Arab-Israeli War of 1973 - ................37 TEAM37basic.weebly.com/uploads/2/7/9/2/2792197/arab-israel…  · Web viewArab-Israeli War of 1973, armed conflict between Israel and

Arab-Israeli War of 1973

Arab-Israeli War of 1973, armed conflict between Israel and the Arab countries of Egypt and Syria, fought during the month of October 1973. Egypt and Syria initiated the conflict to regain territories that Israel had occupied since the Six-Day War of 1967. Although both sides suffered heavy losses during the 1973 war, Israel retained control of the territories. Because the conflict began on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur and took place during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the war is also called the Yom Kippur War by Israelis and the Ramadan War or the October War by Arabs.

Although it brought about no significant changes to territorial boundaries, the 1973 war and its aftermath had far-ranging effects on the participant nations and their relations with world superpowers. Egypt moved steadily away from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which had provided military and economic aid to Egypt since the 1950s, and into a closer relationship with the United States. Syria emerged from the war as the staunchest defender of Arab rights and the closest Middle Eastern ally of the USSR. In Israel, the war increased criticism of the country’s leaders, who eventually resigned. Finally, the war signaled an increased commitment by the United States to negotiate and guarantee Arab-Israeli agreements. Such agreements would center on the return of Israeli-held lands to Arab control, in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel and security guarantees.

Causes of War

The long-standing conflict between Jews and Arabs over control of historic Palestine had resulted in wars in 1948, 1956, and 1967 (see Arab-Israeli Conflict). The Arab opposition to the Jewish state of Israel included neighboring Arab states and, after 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a political body working to create a state for Palestinian Arabs. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, previously controlled by Egypt; the Golan Heights, formerly belonging to Syria; and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, formerly administered by Jordan. Later that year, the United Nations (UN) adopted a resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from these areas in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel’s independence and security. However, neither side met these conditions, and cross-border attacks and reprisals continued. In 1969 Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a campaign on the Suez Canal (an artificial waterway between the Sinai Peninsula and the Egyptian mainland) known as the War of Attrition. The conflict, which did not escalate into a full-scale war, ended with a U.S.-brokered cease-fire in 1970.

In the early 1970s Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat, pushed for Israeli withdrawal through diplomatic means, while simultaneously preparing Egypt’s military for war. Each year the UN passed resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Israel refused to withdraw, and the

United States suffered criticism from the international community for its support of Israel. Meanwhile, the stalemate continued. Arab nations generally refused to negotiate until Israel withdrew. Israel, which refused to withdraw without guarantees of peace and security, fortified its positions in the occupied Arab territories.

Neither the United States nor Israel believed that Arab forces could challenge Israel's proven military power. The USSR, which had supported the Arab nations during previous wars with Israel and had resupplied Egypt militarily, knew that Egypt was preparing for war, but underestimated Sadat’s commitment to use a military option against Israel. Furthermore, neither Washington nor Moscow was fully aware of the profound differences in policy between the Egyptian and Syrian leaders. Although the ultimate goal for both leaders was to regain their territories from Israel, Sadat was willing to combine military means with the initiation of a diplomatic process, whereas Syrian president Hafez al-Assad did not want to sign any agreement with Israel that might recognize Israel’s legitimacy. Sadat, unlike Assad, also was willing to orient Egypt’s foreign policy away from the USSR and toward the United States. With mounting economic pressures at home, Sadat believed that the United States, rather than the USSR, would help Egypt more in the long term.

Despite these differences, mutual frustration and impatience with the diplomatic status quo led Sadat and Assad to plan an attack in collusion. Because the two Arab leaders were focused more on their own particular national interests, rather than on other Arab-Israeli issues such as the future of the West Bank and Jerusalem and the issue of Palestinian statehood, they omitted Jordan and the PLO from the planning of the war.

COURSE OF THE WAR

Egypt and Syria launched their attack against Israel on October 6, 1973. It was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year. With much of its citizen army in synagogues, its national radio off the air, and its people in a generally relaxed mood, Israel was caught off guard by the coordinated attacks. Israeli intelligence sources had discounted the probability of an Arab assault, and Israel's military was not fully prepared for war. Sadat's armies quickly crossed the Suez Canal. In doing so, Egypt overcame the Israeli string of fortifications along the canal’s east bank known as the Bar-Lev line, which Israel had believed to be impenetrable. Egypt established strongholds to defend its position. Aware of his army’s limited firepower, Sadat did not order an advance across all of the Israeli-held Sinai. Instead, his armies took a small slice of land along the entire length of the canal's east bank. Meanwhile, Syrian forces advanced into the Golan Heights.

During the first week of the war, both Syria and Egypt could have done more damage to Israel's army, taken more territory, and inflicted severe damage on Israeli civilian centers. However, both armies failed to take advantage of their

early gains, Israel's lack of preparedness, and initial Israeli losses. Irregular and inaccurate communications between Cairo, Egypt, and Damascus, Syria, and between Moscow and these Arab capitals, inhibited additional Arab military successes.

By mid-October, Israel had mobilized its troops and launched a series of counterattacks on both fronts. Despite severe initial casualties, Israeli forces retook the land that Syria had captured and pushed past the Syrian border, soon making their way within artillery range of Damascus. Meanwhile, Israel launched a counteroffensive against Egypt, crossing the Suez Canal, advancing into Egypt, and surrounding Egypt's Third Army. By the end of the war, Israeli forces had advanced to within 100 km (60 mi) of Cairo and 40 km (25 mi) of Damascus. However, Israel saw no political reason to occupy the two Arab capitals.

CEASE-FIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT

The precarious state in which the Arab armies found themselves hastened the war's conclusion. It also prompted immediate intervention by the United States, which had supplied weapons to Israel during the fighting, and by the Soviet Union, which had supplied the Arab forces. Israel's threat to eradicate the Egyptian Third Army prompted U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger to visit Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire resolution with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. On October 22 the UN passed the resolution, which also called for direct negotiations between the Israelis and Arabs.

Israel and Egypt both broke the terms of the cease-fire, and Israel continued its encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. Brezhnev, viewing an Egyptian defeat as potentially destabilizing to Sadat's government, implied in communications with U.S. president Richard Nixon that Israel's failure to halt military actions would prompt a Soviet response, including intervention to preserve the Third Army. In response, Kissinger asked for and received Nixon's permission to put American troops on a nuclear alert. Both the Soviets and the Americans almost immediately stepped back from a confrontation. A final cease-fire took effect on October 25.

Israel's desire to have its prisoners of war returned, combined with the precarious existence of the Egyptian Third Army, hastened military talks between Israel and Egypt. These talks took place at Kilometer 101 of the Cairo-Suez Road from October 28 until late November. Kissinger, desiring greater American participation, arranged a Middle East peace conference with the United States and the Soviet Union as cochairs, to continue the negotiations. The conference convened in Geneva, Switzerland, on December 21. Although Jordan participated, Syria declined to attend, and the PLO was not invited. After two days of public posturing, the conference was suspended and failed to reconvene.

During the next two years, Kissinger used a negotiating technique called “shuttle diplomacy,” flying back and forth between the Arab capitals and Israel and acting as a mediator. This technique yielded the first Egyptian-Israeli military disengagement agreement, calling for Israel’s withdrawal back across the Suez Canal and the restoration in January 1974 of a UN peacekeeping force in the canal zone. (The UN force had been instituted after the 1956 war and was in place until 1967.) In May 1974 Syria and Israel, with Kissinger’s help, concluded a disengagement agreement by which Israel returned Syrian territory captured in the 1973 war, along with the town of Al Qunayţirah in the Golan region. It also established a UN buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan. A second Egyptian-Israeli agreement was concluded in September 1975.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

Although the war yielded no immediate territorial concessions, it had many far-reaching effects on the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. While Arab casualties were far greater than Israeli casualties, both sides claimed victory. The Arab forces had proven that they could launch a successful coordinated attack. With their initial gains, they shattered the myth of Israel’s invincibility that had persisted since the 1967 war. Meanwhile, despite significant early losses, Israel had successfully regrouped in a matter of days, pushing the Arab forces back beyond the 1967 borders.

While the war did not affect Syria’s close alignment with the Soviet Union and strong opposition to the United States and Israel, it initiated drastic changes in Egypt’s foreign relations. Kissinger’s newly developing relationship with Sadat reduced Soviet influence over Egypt and brought the country closer to the United States. Each successful agreement also generated trust between Israel and Egypt. Both of these developments established the foundation for the U.S.-brokered Camp David Accords in 1978, which led to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. However, Egypt’s improved relations with the United States and Israel also led to its separation and isolation from inter-Arab affairs in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the diplomatic successes of the United States in the aftermath of the war made it the preferred mediator, confidant, and diplomatic guarantor of Arabs and Israelis alike in future negotiations.

The 1973 war also marked the first successful use of oil as a political weapon in the Arab-Israeli conflict. From October 1973 to November 1974, the oil-producing Arab countries maintained an embargo on oil exports to Western nations friendly to Israel, causing gasoline shortages and inflated oil prices. The embargo had a particularly negative effect on the U.S. economy.

Finally, the war caused internal problems in Israel. The Israeli military’s lack of readiness called into question the capabilities of the country’s leaders. The results of an ensuing investigation were highly critical of the military, prompting

the resignations of Israeli prime minister Golda Meir and defense minister Moshe Dayan.

BLITZKRIEG

Blitzkrieg, (in German, “lightning war”), swift, sudden, and overwhelming military offensive used by Germany in World War II (1939-1945).

Major-General John Frederick Charles Fuller, CB, CBE, DSO, commonly J.F.C. Fuller, (September 1, 1878–February 10, 1966) planned the tank attack at Cambrai and the tank operations for the autumn offensives of 1918. His Plan 1919 for a fully mechanised army was never implemented in his lifetime.However,his ideas on mechanised warfare continued to be influential in the lead up to World War II, ironically more with the Germans, notably Heinz Guderian, than with his countrymen. In the 1930’s, the Wehrmacht implemented tactics similar in many ways to Fuller's analysis, which became known as Blitzkrieg. Like Fuller, practitioners of Blitzkrieg partly based their approach on the theory that areas of large enemy activity should be bypassed to be eventually surrounded and destroyed. Blitzkrieg style tactics were used by several nations throughout World War II, predominantly by the Germans in the invasion of Poland, Western Europe and the Soviet Union. While Germany, and to some degree the Western Allies, adopted Blitzkrieg ideas, they were not much used by the Red Army which developed its armoured warfare doctrine based on deep operations. Deep operations was developed by Soviet military theorists, among them Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky, during the 1920s based on their experiences in World War I and the Russian Civil War.

Tactics, technique or science of dispensing and maneuvering forces to accomplish a limited objective or an immediate end, as opposed to strategy, which is the art of employing all elements of the power of a nation or nations to accomplish the objectives of a nation. Military tactics involve the manipulation of forces to accomplish the aims of a campaign or to defeat the enemy. Tactics are developed based on the size, composition, and quality of forces available to a commander, and taking into account the forces that are available to the enemy to oppose the commander's forces. A commander will seek tactics that will give the optimum chance of accomplishing a mission with the least damage to the commander's forces. Tactics include using deception and surprise, maneuvers and fire power, and other capabilities of available forces. Tactics must be adapted to the specific conditions that exist. Important elements in determining tactics are logistics, geography, the available intelligence on the enemy's forces, the enemy's usual tactics, and other matters that may influence the outcome of a battle.

Tactics used by successful commanders in the past are carefully studied to modify them for use under current conditions. The Roman general Scipio

Africanus the Elder used a two-pronged attack to overwhelm the enemy. So did William Tecumseh Sherman, commander of Union forces, in his march to the sea during the American Civil War (1861-1865). The Mongol leader Genghis Khan used overwhelming force in sudden attacks against smaller enemy forces to defeat his enemy piecemeal. The Germans used the same idea in their blitzkrieg (war conducted with speed and force) in World War II (1939-1945). Tactics successful at one point in history are not, however, necessarily successful at another. Marquis Togo Heihachiro, the Japanese naval commander in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), defeated the Russians at Tsushima; when Japan applied the same general tactics against Pearl Harbor, the immediate result was highly destructive to United States aircraft, ships, and personnel, but ultimately the United States overcame the blow. However, the tactics of the British admiral Horatio Nelson—destruction of enemy communications and commerce—were used successfully by the American fleets in World War II.

In modern warfare, tactics are becoming increasingly more complex because of the sophisticated equipment now available. Consequently, coordination of operations within and among military units is more important but also more difficult to achieve.

Arab-Israeli War of 1973I INTRODUCTION

1. Arab-Israeli War of 1973, armed conflict between Israel and the Arab countries of Egypt and Syria, fought during the month of October 1973. Egypt and Syria initiated the conflict to regain territories that Israel had occupied since the Six-Day War of 1967. Although both sides suffered heavy losses during the 1973 war, Israel retained control of the territories. Because the conflict began on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur and took place during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the war is also called the Yom Kippur War by Israelis and the Ramadan War or the October War by Arabs.

2. Although it brought about no significant changes to territorial boundaries, the 1973 war and its aftermath had far-ranging effects on the participant nations and their relations with world superpowers. Egypt moved steadily away from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which had provided military and economic aid to Egypt since the 1950s, and into a closer relationship with the United States. Syria emerged from the war as the staunchest defender of Arab rights and the closest Middle Eastern ally of the USSR. In Israel, the war increased criticism of the country’s leaders, who eventually resigned. Finally, the war signaled an increased commitment by the United States to negotiate and guarantee Arab-Israeli agreements. Such agreements would center on the

return of Israeli-held lands to Arab control, in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel and security guarantees.

II CAUSES OF THE WAR

3. The long-standing conflict between Jews and Arabs over control of historic Palestine had resulted in wars in 1948, 1956, and 1967.The war in 1973 was also the continuation of those war, however, the following factors helped in the breakout of the war in 1973.

(a) The Arab Opposition/Arab nationalism. The Arab opposition to the Jewish state of Israel included neighboring Arab states and, after 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a political body working to create a state for Palestinian Arabs.

(b) The result of the Six-Day War of 1967. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, previously controlled by Egypt; the Golan Heights, formerly belonging to Syria; and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, formerly administered by Jordan.

(c) Failure of UN. Later that year, the United Nations (UN) adopted a resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from these areas in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel’s independence and security. However, neither side met these conditions, nor cross-border attacks and reprisals continued.

(d) The war of attrition. In 1969 Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a campaign on the Suez Canal (an artificial waterway between the Sinai Peninsula and the Egyptian mainland) known as the War of Attrition. The conflict, which did not escalate into a full-scale war, ended with a U.S.-brokered cease-fire in 1970.

(e) Israel’s Refusal for withdrawal. In the early 1970s Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat, pushed for Israeli withdrawal through diplomatic means, while simultaneously preparing Egypt’s military for war. Each year the UN passed resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Israel refused to withdraw, and the United States suffered criticism from the international community for its support of Israel. Meanwhile, the stalemate continued.

(f) Arab Nation’s Refusal for Negotiations. Arab nations generally refused to negotiate until Israel withdrew. Israel, which refused to withdraw without guarantees of peace and security, fortified its positions in the occupied Arab territories.

(g) Wrong Assessment of Super Powers. Neither the United States nor Israel believed that Arab forces could challenge Israel's proven military power. The USSR, which had supported the Arab nations during previous wars with Israel and had resupplied Egypt militarily, knew that Egypt was preparing for war, but underestimated Sadat’s commitment to use a military option against Israel. Furthermore, neither Washington nor Moscow was fully aware of the profound differences in policy between the Egyptian and Syrian leaders.

(h) Own national interests of Assad and Sadat. Although the ultimate goal for both leaders was to regain their territories from Israel, Sadat was willing to combine military means with the initiation of a diplomatic process, whereas Syrian president Hafez al-Assad did not want to sign any agreement with Israel that might recognize Israel’s legitimacy. Sadat, unlike Assad, also was willing to orient Egypt’s foreign policy away from the USSR and toward the United States. With mounting economic pressures at home, Sadat believed that the United States, rather than the USSR, would help Egypt more in the long term.

(i) Failure of Diplomacy. Despite these differences, mutual frustration and impatience with the diplomatic status quo led Sadat and Assad to plan an attack in collusion. Because the two Arab leaders were focused more on their own particular national interests, rather than on other Arab-Israeli issues such as the future of the West Bank and Jerusalem and the issue of Palestinian statehood, they omitted Jordan and the PLO from the planning of the war.

III COURSE OF THE WAR

Egypt and Syria launched their attack against Israel on October 6, 1973. It was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year. Israel's military was not fully prepared for war.

Sadat's armies quickly crossed the Suez Canal. In doing so, Egypt overcame the Israeli string of fortifications along the canal’s east bank known as the Bar-Lev line.

