AppSec is Eating Security PRESENTED BY Alex Stamos ｜ AppSec Cali | January 27, 2015
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AppSec is Eating Security
P R E S E N T E D B Y A l e x S t a m o s｜ A p p S e c C a l i | J a n u a r y 2 7 , 2 0 1 5
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Most enterprises are not safe
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Most enterprises are not safe
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• Big Banks + other FIs• Defense Industr ial Base• Oil and Gas• Crit ical Infrastructure• Big Tech• Some Retai l
“SECURE 100”
Most enterprises are not safe
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• Big Banks + other FIs• Defense Industr ial Base• Oil and Gas• Crit ical Infrastructure• Big Tech• Some Retai l
Everybody Else
“SECURE 100”
“TOASTED 400”
Most enterprises are not safe
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• Big Banks + other FIs• Defense Industr ial Base• Oil and Gas• Crit ical Infrastructure• Big Tech• Some Retai l
Everybody Else
“SECURE 100”
What are they missing? • Secure software engineering • Engineering focused IR • Ability to create, not buy, solutions
“TOASTED 400”
Almost no users are safe
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Arista 7508E 1152 x 10GbE
30Tbps backplane 5kW
Security hardware is becoming un-buyable
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Arista 7508E 1152 x 10GbE
30Tbps backplane 5kW
Palo Alto 7050 120Gbps throughput
2.4kW
Security hardware is becoming un-buyable
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5kW
600kW
Containerization collapses the security perimeter
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No: • Virtual soundcard • Guest OS patching • VT-x enforcement • Network controls • Stable naming • 1:1 service relationshipsDiagrams from docker.com
Containerization collapses the security perimeter
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In the long run, this is a good thing! In the short term, it’s a mess to deal with!
No: • Virtual soundcard • Guest OS patching • VT-x enforcement • Network controls • Stable naming • 1:1 service relationshipsDiagrams from docker.com
What AppSec Needs to Accomplish
Apps have to be secure by default
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https://code.google.com/p/mustache-security/ by cure53.de
Apps have to be secure by default
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How many developersunderstand the securityrisk they imported?
https://code.google.com/p/mustache-security/ by cure53.de
App Sec doesn’t have to be realtime or inline
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▪ 10Gb Ethernet = 67ns between frames
App Sec doesn’t have to be realtime or inline
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▪ 10Gb Ethernet = 67ns between frames
▪ 100Gb Ethernet = 6.7ns between frames
App Sec doesn’t have to be realtime or inline
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▪ 10Gb Ethernet = 67ns between frames
▪ 100Gb Ethernet = 6.7ns between frames
App Sec doesn’t have to be realtime or inline
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▪ 10Gb Ethernet = 67ns between frames
▪ 100Gb Ethernet = 6.7ns between frames
Is this actually necessary? No.Is it a good idea? Probably not.
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by Flickr user Keith Allison CC-BY-SA
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by Flickr user Keith Allison CC-BY-SAby Warren Sharp
www.sharpfootballanalysis.com
Bug bounty communities need to reform to grow
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Accept that the browser is the new OS
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I hate it when good points get twisted to prevent progress
Network security must be transparent to applications
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▪ DNSSEC is dead. Several reasons why….
Network security must be transparent to applications
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▪ DNSSEC is dead. Several reasons why….› Complexity:
dnsviz.net via @jpmens
Network security must be transparent to applications
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▪ DNSSEC is dead. Several reasons why….› Complexity:
› Not end-to-end. How much do you trust your DNS provider?
dnsviz.net via @jpmens
Network security must be transparent to applications
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▪ DNSSEC is dead. Several reasons why….› Complexity:
› Not end-to-end. How much do you trust your DNS provider?› Invisible to user applications!
dnsviz.net via @jpmens
Build apps that are safe, not just secure
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▪ Way too little focus on user experience ▪ Classic difficult example is cert info (see APF tonight)
What is a safe app?
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▪ Safest mode is the default
What is a safe app?
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▪ Safest mode is the default▪ Automatically fixes itself
What is a safe app?
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▪ Safest mode is the default▪ Automatically fixes itself▪ Fails gracefully instead of failing insecurely and immediately ▪ Including client-side failures
What is a safe app?
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▪ Safest mode is the default▪ Automatically fixes itself▪ Fails gracefully instead of failing insecurely and immediately ▪ Including client-side failures
▪ Recognizes the difficulties it’s users face
What is a safe app?
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▪ Safest mode is the default▪ Automatically fixes itself▪ Fails gracefully instead of failing insecurely and immediately ▪ Including client-side failures
▪ Recognizes the difficulties it’s users face▪ Takes into account the entire lifecycle of the user
What is a safe app?
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▪ Safest mode is the default▪ Automatically fixes itself▪ Fails gracefully instead of failing insecurely and immediately ▪ Including client-side failures
▪ Recognizes the difficulties it’s users face▪ Takes into account the entire lifecycle of the user
Yes, I’m a security paternalist
Passwords are dead
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Every big password dump has 10-20% matches
Passwords are dead
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Every big password dump has 10-20% matches
▪ SMS › Lowest common denominator › Surprisingly expensive › Unreliable › Insecure in many countries
Passwords are dead
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Every big password dump has 10-20% matches
▪ SMS › Lowest common denominator › Surprisingly expensive › Unreliable › Insecure in many countries
▪ TOTP › Bad user experience › Many apps means no control over seeds
Passwords are dead
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Every big password dump has 10-20% matches
▪ SMS › Lowest common denominator › Surprisingly expensive › Unreliable › Insecure in many countries
▪ Push notifications › Much more secure › Require more user interaction
▪ TOTP › Bad user experience › Many apps means no control over seeds
Passwords are dead
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Every big password dump has 10-20% matches
▪ SMS › Lowest common denominator › Surprisingly expensive › Unreliable › Insecure in many countries
▪ Push notifications › Much more secure › Require more user interaction
▪ TOTP › Bad user experience › Many apps means no control over seeds
None solve the account lifecycle management problem This is the #1 issue for user safety
So…
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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:
So…
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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:• Build apps with no L3 protections
So…
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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:• Build apps with no L3 protections• Patch in our CI/CD pipelines
So…
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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:• Build apps with no L3 protections• Patch in our CI/CD pipelines• Provide end-to-end and transformable encryption
So…
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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:• Build apps with no L3 protections• Patch in our CI/CD pipelines• Provide end-to-end and transformable encryption• Make browsers more trustworthy than the OS
So…
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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:• Build apps with no L3 protections• Patch in our CI/CD pipelines• Provide end-to-end and transformable encryption• Make browsers more trustworthy than the OS
• More work for AppSec, less for the rest of security • Can we solve some of these problems without selling product
Shameless Pitch
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At Yahoo, our security goal is for all users to be safe using any of our products from any country on any platform.
I’m currently looking for a Director of Product Security to reinvent how we build safe products and meet this goal for 1.3B users
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