Are Deontology and Teleology Mutually Exclusive?James E.
Macdonald Caryn L. Beck-DudleyABSTRJ\.CT. Current discussions of
business ethics usually only consider deontological and utilitarian
approaches. What is missing is a discussion of traditional
teleology, often referred to as "virtue ethics." While deontology
and teleology are useful, they both suffer insufficiencies.
Traditional teleology, while deontological in many respects, does
not object to utilitarian style calculations as long as they are
contained within a moral framework that is not utilitarian in its
origin. It contains the best of both approaches and can be used to
focus on the individual's role within an organization. More work is
needed in exposing students and faculty to traditional teleology
and its place in business ethic's discussions.
People having even a passing acquaintance with moral philosophy
have probably met with the distinction betv^^een deontological and
teleological approaches to moral questions. "A deontological norm
is one that evaluates an act by a characteristic that cannot be
gathered from its consequences" (McCormick, 1973, p. 62).Dr. James
E. Macdonald received a Master of Business Administration, a Ph.D
in Philosophy, and aJ.D. He is a founding member of the Business
Ethics section of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business and
pastpresident of the Rocky Mountain Academy of Legal Studies in
Business. Professor Caryn L. Beck-Dudley received a Juris
Doctorate. She is a member of the Business Ethia sections of the
Academy of Legal Studies in Business and the Society of Business
Ethics. She has published several articles and in 1993 she received
the Holmes-Cardozo award from the Academy of Legal Studies in
Business for outstanding paper submitted and presented at the
national meeting. She is currently secretary-treasure of the
Academy of Legal Studies in Business.
Deontological approaches to ethics attempt to ascertain the
content of duty u^ithout considering the consequences of particular
v^ays of acting. Generally speaking, deontologists have thought
that moral principles are ascertained through some sort of logical
test of consistency, as Kant maintained; or they have thought of
the moral rightness of actions as directly intuited, as H. A.
Pritchard (1949), for example, held. Teleological approaches to
ethics, on the other hand, morally evaluate actions by looking to
their consequences right actions being right because
they tend to have good consequences, wrong actions being wrong
because they tend to have bad consequences. Thus, for teleologists,
evaluations of consequences as good or bad provide the premises for
inferring the norms of right acting. Arthur Andersen's educational
programs in business ethics' have probably done as much to
popularize this distinction as any other contributor, but Arthur
Andersen is not alone: Most writers in business ethics seem eager
to pay their respects to the distinction (Beauchamp and Bowie,
1993; Donaldson and Werhane, 1993). With tables of contents that
look almost liturgical in their repetitive sameness, deontology is
introduced with Immanuel Kant, teleology with Jeremy Bentham or
John Stuart Mill. Teleology is quickly identified with some variety
of utilitarianism and perhaps prettified in the latest, fashionable
economic dressing for our money, a fair enough assessment of
developments in the law and economics movement, although recently
there have been calls for change (Solomon, 1992; Wolfe, 1991).
Invariably, the apparent contradiction between deontology and
teleology is emphasized, each approach is subjected to
battering-ram criticism, and, in the rubble thatJournal of Business
Ethics 13: 615-623, 1994. 1994 Kluwer Academic PubUshers. Printed
in the Netherlands.
616 J.E. Macdonald and C.L. Beck-Dudley remains, bewildered
students, marvelling at so mucb effort squandered with so little to
show for it, scavenge for something useful to carry away. Their
antecedent moral skepticism and relativism seems confirmed in their
minds, and their already too feeble grip on moral truth is further
loosened, perhaps irretrievably. Their brief exposure to moral
philosophy often leaves them worse off than they were before
(Wolfe, 1991). There ought to be a better way, a safe passage
between the Scylla of deontology and the Charybdis of
utilitarianism. There is such a way. On the one hand,
utilitarianism is, at its root, a milquetoast descendant of the
traditional teleological approach to ethics that originated in
antiquity and came to prevail in medieval times.^ Deontology, for
its part, has strained unsuccessfully to recapture the moral
absolutes that once inhabited that same teleological tradition; but
it has left much that is essential behind. Both modern approaches
are subject to maladies from which their much
heartier and more robust ancestor was spared. At the same time,
the truth that is missed in utilitarianism, and (some say) is found
in deontology, is also found - and found much more richly in
traditional teleology. Almost in the Hegelian sense, the
traditional teleology is a synthesis of the thesis of deontology
and the antithesis of utihtarianism. It is a synthesis that, as any
good synthesis should, absorbs the truth from the thesis and
antithesis, while leaving behind their falsity and insufficiency.
One can only conclude that in arriving at deontology and
utilitarianism history took a wrong turn and marched away from
truth. Odd. First comes the synthesis, then the thesis and
antithesis: Hegel is stood on his head in a way Marx never
envisioned. This introduction is a sort of retrospective that must
now be followed by a delivery of the goods promised. At least, as
it is said in sales law, a conforming tender must be made, with the
reader left to decide whether acceptance is proper. It must be
shown that what is true in deontology and utilitarianism is not
original, and what is original in them is not true. Tall order. Our
hope in this short paper is only to make a substantial beginning of
performance. First, however, before the good news of the synthesis
can be sprung, the thesis and the antithesis have to be understood
and their insufficiencies indicated. That should be short work,
since deontology and utilitarianism are already widely understood.
Present memory need only be refreshed or, at the most, past memory
recalled.
Deontology"It is impossible to conceive of anything in the
world, or indeed out of it, which can be called good without
qualification save only a good will." This is Kant's (1964, p. 64)
stirring beginningto his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals
and the opening shot of deontology. It should not be overlooked
that the statement has an initial strangeness, one that tends to
wear off. Older moralists (St. Thomas Aquinas (1848) in particular)
had always carefully distinguished the goodness of the inner act
(criminal lav^^ers now call it the mens rea) from the goodness of
the external act (called the actus reus) (Mclnerny, 1982; 1992).
The simple thought, for traditionalists, was that what is intended
is one thing, what is done is something else - the moral character
of an action might not match the moral
character of the intent with which it is done. Crimes committed
for laudable motives are still crimes, i.e. bad acts done for good
ends. Robin Hood is said to have stolen from the rich to give alms
to the poor, for instance, but his acts of robbery remain no less
wrong. Conversely, good acts can be done for bad ends: giving alms
to the poor, a good act considered in itself, may be done for the
evil end of humiliating the recipient. Kant's preoccupation with
good will is strange because intent was traditionally viewed as
only one aspect to be considered in reaching an overall moral
assessment of a particular human action. External actions were
traditionally thought to have their own antecedent moral character
as good, bad, or neutral, separate and apart from the moral
character of the end for which they are chosen. This familiar
distinction between the goodness of the internal and external
actions evaporates with Kant's enthronement of goodDeontology and
Teleology 617
will as the sole unqualified good. It never seems to reappear,
although, remarkably, it is rarely missed. At any rate,
understanding Kant's deontology requires understanding what he
means by "good will." It means acting out of respect for the moral
law, i.e., for the sake of duty (Kant, 1964, p. 74) Good will means
acting/or the sake of duty, mind you, not merely in accord with it.
