as it is

realistic. Yet the quality of our discussion on national security has been diminished. Fear has trumped conversa-

tion. Articial differences have been created and real differences have been left unexamined. The character of

our national dialogue has grown increasingly shrill while the need for honest discussion has grown more urgent.

Only by developing real analysis and thoughtful answers can a genuine foreign policy consensus be rebuilt for

a dangerous and decisive age. Only then will America again marshal all her resourcesmilitary, diplomatic,

economic, and moralto meet the challenges of a complex world.

Mission

A r e W e W i n n i n g ?


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2 0 1 0 R E P O R T

1

10REPORT

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

20022001

Mission

Board of Directors

The HonorableKenneth M.Duberstein

The Duberstein Group

The HonorableRichard L. Armitage

Armitage International

Brigadier GeneralStephen A. Cheney,USMC (Ret.)

Marine Military

Academy

The HonorableGary Hart

ASP Chairman

The HonorableNorman R. Augustine

Lieutenant GeneralDaniel Christman,USA (Ret.)

Nelson Cunningham

McLarty Associates

Vice Admiral LeeGunn, USN (Ret.)

The CNA Corporation

Ed Reilly

FD

General Lester L.Lyles, USAF (Ret.)

The Lyles Group

The HonorableChuck Hagel

The HonorableWarren B. Rudman

Albright Stonebridge

Group

Admiral WilliamFallon, USN (Ret.)

NeurallQ

Lieutenant GeneralClaudia Kennedy,USA (Ret.)

Population Action

International

The Honorable ChristineTodd Whitman

Whitman Strategy Group

The HonorableJohn Kerry

United States Senate


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2A r e W e W i n n i n g ?

IntroductionGoingintothetenthyearofthewaronterror,anyassessmentofthestruggleagainst

violentIslamistextremistsfacesafundamentalanalyticalchallenge.Everydayinthe

news,weseetremendousdevelopments.TheArabSpring,whichseemstobefunda-

mentallychallengingthepoliticalorderintheArabworld,issweepingawaymuchof

thepoliticalauthoritarianismthatwasamajorrootcauseofradicalismintheregion.On

May1,2011camemorestunningnews:asuccessfulU.S.militaryoperationthatkilledal

QaedaleaderOsamabinLaden.Atthispoint,neitherofthesesetsofdevelopmentspointstoanyclearconclusion.WillthecollapseofauthoritarianregimesintheArabworldlead

tostable,moderatedemocracies,orwillradical,Iranian-styletheocraciesemergeinstead?

Similarly,willbinLadensdeathcausealQaedatoshatterandfadeawayintocomplete

irrelevance,orwillitleadtoarenewedandinvigoratedradicalIslamistmovementas

variousgroupscompeteforleadershipandfollowersthroughanever-escalatingcycle

ofviolence?

Simplyput,wearewitnessingmomentouschanges,butthosechangeshaveuncertain

consequences.Anyjudgmentsaboutthemremainpurespeculation.

However,themoreprosaiclevelofanalysisprovidedinthisreportisgroundedinobjec-

tivedata.Regardlessofthenewsheadlines,therealityisthatthereisonlyonewordto

describethewaronterrorbasedontheempiricaldata:stalemate.

TheUnitedStateshasbuiltastronginternationalcoalitiontocombatthethreatof

Islamistterrorism.Ithasmodernizeditsownlawsandgovernmentalinstitutionswhile

promotingeffectiveinternationalcooperationontrackingandlimitingterroristnancing

andinformationsharing.Thesepositivedevelopmentsarevisibleonaregularbasisinthe

formofdisruptedplotsbothathomeandabroad.

Atthispoint,themainchallengefortheUnitedStatesisnotinthedevelopmentof

effectivecounterterrorisminstruments,butinsustainingastrategyfortheirwiseuse

politically.Thiswillbedifculttoaccomplish,asdemonstratedbythebacklashagainst

effortstouseciviliancourtstoholdterroristscriminallyaccountablefortheiractions,

andinthefailureoftheObamaadministrationtosecuresupporttoclosetheprisonat

GuantanamoBay.

Butdespitesuccessesonthewaysandmeanssideoftheequation,thelatterpartof2009

andmuchof2010wereundoubtedlyatimeofsetbacks.AlQaedacontinuestoabsorb

casualtiesandreplacelosses,eveninthemidstofever-escalatingkineticoperations

againstitanditsafliates.Thoughtheorganizationremainsunderpressure,thereisno

reasontobelievetheUnitedStatesisclosetoeradicatingthethreat.

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N O UNCERTAIN Y E S 2 0 1 0 R E P O R T

3

Worse,forthersttimeinseveralyears,alQaedaseemstobedevelopingeffective

transnationalafliates.AlQaedaintheArabianPeninsula(AQAP),basedinYemen,

hasbeenextremelyactiveinattemptingattacksontheUnitedStates,andalShabaabin

SomaliabranchedoutforthersttimetostrikeinUganda.OsamabinLadensdeathmay

beoccurringjustasalQaedaisbeginningtoreallywalkwithouthisleadership.

AftertheelectionofBarackObamain2008,therewassomehopethattheUnitedStates

mightbeabletoleverageexcitementabouthiselectiontotransformAmericasroleinthe

worldandpotentiallyrefocustheghtagainstIslamistterrorism.ButObamaspolicies

havecloselymirroredthoseofPresidentGeorgeW.Bush,demonstratingeitherthe

durabilityofthegovernmentalconsensusontheoverallstrategyorthepowerofinertia.

Wehavetoacknowledgethatregardlessofrevolutionarydevelopmentsonthehorizon

thereisnosilverbulletinthewaronterror.Indeed,morethaneveritisbecoming

clearthatthebesttheUnitedStatescanachieveistoreducethethreatofterrorismtoa

persistentnuisancethatweacceptasafactoflife.1

Further,trendsinthedomesticspherehaveturnedsharplynegative,markingthemost

signicantchangebetweenthisreportandlastyears.MetricFive,whichlooksatthe

U.S.homefront,sawtwoverynegativedevelopments.Therstistheriseofavocal

anti-Islammovementdemonstratedbyanti-mosqueandanti-Shariainitiatives.Thesec-

ondistheincreasingnumberofdomesticradicalizationcasesintheUnitedStates.Taken

together,thesedevelopmentshavethepotentialtotransformthewaronterror

dramaticallyfortheworse.Wewillneedtoseewhethertheseweresimplyelection-year

andrecession-drivendynamics,butfornow,theseareverytroublingdevelopments.

Therewillbegoodyearsandbadyearsinthefuture.Thereversalof20092010will

surelyprovetemporary,butsolikelywillfuturepositivetrendsaswasthecasewiththe

variousimprovementsinAmericaspositionin2008andearly2009.Asthewaron

terrorapproachesitsseconddecadetheprospectforvictoryremainselusive.

Theresearchforthisreportwascompletedpriortotherecenttransformativeevents

inEgypt,Libya,andelsewhereintheArabworld.Whileitiseasytospeculateonthe

possibleconsequencesofthesedevelopments,wedonotyethavesoliddatatoexamine.

Thesedevelopmentswillbetreatedin-depthinthenexteditionofAreWeWinning?

A Note about TerminologyTherehasbeenagreatdealofdebateovertheappropriateuseofvarioustermsassoci-

atedwiththewaronterroramonggovernmentofcialsandpolicyexpertsalike.The

AmericanSecurityProjecthaschosentoadjustitsuseofterminology.Whileinthepastweframedtheissueasexaminingthelevelofviolentjihadism,wearenowfocusing

ourassessmentonalQaedaandAssociatedMovements(AQAM).

