Architectural Support for Software-Based Protection Mihai Budiu Úlfar Erlingsson Martín Abadi ASID Workshop, Oct 21, 2006 Silicon Valley.

Architectural Support for Software-Based Protection

Mihai Budiu Úlfar Erlingsson Martín Abadi

ASID Workshop, Oct 21, 2006

Silicon Valley

Summary

CFI XFI

Enforce control flow to prevent software attacks

[CCS 05] [ICFEM 05]

Protect modules within a single address space

[OSDI 06]

2

This work: add hardware supportThis work: add hardware support

Outline

• Control-Flow Integrity

• XFI: Protecting Modules• Conclusions

3

CFI Motivation

4

Control flow

Anatomy of many software attacks

CFI Idea

5

Executable Control-Flow Graph

+ =

Self-checking program

CFI Security Benefits

• Enforces CFG against attacker that controlswhole data memory

• Defends against a large class of attacks– Buffer overflows– Stack smashing– Jump-to-libc– Pointer subterfuge

• Validated experimentally

6

Code

Data

Stack

Embedding a CFG Edge

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jmpc r1, 50......

cfilabel 60….cfilabel 50.....

jmp r1......

dest:.....

?

Traditional indirect jump New ISA: checked jump and label

Semantics

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jmpc r1, L cfilabel L

cfi_register = L;jmp r1

if (cfi_register == L) cfi_register = 0

before any instructionexcept cfilabel

if (cfi_register != 0) cfi_exception()

Evaluation

9

Binary

Squeeze++binary rewriter

instrumentationalgorithm

Sim-alphasimulator

Alpha CC

Spec2k Sources

Instrumentedbinary

Performancedata

Linux

CFI Execution Overhead

Outline

• Control-Flow Integrity• XFI: Protecting Modules

• Conclusions11

XFI Motivation

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OS Kernel Driver Driver

Ring 0 (high privilege)Single address space

Kernel heap

Shareddata structure

XFI Address Spaces

13

Host system XFI Module

Data R/OData

R/WData

Stacks

CodeCode

Entry points

Fastpathregion

A B Slowpathregion

Host heap

Memory Bounds Checks

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Host system XFI Module

Data R/OData

R/WDataCodeCode

A B

Host heap

*(int*)x = 2;

if (x < A + 0) goto SlowpathCheck; if (B – sizeof(int) < x) goto SlowpathCheck;retfromSlowCheck: *(int*)x = 2;

2x

ISA Support for XFI

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mrguard $r, L, H

If ($r < $a + L) XFI_exception()if ($b – H < $r) XFI_exception()

[$r – L, $r + H) [$a, $b)

A B

$rL H

Evaluation

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Assembly

Sim-alphasimulator

Alpha CC

Mediabench Sources

Instrumentedbinary

Performancedata

Linux

HandinstrumentKernel

LinkObject files

Bounds Checks Overhead

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Advantages of ISA SupportCompared with software solutions:• Reduce executable size• Reduce pressure on fetch structures

(I-cache, trace cache, br. predictors)• Decrease register pressure

(no intermediate results)• Do not pollute condition flags• Do not pollute the data cache

to fetch code label [CFI only]

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Conclusions

• ISA support is very simple• ISA support does not stretch

critical hw resources

• ISA support can reduce the cost of CFI and XFI enforcement

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Backup Slides 20

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MSR Silicon Valley

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Our Neighbors

GoogleNASA AMESMicrosoft SVC

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We’re Going Into Architecture

We’re Hiring Computer Architects

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• Exciting research opportunities• A chance to influence industry• A lot of creative freedom• A great interdisciplinary team• A brand new research group• A great location

research.microsoft.com/aboutmsr/labs/siliconvalley

CFI & XFI Toolchain

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Compiler

Executable

Debugginginformation

ProgramBinary

rewriter

Safe executable

Unsafecode

Execution

Safecode

Verifier

Instrumentationalgorithm

Trusted computing base

CFI Software Implementation

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jmpc r1, 50......

cfilabel 50.....

if (*r1 != 50) then goto error;goto r1+4;….

.data 50….

CFI Binary Size Increase

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