Egypt established strongholds to defend its position. Aware of his army’s limited firepower, Sadat did not order an advance across all of the Israeli-held Sinai. Meanwhile, Syrian forces advanced into the Golan Heights.

During the first week of the war, both Syria and Egypt armies failed to take advantage of their early gains, Israel's lack of preparedness, and initial Israeli losses.

By mid-October, Israel had mobilized its troops and launched a series of counterattacks on both fronts. Despite severe initial casualties, Israeli forces

retook the land that Syria had captured and pushed past the Syrian border, soon making their way within artillery range of Damascus.

Meanwhile, Israel launched a counteroffensive against Egypt, crossing the Suez Canal, advancing into Egypt, and surrounding Egypt's Third Army.

By the end of the war, Israeli forces had advanced to within 100 km (60 mi) of Cairo and 40 km (25 mi) of Damascus. However, Israel saw no political reason to occupy the two Arab capitals.

IV CEASE-FIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT

The precarious state in which the Arab armies found themselves hastened the war's conclusion. It also prompted immediate intervention by the United States, which had supplied weapons to Israel during the fighting, and by the Soviet Union, which had supplied the Arab forces. Israel's threat to eradicate the Egyptian Third Army prompted U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger to visit Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire resolution with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. On October 22 the UN passed the resolution, which also called for direct negotiations between the Israelis and Arabs.

Israel and Egypt both broke the terms of the cease-fire, and Israel continued its encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. Brezhnev, viewing an Egyptian defeat as potentially destabilizing to Sadat's government, implied in communications with U.S. president Richard Nixon that Israel's failure to halt military actions would prompt a Soviet response, including intervention to preserve the Third Army. In response, Kissinger asked for and received Nixon's permission to put American troops on a nuclear alert. Both the Soviets and the Americans almost immediately stepped back from a confrontation. A final cease-fire took effect on October 25.

Israel's desire to have its prisoners of war returned, combined with the precarious existence of the Egyptian Third Army, hastened military talks between Israel and Egypt. These talks took place at Kilometer 101 of the Cairo-Suez Road from October 28 until late November. Kissinger, desiring greater American participation, arranged a Middle East peace conference with the United States and the Soviet Union as cochairs, to continue the negotiations. The conference convened in Geneva, Switzerland, on December 21. Although Jordan participated, Syria declined to attend, and the PLO was not invited. After two days of public posturing, the conference was suspended and failed to reconvene.

During the next two years, Kissinger used a negotiating technique called “shuttle diplomacy,” flying back and forth between the Arab capitals and Israel and acting as a mediator. This technique yielded the first Egyptian-Israeli military disengagement agreement, calling for Israel’s withdrawal back across the Suez Canal and the restoration in January 1974 of a UN peacekeeping force in the

canal zone. (The UN force had been instituted after the 1956 war and was in place until 1967.) In May 1974 Syria and Israel, with Kissinger’s help, concluded a disengagement agreement by which Israel returned Syrian territory captured in the 1973 war, along with the town of Al Qunayţirah in the Golan region. It also established a UN buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan. A second Egyptian-Israeli agreement was concluded in September 1975.

V CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

Although the war yielded no immediate territorial concessions, it had many far-reaching effects on the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. While Arab casualties were far greater than Israeli casualties, both sides claimed victory. The Arab forces had proven that they could launch a successful coordinated attack. With their initial gains, they shattered the myth of Israel’s invincibility that had persisted since the 1967 war. Meanwhile, despite significant early losses, Israel had successfully regrouped in a matter of days, pushing the Arab forces back beyond the 1967 borders.

While the war did not affect Syria’s close alignment with the Soviet Union and strong opposition to the United States and Israel, it initiated drastic changes in Egypt’s foreign relations. Kissinger’s newly developing relationship with Sadat reduced Soviet influence over Egypt and brought the country closer to the United States. Each successful agreement also generated trust between Israel and Egypt. Both of these developments established the foundation for the U.S.-brokered Camp David Accords in 1978, which led to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. However, Egypt’s improved relations with the United States and Israel also led to its separation and isolation from inter-Arab affairs in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the diplomatic successes of the United States in the aftermath of the war made it the preferred mediator, confidant, and diplomatic guarantor of Arabs and Israelis alike in future negotiations.

The 1973 war also marked the first successful use of oil as a political weapon in the Arab-Israeli conflict. From October 1973 to November 1974, the oil-producing Arab countries maintained an embargo on oil exports to Western nations friendly to Israel, causing gasoline shortages and inflated oil prices. The embargo had a particularly negative effect on the U.S. economy.

Finally, the war caused internal problems in Israel. The Israeli military’s lack of readiness called into question the capabilities of the country’s leaders. The results of an ensuing investigation were highly critical of the military, prompting the resignations of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and defense minister Moshe Dayan.

COMBAT OPERATIONS: IN THE SINAI

General

1. The southern command, under Maj Gen Shmuel Gonen who assumed command on 15 July 1973, was responsible for the defence whole of the southern part of Israel-the Negev and Sinai. The negev mainly is a sandy desert with a number of areas of settelemnet, particularly around Beersheba and at the port city of Eilat on the Red Sea.The Sinai pennensula –some 37,200 Sq mile in the extent is a large traingular wedge between gulf of Akaba in the east and the gulf of Suez in the west.

2. On the eve of the Yom Kippur war, the canal line was held by a Division under command of maj Gen MENDLER with three brigades and 280 tanks at his disposal. The Israelis had built large barricades made primarily from sand.In spite of that, the IDF had constructed a strong series fortification along the canal called as BAR-LEV LINE during the war of attrition , the construction of which was completed on 15 Mar 69.The main aim of this line of fortification was to monitor the probalble crossing of the Egyptian forces acrossthe Suez Canal. It was series of not only a single marginal line of defence, each fortification controlled 1.5 miles on each of its flanks and the area of some 5-6 miles between the fortifications was covered by Ops and patrols.

3. Anticipating a swift Israeli armoured counterattack, the Egyptians had armed their first wave with unprecedented numbers of man-portable anti-tank weapons—Rocket propelled grenades and the more advanced Sagger guided missiles, which proved devastating to the first Israeli armoured counter-attacks. One in every three Egyptian soldiers had an anti-tank weapon. "Never before had such intensive anti-tank fire been brought to bear on the battlefield." In addition, the ramp on the Egyptian side of the canal had been increased to twice the height of the Israeli ramp, giving them an excellent vantage point from which to fire down on the Israelis, as well as any approaching tanks. The scale and effectiveness of the Egyptian strategy of deploying these anti-tank weapons coupled with the Israelis' inability to disrupt their use with close air support (due to the SAM shield) greatly contributed to Israeli losses early in the war.

4. The Egyptian units would not advance beyond a shallow strip for fear of losing protection of their SAM missile batteries which were situated on the West bank of the canal. In the Six-Day War, the Israeli Air Force had pummelled the defenseless Arab armies. Egypt (and Syria) had heavily fortified their side of the cease-fire lines with SAM batteries provided by the Soviet Union, against which the Israeli Air Force had no effective countermeasures. Israel, which had invested much of its defense budget building the region's strongest air force, would see its air force rendered almost useless by the presence of the SAM batteries.

The 1973 War in the Sinai, October 6–15

5. The Egyptian army put great effort into finding a quick and effective way of breaching the Israeli defenses. The Israelis had built large barricades made primarily from sand. Egyptian engineers initially used explosive charges to clear the obstacles, before a junior officer proposed using high pressure water cannons. The idea was tested and found to be a sound one, and several high pressure water cannons were imported from Germany. The Egyptian forces used these water-cannons loaded with water from the Suez Canal. The water-cannons effectively blasted away the barricades. Troops then crossed the Suez Canal in small personnel-carrier boats and inflatable rafts, in what became known as The Crossing, capturing or destroying all but one of the Bar-Lev forts.

6. The Egyptian offensive started at 1355 on 06 Oct 1973 with the crossing of 240 fighter planes across the canal followed by a number of infantry, armored and commando units and formations.The Egyptian troops taking part in the offensive were formed up in two army Corps which were composed of five Infantry Divs, three mechanised Divs, two armored Divs supported by a number of commando units and a well proofed plan of AD plan of SAM umbrella to nullify the probable IAF attack.

7. In a meticulously rehearsed operation, the Egyptian forces advanced and were able to penetrate upto 4/5 miles inside the Sinai overcomming the IDF resistance, and in some places it was able to penetrate approximately 15 km into the Sinai desert with the combined forces of two army corps. The Israeli battalion garrisoning the Bar-Lev forts was vastly outnumbered, and was overwhelmed facing a large loses. Only one fortification, code named Budapest (the northernmost Bar-Lev fort), would remain in Israeli control through the end of the war.

8. First Israili Counter Attack. The Egyptian forces consolidated their initial positions. On October 8, Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli Southern front—who had only taken the position 3 months before at the retirement of Ariel Sharon—ordered a counterattack by Gabi Amir's brigade against entrenched Egyptian forces at Hizayon, where approaching tanks could be easily destroyed by Saggers fired from the Egyptian ramp. Despite Amir's reluctance, the attack proceeded, and the result was a disaster for the Israelis. Towards nightfall, a counterattack by the Egyptians was stopped by Ariel Sharon's 143rd Armoured Division—Sharon had been reinstated as a division commander at the outset of the war. The fighting subsided, with neither side wanting to mount a large attack against the other.

9. Following the disastrous Israeli attack on the 8th, both sides adopted defensive postures and hoped for the other side to attack. Elazar replaced Gonen, who had proven to be out of his depth, with Chaim Bar-Lev, brought out of retirement. Because it was considered dangerous to morale to replace the

front commander during the middle of a battle, rather than being sacked, Gonen was made chief of staff to the newly appointed Bar-Lev.

10. The war continued in favor of Egypt till 11 Oct in which Egypt continued its offensive as well as prepared its defensive preparation to counter the probable Israel counter attack.By the 11 Oct, all the defensice preparation was completed.

The 1973 War in the Sinai, October 15–24

11. Egyptian Offensive of 14 Oct. After several days of waiting, Sadat, wanting to ease pressure on the Syrians, ordered his chief generals (Saad El Shazly and Ahmad Ismail Ali chief among them) to attack. General Saad El Shazly stated in his published memoires that he strongly and vocally opposed the attack, and told president Sadat that this would be a grave strategic error. Due to this sentiment, El Shazly was practically removed from the line of command. The Egyptian forces brought across their reserves and began their counterattack on 14 October. "The attack, the most massive since the initial Egyptian assault on Yom Kippur, was a total failure, the first major Egyptian reversal of the war. Instead of concentrating forces of maneuvering, except for the wadi thrust, they had expended them in head-on attack against the waiting Israeli brigades. Egyptian losses for the day were estimated at between 150 and 250 tanks."

12. Israel Counter attack and crossing. The following day, October 15, the Israelis launched Operation Abiray-Lev ("Valiant" or "Stouthearted Men")—the counterattack against the Egyptians and crossing of the Suez Canal. The attack was a tremendous change of tactics for the Israelis, who had previously relied on air and tank support—support that had been decimated by the well-prepared Egyptian forces. Instead, the Israelis used infantry to infiltrate the positions of the Egyptian SAM and anti-tank batteries, which were unable to cope as well with forces on foot.

13. A division led by Major General Ariel Sharon (almost certainly the 143rd Armoured Division) attacked the Egyptian line just north of Bitter Lake, in the vicinity of Ismailiya. The Israelis struck at a weak point in the Egyptian line, the "seam" between the Egyptian Second Army in the north and the Egyptian Third Army in the south. In some of the most brutal fighting of the war in and around the "Chinese Farm" (an irrigation project east of the canal and north of the crossing point), the Israelis opened a hole in the Egyptian line and reached the Suez Canal. A small force crossed the canal and created a bridgehead on the other side. For over 24 hours, troops were ferried across the canal in light inflatable boats, with no armor support of their own. They were well supplied with American-made M72 LAW rockets, negating the threat of Egyptian armor. Once the anti-aircraft and anti-tank defences of the Egyptians had been neutralized, the infantry once again was able to rely on overwhelming tank and air support.

14. Prior to the war, fearing an Israeli crossing of the canal, no Western nation would supply the Israelis with bridging equipment. They were able to purchase and refurbish obsolete modular pontoon bridging equipment from a French WWII scrap lot. The Israelis also constructed a rather sophisticated indigenous "roller bridge" but logistical delays involving heavy congestion on the roads leading to the crossing point delayed its arrival to the canal for several days. Deploying the pontoon bridge on the night of October 16/17, Avraham "Bren" Adan's 162nd Division crossed and raced south, intent on cutting off the Egyptian Third Army before it could retreat west back into Egypt. At the same time, it sent out raiding forces to destroy Egyptian SAM missile batteries east of the canal. By October 19 the Israelis managed to construct four separate bridges just north of the Great Bitter Lake under heavy Egyptian bombardment. By the end of the war the Israelis were well within Egypt, reaching a point 101 kilometers from its capital, Cairo.

COMBAT OPERATIONS:IN THE SINAI

General

1. The southern command, under Maj Gen Shmuel Gonen who assumed command on 15 July 1973, was responsible for the defence whole of the southern part of Israel-the Negev and Sinai. The negev mainly is a sandy desert with a number of areas of settelemnet, particularly around Beersheba and at the port city of Eilat on the Red Sea.The Sinai pennensula –some 37,200 Sq mile in the extent is a large traingular wedge between gulf of Akaba in the east and the gulf of Suez in the west.

2. On the eve of the Yom Kippur war, the canal line was held by a Division under command of maj Gen MENDLER with three brigades and 280 tanks at his disposal. The Israelis had built large barricades made primarily from sand.In spite of that, the IDF had constructed a strong series fortification along the canal called as BAR-LEV LINE during the war of attrition , the construction of which was completed on 15 Mar 69.The main aim of this line of fortification was to monitor the probalble crossing of the Egyptian forces acrossthe Suez Canal. It was series of not only a single marginal line of defence, each fortification controlled 1.5 miles on each of its flanks and the area of some 5-6 miles between the fortifications was covered by Ops and patrols.

3. Anticipating a swift Israeli armoured counterattack, the Egyptians had armed their first wave with unprecedented numbers of man-portable anti-tank weapons—Rocket propelled grenades and the more advanced Sagger guided missiles, which proved devastating to the first Israeli armoured counter-attacks. One in every three Egyptian soldiers had an anti-tank weapon. "Never before had such intensive anti-tank fire been brought to bear on the battlefield." In addition, the ramp on the Egyptian side of the canal had been increased to twice the height of the Israeli ramp, giving them an excellent vantage point from which to

fire down on the Israelis, as well as any approaching tanks. The scale and effectiveness of the Egyptian strategy of deploying these anti-tank weapons coupled with the Israelis' inability to disrupt their use with close air support (due to the SAM shield) greatly contributed to Israeli losses early in the war.

4. The Egyptian units would not advance beyond a shallow strip for fear of losing protection of their SAM missile batteries which were situated on the West bank of the canal. In the Six-Day War, the Israeli Air Force had pummelled the defenseless Arab armies. Egypt (and Syria) had heavily fortified their side of the cease-fire lines with SAM batteries provided by the Soviet Union, against which the Israeli Air Force had no effective countermeasures. Israel, which had invested much of its defense budget building the region's strongest air force, would see its air force rendered almost useless by the presence of the SAM batteries.

The 1973 War in the Sinai, October 6–15

5. The Egyptian army put great effort into finding a quick and effective way of breaching the Israeli defenses. The Israelis had built large barricades made primarily from sand. Egyptian engineers initially used explosive charges to clear the obstacles, before a junior officer proposed using high pressure water cannons. The idea was tested and found to be a sound one, and several high pressure water cannons were imported from Germany. The Egyptian forces used these water-cannons loaded with water from the Suez Canal. The water-cannons effectively blasted away the barricades. Troops then crossed the Suez Canal in small personnel-carrier boats and inflatable rafts, in what became known as The Crossing, capturing or destroying all but one of the Bar-Lev forts.

6. The Egyptian offensive started at 1355 on 06 Oct 1973 with the crossing of 240 fighter planes across the canal followed by a number of infantry, armored and commando units and formations.The Egyptian troops taking part in the offensive were formed up in two army Corps which were composed of five Infantry Divs, three mechanised Divs, two armored Divs supported by a number of commando units and a well proofed plan of AD plan of SAM umbrella to nullify the probable IAF attack.