Unfortunately,ourabilitytodisaggregatedataisimperfect.Asaconsequence,inseveral

sectionswecontinuetocitetrendsinthenumberofIslamistattacksascodedbythe

U.S.NationalCounterterrorismCenter(NCTC).

3


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4

Themetricsinthisreportarecolorcodedaccordingtoourndingsbased

onthequestion:Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

SummaryofFindings

N O UNCERTAIN Y E S

I. Islamist Violence

The number o terrorist attacs by radical Islamist groups remains at an all-time high, and the level o

violence outside o Iraq and Aghanistan continues to surge.

II. State of al Qaeda Leadership

U.S. drone attacs illed two successive AQ operations chies or Paistan and Aghanistan. In May

2011, Osama bin Laden was illed in an American raid on his sae house in Paistan. Nevertheless, the

al Qaeda media apparatus remains resilient and eective. The ability o the organization to replace

losses demonstrates its durability, although it has never beore aced a challenge lie it aces today.

III. Al Qaeda Afliated MovementsAter years o concern about the potential rise o eective al Qaeda afliates, in 2010 those ears came

to ruition with the increased capacity o al Qaeda afliated groups in Somalia and Yemen.

IV. Muslim Public Attitudes

The Obama Eect has now ully dissipated, and opinion o the United States in the Muslim world is

as bad as it was in 2008. Al Qaeda remains unpopular as well.

V. The Home Front

Trends within the United States too a dramatic turn or the worse with the rise o highly visible anti-

Muslim sentiments as well as an increase in domestic radicalization cases.

A r e W e W i n n i n g ?


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5

10REPORT

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

20022001

Findings

VI. Terrorist Financing

Although reliable inormation remains sporadic, there is increasing evidence to suggest that while

radical Islamist groups continue to have access to signifcant unds, al Qaeda in particular may beundergoing a proound unding crisis.

VII. Ungoverned Spaces

Ungoverned spaces continue to provide sae havens or terrorist groups, and wea governance

remains a major actor in spawning and sustaining radical insurgent movements.

VIII. International Cooperation against Terrorism

While many countries still need to ully implement United Nations counterterrorism measures, regional

initiatives continue to build state capacity and data sharing.

IX. State Sponsorship of Terrorism

Active state sponsorship remains at historically low levels; however, the large number o states that

tolerate some level o presence by nown terrorist groups complicate counterterrorism eorts.

X. Economic Prosperity and Political Freedom

Although poverty and political oppression persist at high levels throughout the Muslim world, trends

in both sets o indicators continue to improve. The Muslim world also weathered the international

fnancial crisis noticeably better than many.


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Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

6

ThenumberofterroristattacksbyradicalIslamistgroupsremainsatan

all-timehigh,andthelevelofviolenceoutsideofIraqandAfghanistan

continuestosurge.

I.Islamist ViolenceInpasteditionsofthisreportwehave

usedtotalincidentsofIslamistterrorasa

surrogateforanassessmentofthethreat

posedbyalQaeda.Thisyear,wehave

decidedtodisaggregatethedatainorder

toprovideamoredetailedassessment.

Thereareatleastsixdistinctnumerical

measuresonecouldusetoassessthelevel

ofviolence.Theseare:

Islamist Violence: Thismeasure

examinesthetotallevelofviolence

perpetratedbyIslamistgroups,including

bothterrorismandinsurgentactivity.The

logicofusingthismeasureisthatthelines

betweenterroristgroupsandinsurgencies,

andbetweenthemembershipsofvarious

groups,ismurkyandshifting.Groupswith

purelylocalgrievancesstillsometimes

utilizeforeignghters.Individualsjoining

theIslamistmovementasinsurgent

ghtersaresometimesrecruitedtojoin

transnationalterrororganizations.While

thismetricdoesnotmeasurethethreat

posedtotheUnitedStatesbyalQaeda,

itdoesessentiallydenethepoolof

potentialrecruitsfororganizationslike

alQaeda.

Islamist Terrorism: Thismeasure

assessesthelevelofactivityofgroupsthat

areactivelytargetingcivilians,irrespective

ofnationality.Groupsthatuseterrorism

havehistoricallydemonstratedsignicant

strategicmalleabilityintermsofwhomtheirviolencetargets.Havingbreachedthe

hurdleoflegitimizingattacksoncivilians,

theirstrategicorientationisoftenexible.

Islamistgroupsthatfocusonlocalgriev-

ancessometimesrefocusontransnational

terrorism,whiletransnationalgroups

sometimesreturntotheirlocalroots.The

signicantdevelopmentistheestablish-

mentoforganizationscommittedtothe

useofpoliticalviolence,oftenagainst

civilians,ratherthanthespecicnatureof

thetargetsetatanygiventime.

Islamist Suicide Terrorism:The

nextlevelofthreatisdenedbythelevel

ofsuicideterrorismbyIslamistgroups.

Suicideattacksaremoredeadly,onaver-

age,thanotherattacks.Inaddition,they

demonstratealevelofcommitmentand

organizationthatindicateahigherlevelof

threatthatisbothvirtuallyimpossibleto

deterandtremendouslydifcult

toprevent.

Mass Casualty Terrorism:Another

potentialmetricisthenumberofmass

casualtyattacks.Masscasualtyattacks

demonstratebothstrategicintentand

operationalcapacity.Butitiseasyto

overstatethispoint.Masscasualtyattacksoftendifferfromotherattackssolely

intermsofconsequencesratherthan

apparentintent.Chance,inshort,seems

toplayalargeroleintheincidenceof

suchattacks.

Islamist Terrorism against

Americans: Themajorityofthevictims

ofIslamistterrorhavebeen,paradoxically

otherMuslims.Thisviolencerepresentsathreattointernationalstability,butonly

anindirectthreattotheUnitedStates.

ViolenceagainstAmericans,bycontrast,

representsadirectnationalsecuritythreat

totheUnitedStates.Suchviolenceisthe

hallmarkofgroupswithatransnational

orientationandinstitutionalcapacityto

operateinwell-defendedenvironments.


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7N O UNCERTAIN Y E S 2 0 1 0 R E P O R T

10REPORT

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

20022001

ThetrendlinesforIslamistviolenceare

poor.Intwosuccessivereports,wehave

identiedwhatwethoughtwasaleveling

offofviolence,onlytoseeanewspikeas

morerecentdatabecameavailable.The

amountofIslamistviolenceworldwidehas

increasedvirtuallyeveryyearsince2001

andcontinuestoworsen.Moreandmore

youngMuslimsarebeingrecruitedinto

terroristorinsurgentmovements,building

agrowingpoolofself-describedjihadists.

Thereisnosingledatabasethatcountsall

incidentsofIslamistviolence.Theterror-

ismdataisunambiguous,however,and

whiletherehasbeenadeclineinIslamist

violenceinIraq,increasesinPakistan,

Afghanistan,andSomaliahavemorethan

offsetthoseimprovements.Indeed,even

progressinIraqisoftenoverstated,asIraq

Spectacular Islamist Terrorism

against Americans: Ultimately,the

waronterrorwasadirectconsequence

ofthreealQaedaattacksinthespaceof

alittleoverthreeyearstheEastAfrica

embassybombingsin1998,theattackon

theUSS Colein2000,andmostimpor-

tantly,theattacksofSeptember11,2001.

Becausethesesortsofattacksarerare,itis

difculttorelyonthemasatrendlinefor

assessingsuccessorfailureincounterter-

rorismefforts.Andyet,thismetriciswhat

manyAmericanswouldconsidertheonly

importantone.ViolenceinPakistanor

Somaliamaybetroubling,buttheabsence

ofsuccessfulmasscasualtyattacksonthe

UnitedStatesisarguablymoresignicant.

