Approaches to Equity in Post-Tsunami Assistance report on equity in post-tsunami assistance, ... successes and lessons of the Sri Lankan experience ... tively less support and more

OFFICE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL’SSPECIAL ENVOY FOR TSUNAMI RECOVERY

Approaches to Equity in Post-Tsunami Assistance

Sri Lanka: A Case Study

Commissioned by the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery (OSE) and financed by theDepartment for International Development, the Government of the United Kingdom, and by the OSE.

About the Author

Mandeep Kaur Grewal has worked on developmentissues for over 10 years. She was Head of theDepartment for International Development’s(DFID) Sri Lanka Office, based in Colombo,between February 2004 and February 2006, beforebeing attached to the Office of the Special Envoyfor Tsunami Recovery for the purpose of thisassignment. She has recently returned to DFID’sHeadquarters in London to work on the linkagesbetween the European Union’s development andsecurity policies.

Introduction and Acknowledgements

This report on equity in post-tsunami assistance,with a focus on Sri Lanka, was commissioned by the Office of the UN Special Envoy for TsunamiRecovery (OSE), and financed by the Departmentfor International Development, the Government ofthe United Kingdom, and by the OSE. The researchfor this report was completed in April 2006, andmost of the figures and analysis are current as ofthat date. While circumstances have changed con-siderably since April 2006, the passage of time hasnot altered the relevance of issues addresses or thereport’s recommendations.

This report could not have been prepared withoutthe views, information and insights provided bybeneficiary groups, representatives of local andnational government authorities, the developmentcommunity and the LTTE representatives involvedin the provision of recovery assistance. Particularthanks are due to representatives from theGovernment of Sri Lanka’s Reconstruction andDevelopment Authority and Ministry of NationBuilding who engaged with this assignment in aspirit of openness and willingness to share both thesuccesses and lessons of the Sri Lankan experiencewith others. Thanks are also due to colleagues in arange of government and development partneragencies that reviewed and provided constructivefeedback on earlier drafts of this report.

The analysis and assessments set out in the paper arethose of the author and do not necessarily reflect theviews of the commissioning and financing institutions.

* Based on research and analysis completed in April 2006.

Approaches to Equity in Post-Tsunami Assistance

Sri Lanka: A Case Study

Mandeep Kaur Grewal

November 2006*

On December 26, 2004, the world’s largestnatural disaster in recent times impacted12 countries. Sri Lanka, already reelingfrom two decades of civil conflict, pro-vided a highly sensitive political and

humanitarian context within which the tsunamiunfolded. As a result of both disasters, Sri Lanka’spolicy-makers and development partners were chal-lenged to implement effective recovery efforts for

tsunami affected communities,while ensuring these efforts didnot inadvertently exacerbate thesocial vulnerabilities of the post-conflict environment.

This paper, commissioned bythe Office of the UN SpecialEnvoy for Tsunami Recovery, isone of a range of studiesdesigned to contribute to lessonlearning within the humanitari-an reform agenda. It is a reviewof how equity has been handled

in the post-tsunami context, using the Sri Lankanexperience as a case study. Through qualitative andquantitative evidence, it identifies:• Patterns of inequity by comparing the assistance

provided to tsunami and conflict affected com-munities;

• Disparities in the assistance provided within the tsunami Internally Displaced Person (IDP)group itself.The findings indicate that despite the stated inten-

tions of the Government of Sri Lanka, developmentpartners and the LTTE to support the needs of bothIDP groups and promote an equitable post-tsunamiresponse, significant disparities have prevailed. Mostconflict IDPs have received quantitatively and qualita-tively less support and more slowly than the supportreceived by tsunami IDPs. While important practicaland conflict related constraints have played a role inlimiting the outcomes for conflict IDPs, these con-straints have not been impenetrable.

A critical obstacle to equity has been the directionof policy priorities. Support for conflict IDPs has

focused mostly on helping them cope with con-straints rather than on re-establishing the potentialfor independent and assertive living. Tsunami recov-ery has been shaped by a commitment to restore fullindependence as quickly as possible to survivors, aswell as building back better prospects and opportuni-ties where possible. The reasons this policy impera-tive has been so much stronger in the post-tsunamirather than post-conflict context are at least partiallyrelated to the unfinished, man-made nature of theconflict as opposed to the exogenous origins, imme-diacy and breadth of impact of the tsunami. Thesedifferences have impacted on political and bureau-cratic incentives to deliver. The media coverage andthe vast funds available with fewer conventional pol-icy conditions have additionally strengthened boththe political impetus and feasibility of enhanceddelivery in the post-tsunami context.

Within the tsunami IDP group, affected com-munities in the east and, particularly, the north haveexperienced a slower pace of progress than those inthe south and west of the country. This pattern is,again, partially related to practical constraints, manyarising from the more difficult conflict context con-straining delivery in the north and east, whilestronger infrastructure and private sector supporthas favoured faster delivery in the south. Howeverwhile the contextual and practical constraints havepromoted a context for inequity, they did not prede-termine that it would prevail.

What have been more dynamic in driving thedisparities are institutional constraints such as therole of politics and the lack of subsidiarity in thenational context, and incentives and pressures thathave adversely affected the quality of NGOengagement. These factors undermined broaderaspects of best practice such as effective coordina-tion and consultation with beneficiaries, and in so doingundermined the prospects for equity. They alsocontributed to intra-district disparities identifiedparticularly in the south, west and east of the coun-try, by undermining systems to deliver assistancemore equitably. Additional pressures wrought by

Executive Summary

2

Most conflict IDPs havereceived quantitatively

and qualitatively less support and more slowly

than the support receivedby tsunami IDPs.

the media, massive funding flows, and a profusionof actors with overly narrow beneficiary targetsexacerbated these weaknesses. This resulted inproblematic national coordination systems, allow-ing competition for beneficiaries among imple-menting agencies. This in turn reduced the consis-tency and depth of the positive efforts by govern-ment and implementing agencies to drive betterpractice and promote equity.

The institutional constraints elaborated in thestudy are far from unique to Sri Lanka or the tsuna-mi context. Most government systems will strugglewith undue political influences and imperfect disas-ter response frameworks; most recovery efforts haveexperienced implementing agencies compartmen-talising responsibility for delivery in a way thatundermines wider best practice; and most develop-ment partners could be much more flexible infinancing disaster response efforts. Acknowledgingthe most sensitive and often least transparent fac-tors constraining better practice and finding practi-cal ways to challenge their influence is imperative inmitigating the risks to equity. From this study, twokey priorities stand out:• Increasing and enhancing collaborative approaches

to recovery: with host governments, developmentpartners and implementing agencies acceptingmutual accountability for the entire recoveryeffort, notwithstanding how individual responsi-bilities may be apportioned between actors.

• Improving transparency to enhance accountabilitysystems: through increased availability of infor-mation about the contribution of individualactors within the overall collaborative frameworkat all stages of recovery.The intention is to reduce the space for poor

practice to go unchecked by increasing the rightkind of pressure and support for all actors to worktogether for joint delivery.

Key recommendations include:1

• The wider use of standing disaster response com-pacts setting out the roles, responsibilities andworking standards between different levels ofgovernment and specific humanitarian actors inthe event of a disaster;

• Transparent, depoliticised and more selectiverecruitment of national disaster response person-nel, combined with enhanced training to ensureimplementing agency staff have strategic capa-bility as well as operational skills;

• Steps to ensure that implementing agencies willbe more accountable for engagement in thedevelopment of multi-agency coordinationmechanisms, and in meeting common standardsto drive best practice;

• Steps to promote stronger accountability fornational authorities through limiting the oppor-tunities for politics to unduly influence recoveryprocesses;

• Requiring development partners to make fund-ing policy support to governments as high a priority as funding for operational delivery;

• Encouraging the UN Inter Agency Standingcommittee (IASC) to explore options for pro-moting joint accountability with a broader rangeof humanitarian actors under its current reformagenda;

• Encouraging the IASC to include the consider-ation of equity issues within the development ofevolving cluster guidance;

• Encouraging the use of spot-checks to ensurethat coordination systems are robust, and sup-port subsidiarity and equitable delivery;

• Encouraging UNDP and OCHA to work withdevelopment partners and media institutions toenhance the capacity of the media to report constructively;

• Encouraging NGOs to explore legal avenues todevelop funding campaigns that legally andtransparently provide for maximum flexibility inthe use of funds, to enable more effective use ofresources in a rapidly changing environment.

Overall, the paper recommends that the IASCand the Active Learning Network for Account-ability and Performance in Humanitarian Action(ALNAP) develop stronger web resources to enablegovernments and development partners to learnabout progress and obtain advice and informationon all of these critical issues.

The recommendations reflect and build on exist-ing themes in the humanitarian reform agenda, butin their specificity are designed to strengthen imple-mentation efforts. The pressure is on: future sur-vivors and an ever growing global support base arewaiting to see how well we will meet our commit-ments in the future.

1 These recommendations are applicable to disasterresponse efforts generally and beyond the Sri Lankacontext. A separate set of recommendations, applicablespecifically to Sri Lanka,appear in Section 4.

3

Section 1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................................6

Section 2. Equity Issues Between Post-Tsunami and Post-Conflict Assistance ...................................9

Policy ...........................................................................................................................................................10

Post-Conflict Policy.................................................................................................................................10

Practice........................................................................................................................................................10

Factors Affecting the Gap Between Policy and Practice .......................................................................13

Contextual Factors:..................................................................................................................................13

Post-Conflict Context .............................................................................................................................14

Post-Tsunami Context ............................................................................................................................14

Funding....................................................................................................................................................14

Perceptions of Political Will ....................................................................................................................16

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................16

Section 3. Equity Issues Within Tsunami Affected Districts.................................................................17

Policy ...........................................................................................................................................................17

Practice........................................................................................................................................................19

Factors Affecting the Gap Between Policy and Practice .......................................................................22

The Political and Governance Framework ..............................................................................................22

Policy and Technical Constraints.............................................................................................................25

Pressure for Results..................................................................................................................................27

Conflict Impacts on the North and East.................................................................................................28

Contextual Challenges.............................................................................................................................29

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................30

Section 4. Final Conclusions ....................................................................................................................31

Overarching Lessons and Future Challenges ..........................................................................................33

Contents

4

Recommendations: General .....................................................................................................................34

Technical and Policy Capacity .................................................................................................................34

The Role of Politics .................................................................................................................................34

Policy Development.................................................................................................................................35

Coordination ..........................................................................................................................................35

Pressure for Results..................................................................................................................................36

Monitoring and Evaluation .....................................................................................................................36

Overall .....................................................................................................................................................36

Recommendations: Sri Lanka...................................................................................................................37

Centralization of Authority: The Role of Politics ..................................................................................37

National Government Capacity...............................................................................................................37

Coordination............................................................................................................................................38

Monitoring and Evaluation ...................................................................................................................38

Particular Implementation Challenges ....................................................................................................38

Annex 1. Guiding Principles ....................................................................................................................40

Annex 2. Mini Case Examples of Transitional Shelter Provision .........................................................41

Annex 3. People Consulted......................................................................................................................42

Annex 4. Bibliography..............................................................................................................................46

5

The tsunami triggered by the Indian Oceanearthquake on December 26, 2004 pro-duced a breadth of disaster rarely experi-enced in recent times. Twelve countriesreported over 200,000 people dead or

missing, along with almost two million people dis-placed. This, in turn, precipitated an unprecedentedglobal response with both private citizens and gov-ernments clamouring to provide support to sur-

vivors. The challenge since thenhas been to ensure that nationaland international efforts andresources are channelled througha robust set of systems to supportcoordinated, effective relief andrecovery in the affected countries.

As with any humanitarianemergency, the experience hasprovided new opportunities toboth test and build national and

international capacity to reduce disaster risk, andimprove management of disaster response. Previousexperience has already led to the development ofcore principles and best practices in many areas.However, despite the increased awareness of andcommitments to best practice, many in the human-itarian community acknowledge that we are collec-tively falling considerably short in applying theselessons effectively. Achieving our full potentialrequires acknowledging both good and problematicpractice, analysing the reasons behind the difficul-ties, and taking concerted remedial action.

This study seeks to contribute to this process byfocusing on equity, a pivotal principle in underpin-ning how disaster response and recovery effortsshould be shaped. While there are varying interpre-tations of equity, at its simplest, it is defined as thequality of being fair and impartial. Its relevancefrom a human rights and development perspectiveis its relationship with the principle of non-discrim-ination, one of the cornerstones of internationalhuman rights law, and central to the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights. For operational pur-poses, its centrality is reflected in the inclusion of

non-discrimination in key documents such as theRed Cross and NGO Code of Conduct,2 theGuiding Principles on Internal Displacement,3 andthe Good Humanitarian Donorship Agenda,4 thelatter of which refers to the importance of impar-tiality, “meaning the implementation of actions solely onthe basis of need, without discrimination between orwithin affected populations.”

Underpinning the principle of equity in reliefand recovery efforts is the belief that, in the face ofdisaster, affected populations maintain the samerights as non-affected populations. The concept iscentral to designing strategies that limit the risk offurther damage to an already vulnerable group andthe risk of resentment and tensions developingamong what would otherwise be competing groups.Finally, as promoting equity relies in part on otheraspects of good practice such as transparent man-agement of the recovery process and participation ofaffected communities in recovery, an equitableapproach should enhance the overall quality of reliefand recovery responses.

The Office of the Special Envoy for TsunamiRecovery commissioned this review on equity issuesarising from post-tsunami response, using Sri Lanka asa case study. The study seeks to document the extentto which patterns of inequity have developed in therecovery effort in Sri Lanka and to understand the fac-tors behind this. Its starting point was the widelyrecognised concern that the recovery effort could leadto disparate treatment between existing conflict affect-ed communities and new tsunami affected groups.However the research and consultation process led toan exploration of other equity issues in the recoveryprocess, which must also be understood and addressed.The report focuses on an analysis of:• Disparities observed through a comparison of

the assistance provided to tsunami affected com-munities and the assistance provided to commu-nities affected by Sri Lanka’s long running civilconflict; and

• Regional disparities arising from how assistancehas been provided solely within the tsunamiaffected group.

Section 1

Introduction

2 The Code of Conduct:Principles of Conduct for theInternational Red Cross andRed Crescent Movement andNGOs in Disaster ResponseProgrammes (1995).

3 UN document reference:E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2,1998.

4 A set of principles, agreed toby a number of donors inJune 2003, which reaffirm thedistinctive purpose of officialhumanitarian aid and outlinebest practice in its financing,management and evaluation.

6

Equity at its simplest is defined as

the quality of being fair and impartial.

In both cases, the study: 1) reports the statedintentions of key policy-makers and influencers;2) compares the provision of selected areas of assis-tance; and 3) explores a range of key factors thathave shaped how assistance has been provided tothe various groups.

The policy-makers and influencers discussedinclude the Government of Sri Lanka, developmentpartners and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE). The study has made reference to develop-ment partners because they have considerable scopeto impact recovery processes through the provisionof funds and technical expertise. The study refers topractices, achievements and challenges linked to the LTTE’s engagement in disaster response andrecovery as it has retained significant influence on recovery processes in LTTE controlled areas thatwere affected by the tsunami, although the exten-sion of government services in these areas is alsoacknowledged.5

Methodology: The report first reflects the statedintentions of key stakeholders by describing thecommitments and agreements that are on record.The outcomes for beneficiary groups are illustratedby comparing selected assistance schemes, quantita-tive records on their implementation and qualitativeaccounts from interviews. The analysis of factors isbased mainly on issues and views observed andreported in a wide range of policy and operationalmeetings held between December 2004 and April2006 and targeted interviews carried out betweenJanuary and April 2006.6 The interviews were basedon a semi-structured format, enabling participantsto contribute to or challenge premises suggested,and to independently raise key points.

The study draws liberally from existing papersthat have reviewed and evaluated performance andchallenges to post-tsunami relief and recoveryefforts and selected papers on post-conflict pro-grammes. The study has also benefited from accessto quantitative information provided by theGovernment of Sri Lanka, development partners,civil society groups and the LTTE’s Planning andDevelopment Secretariat (PDS).

The study highlights key premises, trends andfindings using illustrative examples from selectedsectors. It also relates views and opinions reportedin both meetings and interviews and other studies,on how equity has been managed. While theseviews and opinions may or may not be based on evi-dence, perceptions about fairness and discrimina-tion are critical to assessing whether the goal ofmanaging and communicating a fair process andreducing the risk of resentment and tensions isbeing met. Finally, as introduced in Box 1.3, thestudy makes reference to information gaps and

5 The study does not aim toendorse or comment on theright of the LTTE to influ-ence development processesin areas under its control.However it has sought toreport on the circumstancesaffecting communities inLTTE-controlled areas andreferences are therefore madeto reports on and findingsfrom research on the manage-ment of equity in these areas.

6 Over 100 government, multi-lateral, bilateral, NGO andLTTE representatives wereconsulted in meetings inColombo and a range of dis-tricts. (For more details, seeAnnex 3.) Beneficiary viewswere mainly drawn fromstudies and consultation exer-cises referenced in Annex 4.

7 The scope of this paper doesnot allow for a discussion ofthe political and securitydevelopments in the post-tsunami period but an analysis of these dynamics can be found in JonathanGoodhand and Bart Klem’s2005 assessment, Aid, Conflictand Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka2000-2005, and related sub-studies.

8 See Annex 1 for the full set ofGuiding Principles.

7

Sri Lanka was one of the countries hardest hit by thetsunami. In minutes, the disaster claimed over30,000 lives, injuring a further 20,000 people and displacing thousands of families. Over 150,000 liveli-hoods were lost with fishing communities bearingthe brunt of the economic impact although thetourist and agricultural sectors were also significant-ly affected. The disaster affected all of Sri Lanka’smajor ethnic groups as it impacted the Tamil andMuslim populated northern and eastern districts inaddition to the predominantly Sinhalese populatedsouthern and western districts of the country.

The tsunami brought a second round of suffering toa country already reeling from 20 years of civil con-flict. The failure of a generation of political efforts toresolve the grievances of Tamil groups, linked withcommunal tensions, exploded into violence by theearly 1980s. Over two decades later, the conflict hasbeen marked by alternating periods of intense mili-tary engagement, smaller scale incursions, ceasefiresand peace talks. As a result of the conflict, approxi-mately 60,000 people have been killed, and almostone million civilians have been displaced, withalmost half remaining displaced today. The conflicthas impacted Sri Lanka’s social fabric and significant-ly undermined its economic potential. This is espe-cially the case in the north and eastern districts,the areas most directly affected by the conflict.Humanitarian assistance providers have been oper-ational in most conflict affected areas, and develop-ment efforts have been made during periods of rel-ative calm. This was most recently evident followingthe 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, which held despitean effectively stalled peace process and a markedescalation in violence from early 2004, but whichwas unravelling as of mid 2006.

For these reasons, on the morning of December 26,2004, Sri Lanka’s biggest natural disaster in livingmemory unfolded in a highly sensitive political andhumanitarian context.7 Sri Lanka’s policy-makers andinfluencers were faced with a host of complex policyand operational challenges. Aside from the over-whelming imperative to meet the needs of survivors,concerns were immediately raised regarding theneed to ensure that where possible, response effortsdid not inadvertently exacerbate the existing socialvulnerabilities of the post-conflict environment andin fact, should build on Sri Lanka’s experience in post-conflict reconstruction. By February 2006, a setof Guiding Principles8 were established to help pro-mote a high quality recovery effort. The first principleaffirmed the importance of equity by setting out therequirement for allocating resources on the basis ofneed only and without discrimination.

Background: The Sri Lankan Context

Box 1.1.

inconsistencies that challenge the ability to under-stand and address equity issues.

The paper aims to use the examples arising fromthe Sri Lankan experience to illustrate the patternsthat can develop when factors undermining equityare not addressed sufficiently. While the paper onlyexamines Sri Lanka, the factors challenging equityare relevant to so many other recovery contexts thatthe paper concludes with recommendations thathave wider applicability to other disaster recoverycontexts. These reinforce existing lessons from thisfield, but it is hoped the specificity and method-

ological focus of the recommendations will furtherspur efforts to improve performance. A further setof recommendations for the Sri Lankan context arealso set out.