People's actions often externally conform to duty's requirements
for no other reason than blind inclination. Yet there is no moral
merit in following morally unguided inclinations, even when such
inclinations result in external actions consistent with morality.
People may have nonmoral reasons for acting as morality requires:
Rosa Parks, for instance, is said to have sat in the front of the
Birmingham, Alabama, bus just because her feet hurt and there were
no other empty seats: not that she wanted to protest the
segregation of the races. And, no doubt, she acted rightly, albeit
for a morally irrelevant reason. It is sometimes correctly said
that Kant accords priority to "the right" over "the good." This is
what makes for his deontology, his placement of duty first.' In
contrast, the teleological approach to morals first identifies the
sorts of goods human actions ought to protect and realize, then
evaluates actions as right or wrong according to their
effects. Wrong actions tend to be harmful, and right ones tend
to be beneficial. Kant reverses this ordering, even defining good
will as a sort of right acting, i.e., acting with duty in mind, for
its own sake. And, recall, all he requires for good will is action
on a maxim that may or can be universalized - let the chips fall
where they may. Let justice be done though the heavens fall. The
observance of duty thus becomes for him an end-in-itself, detached
from all practical results, binding in the same measure on angels
as on man. That there is something very attractive about Kant's
insistence on the absolute demands of duty, no one can deny. One of
the most deepseated moral convictions is that there are ways of
treating people that can never be allowed, no matter how dire the
circumstances. Kant captures this conviction. Indeed, criminal law
is absolutist to a degree that seems Kantian: Murder^ is always and
everywhere forbidden, for instance.'* It is entirely fair to say
that substantive criminal law reflects Kant's absolutism much more
than utilitarianism's incessant balancing of consequences. Yet
there is also something repellant about Kant's approach. It smells
of fanaticism, and, in fact, his Categorical Imperative leaves
ample room for fanaticism. Boiled down to familiar terms, the
Categorical Imperative commands us to do as we would be done by.
Never act on a maxim that one would not consent to be a part of a
system of moral rules binding upon everyone. The objection to
Kant's test of moral maxims is not that it is mistaken. Hardly
anyone wittingly denies the Golden Rule. Rather, the objection to
Kant's moral philosophy is that it is entirely too permissive,
allowing morally horrendous maxims to pass muster (Grisez, 1983).
As examples, one sees no knock-down argument against racial
genocide or chattel slavery in the Golden Rule. I might be a Nazi
or a slave holder and reason that, were I an enlightened Jew or
Negro, I would consent to extermination or enslavement as my just
dessert. Indeed, John Hospers (1961), pushing the logic of the
Categorical Imperative to its almost comic limits, imagines how it
would apply to a sadomasochist: He should not hesitate to inflict
pain upon others since he would welcome their infliction of pain
upon himself. In sum, the Golden Rule (and Kant's
Categorical Imperative), although no doubt a necessary moral
measure, is far from a sufficient test of practical maxims. It
commands us to do as we would be done by, but leaves the question
of how we should be done by unanswered, even unaddressed. Explained
differently, [t]he assumption Kant makes is that moral virtue or
perfection consists in the rejection of desire in moral action.
This conception is developed at length into a full fledged moral
theory with all the attendant distinctions, such as acting from
duty versus acting according to duty, self-interest as prudence and
not morality, and the obedience to rules for their own sake. Thus,
for Kant, a person \vho overcomes contrary inclinations and actions
from duty is morally superior to one who does his duty and likes it
(Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 1991, p. 38). 618 J.E. Macdonald and C.L.
Beck-Dudley Therefore, I am to do as I v^ould be done by: But how
do I know how I would be done by? What sorts of harms ought I to
protect myself against? I must first know how I should allow myself
to be treated before I can know how^ I may allow myself to treat
others. A missing identification of the true and comprehensive
human good and the included basic goods of life, knowledge, play,
aesthetic experience, friendship, religion and practical
reasonableness, is needed to get started (Finnis, 1988). It is
possible to couch the same point in familiar legal terms. The
"equal protection of laws"^ cannot, standing alone, be a sufficient
test of legal justice: Many unjust laws pass its test easily. Equal
injustice under law is a real possibility. Unfair discrimination,
particularly unfair self-preference, is only one way of being
unjust.* Yet equal protection is Kant's only test of the maxims
upon which people act, and it is too slender a base upon which to
ground much, if any, moral content. Is utilitarianism a more
adequate starting point?
UtilitarianismAs was stated earlier, teleological approaches to
morals are now often identified with some variety of
utilitarianism. Utilitarians morally assess individual actions (or
sometimes policies, laws or rules of action) by their consequences,
the best being those that produce the greatest proportion of good
over evil. If substantive criminal law has a Kantian deontological
flavor,
widely used judicial balancing tests have a utilitarian one. And
cost/benefit critiques of governmental regulations, which are
essentially utilitarian, are now^adays familiar to almost everyone.
Except perhaps for business majors, for whom the groundwork for
utilitarianism has already been cleared by their economics courses,
students often wonder v^hat question utihtarianism answers: It
comes at them like a bolt from the blue (Wolfe, 1992). Yet it is
really best understood in the light of Jeremy Bentham's originally
planned use of it. He intended utihtarianism as an engine of social
change, employed to change the laws, especially as to criminal
penalties, of early nineteenth-century England. Laws, he thought,
must be measured by their "utihty", their contribution to general
social welfare. They must be reformed as need be to make for "the
greatest happiness of the greatest number." It may be, for
instance, that the incidence of pickpocketing is actually increased
through the pubhc hanging of pickpockets because of the
opportunities for pickpocketing afforded by the large crowds that
gather to view such spectacles: If so, then the general welfare
would appear to be harmed by this form of punishment. In fact,
criminal penalties across the board must be adjusted for maximal
net social benefit. Nothing could sound more plausible. Every
schoolchild knows that Bentham originally identified happiness with
pleasure, unhappiness with pain. No less than with Kant, these is
here from the outset a foreboding sense of strangeness that tends
to get lost. What, after all, does the justice of laws have to do
with how generally pleasing they are to those afFected by them? In
any event, not all pleasures are created equal, as John Stuart Mill
(1967) pointed out early on. The pleasures of reading poetry seem
to differ qualitatively from those of playing pushpin, Bentham
(1962) notwithstanding. Should higher grade pleasures not count for
more? How, in any event, did pleasure, whatever its grade, come to
be identified as the sole ultimate good? Is doing the right thing
nothing more than calculative efficiency in pleasing people? These
are foundational questions that many utihtarians (particularly
those working in economics) have always tried to avoid,
preoccupying
themselves instead with efforts at solving technical problems,
especially the measurement of pleasure. The problem is obvious and
immediate: Social welfare (or total pleasure, or "the greatest
happiness of the greatest number") would seem to have to be
measured if it is to be the test of actions, policies, and laws.
