APPLYING OPTIMIZATION METHODS TO REDUCE ARC FLASH IN LOW VOLTAGE SYSTEMS A Thesis Presented By Mahmoodreza Arefi to The Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Electrical Engineering in the field of Power Systems Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts August 2014
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APPLYING OPTIMIZATION METHODS TO REDUCE ARC FLASH IN LOW VOLTAGE SYSTEMS
A Thesis Presented
By
Mahmoodreza Arefi
to
The Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
in
Electrical Engineering
in the field of
Power Systems
Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts
August 2014
i
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………...………… i
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………….…….……...iv Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………………....v List of Tables………………………………………………………………………………..……………..vi List of Figures…………………………………….…………………………………………………..…..viii
1.1 Arc flash………………………………………………………………………………………..……..1 1.2 Motivations for the study……………………………………………………………………..…........2 1.3 Thesis Outline……………………………………………………………………………………..….2
2. Background and protection of low voltage systems ……………..…………………………………..….4
2.1 Literature review……………………………………………………………………………….…….4 2.2 Background of arc flash regulation and standards………………………………………….………..6 2.3 Behaviors of arcs………………………………………………………………………………..........7 2.4 Three phase faults…………………………………………………………….………………….…...8 2.5 Circuit breakers…………………………………………………………….……………………….10
2.5.1 Molded case circuit breakers……………..…....…………………………………………….......11 2.5.2 Low voltage power circuit breakers…………………..……..…..………………………………13 2.5.3 Insulated case circuit breaker……………………..……………..……………………………....15
2.6 Trip unit types…………………………………………………………………………………….....15 2.7 Low voltage fuses…………………………………………………………………………………...16
3. Arc flash calculation method and analysis…………………...…………………………….…….……..19
3.1 Fault current theory…………………………………..………………………………………….…….19
3.2 Significance of X/R ratio……………………………………………………………………….……..23
3.7 Coordination for protective devices……………………………………………………..…………….30
3.8 Motor contribution to short circuit current……………………………………………………………37
4. Feasible steps for arc flash calculation…………………………………………………………...…….38 4.1 Identification of locations for arc fault hazard…………………………………...……………………38
4.2 Data collection……………………………………………………………………..………………….38
4.3 Preparing single line diagram of the system………………………………….…………………….....55
4.4 Short circuit study…………………………………………………………….……………………….56
4.11 Description of real case study………………………………….…………………………………….67 4.11.1 Circuit breakers configurations……….………………………………………………………….70 4.11.2 Short circuit study and related scenarios…………….…………………………………………...72 4.11.3 Protective device coordination study…………………….………………………………………75 4.11.4 Arc flash results………………………………………….………………………………………76
5. Arc flash optimization Methods and Cost Analysis…………………………………………………….80
5.1 Operation of electrical system with a lack of selective coordination………………………………….81
Figure 5.1 Lowering the instantaneous setting of LVB3 (one Line)……………………………………..82
Figure 5.2 Increasing the working distance at Bus03 (one Line)………………………………………...85
Figure 5.3 Building without single main circuit breaker for shutdown (one line)…………………….…86
Figure 5.4 Building with single main circuit breaker for shutdown (one line)…………………………...89
Figure 5.5 Fused disconnect for panel entrance (one line)……………………………………………….90
Figure 5.6 Low voltage circuit breaker for panel entrance (one line)…………………………………….92
Figure 5.7 Low voltage circuit breaker for transformers rated above 125 KVA (one line)……………...94
Figure 5.8 Arc flash mitigation across 300 KVA………………………………………………………..96
Figure 5.9 TCC showing LSI breaker and arcing current at primary and secondary of T2………………98
Figure 5.10 One line diagram with 250 KVA transformer……………………………………………..100
Figure 5.11 Time current curve arc flash Hazard at panel D10…………………………………………101
Figure 5.12 One – line diagram showing two 125 KVA transformer…………………………………...102
Figure 5.13 Time current curve arc flash hazard at panel M1 and M2…………………………………..104
1
1. Introduction
In the domain of electrical system design, operation and maintenance, the greatest concern
must be the safety and security of workers who operate and maintain the system. Electrical
systems’ designers must not only take necessary precautions to protect systems and equipment,
but also they must assess personnel safety for a given level of arc flash energy due to arcing
faults, generally referred to as arc flash or arc fault.
The issue of secure work practices and methods for staff working on energized electrical
equipment is therefore very significant and has widespread recognition. On the other hand,
shutdown of a segment of the distribution system may have an extensive influence on the
processes continuity, and widespread power loss can interrupt production and also may lead to
loss of revenues.
When working on an energized line, it is not possible to remove arc fault hazard, however it is
possible to decrease the amount of energy dissipated from an arc and the risk of injury or fatality
to the workers.
This study focuses on applying a variety of methods for low voltage distribution systems to
restrict the level of arc flash energy using the standard IEEE 1584. By diminishing the incident
energy, the arc flash energy level will also be reduced. Also, cost analysis to evaluate
optimization techniques is performed for a real case study.
2
1.1 Arc Flash
Arc flash is product of fast release of energy which is caused by arcing fault between two phases
or phase and ground. Arc fault happens when there is a path of conduction and it could be
compared with electric welding.
An arc flash happens in the case of a fault, or short circuit, which passes through this arc gap.
The arc flash can be the result of unintended contact, negligence, use of equipment which is not
properly rated, contamination or crack over insulated surfaces, weakening or deterioration of
equipment and/or parts, and various other reasons.
1.2 Motivations for the study
Reducing the risk of injury to humans and improve safety of workers are the main objectives for
studying arc flashes and applying optimization techniques. Electric arcs create temperatures up
to 35.000 degrees Fahrenheit [1], some of the highest recorded temperatures on earth.
It is estimated that five to ten arc flash explosions occur across the US on a daily basis [2], and
80% of electricity-related accidents and casualties involving “skilled workers” are caused due to
arc flashes (arc blast) [2].
Thus the main motivation of this work was to apply optimization method for a large power
system to reduce energy level of arc flash for safety of workers.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This dissertation consists of 6 chapters, with the first chapter introducing arc flash and
importance of arc flash. The objectives of this research are briefly discussed and outlines are
described.
3
Chapter 2 will present literature review and development of arc flash regulation and standards.
There will be discussion of behaviors of arcs and three phase faults.
Chapter 3 presents an overview of electrical power system studies for 480 volt power systems.
The process of a fault current calculation will be conceptually described to show the purpose of
the study and modeling approach.
Chapter 4 will explore practical steps for arc flash calculation, the procedure explains step by
step from data collection to documentation of arc flash study results and also the software
implementation. Arc flash calculation for a low voltage system which has 271 buses will be
implemented.
Chapter 5 will highlight applicable methods to help mitigate arc flash energy level. A low
voltage system with 271 buses that is in compliance with the NEC and acceptable for an
electrical building permit will be analyzed for reduction of arc flash energy level. Cost analysis
will be performed to compare cost before and after applying the optimization methods for the
case study.
Chapter 6 will discuss the conclusions and future work. The results of implementing the
recommended design techniques will be reviewed. Guidelines for future work will be discussed.
4
2 Background and protection of low voltage systems
2.1 Literature Review
In 1982, a comprehensive paper entitled “The Other Electrical Hazard: Electrical Arc Blast
Burns” was published by Mr. Ralph Lee [1]. The contributions of this paper is regarded as one of
the most significant research improvements about arc in a non-closure equipment by many
researchers, since it quantified the potential burn hazards while training staff about the
significance of safety. Lee found that the “curable burn threshold for the human body is 1.2
cal/cm2”. He also published another related paper in 1987 [4] in which the pressure property of
an arc incident was evaluated.
The paper by Doughty, Neal, Dear, and Bingham, titled “Testing Update on Protective Clothing
and Equipment for Electric Arc Exposure” [5] that was published in 1997, described in detail the
incident energy levels correlated with low voltage arc flash occurrence. The paper was the first to
define how a situation would be escalated when the arc started in panelboards as well as
switchgears.
“Predicting Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600 V Power
Distribution Systems” [6], by Doughty, Floyd, and Neal, which was published in 2000, semi-
experimentally evaluated the incident energy computation for low voltage systems. The paper is
considered as the derivation of the incident energy computation and is applied in the NFPA 70E
standard.