9 For example, interviewsrevealed that the quality ofinformation on operationaland cross-cutting issues provided by OCHA field staffwas high but often failed tobe effectively communicatedto development partners inColombo responsible forinfluencing significant fund-ing decisions and responsestrategies.

8

Development partners refers to bilateral, multilat-eral, international and national non-governmentalorganization (NGO) partners and internationalorganizations (such as the Red Cross and RedCrescent Movement and the International Organi-sation for Migration) that either provide fundsand/or implement activities. Multilateral organiza-tions include the UN and international financialinstitutions such as the World Bank, theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the AsianDevelopment Bank.

Humanitarian actors refers to the same group ofdevelopment partners, but those specificallyfocused on humanitarian response as opposed tothe broader set of development activities.

Implementing agencies refers more specifically todevelopment partners, such as NGOs, engaged inimplementation. In the post-tsunami context,this group also includes a range of smaller scale, lessestablished and/or professional actors such asimprovised charities that made humanitarian inter-ventions such as distributing non-food relief itemswith privately raised resources.

Local authorities refer to the Government of Sri Lanka’s local administration, headed by District Secretaries (otherwise known as Govern-ment Agents) and Divisional Secretaries at the sub-district level.

Provincial authorities refer to Sri Lanka’s electedprovincial authorities and/or their administrativebodies.

Subsidiarity is the principle that decision makingand implementation should be carried out at levelsclosest to citizens. Consequently, central authoritiesshould perform only those tasks that can only beperformed at the centre and cannot be performedat a local level, and regional and local authoritiesshould embrace responsibilities that can be effec-tively carried out at those levels.

Definitions

Box 1.2.

Examples of information challenges that have madeit difficult to monitor equity issues include:

• Limitations in the UN-coordinated district emer-gency needs assessments carried out in the firstweek following the tsunami, which unfortunatelyvaried too significantly in quality to provide anaccurate, composite national picture of emer-gency requirements.

• Communication problems, a lack of subsidiarityand problematic coordination, which led to dis-crepancies when monitoring progress betweendifferent government levels. For example, inFebruary 2005, Hambantota District reportedhanding over 4,724 houses to beneficiariesthrough the donor built housing scheme. A monthlater, Central Government authorities reportedHambantota handing over only 1,704 through thesame scheme.

• Anomalies in the reporting of needs such as thereport of Hambantota District’s donor built housing needs increasing from 2,343, reported12 months after the disaster, to 3,107 threemonths later.

• A paucity of data about the challenges andprogress in LTTE-controlled areas.

• Significant gaps and anomalies in the reportsaccessible through the government’s Develop-ment Assistance Database (DAD). Despite stronggovernment efforts to encourage developmentpartners to report expenditures, as at March 2006,many interviewees believed the DAD had not cap-tured between $0.5 to $1 billion (including fundsalready disbursed). For the information that hadbeen recorded, many development partners hadnot been sufficiently specific about the regions to which commitments had been allocated. (Formore on the DAD, see Section 3.)

• Sub-optimal information flows between humani-tarian partners in the districts and in Colombo.9

• Throughout 2005, the prevalence of a conven-tional focus on monitoring the more limited out-puts of individual agency initiatives (e.g. numberof fishing boats provided) at the expense of more collaborative government and development partner assessments of holistic, district or region-al outcomes (e.g. relative income security of former fishing communities).

Information Challenges

Box 1.3.

Section 2

9

Sri Lanka has two groups of internally displaced persons (IDPs). A tsunami IDPgroup that formed as a result of that rapidonset disaster and a conflict IDP groupthat developed incrementally as a result of

a slow onset disaster — two decades of conflict. It isimportant to note that, despite the ability to providea straightforward definition of equity, the validity ofcomparing tsunami and conflict IDPs may be ques-tioned, as their circumstances resulted from differ-ent tragedies and they confront very different obsta-cles to social progress. Nonetheless, the rationale fordoing so is robust: the principle of equity requiresthe prioritization of need, notwithstanding the rea-sons why the need developed. Different underlyingfactors may affect how that need is met, and indeedan equitable response may involve providing differ-ent levels of assistance to different groups to ensurethey reach a common minimum standard. However,the central focus of governments and developmentpartners should be to exploit all available options for

promoting equity, rather than assume that groupsshould automatically accept disparities in the fulfil-ment of their rights. In the conflict affected context,the issue of equity becomes particularly importantas societal cleavages provide a stronger frameworkfor communities to perceive differences in treat-ment, and the perception of inequity can become aproblem as damaging and time consuming as deal-ing with the reality.

Within Sri Lanka, despite a Ceasefire Agree-ment (CFA) in place since February 2002, theabsence of a final peace agreement and other condi-tions promoting a return to normalcy meant thatalmost one in every 55 Sri Lankans was already aconflict IDP when the tsunami struck. The packageof assistance for tsunami IDPs could, therefore, becompared or contrasted with the schemes already inplace for conflict IDPs.

While the conflict and tsunami unfolded in verydifferent ways, Table 1 illustrates the common typesof losses and needs they both generated.

Equity Issues Between Post-Tsunamiand Post-Conflict Assistance

10 Figures on fatalities, missing,injured and IDPs figures arefrom the Government of SriLanka’s Ministry of NationBuilding and PeaceSecretariat.

11 Except for data on peoplerequiring resettlement, alltsunami figures are from theGovernment of Sri Lankaand Development Partners,Post Tsunami Recovery andReconstruction (hereafterreferred to as Joint One-YearReport) (December 2005);for sources of resettlementfigures, see footnote 12.

12 Some conflict IDPs went onto relocate within Sri Lanka,emigrate, became refugees orreturned to damaged homesleaving a smaller (though stillsubstantial) group of currentconflict IDPs.

13 Figures are from UNHCR.The numbers for the conflictgroup were taken in July2005, and the numbers forthe tsunami group weretaken in February 2005.Many tsunami IDPs living with families and intemporary camps in thisFebruary snapshot moved to transitional sheltersthroughout 2005 whileawaiting permanent resettle-ment. Figures for bothgroups from the Ministry ofNation Building differ byapproximately 5–10 percentfrom the UNHCR totals.

14 World Bank, AsianDevelopment Bank, and UN,Assessment of Needs in theNorth and East (May 2003).A smaller number of conflictIDPs has emerged in com-parison with the number ofhomes damaged as approxi-mately 700,000 peoplebecame refugees and otherscontinue to live in damagedhomes.

15 Following changes in housing entitlement criteriain 2006, housing needs were expected to increase to approximately 105,000;Government of Sri Lanka,Reconstruction andDevelopment Authority(RADA), March 2006.

16 Figures from the Ministry of Nation Building, March2006.

17 This figure is derived fromthe Multilateral GroupNeeds Assessment, carriedout in May 2003 and hasbeen rounded up from a basecase funding requirementscenario of $2.958 billion.An augmented case scenariostood at $3.086 billion.

Indicator Conflict 10 Tsunami11

Reported deaths Approximately 60,000 over the course of the conflict (approximately 2 decades)

35,322, including over 4,000 missing,all on 26 December

Reported missing Over 21,000 over the course of theconflict

See above

Reported injured Approximately 50,000 over the course of the conflict

21,441, all on 26 December

Reported internally displaced Approximately 800,00012 at peak;total figure over the course of the conflict varies

516,150, all on 26 December

Persons requiring resettlement13 342,717 people in total:68,605 in welfare centres274,112 with host families,as at July 2005

457,576 people in total:64,467 in camps, and 393,109 with host families,as at February 2005

Homes damaged or destroyed Over 326,00014 98,00015

Livelihoods affected 200,00016 150,000 (however internal reports used by thegovernment in 2006 refer to 180,000)

Reconstruction needs assessment $3 billion17

as assessed in May 2003Approximately $2.2 billion as reported in December 2005

Table 1. Summary of Disaster Impacts

A key difference between the two groups relatesto diversity and geographical breadth. The vastmajority of conflict IDPs are from mainly Tamiland Muslim communities residing in the northernand eastern districts of the country (hereafterreferred to as the north and east). The tsunamiaffected the majority of these same districts18 aswell as predominantly Sinhalese communities inthe south and west.

PolicyThe statements and policy measures of the Govern-ment of Sri Lanka, the international community and

the LTTE indicate an acknowl-edgement of the needs of bothconflict and tsunami IDPs.

Post-Conflict Policy

Government measures: The gov-ernment established a specificauthority, the CommissionerGeneral of Essential Services, toaddress the needs of conflictIDPs as early as July 1983, andsuccessive administrations havemaintained some form of func-tioning authority to address theneeds of conflict IDPs. In 1992,the Representative of the UN

Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPscommented:

The government has assumed full responsibilityfor its displaced and returnee population andworks closely with international agencies andorganizations. Sri Lanka presents the unusualsituation of a central government providing reliefaid to people under the control of the main opposition groups.19

International measures: While a number ofinternational and national development partnershave a long record of humanitarian assistance in thenorth and east, international donors demonstratedtheir increased support by pledging $4.5 billion ofassistance at the 2003 Donors Conference in Tokyo.Although this was pledged to Sri Lanka as a whole,the conference took place in the context of a seriesof peace talks, and the majority of commitmentswere intended to focus on reconstructing the con-flict affected north and east.

LTTE measures: The LTTE has frequently articulated the importance of meeting the develop-ment needs of the north and east and, in 2004,developed a Planning and Development Secretariat(PDS) to institutionalize and professionalize itsown development capacity. The PDS has since

engaged with local and provincial authorities anddevelopment partners on relief and developmentissues across the north and east.

Post-tsunami commitments: In the aftermath of thetsunami, both the government and LTTE expressed acommitment to support tsunami affected communi-ties, through their joint willingness to negotiate inno-vative arrangements to administer post-tsunami sup-port in the north and east (see Box 3.1); their extend-ed cooperation at the local level; and the flexibilitywith which both sides (in different ways) alloweddevelopment partners to provide support in areasunder their respective control. International supportwas underpinned by: $2.1 billion in post-tsunami reliefand recovery commitments recorded by the govern-ment by March 2006; a further estimated $0.5–$1 bil-lion in commitments by NGOs and private sectororganizations that, as at March 2006, had not beenofficially recorded (see Section 3); and the debt andtrade related assistance pledged by multilateral andbilateral partners, valued at $1 billion.

PracticeTable 2 sets out national and international efforts toaddress the needs of both sets of IDPs by summa-rizing the main forms of assistance provided to sur-vivors of both disasters.

As the table illustrates, both government anddevelopment partners have supported specific assis-tance programmes to target similar areas of need forboth groups. However there are significant differ-ences in the value of support provided to eachgroup, the extent to which the target groups havebeen covered, and the pace at which assistance hasbeen provided.

Value of support: Food, transitional shelter and per-manent shelter best exemplify the differences in thevalue of support provided. The government rationscheme for conflict IDPs has not been linked to infla-tion, remaining set at the unit cost agreed to when thescheme was established in the early 1990s. As a result,the calorific value of each ration is estimated to be sig-nificantly lower than that provided by the WFP-fund-ed tsunami food relief scheme. The latter also includesnon-basic food items such as sugar and corn soya toenhance nutritional adequacy and palatability.

Conflict IDPs have been transitionally housedfor one to two decades in government WelfareCentres, established in the early 1990s. Only 60percent of the centres, which were not built explic-itly for this purpose, have benefited from a basicupgrading programme since then. Compared withtsunami IDPs, residents in these Welfare Centresare reported to live in smaller structures, which aremade of less resilient materials, and to have less

18 This created a significantgroup of people displaced by both disasters and hasfacilitated an in-depth comparison of the assistanceprovided to tsunami andconflict IDP groups.

19 Report of the Representativeof the Secretary General,Francis Deng, submittedpursuant to Commission onHuman Rights Resolution1993–1995, addendum profiles in displacement,Sri Lanka, quoted in T. Lankaneson, InternallyDisplaced Persons Report.

10

In the conflict affectedcontext, equity is particu-larly important as societal

cleavages provide astronger framework for

communities to perceivedifference in treatment.

access to toilets, water, sanitation facilities, andpower. By contrast, the government set a minimumstandard for tsunami transitional shelters in early2005,24 and NGOs that initially built shelters for

tsunami survivors according to the standards of thoseprovided to conflict IDPs were obliged to upgrade thestructures from an early date. Annex 2 provides threecomparative summary cases of communities living in

20 All costs are listed in USdollars and are calculated atan exchange rate of 100 SriLankan rupees per dollar.

21 Rates from the 2001Government EnhancedCompensation Scheme fordependants of persons killeddue to terrorist activities. Theextent to which conflict IDPfamilies have benefited fromthis scheme, as opposed tofamilies in other parts of SriLanka, is unclear althoughanecdotal evidence suggeststhat conflict IDP familieshave found it difficult to participate in the scheme.Similarly, very few — if any— conflict IDP families arebelieved to have benefitedfrom the funeral expensesscheme.

22 2005 tsunami response/UNstock taking exercise for Sri Lanka.

23 Figures from UNHCR,2005.

24 This involved guidance onthe size and structure of theshelter. The expected valuewas initially set at $300 per shelter, before beingincreased to $500 within the space of months.

11

Compensation Deaths: $250–$1,000 21

Injuries: $250–$500Funeral expenses: $100

Deaths: n/a Injuries: n/aFuneral expenses: $150

Food Dry ration package valued at between9 and 12 cents per person, per day.

WFP estimate of nutritional worth:1,000 Kcals per person, per day.

Additional WFP vulnerable feedingprogramme.

Cash grant package valued at approxi-mately 50 cents per person, per day.

WFP estimate of nutritional worth:1,881 Kcals per person, per day.

Non-Food Related Items (NFRIs) Development partner provision ofitems to selected groups throughdevelopment programmes, but nocomprehensive records available.

Estimated that every individual in wel-fare and other temporary shelter siteshave received NFRIs, from soap andclothing to bicycles, from a prolifera-tion of sources.22

Transitional Shelter 17,852 23 families remained in Welfare Centres after two decades.No comprehensive records availableon upgrading/ additional support.

Estimated value: $50–$200 per shelter (for the 60% of shelters benefiting from upgrading).

Approximately 60,000 families housedin purpose built transitional shelterunits within 13 months of the disaster.Upgrading underway from 2005.

Estimated value: $300–$600 per shelter (for all).

Permanent Housing Government pledge in 2003 to support 105,000 qualifying families(approximately one third of the totalneed) with a Unified Assistance Scheme (UAS) Housing Grant (see Box 2.1).

Resources committed to supportapproximately 47,000 householders.

Estimated cost: $2,500 per house (in 2005) for UAS funded homes.

(A further 2,000 [approximately] donor built houses provided to families by early 2006.)

Government pledge in 2005 to support 98,000 (or 100% of) householders (increased to approximately 105,000 to cover allaffected families in 2006).

Resources available for all householders, renters, and squatters.

Estimated cost: $3,000– $11,000 perhouse (covers grant funded and donorbuilt homes).

Livelihoods Livelihoods programmes supportedby a range of multilateral and NGOinputs. No comprehensive records of total numbers covered.

North East Coastal DevelopmentProgramme (NECDEP) MicrofinanceScheme begins in April 2006.

200,000 people have benefited from livelihood restoration programmes (by December 2005).

Over 25,000 loans provided throughSusahana Microfinance Scheme fortsunami affected regions (excludingLTTE-controlled areas) by April 2006.

Cash grants/allowances Since 2003, 105,000 qualifying families (approximately one third of IDP families) have received a $250 UAS resettlement grant (see Box 2.1).

In 2005, approximately 250,000 families (more than 100% of the targetgroup) received two $50 cash grantinstalments, and approximately155,000 families (approximately 100% of the target group) receivedfour $50 cash grant instalments.

$25 per family for cooking utensils.

$50 emergency resettlementallowance for all families.

Table 2. Summary of Assistance for Post-Conflict and Post-Tsunami IDPs as at April 200620

Assistance Conflict affected Tsunami affected

post-conflict and post-tsunami transitional shelter.In 2003, the government and development part-

ners agreed to use the already established UnifiedAssistance Scheme (UAS) to resettle selected con-flict IDPs in permanent housing. The scheme isbased on an ‘owner driven’ concept, providing grantsto families to build their own homes. Between 2003and 2004, the grant rose from $750 to $1,500. In2005, a similar programme was established for themajority of tsunami IDPs with a housing grantvalue of $1000 to repair, and $2,500 to rebuild dam-aged homes. This existed alongside a ‘donor driven’scheme where implementing agencies would buildhomes for tsunami IDP families.

To promote equity and allow for increasing con-struction and labour costs, the UAS housing grantwas also raised to $2,500 in 2005. However, dispari-ties in assistance have remained as most tsunami IDPfamilies receiving grants have also been benefitingfrom supplementary NGO assistance. In all, tsunamiIDPs benefiting from either of the two owner ordonor built tsunami housing schemes have been esti-mated to have secured assistance valued at anywherebetween $3,000 and $11,000, while conflict IDPswith housing grants have been largely unable toaccess additional support. Of further concern is thefact that 55 percent of conflict IDPs who qualifiedfor housing assistance were still awaiting their grantsin mid-2006, as the scheme had yet to be fully fund-ed. As a result, a proportion of conflict IDPs who also

became tsunami IDPs were reported to have optedfor support through the tsunami recovery pro-grammes to gain access to more and faster assistance.

Coverage: The housing examples also exemplifythe differences between the coverage extended to thetwo IDP groups. For conflict IDPs, only familieswith access to land and family incomes of less than$250 per month are eligible for the UAS allowances.In practice, this has meant that only just over one-third of conflict IDP families26 are eligible for thescheme, and as noted above, over half of this qualify-ing group is still awaiting housing grants.

By contrast, from the beginning, all formerhouseholders in the tsunami IDP group were eligi-ble for housing assistance and by early 2006 theentire group had secured commitments to ensurethat their homes were partially or fully rebuiltaccording to agreed minimum government stan-dards. In addition, by early 2006 new governmentschemes were being rolled out to ensure that alltsunami IDPs who were previously landless wouldbe given support to buy land and access housingassistance. Moreover, as noted later in Section 3, thecash allowance, food ration and non-food relief itemdistribution schemes are estimated to have beenprovided to tsunami-affected target groups that aresignificantly larger than originally envisaged.

The examples indicate that while practical chal-lenges and funding constraints combined to narrowthe assistance provided to conflict IDPs and theimpact of this assistance, ample funds and, impor-tantly, policy flexibility have secured generous pro-grammes of assistance to a sometimes even widerthan originally envisaged tsunami target group.

Pace of assistance: Both the temporary and perma-nent shelter examples illustrate the considerable dif-ference in the pace of support provided to the twogroups. Within 12 months of the tsunami, almost alltsunami IDPs requiring transitional shelter werehoused in structures with significantly higher mini-mum standards than those provided to conflict IDPsover the past two decades. For permanent housing,both conflict and tsunami IDPs who are eligible forhousing could potentially benefit from either a donorbuilt house or a housing grant under an owner drivenscheme. Within 15 months of the tsunami, over two-thirds27 of the originally identified-as-eligible 98,000tsunami IDP householders either had a completeddonor built house or had been granted at least the firstinstalment to repair or rebuild their homes throughthe owner driven scheme. On the other hand, only 14percent of the 105,000 eligible conflict IDP familieshad received some form of assistance to repair orrebuild their homes between 2003 and 2006.28

In 2005, in response to complaints about theslow progress of the post-tsunami donor built hous-

25 For background on the UAS,see Livelihood AssistanceAssessed From a Villagers’Perspective, A Netherlands–World Bank SupportedEvaluation of Three Years ofLivelihood Assistance Underthe Unified Assistance Scheme.A Support Package for IDPs in North East Sri Lanka(April 2006).

26 Many conflict IDP familieshave land in governmentcontrolled High SecurityZones where civilian access isnot permitted and for whichalternative lands have notbeen provided.

27 Arising from 35,000 familiesreceiving the first of twoinstalments to repair homes,27,000 families receiving thefirst of four instalments torebuild homes and approxi-mately 4,000 families withcompleted donor built houses.