Yet a moment's reflection reveals that pleasures are
incommensurable, that they cannot, as Bentham thought they could,
each be translated into so many "utiles" and simply added up. Much,
if not most, of the history of utilitarian thought has been
Deontology and Teleology 619 devoted to attempting to get around
this problem. A major advance was made when preference satisfaction
took the place of pleasure as the goal of action and policy. At the
same time it became evident that, while cardinal measures of
utility are impossible, individuals can and do rank alternatives
ordinally, as more, less, or equally satisfying. People clearly
forgo the satisfaction of some preferences to pursue others. They
identify marginal increases in pleasure even though cardinal
measures must always elude them. The quest for an adequate metric
of social welfare continued. Figuring the overall level of
preference satisfaction seemed to require more than each
individual's ranking of their own utilities (mfrapersonal
comparisons); it seemed also to require comparisons of one person's
utilities with other people's (interpersonal comparisons). A change
in the existing allocation of resources might be preferred by one
person and not by another - yet there seemed to be no way, without
comparing the effect on one person's satisfaction with other
people's results, to know whether the reallocation increased or
decreased the overall level of satisfaction. Enter the Pareto tests
(Coleman, 1980). While avoiding any direct measure of total
utility, one allocation of resources can be recognized as superior
to another if anyone is made better off by it and no one is made
worse off. Indeed, a Pareto optimal allocation is one where no one
can be made better off without someone being made worse off. Of
course, as a practical matter, as Richard Posner points out, the
only way to know if someone is made "better off" by a resource
reallocation is if he consents to it. That being so, Posner (1983)
notes, the Pareto
approach becomes useless for most policy questions: It is
usually impossible even to identify, much less to secure the
consent of, everyone affected by an action, law, or policy. Posner
has his own ingenious solution to the problem of an adequate social
metric. He equates the "value" of people's preferences with their
willingness to pay to have them satisfied (Posner, 1983). Unlike
the utility of satisfying preferences, which will remain
imponderable forever, the value of satisfying them has the notable
advantage of being measurable in money. Wealth (the total value of
satisfied preferences) thus replaces utility for Posner as the
quantity that actions, policies and laws must maximize. And the
beat goes on: Posner, having formulated perhaps the most powerful
version of utilitarianism so far, has also brought it into clear
focus for a wide audience. He has made real progress, we think, on
the measurement problem that has so plagued utilitarianism in the
past. He is also sensitive to the notorious "moral monstrousness"
of traditional utilitarianism: His new and improved version is
perhaps much less monstrous than earlier ones. No doubt, his
product looks glossy by comparison with Bentham's crude original.
But the fruit does not fall very far from the tree. Something
morally essential is lost in all varieties of utilitarianism,
including even the most recent. All of them do unacceptable
violence to the insight behind the old saying that "the end does
not justify the mean" - in the v^^ords of St. Paul, that evil may
not be done that good may come of it. Of course, only an end can
justify a means. What else? But the sense of the saying is that
there are means that cannot be justified by any end, that there are
ways of acting that are morally prohibited no matter how much good
might be yielded by allowing exceptions in hard cases. Whatever
other insufficiencies afflict Kant's effort in moral philosophy, at
least it has the considerable merit of attempting to capture and
protect the sense of this old saying. Indeed, that is its chief
attraction over utilitarianism, which loses grip on the saying
entirely. For utilitarians, anything goes, nothing is entirely
forbidden, and everything can be rationalized by the shifting sands
of expected good and evil consequences. "Woe to those who creep
through the serpentwindings
of Utilitarianism," said Kant. He hit the nail on the head. We
spoke earlier of a teleological tradition that is older and more
adequate than either deontology or utilitarianism, and we
particularly complained of the modern tendency to identify
teleology with utihtarianism. The time has come to introduce this
venerable oldster. 620 J.E. Macdonald and C.L. Beck-Dudley
Traditional teleology Georg Henrik von Wright (1963, p. vi) once
made a distinction that makes a good starting point for reflection.
Defending teleology, he distinguished between two main variants of
this position in ethics. The one makes the notion of the good
relative to the nature of man. The other makes it relative to the
needs and wants of individual men. We could call the two variants
the 'objectivist' and the 'subjectivist' variant respectively. I
think it is right to say that Aristotle favored the first. . . .
[The second] is, I think, more akin to that of some writers of the
utilitarian tradition. Textbook distinctions between deontology and
teleology typically identify teleology with one of its modern
subjectivist variants (i.e., some form of utilitarianism), leaving
the traditional objectivist variant undefined, even unmentioned.
The resulting tunnel-vision makes deontology and utilitarianism
appear to be the only players on the field - both, as it turns out,
so crippled as to be of little use. A third player is needed
(Newton, 1991; Solomon, 1992). That third player is traditional,
objectivist teleology. Utilitarianism is widely understood, but,
unfortunately, traditional teleology is not. Comparing and
contrasting utilitarianism and traditional teleology, subjectivism
and objectivism, should help in understanding the latter. First the
comparison. There is much upon which utilitarians and traditional
teleologist seem to agree: that a happy life is the final and
ultimate end of all human action; that all other ends are sought
for the sake of happiness; that happiness is never sought as a
means to any other end; that happiness is the one end that is not
also a means; that happiness is the end behind all ends and means;
that a happy life is the all-encompassing, comprehensive good in
which every assorted lesser good must find its place (Rasmussen and
Den Uyl, 1991; Mclnerny, 1992).
They also agree that human beings, of necessity, pursue their
own happiness. People desire only what appears to them desirable
and worthy of their desire good, that is. Of course, what looks
good may not be good, looks being deceiving. For that reason humans
must submit their actions to rational guidance if they are to
realize the true human good and not be misled by appearances.