Thesesixsetsofmeasureshavenotbeen

wellcorrelated.Overthepastdecadewe

haveseenadramaticworseningofthesta-

tisticsonmeasuringtherstthreemetrics,

whilewehaveseenreasonablypositive

trendsforthelattertwo.Itisplausiblethat

thisinversecorrelationissignicant.But

evenifweareghtingthemtheresowe

donthavetoghtthemhere,itisnot

clearthatthisisasmartlong-termsolution.

Worse,thisinversecorrelationmaybean

illusionthatgivesusafalsesenseofcon-

denceinourcurrentstrategyandafalse

senseofsecurityinthefaceofwhatmaybe

agrowingthreat.Unfortunately,thedataby

itselfisinsufcienttoresolvethisissue.

remainsatremendouslyviolentcountry

withlevelsofviolencethereatroughlythe

samelevelasin2005.Whileitmayseem

peacefulcomparedtothedepthsofthe

civilwarin2006-2007,therealityisthat

Iraqremainsbesetbyextraordinarilyhigh

levelsofIslamistviolence.Onapercapita

basis,onlyAfghanistanisworse.

Islamistterrorismhasalsoincreased

worldwide.ImprovementsinIraqmask

theglobaltrend.AccordingtotheNCTC,

worldwidetherewere2,110incidentsof

Islamistterrorismin2009,downslightly

fromthe2,163in2008and2,106in2007.ConsideringthatincidentsinIraq

havedeclinedfrom606to223inthat

period,itisclearthatviolenceelsewhere

isincreasing.

ISLAMIST TERRORISM WORLDWIDE

YEAR

2004 480

2005 945

2006 1,496

2007 2,106

2008 2,163

2009 2,110

2010 2,534

0

500

1,

000

1,

500

2,

000

2,

500

3,

000

Source: WITS. http://www.nctc.gov/wits/witsnextgen.htm


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8

Inthisseriesofreports,wehavetradi-

tionallyreliedheavilyonthemeasureof

terrorismoutsideofIraq,Afghanistan,

Israel,andthePalestinianterritoriesin

ordertogetasenseofthebaselinelevel

ofviolenceoutsidethosewarzones.In

thismetric,Islamistterroristattackshave

increasedfrom407in2007to671in2008

and799in2009.

Thedatafor2010showsatroubling

growthinIslamistterroristincidents

worldwide.Afterthreeyearsofabout

2,100attacksperyear,attackssurged

in2010to2,534.Oftheseattacks,849occurredoutsideofIraq,Afghanistan,

Israel,andthePalestinianTerritories.

Inshort,2010sawacontinuationofthe

trendtowardsincreasingviolencethatthis

reporthasdocumentedsinceitsinception.

Theseincreasesarelargelyduetodra-

maticspikesinviolenceinPakistanand

Somalia.Therehasbeenatleastsome

speculationthatimprovementsinIraqareconnectedtoincreasesinviolence

elsewhere,thatasalQaedainIraq(AQI)

ghtersrelocatedtoAfghanistan,they

broughtincreasedtechnologicalsophisti-

cationwiththem.2Butwhilethisremains

animportantissueforexamination,there

islittlecompellingevidencetosupport

thisballooneffecthypothesis.Indeed,

anyemulationthatisoccurringislikely

duetothesharingoftechnicaldetails

online.3Thereis,however,compelling

evidencethatasinIraq,foreignghters

continuetopromoteviolenceelsewhere.4

1300

1200

1100

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

m IRAQ m AFGHANISTAN m PAkISTAN m SOMALIA

m RUSSIA m INDIA m ISRAEL AND PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Source: WITS. http://www.nctc.gov/wits/witsnextgen.html

ISLAMIST TERRORISM WORLDWIDE EXCLUDING IRAQ,AFGHANISTAN, AND ISRAEL AND PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

YEAR

2004 182

2005 197

2006 264

2007 407

2008 671

2009 799

2010 849

0

1

00

2

00

3

00

4

00

5

00

6

00

7

00

8

00

9

00



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10REPORT

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

20022001

Islamistsuicideterrorismhasalso

increaseddramaticallysince9/11,largely

drivenbysignicantincreasesintheuse

ofthistacticrstinIraqandnowin

Afghanistan.5AccordingtotheNCTC,

suicideterrorismbyIslamistgroups

spikedin2005andhasremainedhigh

eversince.6Theseattacksareparticularly

problematicbecausetheyareharderto

defendagainstandtheycausegreaterloss

oflifeonaverage.7

Therearenoidentiabletrendsregard-

ingmasscasualtyattacks.Becausethe

numbersofsuchattacksaresmaller

fewerthan100attacksattributedto

Islamistgroupshavekilledmorethan50

peoplesince2004itisdifculttochart

developmentsovertime.Ifanything,there

doesseemtohavebeenasmallspikein

2007withsuchattacksbecomingslightly

lesscommonsince,largelybecausemany

oftheseattacksoccurredinIraq.Simi-

larly,thereisnoidentiablecleartrend

inattacksonAmericans,otherthanthe

expectedreductionsinsuchattacksinIraq

andanincreaseinAfghanistan.Attackson

Americanciviliansoutsideofthesewar

zonesremainrare.OnlynineAmerican

civilianswerekilledbyterrorismin

20098thoughthisguredoesnotcount

the13killedand32woundedatFortHood

inNovember2009byNidalMalikHasan,

aU.S.ArmymajorwithIslamistleanings.

Signicantly,therehavebeennosuc-

cessfulspectacularmasscasualtyattacks

againstAmericancivilianssince2001.

Therehas,however,beenanapparent

recentuptickinattempts.InDecember

2009,UmarFaroukAbdulmutallabtried

todetonateabombonaightboundfor

Detroitwith289peopleaboard.9InMay

2010,acarbombwasnearlydetonatedin

SUICIDE ATTACKS BY ISLAMIST GROUPS

YEAR

2004 42

2005 142

2006 108

2007 178

2008 161

2009 133

2010 141

050

100

150

200


TimesSquare.Bothoftheseattackswould

havecausedmasscausalitieshadthey

beensuccessful.

Therehasalsobeenasignicantuptickin

IslamistactivityinEurope.Thedualcar

bombattackinStockholminDecember

2010wasonlythelatestmanifestationof

thistrend.10Throughoutthesummerand

fallof2010,intelligenceagencieswarned

ofpossibleMumbai-styleattacksonthe

continent,andindeedarrestsofvarious

plotterswerealsoreported.11

Theoverallthreatpicturethusremains

ambiguousbasedonthenumbers.Islamist

violencecontinuestoincrease,andinci-

dentsofsuicideterrorismremainhigh.Bu

eitherduetoluckoreffectivecounterter-

rorismmeasures,therehavenotbeenany

masscasualtyattacksagainstAmerican

civiliansinseveralyears.Onthewhole,

giventheluckybreaksthatprevented

disasterinDecember2009andMay2010

cautionwouldsuggestlookingattheglobalincreaseinIslamistterrorismasa

threateningdevelopmentirrespectiveof

thelackof9/11-styleattacksonAmerican

soilsince2001.Basedonthisassessment,

wecontinuetojudgetrendsinthismetric

tobenegative.


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10

U.S.droneattackskilledtwosuccessiveAQoperationschiefsforPakistanand

Afghanistan.InMay2011,OsamabinLadenwaskilledinanAmericanraidonhis

safehouseinPakistan.Nevertheless,thealQaedamediaapparatusremainsresilient

andeffective.Theabilityoftheorganizationtoreplacelossesdemonstratesits

durability,althoughithasneverbeforefacedachallengelikeitfacestoday.