28 Of the 105,000 eligible fami-lies, the estimate of 14 per-cent is comprised of almost5,500 completed UAS-spon-sored houses completed since2003, half of the 14,000planned for 2006, and notmore than 2,000 homescompleted through otherdevelopment partner fundedhousing schemes.

12

By 1988, the government had initiated an assistancepackage to support the resettlement of conflictIDPs.Throughout the 1990s, the package evolved toboth improve flexibility and respond to inflation,but, critically, was also used to respond to otherregional disasters such as the Ratnapura floods in2003. By 2003, rejuvenated with external fundingfrom a number of development partners, thescheme centred on providing eligible conflict IDPswith a resettlement grant of $250 and a housinggrant of $750 (increased to $2,500 in 2005) to coverthe basic costs of rebuilding permanent homes.

Hallmarks of the scheme include strict eligibility cri-teria, robust implementation procedures, manage-ment at local and provincial levels, and significantcommunity involvement through Village Rehabilita-tion Committees. A recent evaluation reported:“The…brochure on UAS makes it very explicit that inthe distribution of funds no discrimination on basisof ethnicity, location, religious or political persuasionor gender is allowed. 25

The Unified Assistance Scheme

Box 2.1.

ing scheme, the government revised its policy,allowing all tsunami IDPs to access home buildinggrants under the owner built housing program, inaddition to support they may have received fromNGOs. In early 2006, the government set a targetfor 98,000 houses to be completed by the end of theyear. Faster progress is, therefore, a result of bothpolicy and available resources.

On both coverage and pace, the North EastCoastal Community Development Project(NECDEP) scheme, supporting post-conflict micro-finance opportunities in the north and east, was estab-lished by the National Development Trust Fund(NDTF) and the Asian Development Bank inOctober 2004. However, implementation did notbegin until April 2006. Over a slightly shorter period,a similar scheme for tsunami survivors was createdand had disbursed over 25,000 loans. The post-tsuna-mi scheme, in line with the traditional risk manage-ment policy of the NDTF’s Managing Board, did notcover loans in LTTE-controlled areas despite theprevalence of tsunami IDPs residing in these areas. As

agreed before the tsunami, the NDTF NECDEPscheme is covering residents in both LTTE- and gov-ernment-controlled areas in the north and east. In thisparticular example, therefore, the NECDEP schemehas been able to challenge conventional inequitablepractice by providing equitable access to support forboth tsunami and conflict IDPs resident in both government and LTTE-controlled areas.

Factors Affecting the Gap BetweenPolicy and PracticeDespite being targeted to benefit from similar typesof support, the evidence indicates that a larger pro-portion of tsunami IDPs have received a higherquality of support and more quickly than conflictIDPs. A number of partially inter-related factorsdetermine why these patterns have emerged.

Contextual Factors

Type of disaster: The nature of each disaster has influ-enced the characteristics and expectations regarding

13

While this section identifies some of the gaps evidentand challenges involved in promoting equitybetween conflict and tsunami IDP groups, it is impor-tant to recognise the many efforts that have beenmade to promote equity.

Providing Leadership: Since mid-2005, a number ofDistrict Secretaries were reported as being particular-ly helpful in stressing the importance of a holisticresponse for conflict and tsunami affected districts. In2006, President Rajapakse highlighted the impor-tance of addressing the longer standing needs ofconflict IDPs, and a number of NGOs are consideringfuture commitments to this group.

A number of long standing NGOs and INGOs in SriLanka made consistent efforts to stress the impor-tance of conflict sensitive programming followingthe tsunami. Examples include ZOA, a Dutch NGO,which appealed to both development partners andthe media to mitigate the risk of conflict IDP commu-nities being overlooked and further disadvantagedduring the tsunami response period.

Flexibility: Soon after the tsunami, a number ofdevelopment partners determined that narrow targeting of beneficiary groups could undermine thequality of assistance and, as a result, took steps toincrease flexibility. Examples include the UK DisasterEmergencies Committee, which expanded its imple-mentation time frame from one to three years and itsbeneficiary focus from tsunami affected people to

tsunami affected districts. This allowed conflict IDPsand other affected groups who may have been moreindirectly affected by the tsunami to access support.

The European Commission’s Humanitarian Office(ECHO) similarly amended its beneficiary targetgroup to mitigate the risk of discriminating againstconflict affected IDPs. In 2005, the Global Consortiumon Tsunami Recovery endorsed and encouraged fur-ther efforts in this direction.

Practical Mechanisms: The UAS scheme (see Box 2.1)represents a strong example of a flexible responsemechanism that has been used to support IDPs froma variety of disasters. The consistency in its use hasenabled it to be refined and improved and it now hasa record of strong management, reflecting best prac-tice approaches such as subsidiarity, communityinvolvement in decision making and problem solvingand beneficiary ownership of the recovery process. Ithas also promoted aid effectiveness by acting as afacility through which a number of developmentpartners can contribute funds rather than set up theirown parallel programmes.

The ADB-sponsored National Development TrustFund North East Coastal Community DevelopmentProject (NECDEP) Scheme (see Section 2) has filledthe gaps of existing programmes by ensuring thatbeyond the tsunami affected communities in non-LTTE controlled areas, all communities in the northand east can access microfinance support.

Good Practices Promoting Equity Between Conflict and Tsunami IDPs

Box 2.2.

each response. As a slow onset and man-made disas-ter, the conflict context has provided a set of compli-cations not evident in the tsunami disaster. For exam-ple, for practical reasons, very little heavy reconstruc-tion (such as major road construction) was able to

happen before the 2002 CeasefireAgreement was in place. At thepolicy level, the extent to whichpolicy-makers have promoted theneeds of conflict IDPs hasinevitably been influenced bywider political questions and con-ditions related to the conflict. Bycomparison, the exogenous ori-gins, indiscriminate impact,immediacy, breadth and severityof the challenge wrought by thetsunami meant that concerns fortsunami IDPs were largely(though not completely) unaf-fected by national security con-siderations, and addressing theirneeds has not been seen as

dependent on resolving larger political questions.Instead, the factors surrounding the tsunami provid-ed stronger incentives for the government, LTTEand other stakeholders to risk improved collaborationin implementing a humanitarian response.

Post-Conflict Context

Practical constraints: Even with political will to pro-mote recovery, the conflict’s unfinished nature hasput practical limitations on the scope and pace ofsupport for conflict IDPs. For example, the mainte-nance of high security zones and mined areas, andthe resurgence of violence and tensions in parts ofthe north and east, have prevented significant num-bers of conflict IDPs from returning to the region.For those able and willing to return, implementa-tion of assistance programmes is constrained by anumber of factors explained further in Section 3,including interruptions caused by security incidentsand hartals,29 time consuming checkpoint proce-dures, material and labour shortages due to restrict-ed zones, and the decline of local business capacityin the region.

Institutional constraints: The north and east havelong suffered considerable public service shortages.Fewer staff to teach, provide health care, plan andinspect public works and run public administration hasinevitably undermined the coverage of public servicesacross the region, fundamentally constraining recoveryprocesses that could benefit conflict IDPs.

Political constraints: Regional political representa-tives may have been able to lobby for further public

services and support for conflict IDPs. However,while Sri Lanka has officially had a measure of devo-lution since 1988, no elected North East ProvincialCouncil (NEPC) representatives have been in placesince March 1990. The NEPC Secretariat has beenoperational, playing a critical and constructive role,working with development partners, local authoritiesand non-government stakeholders to implementreconstruction programmes and deliver public servic-es. However, interviewees reflect that, in practice,there have been few challenges to strong centraliza-tion of decision-making, and provincial and munici-pal authorities lack a tradition of assertively protect-ing their mandates.

Post-Tsunami Context

In contrast, one-third of the tsunami affected coast-line in the south and west of the country does notexhibit similar constraints. These districts havemanaged to retain healthy numbers of public serv-ice cadres with effectively one language of business.As at April 2006, there were no comparable highsecurity zones affecting residential areas, no checkpoints requiring negotiations to gain access to civil-ian communities and no lands under LTTE control.Material and labour shortages have been conse-quently far less of an issue. All constitutionallyapproved political structures were also in place.While the region has not been without obstacles toprogress, on balance, it has experienced fewer con-straints than the conflict afflicted north and east.30

Funding

Post-conflict funding: Despite international com-mitments to support post-conflict reconstruction,the flow of finance has been far more constrainedthan that for post-tsunami recovery. Aside fromsome of the contextual and practical reasons thathave influenced the extent to which reconstructionhas even been planned, disbursing existing com-mitments has often been a slow and inefficientprocess. According to interviews, this has partlyresulted from weak government capacity to absorbfunds due to cumbersome administrative processesand a lack of dynamism in some departments. Theextent to which commitments have been made hasalso been constrained due to concerns about thepolicy environment. For example, pending furtherdiscussions with the government, a range of eco-nomic concerns led to the cessation of the IMFprogramme and World Bank financed budget sup-port in Sri Lanka at the end of 2003. This situationand related concerns about the lack of a concreteand measurable plan for implementing a pro-poor,

29 Hartals are a cross between a strike and a curfew and are imposed by the LTTE or the community.

30 By contrast, assistance totsunami victims in the northand east has been affected byregional constraints. Theseare described in greater detailin Section 3, below.

14

The factors surroundingthe tsunami provided

stronger incentives for the government,

LTTE and others to riskimproved collaboration

in implementing a humanitarian response.

pro-growth strategy following the arrival of a newgovernment in April 2004 have encouraged a widerange of multilateral and bilateral developmentpartners to implement more cautious support pro-grammes than might otherwise have been the case.

At the same time, as many development partnershave made funding commitments to support recon-struction in the absence of a final peace agreement,31

they have sought a framework to measure progress onpeace. At the 2003 Tokyo Conference, fundingpledges were underpinned by a set of peace relatedbenchmarks expected to be reached following the ini-tial progress made in 2002 by the government andLTTE.32 The obstacles to progress encountered since2003, and the failure to implement specific initiativesdesigned to improve confidence building in theregion and facilitate funding flows, such as the NorthEast Reconstruction Fund (NERF),33 have not pre-vented funding for reconstruction programmes in theregion. However, they have inevitably limited thepace and scope of disbursement.

The underlying governance constraints that havecontributed to the flow of disbursements are essen-tially the same as those that have affected the broad-er flow of assistance to the country at large. However,as a result of the particularly weak infrastructure inthe north and east and its comparatively strongerdevelopment needs, the region has suffered dispro-portionately compared to the rest of the country. Thepractical constraints related to the conflict and thepreclusion of initiatives as a result of the lack ofprogress on peace have further undermined theprospects for development funding in the region, justas they have worked to stem private investment in thenorth and east.

Finally, a number of bilateral partners havereported additional constraints affecting their sup-port for development in the north and east. Withthe LTTE widely considered to be (if not univer-sally listed as) a terrorist organization, a number ofgovernments have legislation in place and/or lessformal arrangements that effectively limit theextent and nature of support for development workin LTTE-controlled areas. While most govern-ments reported still being able to support initiativesin these areas, in practice, concerns about the riskof benefiting a terrorist organization (for example,by contributing unwittingly to LTTE tax collectionsystems)34 have reduced the scope of initiativesgovernments and some NGOs can commit to inthe region.

Post-tsunami funding: In contrast, the tsunamiprovided a context where most of these financingconstraints were irrelevant, at least regarding assis-tance in the south and west. Within months of thedisaster, as a result of massive media coverage and

international sympathy, almost 100 percent of thecommitments required to fund assessed needs hadbeen met.35 As they had largely been made in ahumanitarian context, these commitments weresubject to fewer conditions than conventionaldevelopment commitments. Other conventionalpractices, such as requiring government counter-part funding and not providing debt relief withoutan IMF programme in place, were often suspend-ed. At the same time, the government also actedwith significant flexibility, allowing a wide varietyof development partners to implement pro-grammes directly and minimizing governmentguidelines. While the exceptional funding flowshave raised equity issues of their own (see Section3), they have enabled a bigger proportion of tsuna-mi IDPs to benefit from more support than theconflict IDP group.

31 This is contrary to manyconflict contexts wherereconstruction commitmentshave followed peace agree-ments.

32 The Government of SriLanka and developmentpartners attended the conference although it wasboycotted by the LTTE.

33 In 2003, development part-ners proposed a joint fundingmechanism for supportingnorth and east developmentprogrammes that would beapproved jointly by the government and the LTTE.The initiative stalled after anumber of delays on bothsides and, ultimately, theLTTE’s decision to halt further discussion unlessprogress was made on itsInterim Self GoverningAuthority Proposal.

34 Following the 2002 CeasefireAgreement and the growthof development program-ming in the north and east,a number of governmentshighlighted significant difficulties in clarifying thepotential and limitations fordevelopment interventions in LTTE-controlled areasdue to complicated legisla-tion affecting developmentprogramming.

35 Although the Joint One-YearReport has noted that somesectors still face shortfalls(see page 3 of the report).

15

Over the last few years, some have suggested thata strict conditionality has been in place, with fundseffectively being held hostage to the peaceprocess. Donors have even been accused of tryingto “buy peace.”

In practice, there is little evidence to support thisinterpretation. Development partners such as theWorld Bank have transparently included progresson peace as a factor in helping to make assess-ments about the context for providing future sup-port. However, the emphasis appears to have beenon assessing the existence of good governancepractices that in this scenario should promote themost positive framework for progress on peaceand pro-poor development, notwithstanding theinevitable obstacles.

Similarly, the terms of reference of a Donor PeaceSupport Group (which was functional as at April2006) indicate a willingness to track and assess fac-tors affecting the prospects for peace with a viewto better identifying individual and collectivestrategies to support progress in this direction.One example of such an initiative includes theNorth East Reconstruction Fund (NERF) proposal of2003, a multi-donor trust fund designed to fundcommunity development programmes in thenorth and east based on a coordinated decisionmaking structure between the government andthe LTTE.

On this basis, the so-called peace conditionalitiesappear to reflect a more careful assessment of conventional considerations undertaken beforecommitting large-scale development funding —but looked at through a peace-building lens.

Peace Conditionalities

Box 2.2.

Perceptions of Political Will

Post-conflict context: Interviewees reported two per-ceptions they felt helped to explain why the human-itarian imperative to address the needs of conflictIDPs appeared less strong than that for the tsunamiIDP group. To begin with, a wide range of intervie-wees expressed the view that the needs of citizensliving outside the north and east have long been agreater political priority than the needs of residentsin the north and east. Secondly, a number of inter-viewees also suggested that the LTTE’s stated sup-port for sustainable development of the north andeast is significantly tempered by concerns thatgreater economic prosperity in the region willreduce communities’ incentives to accept, if notactively support, the need for an autonomous Tamilstate through continued political and armed strug-gle. Examples cited for both perceptions includerecurrent government failures to proactively addressthe public service shortages in the north and east,and the LTTE’s decision to sacrifice the NERF (seeBox 2.3) to prioritise its political agenda.36

Post-tsunami context: Building on the perceptionsregarding constraints to the support for conflictIDPs, many interviewees, particularly in the northand east, expressed a belief that tsunami recovery hadprogressed faster due to stronger national politicalcommitment to supporting recovery in the south andwest. The role of politics in driving inequitable out-comes is discussed further in Section 3. Whatappears evident is that the psychological impact ofseeing the tsunami unfold through the media, andthe subsequent level of national and internationalsympathy raised, meant that both the governmentand development partners were motivated to priori-tize tsunami recovery throughout 2005.

Conclusion

The analysis indicates that each disaster and its par-ticular political, funding, and institutional contexthelped shape different approaches to supporting thetwo IDP groups. These differences in approachhave contributed to a disparity in outcomes.Support for conflict IDPs has been focused mostlyon helping IDPs cope with constraints rather thanon re-establishing the potential for independent andassertive living. Tsunami recovery has been shapedby a commitment to restore full independence asquickly as possible to survivors as well as buildingback better37 prospects and opportunities wherepossible.

It is easy, but erroneous, to assume that the crit-ical difference in the circumstances of the twogroups is due to disparities in funding flows. In fact,

huge sums were committed to address the needs ofcommunities affected by both disasters, but a rangeof bureaucratic and political challenges, coupledwith effective policy conditionality,38 impacted therealisation of commitments to conflict IDPs. In thepost-tsunami context, the humanitarian imperativeundermined any focus on broader conditionalityand bore through bureaucratic constraints with thehelp of active political support.

While practical constraints have played a role inlimiting the benefits for conflict IDPs, they havenot been impenetrable. Conflict IDPs who becametsunami IDPs have been able to benefit from largerfood rations, better quality transitional shelter andfaster access to permanent housing, all in the northand east. In this sense, it is clear that the policyimperative to address tsunami IDP needs was ableto overcome some of the practical constraints anddeliver to tsunami IDPs in the north and east. Bycomparison, the efforts made to assist solely conflictaffected IDPs both before and after the tsunami,though helpful, have not been driven by this policyimperative and have not been designed to optimizerealization of their rights to the extent that practi-calities allow. As noted above, the stronger responseto tsunami IDP needs has been at least partiallyrelated to the type of disaster and the impact thishas had on political and bureaucratic incentives todeliver, both among donors and national actors.

But the post-tsunami effort may still play a help-ful role for conflict IDPs. On the one hand, it hasalready provided a proportion of conflict IDPs—those also impacted by the tsunami—with astronger package of assistance. In addition, the dis-parities in assistance between the two groups, andthe realization of what the government and devel-opment partners can actually provide, may helpstimulate new dialogue on enhancing support forconflict IDPs.

However, even with the stronger package ofassistance provided to tsunami survivors, a numberof constraints have permeated aspects of post tsuna-mi recovery in the north and east, which have con-tributed to disparities in regional outcomes that areexplored more fully in Section 3.

36 By mid-2004, plans for aNERF were suspended after months of preparatorydialogue as the prospects for further peace talks diminished and securitydeteriorated.

37 The phrase “build back better” was widely in use bymid-2005 to reflect the aimto use the recovery effort toenhance the pre-tsunami living standards of affectedcoastal communities.

38 This report does not seek tocriticise policy conditionality— that is, the more carefulconsideration of the policyand institutional contextwhich development partnershave pursued before agreeingto non-tsunami programmesof assistance in Sri Lanka.In fact, as will be described in the next section, while therelative absence of thisallowed funds to flow morefreely for post-tsunamiresponse, it has also resultedin the failure to prevent thedevelopment of significantproblems in implementation,undermining both best practice and the prospects for sustainability of someaspects of the recovery effort.Therefore, setting this factoraside, it is the differences inpolitical will and the impactof this on bureaucratic incentives and capacity todeliver that appear the critical factors in determiningthe relative effectiveness ofboth responses.

16

This section focuses on the support provided totsunami IDPs. It reports how, despite earlyconcerns and efforts to promote an equitableresponse between the diverse groups oftsunami IDPs, a range of disparities have

arisen between regions and within districts themselves.

PolicyPost-tsunami intentions of the government, theLTTE and development partners regarding equityamong different groups within the tsunami affectedpopulation can be gleaned by looking at policy, theuse of needs assessments and funding commitments.

Guiding principles: During high-level and techni-cal meetings immediately following the tsunami,development partners and government representa-tives discussed the importance of an equitableresponse. By February 2005, the government, LTTE,development partners and civil society representa-tives had agreed on a set of Guiding Principles toshape the recovery effort. The first principle under-scored the importance of equity through its focus onnon-discrimination.

The allocation of resources both domestic and inter-national should be strictly guided by the identifiedneeds and local priorities, without discriminationon the basis of political, religious, ethnic, or genderconsiderations.39

The exercise underpinned the importance of bestpractice, and later consultation exercises with tsunamiaffected communities endorsed the need for anapproach guided by equity and the other principlessuch as community participation in recovery planning.