Indeed, moral guidance is nothing but guidance in the ways of
reasonability (Aristotle, 1991; Gratsch, 1985). So much verbal
agreement between utilitarianism and traditional objectivist
teleology can seem impressive, but it obscures important underlying
differences. The problem is that the same words are often used with
entirely different meanings. The rival understandings of happiness,
moral rectitude, rationality, and the general welfare are cases in
point. Utilitarians think of the happiest life as the one with the
highest possible overall level of satisfied desires. An egalitarian
democracy of desires reigns: One desire, one vote. For his part,
Bentham went so far as to think of people as pleasure maximizers,
his premise being one of psychological egoistic hedonism (Bentham,
1962). To this day, utilitarians recognize no external, independent
test of which desires are right, which wrong; which natural, which
acquired; which of real, genuine goods, which of merely apparent
goods. Lacking any such independent test, an internal measure of
coherence is all that remains to them: Those pleasures are best
that are in keeping with the largest available package of
pleasures. This conception of happiness seems awfully strange to a
traditional teleologist. Given the sort of creature humans are,
they realize happiness through participation in a fairly short list
of basic goods: friendship, learning, play, work and leisure are
familiar examples. Indeed, John Finnis's (1988) enumeration of the
basic forms of human good, which seems to us well thought out,
includes most of these. People find their fulfillment through
realizing and partaking in these goods: Through them, they can "be
all that they can be." The objective requirements of humans as
rational animals provide the external, independent tests of desires
that is lacking in utilitarianism. Human nature is the basis for a
correspondence test of moral truth for traditionalists.
Utilitarians later replaced it with a coherence test. To
explain, a judgment is true in a correspondence sense if it
conforms with reality. A judgement is true in a coherence sense if
it coheres with other judgments that are generally Deontology and
Teleology 621 accepted as true. The difference is between the truth
of a judgment measured against reality, versus its truth measured
by its fit with the overall web of belief. Once the knowability of
reahty as it is in itself is surrendered, or even seriously called
into question, the working understanding of truth slides away from
correspondence toward coherence. Thus, the working understanding of
moral truth slipped toward a coherence test once an understanding
of the needs of human nature ceased to be the starting point for
moral reflection. Utilitarians and traditional teleologists also
differ in their understanding of what makes for moral rectitude, or
the rightness of human actions. Utilitarians are left to figure the
rightness of actions by how generally pleasing they are. Of course,
because what pleases and displeases varies so much from person to
person, time to time, and place to place, utilitarian
identifications of right and wrong sorts of actions are highly
fluid. On the other hand, reliance on human nature as the basis of
morality stabilizes the traditional teleologist's assessments of
right and wrong. Given the identification of the true human good
and certain basic human goods that make it up, a universal rule
protecting those goods can be formulated: Respect every basic human
good in each of your actions (Aristotle, 1991). In particular,
never intentionally harm a basic good: "First of all, do no harm!"
More specific rules protect specific goods over a wide range. From
the recognition that life is good comes the realization that murder
is wrong; from the knowledge that property is good comes the
prohibition of theft; and so on to complete a list of moral rules
that includes most of the Ten Commandments. Another point to note
is how radically differently utilitarians and traditional
teleologists think of rationality and reasonableness. Rationality
for utilitarians essentially amounts to efficiency in allocating
resources to maximally satisfy preferences. Indeed, the economic
concept of rational man reflects the modern triumph of this
understanding of rationahty (Aristotle, 1991).
In contrast, traditional teleologists, from Aristotle on, make
use of a "prudent man" standard in all essential respects the
ancient equivalent of the "reasonable man" standard lawyers use
today. Reasonable people steer clear of acting as morality forbids,
while at the same time affirmatively developing the natural virtues
- prudence, courage, temperance, and justice that morality (and,
for that matter, their own self-respect and happiness) requires. It
is easy to see that the utihtarian standard of rationality
sometimes collides with the traditionalist's standard or
reasonability. To see this, consider Alan Donagan's example, cited
by Richard Posner (1983, p. 57): It might well be the case that
more good and less evil would result from your painlessly and
undetectedly murdering your malicious, old and unhappy grandfather
that from your forebearing to do so: he would be freed from his
wretched existence; his children would be rejoiced by their
inheritances and would no longer sufFer from his mischief; and you
might anticipate the reward promised to those who do good in
secret. Nobody seriously doubts that a position with such a
consequence is monstrous. The utilitarian standard of rationality
would seem to approve of the monstrous murder contemplated,
although the traditionalist's standard of reasonability never
would: An innocent human life, a basic good, may never
intentionally be destroyed. It should be noted, finally, how
different are the utilitarian and traditional teleologist's
conceptions of the general welfare. Utihtarians think of the
general welfare as nothing but the overall level of satisfaction
the highest possible level being the proper aim of government and
rulers. Indeed, this way of thinking of the general welfare is the
source of the title of utilitarians, ever since John Stuart Miss
(1978) wrote On Liberty, toward libertarian causes: Total happiness
would seem to be maximized when people's freedom to satisfy their
preferences is unfettered by legal constraints to the greatest
extent consistent with maximal equal liberty for all. Traditional
teleologists, on the other hand, instead of speaking of the general
welfare, tend to draw on the traditional notion of the common good
(Finnis, 1988). The common good is the end a community's rulers
must seek to realize for
its members if they are to have their best chance at happiness,
defined as "lasting and justified 622 J.E. Macdonald and C.L.
Beck-Dudley satisfaction witb one's life as a wbole" (Murray, 1988,
p. 34). It is misconceived as total bappiness: It is, ratber, tbe
good available for tbe common use of a community's members in tbeir
separate pursuits of bappiness. Indeed, so distant is tbe standard
of tbe common good from tbat of overall satisfaction tbat it must
trump tbe latter wben tbey conflict. Minorities, for instance, bave
rigbts even democratic majorities must respect (Rasmussen and Den
Uyl, 1991; Finnis, 1988). And everyone knows tbat doing tbe rigbt
tbing is often unpopular.
Deontology or Teleology: Mutually Exclusive?Altbougb we bave not
yet directly addressed tbe question we started witb, our answer to
it sbould be evident. Traditional, objectivist teleology is not
deontological in its approacb (it does not place tbe rigbt abead of
tbe good), but it is deontological in many of its results: Certain
ways of treating people are always forbidden, let tbe cbips fall
wbere tbey will (Mclnerny, 1982). On tbe positive side, everyone is
obliged to develop certain virtues. Indeed, Aristotle implied tbat
only a life of virtue is witbin our control, all otber genuine
goods are not entirely witbin our control. Yet, in anotber vi^ay,
objectivist teleology is quite undeontological in considering good
will as only one element in tbe moral assessment of buman action.