II.Stateoftheal Qaeda LeadershipThebiggestnewsregardingalQaedaleadershipoccurredafter

thescopeofthisreportthedeathofOsamabinLadeninMay

2011.Wedonotyetknowtheconsequencesofthisdevelop-

ment.Thereisbothreasonforoptimism,givenbinLadens

uniqueroleasfounderandsymbolfortheorganization,and

pessimism,givenhowresilientalQaedahasbeeninthepast.

Thisresiliencewasdemonstratedin2010asdronestrikes

continuedtobattersuspectedradicalsinPakistan,including

alQaedatargets.UnderPresidentObama,thescaleofdrone

strikeshasincreaseddramatically.Therewere99dronestrikes

inPakistanthroughNovember2010,comparedwith53in2009

and34in2008.12Thesestrikesarekillingmilitantleaders,but

itisunclearwhetherthelong-termbenetsofthisapproach

outweighthecostsinpublicopinionofcontinuingthem.

Indeed,thereissomereasontobelievethatalQaeda,atleast,

hasbeguntoadapttopressurefromdrones.Forinstance,media

operations,whichsloweddownin2008,perhapsduetothe

persistenceofmilitarystrikes,seemmoreeffectiveatpresent.

Notonlyhasthepaceofmessagesincreased,buttheyarenow

moretimelyaswell.13Thechartatleftshowsmessagesthrough

theendofJune2010.

During2010,theseniorleadershipofalQaedaremained

active.BothOsamabinLadenandAymanal-Zawahirireleased

statementsoverthepastyear.Itisunclearhowmuch,ifany,

operationalcontroltheyexertoveralQaedaoperations.The

deathofbinLadenwillultimatelyrevealagreatdealaboutthe

strengthoftheorganization.

AL QAEDA MESSAGING

m ACTUAL m PROECTED

YEAR

2002 6

2003 11

2004 13

2005 16

2006 58

2007 97

2008 49

2009 76

2010 31

020

40

60

80

100

120

Source: http://www.intelcenter.com/gaeda-timeline-v8-0.pdf

31


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11

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2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

20022001

Osama bin Laden: He was the founder and leader of al Qaeda. He was killed in a U.S. military

operation in May 2011. Born in Saudi Arabia to an afuent family with more than 50 siblings, he rst

took an interest in violent Islamism when he became involved in the Muslim Brotherhood. He later

fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviets. After using Sudan as a base for train-

ing camps in the early 1990s, he ed counter-terrorist efforts there to settle in Afghanistan. 14

Ayman al-Zawahiri: He is al Qaedas second in command, and has increasingly taken the helm as

the face, voice, and inspiration of the organization. In his home country of Egypt, he began organizing

violent Islamists at the age of 15. He met Osama bin Laden while working as a surgeon for the Red

Crescent Society in 1980.15

Sheikh al-Fateh: Al-Fateh was killed in a missile strike in September 2010. An Egyptian national, he

was reportedly al Qaedas chief of operations for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 16

Hamza al-Ju: Al-Ju was killed by a missile strike near Wana in Pakistan in June 2010. He was a

leader of the radical group Jundullah, or Army of God, which Pakistani security ofcials said was

involved in sectarian violence around the port city of Karachi.17

Mustafa Abu al-Yazid: Al-Yazid was killed in a missile strike in Pakistan in May 2010. Al-Yazid

was a top nancial chief for al Qaeda as well as one of the groups founders, and was considered

by American intelligence ofcials to be the organizations No. 3 leader.18 He was also frequently

featured in videos released by al Qaedas media arm.

Sheikh Mansoor: Sheikh Mansoor was a commander in al Qaedas Lashkar al Zil,

or the Shadow Army, U.S. ofcials said.19 He was killed in a missile strike in North Waziristan in

February 2010.

Several other signicant al Qaeda afliated gures were also killed in 2010.20 One of the most sig-nicant developments in this area was the capture, rather than killing, of the Talibans military chief,

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in February 2010.21 The consequences of this development remain

unclearit has been argued that his capture harmed the prospects for a negotiated settlement in

Afghanistandemonstrating the complex web of interests and personalities in South Asia. 22

i

KILLEDi

ii

i

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i

i

i

killedi

ii

i

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i

i

killedi

ii

i

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ii

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12

AfteryearsofconcernaboutthepotentialriseofeffectivealQaedaafliates,

in2010thosefearscametofruitionwiththeincreasedcapacityofalQaeda

afliatedgroupsinSomaliaandYemen.

III.AlQaeda Afliated MovementsPreviouseditionsofthisreporthavenotedtheincreasingdangerposedbyIslamistmovementsintheArabian

PeninsulaandEastAfrica.Thisyear,thosethreatscametofruition.

AAQAPThegrowthofalQaedaintheArabian

Peninsula(AQAP)hasreceivedthemost

attentionfromAmericancounterterrorism

authorities.Theattemptedbombingof

NorthwestFlight253overDetroithas

beenconvincinglytiedtoAQAP,based

inYemen.AQAPclearlyhasincreaseditsoperationalcapacityoverthepastyear.23

AQAPisparticularlydangerousinterms

ofdomesticradicalization.Americanciti-

zenAnwaral-AwlakiisbasedinYemen

andisreportedlyaregionalcommander

foralQaedaintheregion.24Hissermons

andonlineactivitieshavebeenlinked

totheaccusedFortHoodshooterNidal

MalikHasan,underwearbomberUmar

FaroukAbdulmutallab,andTimesSquare

bomberFaisalShahzad.

InOctober2010,authoritiesinEurope

andtheMiddleEastfoiledaplottosend

bombsbymail.Thisplotalsooriginated

inYemen.25Whetherasamatterofchance

ordesign,thelocusofmailthreatsfromal

QaedanowseemstobeinYemenrather

thaninPakistanorAfghanistan.

East Africa BAlShabaabinSomaliahasbecome

increasinglyfocusedontransnational

terrorisminrecentyears,executingtwo

bombingsinKampala,Uganda,inJuly

2009,killingatleast74people.26Al

Shabaabhasincreaseditscontrolover

Somaliaandbecomeincreasinglyvocalinitsthreatsagainstoutsideinvolvementin

Somalia.

AlShabaabhashadsuccessinrecruiting

Somali-AmericanstoghtinSomalia.

AlongwithAQAPandtheactivitiesofal

QaedaCentralinPakistan,alShabaabhas

tobeseenasoneofthemostseriousthreat

vectorsfortheUnitedStates.

Southeast Asia CSoutheastAsiaisgenerallyasuccessstory

ThetwinbombingsinJakarta,Indonesia

byasplintergroupofJemaahIslamiyahin

July2009weretherstsignicantinstanc

ofviolenceinthatcountryinfouryears.27

Thoseattacksledtoavigorousgovernmen

responsethatresultedinthedeathorcaptuofover100terroristsuspects.Thediscove

ontheeveofPresidentObamasNovembe

2010visittoIndonesiaofmilitanttraining

campsinAcehProvince,however,highlig

theresilienceofthesmallandfragmented

radicalmovementintheworldsmostpop

lousMuslimnationaswellasthecontinue

effectivenessofthegovernmentsresponse

Islamistviolenceremainssporadicandloca

focusedinmuchoftherestoftheregion.