7. In a meticulously rehearsed operation, the Egyptian forces advanced and were able to penetrate upto 4/5 miles inside the Sinai overcomming the IDF resistance, and in some places it was able to penetrate approximately 15 km into the Sinai desert with the combined forces of two army corps. The Israeli battalion garrisoning the Bar-Lev forts was vastly outnumbered, and was overwhelmed facing a large loses. Only one fortification, code named Budapest (the northernmost Bar-Lev fort), would remain in Israeli control through the end of the war.

8. First Israili Counter Attack. The Egyptian forces consolidated their initial positions. On October 8, Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli Southern front—who had only taken the position 3 months before at the retirement of Ariel Sharon—ordered a counterattack by Gabi Amir's brigade against entrenched Egyptian forces at Hizayon, where approaching tanks could be easily destroyed by Saggers fired from the Egyptian ramp. Despite Amir's reluctance, the attack proceeded, and the result was a disaster for the Israelis. Towards nightfall, a counterattack by the Egyptians was stopped by Ariel Sharon's 143rd Armoured Division—Sharon had been reinstated as a division commander at the outset of the war. The fighting subsided, with neither side wanting to mount a large attack against the other.

9. Following the disastrous Israeli attack on the 8th, both sides adopted defensive postures and hoped for the other side to attack. Elazar replaced Gonen, who had proven to be out of his depth, with Chaim Bar-Lev, brought out of retirement. Because it was considered dangerous to morale to replace the front commander during the middle of a battle, rather than being sacked, Gonen was made chief of staff to the newly appointed Bar-Lev.

10. The war continued in favor of Egypt till 11 Oct in which Egypt continued its offensive as well as prepared its defensive preparation to counter the probable Israel counter attack.By the 11 Oct, all the defensice preparation was completed.

The 1973 War in the Sinai, October 15–24

11. Egyptian Offensive of 14 Oct. After several days of waiting, Sadat, wanting to ease pressure on the Syrians, ordered his chief generals (Saad El Shazly and Ahmad Ismail Ali chief among them) to attack. General Saad El Shazly stated in his published memoires that he strongly and vocally opposed the attack, and told president Sadat that this would be a grave strategic error. Due to this sentiment, El Shazly was practically removed from the line of command. The Egyptian forces brought across their reserves and began their counterattack on 14 October. "The attack, the most massive since the initial Egyptian assault on Yom Kippur, was a total failure, the first major Egyptian reversal of the war. Instead of concentrating forces of maneuvering, except for the wadi thrust, they had expended them in head-on attack against the waiting Israeli brigades. Egyptian losses for the day were estimated at between 150 and 250 tanks."

12. Israel Counter attack and crossing. The following day, October 15, the Israelis launched Operation Abiray-Lev ("Valiant" or "Stouthearted Men")—the counterattack against the Egyptians and crossing of the Suez Canal. The attack was a tremendous change of tactics for the Israelis, who had previously relied on air and tank support—support that had been decimated by the well-

prepared Egyptian forces. Instead, the Israelis used infantry to infiltrate the positions of the Egyptian SAM and anti-tank batteries, which were unable to cope as well with forces on foot.

13. A division led by Major General Ariel Sharon (almost certainly the 143rd Armoured Division) attacked the Egyptian line just north of Bitter Lake, in the vicinity of Ismailiya. The Israelis struck at a weak point in the Egyptian line, the "seam" between the Egyptian Second Army in the north and the Egyptian Third Army in the south. In some of the most brutal fighting of the war in and around the "Chinese Farm" (an irrigation project east of the canal and north of the crossing point), the Israelis opened a hole in the Egyptian line and reached the Suez Canal. A small force crossed the canal and created a bridgehead on the other side. For over 24 hours, troops were ferried across the canal in light inflatable boats, with no armor support of their own. They were well supplied with American-made M72 LAW rockets, negating the threat of Egyptian armor. Once the anti-aircraft and anti-tank defences of the Egyptians had been neutralized, the infantry once again was able to rely on overwhelming tank and air support.

14. Prior to the war, fearing an Israeli crossing of the canal, no Western nation would supply the Israelis with bridging equipment. They were able to purchase and refurbish obsolete modular pontoon bridging equipment from a French WWII scrap lot. The Israelis also constructed a rather sophisticated indigenous "roller bridge" but logistical delays involving heavy congestion on the roads leading to the crossing point delayed its arrival to the canal for several days. Deploying the pontoon bridge on the night of October 16/17, Avraham "Bren" Adan's 162nd Division crossed and raced south, intent on cutting off the Egyptian Third Army before it could retreat west back into Egypt. At the same time, it sent out raiding forces to destroy Egyptian SAM missile batteries east of the canal. By October 19 the Israelis managed to construct four separate bridges just north of the Great Bitter Lake under heavy Egyptian bombardment. By the end of the war the Israelis were well within Egypt, reaching a point 101 kilometers from its capital, Cairo.

The cease fire

The Security Council of the United Nations passed (14-0) Resolution 338 calling for a cease-fire, largely negotiated between the U.S. and Soviet Union, on October 22. It called upon "all parties to the present fighting" to "terminate all military activity immediately." It came into effect 12 hours later at 6:52 p.m. Israeli time. Because it went into effect after darkness, it was impossible for satellite surveillance to determine where the front lines were when the fighting was supposed to stop. Prior to the ceasefire taking effect, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had told Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, "You won't get violent protests from Washington if something happens during the night, while I'm flying. Nothing can happen in Washington until noon tomorrow." Virtually giving Israel a green light to violate the cease-fire.

Egypt's trapped Third ArmyWhen the cease fire came into effect, Israel had lost territory on the east side of the Suez Canal to Egypt but gained territory west of the canal and in the Golan Heights.

When the cease-fire began, the Israeli forces were just a few hundred meters short of their goal—the last road linking Cairo and Suez. During the night, David Elazar requested permission to resume the drive south, and Moshe Dayan approved. The Israeli troops finished the drive south, captured the road, and trapped the Egyptian Third Army east of the Suez Canal.

During the afternoon, two messages from Brezhnev to Nixon were sent through the hotline. Brezhnev demanded that "the most decisive measures be taken without delay" by Moscow and Washington to stop the "flagrant" Israeli violations. Again, Brezhnev urged new action at the Security Council. Brezhnev's language--"why this treachery was allowed by Israel is more obvious to you"--clearly suggested that he suspected that Washington was behind Israel's military moves. Through the CIA back-channel the Egyptians also got in touch with the White House expressing their worries, with Sadat for the first time directly asking Nixon to "intervene effectively even if that necessitates the use of force." Sadat spoke of U.S.-Soviet "guarantees" of the cease-fire which was more likely based on Soviet interpretations than on Kissinger's understanding of the Moscow talks. Replying the same day, Nixon told Sadat that Washington had only "guaranteed" efforts to reach a settlement, but that he had directed Kissinger to "make urgent representations" to Israel to comply with the cease-fire.

The morning of 24 October, Anatoly Dobrynin read to Kissinger an angry letter from Brezhnev arguing that the Israelis were again defying the Security Council by "fiercely attacking … the Egyptian port of Adabei" and fighting Egyptian forces on the Suez Canal's east bank. Expressing confidence in Nixon's power to "influence Israel" and put an end to "provocative behavior," Brezhnev asked for information on U.S. steps to secure Tel Aviv's "strict and immediate compliance" with the UN. Adding to the pressure was a private message from Sadat, followed by a public statement, calling for U.S. and Soviet troops or observers to help implement the cease-fire.

Nuclear alert

In the meantime, Brezhnev sent Nixon a letter in the middle of the night of October 23–24. In that letter, Brezhnev proposed that American and Soviet contingents be dispatched to ensure both sides honor the cease-fire. He also threatened that "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel." In short, the Soviets were threatening to intervene in the war on Egypt's side.

The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and airlift was marshalled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post was set up in the southern Soviet Union. Several air force units were also alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an airbase in Yugoslavia". The Soviets also deployed seven amphibious warfare craft with some 40,000 naval infantry in the Mediterranean.

The message arrived after Nixon had gone to bed. Kissinger immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, CIA Director William Colby, and White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig. The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the Defense Condition (DEFCON) from four to three. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States.

The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai Podgorny. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria," said Premier Alexei Kosygin, while KGB chief Yuri Andropov added that "We shall not unleash the Third World War."[44] In the end, the Soviets reconciled themselves to an Arab defeat. The letter from the American cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply. The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis to an end.

Loses

Post-cease-fire negotiations

On October 24, the UNSC passed Resolution 339, serving as a renewed call for all parties to adhere to the cease fire terms established in Resolution 338. Organized fighting on all fronts ended by October 26. The cease-fire did not end the sporadic clashes along the cease-fire lines, nor did it dissipate military tensions. Egypt's Third Army, cut off and without any means of resupply, was effectively a hostage to the Israelis.

Israel received Kissinger's threat to support a UN withdrawal resolution, but before they could respond, Egyptian national security advisor Hafez Ismail sent Kissinger a stunning message—Egypt was willing to enter into direct talks with

the Israelis, provided that the Israelis agree to allow nonmilitary supplies to reach their army and agree to a complete cease-fire.

The talks took place on October 28, between Israeli Major General Aharon Yariv and Egyptian Major General Muhammad al-Ghani al-Gamasy. Ultimately, Kissinger brought the proposal to Sadat, who agreed almost without debate. United Nations checkpoints were brought in to replace Israeli checkpoints, nonmilitary supplies were allowed to pass, and prisoners-of-war were to be exchanged. A summit in Geneva followed, and ultimately, an armistice agreement was worked out. On January 18, Israel signed a pullback agreement to the east side of the canal, and the last of their troops withdrew from the west side of the canal on March 5, 1974.[47]

On the Syrian front, Shuttle diplomacy by Henry Kissinger eventually produced a disengagement agreement on May 31, 1974, based on exchange of prisoners-of-war, Israeli withdrawal to the Purple Line and the establishment of a UN buffer zone. The agreement ended the skirmishes and exchanges of artillery fire that had occurred frequently along the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line. The UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan.

Participation by other states

From 1971 to 1973, Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya sent Mirage fighters and gave Egypt around $1 billion to arm for war. Algeria sent squadrons of fighters and bombers, armored brigades, and dozens of tanks. Tunisia sent over 1,000 soldiers, who worked with Egyptian forces in the Nile delta, and Sudan sent 3,500 soldiers.

WeaponsThe Arab armies were equipped with predominantly Soviet-made weapons while Israel's armaments were mostly Western-made. The Arab armies' T-62s were equipped with night vision equipment, which the Israeli tanks lacked, giving them an added advantage on the battlefield during the fighting that took part at night. The older IS-3 'Stalin' tank, mounting a powerful 122 mm main gun, still proved its use on the battlefield, giving long-range anti-tank support to the Egyptian Army's T55/T62 tanks.

Long-term effects of the war

The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for direct public discussions since the aftermath of the 1948 war.

On a tactical level, the end of the war saw Israel with territorial gains in the Golan heights and the encirclement of the Egyptian third army. Some believe the cease

fire prevented Israel from landing its harshest blow, as a USMC report asserts: "They were now in position to threaten the rear administrative and supply areas of the entire Egyptian Army. Largely due to the efforts of the Soviet Union, which was fearful of the possibility of a serious Egyptian defeat, the U.N. Security Council imposed a cease-fire effective 22 October."

The report also argues that the Arab side succeeded in surprising Israeli and worldwide intelligence agencies both strategically and tactically: "From a purely military point of view, the first and most important Arab success was the strategic and tactical surprise achieved. While this was aided to no small degree by mistakes made by Israeli Intelligence and the political and military leadership in Israel, the bulk of the credit must go to the highly sophisticated deception plan mounted by the Egyptians. They succeeded in convincing the Israeli Command that the intensive military activity to the west of the Canal during the summer and autumn of 1973 was nothing more than a series of training operations and maneuvers. This deception must be marked as one of the outstanding plans of deception mounted in the course of military history. The plan was successful not only as far as Israeli intelligence was concerned, but also with world-wide intelligence agencies."

For the Arab states (and Egypt in particular), the psychological trauma of their defeat in the Six-Day War had been healed. In many ways, it allowed them to negotiate with the Israelis as equals. However, given that the war had started about as well as the Arab leaders could have wanted, at the end they had made only limited territorial gains in the Sinai front, while Israel gained more territory on the Golan Heights than it held before the war; also given the fact that Israel managed to gain a foothold on African soil west of the canal, the war helped convince many in the Arab World that Israel could not be defeated militarily, thereby strengthening peace movements. The war effectively ended the old Arab ambition of destroying Israel by force.[49]

The war had a stunning effect on the population in Israel. Following their victory in the Six-Day War, the Israeli military had become complacent. The shock and sudden defeats that occurred at the beginning of the war sent a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had thought they had military supremacy in the region.[50] However, in time, they began to realize what an astounding, almost unprecedented, turnaround they had achieved: "Reeling from a surprise attack on two fronts with the bulk of its army still unmobilized, and confronted by staggering new battlefield realities, Israel's situation was one that could readily bring strong nations to their knees. Yet, within days, it had regained its footing and within less than two weeks it was threatening both enemy capitals, an achievement having few historical parallels." [51] In Israel, however, the casualty rate was high. Per capita, Israel suffered three times as many casualties in 3 weeks of fighting as the United States did during almost a decade of fighting in Vietnam.[52]

In response to U.S. support of Israel, the Arab members of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5% per month on October 17. On October 19, President Nixon authorized a major allocation of arms supplies and $2.2 billion in appropriations for Israel. In response, Saudi Arabia declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by other oil exporters and extended against the Netherlands and other states, causing the 1973 energy crisis.[53]

The initial success greatly increased Sadat's popularity, giving him much firmer control of the Egyptian state and the opportunity to initiate many of the reforms he felt were necessary. In later years this would fade, and in the destructive anti-government food riot of 1977 in Cairo had the slogan "Hero of the crossing, where is our breakfast?" (" الفطور؟ فين العبور، بطل -Yā batl al-`abūr, fēn al" ,"ياfutūr?").

Fallout in Israel

A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the war ended. It was led by Motti Ashkenazi, commander of Budapest, the northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and the only one during the war not to be captured by the Egyptians.[54] Anger against the Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. Shimon Agranat, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an inquiry, the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days.[55]

The Agranat Commission published its preliminary findings on April 2, 1974. Six people were held particularly responsible for Israel's failings:

IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar was recommended for dismissal, after the Commission found he bore "personal responsibility for the assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF."

Intelligence Chief, Aluf Eli Zeira, and his deputy, head of Research, Brigadier-General Aryeh Shalev, were recommended for dismissal.

Lt. Colonel Bandman, head of the Aman desk for Egypt, and Lt. Colonel Gedelia, chief of intelligence for the Southern Command, were recommended for transfer away from intelligence duties.

Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern front, was recommended by the initial report to be relieved of active duty. [56] He was forced to leave the army after the publication of the Commission's final report, on January 30, 1975, which found that "he failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our troops were caught."[57]

Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which "had stressed that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security failings, not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside its mandate"—inflamed it.

Although it had cleared Meir and Dayan of all responsibility, public calls for their resignation (especially Dayan's) became more vociferous.[58]

Finally, on April 11, 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and was turned down both times by Meir. Yitzhak Rabin, who had spent most of the war as an advisor to Elazar in an unofficial capacity,[59] became head of the new Government, which was seated in June.

In 1999, the issue was revisited by Israel's political leadership, and in order to correct the shortcomings of the war from being repeated, the Israeli National Security Council was created to help in better coordinating between the different security and intelligence bodies, and between these and the political branch.

Camp David Accords

Rabin's government was hamstrung by a pair of scandals, and he was forced to step down in 1977. The right-wing Likud party, under the prime ministership of Menachem Begin, won the elections that followed. This marked a historic change in the Israeli political landscape as for the first time since Israel's founding, a coalition not led by the Labour party was in control of the government.

Sadat, who had entered the war in order to recover the Sinai, grew frustrated at the slow pace of the peace process. In a 1977 interview with CBS News' Walter Cronkite, Sadat admitted under pointed questioning that he was open to a more constructive dialog for peace, including a state visit. This seemed to open the floodgates, as in a later interview with the same reporter, the normally hard-line Begin - perhaps not wishing to be compared unfavorably to Sadat - said he too would be amenable to better relations and offered his invitation for such a visit. Thus in November of that year, Sadat took the unprecedented step of visiting Israel, becoming the first Arab leader to do so, and so implicitly recognized Israel.

The act jump-started the peace process. United States President Jimmy Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to a summit at Camp David to negotiate a final peace. The talks took place from September 5–17, 1978. Ultimately, the talks succeeded, and Israel and Egypt signed the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979. Israel withdrew its troops and settlers from the Sinai, in exchange for normal relations with Egypt and a lasting peace.