In 2000, Jones, Liggett, Capelli-Schellpfeffer, Macalady, Saunders, Downey, McClung, Smith,
Jamil, and Saporita: published “Staged Tests to Increase Awareness of Arc-Flash Hazards in
5
Electrical Equipment” [7]. Experimental studies were conducted by applying manikins to better
understand how humans might be negatively concerned by arc flash occurrence.
“IEEE Standard 1584” That is the first copy of “IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
Calculations” [8] was issued in 2002. This standard employed considerable test data to establish
experimental equations resulted from analytical analysis. Tests data was made accessible from
different sources and are covered as an Appendix to the standard. A paper written by Gammon
and Matthews named “IEEE 1584-2002, Incident Energy Factors and Simple 480-V Incident
Energy Equations” [9] contains comprehensive statistical analysis and a brief explanation of the
IEEE 1584 test data.
Stokes and Sweeting published “Electric Arcing Burn Hazards” [10] in 2006, which critically
evaluates the testing methodology, specially the electrode orientation, applied to evaluate the arc
flash hazard for the IEEE 1584 standard development. Additionally, this paper encompassed a
comprehensive tabulation of arc flash history. The authors proposed that this information has
generally been ignored at the time the current IEEE 1584 standard development. A number of
discussion papers were printed which provided further analysis of the issues being discussed.
Further, Stokes and Sweeting published “Closure to Discussions of “Electric Arcing Burn
Hazards”“[11] to document their concerns.
“Effect of Insulating Barriers in arc flash Testing” [12] by Wilkins, Lang, and Allison was also
printed in 2006. As their testing methodology, the authors employed vertical conductors ended in
insulating barriers. The character of arc was analogous to horizontally oriented electrodes;
therefore the work of Stokes and Sweeting is reinforced.
Curtis Thomas Latzo: “Approaches to arc flash Hazard Mitigation in 600 volt power systems”
[38] was published in 2011. The author of this paper suggested design techniques to reduce arc
6
flash in low voltage systems and result showed significant lowering of the arc flash Hazard
Exposure.
2.2 Background of arc flash regulation and standards
‘The Occupational Safety and Health Act’ was approved on December 29, 1970, based on
which every employer “shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to his employees;” [3]
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which was in charge of providing
safety for workers, started to develop Federal regulations, including those that addressed
detecting the electrical dangers and achieving procedures for safe work. In order to have a basis
for electrical regulations, OSHA mainly used the National Electrical Code (NEC), however,
since it generally does not address employee safety, the need for a new standard was felt.
Consequently, a new NFPA committee was formed in 1976. The committee was assigned to
assist OSHA with generating standards with concentration in electrical safety.
Arc flash recognized as an electrical hazard in 1991 by OSHA. The first edition of NFPA 70E
was published in 1979 and later in 1995 fifth edition of NFPA is published and used as the first
standard precisely indication arc flash hazard. The following two revisions emphasized on
analyzing arc flash hazard in details; and offered more technical information respecting the arc
flash protection boundaries and incident energy calculations. NFPA 70E-2004 provides sample
calculations of flash protection boundaries in Annex D. It is worth noting, as quoted on page
70E-98 of the standard: “This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but
is included for informational purposes only.” [2]
7
Besides the NFPA 70E standard and the OSHA , the NEC emphasized on the use of labels to
warn workers about probable arc flash hazards in 2002. At the same year, the standard IEEE
1584-2002, “Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations”, was published by an IEEE
working group. The new standard provided a number of models to estimate incident energy
levels based on a large pool of data. As the above brief summary shows, till a while ago, the arc
flash hazard has not been widely acknowledged. The recent comprehensive research and vast
testing has resulted in better knowing of the arc flash hazard.
2.3 Behavior of arcs
An arc is defined as “the flow of current through a path containing the vapor of the terminal
material, which is initiated by flashover or from the introduction of some conductive material.
This vapor’s resistance is considerably higher than that of the solid metal, to the degree that
voltage drop in the arc ranges between 75 and 100 V/in, that is several thousand times its drop in
a solid conductor. Since the inductance of the arc path is not significantly different from that of a
solid conductor of the equal length, the arc current path is largely resistive in nature, resulting
unity power factor. (Voltage drop in a faulted large solid or stranded conductor is about 0.5 to 1
V/ft.)[1]” Further details can be found in [1].
When the arc length is more than 4 inches, the arc current becomes stabilized for 277/480 volt
circuits. The reason is that in low voltage systems arc consumes a considerable fraction of
existing voltage (75 to 100 V/in). Hence, the fault current passes through the impedance of
system and arc appearing between supply voltage and arc voltage [1].
8
Figure 2.1: Circuit for source and arc resistance
2.4 Three phase faults
A fault takes place when the system operation is disrupted unexpectedly due to a sudden
disturbance which results in unusually high currents and/or voltages. Some sources of faults can
include weather, insulation failure, wildlife, vehicle accidents, and destruction. When such an
unpremeditated electrical path is formed, the system produces undesirable current paths that
must be accounted for. It results in a failure in voltage and an extreme inrush of current toward
the fault location. When a fault occurs, the current from all sections of the electrical system is
oriented towards the short circuit.
This fault current level can range from 6.5kA amps at a 13.2kV substation, to around 100kA at a
480 volt system. It is found that the distance from the source reduces fault levels as a result of
system impedance [13]. It is essential to protect the system against possible negative impacts of
large scale currents. Faults in power systems can be classified into these four types: single line-
to-ground, line-to-line, double line-to-ground and balanced three-phase [14].
Nearly 87% of three-phase fault currents are composed of Line-to-line faults. Line-to-ground
faults can range from a few percent to probably 125% of the three-phase value, while line-to-
ground fault currents with higher than three-phase value are unusual in industrial systems. [15].
It is generally acknowledged that in equipment or cables, line-to-line faults rapidly escalate into
9
three-phase faults [16]. In an industrial system, the three-phase fault condition is often the only
one regarded, since it mostly results in maximum current [15]. All testing applied in arc flash
modeling has been three-phase tested, for three-phase arcs yield the utmost possible arc-flash in
equipment. As a result, this project will focus only on three-phase balanced faults.
It is favorable to investigate a fault current as an asymmetrical waveform including a
symmetrical AC wave superimposed on a DC current [17]. It is demonstrated that the resultant
waveform has an original peak value several times higher than the pre-fault conditions and is
asymmetrically formed from the x-axis. The peak value appearing during the first half cycle of
the fault is known as the Available Fault Current (AFC), the graphical representation of which
can be found in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Current in a series R-L circuit
e(t) = voltage waveform
iac(t) = original current waveform before fault occurs
10
idc(t) = DC component of the fault
i(t) = fault current waveform
When a fault happens, the fault current i(t) includes two major components which are original
sine wave iac(t) and the DC element idc(t). The peak magnitude of i(t) can be several times
higher than the original current, which depends to different factors as well as system condition.
The magnitude declines as a consequence of the DC exponential, which follows the system
reactance and resistance, known as the X/R ratio.
2.5 Circuit Breakers
Low voltage circuit breakers include Molded Case Circuit Breakers, Low-Voltage Power Circuit
Breakers, and insulated Case Circuit Breakers [18]. A circuit breaker is an equipment designed to
protect load and cables. All circuit breakers mainly protect the circuit conductors by detecting
and interrupting over-currents [19].
The opening of circuit breaker is a reaction to transient current situations, such as short circuit or
fault in the electrical system. Circuit breakers are rated based on available interrupting capacity
and rated continuous current. The interrupting capacity of a circuit breaker is the maximum
short-circuit current that circuit breaker can interrupt safely at a definite voltage. This short
circuit current described by current magnitude and its value is in rms symmetrical amperes [20].
The amount of current a circuit breaker can transmit until it achieves overload conditions and
opens the circuit is defined as continuous current rating.
The magnetic trip element is often referred to as the instantaneous trip time and responds
quickly in reaction to high level short circuit currents. The thermal element is normally some sort
11
of bi-metal that enlarges as a result of the heat in a circuit triggered by current at overload that is
less than the magnetic pickup threshold. The element then trips the Molded Case Circuit Breaker
MCCB after a time delay.