P-TOMS: Box 3.1 explains efforts to negotiatethe Post-Tsunami Operational Management Struc-ture for the North and East (P-TOMS). The analy-sis suggests that if implemented effectively, it couldhave promoted equity in at least three ways, by:1. Providing a stronger context for government-LTTE

collaboration, which could have reduced perceptionsof discrimination between different ethnic groups;

2 Providing the Muslim community, largely resi-dent in the east, a measure of parity through the

initiative’s trilateral committee structure; and3. Providing a tri-level institutional structure (with

national, regional and district levels), thereby pro-moting the prospects for subsidiarity and moreimmediate accountability to affected communities.The failure to implement P-TOMS did not pre-

clude the possibility of an equitable approachthrough other means, but can arguably be consideredto be a lost opportunity.40 Furthermore, its withdraw-al raised concerns, particularly among groups in thenorth and east, that the ensuing recovery effort wouldbe far from equitable. However, while the process andthe agreement itself may have been imperfect,41

the fact that the government and LTTE PeaceSecretariats made significant efforts to elaborate thismechanism deserves recognition.

Reconstruction assessments: The tsunami affected13 districts across three-quarters of the Sri Lankancoastal belt.42 The total cost of relief, rehabilitationand reconstruction has been estimated at $2.2 billion.43 The government’s reconstruction andrecovery strategy set out an allocation for each regionbased on assessed needs (Table 3).

These allocations reflected the tsunami’s impactacross the coastline and the quality of infrastructurein the affected areas. The south and west, though rel-atively less affected, required rehabilitation of morecostly infrastructure. The north and east had less andpoorer quality infrastructure to rebuild, but more of itwas damaged. In the spring of 2005, to avoid main-taining some of the disparities between the tworegions, the government and development partnersagreed that infrastructure would be rehabilitated to atleast a common minimum standard.

Funding commitments: Table 3 shows the region-al allocations proposed through the needs assessmentand the commitments made by development partnersto programmes in each region.

The commitments allocated were calculated frominformation entered by development partners in thegovernment’s Development Assistance Database(DAD) as at March 2006.44

As the Table illustrates, of the $2.1 billion com-mitted, specific programme commitments were made

Section 3

39 The full set of principles islisted in Annex 1.

40 P-TOMS followed twoaborted attempts to promotecollaborative workingthrough similar, pooled funding mechanisms. In2002, the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTEconcluded an agreement toestablish the Sub-Committeeon Immediate Humanitarianand Rehabilitation Needs inthe North and East(SIHRN). The SIHRNfailed to be operationalisedafter the attorney generalvoiced concerns that it couldbe subject to legal challenge.By mid-2004, plans for asimilar initiative, the NERF,were also suspended.

41 Muslim representatives wereaggrieved at not beingincluded in the negotiatingprocess.

42 Some reports have notincluded Puttalam, referringto 12 affected districts.

43 Joint One Year Report44 The DAD can be accessed

at dad.tafren.gov.lk. While it is a powerful tool for mon-itoring progress in recoveryprojects and promotingtransparency in general, it isinherently constrained by theconsistency and quality ofinformation entered.

17

Equity Issues Within Tsunami Affected Districts

in all regions.The east, south and west appear to havemade good progress in securing allocations in linewith their assessed needs. The north does not appearto have secured commitments at the same rate as theother regions. However, the fact that nearly half ofthe commitments made are non-region specificmakes it difficult to give an accurate assessment.

In addition, the DAD relies on self-reporting bydevelopment partners. As a result, by March 2006, asignificant proportion of commitments were not registered on the database, and fast disbursing privatesector commitments may never be fully recorded. Itwas expected to be months before an improved set ofinformation from INGOs and national NGOs might

develop, and a further $0.5 to $1 billion of eithercommitted or committed and disbursed fundingfrom these sources had still to be recorded.48

Interviews in both Colombo and the districts suggestthat the majority of private sector assistance wasfocused on the south and west, with Tamil Diasporasupport reaching the north and east. The breakdownof regional figures suggests allocation shortfalls to thenorth. An equal distribution of the non regional spe-cific commitments (10 percent for each region)would indicate the south and west collectively receiv-ing approximately 20 percent more than requiredcommitments compared with a similar shortfall ofcommitments for the north and east. However, for a

45 Adapted from the Joint One-Year Report, page 5.

46 Percentages calculated fromfigures taken from Districtsby Partner Type AnalyticalReport, DAD, March 2006.

47 Either listed as “all districts,”“district not yet identified,”and/or “unallocated” to a district yet.

48 By March 2006, DAD staffhad begun a concerted campaign to encouragedevelopment partners to provide information aboutcommitments and disburse-ments. Therefore, while thefigures provided in this paperreflected those available as of March 2006, they wouldalmost certainly change over the course of the year.The hundreds of millions ofdollars of NGO commit-ments believed not to havebeen recorded derives from a rough calculation of theprivate sums raised in adozen or more countriesacross Europe, NorthAmerica and Australia,divided by the main countriesaffected by the tsunami. Forexample, the UK DisasterEmergency Committee(DEC) group of NGOs bud-geted to spend $74 million(£40million) in Sri Lanka inthe first year following thetsunami (ValidInternational). Replicatingthis over another 10 major(private) national donorgroups (allowing for thevarying sizes of these groups)over a two to three yearresponse period, allowing forreduced support after thefirst year would suggest sumsreaching close to $1 billion.With further sums raised and quickly disbursed by the private sector, the total con-tribution from this collectivegroup is estimated to havecompletely outstripped the(approximately) $0.5 billionthey were recorded as havingcommitted as of March 2006.

18

By December 2004, there was little dialogue betweenthe Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, and polit-ical killings were increasing.The tsunami triggered anunprecedented response as communities of all eth-nicities and faiths were reported to be helping eachother, and many hoped that this spirit of cooperationcould help to restart the peace process. In the earlystages of the relief and recovery effort, this belief wasreinforced as the government and the LTTE workedtogether to address immediate needs. In January,negotiations began between the government andthe LTTE Peace Secretariats to create a joint mecha-nism to oversee recovery and reconstruction.

With the majority of negotiations completed by theend of March 2005, representatives of the Ministry forRelief, Reconstruction and Reconciliation and theLTTE’s Planning and Development Secretariat signedan agreement establishing the Post-Tsunami Opera-tional Management Structure (P-TOMS) in May.

P-TOMS provided a structure of three committees atthe national, regional and district levels to oversee thedistribution of assistance; it also created a RegionalFund to finance recovery and reconstruction. Commit-tees would include representatives of the government,the LTTE and the Muslim community. P-TOMS wouldhave been the first joint working system between the

parties to the conflict since the collapse of the Sub-Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehab-ilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN) in 2003.While it was clearly stated that the committees’responsibilities were limited to the tsunami affectedcoastal belt, many thought that the mechanism couldhelp build confidence between the parties, promotinga favourable context to restart peace talks. Theprospect of an efficient funding facility to supportpost-tsunami reconstruction, which might also pro-vide an opportunity to improve cooperation betweenthe parties to the conflict, particularly encourageddevelopment partners to support the initiative.

P-TOMS was immediately challenged in the SupremeCourt by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party,which had left the coalition government over theissue. While it was deemed to be constitutional, cer-tain elements were stayed by the Supreme Courtpending further clarification, including the establish-ment and operation of the regional fund, location ofthe regional committee in Kilinochchi, and the rightof P-TOMS to exercise certain functions. A full hearingof the case never took place as the new leadershipeffectively withdrew the initiative in December 2005in anticipation of a new Jaya Lanka programme,which as at April 2006 had yet to be fully elaborated.

Box 3.1.

Table 3. Summary of Assessed Reconstruction Needs and Funding Commitments46

Regions Proposed Share of $2.2 billion totalfunding required

Share of $2.1 billion commitmentsallocated as at March 2006

North 19 percent 7 percent

East 45 percent 30 percent

South 26 percent 15 percent

West 10 percent 6 percent

Commitments that are non-region specific47

N/A 41 percent

P-TOMS: The Agreement That Never Was 45

less speculative and more tangible picture of results, itis helpful to look at some sector examples.

PracticeFood relief: The majority of food relief was distrib-uted through a joint government-WFP partnership.Within hours of the disaster, WFP diverted existingfood stocks (from its conflict programme) to areashit by the tsunami. Within two weeks, this pro-gramme became the main provider of food rationsacross the affected areas. While emergency assess-ments carried out in January and May recommend-ed supporting a more moderate target group, over900,000 beneficiaries were covered under the gener-al food distribution scheme for most of 2005 beforebeing replaced by a more targeted vulnerable groupfeeding programme at the end of that year.Generous government targeting criteria combinedwith WFP’s experience of working in the north andeast translated into a comparative overprovision ofassistance in all tsunami affected districts with noevidence of regional disparities.

Non-food relief items: The overprovision of fooddid not appear to cause any significant equity issues,partly because of wide targeting across all districtsand the use of a consistent beneficiary list and pro-cedures. On the distribution of non-food reliefitems, findings from a six district survey indicatethat distribution practices did not “point to any sig-nificant differences with regard to the actual support,mainly in the form of relief and transitional support,received by the different ethnic groups.”49 While this isa positive finding, the study did find disparities inthe provision of non-food items within ethnicgroups — both across communities and betweenhouseholds. For example, the study found that com-munities received a wide range of assistance, frombetween 15 to 40 relief interventions. WhileHambantota District received 40 relief actors(either professional NGOs or improvised charitiesproviding relief assistance), the remaining five dis-tricts each received a similar number of fewer actors.Aside from this anomaly, household interviewswithin the surveyed districts suggested:

…that there are substantial variations in whathouseholds have received. Some had received up toten types of support while others had receivedvery little beyond the support provided by thegovernment…This pattern suggests that many ofthe interventions have been narrow in their scope and coverage, resulting in inequitable distribu-tion of goods.50

Importantly, the study does not look at theLTTE-controlled districts of Kilinochchi andMullaitivu, where interviewees for this paper have

reported that stronger coordination systems were inplace and appear to have promoted a more equitabledistribution of relief items. While the LTTE didnot take over distribution processes, within days ofthe tsunami, it established coordination offices,staffed by the local NGO consortium, to keeprecords of incoming provisions and their distribu-tion and to direct humanitarian actors with suppliesto affected communities.

Housing: Approximately 100,000 homes acrossSri Lanka required repair or rebuilding as a result oftsunami damage and the enforcement of a revised

49 Dr. Maurit Haug andChamindra Weerackody,The Tsunami Aid DeliverySystem: A View from SixDistricts in Sri Lanka (draft),Working Paper No. 1,Norwegian Institute forUrban and RegionalResearch, January 2006.

50 Ibid.51 The blanket restrictions

were not believed to beunderpinned by sufficientlyrobust topographical or otherassessments that mightexplain why certain localitieswere deemed more vulnerablethan others.

19

The Coastal Conservation Act of 1981 (through theNational Coastal Zone Management Plan of 1990)provided for construction along the coastline to besubject to case by case approval by the CoastalConservation Department making decisions basedon vulnerability and other criteria. In practice, the lawwas rarely enforced, and, as a result, many communi-ties settled near the coastline without the formalapproval from the authorities. In March 2005, follow-ing the tsunami, the government enforced a bufferzone, ranging from 100 meters in the south and westto 200 meters in the north and east. This had massivepolicy and operational implications, requiring therelocation of many tens of thousands of families.

The government emphasized that the policy wasdesigned to reduce vulnerability to future disasters,but many development partners and beneficiarieswere sceptical about the merits of the approach.51

Strict application of the policy risked contradictinglessons from former post-disaster experiences, whichadvocate allowing survivors to return to formerplaces of residence if possible.The policy also causedmassive delays in the donor built housing pro-grammes, which were dependent on the sourcingand preparation of alternative lands where benefici-aries could relocate. By November 2005, a policyreview resulted in the effective abolition of the bufferzone and its replacement with a much smaller “nobuild category one zone,” based on existing hazards,such as proximity to existing irrigation and rail struc-tures. In practice,the new zone prohibits constructionin an average area of 35 meters from the coastline.

Over the course of 2005, parts of Jaffna and Ampara(in the north and east respectively) and Colombo(west) were most affected by the buffer zone policydue to the relative scarcity of alternative land.Interviewees have suggested that the LTTE decisionto enforce a 300 meter buffer zone in parts of Mullai-tivu has unfairly affected communities that need toremain in those areas, by giving them smaller landallocations compared with other communities.

The Buffer Zone: A Tale of Many Changes

Box 3.2.

buffer zone that precluded housing constructionwithin a coastal zone, ranging from 100 meters inthe south to 200 meters in the east (see Box 3.2). Incertain LTTE-controlled areas, a 300 meter zonewas established by the LTTE. In November 2005,the government revised the buffer zone downwardsin a number of areas, but the total number of hous-es required remained the same.52 Box 3.2 describesthe buffer zone policy, which has had a significantimpact on housing reconstruction.

The government provided two assistance schemesfor former householders. In the owner drivenscheme, householders who owned property outsideof the buffer zone were entitled to a $1,000 grant torepair or a $2,500 grant to rebuild their homes.Thoseindividuals who needed to be relocated from withinthe buffer zone to an approved house-building areaoutside this zone were supported through a donordriven scheme, where a new house would be built bya development partner in accordance with govern-ment standards on new land allocated by the govern-ment. The latter group would, however, retain title totheir land inside the buffer zone, where housingreconstruction was prohibited.53

Owner driven progress: By March 2006, theowner driven scheme had made the swiftest progressover the recovery period; families with partially andfully damaged houses have all received at least thefirst instalment of grants provided to begin repairs orrebuilding. A measure of equity is therefore evident.Indeed, no inequities are immediately apparent in thegroup that were entitled to two $500 instalments torepair their homes. However, a very mixed picture ofdistribution rates emerges for the householdersrequiring four instalments to fully rebuild destroyedhomes. Charts 1 and 2 illustrate the regional break-down of housing needs under this programme andthe national disbursement rate for the scheme.54

The decreasing rate of progress in Chart 2 maybe explained by the fact that once a family receivesan instalment, it needs to demonstrate that thefunds received have been spent on actual rebuilding,and government building inspectors must assessthat each stage of progress meets minimum nation-al building standards.55 Table 4 shows regional ratesof progress in the disbursement of instalments.

All participants in all regions had received thefirst instalment by March 2006, meaning that no

52 This was the case untilJanuary 2006 when the“house for a house policy”was replaced with a new policy that allowed anincrease (of approximately10–15 percent) in home-building to cover residentsthat had previously beensquatting or renting propertythat was damaged in thetsunami. The tables in thehousing section reflect infor-mation available in March2006 and hence do not fullyincorporate the new housingneeds that were still beingassessed at that time.

53 In practice, many southern-based residents outside thebuffer zone have chosen —and been permitted to access— donor built housing ratherthan going through theowner driven program.

54 Many interviewees expresseddoubts about housing figures,including scepticism aboutthe extent of needs assessedin some western districts andhousing figures and assessedneeds in other districts. Anumber of anomalies andinconsistencies were foundduring the research for thisstudy, including those indi-cated in Box 1.3. Althoughsome of the original figuresmay be disputed, for consis-tency, the data reflected inCharts 1–5 and Table 4 weredrawn from RADA betweenMarch and April 2006.

55 An alternative possibility isthat beneficiaries may nothave used one of their instalments for the purposeprovided, thus forfeitingapproval to receive the nextinstalment until they coulddemonstrate that the requiredreconstruction progress hadbeen made. While there is evidence that this has happened, it is not believedto have been a frequent orcommon occurrence.

56 Data from RADA as atMarch 15, 2006.

20

Owner Driven Programme: Fully DamagedHousing Requirements by Region

Chart 1.

100%

58%

21%

8%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

First Second Third Fourth

Instalments

Perc

enta

ge

Dis

bu

rsed

Owner Driven Programme: National Rate ofDisbursement for Fully Damaged Houses (asat March 2006)

Chart 2.

Table 4. Percentage of Instalments Received by Households Benefiting from the Four Instalment Grant to Rebuild, as at March 200656

Instalments receivedas a proportion of the needs required byregion (with percent-ages in brackets) 1st Instalment 2nd Instalment 3rd Instalment 4th Instalment

North 4722 (100%) 1046 (22%) 291 (6%) 33 (1%)

East 18,415 (100%) 11,425 (62 %) 3190 (17%) 1153(6%)

South 3447 (100%) 2868 (83 %) 1815 (53%) 879 (26%)

West 754 (100%) 617 (82%) 501 (66%) 177 (23%)

equity issues were apparent initially. However, as thescheme progresses through the next three cycles, theslower rate of disbursement disaggregated regional-ly, as illustrated in Table 4, reveals that the northand, to a lesser extent, the east, experienced a muchslower rate of progress than the south and west.With 85 percent of owner driven housing needslocated in the north and east, a means of promotingmore equitable progress would have involved earlieridentification of factors for delay (such as govern-ment inspection capacity and availability of contrac-tors, which are discussed later in this section), andproactive planning to address these constraints.

Donor driven progress: NGOs and a range ofother actors building homes have encountered a vari-ety of challenges that undermined the pace ofprogress in 2005. These have mostly involved thesourcing and preparation of alternative land forrebuilding. Other bureaucratic procedures, materialand labour constraints as well as the learning curvefor many agencies new to this work have also impact-ed time scales. The progress that had been made as atApril 2006 is summarized in Charts 3 - 5.

Chart 5 shows all regions trailing in the wake ofthe south’s much faster progress toward completionand handover of houses to families under the donordriven programme. What is particularly striking isthe overprovision of house reconstruction in thesouth, which clearly indicates an inequitable alloca-tion of resources from a national perspective. Thefactors that have facilitated this outcome are set outlater in this section.

Finally, the government’s policy, adopted in2005, to allow families with housing grants to addi-tionally access supplemental NGO support forhouse construction appears to have benefited south-erners disproportionately. Research undertaken forthe World Bank reported that over 76 percent ofhouses surveyed in the south and west had been co-financed, compared with only 30 percent in thenorth and east.57 Having increased access to finan-cial resources, supplies and technical advice fromNGOs may have supported faster house construc-tion in the south compared with other areas.

Intra-district disparities: Inequities have alsoarisen within particular tsunami affected districts.The government’s enforcement of minimum stan-dards only has meant the costs of donor-built hous-es have varied from $3,000 to $11,000. While thedifferences are partly explained by inflationarylabour and material costs, interviewees also report-ed differences in the quality of support provided.Some families received fully furnished houses,while others received only a basic housing struc-ture. Similarly, interviewees report that some com-munities are living in new settlements with no

57 The survey covered the 24divisions where the WorldBank was funding the owner driven program.The significant difference inco-financing may be partlyexplained by a policy revisionin January 2006, according towhich householders withdonor built houses were also allowed to access grantsupport. As at April 2006,anecdotal reports suggestedthis policy had been morevigorously implemented bylocal authorities in the southand west of the country compared with the north and east.

21

Donor Driven Housing:Housing Needs Identified by Region

Chart 3.

Donor Driven Housing:National Picture of Progress as at April 2006

Chart 4.

6% 5%

45%

4%

22% 22%

69%

21%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

North East South West

Handed over to Beneficiary Under Construction

Regional Breakdown of Progress in HousingConstruction Made Through the DonorDriven Scheme as at April 2006 (Percentageof needs being met or in the process ofbeing met)

Chart 5.

access to power and water while others have accessto both.

The potential for future disparities is also appar-ent. Despite the effective abolition of the bufferzone, families, particularly in the south and west,with lands outside the new, smaller no-build zonehave still been given the option to either move backto their original land or relocate to new land and a

house away from the coastline.Should they choose the latteroption, they retain title totheir pre-tsunami land onwhich there is no longer anybasis to restrict building. Inthis sense, the position oftsunami IDPs will vary fromthose with a new house ontheir pre-tsunami land; thosein a new house on new land

but also retaining title to land in the new no buildzone; and those with both a new house away fromthe coastline and title for their old lands that are nolonger part of a restricted zone and therefore uncon-strained by any building restrictions.58

Cash allowances: Remedial measures may beavailable to correct inequities that may have arisen.For example, within three months of the disaster,the government launched an allowance schemedesigned to help vulnerable families boost theirassets before substantive livelihoods programmesbegan. Financed by the World Bank, the schemeprovided four cash instalments to be paid to familiesthat had either lost their homes entirely and/or hadlost their major income earner. The scheme wasrolled out in all affected districts, targeting approx-imately 160,000 families.

A mid-programme assessment indicated that,while the scheme was reaching over 95 percent ofthe target group, it was also providing funds to a sig-nificant number of families that did not meet eligi-bility requirements. In total, the scheme was bene-fiting 250,000 families, resulting from a generaloverprovision but particularly so in some districts inthe south and west of the country.