AspateofviolencebytheMoroIslamic

LiberationFrontinthePhilippinesseemstohavebeenatemporaryresponsetoaPhilip-

pinecourtdecisionvoidingapeaceagreeme

withthegroup.InSeptember2009,thegrou

announceditswillingnesstoacceptamore

limitedformoflocalautonomy,thuslikely

clearingthewayforanewagreement,whic

isstillbeingnegotiated.29Aninsurgency

amongMuslimsinThailandcontinuestosim

mer,particularlywiththeThaigovernment

sufferingthroughanextendedpoliticalcrisi


15/28



10REPORT

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

20022001

A

B

North Africa DAlQaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM)

remainsalow-levelthreat.Despitethe

grandioseproclamationsissuedbythe

groupinthe200607timeframe,itsreach

hasbeenlimited.Effectivegovernment

actionandtheunpopularityofalQaedain

NorthAfricaseemtohavemarginalized

thegroup,anditsrecentactionslargely

revolvearoundlow-levelcriminalitytomaintainsomefunding,punctuatedwith

occasionalattacksonsecurityservices

anddevelopmentprojects.Terrorist

organizationsdosometimesfadeunder

nancialpressures,andrecourseto

criminalitycanunderminetherevolu-

tionaryfervoroftheorganization.This

maybethecaseofAQIM.31

West AfricaThereislittleevidenceofeffectivealQa-

edapenetrationintoWestAfrica,butthere

isalsosomereasonforconcern.Various

Islamistgroupscontinuetooperatein

theregion,particularlyinNigeria.For

instance,theIslamistsectBokoHaram

wasresponsibleforviolencethatclaimed

over150livesinJuly2009.32Thegroupis

severalyearsold,hasalargelyincoherentanti-scienticideology,butnevertheless

seemstoreectapotentialvectorof

radicalization.Thefactthatunderwear

bomberUmarFaroukAbdulmutallabis

alsofromNigeriacreatesanotherworri-

somedatapoint.

AfliatedMovements

D

South AsiaDespiteamassiveincreaseintheAmeri-

canmilitarycommitmenttoAfghanistan,

theconictseemsnoclosertoadecisive

outcomethanlastyear.Thoughthereis

signicantdebateaboutthelikely

consequencesofdifferentoutcomesin

Afghanistan,thecontinuedinstitutional-

izationofIslamistgroupsthereisnota

positivedevelopment.

Itisalsounclearwhetherthetacticaland

operationalsuccessesofthePakistani

armyagainstthePakistaniTalibanwill

havelong-termpositiveconsequences.

Wearestillseeingthefalloutofthe

massiveoodsthatdevastatedthecountry

inthesummerof2010,includingan

apparentweakeningofciviliangovern-

mentandadiversionofattentionbythe

militaryfromcounterinsurgency

operationstooodrelief.Giventhe

deathofOsamabinLaden,thefutureofAmericanmilitaryoperationsanddrone

strikesinSouthAsiaremainsuncertain.

CE

E F

F


16/28



14

TheObamaEffecthasnowfullydissipated,andopinionofthe

UnitedStatesintheMuslimworldisasbadasitwasin2008.

AlQaedaremainsunpopularaswell.

IV.MuslimPublic AttitudesTheelectionofBarackObamacreatedatemporarywaveof

hopefulnessintheMuslimworld.Now,twoyearslater,the

wavehasalmostcompletelydissipated.ViewsoftheUnited

Statesarenow,intheaggregate,asnegativeastheywereduring

theBushadministration,thoughthenumberofrespondents

withverynegativeviewsoftheUnitedStatesremains

slightlylower.

Thisisnotparticularlysurprising.MuslimangerattheUnited

Statesisafunctionofitsstrategicchoices.Clearly,givenPresi-

dentObamasrhetoricaloutreach,thisisnotanissueofstyle.

Americanpolicyisdeeplyunpopular,andthisunpopularity

providesafertilerecruitinggroundforanti-Americanradicals.

Explicitsupportforterrorism,however,remainslowinthe

Muslimworld.OsamabinLadenandalQaedaremainunpopu-

lar.Thusfar,theUnitedStateshasbeenunabletoconvertthis

angeratgroupslikealQaedaintopublicsupportforengage-

mentwiththeUnitedStates.

Thenumberstellthestory.Ina2010pollofsixArabcountries,

MiddleEastscholarShibleyTelhamifoundthatonly12%of

Arabsheldfavorableorsomewhatfavorableviewsof

theUnitedStates.33Thisisdownfrom18%in2009and15%

in2008.

TheresultsaresimilarelsewhereintheMuslimworld.In

TurkeyanAmericanallyandmemberofNATOonly13%

ofthepopulationhadamainlypositiveviewoftheUnited

Statesinuenceintheworld,while70%viewedU.S.inu-

enceasmainlynegative.34InPakistan,thenumberswere

9%positive,52%negative.Asinpastyears,WestAfricaand

Indonesia,withlargeMuslimpopulations,nonethelesssawthe

UnitedStatesmorefavorably,thoughIndonesias36%positive

39%negativendingislessthanencouraging.Thesituationin

Nigeriaispeculiar.Inanotherrecentsurvey,81%ofNigerians

heldfavorableviewsoftheUnitedStates,butoddly49%of

NigeriansalsohadpositiveviewsofalQaeda.35

DevelopmentsinPakistanareparticularlydistressing.Accord-

ingtoaPewResearchpoll,favorableviewsofalQaeda

doubledinthepastyearfrom9%to18%,andsupportfor

cooperationwiththeUnitedStatesonghtingradicalgroups

hasdeclined.Roughlysix-in-ten(59%)Pakistanisdescribe

ATTITUDE RESULTS

Very Unavorable64%

46%

47%

Somewhat Unavorable19%

31%

38%

Somewhat Favorable11%

15%

10%

Very Favorable

4%

3%2%

ARAB ATTITUDES OF THE U.S.

m2008

m2009

m2010

020

40

60

80

100

Source: http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_telhami.aspx


17/28



15

10REPORT

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

20022001

theU.S.asanenemy,whilejust11%sayitisapartnerThe

U.S.-ledwarinneighboringAfghanistaniswidelyopposed

byPakistanis.Nearlytwo-thirds(65%)wantU.S.andNATO

troopsremovedassoonaspossible.36

PollinginPakistansFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas

(FATA)providesparticularlystarkevidenceofthechallenge.

ThevastmajorityofFATAresidentsopposeAmericanaction

againstalQaedaontheirterritorywhilethevastmajoritysup-

portPakistanigovernmentaction.Havingacommonenemy

isnottranslatingintoadesireforcoordinatedaction.Thisis

afundamentallydifferentdynamicfromtheattitudesof,for

instance,GermancitizensduringtheColdWar,whereanti-

Sovietattitudestranslatedintopro-Americanpositions.Today,

asharedantipathytoalQaedaisdoinglittletoimproveAmericanrelationswiththeMuslimworld.

AjointpollbytheNewAmericaFoundationandTerrorFree

TomorrowconductedinPakistansFATAfoundthat,

NearlynineouteverytenpeopleinFATAoppose

theU.S.militarypursuingal-Qaedaandthe

Talibanintheirregion.Nearly70%ofFATA

residentsinsteadwantthePakistanimilitary

alonetoghtTalibanandal-Qaedamilitantsin

thetribalareas.

TheintensityofoppositiontotheAmericanmilitaryishigh.

WhileonlyoneintenFATAresidentsthinksuicideattacks

areoftenorsometimesjustiedagainstthePakistanimilitary

andpolice,almostsixintenbelievetheseattacksarejustied

againsttheU.S.military.37

AlQaedaremainsunpopularintheMuslimworld.

Pollsfrequentlyaskrespondentsabouttheircon-

denceinOsamabinLadentodotherightthing,

andthisisausefulsurrogateforattitudestowardsal

Qaedagenerally.PewsGlobalAttitudeProjecthas

trackedattitudestowardbinLadensince2003,and

hisstandingamongMuslimpublicsremainslow.38

Itwillbeinterestingtoseewhetherthistrendwill

continuewithhisdeath,orwhetheramartyrnarra-

tivewilltakehold.