Many in the Arab community were outraged at Egypt's peace with Israel. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. Until then, Egypt had been "at the helm of the Arab world."[60]

Anwar Sadat was assassinated two years later, on October 6, 1981, while attending a parade marking the eighth anniversary of the start of the war, by army members who were outraged at his negotiations with Israel.

Commemorations

Yom Kippur is the holiest day for Jews. Apart from the usual ceremonies of the holiday and the fasting, in Israel Yom Kippur also commemorates the war of 1973. This is very apparent in the Israeli media.

October 6 is a national holiday in Egypt called Armed Forces Day. It is a national holiday in Syria as well.[61]

In commemoration of the war, many places in Egypt were named after the October 6 date and Ramadan 10, its equivalent in the Islamic calendar. The examples of these commemorations are the famous 6th of October Bridge كوبري

اكتوبر من and the known cities 6th of October city and 10th of Ramadan السادسcity.

ELEMENT OF SURPRISE IN YOM KIPPUR WAR

The Concept

1. The IDF's Directorate of Military Intelligence's (abbreviated as "Aman") Research Department was responsible for formulating the nation's intelligence estimate. Their assessments on the likelihood of war were based on several assumptions.

(a) First, it was assumed correctly that Syria would not go to war with Israel unless Egypt went to war as well.

(b) Second, they learned from a high-ranking Egyptian informant (who remains confidential to this day, known only as "The Source" ) that Egypt wanted to regain all of the Sinai, but would not go to war until the Soviets had supplied Egypt with fighter-bombers to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and Scud missiles to be used against Israeli cities as a deterrent against Israeli attacks on Egyptian infrastructure. Since the Soviets had not yet supplied the fighter bombers, and the Scud missiles had only arrived in Egypt in late August, and in addition it would take four months to train the Egyptian ground crews, Aman predicted war with Egypt was not imminent. This assumption about Egypt's strategic plans, known as "the concept," strongly prejudiced their thinking and led them to dismiss other war warnings.

The Strategic Deception

2. The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Both the Israelis and the Americans felt that the expulsion of the Soviet military observers had severely reduced the effectiveness of the Egyptian army. The Egyptians ensured that there was a continual stream of false information on maintenance problems

and a lack of personnel to operate the most advanced equipment. The Egyptians made repeated misleading reports about lack of spare parts that also made their way to the Israelis. Sadat had so long engaged in brinkmanship, that his frequent war threats were being ignored by the world. In May and August 1973 the Egyptian army had engaged in exercises by the border and mobilizing in response both times had cost the Israeli army some $10 million.

3. For the week leading up to Yom Kippur, the Egyptians staged a week-long training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed these movements as mere training exercises. Movements of Syrian troops towards the border were puzzling, but not a threat because, Aman believed, they would not attack without Egypt and Egypt would not attack until the Soviet weaponry arrived.

The obvious reason for choosing the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur for staging a surprise attack on Israel was that on this specific day (unlike any other holiday) the country comes to a complete standstill. On Yom Kippur, the holiest day for Jews, not only observant, but most secular Jews fast, abstain from any use of fire, electricity, engines, communications, etc., and all road traffic comes to a standstill. Many soldiers leave military facilities for home during the holiday and Israel is most vulnerable, especially with much of its army demobilized. The war also coincided with the Muslim holiday of Ramadan, meaning that many of the Muslim soldiers were also fasting. Many others believe that the attack on Yom Kippur surprisingly helped Israel to easily recruit reserves from their homes and synagogues, because the nature of the Yom Kippur holiday meant that roads and communication would be largely open, to help organize and mobilize the military.

Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with Sadat and [Syrian President] Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in."[14] On the night of September 25, Hussein secretly flew to Tel Aviv to warn Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir of an impending Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they [Egypt] would cooperate'".[15] Surprisingly, this warning fell on deaf ears. Aman concluded that the king had not told it anything it did not already know. "Eleven warnings of war were received by Israel during September from well placed sources. But [Mossad chief] Zvi Zamir continued to insist that war was not an Arab option. Not even Hussein's warnings succeeded in stirring his doubts".[16] He would later remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable [of War]"[17]

Finally, Zvi Zamir personally went to Europe to meet with the Source (the high-ranking Egyptian official), at midnight on October 5/6th. At that meeting, The Source informed him that a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack on Israel was imminent.

It was this warning in particular, combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded the Israeli high command into action. Just hours before the attack began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli reserves.[18] Ironically, calling up the reserves proved to be easier than usual, as almost all of the troops were at synagogue or at home for the holiday.

Lack of an Israeli pre-emptive attackUpon learning of the impending attack, Prime Minister of Israel Golda Meir made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike. The Israeli strategy was, for the most part, based on the precept that if war was imminent, Israel would launch a pre-emptive strike. It was assumed that Israel's intelligence services would give, at the worst case, about 48 hours notice prior to an Arab attack.

Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, and Israeli general David Elazar met at 8:05 a.m. the morning of Yom Kippur, 6 hours before the war was to begin. Dayan began the meeting by arguing that war was not a certainty. Elazar then presented his argument, in favor of a pre-emptive attack against Syrian airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00 p.m., and Syrian ground forces at 5:00 p.m. "When the presentations were done, the prime minister hemmed uncertainly for a few moments but then came to a clear decision. There would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing American assistance soon and it was imperative that it not be blamed for starting the war. 'If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody', she said."[19] European nations, under threat of an Arab oil embargo and trade boycott, had stopped supplying Israel with munitions. As a result, Israel was totally dependent on the United States to resupply its army, and was particularly sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship. After Meir had made the decision not to strike first, a message arrived from Henry Kissinger: "Don't preempt."[20]

Some say that in retrospect the decision was a sound one. While Operation Nickel Grass, the American airlift of supplies during the war which began October 13, did not immediately replace Israel's losses in equipment, it did allow Israel to expend what it did have more freely.[21] Had they struck first, according to Henry Kissinger, they would not have received "so much as a nail".

Israeli Intelligence and theYom Kippur War of 1973

1. The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 was a terrible surprise, which put Israel's security - and even survival - in jeopardy. By the end of the war, Israel

had turned the tables and both Cairo and Damascus were under threat. But that did not diminish the sense of shock which shook the nation in the aftermath of the war. How could such a disaster have happened? Israel was supposed to be nearly "invincible", in the minds of many of her military and political leaders. That sense of confidence deflated quickly in the aftermath of the war. Much of the blame fell on the shoulders of the Intelligence community, which was blamed for not accurately assessing clear information that Egypt and Syria planned to go to war on October 6, 1973.

2. The Soviets were deeply involved in the defense of Egypt - even to the point of clashing with Israel - the Americans became concerned about a strategic conflagration and negotiated a cease-fire in the form of the Rogers Plan that went into effect on August 7, 1970. This plan called for a freeze of Egyptian and Israeli deployments as of August 7, 1970. The Egyptians broke that part of the agreement the next day, moving their Soviet anti-aircraft batteries close to the banks of the Suez Canal. The Soviets and Egyptians gambled that Israel would not respond sosoon after the cease-fire went into effect - and they were right. Israel did nothing. This would have telling effect three years later, when Egyptian anti-aircraft batteries along the Suez Canal pounded the IAF in the first days of the October 1973 War. At the time, in the summer of 1970, however, when "Israel complained to Washington that the Egyptians had breached the agreement, Ray Cline, the head of the State Department intelligence unit…told the White house that the Israeli complaint was baseless. When Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin told his military attaché, General Eli Zeira, what had happened, Zeira immediately asked Tel Aviv to send him a photographic interpreter and a set of aerial photographs showing the Egyptian deployment. These duly arrived in Washington and Zeira was summoned to the White House, where he laid out the evidence before President Nixon. Nixon, angry with Cline, then ordered the Pentagon to remove its veto on several categories of weapons the Israelis had asked for during the preceding months."

3. The main causes of the failure of the Israel intelligence and the surprise attack can be enumerated as follows:-

(a) Reliance on the “Concept”. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a concept (or "conceptzia", as the Israelis called it) took hold that the Arabs were unwilling to go to war against Israel. The concept was based on the idea that the 1967 War was such an overwhelming victory that the Arabs would not be able to overcome Israel for the time being. Thus even when it appeared clear that the Arabs had aggressive intentions, Israeli analysts refused to believe that the Arabs would actually follow through with them.

By mid-1973 Israeli military intelligence was almost completely aware of Arab war plans. They knew that the Egyptian Second and Third Armies would attempt to cross the Suez Canal to a depth of about ten kilometers

inside the Israeli side of Sinai. Following the infantry assault, Egyptian armored divisions would then attempt to cross the Suez Canal and advance all the way to the Mitla and Gidi Passes - strategic crossing-points for any army in the Sinai. Naval units and paratroopers would then attempt to capture Sharm el-Sheikh at the southern end of the Sinai. Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence) was also aware of many details of the Syrian war plan.

But Israeli analysts did not believe the Arabs were serious about going to war. Even when all the signs indicated that the Arabs were prepared for war, Israeli analysts continued to believe they would not - almost until the day the war broke out. Why did this happen?

(b) More reliance on AMAN.

(b) Arab political and military deception. Part of the reason for Israeli complacency on the eve of the war was due to Arab political and military deception. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (he had replaced Nasser after his death in 1970) frequently and publicly declared his intention to attack Israel. He called 1971 "the Year of Decision" - but 1971 came and went and Sadat did not attack. In 1972 he continued to make threats of his aggressive intentions towards Israel. By 1973 Sadat had become, in the minds of Israeli Intelligence, "a case of crying wolf."

By September and October of 1973, when Egypt really was preparing for war, it was believed that he really was not, because there had been false alarms in the past. Egyptian ministers held talks expressing their peaceful intentions to Western Governments throughout much of 1973. Egyptian military deception was even more effective. Reports were given instructing cadets in military colleges to resume their courses on October 9, and officers were allowed to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. "On 4 October the Egyptian media reported that 20,000 reservists had been demobilized. Immediately before the assault on the morning of 6 October, the Egyptians deployed special squads of troops along the canal; their task was to move about without helmets, weapons or shirts, and to swim, hang out fishing lines and eat oranges."

All of these reports and actions were monitored by Aman - as they were intended to be - and they utterly fooled Israeli Military Intelligence.

(c) Secrecy of Plan. Even more than that, the Egyptians and Syrians were very careful about who knew of the impending war plans in advance of October 6. In Egypt, only President Sadat and his Minister of War, Ismail Ali, knew about the war plans before October 1. In Syria, no more than ten people - including President Assad, his Minister of War and Commander-in Chief, the Director of Operations, the director of Military Intelligence, the commander of the Air Force and the Commander of the Anti-Aircraft Defense networks - knew

about the impending assault on Israel. "Egyptian army corps and divisional commanders, and equivalent General Staff officers, were told of the war on 1 October at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Their Syrian counterparts learned of the war and D-Day at a similar meeting in Damascus. Brigade and battalion commanders in both armies learned of the imminent offensive only on 5 October or the following morning, on the actual day of the attack. The vast majority of Egyptian and Syrian officers and troops found out only an hour or two before the actual assault."

Egyptian and Syrian leaders were so wary of Israel's Signals Interception capabilities that they "refrained completely from exchanging messages by telephone, radio-telephone or cables."

Syria also engaged in political deception, but to a far lesser extent than Egypt. For example, "Radio Damascus announced on 4 October that President Assad would begin a nine-day tour of Syria's eastern provinces on 10 October."

It appears that while the Egyptians engaged in deception, they didn't put much stock in completely fooling Israel's Intelligence services. "Egyptian intelligence in fact assessed that Israel would have a 'three-to-fifteen day concrete warning ' of the impending attack.'" They expected an Israeli counter-attack 6-8 hours after the start of the Egyptian assault, with 24 hours being the best-case scenario. The Egyptians were wrong about that; Israel was far slower to know about the attack than the Egyptians anticipated, and the Israeli counter-attack did not begin for a full two days after the beginning of the Egyptian assault (code-named "Operation Badr.")

The date set for the Egyptian/Syrian assault, October 6, was chosen only on September 12, and perhaps as late as October 1 or 2. In any case, the final timing of the attack - 2 p.m. - was only chosen on October 3. "The Syrians preferred an assault at dawn (with the sun behind their back); the Egyptians preferred sunset. The compromise struck was 2 p.m."

As early as April and May 1973, a full six months before the actual combined Egyptian/Syrian attack on the Sinai and Golan fronts, Israeli Intelligence had been picking up clear signals of Egypt's intentions for war. It was recognized that Sadat had the necessary divisions prepared to cross the Suez Canal, he had the bridging equipment to facilitate his army's crossing, and he had SAMs to protect his own divisional crossings from the penetrating raids of the Israeli Air Force.

Military Intelligence (Aman) Chief Eli Zeira was most confident in expressing the view that the probability of war was low. Mossad Chief Zvi Zamir was less dismissive of Arab intentions, as were Chief of Staff David Elazar and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.

April and May passed without event, except for a small-scale mobilization of Israeli reserves. This mobilization had been costly, and in terms of actual need, as it turned out, not necessary at the time - except perhaps as a deterrence factor. In August 1973, the Syrians carried out a huge deployment of troops and weaponry along the Golan front, accompanied by "a tightly packed (Surface-to-Air) missile network, which covered the Golan skies as well as the air space above the Syrian divisions." Aman dismissed this deployment as a defensive one against Israeli air strikes. Again, nothing came of it.

Military Intelligence's prognosis that war would not break out was correct in the spring and summer of 1973. Therefore, they were believed again in the fall, with catastrophic results.

On April 7, 1967, two months before the outbreak of the Six-Day War of June 1967, Israel had shot down six Syrian planes to no Israeli losses in a dogfight above the Golan. On September 13, 1973, Israel shot down 12 Syrian aircraft to1 Israeli loss when IAF jets were attacked during a reconnaissance mission over Syrian territory. This naturally reinforced the military belief that the Arabs would not attack due to Israel's once-again proven air capability.

At the same time, Israel had not yet experienced the effectiveness of the Arab Surface-to Air missile defenses.

A few days later, after the September 13 air battle, Aman Chief Eli Zeira argued that the Arabs would not contemplate even a war of attrition before the end of 1975.

Egyptian build-ups continued to be explained away as a practice exercise without harmful intentions. But Syrian deployments were more worrying. Even after the battle of September 13, Syrian reinforcements were sent to the Golan accompanied by the cancellation of leaves as well as a simultaneous call-up of Syrian reserves accompanied by a state of alert. All of these developments were worrying, especially to Northern Command. But because "the concept" still held that Syria would not attack without Egypt, and Egypt was not planning to go to war, that meant that Syrian intentions could not really be aggressive in nature. This view held even after US Intelligence in late September sent an assessment that a combined Egyptian-Syrian attack was possible. Israel responded that it was not something to worry about.

Nevertheless, Syrian deployments below the Golan Heights were worrying enough for Israel to send more infantry and tanks to the Golan at the end of September. These reinforcements, slight as they were, were to make all the difference between holding the line and utter defeat and an invasion of Northern Israel on the first day of the war. Even these reinforcements were not easy to authorize. Mossad Chief Zamir continued to express his concern over the Syrian build-up in contradistinction to Aman Chief Eli Zeira's tranquilizing assessment of

the situation on October 3. "Zamir apparently tried to alert Golda Meir to the situation, but the prime minister told him to talk to Dayan." Dayan was influenced by his own optimistic assessments as well as those of Military Intelligence, and was slow to call up reserves.

In the post-war research assessment of Israel's Intelligence failure, it emerged that only one of Aman's researchers refused to be swayed by "the concept." His name was Lieutenant Binyamin Siman-Tov, a junior Military Intelligence officer. He argued that the huge Egyptian deployments and exercises along the Suez Canal "seemed to be camouflage for a real canal-crossing assault." When his first assessment was ignored on October 1, he sent a more comprehensive one on October 3. Both were ignored by his superior, and Siman-Tov, low as he was in the rank of the IDF hierarchy, was to have no influence on the upper-level Intelligence assessments of Egyptian intentions.

On October 4, however, Mossad Chief Zvi Zamir began getting more worried. That day, Soviet advisers and their families left both Egypt and Syria. Meanwhile, transport aircraft, apparently filled with military hardware, landed in Damascus on October 5. The night before, aerial photographs revealed that Egyptian and Syrian concentrations of tanks, infantry, and SAMs were at an unprecedented high. Aman "Research Department Officers later described the "'hammer-blow effect the photographs had on them.'" Yet little was done.

Perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects of the failure of intelligence to properly assess information is the possibility that as early as September 25, 1973, 12 days before the outbreak of war, "prime minister Golda Meir received a personal warning of the impending Egyptian-Syrian assault from King Hussein of Jordan…" Jordan did send a token force to the Syrian side of the Golan Heights to show his concern for Arab solidarity, but he kept his own front with Israel completely quiet during the war. Israel was thus able to leave a skeleton force of a mere 28 tanks on the Jordan River boundary, enabling Israel's Army and Air Force to concentrate on the direct Syrian and Egyptian threats.