Following the assessment, the governmentrevised the beneficiary lists, bringing the total downto the amount originally envisaged. Colombo,Chilaw, Gampaha and Hambantota in the southand west of the country were particularly affected bythe downward revisions. The final two instalmentswere issued to this revised target beneficiary groupwith government funding. The case not onlydemonstrates equity-related risks attendant to pro-grammes supporting the direct needs of beneficiarygroups, but also the value of effective monitoring inmitigating these risks.

Factors Affecting the Gap Between Policy and Practice

The cash allowance and housing construction sectors,described earlier, illustrate a pattern of faster imple-mentation progress, mainly in the south, comparedwith slower and less comprehensive progress in thenorth and east. This pattern echoes informationgleaned from interviews and reports from other sec-tors not within the scope of this paper.59 As will bedescribed below, a set of complex and inter-relatingfactors have contributed to these outcomes. Politicaland Governance factors involve powerful institution-al constraints within the Sri Lankan governanceframework that have affected the extent to which dis-parities have arisen. Policy and Technical Constraintsimpact the development of disparities on a daily basis.Pressure for Results refers to institutional constraintswithin government and non-government implement-ing agencies that have reduced the space to focus onbetter practice. Finally, the section ends with adescription of the impact of Conflict60 and otherContextual Factors, which either improved or limitedthe various districts’ recovery processes. Althoughimportant, these final factors could have been over-come more effectively had the more dynamic factors— relating to institutional, policy and technical con-straints, and pressure for results — not underminedincentives to promote equitable outcomes.

The Political and Governance Framework

The role of politics: Research conducted by MauritHaug and Chamindra Weerackody has revealedpatterns of political patronage in recovery as politi-cians were found to have increasingly competed totake control of state-managed resources for distri-bution among their constituents. The authors state:“Politicians themselves admit that politicization of aidis one of the main reasons for inequity in aid distribu-tion, yet they blame the voters for applying pressure onthem for special favours.” 61

Support for recovery from elected political lead-ership can indeed be critical, and the involvement ofpoliticians in the recovery efforts of their con-stituents can help to overcome bureaucratic obsta-cles and accelerate reconstruction. At the sametime, measures to secure the appropriate degree ofinsulation from the political process are also crucial,to ensure that efforts respond to community needs,are transparent and accountable, and adhere to bestpractices, including the promotion of equity.

The cash allowance scheme resulted in the tar-geting of ineligible people in traditional centres ofpolitical influence. There has also been consistentreporting that politics has at times influenced the

58 While local authorities mayobject to families developingthis land in the future, thereappears to be a potential legal loophole that will allowthem to do so, potentiallyincreasing their assets by asignificant amount.

59 For example, the IncomeRecovery Plan Report, con-ducted by government anddevelopment partners (WorldBank, ADB, UNDP andILO) in March 2006, notedthe slower rate of progressthe north and east has madeon recovering incomes com-pared with the rest of thecountry. This may partially belinked to the region’s slowerprogress on permanent hous-ing as the report also foundthat citizens remaining intransitional shelter were twiceas likely to be living in pover-ty than those in permanenthomes.

60 LTTE imposition of taxes isincluded as a conflict factor,below, though it could also becharacterized as an institu-tional constraint.

61 Haug and Weerackody,The Tsunami Aid DeliverySystem.

22

Challenges in implementing subsidiarity

have undermined the focus on locally

driven solutions.

composition of beneficiary lists for housing con-struction. In most areas visited, interviewees report-ed that beneficiary lists were often unavailable, notpublished, or subject to many changes. One NGOrepresentative reported a beneficiary list for a hous-ing project changing as many as 20 times. Localgovernment staff have reported that these changesoften resulted from pressures from politicians seek-

ing to provide benefits to their supporters. Aninterviewee from the central government noted thatgovernment officials often addressed problemsrelating to patronage reported at local levelsthrough ‘politics’ — the intervention of more seniorpolitical figures or offices from the centre. Althoughit may be encouraging that inequities arisingthrough the use of patronage were sometimes chal-

62 In mid-2005, the governmentand development partnersorganised a set of sectorbased groups to enable policymakers and developmentpartners to work together toidentify key issues that need-ed to be addressed in therecovery policies and pro-gramme implementation.

23

As in the previous section, this box acknowledgesimportant examples of efforts made to promote equi-ty of response for tsunami affected groups:

Principled Planning: The Road Sector Group62 metduring the first half of 2005 to systematically examinehow it could incorporate the Guiding Principles — theset of common principles adopted by stakeholders toguide recovery (see Annex 1) — in its implementationplans. For equity, the group focused on trying toensure that road building in one region was not car-ried out at the expense of any other region and thatthe rehabilitation of road standards in the north andeast would be based on a projection of road use envis-aging regional growth. The rehabilitation schedules,projected costs, and supporting partners were pub-lished, promoting transparency and close coordina-tion in setting standards and unit costs.

Equitable Policy: By early 2006, the government hadextended its permanent housing programme to covertsunami IDPs who had not owned property prior tothe tsunami but had been made homeless whenhomes in which they had been squatting or whichthey were renting were damaged or destroyed. TheseIDP families are eligible for a grant enabling them topurchase land to build on and will then be allowed tojoin the home owner driven housing scheme.This rep-resents an important step in promoting equity withinthe tsunami IDP group, but it remains to be seenwhether a similar scheme will or can be arranged forconflict IDPs.

Promoting Inclusivity: A number of actors have madespecific efforts to ensure that all members of diversecommunities can access important information andservices. Within weeks of the disaster, the DistrictAuthorities in Batticaloa issued a bilingual pamphletsetting out entitlements for tsunami IDPs. The expan-sion of Save the Children’s office in Ampara allowed itto develop a mixed gender and ethnicity team,increasing its outreach potential in the diverse district.The Sri Lankan Human Rights Commission has dealtwith over one thousand cases related to concerns overaccess to recovery assistance from all affected areas,and has been involved in raising awareness of equityand other best practices among beneficiaries andimplementing agencies.

Community Participation: For operational purposes,nation-wide Rural Development Societies and VillageDevelopment Forums (in LTTE-controlled areas) areexamples of local community groups which, whenused effectively, have given affected local communi-ties a valuable opportunity to influence recoveryprocesses. Other mechanisms, such as workingthrough fishing cooperatives in Jaffna, have demon-strably enhanced the efficiency and fairness of the dis-tribution of assistance.

Consultation: The government and development part-ners have carried out a range of exercises aimed atimproving consultation with beneficiary groups,district authorities, and non-government actors. Exam-ples include the April 2005 government–developmentpartner district implementation joint planning exercis-es; the People’s Consultation Report on Post-TsunamiRecovery, which included consultations with 1,000 vil-lages; and consultation during preparation of the PostTsunami Reconstruction and Recovery Report (a jointreport by the government and development partnersissued in December 2005, which assessed progress atthe one-year mark). These exercises have involved dia-logue between local officials, development partners,and significant numbers of beneficiaries to strengthenunderstanding about how implementation is beingmanaged on the ground and how efforts should be prioritised.To be sure, these exercises are not the sameas systematically incorporating local participation inrecovery planning and implementation. But in a con-text where a range of pressures seriously compromiseda bottom up approach, the exercises have continuallyflagged over-arching messages from local communi-ties and highlighted the importance of improving con-sultation.

Coordination: Jaffna’s decades long experience indealing with conflict IDPs enabled it to develop robustcoordination mechanisms very early in the tsunamiresponse period. Throughout the country, all affecteddistricts have developed coordination structures,which have strengthened with time. Ampara hasexperimented with cross sectoral divisional meetings,in addition to sector meetings, to better identify crosscutting issues affecting communities.

Good Practices Promoting Equity within the Tsunami IDP Group

Box 3.3.

lenged, this solution seems too ad hoc, and relies oncommunities being assertive enough to report prob-lems to other parts of the system with leverage toaddress their concerns.

The interviews for this paper revealed no com-parative reports of patronage in northern LTTEareas with consistent reports from developmentpartners indicating the helpfulness of stronger riskmitigation systems in place, such as consistent beneficiary lists provided at the right stages andmore active community consultation mechanismswhich also matched some reports from communi-ties themselves. However, other findings havereported community views that preferential accessto relief and rehabilitation assistance has been pro-vided to communities and families that havedemonstrated particular loyalty or have been ofstrategic importance to the LTTE.63

While it is apparent that political influences havefavoured particular families or groups within affect-ed districts across the country, from a national per-spective, the stronger political influence of the southand west was routinely cited by interviewees as a keyreason why those regions have exhibited a faster rateof progress than the north and east, which make uptwo-thirds of tsunami affected areas. The followingexamples illustrate how this influence has manifest-ed in practice.

Challenges to subsidiarity: While a unitary state,Sri Lanka has both elected provincial authoritiesand a decentralized district government structure.64

Despite this, interviewees have echoed commenta-tors in noting that, given the abundance of decisionsreferred to the centre, the country retains a very cen-tralized bureaucracy. In the post-tsunami period,despite an increased recognition of the value of sub-sidiarity, challenges in consistently implementingthis in practice have often undermined the focus onlocally driven solutions, which are believed tostrengthen the prospects for equity — as local offi-cials are often more accessible to affected communi-ties and best placed to recognize gaps in perform-ance and to respond effectively.

For example, from an operational perspective, mostagreements between the government and implement-ing agencies for home building (MOUs) have beennegotiated in Colombo.65 For districts such asAmpara in the east, which has struggled to coordinateas many as 40 house building partners, intervieweessuggested that devolving this responsibility wouldhave better enabled local authorities to respond togaps in commitment and delays in implementation.

A case demonstrating particular empowermentat the local level is in the district of Hambantota, atraditional centre of political influence66 that hasmade more and swifter progress on permanent

housing than many districts put together. A specialHelping Hambantota unit was established outsidethe existing government framework and was nego-tiating housing MOUs with implementing agenciesbefore most national recovery systems were in place.The district was also able to attract targeted privatefinancial donations that were recorded early on inthe national media. Although a model of devolutionin one sense, the unique policy response in this dis-trict raised concerns about equity. In particular, theadvantages of the political profile of the district andthe flexibility accorded to local officials were per-ceived as enabling Hambantota to benefit dispro-portionately, compared to equally deserving districtswhere less flexibility was permitted.

The best contrasting example of how a lack of sub-sidiarity has affected district capacity comes fromTrincomalee district in the northeast of the island.Within several days of the tsunami, Trincomalee’sDistrict Secretary echoed the practice of his counter-parts in other tsunami affected districts by engagingwith a range of local stakeholders to form a coordina-tion task force. By February 2005, presidentialinstructions arrived, requiring the District Secretaryto seek ministerial approval for each task force meet-ing, effectively replacing this body with a specialCouncil for the Reconstruction of Trincomalee,which involved approximately 70 members and washeaded by ministers based in Colombo.The Council’screation compromised district coordination effortswhile providing no effective alternative, with the newCouncil meeting fewer than three times over 2005.

The case exemplifies the arbitrary constraintsthat have affected the capacity of some districts.The example of the District Secretary, who wasundermined in developing a standard coordinationprocess that other districts were able to implement,contrasts sharply with Hambantota’s housing expe-rience, where conventional bureaucratic norms andsystems of accountability were set aside, allowingthe district to respond comparatively faster in plan-ning reconstruction. It is possible to appreciate theefforts made within Hambantota to ensure that theneeds of its residents were met as quickly as possi-ble while deploring the failure to prevent the yawn-ing disparities that consequently emerged withother affected districts. The problem in part arosewhen the centre began grappling with challengesthat might have been better managed at local levelsand, partly as a consequence, failed to exercise itsown authority properly by exerting sufficient over-sight and control to ensure that districts were moreequally able to drive recovery effectively.

The centre also assumed a greater role in areas tra-ditionally managed by provincial administrations, suchas health and education. Interviewees have suggested

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63 Professor MuttukrishnaSarvananthan, Post-TsunamiSri Lanka: Swindlers HoldSway. May 2005, available atwww.pointpedro.org/wp-con-tent/uploads/2006/04/PPID%20Working%20Paper%204.pdf

64 This is the case, except aspreviously mentioned, in thenorth and east where thereare no elected provincial representatives.

65 RADA information indicatesthat only Hambantota, Jaffnaand Killinochchi districts had systems for agreeing toMOUs at the district level.

66 It is, for example, the con-stituency of the former prime minister and currentpresident.

that this disproportionately affected the north and eastas it prevented the capacity and experience of theNorth East Provincial Council (NEPC) Secretariatfrom being fully utilized. This was increasingly recog-nized, and the Secretariat was asked to support aspectsof the north and east housing programme in the second half of 2005.67 Box 3.4 summarizes the institu-tional changes at central and district levels that evolvedthroughout 2005 and contributed to the centre beingunable to sufficiently focus on supporting the districtsto deliver more effectively — and equitably.

Policy and Technical Constraints

Policy formulation: If a lack of subsidiarity chal-lenged the prospects for equity from an operationalperspective, it also undermined the quality of poli-cy-making. Interviewees reported that the institu-

tional changes highlighted in Box 3.4 reflect thestate’s traditional centralized nature. The new insti-tutions, partly staffed by representatives with littleor no experience in the public sector or disastermanagement, were reportedly not sufficientlyfocused on drawing information and views fromlocal and provincial authorities to inform policy-making. As a result, some policies became unviableand others were incrementally adjusted, both ofwhich created a context that allowed groups to betreated differently from one another.

The most powerful examples involve the bufferzone68 and housing entitlement policies, describedin Box 3.2 and earlier in this section, respectively.Stronger inputs by districts would arguably haveled to more realistic, nuanced and viable policiesthat took into account differing regional contexts.When central representatives began to visit and

67 By using tried and testedprogramme approaches combining the efforts of theNEPC, local authorities anddevelopment partners, almost5,000 conflict affected homeswere built in the north andeast in 2005 compared withless than 500 under the newtsunami housing schemesover the same period.

68 According to reports, thebuffer zone resulted not froma decision by personnel innew recovery institutions, butrather from senior politicalcircles. As also seen in the‘Challenges to Subsidiarity’section, centralized decision-making is as much a result ofactive political direction fromthe centre as of entrenchedbureaucratic norms and differences in the relativecapacities of district and central authorities.

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On the day the tsunami struck, a National DisasterManagement Centre (NDMC) was operational buthad weak institutional capacity. Earlier in 2004, the SriLankan Parliament had failed to approve a DisasterManagement Act, which would have put in place aninstitutionalised system for disaster managementand enhanced such capacities. In the absence of theact, the NDMC’s main role was limited to providingofficial figures of damaged housing, injured people,and fatalities.

By early January, President Kumaratunga establisheda Centre for National Operations (CNO) and threesenior level task forces — the Task Force for Rescueand Relief (TAFRER), the Task Force to Rebuild theNation (TAFREN), and the Task Force for Logistics, Lawand Order (TAFLOL). Before the CNO could build onits early experience, it was replaced by TAFLOL andTAFRER, which merged to form the Task Force forRelief (TAFOR) in February.

As an agency not rooted in the existing state institu-tional framework,TAFREN experienced a sharp learningcurve before instituting significant institutional reformsin the second half of 2005. Before these could be fullyembedded, in January 2006, TAFREN was replaced with a new institution, the Reconstruction andDevelopment Agency (RADA), incorporating a widermandate (oversight and support for both post-tsunamiand post-conflict reconstruction) with a new institu-tional home in the President’s Office. By mid-2006,RADA was under new leadership, had still not beenauthorised by legislation and, despite some positivesteps in the early months, was perceived as not havingbuilt on the lessons learned by TAFREN during 2005and not fully utilising its potential to drive coordinationbetween implementing ministries and agencies.

In February 2005, a multi-party Parliamentary SelectCommittee was created to investigate the lack of pre-paredness to meet future humanitarian emergenciesand to recommend steps to mitigate future risks. InJune, the committee recommended the formation ofa new Disaster Management Centre (DMC) with astronger mandate, allowing the DMC to work withmultiple stakeholders at various levels of the admin-istration, and also to actively engage in risk reduction.By November 2005, the DMC was moved from thePresident’s Office into a newly created Ministry ofDisaster Management, under the Prime Minister’sOffice. In early 2006, it was relocated again to formpart of a new Ministry of Disaster Management andHuman Rights.

At the district level, the UN provided early skeletalsupport to District Secretaries through its UNVolunteer Programme. In the second half of 2005, thegovernment rolled out additional technical staff topush for progress in sectors such as transitional shel-ter. In early 2006, a combined government and UNDPprogramme, with support from ILO and UN-Habitat,provided approximately 10 staff in each affected district to support District Secretaries in key areassuch as livelihoods and monitoring.

A disaggregated assessment of staffing needs acrossthe different districts and a more targeted pro-gramme of support earlier in 2005 might well haveyielded faster progress in general and a more equi-table pace of progress across districts. Stronger mon-itoring capacity in 2006 should prove helpful inassisting districts and the centre in identifying andresponding to local and regional patterns of inequity.

Institutional Changes: Out with the Old, In With the New

Box 3.4.

consult with local and provincial authorities in thesecond half of 2005, significant benefits resulted,such as reform of the buffer zone policy andimproved management of the owner driven hous-ing programme in the north and east. However,interviewees have reported a relative failure by thecentre to respond to other weaknesses revealed bymonitoring, such as the overprovision of housing.More outcome-oriented and transparent monitor-ing and evaluation of implementation withstrengthened response mechanisms will be requiredto galvanise action in the future.

In turn, many agencies, particularly NGOs,struggled to grasp the potential to use their new,virtual donor status69 to work more effectively at thepolicy level. As a recent evaluation noted:

There has been a tendency for agencies to pursuetheir own successes rather than focus on the systemas a whole and the general needs.…Internation-al NGOs…had the opportunity to play a majorrole during the transition from relief to recovery.A more collective and strategic approach duringthat period could have added further value.…70

For example, utilizing even a small proportion offunding to recruit staff with expertise in addressingpolicy constraints with the government and workingmore strategically to raise policy issues could haveyielded faster progress on a range of underlying con-straints to both equity and broader implementationchallenges.71 Where policy expertise was provided tothe government, such as support for the developmentand roll out of a transitional shelter policy, the bene-fits had a multiplier impact, which greatly out-weighed the costs of the support provided.

Policy communication: Interviewees consistentlyreported concerns that local authorities had difficul-ty in interpreting policy implementation guidelines.Interviews in Ampara, Hambantota and Matarareported that, at least initially, central instructions todivisional secretaries were not sufficiently focusedon ensuring accuracy in determining eligibility ofbeneficiaries, and thus contributed to ineligible peo-ple receiving benefits. As well as contributing to alack of consistency in applying recovery policiesacross regions, poor policy communication alsodirectly affected potential beneficiaries, by reducingtheir awareness of information about entitlementsand limiting their ability to hold policy-makersaccountable. These concerns appeared especiallyrelevant with respect to some of the more isolatedcommunities in LTTE-controlled areas in the eastand generally less literate and/or less assertivewomen in all areas.

Policy implementation: Interviewees reported asomewhat laissez-faire approach by officials in

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69 A significant number ofNGOs were able to inde-pendently raise large sums,which should have resulted inincreased bargaining powerto negotiate the scope andcontent of their own efforts,along with the increased ability to influence the policyenvironment for recovery byproviding funding for policyadvice and coordinationefforts.

70 Valid International,Independent Evaluation of the Disaster EmergenciesCommittee (DEC) TsunamiCrisis Response, Report to theDEC Board, December2005.

71 For example, agencies couldhave used funds to commis-sion a social and economicassessment of the buffer zoneand propose changes in agiven district to help informgovernment policy with precise facts and figures.

Access to information for beneficiaries, effective con-sultation and participation of beneficiaries in therecovery process all enhance the prospects for equitybecause they better enable communities to accessbenefits and to hold policy-makers accountable.While the scope of this study has not allowed a rigor-ous review of the relationship between communica-tion and engagement with local communities andequity, a number of observations can be made.

• The Government of Sri Lanka has consistentlyrecognised the importance of an effective com-munication strategy to publicise and clarify reliefand recovery policies. However, implementingsuch a strategy has proved challenging.