Tbe tendency of an action to be beneficial or barmful places it
objectively as rigbt or wrong in tbe first place, separate and
apart from tbe subjective intent witb wbicb it is done. Indeed, tbe
traditionalist begins bis identification of moral goodness from tbe
objective pole. Giving alms to tbe poor is not good because people
of good will do it, for example; ratber, people of good will give
alms because it is good (Mclnerny, 1982). Traditional objectivist
teleology bears a superficial resemblance to utilitarianism,
anotber, but quite different, teleological position. No objectivist
bas any objection to utiUtarian-style efficiency calculations, so
long as tbey are contained witbin a moral framev^^ork tbat is not
utilitarian in its origin. To tbe contrary, preferences tbat are
morally allowable sbould be satisfied as efficiently
as possible. Winding up, it must be empbasized tbat everday
moral reasoning makes use of a few exceptionless moral norms tbat
are as universal and uncbangeable as any norms ever promised by tbe
deontological tradition. Tbese moral absolutes are, bowever, more
securely grounded in traditional, objectivist teleology tban tbey
ever could be in deontology. At tbe same time, mucb of everyday
reasoning amounts to tbe familiar utilitarian balancing of good and
evil consequences. Tbus, botb deontological and teleological
results coexist side by side in traditional objectivist teleology
and in common sense, any appearance to tbe contrary being tbe
result of tbe mistaken reduction of teleology to utilitarianism and
subjectivism. Traditional teleology offers tbe best of botb
deontology and utilitarianism witbout tbe insufficiencies or
perversions of eitber. Students brougbt aboard for brief tours of
deontology or utilitarianism will, unfortunately, probably miss tbe
one boat tbat does not leak.
Notes' Arthur Andersen & Co., the large accounting firm,
initiated a "Conference on Teaching Business Ethics" in the summer
of 1988. As of 1993, participants from more than 220 institutions
have participated in the sessions. This paper is not meant to
criticize Arthur Andersen's approach to teaching business ethics.
Rather, its intent is to focus on the larger problem of failing to
include traditional teleology in current ethical discussions. ^ For
purposes of this article, the tradition originates in Aristotle and
is advanced in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, hereinafter
referred to as "traditionalists." While we recognize that there are
important differences between the two philosophers, the focus of
this paper is on their similarities. ' Murder is defined in the
common law as "the killing of another human with malice
aforethought." It does not refer to all killings. ^ This statement
must be qualified somewhat. John Finnis (1983), notes that the
Model Penal Code, arts. 2 and 3, provides for a necessity defense
to homicide that is explicitly utilitarian in its rationale.
Although the future of this defense remains open, it seems for now
to be an anomalous utilitarian intrusion into Deontology and
Teleology 623an overall fabric of substantive criminal law that is
deontological.
' The fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in
part, "No State Shall make or enforce any law which should abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; now
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." * Self-preference
occurs where a rule is enacted to benefit the rulemaker at
another's expense. One such rule in Oklahoma was a law that
required a person to pass a literacy test before being allowed to
vote unless a lineal descendant had voted before 1866. See Guinn V.
United States, 238 U.S. 368 (1915). John Rawls in A Theory of
Justice tries to solve this Kantian self-preference problem by
imposing a "veil of ignorance" over individuals. In a veil of
ignorance individuals cannot choose alternatives that unfairly
benefit themselves since they do not know their "station" in life.
This veil, then, restricts the range of choices individuals have
since they may have to live with the choice. In the "grandfather
clause" case, you would not know whether you were white or black,
male or female, and therefore you would choose to allow every adult
the right to vote. References Aristotle: 1991, 'Nicomachean
Ethics', in J. Barnes (ed.). The Complete Works of Aristotle 2
(Bollingen Series, Princeton University Press, Oxford) pp.
1729-1868. Aquinas, T: 1948, Summa Theologica, translated by the
Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Christian Classics,
Westminster, MD). Beauchamp, T. L. and N. E. Bowie: 1993, Ethical
Theory and Business 4th (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ).
Bentham, J.: 1962, The Works of Jeremy Bentham 2, John Bowring
(ed.) (Russell & Russell, New York). Coleman, J. L.: 1980,
'Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the
Economic Approach to Law', California Law Review 68, 221.
Donaldson, T and P H. Werhane: 1993, Ethical Issues in Business A
Philosophical Approach (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffi, NJ).
Finnis, J.: 1983, Fundamentals of Ethics (Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C). Finnis, J.: 1988, Natural Law and Natural Rights
(Oxford University Press, Oxford). Gratsch, E. J.: 1985, Aquinas
Summa An Introduction and Interpretation (Alba House, Staten
Island, NY). Grisez, G.: 1983, Tlfie Way of the Lord Jesus
(Franciscan Herald, Chicago). Hospers, J.: 1961, Human Conduct: An
Introduction to the Problems of Ethics (Harcourt, Brace &
World, New York).
Kant, I.: 1964, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,
translated by H. J. Paton (Harper Torchbooks, New York). McCormick,
R.: 1973, 'Notes on Moral Theology', Theological Studies, pp. 34,
62. Mclnerny, R.: 1982, Ethica Thomistica (The Cathohc University
of America Press, Washington DC). Mclnerney, R.: 1992, Aquinas on
Human Action (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington
D.C). Mill, J. S.: 1967, Utilitarianism (Liberal Arts Press Inc.,
Indianapolis, IN). Mill, J. S.: 1978, On Liberty (Hackett
Publishing, Indianapolis, IN). Murray, C: 1988, In Pursuit of
Happiness and Good Government (Simon and Schuster, NY). Newton, L.:
1991, 'Virtue and Role: Reflections on The Social Nature of
Morality', Business Ethics Quarterly 1, 357-367. Posner, R.: 1983,
The Economics of Justice (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA).
Pritchard, H. A.: 1949, Moral Obligation (Oxford University Press,
New York). Rasmussen, D. B. and D. J. Den Uyl: 1991, Liberty and
Nature An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order (Open Court, La
Salle, IL). Rawls, J.: 1971, A Theory of Justice (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA). Solomon, R. C: 1992, 'Corporate
Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business
Ethics,' Business Ethics Quarterly 2, 317-341. Von Wright, G. H.:
1963, The Varieties of Goodness (Routledge & Kegan Paul, New
York). Wolfe, A.: 1991, 'Reflections on Business Ethics: What Is
It? What Causes It and. What Should a Course in Business Ethics
Include?', Business Ethics Quarterly 1, 409-441. Department of
Business Administration, Weber State University,
Ogden, UT 84408, U.S.A. Department of Management and Human
Resources, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84321, U.S.A.