It is necessary to mention that all time current curve for circuit breakers are from Cutler-Hammer
manufacturer and this information obtained through the library of ETAP software.
2.5.1 Molded case circuit breakers
Graphical illustration of Circuit breaker trip curves helps better understand the time versus
current application of the device. When demonstrated as follows, the plot is referred to ‘a time
current curve (TCC)’. Figure 2.3 shows a common TCC for a 480 volt, 110 amp, non-adjustable
thermal magnetic MCCB. Here it is observable that the thermal element is 110 amps at 1000
seconds and the instantaneous sensor is at less than 0.03 seconds for short circuit currents greater
than 2000 amps. The interrupting time for a fault current level in the range of 300-350 amps is
demonstrated to be greater than ten second.
12
Figure 2.3: Time current curve for molded case circuit breaker
13
2.5.2 Low voltage power circuit breakers
Low voltage power circuit breakers (LVPSBs) were the subsequent accessible circuit breakers
made in the late 1960s. These circuit breakers which were designed to be rack mounted in
switchgear enjoys larger frame sizes and higher current ratings compared to MCCBs.
Maintenance for these circuit breakers can be performed by replacing parts such as contacts,
motors, opening and closing shunts.
The LVPCBs possess thermal-magnetic trip units which react to overloads in the same way as
MCCBs; however, LVPCBs had a 30-cycle short time current rating in accordance with ANSI
standards [21]. This short time current rating makes a second breaker adjustment possible
between the magnetic pickup and the long time sensor. These situations are generally referred to
as Long-Time (L), Short-Time (S) and Instantaneous (I), thus calling the breaker an LSI
protective device. A TCC for a LVPCB is presented in Figure 2.4. In this figure, the long time
setting is 2500 Amps (1), the short time is 6250 Amps (2.5) and Instantaneous setting is 15000
(6) Amps.
14
Figure 2.4: Time current curve for low voltage power circuit breakers
15
2.5.3 Insulated case circuit breaker
These devices were particularly designed molded case circuit breakers which encompassed a
number of low-voltage power circuit breaker features [20]. These features involved short time
current duty cycles and a stored energy mechanism [19]. The ICCB possessed an instantaneous
trip component that could be set at a much higher trip level than the MCCB, which made it
possible to achieve some short time current ratings.
2.6 Trip unit types
A brief definition of different types of trip units [22] mentioned in this study can be found
below, and also this definitions are based on circuit breaker manufacturers.
Thermal magnetic trip units trip under short circuit circumstances immediately, without any
intended delays. They have a long time delay under the instantaneous trip current, created to
protect conductors while allowing temporary current flows, as for motor starting and transformer
inrush. In a lot of cases, their instantaneous trip current conditions can be adjusted.
The magnetic trip units have no long time characteristic and will not trip below the
instantaneous trip current. These units are only applied for short circuit protection and usually
are used for motor protection.
Three characteristics are found in electronic trip units that might be used individually or in
combination: (L) long time,(S) short time, and (I) instantaneous. A trip unit might be designated
as LI type when it includes both long time and instantaneous features. Other common
combinations are LS and LSI.
16
• L— The long-time feature relates to lower overcurrent conditions to allow for temporary
current surges. It generally includes a current pickup adjustment and a time-delay adjustment.
• S—The short-time feature is applied for coordination purposes via the overload and short
circuit current levels. It typically includes a current pickup and a time-delay adjustment.
• I—The instantaneous feature determines a current level above which tripping occurs without
any premeditated delays. When using the short-time function, it is normally not present, or
turned off.
2.7 Low voltage fuses
Based on the NEC definition, “a fuse is an overcurrent protective device with a circuit-opening
fusible element which is heated and severed when an overcurrent passes through it”.[23]
The aim of using fuses in 480 volt electrical systems is to protect the system against over-loads
and short circuits. A fuse basically functions through a simple thermal process; the flow of
excess currents through specifically designed fuse elements causes them to melt, and so cut off
the faulty circuit [24]. The interrupting capability is changed by the fuse element and the filler
embedded in the fuse cartridge.
The fuses with current limiting capability open expedite within ½ cycle when a fault with high
current occurs. As a result, they are able to offer very good protection for electrical equipment
such as circuit breakers, static and dynamic loads. Fuses can be employed in switchboards, motor
control centers,etc.[25]
Since the fuse does not include any moving parts, it can act swiftly in the case of high fault
currents. A fuse actuation indicates the end of its useful life, hence the reliability and accuracy is
17
maintained when new fuses are embedded into the circuit. Due to lack of moving parts, it is not
possible to adjust the time domains of the fuse, which can be costly when attempting to protect a
system against fault currents. Figure 2.5 illustrates the TCC for a fuse. The fuse curve
demonstrates the interrupting times for different levels of overcurrent. These interruptions can
take place over a short period of time, as indicated by the minimum melt characteristic, i.e. the
time the fuse starts to melt, and the total clearing characteristic, i.e. the thorough interruption of
the current.
18
Figure 2.5: Time current curve for low voltage fuse
The inverse time characteristics of the TCC for the 60 ampere fuse are the same as those of the
circuit breakers. This specific device is revealed to have 60 amperes of over-load protection
beyond 100 seconds, and for a short circuit of 800 amperes, it interrupts at nearly 0.02 seconds.
19
3. ARC flash calculation method and analysis
Conducting a fault current analysis and a protective device coordination study makes it possible
for us to proceed with the arc-flash analysis, which should be accomplished together with or
following the coordination protective devices and short circuit study [25]. The outcomes of the
short-circuit study help us find out the available fault current at electrical equipment locations
and hence properly specify equipment withstand ratings and interrupting capabilities. Besides,
the results of the protective-device coordination study provide us with information on the time
the system needs to isolate overload or fault conditions. Further, the outcomes of both the short-
circuit study and protective device evaluation jointly offer the necessary information needed to
implement an arc-flash analysis. Finally, the results of the arc-flash analysis are employed to
determine the incident energy and flash protection boundary at specified ranges all over positions
or levels in the electrical distribution system [25].
3.1 Fault current theory
Fault current analysis on a theoretical basis is conducted by examining the reaction of the series
R-L circuit presented in Figure 3.1 below:
20
Figure 3.1: Series RL Circuit
When the switch SW closes at time t=0, the circuit’s reaction will be the same as that of a
balanced three phase fault with zero impedance between the phases [26]. Writing Kirchhoff’s
Law for the circuit when t>0.
+ Ri(t)=√2 for t>0
Solving this results in the fault current i(t):
i(t)=√ sin sin
i(t)=iac(t)-idc(t)
Z=
tan . tan .
21
T=
To find i(t) as its greatest value we allow ,then:
i(t)=√2 Iac[sin( )+ / ]
The main objective of the short circuit study is to identify the available fault current (AFC) at
different points throughout the system under fault conditions. Afterwards, the AFC is compared
to equipment withstand ratings and available interrupting capacity (AIC) of protective devices.
Equipment with a withstand rating do not interrupt fault current but must “ride through” a fault
without damage imposed by the magnetic forces caused by the large currents. Consequently,
withstand rating of each panel-board must be greater than the AFC calculated at its bus and the
AIC of each protective device must be greater than the AFC so that it can interrupt the maximum
fault current seen at its contacts. If a breaker or fuse is not rated to handle the maximum
available fault current it might meet, the device might not function appropriately and its internal
components might fuse together or buckle under the destructive stresses of a fault condition,
which can result in serious harm and/or property damage [27].
The AFC observed at any locations in an electrical system is a product of the fault contributions
imposed on the system and the impedances in their path to the fault location. The contributions
toward the system include the utility, generators, and motors. Besides, the impedances
throughout the system are provided by conductors and transformers.