Later, on October 5, 1973, at 2:30 a.m., Mossad Chief Zamir received a cable from a trusted source expressing that war was certain. No date or exact time was given, but the message was clear: war was certain. This agent had been described "by one senior Israeli as 'the best agent any country ever had in wartime, a miraculous source…'" The Mossad Bureau Chief, "the first Israeli official to actually see the cable and digest its shattering significance, said later: 'We'd never had anything like it.'"

However, Zamir, despite his alarm, did not tell Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, or Chief of Staff David Elazar about the message. He did inform Aman Chief Eli Zeira of the contents of the message, and expressed his certainty that war was imminent. Yet Zamir decided to go to

Europe in order to personally meet the source at midnight on the night of October 5/6. Eli Zeira waited to hear from him before taking any action.

At 3:45 a.m., on October 6, Zamir called Zeira over an open telephone line (due to the absence of a cipher clerk at an unknown Israeli embassy in Europe. There were no clerks available due to the Yom Kippur holiday) and informed Zeira war would come that day at sunset. Subsequent analysis revealed that the message was distorted en route to Israel's top military and political leaders, and instead of expressing the certainty that war would break out "in the afternoon hours" or "before sunset", it had become a definite "sunset." Sunset on October 6 was 5:20 p.m., but somehow the hour became fixed as 6 p.m. The source also asserted that the attack would be a combined and simultaneous one of Egyptian and Syrian forces.

The attack did not begin at 6 p.m., however; it began at 1:55 p.m., and Israel was woefully unprepared. On the Golan Heights 1400 Syrian tanks and over 1000 artillery pieces faced 177 Israeli tanks and 50 artillery pieces - and only that number was there due to the last-minute partial call-up of reserves. The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal, easily overcoming Israeli defenses, and established a bridgehead about ten kilometers into the Sinai.

Israel fought a tenacious battle on the Golan and turned near-defeat on October 6 to a recapture of almost all of the Golan by the evening of October 7. But Syria's rapid advance towards the Sea of Galilee and Israel's northern settlements unleashed a fear that has been hard for Israel to ever forget.

On the Sinai front, Egypt nearly had the Mitla and Gidi passes open to them before sufficient Israeli reserves arrived to defend Israel's southern borders. Military Intelligence had seriously underestimated the lethal effectiveness of the Soviet-made Sagger anti-tank missiles, which the Egyptian infantry used to devastating effect against Israeli armor, as well as the Surface-to-Air Missiles, which both the Egyptians and Syrians used to devastating effect against the Israeli Air Force.

Intelligence did pick up on certain changes that had occurred on the battlefield during the war, but it was mainly the courage, ingenuity, and leadership of the armed forces on Israel's southern and northern fronts that enabled Israel to turn the tide of battle. Within two days, the tide had turned on the Golan front. It took more than a week, but by the middle of October Israel had turned the tide in the Sinai, pummeling Egyptian armor, and had crossed the Suez Canal to destroy Egypt's defenses from the rear. By late October, both Cairo and Damascus were exposed to an Israeli advance, and only dire Soviet threats and Superpower intervention put an end to the hostilities and certain and complete Egyptian and Syrian defeat.

While the tide turned, the failure of Intelligence has never been forgotten in Israel. Many lessons were learned, and many people in the Intelligence community were fired. In 1982, during Israel's invasion of Lebanon, Intelligence was right up on Syrian defenses and destroyed them far more easily than was done in 1973. But the misconceptions and even hubris that dominated the thinking of Israel's military and political leaders at the time has been tempered by a far greater wariness of Arab intentions after the devastating surprise Egyptian-Syrian attack on October 6, 1973.

Israeli Intelligence and theYom Kippur War of 1973

By Doron Geller

The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 was a terrible surprise, which put Israel's security - and even survival - in jeopardy. By the end of the war, Israel had turned the tables and both Cairo and Damascus were under threat. But that did not diminish the sense of shock which shook the nation in the aftermath of the war. How could such a disaster have happened? Israel was supposed to be nearly "invincible", in the minds of many of her military and political leaders. That sense of confidence deflated quickly in the aftermath of the war. Much of the blame fell on the shoulders of the Intelligence community, which was blamed for not accurately assessing clear information that Egypt and Syria planned to go to war on October 6, 1973.

Israel's victory in 1967 extended her borders to all of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. Israel set up electronic eavesdropping and early warning stations in the Jordan Valley along the border with Jordan, on Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights, looking into Syria, and along the East Bank of the Suez Canal, which enabled Israel to observe Egyptian forces on the other side.

By 1969, the Israeli Air Force was using drones to photograph and monitor Egyptian, Syrian, and later, Jordanian troops. By July of 1969, the Israeli Air Force was called on to engage in deep penetration bombing in the Nile Valley inside of Egypt in response to the continuance of Egypt's declared "War of Attrition."

In response to the Israeli Air Force's (IAF) attacks, Egyptian President Nasser asked the Soviets for help in defending Egyptian air space. "The Soviets responded quickly, sending batteries of SAM's (Surface-to-Air), including the latest SAM-3s, with Soviet crews, and squadrons of MiG-21s, with Soviet pilots and ground crews."

The Soviets used their MiGs to cover the Egyptian troops along the Suez Canal - as well as to move up their SAM batteries as close to the Israeli side as possible. At first Israel refrained from engaging the Soviet-piloted MIGs. That changed in July 1970, however - when in a clash, the IAF shot down 4 or 5 Soviet MiGs in a dogfight off of the Suez Canal.

With the Soviets deeply involved in the defense of Egypt - even to the point of clashing with Israel - the Americans became concerned about a strategic conflagration and negotiated a cease-fire in the form of the Rogers Plan that went into effect on August 7, 1970. This plan called for a freeze of Egyptian and Israeli deployments as of August 7, 1970. The Egyptians broke that part of the agreement the next day, moving their Soviet anti-aircraft batteries close to the banks of the Suez Canal. The Soviets and Egyptians gambled that Israel would not respond so soon after the cease-fire went into effect - and they were right. Israel did nothing. This would have telling effect three years later, when Egyptian anti-aircraft batteries along the Suez Canal pounded the IAF in the first days of the October 1973 War. At the time, in the summer of 1970, however, when "Israel complained to Washington that the Egyptians had breached the agreement, Ray Cline, the head of the State Department intelligence unit…told the White house that the Israeli complaint was baseless. When Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin told his military attache, General Eli Zeira, what had happened, Zeira immediately asked Tel Aviv to send him a photographic interpreter and a set of aerial photographs showing the Egyptian deployment. These duly arrived in Washington and Zeira was summoned to the White House, where he laid out the evidence before President Nixon. Nixon, angry with Cline, then ordered the Pentagon to remove its veto on several categories of weapons the Israelis had asked for during the preceding months."

By mid-1973 Israeli military intelligence was almost completely aware of Arab war plans. They knew that the Egyptian Second and Third Armies would attempt to cross the Suez Canal to a depth of about ten kilometers inside the Israeli side of Sinai. Following the infantry assault, Egyptian armored divisions would then attempt to cross the Suez Canal and advance all the way to the Mitla and Gidi Passes - strategic crossing-points for any army in the Sinai. Naval units and paratroopers would then attempt to capture Sharm el-Sheikh at the southern end of the Sinai. Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence) was also aware of many details of the Syrian war plan.

But Israeli analysts did not believe the Arabs were serious about going to war. Even when all the signs indicated that the Arabs were prepared for war, Israeli analysts continued to believe they would not - almost until the day the war broke out. Why did this happen?

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a concept (or "conceptzia", as the Israelis called it) took hold that the Arabs were unwilling to go to war against Israel. The

concept was based on the idea that the 1967 War was such an overwhelming victory that the Arabs would not be able to overcome Israel for the time being. Thus even when it appeared clear that the Arabs had aggressive intentions, Israeli analysts refused to believe that the Arabs would actually follow through with them.

Part of the reason for Israeli complacency on the eve of the war was due to Arab political and military deception. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (he had replaced Nasser after his death in 1970) frequently and publicly declared his intention to attack Israel. He called 1971 "the Year of Decision" - but 1971 came and went and Sadat did not attack. In 1972 he continued to make threats of his aggressive intentions towards Israel. By 1973 Sadat had become, in the minds of Israeli Intelligence, "a case of crying wolf."

By September and October of 1973, when Egypt really was preparing for war, it was believed that he really was not, because there had been false alarms in the past. Egyptian ministers held talks expressing their peaceful intentions to Western Governments throughout much of 1973. Egyptian military deception was even more effective. Reports were given instructing cadets in military colleges to resume their courses on October 9, and officers were allowed to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. "On 4 October the Egyptian media reported that 20,000 reservists had been demobilized. Immediately before the assault on the morning of 6 October, the Egyptians deployed special squads of troops along the canal; their task was to move about without helmets, weapons or shirts, and to swim, hang out fishing lines and eat oranges."

All of these reports and actions were monitored by Aman - as they were intended to be - and they utterly fooled Israeli Military Intelligence.

Even more than that, the Egyptians and Syrians were very careful about who knew of the impending war plans in advance of October 6. In Egypt, only President Sadat and his Minister of War, Ismail Ali, knew about the war plans before October 1. In Syria, no more than ten people - including President Assad, his Minister of War and Commander-in Chief, the Director of Operations, the director of Military Intelligence, the commander of the Air Force and the Commander of the Anti-Aircraft Defense networks - knew about the impending assault on Israel. "Egyptian army corps and divisional commanders, and equivalent General Staff officers, were told of the war on 1 October at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Their Syrian counterparts learned of the war and D-Day at a similar meeting in Damascus. Brigade and battalion commanders in both armies learned of the imminent offensive only on 5 October or the following morning, on the actual day of the attack. The vast majority of Egyptian and Syrian officers and troops found out only an hour or two before the actual assault."

Egyptian and Syrian leaders were so wary of Israel's Signals Interception capabilities that they "refrained completely from exchanging messages by telephone, radio-telephone or cables."

Syria also engaged in political deception, but to a far lesser extent than Egypt. For example, "Radio Damascus announced on 4 October that President Assad would begin a nine-day tour of Syria's eastern provinces on 10 October."

It appears that while the Egyptians engaged in deception, they didn't put much stock in completely fooling Israel's Intelligence services. "Egyptian intelligence in fact assessed that Israel would have a 'three-to-fifteen day concrete warning ' of the impending attack.'" They expected an Israeli counter-attack 6-8 hours after the start of the Egyptian assault, with 24 hours being the best-case scenario. The Egyptians were wrong about that; Israel was far slower to know about the attack than the Egyptians anticipated, and the Israeli counter-attack did not begin for a full two days after the beginning of the Egyptian assault (code-named "Operation Badr.")

The date set for the Egyptian/Syrian assault, October 6, was chosen only on September 12, and perhaps as late as October 1 or 2. In any case, the final timing of the attack - 2 p.m. - was only chosen on October 3. "The Syrians preferred an assault at dawn (with the sun behind their back); the Egyptians preferred sunset. The compromise struck was 2 p.m."

As early as April and May 1973, a full six months before the actual combined Egyptian/Syrian attack on the Sinai and Golan fronts, Israeli Intelligence had been picking up clear signals of Egypt's intentions for war. It was recognized that Sadat had the necessary divisions prepared to cross the Suez Canal, he had the bridging equipment to facilitate his army's crossing, and he had SAMs to protect his own divisional crossings from the penetrating raids of the Israeli Air Force.

Military Intelligence (Aman) Chief Eli Zeira was most confident in expressing the view that the probability of war was low. Mossad Chief Zvi Zamir was less dismissive of Arab intentions, as were Chief of Staff David Elazar and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.

April and May passed without event, except for a small-scale mobilization of Israeli reserves. This mobilization had been costly, and in terms of actual need, as it turned out, not necessary at the time - except perhaps as a deterrence factor. In August 1973, the Syrians carried out a huge deployment of troops and weaponry along the Golan front, accompanied by "a tightly packed (Surface-to-Air) missile network, which covered the Golan skies as well as the air space above the Syrian divisions." Aman dismissed this deployment as a defensive

one against Israeli air strikes. Again, nothing came of it.

Military Intelligence's prognosis that war would not break out was correct in the spring and summer of 1973. Therefore, they were believed again in the fall, with catastrophic results.

On April 7, 1967, two months before the outbreak of the Six-Day War of June 1967, Israel had shot down six Syrian planes to no Israeli losses in a dogfight above the Golan. On September 13, 1973, Israel shot down 12 Syrian aircraft to1 Israeli loss when IAF jets were attacked during a reconnaissance mission over Syrian territory. This naturally reinforced the military belief that the Arabs would not attack due to Israel's once-again proven air capability.

At the same time, Israel had not yet experienced the effectiveness of the Arab Surface-to Air missile defenses.

A few days later, after the September 13 air battle, Aman Chief Eli Zeira argued that the Arabs would not contemplate even a war of attrition before the end of 1975.

Egyptian build-ups continued to be explained away as a practice exercise without harmful intentions. But Syrian deployments were more worrying. Even after the battle of September 13, Syrian reinforcements were sent to the Golan accompanied by the cancellation of leaves as well as a simultaneous call-up of Syrian reserves accompanied by a state of alert. All of these developments were worrying, especially to Northern Command. But because "the concept" still held that Syria would not attack without Egypt, and Egypt was not planning to go to war, that meant that Syrian intentions could not really be aggressive in nature. This view held even after US Intelligence in late September sent an assessment that a combined Egyptian-Syrian attack was possible. Israel responded that it was not something to worry about.

Nevertheless, Syrian deployments below the Golan Heights were worrying enough for Israel to send more infantry and tanks to the Golan at the end of September. These reinforcements, slight as they were, were to make all the difference between holding the line and utter defeat and an invasion of Northern Israel on the first day of the war. Even these reinforcements were not easy to authorize. Mossad Chief Zamir continued to express his concern over the Syrian build-up in contradistinction to Aman Chief Eli Zeira's tranquilizing assessment of the situation on October 3. "Zamir apparently tried to alert Golda Meir to the situation, but the prime minister told him to talk to Dayan." Dayan was influenced by his own optimistic assessments as well as those of Military Intelligence, and was slow to call up reserves.

In the post-war research assessment of Israel's Intelligence failure, it emerged

that only one of Aman's researchers refused to be swayed by "the concept." His name was Lieutenant Binyamin Siman-Tov, a junior Military Intelligence officer. He argued that the huge Egyptian deployments and exercises along the Suez Canal "seemed to be camouflage for a real canal-crossing assault." When his first assessment was ignored on October 1, he sent a more comprehensive one on October 3. Both were ignored by his superior, and Siman-Tov, low as he was in the rank of the IDF hierarchy, was to have no influence on the upper-level Intelligence assessments of Egyptian intentions.

On October 4, however, Mossad Chief Zvi Zamir began getting more worried. That day, Soviet advisers and their families left both Egypt and Syria. Meanwhile, transport aircraft, apparently filled with military hardware, landed in Damascus on October 5. The night before, aerial photographs revealed that Egyptian and Syrian concentrations of tanks, infantry, and SAMs were at an unprecedented high. Aman "Research Department Officers later described the "'hammer-blow effect the photographs had on them.'" Yet little was done.

Perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects of the failure of intelligence to properly assess information is the possibility that as early as September 25, 1973, 12 days before the outbreak of war, "prime minister Golda Meir received a personal warning of the impending Egyptian-Syrian assault from King Hussein of Jordan…" Jordan did send a token force to the Syrian side of the Golan Heights to show his concern for Arab solidarity, but he kept his own front with Israel completely quiet during the war. Israel was thus able to leave a skeleton force of a mere 28 tanks on the Jordan River boundary, enabling Israel's Army and Air Force to concentrate on the direct Syrian and Egyptian threats.

Later, on October 5, 1973, at 2:30 a.m., Mossad Chief Zamir received a cable from a trusted source expressing that war was certain. No date or exact time was given, but the message was clear: war was certain. This agent had been described "by one senior Israeli as 'the best agent any country ever had in wartime, a miraculous source…'" The Mossad Bureau Chief, "the first Israeli official to actually see the cable and digest its shattering significance, said later: 'We'd never had anything like it.'"

However, Zamir, despite his alarm, did not tell Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, or Chief of Staff David Elazar about the message. He did inform Aman Chief Eli Zeira of the contents of the message, and expressed his certainty that war was imminent. Yet Zamir decided to go to Europe in order to personally meet the source at midnight on the night of October 5/6. Eli Zeira waited to hear from him before taking any action.