Deontological Vs. Teleological Ethical Systems in Criminal
Justice
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FlagPost a comment Deontological vs. Teleological Ethical
Systems Deontological ethical systems are concerned with the nature
of an action that is being judged. If the action is considered to
be inherently good, even if the action has bad consequences than it
can be defined as good. Deontological ethical systems include
ethical formalism, religion, and natural law (Pollock, 2004).
Ethical formalism is based on motive and intent of the person who
performs the action (Pollock, 2004). For example, a friend stops by
another friend's apartment to visit and finds him struggling to
breathe, and was grasping at his chest. He dials 911 and then
having remembered a commercial for Bayer aspirin that mentioned
taking an aspirin during a heart attack can help, she goes into her
purse and gets an aspirin to give to her friend while they are
awaiting the arrival of rescue crews. After giving him the aspirin,
his symptoms worsen and by the time paramedics arrive, the man was
dead. After autopsy, information was revealed that the man died
from an allergic reaction to acedimenaphin, not because of the
heart attack. Even though the man died due to the actions of the
woman, ethical formalism believes that because her intention was to
give him the medication to help him, her intentions were good, even
though the result was bad. However, ethical formalism also believes
that what is considered to be wrong is wrong no matter what. There
is no justification for Murder, in the eyes of ethical formalism,
and believes that no good can come from a person taking another
persons life intentionally (Pollock, 2006). For example, recently
Saddam Hussein, who has been the President of Iraq for the past two
decades, was put to death for his crimes against humanity (Santora,
Glanz, & Tavernise, 2006).Even though most people believe that
his death sentence was justified, ethical formulation says that
there is no justification for murder, even if it is for the
betterment of society. (Pollock, 2004). Another form of the
deontological ethical system is religion. Religion is the most
widely used source of individual ethics. Religion has us believe
that what is morally good is what is defined by God. All religions
believe that their supreme being is all knowing so there is no
further examination needed and even though God has given us
guidelines to follow the only question that is left is God's will.
Even though there is a continued struggle with in religions, to
figure out God's will, they all have the same general concepts of
good and evil, and what is right or wrong (Pollock, 2004).
The Ten Commandments are what guides us to live a good life and
to achieve greater good among ourselves and serve as a guideline on
which to live. In our quests for divinity, if something arises, the
act will be judged mostly on the intentions of the actor and even
though it may have grave consequences, if the intention of the act
was good, than God will see it as being morally good. (Pollock,
2004). For example, if a person decided to give to the poor out of
the kindness of their heart it is deemed as being a good act but,
if the person does it with the intentions of gaining notoriety or
anything else, than God says this is wrong. Natural law believes
that "what is good is that which is natural" (Pollock). If the
action is to defend themselves in efforts to save their own lives,
than this is considered to be a natural reaction and therefore seen
as a good action. Natural law can be considered a deontological
ethical system because it is much like religion in that the acts
are judged based on the situation (Pollock, 2004). For instance, a
person breaks into a home and takes a family hostage. After a few
hours of watching his family being victimized, the father decided
to take action and fight back. During the struggle with the
assailant, the gun goes off mortally wounds the attacker. Natural
law would say that the father's act was considered to be good based
on the fact that he was doing what was natural to him; defending
his family. The last deontological ethical system is egoism. Egoism
believes that what ever it takes to achieve personal happiness is
considered moral. It gives the belief that what ever it takes for
us to gain personal happiness and whatever benefits themselves is
moral (Pollock, 2004). For example, a student attends Western
International University to obtain their degree, but they can find
no time to study or do their work so they employ someone else who
does not attend the University, to do their work for them. Under
the egoism ethical system, this person would consider the choice to
be moral based on the fact that they will gain their degree, even
though it is considered cheating. But, because it made them happy,
it is considered to be moral. The Teleological ethical system is
the opposite of the deontological system. The teleological ethical
system judges the consequences of the act rather than the act
itself. It believes that if the action results in what can be
considered as a good consequence, than it must be good and that the
end result will justify the reason that the act was committed in
the first place (Pollock, 2004). Among the teleological ethical
systems are utilitarianism, ethics of virtue, and ethics of care.
Utilitarianism is the view that "what is good is determined by the
consequences of the action". If it can be shown that an action
benefits the greater amount, than it is good because it outweighs
the small amount of harm that the action has caused (Pollock,
2004).
For example, a family and their two dogs go out on a boat ride
and ended up getting stranded on an island with no food. Even
though they love their pets, they chose to kill them and eat them
to provide food for their children and used their fur to keep warm.
Even though many people find their pets to be like their children,
and animal organizations see no reason for killing animals, they
did what they had to do to survive, which under the utilitarianism
was a moral choice. Another form of teleological ethical systems is
the Ethics of virtues. Instead of judging the act or consequences,
this ethical system looks at the person who is committing the act.
It believes that in order for something to be considered a good act
than the person must be a good person with virtues such as
compassion, honesty, humility, courage, and devotion. If a person
holds such virtues, they are good people and will do good (Pollock,
2004). For instance, a doctor in the emergency room gets a visit
from a friend who is there for the intentions of getting the doctor
to write a prescription for pain medications. However, the doctor
finds nothing wrong with the friend and gives him samples of
Tylenol instead. The thought never entered his mind that his friend
was a drug seeker and depended on their friendship to get the
medication. Instead, the doctor applied his medical expertise to
the situation and the act was considered to be good because he has
always done good, and wasn't tempted to do otherwise. The last
teleological system is virtue of care which is based on the needs
of individuals who are sick, injured, or incapable to make
decisions on their own. The decisions are based on the immediate
needs of individuals being cared for and doesn't concern itself
with a person's individual right's (Pollock, 2004). If a person was
injured severely in an automobile accident and was put on life
support, they would not be able to make decisions for themselves.
The next of kin is responsible for making a decision on whether to
care for the person or to take them off life support. The next of
kin then decides that they are going to take the person off life
support because they feel that they would not want to live like
that and that their quality of life would be diminished if they
chose to keep the person on life support. This ethical dilemma
would be a justifiable moral choice, according to the ethics of
care. The teleological ethical system is a system that matches my
views the most. The teleological system seems to be the most humane
system in that there is no one set of rules to abide by. It is a
system that is judged by individual circumstances rather than just
the actor themselves. People are all generally good and try and
follow God's law, but when it all comes down to it, there is no
universal guideline on what to do when life presents us with moral
decisions. However, with the teleological system, it offers us the
chance to understand that life does happen and that we can not
judge on the basis of one universal set of rules. 333333
Compare and Contrast deontological & teleological ethical
systems.?Can you give examples and descriptions of the seven major
ethical systems and determine whether you believe each system to be
deontological or teleological.