The real process of fault current calculation has been admirably documented in the IEEE
standard. Nevertheless, the reduction of fault current can be valued through a point to point
calculation method using the following equation [28]:
22
F= (1.732*L*AFC)/(C*N*V) where L: Length of conductor AFC: Available fault current at beginning of run C: Constant representing conductor type n: number of conductor parallel runs V: Voltage line to line
The AFC at the service entrance is a crucial item in the calculation and is easily provided by the
local electrical utility. Traditionally, this figure is an overly conservative large one whose
intention is to assess the system during a worst case high fault current scenario. As a result, the
AFC is usually provided as an infinite bus calculation dependent on the service transformer size
and impedance. This brings about the highest possible fault current on the service transformer
secondary terminals. The simplified form of this calculation on the basis of infinite bus theory is
presented below [27]:
1. Step One: Calculate the full load current at the secondary of the transformer:
FLA (secondary)=√
2. Step Two: Calculate the Available Fault Current at the secondary of transformer
AFC (secondary) = ∗
%
For a 15kV-480V , 2000 KVA transformer with impedance (Z)= 4.5 %, the resulting infinite bus
calculation for AFC= 53547 amps.
The peak value of the first cycle is the product of the DC exponential decay value. The rate of
DC exponential decay ensues from the system impedance properties when looking from the fault
back to the short circuit contribution. In most power systems, the DC component of the current
generally decays quickly and reaches a non-significant value within 0.1 second [26]. The
conductor and transformer properties of resistance (R) and reactance (X) in calculation with the
23
utility source system properties are the reasons for this value which is recognized as the X/R
ratio and varies throughout the system in accordance with inherent properties. The protective
devices must be evaluated against this value as well as the AFC.
Once a fault occurs, the current is no longer a sine wave, so the wave form must now be
illustrated as the combination of a sine wave and a decaying exponential.
3.2 Importance of X/R ratio
The X/R value of the electrical system is crucial, since it presents the value of the fault current at
3-5 cycles after the fault that corresponds to the moment when the protective device activates to
isolate the fault. The higher the X/R ratio , the longer the DC component will exist [31]. System
X/R ratio should be compared to the X/R ratio associated with the tested protective device . In
case the system X/R ratio is larger than the equipment X/R ratio then additional research will be
necessary to decide whether the device can be safely used. .
If the resulting de-rated AIC is greater than the AFC, it means that the device is appropriately
rated for installation in the system at the determined location. All low voltage protective devices
are tested at previously planned X/R ratios as shown in table 3.1 [30].
Table 3.1: Test X/R ratios for protective devices
Device Test X/R Ratio
Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers 6.6
Molded Case Circuit Breakers rated less than 10k AIC 1.7
Molded Case Circuit Breakers rated between than 10k & 20k AIC 3.2
Fuses, Insulated Case Circuit Breakers,Molded Case Circuit Breakers rated
Greater than 20k AIC
4.9
24
The short circuit study qualifies the equipment through its evaluation against two parameters:
1. The AIC rating of the equipment against the calculated system AFC.
2. The X/R ratio at which the device was tested against the calculated X/R ratio of the system.
3.3 IEEE Method (Standard)
IEEE Standard 1584-2002 recommends the following procedures for the evaluation of arc flash
hazard. An IEEE working group on arc flash has developed the empirically derived equations
based on test results, which can be applied in the following situations.
Table 3.2: Conditions for which the IEEE 1584 equations are applicable
Parameter Applicable Range
System voltage (kV) 0.208 to 15 kV
Frequencies (Hz) 50 or 60 Hz
Bolted fault current (kA) 0.7 to 106 kA
Gap between electrodes (mm) 13 to 152 mm
Equipment enclosure type Open air,box, MCC,panel,switchgear,cables
Grounding type Ungrounded,grounded, high resistance grounded
Phases 3 Phase faults
3.3.1 Arcing current calculations
For electrical distribution systems which voltage is less than 1000 V, the arc current is specified
by equation (3.1).
25
Ia=10 {K+0.622 log (I
bf)+0.0966V+0.000526G+0.5588V*log(I
bf)-0.00304G*log(I
bf)} (equation 3.1)
Where log is the log10 Ia=arcing current (kA)
K= -0.153; open configuration
= -0.097; box configuration
Ibf= bolted fault current for three phase faults (symmetrical RMS) (KA)
V=system voltage (kV)
G= gap between conductors, (mm)
For medium voltage systems (>1 kV), the arc current is given by equation
Ia= 10{0.00402+0.983 log(Ibf
)}
3.3.2 Normalized incident energy
The normalized incident energy is calculated by the following equation and formed on arc
duration for 0.2 second and distance from arc that is 610 mm.
En=10{K1+K2+1.081*log(Ia)+0.0011G}
Where En=Incident energy normalized for time and distance (J/cm2)
K1= -0.792; open configuration
=-0.555; box configuration
K2=0; ungrounded and high resistance grounded systems
=-0.113; grounded systems
G=gap between conductors (mm)
3.3.3 Incident energy calculation
The normalized incident energy is employed to calculate the incident energy at a normal surface
at a specified distance and arcing time with equation below:
E= 4.184 Cf En (t/0.2)(610/D)x
26
Where E=incident energy (J/ cm2)
Cf=Calculation factor =1.0; voltage>1kV
=1.5; voltage<1kV
t= arcing time (seconds)
D= working distance from arc (mm)
x= distance exponent as shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Distance factor (x) for various voltages and enclosure types
Enclosure Type 0.208 to 1 kV >1 to 15 kV
Open air 2 2
Switchgear 1.473 0.973
MCC and Panels 1.641
Cable 2 2
3.3.4 Flash protection boundary
The flash protection boundary is defined by NFPA as the distance at which a person with no
personal protective equipment (PPE) may get a second degree burn which is treatable. For the
empirically derived equation:
DB= 610* [ 4.184 Cf En (t/0.2)(1/EB)]1/x
For the theoretically derived equation,
DB= [ 2.142*106*V*Ibf*(t/EB)]1/x
Where DB= distance of the boundary from the arcing point (mm)
Cf= calculation factor =1.0; voltage> 1 kV
=1.5; voltage < 1kV
27
En=incident energy normalized
EB= incident energy at the boundary distance (J/cm2); EB can be set at 5.0 J/cm2 (1.2 Cal/cm2) for bare skin.
t= arcing time (seconds)
x= the distance exponent from table 3.3.
Ibf=bolted fault current (kA).
V=system voltage, kV
3.4 Protection boundaries definition
According to NFPA, The boundaries are classified into following 4 categories:
3.4.1 Flash protection boundary
Severe injuries are probable to occur within this area as a result of arc flash burns unless proper
PPE is used and everyone within this area must use appropriate PPE despite the activity he/she is
doing.
The distance from the arc source at which one set of a second degree burn happens 2
Cal/cm2>0.1 sec. is regarded as a second degree burn threshold.If bare skin is exposed to this
level of flash, medical treatment might still be necessary, while complete recovery is expected.
3.4.2 Limited approach boundary
Describes a boundary near energized parts that only qualified person can cross it. Might be closer
than flash boundary and defined exclusively on the basis of the nominal voltage. Limited
Approach Boundary according to NFPA is defined as "a shock protection boundary to be crossed
by only qualified persons (at a distance from a live part) which is not to be crossed by
unqualified persons unless escorted by a qualified person"[2].
28
3.4.3 Restricted approach boundary
Boundary near exposed live parts that might be crossed merely by “qualified” people who apply
suitable shock prevention techniques and equipment. A shock hazard is the main concern.
Defined exclusively on the basis of the nominal voltage. Restricted Approach Boundary
according to NFPA is defined as “A shock protection boundary to be crossed by only qualified
persons (at a distance from a live part) which, due to its proximity to a shock hazard, requires the
use of shock protection techniques and equipment when crossed”[2].
3.4.4 Prohibited approach boundary
A shock protection boundary which is merely crossed by “qualified” people who use the same
protection in such a way that it seems direct contact with live part is prearranged. It is defined
exclusively on the basis of the nominal voltage.
3.5 Arc flash pressure
This pressure is noteworthy since it can throw workers away from the arc and makes them fall
and injure more severely than they might in the case of burn occurrence. In his 1987 paper
“Pressures Developed by Arcs”, Ralph Lee [4] mentions several real cases. In one of these
cases, with available system three phase short circuit 100 kA and estimated arc flash current 42
kA for a low voltage system (480 V), hurled by arc flash pressure about 25 feet. Forcing the
electricians away from the arc decreases their hazard to the heat transfer and smelted copper, but
might put the workers at the risk of falls or impact injuries. As specified by following equation,
the introductory force is roughly 260 lb/ft2 at 24 inches.