At 3:45 a.m., on October 6, Zamir called Zeira over an open telephone line (due to the absence of a cipher clerk at an unknown Israeli embassy in Europe. There were no clerks available due to the Yom Kippur holiday) and informed

Zeira war would come that day at sunset. Subsequent analysis revealed that the message was distorted en route to Israel's top military and political leaders, and instead of expressing the certainty that war would break out "in the afternoon hours" or "before sunset", it had become a definite "sunset." Sunset on October 6 was 5:20 p.m., but somehow the hour became fixed as 6 p.m. The source also asserted that the attack would be a combined and simultaneous one of Egyptian and Syrian forces.

The attack did not begin at 6 p.m., however; it began at 1:55 p.m., and Israel was woefully unprepared. On the Golan Heights 1400 Syrian tanks and over 1000 artillery pieces faced 177 Israeli tanks and 50 artillery pieces - and only that number was there due to the last-minute partial call-up of reserves. The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal, easily overcoming Israeli defenses, and established a bridgehead about ten kilometers into the Sinai.

Israel fought a tenacious battle on the Golan and turned near-defeat on October 6 to a recapture of almost all of the Golan by the evening of October 7. But Syria's rapid advance towards the Sea of Galilee and Israel's northern settlements unleashed a fear that has been hard for Israel to ever forget.

On the Sinai front, Egypt nearly had the Mitla and Gidi passes open to them before sufficient Israeli reserves arrived to defend Israel's southern borders. Military Intelligence had seriously underestimated the lethal effectiveness of the Soviet-made Sagger anti-tank missiles, which the Egyptian infantry used to devastating effect against Israeli armor, as well as the Surface-to-Air Missiles, which both the Egyptians and Syrians used to devastating effect against the Israeli Air Force.

Intelligence did pick up on certain changes that had occurred on the battlefield during the war, but it was mainly the courage, ingenuity, and leadership of the armed forces on Israel's southern and northern fronts that enabled Israel to turn the tide of battle. Within two days, the tide had turned on the Golan front. It took more than a week, but by the middle of October Israel had turned the tide in the Sinai, pummeling Egyptian armor, and had crossed the Suez Canal to destroy Egypt's defenses from the rear. By late October, both Cairo and Damascus were exposed to an Israeli advance, and only dire Soviet threats and Superpower intervention put an end to the hostilities and certain and complete Egyptian and Syrian defeat.

While the tide turned, the failure of Intelligence has never been forgotten in Israel. Many lessons were learned, and many people in the Intelligence community were fired. In 1982, during Israel's invasion of Lebanon, Intelligence was right up on Syrian defenses and destroyed them far more easily than was done in 1973. But the misconceptions and even hubris that dominated the thinking of Israel's military and political leaders at the time has been tempered

by a far greater wariness of Arab intentions after the devastating surprise Egyptian-Syrian attack on October 6, 1973.

Bibliography

1). Ian Black and Benny Morris - Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services

2). Dennis Eisenberg, Uri Dan, Dennis Eisenenberg - The Mossad-Inside Stories: Israel's Secret Intelligence Service

3). Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman - Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community

4). Stewart Steven - The Spymasters of Israel

The Air Raid on the Syrian General Command(October 9, 1973)

The Yom Kippur started at noon, October 6, 1973, with the combined assault of the Egyptian and Syrian military forces against Israeli forces on the Suez Canal in the south and the Golan Heights in the north. With the declared intention of avenging the disgrace of 1967, Arab forces surprised the unready Israelis and won a number of initial victories. Following Syrian attacks on Israeli population centers such as Migdal-Ha'emek on October 8 and the failure of the IAF to destroy the SAM arrays on the Golan heights (a single battery destroyed with the loss of six jets), the Israeli government decided to strike strategic and economic centers with the hope of passing the message across to the Syrians: The IAF was ready and able to surpass the SAM barriers while physically and morally disrupting Syrian operations. The first targets chosen were the Syrian General Command building and the adjoining Syrian Air Force Command, located in the heart of Damascus.

From two squadrons 16 Phantoms were allocated to the mission, planned overnight and led by Major L. Takeoff and achieving formation were carried out in complete radio silence and at a low height needed to avoid early detection. Shortly after takeoff one of the Phantoms in the first formation suffered a

mechanical malfunction and had to return to base, leaving the remaining seven to continue. While weather was still fair over Israel, it got worse with the advance into Syria with heavy clouds and turbulence making navigation, formation, and low level flight very difficult, endangering safety and the element of surprise. Navigation soon became nearly impossible and abortion seemed like the only option but Major L. broke radio silence to push his team onwards. This soon paid off when a break was sighted in the clouds and the planes corrected their path, having flown a little off course. The Phantoms appeared over Damascus in complete surprise and except for a single shoulder launched SAM, no anti-aircraft fire was directed against the incoming bombers until after the first bombs had already hit their targets.

The seven Phantoms of the first formation entered their bombing runs—coming in at a low height, sharply pulling up, flipping onto their backs and diving into their targets—each plane releasing 5 tons of ammunition and then pulling away, evading the heavy anti aircraft (AA) fire that now erupted and making their way back to Israel. With the element of surprise gone, the defenses of the Syrian capital came to life, filling the sky with cannon fire. One Phantom was hit, the pilot losing his life and the navigator ejecting and falling into Syrian hands. Another plane was hit in one of the wings and an engine and was escorted back to Israel so that the pilot and navigator could eject there. This proved to be unnecessary and the plane safely landed in Ramat-David AFB.

The second formation of eight Phantoms had not made it to Damascus - the break in the clouds had closed and a prepared Syrian air defense was deemed too big a threat. The upper floors of the Syrian General Command were damaged as well as the air command, forcing them to move to alternate locations. Another target hit (by accident) was a nearby Soviet cultural center. For leading this mission and saving the stricken Phantom, Major L. received Israel's second highest wartime decoration— the Medal of Valor.

The Six-Point Agreement(November 11, 1973)

The Israel-Egypt cease-fire was violated repeatedly and admittedly by Egypt. Intensive negotiations, including a visit to Cairo by Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger and a visit to Israel by Undersecretary of State Sisco, led to the signing of the Six-Point Agreement for the stabilization of the cease-fire. The agreement was signed at Kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez road by General Yariv on behalf of Israel and General Gamazy on behalf of Egypt. It was the first agreement

signed by Israel and Egypt since the 1949 Armistice Agreement.

1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the cease-fire called for by the UN Security Council.

2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the 22 October positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations.

3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicines. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.

4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank of the Suez Canal.

5. The Israeli check-points on the Cairo-Suez road will be replaced by UN checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers can participate with the UN in supervising the non-military nature of the cargo at the bank of the Canal.

6. As soon as the UN check-points are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange of all prisoners of war, including wounded.

Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs

YOM KIPPUR WAR:

ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

General

1. In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked the Israeli defenses of two brigades and eleven artillery batteries with five divisions( Three infantry Divs and Two Armored Divs) and 188 batteries. At the onset of the battle, 180 Israeli tanks faced off against approximately 1,300 Syrian tanks.Every Israeli tank deployed on the Golan Heights was engaged during the initial attacks. Syrian commandos dropped by helicopter also took the most important Israeli stronghold at Jabal al Shaikh (Mount Hermon), which had a variety of surveillance equipment.

Dispositions

2. In the Golan Heights, IDF had deployed two brigades and eleven artillery batteries under command of Northern command under Maj Gen HOFI. Under him were two armored Brigade as the main defending force, i.e. The 7 th Bde under Col AVIGDER which was defending northern sector of the PURPLE LINE(The armistic line separating Syria and Israel after 1967 war) and the BARAK bde under Col BEN SHOHAM which was defending the southern sector of the PURPLE LINE.

3. Out of the five Syrian divisions( Three infantry Divs and Two Armored Divs), the 3rd Syrian Div was attacking from northern part , 9th Div from Middle and 5th

Div from South. These Divs were being directly supported by 1st and 3rd Syrian Armored Divisions. At the onset of the battle,approximately 1,300 Syrian tanks were deployed to crush the IDF defence across the PURPLE LINE in the Golan heights. Apart from that, Syrian commandos dropped by helicopter also took the most important Israeli stronghold at Jabal al Shaikh (Mount Hermon), which had a variety of surveillance equipment.

Golan Heights campaign

4. The fighting in the Golan height front started at 1350 on the 6 th Oct 1973, on the day of Yom Kippur.Soon after the breakout of war, hundreds of Syrian tanks and troops started to cross the PURPLE LINE.

5. By the end of the first day of battle, the Syrians (who at the start outnumbered the Israelis in the Golan 9 to 1) had achieved moderate success. Towards the end of the day, "A Syrian tank brigade passing through the Rafid Gap turned northwest up a little-used route known as the Tapline Road, which cut diagonally across the Golan. This roadway would prove one of the main strategic hinges of the battle. It led straight from the main Syrian breakthrough points to Nafah, which was not only the location of Israeli divisional headquarters but the most important crossroads on the Heights." During the night, Lieutenant Zvika Greengold, who had just arrived to the battle unattached to any unit, fought them off with his single tank until help arrived. "For the next 20 hours, Zvika Force, as he came to be known on the radio net, fought running battles with Syrian tanks—sometimes alone, sometimes as part of a larger unit, changing tanks half a dozen times as they were knocked out. He was wounded and burned but stayed in action and repeatedly showed up at critical moments from an unexpected direction to change the course of a skirmish." For his actions, Zvika became a national hero in Israel.

6. Fighting in the Golan Heights was given priority by the Israeli High Command. The fighting in the Sinai was sufficiently far away that Israel was not immediately threatened; should the Golan Heights fall, the Syrians could easily advance into Israel proper. Reservists were directed to the Golan as quickly as

possible. They were assigned to tanks and sent to the front as soon as they arrived at army depots, without waiting for the crews they trained with to arrive, without waiting for machine guns to be installed on their tanks, and without taking the time to calibrate their tank guns (a time-consuming process known as bore-sighting).

7. As the Egyptians had in the Sinai, the Syrians on the Golan Heights took care to stay under cover of their SAM missile batteries. Also as in the Sinai, the Syrians made use of Soviet anti-tank weapons (which, because of the uneven terrain, were not as effective as in the flat Sinai desert).

8. The Syrians had expected it would take at least 24 hours for Israeli reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, Israeli reserve units began reaching the battle lines only fifteen hours after the war began.

9. During over four days of fighting, the Israeli 7th Armoured Brigade in the north (commanded by Yanush Ben Gal) managed to hold the rocky hill line defending the northern flank of their headquarters in Nafah. For some as-yet-unexplained reason, the Syrians were close to conquering Nafah, yet they stopped the advance on Nafah's fences, letting Israel assemble a defensive line. The most reasonable explanation for this is that the Syrians had calculated estimated advances, and the commanders in the field didn't want to digress from the plan. To the south, however, the Barak Armored Brigade, bereft of any natural defenses, began to take heavy casualties. Brigade Commander Colonel Shoham was killed during the second day of fighting, along with his second in command and their Operations Officer (each in a separate tank), as the Syrians desperately tried to advance towards the Sea of Galilee and Nafah. At this point, the Brigade stopped functioning as a cohesive force, although the surviving tanks and crewmen continued fighting independently.

The Counter Attack

10. The tide in the Golan began to turn as the arriving Israeli reserve forces were able to contain and, starting at 0830 on 8 October, push back the Syrian offensive. The tiny Golan Heights were too small to act as an effective territorial buffer, unlike the Sinai Peninsula in the south, but it proved to be a strategic geographical stronghold and was a crucial key in preventing the Syrian army from bombarding the cities below. By the modday of Wednesday, October 10, the last Syrian unit in the Central sector had been pushed back across the Purple Line, that is, the pre-war border.

The counter offensive

11. A decision now had to be made—whether to stop at the 1967 border, or to continue into Syrian territory. Israeli High Command spent the entire October 10 debating this well into the night. Some favored disengagement, which would

allow soldiers to be redeployed to the Sinai (Shmuel Gonen's defeat at Hizayon in the Sinai had happened two days earlier). Others favored continuing the attack into Syria, towards Damascus, which would knock Syria out of the war; it would also restore Israel's image as the supreme military power in the Middle East and would give them a valuable bargaining chip once the war ended. Others countered that Syria had strong defenses—antitank ditches, minefields, and strongpoints—and that it would be better to fight from defensive positions in the Golan Heights (rather than the flat terrain of Syria) in the event of another war with Syria. However, Prime Minister Meir realized the most crucial point of the whole debate—"It would take four days to shift a division to the Sinai. If the war ended during this period, the war would end with a territorial loss for Israel in the Sinai and no gain in the north—an unmitigated defeat. This was a political matter and her decision was unmitigating—to cross the purple line… The attack would be launched tomorrow, Thursday, October 11."

12. As per the directon of the government, the counter offensive of the IDF started on 11 Oct. The IDF troops crossed PURPLE LINE at 1100 of that day. From 11 October to 14 October, the Israeli forces pushed into Syria, conquering a further twenty-square-mile box of territory in the Bashan. From there they were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, only 40 km away, using heavy artillery.

13. "As Arab position on the battlefields deteriorated, pressure mounted on King Hussein to send his Army into action. He found a way to meet these demands without opening his kingdom to Israeli air attack. Instead of attacking Israel from their common border, he sent an expeditionary force into Syria. He let Israel know of his intentions, through US intermediaries, in the hope that it [Israel] would accept that this was not a casus belli justifying an attack into Jordan… Dayan declined to offer any such assurance, but Israel had no intention of opening another front."

14. Iraq also sent an expeditionary force to the Golan, consisting of some 30,000 men, 500 tanks, and 700 APCs. The Iraqi divisions were actually a strategic surprise for the IDF, which expected a 24-hour-plus advance intelligence of such moves. This turned into an operational surprise, as the Iraqis attacked the exposed southern flank of the advancing Israeli armor, forcing its advance units to retreat a few kilometers, in order to prevent encirclement.

15. The Israel troops encountered with Iraqi and Jordanian forces from 12-16 Oct at various places. Also the combined Syrian, and Iraqi counterattacks prevented any further Israeli gains. However, they were also unable to push the Israelis back from the Bashan salient.

16. On 22 October, the Golani Brigade and Sayeret Matkal commandos recaptured the outpost on Mount Hermon, after sustaining very heavy casualties from entrenched Syrian snipers strategically positioned on the mountain. An attack two weeks before had cost 25 dead and 67 wounded, while this second

attack cost an additional 55 dead and 79 wounded. An Israeli D9 bulldozer with Israeli infantry breached a way to the peak, preventing the peak from falling into Syrian hands after the war. A paratrooper brigade took the corresponding Syrian outposts on the mountain.

Weapons

17. The Arab armies were equipped with predominantly Soviet-made weapons while Israel's armaments were mostly Western-made. The Arab armies' T-62s were equipped with night vision equipment, which the Israeli tanks lacked, giving them an added advantage on the battlefield during the fighting that took part at night. The older IS-3 'Stalin' tank, mounting a powerful 122 mm main gun, still proved its use on the battlefield, giving long-range anti-tank support to the Egyptian Army's T55/T62 tanks.

Loses

18. Despite of heavy fighting under most unfavourable conditions, the total loss of Israel on the Golan Height front was 250 tanks, KIA 772, Wounded 2453 and PW 65 which was comparitively lower than the Syrian loses which was tank 1150, KIA 3500, and PW 3700. Apart from that, the Iraqi troops suffered loss of about 100 tanks and Jordanians suffered loss of 50 tanks.

Nuclear alert

19. In the meantime, Brezhnev sent Nixon a letter in the middle of the night of October 23–24. In that letter, Brezhnev proposed that American and Soviet contingents be dispatched to ensure both sides honor the cease-fire. He also threatened that "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel." In short, the Soviets were threatening to intervene in the war on Egypt's side.

19. The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and airlift was marshalled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post was set up in the southern Soviet Union. Several air force units were also alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an airbase in Yugoslavia". The Soviets also deployed seven amphibious warfare craft with some 40,000 naval infantry in the Mediterranean.

20. The message arrived after Nixon had gone to bed. Kissinger immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, CIA Director William Colby, and White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig. The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent

(in Nixon's name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the Defense Condition (DEFCON) from four to three. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States.

22. The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai Podgorny. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria," said Premier Alexei Kosygin, while KGB chief Yuri Andropov added that "We shall not unleash the Third World War."[44] In the end, the Soviets reconciled themselves to an Arab defeat. The letter from the American cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply. [45] The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis to an end.

Northern front de-escalation

23. On the northern front, the Syrians had been preparing for a massive counter-attack, scheduled for October 23. In addition to Syria's five divisions, Iraq had supplied two, and there were smaller complements of troops from other Arab countries, including Jordan. The Soviets had replaced most of the losses Syria's tank forces had suffered during the first weeks of the war.