5 years ago Report Abuse
China Jon
Best Answer - Chosen by AskerDeontological: Deontological moral
systems are characterized primarily by a focus upon adherence to
independent moral rules or duties. Thus, in order to make the
correct moral choices, we simply have to understand what our moral
duties are and what correct rules exist which regulate those
duties. When we follow our duty, we are behaving morally. When we
fail to follow our duty, we are behaving immorally. Deontological
moral systems also place some stress on the reasons why certain
actions are performed. Thus, simply following the correct moral
rules is often not sufficient - instead, we have to have the
correct motivations. This would allow a person to not be considered
immoral even though they have broken a moral rule, but only so long
as they were motivated to adhere to some correct moral duty.
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that in deontological
moral systems, a correct motivation alone is never a justification
for an action and cannot be used as a basis for describing an
action as morally correct. It is also not enough to simply believe
that something is the correct duty to follow. Duties and
obligations must be determined objectively and absolutely, not
subjectively. Perhaps the most significant thing to understand
about deontological moral systems is that their moral principles
are completely separated from any consequences which following
those principles might have. Thus, if you have a moral duty not to
lie, then lying is always wrong - even if that results in harm to
others. For example, you would be acting immorally if you lied to
Nazis about where Jews were hiding. The word deontology comes from
the Greek roots deon, which means duty, and logos, which means
science. Thus, deontology is the "science of duty." Key questions
which deontological ethical systems ask include: What is my moral
duty?
What are my moral obligations? How do I weigh one moral duty
against another? Teleological Teleological moral systems are
characterized primarily by a focus on the consequences which any
action might have (for that reason, they are often referred to as
consequentalist moral systems, and both terms are used here). Thus,
in order to make correct moral choices, we have to have some
understanding of what will result from our choices. When we make
choices which result in the correct consequences, then we are
acting morally; when we make choices which result in the incorrect
consequences, then we are acting immorally. The idea that the moral
worth of an action is determined by the consequences of that action
is often labeled consequentialism. Usually, the "correct
consequences" are those which are most beneficial to humanity -
they may promote human happiness, human pleasure, human
satisfaction, human survival or simply the general welfare of all
humans. Whatever the consequences are, it is believed that those
consequences are intrinsically good and valuable, and that is why
actions which lead to those consequences are moral while actions
which lead away from them are immoral. The various teleological
moral systems differ not only on exactly what the "correct
consequences" are, but also on how people balance the various
possible consequences. After all, few choices are unequivocally
positive, and this means it is necessary to figure out how to
arrive at the correct balance of good and bad in what we do. Note
that merely being concerned with the consequences of an action does
not make a person a consequentialist - the key factor is, rather,
basing the morality of that action on the consequences instead of
on something else. The word teleology comes from the Greek roots
telos, which means end, and logos, which means science. Thus,
teleology is the "science of ends." Key questions which
teleological ethical systems ask include: What will be the
consequences of this action? What will be the consequences of
inaction? How do I weigh the harm against the benefits of this
action? ;-D Sorry, I just copied and pasted.
Source(s):http://atheism.about.com/library/FAQs/ph
http://clk.about.com/?zi=3%2FFr&SUName=a
deontological&x=0&y=0 444444
Deontological Vs. Teleological Ethical SystemsJesse Mathewson,
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FlagPost a comment Ethics is a branch of philosophy dealing with
right and wrong. According to MerriamWebster dictionary, the
definition is "the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and
with moral duty and obligation." To understand the Deontological
and Teleological separations it is necessary to understand what
ethics is. Obviously as it is a philosophical study, there are
varying degrees and definitions that can be based simply on ones
individual perception of these types. Deontological ethics is the
study of moral obligation; obviously, morals are based on many
separate views, as a result, it is important to understand the
varying perceptions. In the study of deontological ethics, it is
the right or wrong of the action that defines it. This is versus
the teleological ethical system, which focuses on the good or evil
of the action and the person committing the action. Emmanuel Kant
first defined these principles, "Kant held that nothing is good
without qualification except a good will, which is one that wills
to act in accord with the moral law and out of respect for that
law, rather than out of natural inclinations. He saw the moral law
as a categorical imperative-i.e., an unconditional command-and
believed that its content could be established by human reason
alone." Ethical formalism tends to dictate the logic of the
approach, and does not necessarily contemplate what benefits the
human versus the law, however is based purely on the action and
whether it is right or wrong. Another form of deontological ethics
is egoism, in which the action must benefit the person committing
the action, again however basing the form on the action versus the
potential morality or reflection of god, as teleological arguments
tend to be. Lastly, there is natural law, and the approach based on
survival of the fittest, versus contributing to the whole. When
utilizing this approach it is necessary to understand that
according to "natural law" it is necessary that some humans,
animals, etc, fail. Interestingly teleological ethics tend to
encompass the religious ideals of ethical involvement versus a
purely rational mindset and logical approach. The teleological
argument is different due to the following "Teleological theories
differ on the nature of the
end that actions ought to promote. Eudaemonist theories (Greek
eudaimonia, "happiness"), which hold that ethics consists in some
function or activity appropriate to man as a human being, tend to
emphasize the cultivation of virtue or excellence in the agent as
the end of all action. These could be the classical
virtues-courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom-that promoted the
Greek ideal of man as the rational animal; or the theological
virtues-faith, hope, and love-that distinguished the Christian
ideal of man as a being created in the image of God. "
Utilitarianism is a form of teleological ethics; this form states
that what is good is that which has the greatest result for the
greatest number. The ethics of virtue are also a form of
teleological ethics; it promotes ones character over rules when
approaching ethics. This form leads one to quest for a greater
meaning in life and approach their ethical dilemmas with this
mindset. Another example of the teleological system is religion
ethics. This approach bases the ethical approach to ones religious
stance, unfortunately this also tends to confine ones ethical
abilities to that which most closely matches a system of belief
that may or may not be correct in the societal situation one finds
one self. An example of this ethical approach, Ethics of virtue can
be seen in the very controversial abortion question; where in a
majority of "pro-life" supporters are also religiously devout. The
last system that addressed today is ethics of care, this system
tends to allow one too care more for those that are close to
oneself. With the ethics of care on may find that while we wish to
prosecute a person for petty theft that we do not know, we may be
willing to look the other way if it is a person we do know.
Unfortunately, I disagree with this ethical standing, though I can
understand the logic it is not a style I normally employ. In
studying these systems, I find that the deontological system is
more my approach to ethical dilemmas. The action itself is more
important than the person committing that action. While this
approach tends to delineate the personal aspect, it also allows for
a more formal approach to legal matters. In many cases the
particular action preformed (such as theft, or murder) remains the
same, while the circumstances of said action differ. The person
committing this action is separate from the legality of the action.