• The need to ensure that the diverse and multilin-gual communities in the east have equal access toinformation on benefits is of particular impor-tance.

• Many implementing agencies reported that theyhad not worked with district authorities on strate-gically communicating messages with beneficiar-ies about the relief and recovery effort becausethey believed this was the government’s responsi-bility.

• According to the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition,implementing agencies have often failed to con-sult with and fully utilise local capacity in design-ing and implementing recovery programmes.While a number of agencies have followed betterpractice in this regard, others have indicated thatpressure caused by tight deadlines has led to amore directive approach to programming.

• Some agencies also cited relative difficulties inmotivating tsunami IDPs to drive their own recov-ery process, which contrasts sharply with reportsabout the more proactive conflict IDP group.

• The UAS scheme, which is operational for conflictIDPs in the north and east,has a much stronger rep-utation for community involvement than tsunamiprogrammes, although some aspects of thescheme could be more carefully communicated.

• RADA identified community mobilisation as a pri-ority objective for 2006.

• Despite its record of authoritarian control andresistance to democratic norms, the LTTE beganefforts to institutionalise greater communityinvolvement on post-tsunami and broader devel-opment issues from the autumn of 2005 with theestablishment of Village Development Forums.This built on the involvement of communities inaddressing post-tsunami issues during earliermonths.

Equity: More Than Material Benefits!

Box 3.5.

enforcing implementation of agreed policies, as wellas the ability of powerful NGOs to persuade localauthorities to bend procedures. The government’slimited capacity or sense of responsibility to enforcepolicy implementation contributed to intra-districtand regional inequities — such as varying housingstandards — and regional inequities in the alloca-tion of housing programmes between districts.

There are some exceptions to this pattern such asin government-controlled Jaffna district where theDistrict Secretary was seen as contributing to a clearpolicy context and was able to work effectively withNGOs in enforcing clear standards and targets.Implementing agencies in LTTE-controlledKilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts also reportedan active dialogue with the LTTE’s Planning andDevelopment Secretariat (PDS) on standards. Forexample, in transitional shelter, the PDS set a max-imum standard for shelter, and beneficiary lists wereallocated in advance to NGOs, which enabled asmooth and more equitable implementationprocess. Additionally, the PDS encouraged NGOsto peer review shelter standards, and significantdeviations from the norm were highlighted andaddressed. The focus on common standards wasthen applied to permanent housing efforts. Theability of the LTTE to enforce better practice hasinevitably been influenced by the tight political con-trol it traditionally exerts and the fewer numbers ofNGOs operational in areas under its control.Further comments on this context are set out in theconcluding section.

Staffing issues: The disaster’s extent and naturewould have taxed the strongest administration, andthe Government of Sri Lanka has noted that theresponse severely stretched its public service capac-ities. District interviewees reported staffing gaps,stretched resources, and frequent staff turnover inboth the government and implementing agencies,which undermined coordination and a focus on bestpractice.

North and east shortages: The public serviceshortages in the north and east, highlighted earlier,have significantly delayed the pace of recovery com-pared with other regions. Examples include the lackof any marine or Education Department engineersresident in Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi. Depen-dence on visits by officials from other districts hasdelayed the process of registering new boats andrebuilding schools. Similarly, technical staffrequired to inspect land and resettlement plans havefaced additional challenges in LTTE-controlledareas because they have been unfamiliar with thelocations visited.

Pressure for Results

In a politicised context with existing policy andcapacity constraints, pressure fuelled by a range offactors acted to distort some of the incentives forimplementing agencies to implement a best practiceapproach and directly led to a context that enabledinequities to occur.

The role of the media: As in many disasters, themedia played an invaluable role in raising awarenessof both the disaster and the response. The coveragecontributed to the record tally of official donorassistance and international private donations,equipping many existing and new NGOs with hugesums for recovery and reconstruction programmes.

Media reporting was also subject to criticism.Implementing agencies referred to the media’sapparent preference to report bleak, simplistic pic-tures of performance rather than elaborate on thecomplexities of the challenges involved in promotingequitable and sustainable recovery. Agencies alsoreported that the media was slower to begin cover-age of the east, noting that this would have been par-ticularly helpful in countering the comparativelyweaker flows of private assistance to this region.

This approach served to put both the governmentand many agencies on the defensive, and anxious tojustify the funds donated by encouraging hasty deliv-ery of assistance that responded, at least superficially,to media pressure.72 Unfortunately, as a recent evalu-ation notes, this undermined the incentives and toolsfor focusing on the quality of implementationprocesses, including promoting an equitable response:

High media profile tends to encourage competition,an opportunistic approach among the agencies andpoor coordination. Agencies distance themselvesfrom intractable issues . . . and compete for whatcan be done rather than what should be done.” 73

Time frames, targeting and funding: Mediareporting served to amplify existing pressures thatdevelopment partners might otherwise have man-aged differently. Ironically, one of the biggestdynamics affecting best practice involved the highlevels (and diverse sources) of funds raised, and theconstraints imposed upon the funding. TheTsunami Evaluation Coalition74 has noted:

It was television coverage of the disaster that pro-vided the basis on which funding decisions werebased rather than any more formal assessment ofneeds. The result of such appeals is that funds areearmarked for a particular crisis, and cannot bereallocated to areas of greater need. 75

Almost all agencies interviewed referred to beingoverly constrained by targets set by funding agenciesor during funding appeals. The most common con-straints involved too short deadlines within which

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72 NGOs in particular havebeen the target of consider-able criticism from a range of media and political actorsin Sri Lanka throughout therecovery period, adding tothe pressure already felt bymany humanitarian actors.

73 Valid International,Independent Evaluation of theDEC Tsunami Crisis Response,page 7.

74 The TEC, which was initiated in February 2005,involves over 50 agenciesworking to develop a coordi-nated sector based evaluationof post-tsunami response.For more information, seewww.alnap.org/tec.

75 Tsunami EvaluationCoalition, Initial Findings,December 2005, page 11.

to spend funds and too narrow a target group.Agency staff reported meeting stiff resistance totheir requests to broaden the target group to enableless directly affected communities to access support,due to legal or procedural restrictions enforced bytheir respective headquarters.

Agencies did report that some constraints loos-ened over time; for example the UN Flash Appealimplementation period was lengthened from 6 to 18months. Others referred to more enlightened practiceby some funding agencies, which allowed more flex-ible responses to evolving needs, for example, by

allowing the targeting of entiredistricts, instead of only the divi-sions that had been directlyimpacted. Flexibility on timingenabled more sustainable inter-ventions, while targeting flexibili-ty enabled better outreach to lessdirectly affected communitiesand other disadvantaged groupssuch as conflict IDPs. However,most immediately, flexibilityreduced the intense pressure onagencies and local officials, creat-ing space for applying best practices. Unfortunately, many

agencies did not have sufficient flexibility in theirprogrammes, and challenges inevitably arose.

On balance, the high levels of funding and narrowtargeting employed by most agencies contributed toan unusual competition for beneficiaries. While thisdid not raise equity issues in all sectors, the pressuredid result in a focus on visible delivery at the expenseof spending time on more difficult but less recognizedactivities, such as advising the government’s policyprocesses and driving effective coordination, whichwould have promoted local and regional equity.

As a result, agencies contributed to the over-aiding of affected communities in some sectors,such as non-food relief items, which resulted instark disparities between tsunami IDPs and otherdisadvantaged groups. An extreme consequence hasinvolved credible reports of agencies that have optedto utilise spare funds by bulldozing and rebuildinghabitable transitional shelters (to admittedly higherstandards) rather than addressing pressing needs inmore challenging environments for implementa-tion. From a national perspective, spending pres-sures are reported to have disproportionatelyattracted certain agencies (particularly less experi-enced groups and private sector initiatives) to thesouth, because it has provided a better context forswifter implementation.

Coordination challenges: Delivering an equitableresponse relies on the commitment and proactive

engagement of all actors to work in an integratedway at both policy and operational levels. The sheernumbers of implementing agencies involved in therelief and recovery effort was a major constraint inthis respect.76 The breadth of actors involved andthe limited official capacity (and in some cases com-mitment) to enforce aspects of coordination critical-ly undermined the prospects of agencies working tothe same standards both within districts and acrossregions. As noted above, the pressure to implementundermined the incentive of many agencies to con-tribute actively to coordination when it riskeddelaying delivery schedules. As a result, althoughthe majority of professional agencies made sincereefforts, particularly on operational coordination,these efforts ultimately fell short, and allowed arange of inequities to develop.77

Both the government and development partnerswere able to drive better and more equitable deliverywhen they strengthened policy and implementationnetworks — both horizontally and vertically. Thiswas largely achieved in transitional shelter where thenational leads (TAFOR for the government andUNHCR for development partners) quickly devel-oped linkages to districts, appointing lead agencies tosupport a closely monitored set of district targets.Despite problems, the programme largely achievedits objectives. By contrast, the failure to address cer-tain equity issues associated with permanent housingunder the donor driven scheme was partially linkedto the fact that the respective government and devel-opment partner leads on permanent housing did nothave sufficient presence within or linkages to districtsfor most of 2005.78

By the second half of 2005, interviewees reportthat coordination and policy dialogue hadimproved, but, by then, policies and existing imple-mentation had already begun contributing toinequities — including, among others, on distribu-tion of relief items, rebuilding standards and thepace of permanent housing progress. However, mostinterviewees also expressed a belief that there wassufficient scope for improving coordination andpolicy dialogue to address some of the evolvinginequities and that efforts to this end wouldmarkedly improve the recovery effort and broadernational development.

Conflict Impacts on the North and East

Security concerns: The parties to Sri Lanka’s con-flict have ultimately been unable to utilize thetsunami as a turning point for peace, and, in fact,security further deteriorated throughout late 2005and 2006, significantly impacting the context forrecovery in the north and east. Increased violence

76 According to the UN, over300 NGOs are estimated tohave been providing tsunamirelief during the first half of 2005.

77 Private sector initiatives werelargely reported as being outside the loop of mostcoordination mechanismseven when they were wellresourced by major nationalcompanies.

78 In this case, the problem wasalso linked to the fact thatthe development partner lead agency for permanenthousing had no operationalresponsibility for the donordriven scheme. Rather, itwas primarily engaged in theowner driven program, andwas thus less able and lessinclined to drive progress onthe donor driven dimensionof permanent housing.

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An equitable response relies on the

commitment and proactive engagement of

all actors to work in anintegrated way at policyand operational levels.

and killings, including the murder of two division-al secretaries in the east, along with hartals, inter-rupted implementation of recovery programmes.Increasingly onerous checkpoint procedures havealso delayed progress. One NGO reported that ittook 12 weeks to transport building materials intoLTTE-controlled areas; others reported thatimports such as VHF radios and fibre glass boatsalso took a long time to import and in some caseswere not released by state authorities, even thoughsuch items are not officially restricted. Accordingto agencies, some contractors had reported beingunwilling to work in the east as a result of theseproblems. In the meantime, local authorities werealso dealing with the temporary IDP groups fleeingto escape the recent increases in violence.79

LTTE-imposed taxes: Within LTTE-controlledareas, interviewees reported their struggle to avoidpaying LTTE-imposed taxes. While negotiationshad resulted in the LTTE waiving certain taxes for

individual or larger groups of NGOs, other taxeshad remained, or were only temporarily reduced.This has affected recovery by: 1) deterring certainagencies from working in LTTE-controlled areas;2) raising the cost of reconstruction materials pro-cured in LTTE-controlled areas; and 3) adding tothe workload and frustration of agency staff whomust divert time to address these issues.81 Similarly,interviewees reported that a local LTTE monopolyon the use of heavy equipment in Mullaitivu andKilinochchi was increasing reconstruction costsalthough some agencies were negotiating alterna-tives. Separately, Amnesty International has report-ed that local NGOs felt unduly pressured by theLTTE to restrict their activities and work onlythrough the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation(TRO) on tsunami reconstruction activities, reduc-ing the space for independent civil society.82

Absence of P-TOMS implementation: Theabsence of P-TOMS implementation affected thecontext for recovery, especially in the north.Development partners withheld resources andactivities in anticipation of the agreement, and someeventually withdrew some recovery commitmentsthat hinged on P-TOMS.83 In addition, LTTE representatives reported diverting time and focusfrom other reconstruction issues to negotiate theultimately moribund initiative. By comparison, inthe south, there were no reasons to delay commit-ments and no interruptions for staff supportingdevelopment.

Contextual Challenges

Location and profile of affected areas: Most tsunamiaffected areas in the south and west are closer toColombo where the majority of journalists, externalrelief workers and supplies arrived. These areas arealso more easily accessed by roads and the rail net-work, the latter of which is nonexistent in the northand east.84 The south has higher profile touristareas, and the south and west have stronger connec-tions to national industry and the private sector.Interviewees reported that these factors contributedto the stronger exposure the south is perceived tohave received after the disaster and, in particular,support from private sector organizations that had amajor — although largely undocumented — rolesupporting recovery work, such as permanent hous-ing reconstruction.

These advantages, combined with the relative lackof obstacles faced by the south, enabled southern districts to start reconstruction activities earlier than districts in other regions. The south was able tomaintain a faster rate of progress in subsequentmonths as in some cases, other regions had to wait for

79 The increase in violence andconcerns about a full break-down of the ceasefire agree-ment caused the flight ofover 6,000 families fromJaffna to Kilinochchi andMullaitivu in early 2006.

80 In the spring of 2004, theerstwhile commander ofLTTE forces in the east,Colonel Karuna, led a break-away faction of easterncadres and has since beenorchestrating a guerrilla campaign against the north-ern-led LTTE forces andtheir supporters in the east.

81 Government tax policies andcomplicated bureaucracy arealso reported to have nega-tively affected aid importsfrom private funders andprofessional NGOs.

82 The TRO is an NGO,registered in Sri Lanka and a number of other donorcountries. It works mostly inthe north and east of SriLanka on both humanitarianresponse and reconstructionactivities and is widely con-sidered to be affiliated withthe LTTE.

83 Some were able to re-channel funds to the sametarget group via other initiatives.

84 For example, it takes approx-imately three hours to drivefrom Colombo to the southern district of Gallecompared with eight hoursto drive from Colombo toAmpara District in the east.

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Interviewees and independent reports have high-lighted conditions affecting a particularly vulnerablegroup: IDPs living in the east, affected by both theconflict and the tsunami, living in a deterioratingsecurity context that actively undermines their qual-ity of life and prospects for recovery. Reports indi-cate that Tamils based in the east have becomemore vulnerable to suspicions by the LTTE, whichhas been on the defensive due to internal threats80

and, as a result, has been accused of attempting tokeep these communities on a war footing throughintimidation. NGOs have observed particularly insu-lar communities that appear unwilling or unable toengage with development actors. Amnesty Inter-national has reported that the resulting fear, whichprevents civil society and local civilians from speak-ing openly, “is particularly problematic…given that a large scale post tsunami reconstruction process isunderway and it is vital that the local communities areable to freely participate in consultations and expresstheir views and needs.”

According to Amnesty International, tsunami IDPcamp residents in the east have also reportedincreased harassment by government securityforces as the security situation deteriorates. In addition, some camps have been located in areasthat are not fully under the control of either theLTTE or the government, and, as a result, camp resi-dents have been unable to rely on either to enforcesafer conditions for residents vulnerable to issuessuch as camp or domestic violence.

Vulnerabilities of Dual IDPs

Box 3.6.

limited technical staff involved in the reconstructionprocess (e.g. national housing inspectors) to completework in the south before addressing the needs ofother regions. A more equitable focus on addressingregional capacity needs would have promoted a moreequitable pace of delivery across regions.

Community divisions: The existence of morediverse communities in Batticaloa and Ampara inthe east has provided a context for division andmutual suspicion. Language differences have alsoaffected the pace and quality of recovery efforts inthese areas. For example, the Sinhala and English-speaking District Secretary in Ampara had toimplement an emergency programme with mostlyTamil-speaking divisional staff. The neighbouringDistrict Secretary of Batticaloa had to overcome alack of English to work with many internationalimplementing agencies. These types of divisions areless of an issue in the south and west.

Access to materials and areas: The transactioncosts of working in parts of the north and east aremuch higher than in the south and west. This ismainly due to the limited access to sand banks, rub-ble and other reconstruction materials; high securi-ty zones; the relative paucity of skilled labour; andthe limited access to reconstruction sites. In partic-ular, certain LTTE-controlled areas have almost notarmac roads and there are painstaking checkpointprocedures required for travel between the govern-ment and LTTE-controlled areas. These constraintsmay have caused the north, in particular, to attractfewer implementation partners and for imple-menters operational in the north and east to makeslower and more limited progress.

Conclusion

Equitable outcomes are fundamentally dependenton a broad range of best practices in disasterresponse and recovery. Even with the best inten-tions, equity will be undermined when processes,such as communication with and participation ofbeneficiaries and effective coordination, are noteffectively developed or implemented.

On patterns of inequity, the analysis indicatesthat a combination of practical and institutionalconstraints has contributed to less and/or slowerpost-tsunami progress in the north and east andfaster progress elsewhere, particularly in the south.The practical constraints range from those arisingfrom the conflict, such as accessibility of materials,to geographic disadvantages such as distance fromthe capital. These practical conditions have beenrelatively transparent and straightforward in provid-ing standing advantages or disadvantages for carry-ing out recovery work in given areas.

Institutional constraints such as the excessiveinfluence of politics, the lack of subsidiarity, organi-zational pressures affecting the quality of NGOengagement and specific policies such as LTTE tax-ation, have been less transparent in their impact buthave been more dynamic in limiting the prospectsof some districts and promoting the prospects ofothers. These factors also contributed most to intra-district disparities by undermining systems to deliv-er assistance more equitably. The pressures wroughtby the media, targets and funding flows have exac-erbated the institutional constraints, reducing theopportunities for positive efforts to be broadenedand consolidated. While this paper has also provid-ed examples of the positive efforts made to drivebetter practice and thus promote equity, the con-straints and challenges assessed indicate why suchprogress has only been partially achieved, and whatwould need to change to yield more equitable prac-tice and outcomes.

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The government, development partners andthe LTTE all recognized and articulatedthe importance of meeting the needs of allIDPs and of an equitable post-tsunamiresponse. However, despite some efforts in

this direction, significant inequities have prevailed,with most conflict IDPs receiving quantitativelyand qualitatively less support than tsunami IDPs. Inaddition, on balance, tsunami IDPs in the east and,particularly, the north, have experienced a slowerpace of progress than those in the south. Researchfor this paper suggests that most districts, particu-larly in the south, west and east of the country havealso exhibited internal inequities.

The differing nature of the disasters has influ-enced the context for providing assistance. In theconflict context, the ongoing lack of peace continuesto have an effect, having severely undermined statecapacity in the north and east, prevented a strongercontext for economic recovery, undermined the writof elected institutions, and created a mindset inwhich addressing the requirements of conflict IDPsis too often considered subject to a final peace set-tlement. As a result, most support to conflict IDPsis of a localized and interim nature.

The more diverse post-tsunami IDP group hasbenefited from assistance focused not only on reha-bilitating, but also on building back better the livesof affected communities. However, even within thisgroup, myriad, interrelated factors have allowedsome districts to move ahead more quickly andeffectively than others. Practical constraints, oftenconflict related, have reduced and slowed both post-conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction in thenorth and east while southern and western regionshave, by comparison, been able to move forwardwith post-tsunami efforts in a relatively uncon-strained manner. Institutional constraints affectingthe government, development partners and theLTTE have influenced the structures and processesby which recovery has been planned and imple-mented, contributing to both intra-district dispari-ties and exacerbating the regional disparities men-tioned above.

The critical underlying dynamic underminingmore equitable outcomes has been that of politicalwill, both on the part of development partners andthe government. Most of the contextual and practi-cal constraints increased the prospects for inequitybut did not predetermine that it would prevail, andthere were factors already in place in Sri Lanka thatcould have supported a more equitable response.These included an understanding of and experiencewith conflict sensitive development; a constitution-al commitment to non-discrimination; participato-ry development structures;85 recurrent nationalexperience of managing IDPs; and, critically, theestablished UAS for addressing IDP needs as partof post-disaster response. But divergent politicalincentives affecting both the government and devel-opment partners have undermined the extent towhich these opportunities have thus far been seized.