Pressure= (11.58*Iarc)/D0.9
Where, pressure is in pounds per square foot.
29
D= Distance from arc in feet.
Iarc= Arc current in kA.
3.6 Arc flash energy levels
In addition to studies and research on incident energy prediction, some other studies are devoted
to ways of protecting workers in the event of an arc-flash. In 1997 and 1998, two papers were
published on the testing of personal protective equipment (PPE) for arc-flash analysis [32,33]. In
this project, the flammability of clothing was tested when disclosed to arc flashes with varying
incident energy magnitudes. Ultimately, the paper suggested protective clothing classes based on
incident energy ranges in line with a fire rated clothing system and description. Moreover, this
project incorporated the function of safety glasses, face shields, and work gloves when exposed
to an arc flash. Finally, this research offered the ground work for a standardized system with the
focus on worker safety in the case of an incident.
The arc flash analysis provides the energy level at a definite working range from the arc’s point
of supply. This allows us to select a personal protective equipment (PPE) that is rated above the
incident energy. Although the concept of using the PPE that matches the task seems simple, the
different incident energy levels can be extensive. For this reason, the application of energy level
was embedded into the PPE selection process.
According to NFPA, there are five energy levels of 0,1,2,3 and 4 which associate with the
maximum incident energy levels (cal/cm2) of 1.2, 4, 8, 25, and 40. This makes it possible for an
electrical device to be labeled per category, and consequently the selection of PPE can be
matched likewise, as shown by Table 3.4. In this thesis “hazard risk category” and “energy level”
are used interchangeably.
30
Table 3.4: Protective clothing characteristics
Energy Levels
Common FR clothing at this level Minimum (Cal/cm^2)
0 Non-melting, flammable materials 1.2 1 FR shirt and FR pants; Or FR coveralls; Single base layer of FR protection 4 2 FR under garments (undershirt, underwear), FR shirt, and FR pants; FR
under garments, FR coveralls; 2 or more layers of FR protection 8
3 FR under garments (undershirt, underwear), FR shirt, FR jacket, FR pants, and FR coveralls; 2-3 or more layers of FR protection;
25
4 FR under garments (undershirt, underwear), FR shirt, FR jacket/coat, FR pants, and FR coveralls; FR under garments (undershirt, underwear), FR shirt, FR pants, multi-layer flash suit; 3-4 or more layers of FR protection;
40
3.7 Coordination for protective devices
Protective device selective coordination is the reaction of circuit breakers and fuses throughout a
transient, aiming at isolating the faulted part of the system from service. The objective is to
minimize the damage to equipment and personnel located nearby, while preserving electrical
service in parallel branches. This is essentially important in mission critical systems which are
the basis of this thesis. According to IEEE Buff Book, “Coordination is a fundamental ingredient
of a well-designed electrical distribution system and is compulsory in certain healthcare and
continuous process industrial systems” [29].
This coordination is necessary from the sources of energy such as utility to the loads for all
protection devices which are in series. When circuit breakers are appropriately adjusted and
installed, a fault at any location has minimal influence on close panels and feeders. Figure 3.2
shows a one line diagram of an electrical system. If a fault occurred at Motor-1, appropriate
selective coordination would happen if circuit breaker CB154 is opened before CB153 or any
device further upstream.
31
Figure 3.2: One line diagram of a three motor distribution system
The protective devices causing system selective coordination comprise fuses and circuit
breakers. These devices enjoy a time versus current profile, called time-current curve (TCC), that
they will allow to pass before activating. Figure 3.3 illustrates a TCC for circuit breaker CB150
and fuse 19.
32
Figure 3.3: Time current curves for a circuit breaker and a fuse
Because the reference voltage is 480 volt and the current is presented at times 10, a 3kA fault
current would be cleared at less than 0.03 seconds by this circuit breaker and at 0.45 seconds by
this fuse.
Figure 3.4 shows the TCCs for the system with proper selective coordination. This plot
demonstrates all circuit breaker curves which are in series from Utility source to Motor-1.
33
Figure 3.4 Time current curves for a selectively coordinated circuit breakers
34
It is apparent that the breaker curves do not touch or overlap each other and as a result
appropriate selective coordination exists. Figure 3.5 illustrates the TCC for the above system
with a lack of selective coordination.
Figure 3.5: Time current curves with a lack of selective coordination
35
The overlap of breaker curves CB-150 and CB-153 suggests that selective coordination does not
exist. If a fault of 2000 amps were to take place on Panel B, then CB-150 would open before CB-
153. This would result in the power loss of the feeder to Motor-2 and Motor-3 , and therefore our
goal of isolating the fault without disturbing close devices would not be achieved. Selective
coordination is accomplished by suitable selection and adjustment of the protective devices. In
fact, all electrical systems carry some level of coordination, since the overcurrent protective
devices which are closer to the utility or generators have higher ratings in comparison to
downstream devices [34].
This project explores the coordination with circuit breakers, since they can encompass adjustable
settings, where fuses cannot. The adjustable features in a circuit breaker are divided by time
segments. The Long Time (LT) is the setting of the breaker for overload circumstances which is
also called the amperage rating. This is generally in the time period beyond 60 seconds and has a
similar reaction to a thermal element. The Short Time (ST) is the setting for the breaker which is
normally 0.5 seconds until the long time segment. This transitional period is vital for identifying
low level faults that might occur as a result of system impedances. The Instantaneous (I) element
is the setting for the initial transient of a fault which is frequently adjusted very high to
incorporate motor and transformer inrush currents in the first few cycles of start-up, however not
higher than the available fault current.
36
3.8 Motor contribution to short circuit current
When studying short circuit, motor contribution should be considered in analysis. Load such as
motors convert to generators and create current, this current adds up to short circuit which flows
to fault location.
Same as contribution from a generator, motor gives the full load ampere (FLA) of nameplate
divided by its per unit subtransient reactance. Meanwhile, at upstream panel board, related
impedance of the motor branch circuit conductors decreases the motor contribution current to
short circuit.
The results which illustrate the highest short circuit current to related devices should include
motors contribution to short circuit.
37
4. Feasible steps to arc flash calculations
A detailed arc flash study includes the following steps. A detailed engineering analysis is
preferred for large power systems with several sources and different mode of operation such as
normal, emergency and maintenance. Since it can determine the probable worst case situations
for arc flash.
To illustrate the steps using an example, data and model from a ETAP workshop were used after
being modified for a system with 5 buses.
4.1 Identification of locations for arc fault hazard
Arc flash hazard evaluation is only necessary for the places where workers are vulnerable by
risk. Hence, the assessment may not be required for every bus and equipment in the power
system. In case that the service transformer is less than 125 KVA, panels and switchboards with
voltages 208 volts or under this can usually be overlooked. The arc might not be viable for
lower voltages and lower available fault currents. Whenever a potential significant arc flash
injury is perceived, all electrical panels with circuit breakers and fuses should be considered in
the evaluation. Incidents are probable when circuit breakers or fuses are under operation and they
connects or disconnects, even though the panel door is closed. In the example below, all buses
are faulted.
4.2 Data collection
Although arc flash hazard evaluation may not be necessary for some equipment, data regarding
the equipment may be needed in a short circuit analysis. Table 4.1 shows typical data needed for
38
the study. Data on utility, generators, transformers, circuit breakers,cables, transmission lines,
motors, and etc. is required in short circuit analysis, however, most of the necessary data can be
obtained using the name plate of the equipment. Additionally, typical data can be collected from
handbooks and product manual data sheet. Power system software such as ETAP includes a
comprehensive collection of manufacturer’s data which covers most electrical equipment
available today. The following data for utility, buses, transformers, loads and motors has been
collected from an ETAP workshop with slight modifications.
The one line diagram in figure 4.1 illustrates utility, protection relay, step down transformer,
switchgear panel, protection devices and loads.
The rated voltage for utility is 13.8 kV, three phase and one phase short circuit is 150 MVA and
ratio of X/R is 15. Utility is grounded solidly.