Thereisgoodnewsinthesepublicattitudedynamics.

Forgoodandill,attitudestowardtheUnitedStates

andalQaedaseemlargelyuncorrelated.Thismeans

thatangerattheUnitedStatesisnotbeingtranslatedintoincreasedsupportforalQaeda.Butbythesame

token,angeratalQaedaisnottranslatingintodeeper

publicsupportforcooperationwiththeUnitedStates.

InmuchoftheMuslimworld,themessageseemsto

bethatthepublicwantsneitheralQaedanorgreater

Americaninvolvement.

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Source: http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popular-abroad-than-at-home/

CONFIDENCE IN BIN LADEN

m NIGERIA m INDONESIA m EGYPT m PAkISTAN

m ORDAN m TURkEY m LEBANON

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010


18/28



16

TrendswithintheUnitedStatestookadramaticturnfortheworsewiththerise

ofhighlyvisibleanti-Muslimsentimentsaswellasanincreaseindomestic

radicalizationcases.

V.TheHome FrontAmerican Public AttitudesAcleargoalofalQaedaistoprovokeaclashofcivilizations

betweenIslamandtheWest.DevelopmentsintheUnitedStates

thispastyear,includingtheriseofanti-Muslimrhetoric,arethus

troublingastheyfeedintoalQaedasstrategy.Thedebateover

theGroundZeroMosquewasthemostvisibleinstanceofthis

trend,butoppositiontomosquesinanumberoflocalitiesaswell

asanti-Shariarhetoricandlawsinsomepartsofthecountryalso

contributedtothevisibilityofthisissue.

Despitetheriseoffringe,anti-MuslimactivistsintheUnited

States,overallpublicopinionpollingshowsrelativelyminor

changesinAmericanattitudestowardMuslims.Nonetheless,the

trendsaretroubling.ThepercentageofAmericanswhohavea

favorableopinionofIslamdeclinedfrom41%inJuly2005to

30%inAugust2010.Duringthatsametimeframe,unfavorableviewsofIslamincreasedslightlyfrom36%to38%.39

Thispollingperhapsminimizesthechangesindomesticattitudes

InthewakeofthedebatesovertheconstructionofanIslamic

centerinlowerManhattan,anti-mosqueprotestseruptedinat

leastahalf-dozenotherlocations.40Worse,inSeptember2010,a

FloridaministerthreatenedtopubliclyburnQurans,prompting

severaldaysofanti-AmericanviolenceinAfghanistanandPaki-

stan.41InNovember2010,votersinOklahomapassedareferen-

dumwhichprohibitsstatecourtsfromconsideringinternational

laworIslamicShariahlawwhendecidingcases.42

Someorganizationshavenotedanincreaseinanti-Muslimhate

crimes,43butsinceofcialgovernmentstatisticshavenotbeen

updatedsince2008,thereisnoreliablewaytoassesswhether

therehasbeenanupsurge.44


19/28



10REPORT

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

20022001

Thegrowthandtransformationofanti-Muslimsentimentinthe

UnitedStatesisanissuethatbearsfurtheranalysis.

TheAmericanpublichasgrownslightlymorepessimisticabout

thewaronterror.FromSeptember2008toFebruary2009,

between46%and62%ofthepublicbelievedtheU.S.was

winningthewaronterror.SinceMarch2010,thisnumber

hasnottopped46%andhasbeenaslowas39%.45Thischange

likelyreectsincreasedpessimismoverthewarinAfghanistanas

wellastheimpactoftheclosecallsofFlight253andtheTimes

Squarecarbomb.

Domestic RadicalizationAnothertroublingdevelopmentonthehomefronthasbeen

anapparentsurgeindomesticradicalizationcases.Between

September11,2001,andtheendof2009,46publiclyreported

casesofdomesticradicalizationandrecruitmenttojihadistterror-

ismoccurredintheUnitedStates;13ofthosecasesoccurredin

2009.46Severaladditionalcaseswerereportedin2010.47

ApreviousAmericanSecurityProjectreport,EnemiesAmong

Us,highlightedtheidiosyncrasyofmanyofthesecases.The

reportnotesthat[e]xtremismcapitalizesandthrivesonpercep-

tionsofalienationandexclusion.48Thisdynamichighlights

thedangersassociatedwiththeriseofanti-Muslimsentimentin

theUnitedStates,andparticularlyitsadoptionbymainstream

politicalgures.

Inretrospect,PresidentGeorgeW.Bushdeservessignicant

creditforcondemninganti-MuslimsentimentintheUnited

States.PresidentObama,forvariousreasons,mayhaveless

credibilitywithmanyAmericansonthisscore,despitehisequally

vigorouscondemnationofanti-Muslimrhetoric.

Domesticradicalizationisparticularlydangerousbecauseof

theabilityofAmericancitizensandlawfulresidentstotravel

totrainingandradicalizationhotspots.Indeed,theiruseofAmericantraveldocumentsmakesthemparticularlydangerous

astransnationalterrorists.AmericancitizenDavidHeadley,for

instance,madevescoutingtripstoMumbaitohelpLashkar-e-

Taibaplanthedeadly2008attacksinthatcity.49NajibullahZazi

usedhislegalAmericanresidencystatustotraveltoPakistan

fortrainingbeforehisplannedattackontheNewYorksubway

system.50Would-beTimesSquarebomberFaisalShahzadis

alsoanAmericancitizenwhotraveledtoPakistanaspartofhis

radicalization.51

Theinterplayofgrowinganti-MuslimsentimentintheUnited

Statesandincreasingdomesticradicalizationisaparticularly

dangerousthreat,andonethatexistingcounter-terrorinitiatives

arepoorlydesignedtocontain.


20/28



18

Althoughreliableinformationremainssporadic,thereisincreasing

evidencetosuggestthatwhileradicalIslamistgroupscontinuetohave

accesstosignicantfunds,alQaedainparticularmaybeundergoinga

profoundfundingcrisis.

VI.TerroristFinancing

18

Estimated Cost of Executing Major Terrorist AttacksATTACKS ON NEW YORKAND WASHINGTON

DATE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001COST: $500,000

LONDON TRAINAND BUS BOMBINGS

DATE: JULY 7, 2005COST: $1,000-$10,000

MUMBAIATTACKS

DATE: NOVEMBER 26-29, 2008COST: $730,000

VII. Ungoverned SpacesGOVERNMENT

EFFECTIVENESS(PERCENTILE RANKING)

m0-10

m>10-25

m >25-50 m >50-75

m >75-90 m >90

18

Ungovernedspacescontinuetoprovidesafehavensforterroristgroups,

andweakgovernanceremainsamajorfactorinspawningandsustaining

radicalinsurgentmovements.


21/28



19

WhilemanycountriesstillneedtofullyimplementUnitedNations

counterterrorismmeasures,regionalinitiativescontinuetobuildstate

capacityanddatasharing.

VIII.InternationalCooperation against TerrorisInternational CommunityTheUnitedNationsprovidedafoundationforaninternationalcounterterrorismlegalregimeinSecurityCouncilResolutions1390,

1452,1455,and1456.Pursuanttotheseresolutions,nationsareurgedtofreezethefundingandassetsofterroristorganizations

andindividualswhoparticipateinsuchactivities,topreventthetraveloftheseindividuals,andtopreventthesupplyofarmsand

relatedmaterialstosuchpeopleandorganizations.Whileallcountrieswerecalledontobecomepartiestothisandotherpastter-

roristconventions,actualcooperationhasvaried.