An extraordinary disaster can justify extraordi-nary responses to manage recovery, including theestablishment of new mechanisms to fill gaps. Atthe same time, a number of important policy andimplementation decisions that resulted in thebypassing of established institutions and procedureshave undermined equitable outcomes, while raisingconcerns about the role of politics in the recoveryprocess. The rapid creation of bodies such asTAFREN, without planned and disciplinedprocesses to link them effectively to existing gov-ernmental structures, undermined the potential formore experienced, key institutions to play an effec-tive role.

The new centralised bodies provided a degree ofnational control, but the relative inexperience oftheir staff and failure to operate through the princi-ple of subsidiarity meant that they took too muchresponsibility from the districts, such as managinghouse-building MOUs with development partners.They were also unable to execute fully centralresponsibilities, such as ensuring consistent cover-age of housing across districts and developing andenforcing maximum housing standards. Both ofthese problems directly affected equity. The centralgovernment’s pre-emptive action in Trincomalee’s

Section 4

Final Conclusions

85 For example, this is the casewith the traditional RuralDevelopment Societies andVillage RehabilitationCommittees operating indistricts.

31

coordination efforts, and its acceptance of extraordi-nary housing coordination arrangements for somecommunities but not others, are other examples ofpolitical decisions that bypassed normal proceduresand impacted equity concerns. The problems thatarose do not lie in the shortcomings of any oneagency or decision, but in a range of political deci-sions that prevented some of the factors required forequity and linked best practices, such as consulta-tion and subsidiarity, from being prioritised.

To promote equity, key activities could have beenprioritized, such as the early relocation of staff suchas building inspectors to compensate for the institu-tional weaknesses in the north and east; use of the

existing UAS scheme to supporttsunami IDPs and stronger coor-dination of NGOs at the districtlevel. The challenges to movingin this direction were certainlynot trivial. For instance, the gov-ernment’s adoption of a laissezfaire approach toward enforce-ment of coordination and bestpractice was influenced by anunderstandable concern thatfunding opportunities might oth-erwise be lost. However, allowingpolitical influences to underminea stricter focus on best practicescreated space for inequities todevelop. Interviewees reported

that bureaucratic incentives for reform may, in somecases, have remained dormant because certaininequities mirrored traditional disparities within dis-tricts and across regions, disparities which were easi-er to tolerate than challenge.

The efforts of development partners to supportequity were also undermined by incentives that dis-couraged best practice, and in some cases by a lackof strategic vision. In response to public sympathyand media exposure, governments and NGOs raisedbillions in aid but often within such narrow con-straints that competition for beneficiaries quicklytook root. The overarching objective to spendquickly reduced the normal focus on consultationand more effective partnerships with local authori-ties, which would have strengthened mechanisms topromote equity. Signals from the international com-munity, such as the G-8’s very early request for anoverall figure for reconstruction costs, exemplifiesthe quantitative focus at the expense of concentrat-ing on qualitative processes that would have pro-moted a best practice and equitable approach.86

Many development partners tried to support andimplement best practices that would have strength-ened the prospects for equity but these efforts were

far from optimal. One key gap was the lack of suf-ficient engagement by the UN to help governmentdevelop and enforce best practice in governance atthe policy (rather than programme) level.87 In addi-tion, NGOs did not sufficiently engage the govern-ment on policy concerns (such as equitable access tohousing), or on ensuring operational coordination atdistrict and central levels. That these opportunitieswere not fully grasped is partly due to a lack of expe-rience, but largely due to a competing incentive —to programme funds even if that meant workingwithin a more problematic and inequitable contextfor recovery.

Collectively, the influence of politics and theinability of many development partners to overcometheir own organisational concerns to drive changesuccessfully meant that common awareness of poli-cy problems did not necessarily lead to early solu-tions. The Guiding Principles (see Annex 1), estab-lished so early in the recovery effort, consequentlybecame an expression of what could be done, rathera consistent, common drive for what should be done.

There is some evidence to suggest that in north-ern LTTE-controlled areas, increased efforts oncommunity consultation, the provision of early andconsistent beneficiary lists, stronger NGO coordi-nation and the setting of maximum standards forhousing yielded some positive results on equity forthe post-tsunami IDP group. However otherreports have suggested that preferential access torelief and rehabilitation assistance has been provid-ed to families and groups within tsunami IDP com-munities that have demonstrated loyalty toward orbeen of strategic importance to the LTTE. At abroader level, the evidence clearly demonstrates dis-parities between the differences in assistance pro-vided to conflict IDPs and tsunami IDPs in bothgovernment- and LTTE-controlled areas. TsunamiIDPs in LTTE-controlled areas in the east are alsoreported to be among the most vulnerable and dis-empowered of all tsunami IDPs.

In northern LTTE-controlled areas whereefforts to promote equity have clearly yielded someresults, a number of underlying factors are relevant,including smaller numbers of more experiencedNGOs combined with a directive LTTE approachto coordination and standard setting. The contextfor stronger coordination in these areas — unchal-lenged political control by the LTTE and theabsence of democracy — is of deep concern. It maybe appropriate for an authority to be more directiveto ensure quality delivery during a crisis period, butif intimidation narrows the space for developmentpartners and communities to engage in recoverywork, the quality and sustainability of that recoveryand related development are put seriously at risk.

86 The G-8, which includesCanada, France, Germany,Italy, Japan, Russia, theUnited Kingdom, and theUnited States, requested afigure reflecting how muchreconstruction would cost tobe produced by early Februarywhen many actors within SriLanka were trying to steer astronger focus on how theeffort should be managed todrive early best practice.

87 UNDP in particular was per-ceived as having missed criti-cal opportunities to encour-age early progress on imple-menting the GuidingPrinciples, which shouldhave strengthened the overallquality of the recovery effort.

32

Many development partners tried to

support and implementbest practices that would

have strengthened theprospects for equity,

but these efforts were far from optimal.

This paper has sought to reflect both positive andworrying trends. Future studies should seek to fur-ther investigate the LTTE’s engagement in recoveryand development issues, not least to promotestronger accountability.

Overarching Lessons and Future Challenges

The practical constraints affecting future recoveryprocesses will inevitably vary with the complexitiesof each type of crisis and context. However, theinstitutional constraints identified in this paper existto different degrees in all other potential disastercontexts. Few governmental systems are robustenough to prevent at least occasional undue politi-cal influences, and most governments could furtherstrengthen risk mitigation and response structures.For their part, implementing agencies often defaultto compartmentalising responsibility for recovery ina way which, as in Sri Lanka, can mean prioritisingdelivery for their own beneficiary target groups, atthe expense of enforcing wider best practice.Development partners, influenced by domesticpolitical pressures and domestic financial regula-tions, will always find it difficult to develop the flex-ibility that needs-driven responses require.

The pressure to overcome these constraints, todeliver better practice, and more equitable out-comes, will only grow, now that humanitarianresponse has developed into a truly global endeav-our, with international private donations increasing-ly able to meet and exceed the level of official devel-opment assistance. Acknowledging the most sensi-tive factors creating constraints to better delivery,and finding practical ways to challenge the influ-ence of these factors is imperative in mitigating therisks to best practice. Two key steps appear to pro-vide the strongest opportunity for addressing theinstitutional constraints investigated in this paper.

The first is increasing and enhancing collaborativeapproaches to recovery. This means host governments,development partners and implementing agenciesmust find ways to develop a stronger level of mutu-al accountability for the entire recovery effort,notwithstanding how individual responsibilitiesmay be apportioned between actors.

The second is ensuring optimal transparency toenhance accountability systems. This means makinginformation available about the contribution ofindividual actors within the overall collaborativeframework at all stages of recovery.

Progress in both areas should reduce the possi-bilities for poor practice to go unchecked by increas-ing the right kind of pressure on all actors to worktogether for joint delivery. The dynamic will expose

weaknesses in the delivery framework and/or with-in certain actors, and will also promote muchstronger joint efforts to drive solutions.

Efforts in this direction are not new. Thehumanitarian reform agenda is picking up speedand there are groups and processes that are facilitat-ing progress to these ends, and which are referred toin the recommendations section. Examples of posi-tive practice have also been referred to in earlier sec-tions. However, the rights of future survivors alongwith the increasing expectations of a global supportbase demand a more comprehensive drive forprogress in these two areas.

In practice, this will require considerable efforts,with implementing agencies surrendering some oftheir autonomy, host governments investing in sig-nificant disaster risk reduction and response plan-ning and both actors addressing the most pervasiveand sensitive political disincentives to reform. Thepath to progress is by no means easy or straightfor-ward, as it challenges some of the most deeplyentrenched and institutional barriers to change. Therecommendations in the next section acknowledgethese difficulties within the recovery working con-text, but seek to propose ways to challenge andmanage their risks to equity.

33

The following recommendations involve for-ward actions for governments, developmentpartners and implementing agencies. Theyalso propose actions and roles for specificorganisations based on the author’s initial

assessment of where there is existing capacity andresponsibility in the humanitarian community to takethe proposals forward. In each case, it is hoped that theproposed organisations will either be able to responddirectly to the challenge or engage other partners intaking on or sharing the responsibility for action.

Technical and Policy Capacity

Improving the technical and policy capabilities with-in governments and development partners will helpensure that appropriate capacities are in place beforedisaster strikes in order to improve disaster risk reduc-tion, response and recovery efforts. It will also help toensure the proper balance between politics and tech-nical and policy expertise in the recovery process.• Governments should reduce the need to create new

structures in the aftermath of a disaster by investing inand maintaining standing national disaster responsecapacity at central and local levels. This should includecapacity for implementation of recovery activities.Wherever possible, governments should formally incor-porate international humanitarian actors within thesedisaster response plans, by, for example, developing provisional disaster response compacts — standingagreements setting out roles, responsibilities, and work-ing standards — for both national authorities andhumanitarian actors in the event of a disaster.

• While a range of humanitarian actors can facilitategovernment efforts to develop and agree on a disasterresponse plan, OCHA and UNDP should considerproviding an oversight and coordination role, work-ing with the UN’s Inter-Agency StandingCommittee 88 and ALNAP 89 to develop (or adapt) auser friendly web portal. The portal would serve as arepository of advice, models and lesson learning ondisaster response compacts, and would be accessible bygovernments and humanitarian agencies. (See finalrecommendation.)

• Governments should enhance recruitment, trainingand retention of staff qualified in disaster risk reductionand disaster response, including recovery. The criteriafor recruitment within these institutions should bebased on expertise and experience in the issues con-cerned. Transparent criteria for senior posts and inde-pendent evaluations of performance can help institu-tionalise national capacity. Responsible outsourcing oftasks to competent private sector and civil society organ-isations should be considered in certain areas (such asbeneficiary consultation exercises), while governmentsmaintain close oversight and coordination.

• Development partners should also enhance recruit-ment and training to ensure sufficient staff with theright skills mix to perform in a humanitarian context.Central to this are staff with strategic vision, man-agement and interpersonal skills, able to identify andaddress policy and institutional constraints as well asoperational challenges; recognise when organisationalpriorities need to change; integrate organisationalefforts within a larger multi-actor framework; man-age change effectively in a fast moving environment;delegate effectively and work with a wide range ofactors of differing capacities and backgrounds.

• Implementing agencies should be held accountable forspending time developing and publicly reporting ondivisions of labour in complex operating environments.Early acknowledgement and communication of capaci-ty constraints to both agency headquarters and hostgovernments should help manage expectations.

• Most NGOs are not technical housing experts and theowner-built model provides stronger opportunities toalign with international best practice. Where possible,as with some NGOs in Sri Lanka, agencies shouldconsider focusing on supporting owner-built schemes,adding value in areas such as facilitating communityplanning and decision making and providing guid-ance on cross cutting (e.g. environmental) issues.

The Role of Politics

• Governments should support functional decentraliasedstructures, and ensure that development partners arefully aware of the role of provincial and local authori-

Recommendations: General

34

88 Established in 1992, theIASC is the primary mechanism for inter-agencycoordination of humanitarianassistance involving the keyUN and non-UN humanitar-ian partners.

89 Established in 1997,ALNAP is a collectiveresponse by the humanitariansector, dedicated to improv-ing humanitarian perform-ance through increased learn-ing and accountability.

ties in disaster risk reduction and disaster response.• Levels of responsibility should be published before a

disaster, preferably as part of a disaster response com-pact agreed with humanitarian partners. Followinga disaster, regular assessments of policy and opera-tional coordination structures and networks shouldidentify whether different levels of government aredealing with the right level of detail, working in themost efficient way and have the capacity to managetheir respective responsibilities.

• Implementing agencies should ensure they are aware ofthe responsibilities of national, provincial, district andlocal authorities in disaster response and recovery, andagencies should be able to systematically report on howthey are engaging with these authorities for delivery.

Support for recovery from elected political leader-ship can be critical, and the involvement of politi-cians in the recovery efforts of their constituents canhelp to overcome bureaucratic obstacles and acceler-ate reconstruction. At the same time, measures thatallow the reconstruction process an appropriatedegree of insulation from political influence are alsocritical, to ensure that efforts respond to communityneeds are transparent and accountable, and adhere tobest practices, including the promotion of equity.

• UNDP should consider working with humanitarianpartners such as the Humanitarian AccountabilityPartnership – International 90 and ALNAP to devel-op a set of best practice guidelines to help governmentsmanage the role of politics in recovery processes.Development partners should consider providingfunding to ensure that disaster response efforts can beassessed according to these guidelines, possibly by acoalition of civil society representatives.

• Host governments should provide open access to infor-mation for monitoring purposes, and provide guid-ance to all levels of government, members of parlia-ments and other elected bodies on acceptable forms ofpolitical engagement in disaster response.

• Host governments should use consistent and transpar-ent beneficiary lists, and civil society and beneficiarygroups should conduct regular, independent monitor-ing of their validity and application.

Policy Development

• Governments should aim to consult widely, accesstechnical expertise available and establish transparentcommunication strategies to set out the rationale formajor decisions affecting recovery efforts.

• Development partners, both funders and implementers,should treat policy development and coordination as ahigh priority, akin to program implementation.Development partners should be willing and able to

provide untied 91 support for policy expertise as part ofa response effort. Implementing agencies should reporthow they are working with governments and oneanother to address policy constraints to facilitate theimplementation of recovery programmes.

• Donor governments should fulfill commitments to provide support to the Central Emergency ResponseFund 92 (CERF), which will better enable rapidhumanitarian response to sudden disasters, time-critical responses in slow onset disasters, and essentiallife-saving actions in under-funded crises, promotingglobal equity of humanitarian response.

• The IASC should consider extending its work inreforming the Humanitarian Coordinator system byfully exploring options for promoting joint accounta-bility with a broader range of humanitarian actors.Enhanced engagement with key non-UN actors,including interventions piloting stronger coordina-tion and innovative division of labour arrangementsshould be carried out, evaluated and reported as partof a focused action plan to build experience and confi-dence between humanitarian actors to encourage moremeaningful joint efforts.

• Development partners should seek to ensure theIASC’s existing cluster development work 93 reaffirmsthe importance of accountability mechanisms and con-sideration of equity issues within the development ofevolving cluster guidance.

Coordination

The Sri Lankan context highlights the importance ofeffective operational coordination, in order to avoidduplication and gaps in response, both of which cancontribute directly to undermining equity.• Governments must take overall responsibility for

ensuring effective coordination, including by rigorousenforcement of agreed standards for coordinationamong implementing agencies, even where this meanslimiting the number of agencies in a given area andrestricting the engagement of agencies unable to respondto agreed coordination standards and practice.Development partners and Flash Appeal decision-makers should require implementing agencies to complywith coordination agreements and demonstrate compli-ance with other best practices as a condition of funding

• The IASC should commission early and independentmonitoring of the role and performance of key staff(e.g. Humanitarian Coordinators) and specialistagencies (e.g. OCHA) brought in specifically to sup-port coordination or facilitate disaster response, alongwith timely follow up action. Key messages and agreedfollow up action should be publicly reported.

• Governments and development partners should carryout and respond to regular spot-checks on policy andoperational coordination structures and networks

90 HAP International is aninternational self-regulatorybody for humanitarian agencies. Launched in 2003, HAP International’smember agencies are focused on ensuring thatquality and effectiveness ofhumanitarian action isimproved through reachinghigh standards of accounta-bility to beneficiaries.

91 Such support would involvetechnical assistance that isnot dependent on use of con-sultants from the countryproviding assistance.

92 In December 2005, the UNGeneral Assembly approvedthe creation of a new CentralEmergency Response Fundfrom the former CentralEmergency Revolving Fund.With a planned $500 millionin resources, the new CERFhas been designed to allowfor a more predictable andtimely response to humani-tarian crises across the world and to strengthen core elements of humanitari-an response in under-fundedcrises.

93 The IASC established thecluster approach to improvethe predictability, timelinessand effectiveness of humani-tarian response by improvingcollaborative response, lead-ership and accountability inkey sectors where gaps inhumanitarian response havebeen identified.

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with a view to determining any policy gaps and oper-ational capacity constraints emerging across affectedregions. This should include monitoring of the performance of joint coordination structures (e.g.government-development partner steering commit-tees) commissioned by host governments and the mainhumanitarian partners.

• Implementing partners should be prepared, as neces-sary, to partner with government counterparts asjoint lead coordinating agencies in particular sectorsand resource this role accordingly.

Pressure for Results

The media, donors, NGOs and the public can putboth appropriate and inappropriate pressure on gov-ernments and implementing agencies in disasterresponse situations. An improved understanding ofpolicy and operational challenges faced by govern-ments and implementing agencies should helpcounteract inappropriate forms of pressure that canlead to programming that ignores or underminesbest practices, including the promotion of equity.• UNDP should consider working with development

partners and media institutions to develop targetedand easily accessible training to enhance internation-al correspondents’ awareness of critical issues, to betterenable constructive reporting of disaster response andrecovery efforts.

• During disaster response periods, governments anddevelopment partners should develop more assertivecommunication strategies to better manage expecta-tions among beneficiaries and private donors andraise awareness about equity issues.

• Donor governments should engage their FinanceMinistries, as well as Development and/or ForeignMinistries, to develop more constructive fundingarrangements, such as those that would allow for moreflexible timetables for funding and program imple-mentation, to improve the effectiveness of bilateralresponses to disasters.

• NGOs should accelerate joint efforts at educating thepublic on the most effective use of resources to achieveholistic and equitable outcomes in response to individ-ual disasters. The aim should be to encourage privatedonors to support appeals that will help agencies tofocus on best practices, rather than on rigid targetingand unrealistic expenditure schedules.

• NGOs should share information about managingfunding challenges, and further explore legal avenuesto develop funding campaigns that transparently pro-vide for maximum flexibility and enable better use ofresources in a rapidly changing environment.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation efforts will best ensuretransparency and accountability when they arefocused on outcomes as well as outputs, and are sys-temic and holistic.• Implementing partners should commit to monitoring

and evaluation that looks beyond the immediate out-puts of their individual interventions, includingmonitoring and evaluation of coordination mecha-nisms, beneficiary participatory mechanisms, andsocioeconomic and environmental issues.

• Governments and development partners should collec-tively set out goals and action plans for achieving progresson cross cutting, best practice issues, such as equity inassistance, which can then be jointly monitored. Wheredevelopment partners have the opportunity to supportgovernment or international efforts in joint monitoringand evaluation, they should share information andexpertise, and provide funding where appropriate.

• A broader set of implementing partners should explorethe use of independent evaluations of collaborativeefforts, building on those, for example, commissionedby the UK Disaster Emergencies Committee.

• Implementing partners should explore and pilot peerreview processes to promote lessons learned and raisecollective standards, reporting positive case studies tothe IASC.

