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APT: Hunting ÖDay Malware Mustafa Qasim
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APT - Hunting 0Day Malware

Jun 09, 2015

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Technology

Mustafa Qasim

Presentation slides of my talk at Cyber Secure Pakistan 2013.
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Page 1: APT - Hunting 0Day Malware

APT: Hunting ÖDay Malware

Mustafa Qasim

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Since this presentation started

of organizations will have some malware event successfully evade their IT defenses.

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On average, malware events occur at a single organization once every

3 MIN

UT

ES

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Introduction

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Once upon a time...

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According to IDC, between 2003 and 2011, total IT security spend grew from $12 billion to $28 billion.

$12 Billion2003

$28 Billion2011

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reActive

Vs

proActive

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Fear of False Positive!

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So called Defenders!

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Firewalls

- Yes/No

- NexGen Firewall Buzz

- Latency Impact

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IPS

- Traffic Signatures

- 0Day Prevention Buzz (Exploit > Vulnerability)

- Network Services vs. Client Side Attacks

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Web Gateways

Called: Defense In-depth

In Actual: Iteration

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Anti-Virus (L0L)

- Signatures

- Heuristics

- Sandbox

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Anti-Virus (L0L)

- VIP entry via signed binary– Flame by Microsoft ;-)

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Signatures

- Binary / Traffic

- Morphing, Obfuscation, Encryption

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Heuristics Dilemma

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Heuristics Dilemma

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Isn't Sandbox made up of sand?

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Disheartened by Backward Looking Defenders?

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The highest technique is to have no technique.

My technique is a result of your technique; my movement is a result of your movement.

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APT Malware vs. Traditional

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APT Attack Life Cycle

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Stage 1

Intrusion through exploitation

- Remote Exploit / Local Exploit

- Social Engineering

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Stage 2

Malware is dropped

- Single Click

- 64base Encrypted Hidden Link

- Java revoke list check disabled

- Legacy vs Advanced

* pdf not exe

* DLL search order hijacking

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Stage 3

Phones Home

- RAT

- Outbound Encrypted Connection

- Proxy CnC for a network

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Stage 4

Spreads laterally

- Not always hits target

- Clear entry point

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Stage 5

Data extraction

- Small Chunks

- Staged Host

- Encrypted RAR

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Case Studies

- RSA breach

- Operation Aurora

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Forensics & Challenges

- Behavior

- Code

* Packed

* Obfuscated

* Anti Debugger

* Anti VM

* Time

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NGTP

- Signature less

- Protection not Detection

- Virtual Execution Engine

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Pakistan Cyber Space

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First things FIRST!

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“ If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.”

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War

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Honeynet Pakistan

- 6 Deployments

- Avg. 400 malware per day

- Around 100 Unique

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ISPs

FinancialInstitutions

NADRA

Government Organizations

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Honeytoken Snort Rule

alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Alert! Token c86"; content:"r71p@g3r";)

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Catch Me

Twitter: mustafaqasim

Freenode: mustu @ #offsec