WhileResolution1390providedthegroundworkforinternationalcounterterrorismcooperation,additionalconventionsareneeded

toresolveissuesandholesinthecurrentinternationalframework.Specicissuestoaddressare:

thelegalstatusofrendition;

therightsandstatusofsuspectedmembersofterroristorganizations;and

theobligationsofstatestopreventattacksemanatingfromtheirsoil,andontheipside,therightsofstatestoactagainst

threatscomingfromnon-stateactorsemanatingfromanothercountry.

IX. State SponsorshipofTerrorism

Activestatesponsorshipremainsathistoricallylowlevels;however,thelarge

numberofstatesthattoleratesomelevelofpresencebyknownterroristgroups

complicatecounterterrorismefforts.

OnlyasmallnumberofcountriesarefailingtocooperateinsomemannerwiththeU.S.governmentscounterterrorismefforts.The

StateDepartmentspeciesfourcountriesascompletelyuncooperativeIran,Syria,Cuba,andSudananddesignatesthemasstate

sponsorsofterrorism.

Itdoesnotdifferentiate,forexample,betweenthosecountrieswhoaregenuinepartnersincounterterrorismandthosewhotolerate

terroristorganizationswithintheirbordersorturnablindeyetoterroristfundraising.Othercountrieshavegoodintentions,butlack

thecapacitytocomply.


22/28



20


FREE

PARTIALLY FREE

NOT FREE

LESS THAN $1,000 GDP PER CAPITA $1,000-$4,000 GDP PER CAPITA

$4,001-$10,000 GDP PER CAPITA

$10,001-$20,000 GDP PER CAPITA GREATER THAN $20,000 GDP PER CAPITA

Althoughpovertyandpoliticaloppressionpersistathighlevelsthroughoutthe

Muslimworld,trendsinbothsetsofindicatorscontinuetoimprove.TheMuslim

worldalsoweatheredtheinternationalnancialcrisisnoticeablybetterthanmany.

X.Economic Prosperity &Political Freedom

m SIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENT

m SOME IMPROVEMENT

m NO CHANGE

m SOME REGRESSION

m SIGNIFICANTREGRESSION

m LESS THAN 0% GDPGROWTH

m 0-2% GDP GROWTH

m 2-4% GDP GROWTH

m 4-6% GDP GROWTH

m GREATER THAN 6%GDP GROWTH


23/28


2 0 1 0 R E P O R T

10REPORT

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

20022001

Conclusions &Recommendations

21

10REPORT

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

20022001

Conclusions & Recommendations

N O UNCERTAIN Y E S

ThetransitionfromtheBushtotheObama

administrationmarkedakeypotential

turningpointinAmericancounterterror-

ismpolicy.Thecontinuitybetweenthe

twoadministrationshighlightsthatwe

haveenteredaperiodofstrategicstasis.

Americancounterterrorismpolicywill

likelycontinuetobedenedbyanallof

theabovestrategywhichincludesavery

signicantandcostlyroleforAmerican

groundforcesinvariousexistingand

emerginghotspotsaroundtheworld.

Whetherthisisscallysustainablein

thelong-runremainsverymuchan

openquestion.

Thatsaid,Americancounterterrorism

strategyremainsvulnerabletoseveral

potentialdisruptions.Risinganti-Muslim

sentimentintheUnitedStatesoratleast

ariseinthevisibilityandstrengthofa

radicalanti-Islamicfringecoulddisrupt

relationswiththeMuslimworldsuf-

cientlytomakeexistingpoliciesunsus-

tainable.Budgetpressuresmightalsoforceareassessment.Andofcourse,itis

impossibletopredictwhatwouldhappen

inthewakeofasuccessful,mass-casualty

attackonU.S.soil.

Therearethreesteps,however,thatthe

UnitedStatesoughttotakeimmedi-

atelyasthewaronterrorentersits

seconddecade:

First,Americanleadersneedtoaddress

thenumerousinstitutionalproblemsthat

remainingovernmentalorganizations.In

particular,thereneedstobeathorough

reviewoftheintelligencecommunity,

whichhasgrownmassivelysince9/11,

resultingininefcienciesandduplication

ofeffort.Thegovernmentalsoneedsto

considerthelogicofremainingheavily

reliantoncontractorsifweare,indeed,

nowinaquasi-permanentstateofwar.

Second,criticsoftheAfghanwarhave

longnotedthatevenvictorytherewould

beunlikelytoeradicatethethreatofter-

rorism,giventhepossibilitythatalQaeda

couldrelocateelsewhere.WiththeriseofAQAP,thisisnolongeratheoretical

possibility,butareality.Asaconsequence,

itisimperativefortheUnitedStates

torebalanceitsmilitarycommitments

acrossthefullrangeofterroristthreats.It

isaprofoundmistaketoover-investour

commitmentintheplacethatspawnedthelastmajorattackratherthanthelikely

nextone.

Third,thereneedstobeadditional

sustainedattentiononthehomefront.The

twinthreatsofdomesticradicalizationand

risinganti-Muslimsentimentriskunder-

miningwhateverriskreductionefforts

Americanshaveaccomplishedabroad.

Theserecommendationsstillhold,butit

isclearthatwiththedeathofOsamabin

Ladenwehaveenteredanewperiodof

uncertaintyinthewaronterror.While

therewasgreatcontinuitybetweenBush

andObama,wearenowinanewera,

onethatwouldbenetfromathorough

reconsiderationofAmericanassumptions

andgoals.


24/28



Endnotes1 Senator John Kerry made this argument in

2004. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/10/magazine/10KERRY.html?pagewanted=all

2 Murphy, Caryle, Jihadis shift attention to war

in Afghanistan, The Christian Science Monitor,

August 19, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2008/0819/p01s02-wome.html(accessed January 26, 2011).

3 Jacobson, Philip, The success of the home-madebomb, The Times, September 21, 2008, http://

www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article4772890.ece (accessed January 26, 2011).

4 Raghavan, Sudarsan, Foreign ghters gain

inuence in Somalias Islamist al-Shabab militia,

The Washington Post, June 8, 2010, http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR2010060704667.html

(accessed January 26, 2011)

5 Pape, Robert A. and James K. Feldman, Cutting the

Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and

How to Stop it(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

2010), pp. 26-28.

6 National Counter-Terrorism Center, WorldwideIncident Tracking System. Data available at http://

wits.nctc.gov.

7 Pape and Feldman, p. 5.

8 Terrorism Deaths, Injuries, Kidnappings of Private

U.S. Citizens, 2009, U.S. Department of State,

August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/145700.htm (accessed January 26, 2011).

9 Schmitt, Eric and Eric Lipton, Ofcials Point to

Suspects Claim of Qaeda Ties in Yemen, The

New York Times, December 26, 2009, http://www.

nytimes.com/2009/12/27/us/27terror.html?_r=1(accessed January 26, 2011).

10 Stockholm blasts: Sweden probes terrorist attack,

BBC News, December 12, 2010, http://www.bbc.

co.uk/news/world-europe-11978389 (accessed

January 26, 2011).

11 Norton-Taylor, Richard and Owen Bowcott, Mumbai-

style terror attack on UK, France and Germany

foiled, The Guardian, September 29, 2010, http://

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/29/terror-attack-plot-europe-foiled(accessed January 26,

2011); Denmark foils terror attack, Al Jazeera,

December 29, 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2010/12/20101229133356374274.html(accessed January 26, 2011).

12 The Year of the Drone, New America Foundation,

February 12, 2011, http://counterterrorism.

newamerica.net/drones, (accessed February 25,2011).

13 Al-Qaeda Messaging/Attacks Timeline, IntelCenter,

July 22, 2010, http://www.intelcenter.com/qaeda-

timeline-v8-0.pdf (accessed January 26, 2011);

Al-Qaeda Messaging Statistics (QMS), IntelCenter,

September 9, 2007, http://www.intelcenter.com/QMS-PUB-v3-3.pdf, (accessed January 26, 2011).