39
Figure 4.1: One line diagram of 13.8kV/480V distribution system
Information regarding bus 01 can be found in table 4.2. The Nominal voltage for bus 01 is 13.8
kV since it is connected to utility. The gap between conductors is 150 mm. The following
information is recorded in the rating tab of bus editor in Figure 4.2. Limited approach exp. mov.
cond is 12 feet, limited approach FCP is 8 feet, restricted approach boundary is 4.16 feet,
prohibited approch boundary is 1 feet, distance X factor is 2 and working distance is 24 inches.
The Limited Approach Boundary (LAB) is defined according to NFPA 70E-2009 “as the
approach limit at a distance from an exposed live part within which a shock hazard exists”. The
LAB for movable conductors is the distance, that persons who are not trained can not come
nearer to conductor which is not braced in fixed position. The limited approach boundary for
40
fixed circuit parts is the distance, persons who are not trained can not come nearer to a not
movable conductor (fixed conductor).
Table 4.2. Bus 1 parameters
Device ID Field Description Value Bus 1
Nominal kV 13.8 kV Equipment Type Open Air Gap Between Conductors 150 mm Limited Approach Exp. Mov. Cond 12 ft. Limited Approach FCP 8 ft. Restricted approach Boundary 4.16 ft. Prohibited Approach Boundary 1 ft. Distance X Factor 2.00 Working Distance 24 in.
Figure 4.2: Bus 01 (13.8 kV) editor page
41
Information regarding Switchgear A can be found in table 4.3. The nominal voltage for
switchgear A is 0.48 kV since it is connected to secondary side of step-down transformer. The
gap between conductors is 32 mm. The following information is recorded in the rating tab of bus
editor in Figure 4.3: limited approach exp. mov. cond is 12 feet, limited approach FCP is 4 feet,
restricted approach boundaryis 1.5 feet, prohibited approch boundary is 0.2 feet, distance X
factor is 2 and working distance is 18 inches.
Table 4.3. Switchgear A parameters
Device ID Field Description Value Switchgear A
Nominal kV 0.48 kV Equipment Type Switchgear Gap Between Conductors 32 mm Limited Approach Exp. Mov. Cond 12 ft. Limited Approach FCP 4 ft. Restricted approach Boundary 1.5 ft. Prohibited Approach Boundary 0.2 ft. Distance X Factor 2.00 Working Distance 18 in.
42
Figure 4.3: Switchgear A (0.48 kV) editor page
The information regarding bus 2 is recorded in table 4.4. The nominal voltage for bus 2 is 0.48
kV since it is connected to Switchgar A. The gap between conductors is 20 mm. The following
information is recorded in the rating tab of bus editor in Figure 4.4: limited approach exp. mov.
cond is 12 feet, limited approach FCP is 5 feet, restricted approach boundary is 2 feet, prohibited
approch boundary is 0.2 feet, distance X factor is 2 and working distance is 24 inches.
Table 4.4. Bus 2 parameters
Device ID Field Description Value Bus 2
Nominal kV 0.48 kV Equipment Type MCC Gap Between Conductors 20 mm Limited Approach Exp. Mov. Cond 12 ft. Limited Approach FCP 5 ft. Restricted approach Boundary 2 ft. Prohibited Approach Boundary 0.2 ft. Distance X Factor 2.00 Working Distance 24 in.
43
Figure 4.4: Bus 2 (0.48 kV) editor page
The information regarding bus 3 can be found in table 4.5. The nominal voltage for bus 3 is 0.208 kV
since it is connected to step down transformer 2 (0.480/0.208kV). The gap between conductors is 25 mm.
the following information is recorder in the rating tab of bus editor in Figure 4.5. Limited approach exp.
mov. cond is 12 feet, limited approach FCP is 5 feet, restricted approach boundary is 2 feet, prohibited
approch boundary is 0.2 feet, distance X factor is 2 and working distance is 18 inches.
Table 4.5. Bus 3 parameters
Device ID Field Description Value Bus 3
Nominal kV 0.208 kV Equipment Type Panel Board Gap Between Conductors 25 mm Limited Approach Exp. Mov. Cond 12 ft. Limited Approach FCP 5 ft. Restricted approach Boundary 2 ft. Prohibited Approach Boundary 0.2 ft. Distance X Factor 2.00 Working Distance 18 in.
44
Figure 4.5: Bus 3 (0.208 kV) editor page
The information regarding bus 4 can be found in table 4.6. The nominal voltage for bus 4 is
0.480 kV since it is connected to switchboard A. The gap between conductors is 20 mm. The
following information is recorded in the rating tab of bus editor in Figure 4.6. Limited approach
exp. mov. cond is 12 feet, limited approach FCP is 5 feet, restricted approach boundary is 2 feet,
prohibited approch boundary is 0.2 feet, distance X factor is 2 and working distance is 24 inches.
Table 4.6. Bus 4 parameters
Device ID Field Description Value Bus 4
Nominal kV 0.48 kV Equipment Type MCC Gap Between Conductors 20 mm Limited Approach Exp. Mov. Cond 12 ft. Limited Approach FCP 5 ft. Restricted approach Boundary 2 ft. Prohibited Approach Boundary 0.2 ft. Distance X Factor 2.00 Working Distance 24 in.
45
Figure 4.6: Bus 4 (0.480 kV) editor page
Transformer one and two data can be found in table 4.7. Both transformers are step down.
Transformer one (T1) is 5 MVA and decreases the voltage from 13.8 kV to 0.480 kV. Also its
positive sequence Z is 5.4% and X/R for both Positive sequence and Zero sequence is 10.21%
and grounding is Delta-Ysolid.
Transformer 2 (T2) is 0.5 MVA and reduces the voltage from 0.480 kV to 0.208 kV. Besides, its
positive sequence Z is 5.4% and X/R for both Positive sequence and Zero sequence is 3.51%.
Grounding for transformer 2 (T2) is the same as that of transformer1 (T1), which is Delta-Y
solid. At 2-winding transformer editor figure 4.7 related data is entered.
Motors data can be found in table 4.8. The bus bar 2 is connected with four motors. The first two
motors are 120 HP with rated voltage of 0.460 kV, power factor of 91.49% and efficiency of
82.06%. The other two motors are 150 HP with rated voltage of 0.460 kV, power factor of
91.59% and efficiency of 85.16%. The data is recorded in induction machine editor figure 4.8.
Table 4.8. Motor 1&2 parameters
Device ID Field Description Value Motor 1
HP 120 Rated kV 0.460 kV Manufacturer Typical Data PF%=91.49 Eff%=82.06 Quantity 2
Motor 2
HP 150 Rated kV 0.460 kV Manufacturer Typical Data PF%=91.59 Eff%=85.16 Quantity 2
Figure 4.8: Motor 1 & 2 editor page
48
Load 1 data can be found in table 4.9. The value of load is 0.4 MVA and its rated voltage is
0.208 kV. The power factor is 95%. This data is recorded in static load editor figure 4.9.
Table 4.9. Static Load Parameters
Device ID Field Description Value Load 1
Rated MVA 0.4 MVA Rated kV 0.208 kV % PF 95%
Figure 4.9: Static load editor page
Load 2 (Lump 1) data can be found in table 4.10. The value of the load is 0.3 MVA and its rated
voltage is 0.480 kV. The power factor is 85%. This data is recorded in lumped load editor figure
4.10.
49
Table 4.10. Lump load parameters
Device ID Field Description Value Lump 1
Rated MVA 0.3 MVA Rated kV 0.48 kV % PF 85%
Figure 4.10: Lump load editor page
As table 4.11 shows, for high voltage circuit breaker, the rated max voltage is 15 kV while the
continuous current is 1200 Amps. This data is recorded in high voltage circuit breaker in figure
4.11. Cycle and CPT is necessary to determine the fault clearing time for HVCB.
Table 4.11. High voltage circuit breaker parameters
Device ID Field Description Value
High Voltage CB
Rated Max kV 15 Manufacturer Cutler-Hammer Model 150 VCP-W1000 Cycle 5 CPT 3 Continuous Amps 1200 Amps
50
Figure 4.11: High voltage circuit breaker editor page
As it can be seen in table 4.12, the rated max voltage for fuse 1 (high voltage fuse) is 15 kV,
continuous current is 200 amps and test PF is 3.95. This data is recorded in fuse parameter page
in figure 4.12.