Overall

The recommendations above involve encouraginggovernments, development partners and imple-menting agencies to work more collaboratively toprepare for and respond to disasters in a way inwhich the focus remains on building effectiveresponse systems for delivery. Building awareness,transferring knowledge and being able to refer to anevidence base are critical in helping governmentsand humanitarian agencies promote internal andsystemic changes. The final recommendation in thissection, below, focuses on a vehicle for recordingand monitoring progress on these critical issues.• The UN’s IASC, in conjunction with ALNAP, should

consider developing or adapting a web based resource torecord progress in the establishment of provisional disaster response compacts; examples of innovation inpromoting mutual accountability, policy and opera-tional coordination; and case studies exemplifying theindividual skills required to drive progress.The resourcewould also include media training materials; adviceand information on conducting funding campaignsthat maximise flexibility; best practice guidance formitigating the risks of political interference in recoveryefforts; and information, advice and case studies on peerreviews and other examples of constructive and/orholistic monitoring and evaluation.

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Anumber of the recommendations belowwould require the Government of SriLanka and the LTTE to work coopera-tively. As the security situation and confi-dence in the peace process has steadily

deteriorated in recent months, this possibilityappears ever more remote. At the same time, theneed for collaborative efforts (even when they areexternally facilitated) appears even more pertinentin a heightened conflict context, to ensure that theneeds of conflict affected IDPs are not margin-alised. For this reason, the recommendations forjoint efforts remain relevant.

While arising from a review of tsunami efforts,the following recommendations apply to all actorsinvolved in broader development programming in SriLanka, including post-conflict assistance. This willespecially be the case as tsunami recovery becomesmore integrated with broader development planning.

Centralization of Authority:The Role of Politics

The post-tsunami period in Sri Lanka broughtmore sharply into focus the serious shortcomings ofover-centralized policy development and imple-mentation, although this has long been informallyrecognized as undermining the prospects for devel-opment in Sri Lanka. Policy-makers should benefitfrom an assessment that demonstrates the practical,daily impact of over centralisation and provides recommendations (including those that can beimplemented within the framework of the constitu-tion) to effectively promote subsidiarity.• The Government of Sri Lanka should consider sup-

porting the establishment of a Presidential Commis-sion to perform a pilot audit of subsidiarity, to allowexperienced but objective professionals to set out theconstitutional responsibilities of local, municipal andprovincial authorities; the current status of imple-mentation of these powers in given areas; and theresulting development gains and losses. Due to thesensitive nature of the issues surrounding the exercise,the make up of the audit team should be carefully con-sidered and reflect broad consensus.

National Government Capacity

By March 2006, interviewees reported that RADAhad the potential to play a positive role in support-ing progress across all sectors of the reconstructioneffort by driving coordination between existing gov-ernment implementation structures. These struc-tures include the central line ministries, provincialadministrations and local authorities, in addition todevelopment and humanitarian partners. But therewere major concerns about RADA’s commitmentand capacity to fully implement some of the lessonslearned during the TAFREN experience, and toplay its limited but critical role effectively. Thesewere particularly heightened given the expectationthat RADA would undergo further managementchanges in mid-2006.94 Increasing concerns in thisarea are likely to impact significantly on broaderdonor confidence in Sri Lanka.• RADA’s role will continue to be undermined until it

becomes an authority (even of limited duration) withthe power to enforce coordination where necessary.However, legislation alone will not ensure thatRADA is an effective force. The functioning andimpact of RADA should be carefully and objectivelyevaluated and problems speedily addressed given itscentral role in coordination.

• Similarly, care should be taken to ensure that any further changes envisaged to the departments responsi-ble for disaster risk-reduction, disaster response, post-conflict or post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstructionshould be carefully evaluated from a technical ratherthan political perspective. Adjustments should aim toconsolidate and further strengthen existing nationalcapacity in these areas. As in the case of disaster responsecompacts, it would be logical to consult national andinternational humanitarian and development partnerswhen considering adjustments to these frameworks,particularly where such partners are expected to play arole in disaster risk reduction, response and rehabilita-tion activities.

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Recommendations: Sri Lanka

94 In fact, Shanti Fernando wasnamed Chief OperatingOfficer of RADA in mid-2006, replacing SaliyaWickramasooriya.

Coordination

Despite some consistent and productive coordina-tion structures operating at the central and districtlevels, the research conducted for this study indi-cates that as at March 2006 they were not effectiveenough. Particular concerns identified include thenon-functioning leadership groups95 (which weredue to be hosted by RADA), meeting fatigue in thedistricts, and the need for stronger informationflows between UN district offices and bilateral part-ners to optimise the constructive use of information.• The government and development partners should

commit to a review (which could be externally facili-tated) and necessary adjustments to existing coordina-tion structures and processes, the goal of which wouldbe to promote improved information sharing and lesson learning.

Monitoring and Evaluation

A stronger national focus on monitoring the out-comes of tsunami response is required. Conditionspermitting, this should include reporting on LTTE-controlled areas, about which there is a relativepaucity of information. The progress and chal-lenges to recovery in areas outside of governmentcontrol should be more effectively recorded andconsidered as part of policy development.• As of mid-2006, the deterioration in security condi-

tions and confidence between the government andLTTE did not permit collaborative monitoringefforts. But if future conditions do so permit, theGovernment of Sri Lanka, and the LTTE andMuslim representatives, along with developmentpartners, should explore the possibility of organisingcollaborative monitoring arrangements to ensure aconsistent and up-to-date picture of information forplanning, implementation and evaluation purposes.The information should be transparent, enablingdevelopment partners to better understand and con-tribute to regional development. The recently estab-lished Tsunami Recovery Impact Assessment andMonitoring System (TRIAMS) process, a UN-sup-ported social impact assessment project in which theGovernment of Sri Lanka is participating, should bestudied to see how it can most effectively contribute tothis objective.

Particular Implementation Challenges

Progress in most of the areas below would require adegree of practical cooperation between the govern-ment and the LTTE, which was limited as at April2006 and deteriorated considerably in the monthsthat followed. Nonetheless, the recommendationsshould be considered if and when the political andsecurity situation changes over time.

Restricted Land for Conflict IDPsMany conflict IDPs have land in high securityzones from which citizens are effectively barred,with the result that resettlement planning isdependent on higher level political agreements. Theprovision of alternative lands might be resisted bysome who believe it would reduce the humanitarianimperative — and thereby reduce pressure on theparties — for a comprehensive political settlement.At the same time, a permanent settlement in SriLanka may be some years away, and allowing com-munities to live in substandard conditions fordecades should not be tolerated as a mere cost of abroader political objective.• As security conditions permit, the government and the

LTTE should factor in a more people-centredapproach that allows a healthier balance between thepursuit of a final peace agreement and the rights of thepeople most affected by conflict. A review (perhaps bythe Human Rights Commission) should be undertak-en to assess the updated preferences of conflict IDPs,which may have shifted after seeing tsunami affectedneighbours resettle in higher quality housing. Theparties should clarify the parameters within whicheven temporary but improved solutions may be iden-tified, possibly through the establishment of a workinggroup composed of the respective peace secretariats, theMinistry of Nation-Building and the LTTEPlanning and Development Secretariat.

Enhancing Equity in Provision of Housing betweenTsunami and Conflict IDPsBy April 2006, to promote faster implementation ofpost-tsunami housing, the government had allowedand encouraged tsunami IDP families initially prom-ised houses under the post-tsunami donor built pro-gram to also access the owner built, grant scheme.While this may hasten progress in housing construc-tion and help protect against inflationary buildingcosts, it has the potential to increase inequitiesbetween tsunami and conflict IDPs, as over half ofthe latter continue to await support from the UASand/or any donor-built schemes.• Government, development partners and the LTTE

should jointly commit to putting their rhetorical sup-port for conflict IDPs into practice by identifyingwhether they can encourage more equitable supportfrom new or existing (and flexible) funding commit-ments. They should also seek to address administra-tive constraints, to ensure that progress on conflictIDP housing is not left behind in the effort to achievegovernment targets on tsunami IDP housing.

Future Donor Support to Conflict IDPsA number of development partners are already pro-viding support to conflict IDPs, and others have

38

95 Several groups were estab-lished in late 2005 aroundkey outcomes (such as‘Getting People intoHomes’). They were intend-ed to bring together bothgovernment and develop-ment partner representativescovering a number of sectorsrelevant to each outcome,with a view toward theirworking in a more efficientand holistic manner.

indicated a preference to explore work in this area.While this should be actively encouraged, strongerpolicy dialogue and collaborative planning isrequired to ensure that lessons learned from thepost-tsunami experience are taken into account inany new phase of support to conflict IDPs.• Key stakeholders, such as RADA, the Ministry of

Nation-Building, the North East Provincial CouncilSecretariat, the LTTE’s Planning and DevelopmentSecretariat, and development partners, should agreeon a framework for ensuring that future support toconflict IDPs is carried out in much stronger align-ment with the Guiding Principles and according tostandards that will promote equity. This will enablekey policy-makers and implementers to ensure thatexisting mechanisms are being effectively used andadapted, that the roles, responsibilities and standardsto be achieved are understood and that common obsta-cles to delivery are highlighted and addressed. Itshould also ensure that the mechanisms for communi-ty consultation and involvement are properly utilised.Facilitated workshops for technical experts followingpreparatory work would be essential in allowing pol-icy-makers and implementers to discuss, agree andadapt the framework as required.

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These were agreed between government,development partner, civil society, andLTTE stakeholders in February 2005 as aframework of principles to guide the reliefand recovery effort.

1. The allocation of resources both domestic andinternational should be strictly guided by theidentified needs and local priorities, without dis-crimination on the basis of political, religious,ethnic or gender considerations.

2. Reconstruction activities should be carried outby the appropriate level of government, with anemphasis on decentralization where feasible.

3. Communities should be empowered to maketheir own decisions during recovery.

4. Communication and transparency to be presentin decision-making and implementation.

5. Reconstruction should avoid rebuilding existingvulnerability to natural hazards.

6. A coordinated approach should be used to pre-vent duplication in activities.

Annex 1

40

Guiding Principles

Annex 2

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The following presents some case examples of tran-sitional shelter provided to conflict and tsunamiaffected communities.96

Mini Case Examples of TransitionalShelter Provision

96 The information was drawnfrom The Internally DisplacedIn Sri Lanka, Discussion Paperon Equity, December 2005;Participating agencies: CareInternational, Christian Aid,Jaffna Social Action Centre,Oxfam, Norwegian RefugeeCouncil, Zoa Refugee Care,UNDP, OCHA andUNHCR.

Tsunami IDPs;Children’s Park;78 persons;Tangalle

1 shelter per family;material: concrete,wood, tin sheets,glass; size: 36 m2

3 families per toilet;separate bath housefor females

Adequate; pipe bornewater to shelters; 2 x200 litre storage tanks

All have electricity

Conflict IDPs;Puttalam Saltern I;389 persons

90 huts for 110 fami-lies; material: mostlyconcrete foundation,cajan walls, and roof;size: 35 m2

11 families per toilet Inadequate;available from tank6:30-8:30am;waiting time measured in minutes

20 percent have electricity

Tsunami IDP camp in conflict affected Jaffna;Manalkadu Camp;1,800 persons

1 shelter per family;material: concretefloor, plastic sheeting,tin sheets; size: 50 m2

5 families per toilet;separate bathing facilities

Adequate; drinkingwater: 1 well/60 people; no waitingtime

One generator provided by an NGO

Tsunami IDPs;Tangalle

25 meters tohospital

Yes Land allocated, andreconstruction on permanent houses has started;timeframe: 6 months;compensation awarded to 3 families

Only those whoowned houses are pro-vided with new landand homes; familiesliving on rent have nosolutions beyond thetemporary shelter

Conflict IDPs;Puttalam

5 kilometers tohospital

No secure tenure;no land allocated;no timeframe; no compensation

Displacement haslasted over 15 years

Tsunami and conflict IDPs;Jaffna

15 kilometers to hospital; NGO mobilehealth visitstwice a week

Yes Allowed to stay onland for 1 year;No land allocated;no time frame; com-pensation promisedbut not awarded

Most families displaced several times

Type of Settlement Access to Health Access to Education Durable Solutions Remarks

Type of Settlement Shelter Standard Sanitation Water Electricity

Annex 3

42

Person Organisation

Ampara

H Abeyweera District Secretary’s Office

Elaine Bainard UNICEF

Bill Barkle USAID

Zofia Burda UNHCR

Nelson Bosch IOM

Chris Day GOAL

Elankovan ZOA

Horst Indorf HELP

Jeevarajah Innasi Save the Children Fund

Zarrina Kubanova World Food Programme

Mr. K Kulendra RADA / ILO, Ampara District

Shah Liton Save the Children

Aowfer Mustafa Save the Children Fund

Emma Waller UNDP

Z M Jauffer UNDP

Village community group Pallikura Village

Wendy Van den Beld Sewalanka Foundation

Batticaloa

Christina de Bruin UNICEF

Colombo

Seneka Abeyratne Independent consultant

Aasmund Andersen Reconstruction and Development Agency

Vinaya Ariyaratne Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement

Nihal Attaputtu Canadian High Commission

Amin Awad UNHCR

Miguel Bermeo Then UNRC Sri Lanka

Annie Bertand Reconstruction and Development Agency

Arjan Blanken Netherlands Red Cross

Johanna Boestel Asian Development Bank

People Consulted

43

Person Organisation

Paolo Bonino Italian Cooperazione

Agostino Borra World Health Organisation

David Evans UN OCHA

Timmo Gasbeek ZOA

Yasmin Haque UNICEF

Peter Harrold World Bank

Andreas Hartmann German Embassy

Jan Huesken Royal Netherlands Embassy

Quentin Levet ACTED

Borja Miguelez ECHO

Jacopo Monzini Italian Cooperazione

Rory Mungovern UN RC’s Office

W.M.B.S. Nissanka Reconstruction and Development Agency

Auvarsi Patel UNHCR

Rachel Perera Reconstruction and Development Agency

Calvin Piggot CIDA

Alessandro Pio Asian Development Bank

L A Piyadasa National Development Trust Fund

Mahendra Ratnaweera British High Commission

Sam Rahubadda ILO

Pablo Ruiz-Hiebra UNRC’s Office

M Thiruchelvam Asian Development Bank

Serge Tissot FAO

Goran Schill SIDA

Ramesh Selliah Reconstruction and Development Agency

Tarlochan Singh Grewal tsunami volunteer

S Sivathasan Ministry of Nation-Building

Mr. Sivanandan Ministry of Nation-Building

Brian Smith Asian Development Bank

Percy Stanley AusAid, Sri Lanka

Roland Steurer German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)

Martin Stuerzinger Swiss Embassy

Nilakshan Swarnarajah British High Commission

Jeff Taft–Dick World Food Programme

Patrick Vanden Braune World Bank

Carmen Van Heese UN OCHA

David Verboom ECHO

Jonathon Wheatcroft CIDA

Saliya Wickramasooriya Reconstruction and Development Agency

Doekle Wielinga International Labour Organisation

Joe William CIDA, Sri Lanka

44

Person Organisation

Galle, Matara, Hambantota

D Abeysiriwardena District Engineer, THRU, Hambantota

Murray Burt World Vision

Christin Lidzba Navajeevana Development Alternatives, Hambantota

Justin Morgan OXFAM GB, Hambantota, Matara Districts

Asadur Rahman UNICEF Galle

John Skully GOAL, Hambantota, Matara Districts

Esty Sutyoko UN OCHA,Galle

Hans Visser Netherlands Red Cross

Jaffna

H A Arulgnanam IOM

R Bala Krishnana UNHCR

Edward Benson UNHCR

Laura Bill WFP

Yuko Osawa UNICEF

G S Sivapalhasundaram UNDP

N Sivarajah WHO

A Sriskandarajah UNICEF

Kilinochchi

Penny Brune UNICEF

Lawrence Christy Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation

Are Eriksen FORUT

Arjunan Ethirveerasingham Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation

K Kamalanathan FORUT

S Kengatharan UN OCHA

R Maran PDS, LTTE

T Nadarajah PDS, LTTE

A Sutharsan FORUT

Annabel Taylor UN OCHA

Mullaitivu

P Aarani District Secretary’s Office

K Parthipan District Secretary’s Office

T Sithampappillai CADREP Programme

S Sivajayanthan North East Housing Reconstruction Programme

S Sivatharshan CADREP

A Sutharsan CADREP

M G Vilvarajah District Secretary’s Office

Mr. Yarlamuthan District PDS (LTTE)

45

Person Organisation

Trincomalee

Gabriela Elroy UNICEF

T Lankanesan North East Community Restoration and Development Project (NECORD)

Mr. Rangarajah North East Provincial Council Secretariat

Outside Sri Lanka

James Adams World Bank, Washington

Nigel Adams DFID, London

Ajay Bisaria World Bank, Washington

Adam Burke Independent consultant

Sheba Crocker Office of the Special Envoy, NY

Marshall Elliott DFID Bangkok

David Horobin DFID, London

Olga B Jonas World Bank, Washington

Alan Keenan Independent consultant

Anthea Mulakala Multi Donor Office, Indonesia

Kristen Ormston DFID, London

Robert Piper Office of the Special Envoy, NY

Chris Pycroft DFID, Bangkok

Anissa Toscano DFID, London

Eric Schwartz Office of the Special Envoy, NY

Margareta Wahlstrom UN OCHA, NY

John Ohiorhenuan BCPR, UNDP, NY

Eva Busza BCPR, UNDP, NY

Yasumitsu Doken BCPR, UNDP, NY

Jean Louis Van Belle Belgian Embassy (New Delhi)

Amnesty International, A Climate of Fear in theEast, February 2006.

Action Aid International, PDHRE, People’sMovement for Human Rights LearningHabitat International Coalition, Housing andLand Rights Network, Tsunami Response:A Human Rights Assessment, January 2006.

Cosgrave, John, Initial Findings, TsunamiEvaluation Coalition, December 2005.

Disaster Relief Monitoring Unit, Human RightsCommission, Colombo University CommunityExtension Centre, Report on People’s Consultationson Post Tsunami Relief, Reconstruction andRehabilitation in Sri Lanka.

De Ville de Goyet, Claude and Lezlie Morinière,The role of needs Assessment in the Tsunami Response,Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, July 2006.

Discussions coordinated by UNDP and chaired orhosted by district authorities and/or UN partners,Reported Comments from District Stakeholders onDraft of Post Tsunami Recovery and ReconstructionReport (unpublished).

Goodhand, Jonathan and Bart Klem, Aid, Conflictand Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, Funded by the governments of the Netherlands, Sweden, and theUnited Kingdom in collaboration with the AsiaFoundation and the World Bank, 2005.

Government of Sri Lanka and the United Nations,National Lessons Learned and Best PracticeWorkshop, June 8-9, 2005.

Haug, Dr Marit and Chamindra Weerackody,The Tsunami Aid Delivery System: A View from SixDistricts in Sri Lanka (draft), Working Paper No.1, Norwegian Institute for Urban and RegionalResearch, January 2006.

Joint Report of the Government of Sri Lanka and Development Partners, Post Tsunami Recoveryand Reconstruction, December 2005.

Lankaneson, T., Internally Displaced Persons(unpublished paper presented at Paper submittedat the National Conference on SocialDevelopment, Colombo), February 2003.

People’s Planning Commission, Booklet: People’sPlanning Commission for Recovery after Tsunami.

Sarvananthan,Muttukrishna, Post-Tsunami SriLanka: Swindlers Hold Sway, May 2005, available atwww.pointpedro.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/04/PPID%20Working%20Paper%204.pdf.

UNHCR, OCHA, UNDP, Care International,Christian Aid, Jaffna Social Action Centre,Oxfam, Norwegian Refugee Council, ZOARefugee Care, The Internally Displaced in SriLanka, Discussion Paper on Equity, December 2005.

Valid International, Independent Evaluation of theDisaster Emergencies Committee (DEC) Tsunami CrisisResponse, Report to the DEC Board, December 2005.

Victory for Sri Lanka, Presidential Election 2005,Mahinda Chinthana, available atwww.presidentsl.org/data/html/pdf/MC/MahindaChinthanaEnglish.pdf.

Websites

Active Learning Network for Accountability andPerformance in Humanitarian Action, www.alnap.org.

Government of Sri Lanka Reconstruction andDevelopment Agency, Development AssistanceDatabase, www.dad.tafren.gov.lk.

Humanitarian Accountability Partnership –International, www.hapinternational.org.

InterAgency Standing Committee,www.humanitarianinfo.org.

Annex 4

46

Bibliography