The affect of the action on the surrounding community is important
though should not be used as the decider as to whether the action
is illegal or legal. By presenting actions separate from the human
component one is more easily able to separate the wrongness versus
the rightness of the action itself. For instance, there is the case
of the juvenile offender that used a wrestling move on a much
younger child and caused that child's death. The media
characterized this as a case of television and games being the
cause versus the offender, and recently we see that the offender
was released back into society. However, the action that had been
taken caused the death of another. While there was credence too the
claims of societal pressure being involved it did not change the
simple fact that causing another human pain and death is not right.
My approach ethically tends to be ethical formalism, though I have
been known to change this view upon occasion. In my opinion, the
ability to change a view based on more evidence is the sign of
growth. While ethical boundaries and commitment are important, we
should be willing to approach every case individually which
obviously means our ethical approach may vary, while our moral base
remains the same. ethic. (2008). In Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary. Retrieved August 08, 2008, from http://www.
Merriam-Webster .com/dictionary/ethic
deontological ethics. (2008). In Encyclopdia Britannica.
Retrieved August 10, 2008, from Encyclopdia Britannica Online:
http://www. Britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/158162/deontological-ethics teleological
ethics. (2008). In Encyclopdia Britannica. Retrieved August 10,
2008, from Encyclopdia Britannica Online: http://www. Britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/585940/teleological-ethics
55555555 A Brief Introduction to Formal EthicsYou've been
thinking about and discussing two ethical situations in class, the
torture situation and the attempted suicide situation. You've been
asked to think about what course of action would be (or would have
been) right or wrong in those situations. You were not just asked,
for example, what would be (or would have been) legally correct in
those situations (which would be a purely legal question). You were
not just asked what most people might do in that situation (a
purely sociological question). You were not just asked what might
feel more pleasant or unpleasant in those situations (a purely
psychological question). You were instead asked what course of
action you thought would be the best (or worst) one to take in
those situations. That's the kind of question that ethics deals
with. How does one think about ethical questions? Do you just go on
your gut feeling and follow whatever your feelings tell you? Do you
just go on what people in authority have told you in the past? Do
you just go with what the law and courts have to say? How does one
go about deciding what course of action would be the best, or most
right, course of action in a given situation? Or rather, how should
one even start to think about questions like that? What methods of
analyzing these questions would be most helpful and would be most
likely to lead to the best answers? In the history of thinking
about ethical questions in the West, several methods for analyzing
these questions have emerged. Many of those methods can be
classified under two main headings: Teleological methods and
Deontological methods. Below is a brief description of each of
these two methods of thinking about ethical questions. In our
discussions about ethical situations in class -- the torture
situation and the attempted suicide situation, as well as some
others we'll be discussing in the coming weeks -- you'll want to be
able to identify which kind of thinking is being used to come to
the conclusions people come to. Are they using a primarily
teleological approach (TEE LEE uh LAWJ ih kul), or are they using
primarily a deontological approach (DEE AWN tuh LAWJ ih kul)? So
here's what each kind of method is: Teleological methods, sometimes
called consequentialist methods, are based on estimating what the
likely outcomes of a given course of action will be, and then
choosing
the method that has the most positive consequences and the
fewest negative consequences. According to these methods, those
actions should be chosen which lead to more positive and fewer
negative consequences, and those actions should be rejected which
lead to more negative consequences and fewer positive consequences.
In class, for example, some of you who said that it would be good
to torture the person who had been arrested argued that the
outcomes would be better if we did torture him (lives saved, etc)
than if we did not (thousands killed, etc). That is using a
teleological or consequentialist kind of thinking to determine
which course of action would be best. John Stuart Mills
Utilitarianism is usually seen as the classical expression of
consequentialist ethical thinking, and so is Joseph Fletchers
Situation Ethics. Future lectures in the course will focus on Mills
utilitarian method as the primary example of teleological ethical
thinking. Mill's most famous book outlining this method is titled
Utilitarianism. Fletcher's book on the subject, taking a somewhat
different approach, is titled Situation Ethics. ... Deontological,
or duty-based, ethical systems, on the other hand, are those that
simply claim, directly and simply, what the fundamental ethical
duties are. The Ten Commandments (from Exodus and Deuteronomy in
the Hebrew Torah) would be examples of deontological ethical
thinking. According to the Ten Commandments, these actions -honor
your father and mother, do not steal, do not commit adultery, keep
holy the sabbath, etc -- are stated as simply right things to do or
wrong things to do. They are said to be our clear moral duty. The
Ten Commandments do not merely suggest, for example, that you look
at the consequences of actions and then weigh the possible outcomes
to determine if an action is right or wrong. Instead they say that
some actions are just plain right and others are just plain wrong.
This is what characterizes deontological ethical methods: they
simply state that some things are right or wrong. Some things are
your duty to do (Greek deon: duty) and other things are your duty
to avoid. Human Rights documents, for example, are instances of
deontological thinking. When The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR, 1948) says, for example, that "No one shall be held
in slavery or servitude" (article 4), or that "No one shall be
subjected to torture" (article 5), it is saying these things are
just plain wrong. When the UDHR says that "Everyone has the right
to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country" (article 13), or that " Everyone has the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and association" (article 20), or that
"Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay
for equal work" (article 23), it is saying that these things are
simply right and good. Human Rights documents, therefore, exemplify
deontological thinking. After all, rights and duties are just the
mirror images of each other. When these documents say that person A
has a certain right, that means that person B (or state B) has the
duty to see that that right
is fulfilled. If person A has the right to not be tortured, then
person B has the duty to not torture them. Rights and duties are
just two sides of the same coin. How does deontological thinking
figure out exactly which actions are right and which are wrong,
though? Several different analytical methods have been developed
for determining what our ethical duties are. Two of the more famous
methods can be found in the writings of Natural Law ethics and in
the writings of Immanuel Kant, particularly his books titled
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, and his
Critique of Practical Reason. We will explore Immanuel Kants
ethical system as the primary example of deontological thinking.
The Human Rights documents we will be examining in the coming weeks
will also be examples of deontological thinking. Your assignment
for this week will be to read selections from Immanuel Kants
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals and from John
Stuart Mills Utilitarianism. Then you will write out answers to
Study Questions for each reading, and post them into the SQs folder
in our classroom. And then, in the classroom folder for week one,
you will discuss what you understand these Philosophers to be
saying, and how you think their ideas apply to the situations weve
been discussing.