Table 4.12. Fuse parameters
Device ID Field Description Value Fuse 1
Rated Max kV 15 kV Manufacturer Cutler Hammer Model BA-200 (Condenser) Size 200 E Continuous Amps 200 Interrupting 10 Test PF 3.95
51
Figure 4.12: Fuse editor page
Current transformer (CT9) is connected to over current protection relay as indicated in table
4.13. The primary turns’ value is 150 and secondary turns’ value is 5. This data is recorded in
current Transformer (CT) editor page in figure 4.13.
Table 4.13. Current transformer parameter
Device ID Field Description Value CT9 Primary turns 150
Secondary Turns 5
52
Figure 4.13: Current transformer editor page
The input of relay 1 is connected to CT9 and its output is connected to high voltage circuit
breaker (HVCB1), as it is observable in table 4.14. The other values are recorded in over current
relay editor in figure 4.14.
Table 4.14. Over current relay parameters
Device ID Field Description Value Relay 1
Input CT CT9 Output PD HVCB1 Relay Element Any Level/zone Any Action Open OCR Manufacturer GE Multilin Model IFC Curve Type Inverse (51) Pickup Range 1-12 sec-5A Pickup 12 Time Dial 2.3 Inst Pickup Range 30-150 Sec-5 A Pickup 100
53
Figure 4.14: Over current relay editor page
The nominal voltage for low voltage circuit breaker (LVCB1) is 0.480 kV, while the continuous
current is 4000 Amps. Circuit breaker is supplied with a solid state trip unit which is
characterized by Long time, short time and instantaneous trip features. The associated
information can be found at circuit breaker editor page in Figure 4.15. Considering the four
circuit breakers in this one line, the same procedures are followed for each of the other three
circuit breakers.
54
Figure 4.15: Low voltage circuit breaker (LVCB1) editor
4.3 Preparing single line diagram of the system
Single line diagrams are regarded as robust tools to document and communicate information
regarding power systems. They are not only easily readable and understandable, but also express
the way that equipment are connected and also shows the status of equipment, for instance circuit
breaker could be open or close. The results of analyses like short circuit studies and arc flash
evaluation can effortlessly be placed on the diagrams. The model illustrated in figure 4.16 below
is developed using ETAP software:
55
Figure 4.16: One line diagram for five bus network
The step down transformer (T01) reduces the voltage from 13.8 kV to 480 V. Together, there
are six loads which include four motors, one static load and one lumped load. Additionally,
transformer (T02) decreases voltage from 480 V to 208 V. Switchgear A is protected by circuit
breaker LVCB1, while motors 1 &2 are protected by circuit breaker LVCB2. Moreover, Load1
and Lump1 are protected by circuit breakers LVCB3 & LVCB4, and transformer T1 is protected
by high voltage circuit breaker. The major upstream device to protect faults probable in Bus 01
or downstream devices is Fuse 1.
4.4 Short circuit study
Performing arc flash hazard (AFH), merely three phase faults are considered. It might seem odd;
however it is compatible with the recommendations in IEEE-1548 and NFPA-70E. It is due to
56
several causes. First, three phase faults typically provide the highest probable short circuit energy
and specify the worst case. Second, it is indicated by experience that arcing faults happens in air
or equipment , which initiate as line to ground faults, can intensify instantaneously into three
phase faults, as the air ionizes through phases. Such an evolution from single phase to three
phase fault normally occurs within a few cycles. As a result, the majority of analyses done so far
on arc flash energy have been based on three phase faults.
IEEE 1584 recommends that the calculations for single phase systems are performed for a
corresponding three phase system. It declares that this will lead to conservative outcomes. Table
4.15 demonstrates the result for three phase bolted short circuit.
Table 4.15: Three phase bolted short circuit
ID kA (Three phase bolted short circuit)
Switchgear A 73.6
Bus 01 6.4
Bus 02 73.6
Bus 03 22.4
Bus 04 73.6
57
Figure 4.17: Short current result for five bus network (one line)
Figure 4.17 illustrates the short current outcome for each bus. The short circuit current at
switchgear A is 73.6 kA, and since there is no impedance between switchgear A and bus 02, the
short circuit current at bus 02 is identical with Switchgear A. The short circuit current at bus 03
is 22.4 kA, which is less than that of switchgear A due to Impedance transformer T02. To
identify maximum short circuit current, highly conservative estimates and assumptions are
employed in short circuit calculations. It is compelling if the purpose is to specify maximum
breaker or equipment duties. Nevertheless, employing excessively conservative short circuit data
for arc flash hazard AFH might produce non-conservative outcomes. This is because a very high
fault current might result in notably short arc duration caused by the operation of immediate trip
elements. The highest fault current does not essentially mean the highest probable arc flash
58
hazard, since the incident energy is a function of arcing time, which can be an inversely
proportional function of the arcing current.
4.5 Determine arc current
In this stage we calculate the arc fault current using IEEE formulas described in chapter 3. IEEE
procedure recommends the following steps to include the variance probable in arcs:
1. Determining the maximum expected bolted fault condition.
2. Determining the minimum expected bolted fault condition, which can be a light load
condition with numerous motor loads or generators that are not running.
3. Computing the arcing current at 100% of IEEE 1584 estimate for the above two
conditions.
4. Calculating the arcing current at 85% of IEEE 1584 estimate for the two above
conditions.
When evaluating these four arcing currents, determine the arc flash incident energy and choose
PPE base on highest incident energies. The minimum fault current in comparison with the
maximum fault current condition might need more time to clear and might lead to a higher level
of arc flash incident energy level. It is recommended main fault current source (Utility or
Generator) to be calculated, as its current can conclude the fault clearing time for the large part
of the arc flash incident energy level. The result of arc flash calculation on one line diagram is
depicted in Figure 4.18.
59
Figure 4.18: Arc flash result for five bus network (one line)
The result of the arc flash analysis is illustrated in table 4.16 and figure 4.19. The total released
energy at bus 02 is 10.81 cal/cm2, that is classified as level 3 and is considered dangerous. Arc
flash boundary is 4.5, final clearing time (FCT) is 0.05 seconds, and the arcing current at FCT is
41.573 kA. Circuit breaker LVCB2 is the primary protection device for clearing the fault at bus
The recommended documentations by NFPA for arc flash hazard assessment results to be placed
on equipment are divided into two types as below:
1. Warning labels showing arc flash values: These are stickers on which a warning sign of
acceptable size is printed. The stickers must be pasted in such a way to be easily
noticeable and readable from a specified distance. They must include clear prints of the
incident energy at the determined working distance and its related risk energy level
number as well as flash protection boundary.
66
2. Arc flash evaluation outcomes: it is recommended that these results are placed on the
equipment like table formats and one line diagram as explained in the preceding section,
at a spot effortlessly available for workers.
4.11 Description of real case study
In this section of the research, a power distribution system is analyzed which is located in a
commercial building in Boston. The building was constructed before 1990. Several years later,
the owner made up his mind to perform an arc flash hazard analysis in order to meet the terms of
NFPA. They intended to obtain a hazard risk of level 2 or below at all electrical breaker panels in
the system.
The plant’s power system includes a 15 KV system formed by the utility feed and six step down
transformers each 2500 KVA. These transformers stepdown the 15 KV system to 480 Volt
networks. The plant’s maximum load is 9000 KVA and the network has 271 buses. The 480 Volt
system is located throughout the plant and includes two Main Tie Main (M-T-M) breaker
configurations on the 480 volt side.
The emergency power to supply the loads is provided by three diesel generators with the
capacity of 1000 KVA (each) connected via two tie breakers for maintenance mode. Figure 4.20
illustrates the one line and annex A includes the related details.
The computer model, the short circuit requirements and the TCC curves were developed on the
basis of manufacturer’s printed equipment data together with the information given by client.
The studies are conducted applying ETAP software.