14 A Biography of Osama bin laden, PBS Frontline,

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/bio.html (accessed January26, 2011).

15 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Global Security, http://www.

globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/zawahiri.

htm (accessed January 26, 2011).

16 US missile strike kills al-Qaeda chief in Pakistan,

BBC News, September 28, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11429016(accessed

January 26, 2011).

17 Shah, Pir Zubair, Qaeda Figure Is Reported Killed

in Pakistan, The New York Times, June 29, 2010,http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/world/asia/30pstan.html?_r=1 (accessed January 26,

2011).

18 Schmitt, Eric, American Strike Is Said to Kill a Top

Qaeda Leader, The New York Times, May 31, 2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/world/

asia/01qaeda.html?ref=world (accessed January

26, 2011).

19 Roggio, Bill Senior al Qaeda military commander

killed in Predator strike, The Long War Journal,

February 20, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.

org/archives/2010/02/senior_al_qaeda_mili.php

(accessed January 26, 2011).

20 Roggio, Bill and Alexander Mayer, Senior al Qaedaand Taliban leaders killed in US airstrikes in Pakistan,

20042011, The Long War Journal, January 13,

2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-

strikes-hvts.php (accessed January 26, 2011).

21 Mazzetti, Mark and Dexter Filkins, Secret Joint Raid

Captures Talibans Top Commander, The New York

Times, February 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.

com/2010/02/16/world/asia/16intel.html(accessed

January 26, 2011).

22 Pakistans arrest of Mullah Baradar: tactics or

strategy? Reuters, February 17, 2010, http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2010/02/17/pakistans-

arrest-of-mullah-baradar-tactics-or-strategy/


23 Report: Al Qaeda Entrenchment In Yemen Is

Not A Forgone ConclusionBut We Have To

Think Strategically If We Are To Win, American

Security Project, November 8, 2010, http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2010/report-al-qaeda-entrenchment-

in-yemen-is-not-a-forgone-conclusion-

%E2%80%93-but-we-have-to-think-strategicallyif-we-are-to-win/(accessed January 26, 2011).

24 Lake, Eli, Yemeni gains civil liberties backing, The

Washington Times, August 3, 2010, http://www.

washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/3/aclu-to-

help-al-awlakis-father-sue-us/(accessed February4, 2011).

25 Finn, Peter and Mary Beth Sheridan, Investigators

link package explosives to al-Qaeda bomb-maker in

Yemen, The Washington Post, October 31, 2010,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2010/10/29/AR2010102904395.htm(accessed January 26, 2011).

26 Raghavan, Sudarsan, Islamic militant group

al-Shabab claims Uganda bombing attacks,

The Washington Post, July 12, 2010, http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2010/07/12/AR2010071200476.html


27 Onishi, Norimitsu, Indonesia Bombings Signal

Militants Resilience, The New York Times, July 17,

2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/world/

asia/18indo.html (accessed January 26, 2011).

28 Baldor, Lolita C., U.S. worries about upswing in

terrorism in Indonesia, The Washington Times,

November 7, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/7/us-worries-about-

upswing-terrorism-indonesia/?page=1(accessed

January 26, 2011).

29 McIndoe, Alastair, Letter From Manila: Ending a

Long Insurgency in the Philippines, Foreign Affairs,

January 29, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/

features/letters-from/letter-from-manila(accessedFebruary 4, 2011).


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Endnotes

30 Stalemate in Southern Thailand, International Crisis

Group, November 3, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/

B113-stalemate-in-southern-thailand.aspx


31 Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa

Overview, U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010,http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140886.htm(accessed January 26, 2011).

32 Nigerian Islamist attacks spread, BBC News, July

27, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8169966.

stm (accessed January 26, 2011); Nossiter, Adam,Killings in Nigeria Are Linked to Islamic Sect, The

New York Times, October 18, 2010, http://www.

nytimes.com/2010/10/19/world/africa/19nigeria.html?_r=2&hp (accessed January 26, 2011).

33 Telhami, Shibley, 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll:

Results of Arab Opinion Survey Conducted June

29July 29, 2010, Brookings, August 5, 2010, http://

www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_telhami.aspx (accessed January 26,

2011).

34 Global Views of United States Improve While Other

Countries Decline, World Public Opinion.org, April

18, 2010, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/660.

php (accessed January 26, 2011).

35 Obama More Popular Abroad Than at Home,

Global Image of U.S. Continues to Benet, Pew

Research Center, June 17, 2010, http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popular-abroad-

than-at-home/(accessed January 26, 2011).

36 Public Opinion in Pakistan: Concern About Extremist

Threat Slips, Pew Research Center, July 29, 2010,

http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1683/pakistan-

opinion-less-concern-extremists-america-image-poor-india-threat-support-harsh-laws


37 Bergen, Peter and Patrick C. Doherty, Public

Opinion in Pakistans Tribal Regions, New America

Foundation, September 28, 2010, http://www.

newamerica.net/publications/policy/public_

opinion_in_pakistan_s_tribal_regions(accessedJanuary 26, 2011).

38 Obama More Popular Abroad Than at Home

39 Public Remains Conicted Over Islam, The Pew

Forum, August 24, 2010, http://pewforum.org/

Muslim/Public-Remains-Conicted-Over-Islam.aspx (accessed January 26, 2011).

40 Goodstein, Laurie, Across Nation, Mosque Projects

Meet Opposition, The New York Times, August

7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/

us/08mosque.html?_r=1 (accessed January 26,2011).

41 Healy, Jack and Steven Erlanger, Planned Koran

Burning Drew International Scorn, The New York

Times, September 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.

com/2010/09/10/world/10react.html(accessedJanuary 26, 2011).

42 Election ResultsOklahoma, The New York

Times, November 2010, http://elections.nytimes.

com/2010/results/oklahoma (accessed January 26,

2011).

43 Pipe-Bombing of Crowded Mosque Latest Anti-

Muslim Attack, Southern Poverty Law CenterIntelligence Report, Fall 2010, no. 139, http://web1.

splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2010/fall/pipe-bombing-of-

crowded-mosque-latest-a (accessed January 26,

2011).

44 Uniform Crime Reports, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr (accessed January 26, 2011).

45 War on Terror Update, Rasmussen Reports, January

5, 2011, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/

public_content/politics/mood_of_america/war_

on_terror_update (accessed January 26, 2011).

46 Jenkins, Brian Michael, Would-Be Warriors:

Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in theUnited States Since September 11, 2001, Santa

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010, http://www.

rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP292/(accessed January 26, 2011).

47 Difo, Germain, Enemies Among Us: Domestic

Radicalization after September 11, American

Security Project, October 2010, pp. 1-18, http://

americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/

uploads/2010/10/Enemies-Among-Us-FINAL.pdf


48 Difo, p. 6.49 Rotella, Sebastian, Scout in Mumbai attacks was

DEA informant while in terror camp, authorities

say, The Washington Post, October 17, 2010,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/story/2010/10/15/ST2010101505105.html?sid=ST2010101505105 (accessed January 26,

2011).

50 Wilson, Michael, From Smiling Coffee Vendor to

Terror Suspect, The New York Times, September

25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26prole.html?_r=1 (accessed January

26, 2011).

51 Elliott, Andrea, For Times Sq. Suspect, Long

Roots of Discontent, The New York Times, May15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/nyregion/16suspect.html?pagewanted=all


52 Top Secret America: A Washington Post

Investigation, The Washington Post, July 18, 2010,

http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/(accessed January 26, 2011).


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