24. However, the day before the offensive was to begin, the United Nations imposed its cease-fire (following the acquiescence of both Israel and Egypt). "The acceptance by Egypt of the cease-fire on Monday [October 22] created a major dilemma for Assad. The cease-fire did not bind him, but its implications could not be ignored. Some on the Syrian General Staff favored going ahead with the attack, arguing that if it did so Egypt would feel obliged to continue fighting as well… Others, however, argued that continuation of the war would legitimize Israel's efforts to destroy the Egyptian Third Army. In that case, Egypt would not come to Syria's assistance when Israel turned its full might northward, destroying Syria's infrastructure and perhaps attacking Damascus"

25. Ultimately, Assad decided to call off the offensive, and on October 23, Syria announced it had accepted the cease-fire, and the Iraqi government ordered its forces home.

Post-cease-fire negotiations

26. On October 24, the UNSC passed Resolution 339, serving as a renewed call for all parties to adhere to the cease fire terms established in Resolution 338. Organized fighting on all fronts ended by October 26. The cease-fire did not end

the sporadic clashes along the cease-fire lines, nor did it dissipate military tensions.

27. On the Syrian front, Shuttle diplomacy by Henry Kissinger eventually produced a disengagement agreement on May 31, 1974, based on exchange of prisoners-of-war, Israeli withdrawal to the Purple Line and the establishment of a UN buffer zone. The agreement ended the skirmishes and exchanges of artillery fire that had occurred frequently along the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line. The UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan.

Long-term effects of the war

28. The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for direct public discussions since the aftermath of the 1948 war.

29. On a tactical level, the end of the war saw Israel with territorial gains in the Golan heights and the encirclement of the Egyptian third army. For the Arab states (and Egypt in particular), the psychological trauma of their defeat in the Six-Day War had been healed. In many ways, it allowed them to negotiate with the Israelis as equals. However, given that the war had started about as well as the Arab leaders could have wanted, at the end they had made only limited territorial gains in the Sinai front, while Israel gained more territory on the Golan Heights than it held before the war; also given the fact that Israel managed to gain a foothold on African soil west of the canal, the war helped convince many in the Arab World that Israel could not be defeated militarily, thereby strengthening peace movements. The war effectively ended the old Arab ambition of destroying Israel by force.

30. The war had a stunning effect on the population in Israel. Following their victory in the Six-Day War, the Israeli military had become complacent. The shock and sudden defeats that occurred at the beginning of the war sent a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had thought they had military supremacy in the region. However, in time, they began to realize what an astounding, almost unprecedented, turnaround they had achieved: "Reeling from a surprise attack on two fronts with the bulk of its army still unmobilized, and confronted by staggering new battlefield realities, Israel's situation was one that could readily bring strong nations to their knees. Yet, within days, it had regained its footing and within less than two weeks it was threatening both enemy capitals, an achievement having few historical parallels." In Israel, however, the casualty rate was high. Per capita, Israel suffered three times as many casualties in 3 weeks of fighting as the United States did during almost a decade of fighting in Vietnam.

31. In response to U.S. support of Israel, the Arab members of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5% per month on October 17. On October 19, President Nixon authorized a major allocation of arms supplies and $2.2 billion in appropriations for Israel. In response, Saudi Arabia declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by other oil exporters and extended against the Netherlands and other states, causing the 1973 energy crisis.

32. The initial success greatly increased Sadat's popularity, giving him much firmer control of the Egyptian state and the opportunity to initiate many of the reforms he felt were necessary. In later years this would fade, and in the destructive anti-government food riot of 1977 in Cairo had the slogan "Hero of the crossing, where is our breakfast?" (" الفطور؟ فين العبور، بطل ,Yā batl al-`abūr" ,"ياfēn al-futūr?").

Yom Kippur War

The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War or October War (Hebrew: יום מלחמת ;הכיפורים transliterated: Milkhemet Yom HaKipurim or כיפור יום ,מלחמת Milkhemet Yom Kipur; Arabic: أكتوبر ;حرب transliterated: ħarb October or حرب ħarb Tishrin), also known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Fourth ,تشرينArab-Israeli War, was fought from October 6 to October 26, 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. The war began with a surprise joint attack by Egypt and Syria on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. Egypt and Syria crossed the cease-fire lines in the Sinai and Golan Heights, respectively, which had been captured by Israel in 1967 during the Six-Day War.[5]

The Egyptians and Syrians advanced during the first 24–48 hours, after which momentum began to swing in Israel's favor. By the second week of the war, the Syrians had been pushed entirely out of the Golan Heights. In the Sinai to the south, the Israelis struck at the "seam" between two invading Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez Canal (where the old ceasefire line had been), and cut off the Egyptian Third Army just as a United Nations cease-fire came into effect.

The war had far-reaching implications for many nations. The Arab World, which had been humiliated by the lopsided defeat of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian alliance during the Six-Day War, felt psychologically vindicated by its string of victories early in the conflict, despite the endstate. This vindication paved the way for the peace process that followed, as well as liberalizations such as Egypt's infitah policy. The Camp David Accords, which came soon after, led to normalized relations between Egypt and Israel—the first time any Arab country had recognized the Israeli state. Egypt, which had already been drifting away from the Soviet Union, then left the Soviet sphere of influence entirely.

Background

This war was part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an ongoing dispute which has included many battles and wars since 1948. During the Six-Day War of 1967, the Israelis had captured Egypt's Sinai Peninsula all the way up to the Suez Canal, which had become the cease-fire line, and roughly half of Syria's Golan Heights.

In the years following that war, Israel erected lines of fortification in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights. In 1971 Israel spent $500 million fortifying its positions on the Suez Canal, a chain of fortifications and gigantic earthworks known as the Bar Lev Line, named after Israeli General Chaim Bar-Lev.

Nonetheless, according to Chaim Herzog:

The Israeli decision was to be conveyed to the Arab states by the U.S. Government. The U.S. was informed of the decision, but not that it was to transmit it. There is no evidence of receipt from Egypt or Syria, who thus apparently never received the offer. The decision was kept a closely-guarded secret within Israeli government circles and the offer was withdrawn in October, 1967.[7]

Egypt and Syria both desired a return of the land lost in the Six-Day War. However, the Khartoum Arab Summit issued the "three no's," resolving that there would be "no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel."

President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt died in September 1970. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who resolved to fight Israel and win back the territory lost in the Six-Day War. In 1971, Sadat, in response to an initiative by UN intermediary Gunnar Jarring, declared that if Israel committed itself to "withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip" and to implementation of other provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242 as requested by Jarring, Egypt would then "be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel." Israel responded that it would not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.[8]

Sadat hoped that by inflicting even a limited defeat on the Israelis, the status quo could be altered. Hafiz al-Assad, the head of Syria, had a different view. He had little interest in negotiation and felt the retaking of the Golan Heights would be a purely military option. Since the Six-Day War, Assad had launched a massive military build up and hoped to make Syria the dominant military power of the Arab states. With the aid of Egypt, Assad felt that his new army could win convincingly against the Israeli army and thus secure Syria's role in the region. Assad only saw negotiations beginning once the Golan Heights had been retaken by force, which would induce Israel to give up the West Bank and Gaza, and make other concessions.

Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office… were the most demoralized in Egyptian history…

A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option."[9] In his biography of Sadat, Raphael Israeli argued that Sadat felt the root of the problem was in the great shame over the Six-Day War, and before any reforms could be introduced he felt that shame had to be overcome. Egypt's economy was in shambles, but Sadat knew that the deep reforms that he felt were needed would be deeply unpopular among parts of the population. A military victory would give him the popularity he needed to make changes. A portion of the Egyptian population, most prominently university students who launched wide protests, strongly desired a war to reclaim the Sinai and was highly upset that Sadat had not launched one in his first three years in office.

The other Arab states showed much more reluctance to fully commit to a new war. King Hussein of Jordan feared another major loss of territory as had occurred in the Six-Day War, during which Jordan was halved in population. Sadat was also backing the claim of the PLO to the territories (West Bank and Gaza) and in the event of a victory promised Yasser Arafat that he would be given control of them. Hussein still saw the West Bank as part of Jordan and wanted it restored to his kingdom. Moreover, during the Black September crisis of 1970 a near civil war had broken out between the PLO and the Jordanian government. In that war Syria had intervened militarily on the side of the PLO, leaving Assad and Hussein estranged from each other.

Iraq and Syria also had strained relations, and the Iraqis refused to join the initial offensive. Lebanon, which shared a border with Israel, was not expected to join the Arab war effort due to its small army and already evident instability. The months before the war saw Sadat engage in a diplomatic offensive to try to win support for the war. By the fall of 1973 he claimed the backing of more than a hundred states. These were most of the countries of the Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement, and Organization of African Unity. Sadat had also worked to curry favour in Europe and had some success before the war. Britain and France had for the first time sided with the Arab powers against Israel on the United Nations Security Council.

Events leading up to the war

Anwar Sadat in 1972 publicly stated that Egypt was committed to going to war with Israel, and that they were prepared to "sacrifice one million Egyptian soldiers." From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving MiG-21 jet fighters, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-6 and SA-7 Surface-to-air missile systems, RPG-7s, T-55 and T-62 Tanks, and especially the AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile from the Soviet Union and improving its military tactics, based on Soviet battlefield doctrines. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with competent ones. [10]

The role of the great powers, too, was a major factor in the outcome of the two wars. The policy of the Soviet Union was one of the causes of Egypt's military

weakness. President Nasser was only able to obtain the material for an anti-aircraft missile defense wall after visiting Moscow and pleading with the Kremlin leaders. He claimed that if supplies were not given, he would have to return to Egypt and tell the Egyptian people Moscow had abandoned them, and then relinquish power to one of his peers who would be able to deal with the Americans. The Americans would then have the upper hand in the region, which Moscow could not permit.

One of Egypt's undeclared objectives of the War of Attrition was to force the Soviet Union to supply Egypt with more advanced arms and war materiel. Egypt felt the only way to convince the Soviet leaders of the deficiencies of most of the aircraft and air defense weaponry supplied to Egypt following 1967 was to put the Soviet weapons to the test against the advanced weaponry the United States supplied to Israel.

Nasser's policy following the 1967 defeat conflicted with that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets sought to avoid a new conflagration between the Arabs and Israelis so as not to be drawn into a confrontation with the United States. The reality of the situation became apparent when the superpowers met in Oslo and agreed to maintain the status quo. This was unacceptable to Egyptian leaders, and when it was discovered that the Egyptian preparations for crossing the canal were being leaked, it became imperative to expel the Russians from Egypt. In July 1972 Sadat expelled almost all of the 20,000 Soviet military advisors in the country and reoriented the country's foreign policy to be more favorable to the United States.

The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez would incur massive losses. The Soviets, who were then pursuing détente, had no interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June 1973 meeting with U.S. President Richard Nixon, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had proposed Israel pull back to its 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to restrain Sadat's plans.[11]

In an interview published in Newsweek (April 9, 1973), President Sadat again threatened war with Israel. Several times during 1973, Arab forces conducted large-scale exercises that put the Israeli military on the highest level of alert, only to be recalled a few days later. The Israeli leadership already believed that if an attack took place, the Israeli Air Force would be able to repel it.

Almost a full year before the war, in an October 24, 1972, meeting with his Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Sadat declared his intention to go to war with Israel even without proper Soviet support. [12] Planning was done in absolute secrecy—even the upper-echelon commanders were not told of war plans until less than a week prior to the attack, and the soldiers were not told until a few hours beforehand. The plan to attack Israel in concert with Syria was code-

named Operation Badr (the Arabic word for "full moon"), after the Battle of Badr, in which Muslims under Muhammad defeated the Quraish tribe of Mecca.

Lead up to the surprise attack

The IDF's Directorate of Military Intelligence's (abbreviated as "Aman") Research Department was responsible for formulating the nation's intelligence estimate. Their assessments on the likelihood of war were based on several assumptions. First, it was assumed correctly that Syria would not go to war with Israel unless Egypt went to war as well. Second, they learned from a high-ranking Egyptian informant (who remains confidential to this day, known only as "The Source" [13] ) that Egypt wanted to regain all of the Sinai, but would not go to war until the Soviets had supplied Egypt with fighter-bombers to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and Scud missiles to be used against Israeli cities as a deterrent against Israeli attacks on Egyptian infrastructure. Since the Soviets had not yet supplied the fighter bombers, and the Scud missiles had only arrived in Egypt in late August, and in addition it would take four months to train the Egyptian ground crews, Aman predicted war with Egypt was not imminent. This assumption about Egypt's strategic plans, known as "the concept," strongly prejudiced their thinking and led them to dismiss other war warnings.

The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Both the Israelis and the Americans felt that the expulsion of the Soviet military observers had severely reduced the effectiveness of the Egyptian army. The Egyptians ensured that there was a continual stream of false information on maintenance problems and a lack of personnel to operate the most advanced equipment. The Egyptians made repeated misleading reports about lack of spare parts that also made their way to the Israelis. Sadat had so long engaged in brinkmanship, that his frequent war threats were being ignored by the world. In May and August 1973 the Egyptian army had engaged in exercises by the border and mobilizing in response both times had cost the Israeli army some $10 million.

For the week leading up to Yom Kippur, the Egyptians staged a week-long training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed these movements as mere training exercises. Movements of Syrian troops towards the border were puzzling, but not a threat because, Aman believed, they would not attack without Egypt and Egypt would not attack until the Soviet weaponry arrived.

The obvious reason for choosing the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur for staging a surprise attack on Israel was that on this specific day (unlike any other holiday) the country comes to a complete standstill. On Yom Kippur, the holiest day for Jews, not only observant, but most secular Jews fast, abstain from any use of fire, electricity, engines, communications, etc., and all road traffic comes to a standstill. Many soldiers leave military facilities for home during the holiday and Israel is most vulnerable, especially with much of its army demobilized. The war

also coincided with the Muslim holiday of Ramadan, meaning that many of the Muslim soldiers were also fasting. Many others believe that the attack on Yom Kippur surprisingly helped Israel to easily recruit reserves from their homes and synagogues, because the nature of the Yom Kippur holiday meant that roads and communication would be largely open, to help organize and mobilize the military.

Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with Sadat and [Syrian President] Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in."[14] On the night of September 25, Hussein secretly flew to Tel Aviv to warn Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir of an impending Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they [Egypt] would cooperate'".[15] Surprisingly, this warning fell on deaf ears. Aman concluded that the king had not told it anything it did not already know. "Eleven warnings of war were received by Israel during September from well placed sources. But [Mossad chief] Zvi Zamir continued to insist that war was not an Arab option. Not even Hussein's warnings succeeded in stirring his doubts".[16] He would later remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable [of War]"[17]

Finally, Zvi Zamir personally went to Europe to meet with the Source (the high-ranking Egyptian official), at midnight on October 5/6th. At that meeting, The Source informed him that a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack on Israel was imminent. It was this warning in particular, combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded the Israeli high command into action. Just hours before the attack began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli reserves.[18] Ironically, calling up the reserves proved to be easier than usual, as almost all of the troops were at synagogue or at home for the holiday.

Lack of an Israeli pre-emptive attackUpon learning of the impending attack, Prime Minister of Israel Golda Meir made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike.

The Israeli strategy was, for the most part, based on the precept that if war was imminent, Israel would launch a pre-emptive strike. It was assumed that Israel's intelligence services would give, at the worst case, about 48 hours notice prior to an Arab attack.

Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, and Israeli general David Elazar met at 8:05 a.m. the morning of Yom Kippur, 6 hours before the war was to begin. Dayan began the meeting by arguing that war was not a certainty. Elazar then presented his argument, in favor of a pre-emptive attack against Syrian airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00 p.m., and Syrian ground forces at 5:00 p.m. "When the presentations were done, the prime minister hemmed uncertainly for a few

moments but then came to a clear decision. There would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing American assistance soon and it was imperative that it not be blamed for starting the war. 'If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody', she said."[19] European nations, under threat of an Arab oil embargo and trade boycott, had stopped supplying Israel with munitions. As a result, Israel was totally dependent on the United States to resupply its army, and was particularly sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship. After Meir had made the decision not to strike first, a message arrived from Henry Kissinger: "Don't preempt."[20]

Some say that in retrospect the decision was a sound one. While Operation Nickel Grass, the American airlift of supplies during the war which began October 13, did not immediately replace Israel's losses in equipment, it did allow Israel to expend what it did have more freely.[21] Had they struck first, according to Henry Kissinger, they would not have received "so much as a nail".

At sea

The Battle of Latakia, a revolutionary naval battle between the Syrians and the Israelis, took place on October 7, the second day of the war, resulting in a resounding Israeli victory that proved the potency of small, fast missile boats equipped with advanced ECM packages. This battle was the world's first battle between missile boats equipped with surface-to-surface missiles. The battle also established the Israeli Navy, long derided as the "black sheep" of the Israeli services, as a formidable and effective force in its own right. Following this and other smaller naval battles, the Syrian and Egyptian navies stayed at their Mediterranean Sea ports throughout most of the war, enabling the Mediterranean sea lanes to Israel to remain open.

However, the Israeli navy was less successful in breaking the Egyptian Navy's blockade of the Red Sea for Israeli or Israel-bound shipping, thus hampering Israel's oil resupply via the port of Eilat. Israel did not possess enough missile boats in Red Sea ports to enable breaking the blockade, a fact it regretted in hindsight.

Several other times during the war, the Israeli navy mounted small assault raids on Egyptian ports. Both Fast Attack Craft and Shayetet 13 naval commandos were active in these assaults. Their purpose was to destroy boats that were to be used by the Egyptians to ferry their own commandos behind Israeli lines. The overall effect of these raids on the war was relatively minor.

Participation by other states

Besides Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, several other Arab nations were involved in this war, providing additional weapons and financing. The amount of support is uncertain.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gave financial aid and sent some token forces to join in the battle. Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines; the Palestinians sent troops as well.[32] Pakistan sent sixteen pilots.

From 1971 to 1973, Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya sent Mirage fighters and gave Egypt around $1 billion to arm for war. Algeria sent squadrons of fighters and bombers, armored brigades, and dozens of tanks. Tunisia sent over 1,000 soldiers, who worked with Egyptian forces in the Nile delta, and Sudan sent 3,500 soldiers.

Uganda radio reported that Idi Amin sent Ugandan soldiers to fight against Israel. Cuba also sent approximately 1,500 troops including tank and helicopter crews who reportedly also engaged in combat operations against the IDF. [33]

WeaponsThe Arab armies were equipped with predominantly Soviet-made weapons while Israel's armaments were mostly Western-made. The Arab armies' T-62s were equipped with night vision equipment, which the Israeli tanks lacked, giving them an added advantage on the battlefield during the fighting that took part at night. The older IS-3 'Stalin' tank, mounting a powerful 122 mm main gun, still proved its use on the battlefield, giving long-range anti-tank support to the Egyptian Army's T55/T62 tanks.

The cease-fire and immediate aftermath

Egypt's trapped Third ArmyWhen the cease fire came into effect, Israel had lost territory on the east side of the Suez Canal to Egypt (shown in red) but gained territory west of the canal and in the Golan Heights (shown in green).

The Security Council of the United Nations passed (14-0) Resolution 338 calling for a cease-fire, largely negotiated between the U.S. and Soviet Union, on October 22. It called upon "all parties to the present fighting" to "terminate all military activity immediately." It came into effect 12 hours later at 6:52 p.m. Israeli time.[34] Because it went into effect after darkness, it was impossible for satellite surveillance to determine where the front lines were when the fighting was supposed to stop.[35] Prior to the ceasefire taking effect, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had told Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, "You won't get violent protests from Washington if something happens during the night, while I'm flying. Nothing can happen in Washington until noon tomorrow." [36] Virtually giving Israel a green light to violate the cease-fire.

When the cease-fire began, the Israeli forces were just a few hundred meters short of their goal—the last road linking Cairo and Suez. During the night, David Elazar requested permission to resume the drive south, and Moshe Dayan

approved.[37] The Israeli troops finished the drive south, captured the road, and trapped the Egyptian Third Army east of the Suez Canal.

During the afternoon, two messages from Brezhnev to Nixon were sent through the hotline. Brezhnev demanded that "the most decisive measures be taken without delay" by Moscow and Washington to stop the "flagrant" Israeli violations. Again, Brezhnev urged new action at the Security Council. Brezhnev's language--"why this treachery was allowed by Israel is more obvious to you"--clearly suggested that he suspected that Washington was behind Israel's military moves. Through the CIA back-channel the Egyptians also got in touch with the White House expressing their worries, with Sadat for the first time directly asking Nixon to "intervene effectively even if that necessitates the use of force." Sadat spoke of U.S.-Soviet "guarantees" of the cease-fire which was more likely based on Soviet interpretations than on Kissinger's understanding of the Moscow talks. Replying the same day, Nixon told Sadat that Washington had only "guaranteed" efforts to reach a settlement, but that he had directed Kissinger to "make urgent representations" to Israel to comply with the cease-fire [38].

The morning of 24 October, Anatoly Dobrynin read to Kissinger an angry letter from Brezhnev arguing that the Israelis were again defying the Security Council by "fiercely attacking … the Egyptian port of Adabei" and fighting Egyptian forces on the Suez Canal's east bank. Expressing confidence in Nixon's power to "influence Israel" and put an end to "provocative behavior," Brezhnev asked for information on U.S. steps to secure Tel Aviv's "strict and immediate compliance" with the UN. Adding to the pressure was a private message from Sadat, followed by a public statement, calling for U.S. and Soviet troops or observers to help implement the cease-fire.[39]

Nuclear alert

In the meantime, Brezhnev sent Nixon a letter in the middle of the night of October 23–24. In that letter, Brezhnev proposed that American and Soviet contingents be dispatched to ensure both sides honor the cease-fire. He also threatened that "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel."[40] In short, the Soviets were threatening to intervene in the war on Egypt's side.

The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and airlift was marshalled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post was set up in the southern Soviet Union. Several air force units were also alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an airbase in Yugoslavia". [41] The Soviets also deployed seven amphibious warfare craft with some 40,000 naval infantry in the Mediterranean.

The message arrived after Nixon had gone to bed. Kissinger immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, CIA Director William Colby, and White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig. The Watergate scandal had reached its apex, and Nixon was so agitated and discomposed that they decided to handle the matter without him:

"When Kissinger asked Haig whether [Nixon] should be wakened, the White House chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared Kissinger's feelings that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty decisions."[42]

The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the Defense Condition (DEFCON) from four to three. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States. [43]

The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai Podgorny. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria," said Premier Alexei Kosygin, while KGB chief Yuri Andropov added that "We shall not unleash the Third World War."[44] In the end, the Soviets reconciled themselves to an Arab defeat. The letter from the American cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply. [45] The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis to an end.

Northern front de-escalation

On the northern front, the Syrians had been preparing for a massive counter-attack, scheduled for October 23. In addition to Syria's five divisions, Iraq had supplied two, and there were smaller complements of troops from other Arab countries, including Jordan. The Soviets had replaced most of the losses Syria's tank forces had suffered during the first weeks of the war.

However, the day before the offensive was to begin, the United Nations imposed its cease-fire (following the acquiescence of both Israel and Egypt). "The acceptance by Egypt of the cease-fire on Monday [October 22] created a major dilemma for Assad. The cease-fire did not bind him, but its implications could not be ignored. Some on the Syrian General Staff favored going ahead with the attack, arguing that if it did so Egypt would feel obliged to continue fighting as well… Others, however, argued that continuation of the war would legitimize Israel's efforts to destroy the Egyptian Third Army. In that case, Egypt would not

come to Syria's assistance when Israel turned its full might northward, destroying Syria's infrastructure and perhaps attacking Damascus"[46]

Ultimately, Assad decided to call off the offensive, and on October 23, Syria announced it had accepted the cease-fire, and the Iraqi government ordered its forces home.

Post-cease-fire negotiations

On October 24, the UNSC passed Resolution 339, serving as a renewed call for all parties to adhere to the cease fire terms established in Resolution 338. Organized fighting on all fronts ended by October 26. The cease-fire did not end the sporadic clashes along the cease-fire lines, nor did it dissipate military tensions. Egypt's Third Army, cut off and without any means of resupply, was effectively a hostage to the Israelis.

Israel received Kissinger's threat to support a UN withdrawal resolution, but before they could respond, Egyptian national security advisor Hafez Ismail sent Kissinger a stunning message—Egypt was willing to enter into direct talks with the Israelis, provided that the Israelis agree to allow nonmilitary supplies to reach their army and agree to a complete cease-fire.

The talks took place on October 28, between Israeli Major General Aharon Yariv and Egyptian Major General Muhammad al-Ghani al-Gamasy. Ultimately, Kissinger brought the proposal to Sadat, who agreed almost without debate. United Nations checkpoints were brought in to replace Israeli checkpoints, nonmilitary supplies were allowed to pass, and prisoners-of-war were to be exchanged. A summit in Geneva followed, and ultimately, an armistice agreement was worked out. On January 18, Israel signed a pullback agreement to the east side of the canal, and the last of their troops withdrew from the west side of the canal on March 5, 1974.[47]

On the Syrian front, Shuttle diplomacy by Henry Kissinger eventually produced a disengagement agreement on May 31, 1974, based on exchange of prisoners-of-war, Israeli withdrawal to the Purple Line and the establishment of a UN buffer zone. The agreement ended the skirmishes and exchanges of artillery fire that had occurred frequently along the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line. The UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan.

Long-term effects of the war

The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for direct public discussions since the aftermath of the 1948 war.

On a tactical level, the end of the war saw Israel with territorial gains in the Golan heights and the encirclement of the Egyptian third army. Some believe the cease fire prevented Israel from landing its harshest blow, as a USMC report asserts: "They were now in position to threaten the rear administrative and supply areas of the entire Egyptian Army. Largely due to the efforts of the Soviet Union, which was fearful of the possibility of a serious Egyptian defeat, the U.N. Security Council imposed a cease-fire effective 22 October."[48]

The report also argues that the Arab side succeeded in surprising Israeli and worldwide intelligence agencies both strategically and tactically: "From a purely military point of view, the first and most important Arab success was the strategic and tactical surprise achieved. While this was aided to no small degree by mistakes made by Israeli Intelligence and the political and military leadership in Israel, the bulk of the credit must go to the highly sophisticated deception plan mounted by the Egyptians. They succeeded in convincing the Israeli Command that the intensive military activity to the west of the Canal during the summer and autumn of 1973 was nothing more than a series of training operations and maneuvers. This deception must be marked as one of the outstanding plans of deception mounted in the course of military history. The plan was successful not only as far as Israeli intelligence was concerned, but also with world-wide intelligence agencies."

For the Arab states (and Egypt in particular), the psychological trauma of their defeat in the Six-Day War had been healed. In many ways, it allowed them to negotiate with the Israelis as equals. However, given that the war had started about as well as the Arab leaders could have wanted, at the end they had made only limited territorial gains in the Sinai front, while Israel gained more territory on the Golan Heights than it held before the war; also given the fact that Israel managed to gain a foothold on African soil west of the canal, the war helped convince many in the Arab World that Israel could not be defeated militarily, thereby strengthening peace movements. The war effectively ended the old Arab ambition of destroying Israel by force.[49]

The war had a stunning effect on the population in Israel. Following their victory in the Six-Day War, the Israeli military had become complacent. The shock and sudden defeats that occurred at the beginning of the war sent a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had thought they had military supremacy in the region.[50] However, in time, they began to realize what an astounding, almost unprecedented, turnaround they had achieved: "Reeling from a surprise attack on two fronts with the bulk of its army still unmobilized, and confronted by staggering new battlefield realities, Israel's situation was one that could readily bring strong nations to their knees. Yet, within days, it had regained its footing and within less than two weeks it was threatening both enemy capitals, an achievement having few historical parallels." [51] In Israel, however, the casualty rate was high. Per capita, Israel suffered three times as many casualties in 3

weeks of fighting as the United States did during almost a decade of fighting in Vietnam.[52]

In response to U.S. support of Israel, the Arab members of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5% per month on October 17. On October 19, President Nixon authorized a major allocation of arms supplies and $2.2 billion in appropriations for Israel. In response, Saudi Arabia declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by other oil exporters and extended against the Netherlands and other states, causing the 1973 energy crisis.[53]

The initial success greatly increased Sadat's popularity, giving him much firmer control of the Egyptian state and the opportunity to initiate many of the reforms he felt were necessary. In later years this would fade, and in the destructive anti-government food riot of 1977 in Cairo had the slogan "Hero of the crossing, where is our breakfast?" (" الفطور؟ فين العبور، بطل -Yā batl al-`abūr, fēn al" ,"ياfutūr?").

Fallout in Israel

A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the war ended. It was led by Motti Ashkenazi, commander of Budapest, the northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and the only one during the war not to be captured by the Egyptians.[54] Anger against the Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. Shimon Agranat, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an inquiry, the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days.[55]

The Agranat Commission published its preliminary findings on April 2, 1974. Six people were held particularly responsible for Israel's failings:

IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar was recommended for dismissal, after the Commission found he bore "personal responsibility for the assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF."

Intelligence Chief, Aluf Eli Zeira, and his deputy, head of Research, Brigadier-General Aryeh Shalev, were recommended for dismissal.

Lt. Colonel Bandman, head of the Aman desk for Egypt, and Lt. Colonel Gedelia, chief of intelligence for the Southern Command, were recommended for transfer away from intelligence duties.

Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern front, was recommended by the initial report to be relieved of active duty. [56] He was forced to leave the army after the publication of the Commission's final report, on January 30, 1975, which found that "he failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our troops were caught."[57]

Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which "had stressed that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security failings, not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside its mandate"—inflamed it. Although it had cleared Meir and Dayan of all responsibility, public calls for their resignation (especially Dayan's) became more vociferous.[58]

Finally, on April 11, 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and was turned down both times by Meir. Yitzhak Rabin, who had spent most of the war as an advisor to Elazar in an unofficial capacity,[59] became head of the new Government, which was seated in June.

In 1999, the issue was revisited by Israel's political leadership, and in order to correct the shortcomings of the war from being repeated, the Israeli National Security Council was created to help in better coordinating between the different security and intelligence bodies, and between these and the political branch.

Camp David AccordsMain article: Camp David Accords (1978)

Rabin's government was hamstrung by a pair of scandals, and he was forced to step down in 1977. The right-wing Likud party, under the prime ministership of Menachem Begin, won the elections that followed. This marked a historic change in the Israeli political landscape as for the first time since Israel's founding, a coalition not led by the Labour party was in control of the government.

Sadat, who had entered the war in order to recover the Sinai, grew frustrated at the slow pace of the peace process. In a 1977 interview with CBS News' Walter Cronkite, Sadat admitted under pointed questioning that he was open to a more constructive dialog for peace, including a state visit. This seemed to open the floodgates, as in a later interview with the same reporter, the normally hard-line Begin - perhaps not wishing to be compared unfavorably to Sadat - said he too would be amenable to better relations and offered his invitation for such a visit. Thus in November of that year, Sadat took the unprecedented step of visiting Israel, becoming the first Arab leader to do so, and so implicitly recognized Israel.

The act jump-started the peace process. United States President Jimmy Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to a summit at Camp David to negotiate a final peace. The talks took place from September 5–17, 1978. Ultimately, the talks succeeded, and Israel and Egypt signed the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979. Israel withdrew its troops and settlers from the Sinai, in exchange for normal relations with Egypt and a lasting peace.

Many in the Arab community were outraged at Egypt's peace with Israel. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. Until then, Egypt had been "at the helm of the Arab world."[60]

Anwar Sadat was assassinated two years later, on October 6, 1981, while attending a parade marking the eighth anniversary of the start of the war, by army members who were outraged at his negotiations with Israel.

Commemorations

Yom Kippur is the holiest day for Jews. Apart from the usual ceremonies of the holiday and the fasting, in Israel Yom Kippur also commemorates the war of 1973. This is very apparent in the Israeli media.

October 6 is a national holiday in Egypt called Armed Forces Day. It is a national holiday in Syria as well.[61]

In commemoration of the war, many places in Egypt were named after the October 6 date and Ramadan 10, its equivalent in the Islamic calendar. The examples of these commemorations are the famous 6th of October Bridge كوبري

اكتوبر من and the known cities 6th of October city and 10th of Ramadan السادسcity.

Notes

1. ^ [1] 2. ^ a b c d The number reflects artillery units of caliber 100 mm and up 3. ^ a b (Russian) Yom Kippur War at sem40.ru 4. ^ a b Rabinovich, 496–497 5. ^ During the Autumn of 2003, following the declassification of key Aman

documents, the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth released a series of controversial articles [2] which revealed that key Israeli figures were aware of considerable danger that an attack was likely, including Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, but had decided not to act. The two journalists leading the investigation, Ronen Bergman and Gil Meltzer, later went on to publish Yom Kippur War, Real Time: The Updated Edition, Yediot Ahronoth/Hemed Books, 2004. ISBN 965-511-597-6

6. sed 2007-06-07.