67
There are three electrical operating modes in a commercial building: normal mode, maintenance
mode and emergency mode. These three scenarios form the basis for the content of this
simulation. The definition for each mode is found below:
Normal mode: The normal operating mode is the situation where the power system is energized
and the power is being fed to loads without any human interactions. In case that a non-arcing
fault takes place, the protective devices such as circuit breaker will identify the fault and will
disconnect the faulted equipment rapidly and securely since there is no arc to
68
Figure 4.20: One line diagram for 271 bus system
cause equipment failure. On the contrary, whenever an arcing fault happens, the protective
relaying and other protective device would spot the fault, however the current value will not be
D0.48 kV
D5
0.48 kV
D6
0.48 kV
D7
0.48 kV
D32
0.48 kV
D41
0.48 kV
D43
0.48 kV
D45
0.208 kV
D49
0.208 kV
D48
0.208 kV
D47
0.208 kV
D46 0.208 kV
D44
0.48 kV
D42
0.208 kV
D33
0.208 kV
D36
0.208 kV
D38
0.208 kV
D40
0.208 kV
D39
0.208 kV
D37
0.208 kV
D35
0.208 kV
D34
0.208 kV
D8
0.48 kV
D19
0.48 kV
D20
0.48 kV
D27
0.48 kV
D31
0.48 kV
D30
0.208 kV
D29
0.208 kV
D28
0.208 kV
D21
0.208 kV
D25
0.208 kV
D24
0.208 kV
D23
0.208 kV
D22
0.208 kV
D26
0.208 kV
D9
0.48 kV
D10
0.208 kV
D16A
0.208 kV
D17
0.208 kV
D13
0.208 kV
D16
0.208 kV
D15
0.208 kV
D14
0.208 kV
D12
0.208 kV
D11
0.208 kV
D4
0.48 kV
E0.48 kV
C
13.8 kV
A13.8 kV
B
13.8 kV
D50
0.48 kV
D51
0.48 kV
D61
0.208 kV
D63
0.208 kV
D64
0.208 kV
D62
0.208 kV
D52
0.48 kV
D55
0.208 kV
D56
0.208 kV
D53
0.208 kV
D54
0.208 kV
D57
0.48 kV
D58
0.208 kV
D59
0.48 kV
D60
0.208 kV
D65
0.48 kV
D66
0.48 kV
E8
0.48 kV
E7
0.48 kV
E6
0.48 kV
E5
0.48 kV
E3
0.48 kV
E4 0.48 kV
E2
0.48 kV
E10.48 kV
D1
0.48 kV
D2 0.48 kV
D3
0.48 kV
Lump32
0 MVA
CBL-52
L4
240 kVA
CBL-51
L3
275 kVA
CBL-6
Lump7
0 MVA
L5 50 kVA
CBL-50
Lump133
0 MVA
L6 512 kVA
CBL-53
L8
60 kVACBL-55
L7 310 kVA
CBL-54
L9
504 kVA
CBL-56
L10
504 kVA
CBL-57
L11
504 kVA
CBL-58
L12
40 kVACBL-59
NORMAL SERV
401.559 MVAsc
NORM SERV
ALTERNITE SERV
0 MVAsc
ALT SERV
TRANS 1
2500 kVA
FUSE3
CBL-60
L13
80 kVA
Fuse15
CBL-187
Lump3
0 MVA
TRANS 12
45 kVA
CBL-197
Lump4
0 MVA
TRANS 11
45 kVA
CBL-196
Lump6
0 MVA
CBL-195
TRANS 9
45 kVA
CBL-194
Lump5
0 MVA
CBL-193
TRANS 10
30 kVA
CBL-192
LUMP RL1PSH1
10 kVA
CBL-190
Lump1
0 MVA
CBL-205
Lump2
0 MVACBL-213
CBL-212
CBL-204
FIRE PUMP
50 HPCable2
BM2
BM1
CBL-1
FUSE1
FUSE2
CBL-2
FUSE4
TRANS 2
2500 kVA
CBL-3
Open
L1
122 kVA
CBL-8
Lump35
0 MVA
CBL-29
Lump36
0 MVA
CBL-31
Lump38
0 MVA
CBL-34
Lump39
0 MVA
CBL-30
Lump40
0 MVA
CBL-33
Lump37
0 MVA
CBL-32
Lump41
0 MVA
CBL-35
Lump33
0 MVA
CBL-36
TRANS 3
225 kVA
FUSE7
Lump31
0 MVA
CBL-23
FUSE 6
Lump25
0 MVA
CBL-38
Lump28
0 MVACBL-44
Lump27
0 MVACBL-45
Lump29
0 MVACBL-39
Lump26
0 MVA
CBL-41
TRANS 4
225 kVA
FUSE9
Lump23
0 MVA
CBL-48
Lump22
0 MVA
CBL-49
TRANS 5
45 kVA
FUSE10
Lump24
0 MVA
CBL-47
CBL-46
Lump30
0 MVA
CBL-37
FUSE 8
CBL-14
CBL-12
Lump16
0 MVACBL-15
Lump15
0 MVACBL-16
Lump13
0 MVA
CBL-17
Lump11
0 MVACBL-18
Lump10
0 MVACBL-21
Lump12
0 MVACBL-20
Lump14
0 MVACBL-19
TRANS 6
150 kVA
FUSE11
Lump9
0 MVA
TRANS 7
113 kVA
FUSE13
Lump17
0 MVACBL-28
FUSE14
Lump18
0 MVACBL-24
Lump19
0 MVA
CBL-25
Lump20
0 MVACBL-26
Lump21
0 MVACBL-27
TRANS 8
113 kVA
RL2-FS02
CBL-13
Lump8
0 MVA
CBL-22
FUSE12
CBL-11
CBL-10
CBL-9
FUSE5
Lump34
0 MVA
L2
145 kVA
CBL-4
CBL-5
CBL-8
CBL-4
Open
FUSE5
CBL-50
CBL-53
CBL-58
CBL-56
CBL-54
CBL-57
CBL-59
NORMAL SERV
401.559 MVAsc
ALTERNITE SERV
0 MVAsc
NORM SERV
ALT SERV
FUSE2
CBL-1
CBL-2
FUSE1
FUSE3
FUSE4
TRANS 1
2500 kVA
TRANS 2
2500 kVA
CBL-51
CBL-52
CBL-23
FUSE7
TRANS 3
225 kVA
CBL-36
CBL-35
CBL-33
CBL-30
CBL-34
CBL-32
CBL-31
CBL-29
CBL-37
FUSE9
TRANS 4
225 kVA
CBL-44
CBL-45
CBL-39
CBL-41
CBL-38
CBL-47
FUSE10
TRANS 5
45 kVA
CBL-48
CBL-49
CBL-16
CBL-19
CBL-17
CBL-20
CBL-18
FUSE11
TRANS 6
150 kVA
CBL-15
CBL-21
CBL-22
TRANS 7
113 kVA
CBL-28
RL2-FS02
TRANS 8
113 kVA
CBL-24
CBL-25
CBL-26
CBL-27
CBL-55
CBL-12
CBL-11
CBL-14
CBL-13
CBL-46
CBL-10
CBL-3
CBL-5
CBL-6
CBL-60
CBL-9
L5 50 kVA
L6 512 kVA
L7 310 kVA
L8
60 kVA
L4
240 kVA
L3
275 kVA
L1
122 kVA
L2
145 kVA
BM2
BM1
CBL-187
CBL-196
TRANS 9
45 kVA
TRANS 11
45 kVA
CBL-197
TRANS 12
45 kVA
TRANS 10
30 kVA
CBL-193
CBL-190
CBL-192
CBL-194
CBL-195
L13
80 kVA
CBL-204
CBL-205
L11
504 kVA
L10
504 kVA
L9
504 kVA
CBL-212
CBL-213
L12
40 kVA
LUMP RL1PSH1
10 kVA
Cable2
FIRE PUMP
50 HP
Fuse15
FUSE12
FUSE13
FUSE 6
FUSE 8
FUSE14
Lump1
0 MVA
Lump2
0 MVA
Lump3
0 MVA
Lump4
0 MVA
Lump5
0 MVA
Lump6
0 MVA
Lump7
0 MVA
Lump8
0 MVA
Lump9
0 MVA
Lump10
0 MVA
Lump11
0 MVA
Lump12
0 MVA
Lump13
0 MVA
Lump14
0 MVA
Lump15
0 MVA
Lump16
0 MVA
Lump17
0 MVA
Lump18
0 MVA
Lump19
0 MVA
Lump20
0 MVA
Lump21
0 MVA
Lump22
0 MVA
Lump23
0 MVA
Lump24
0 MVA
Lump25
0 MVA
Lump26
0 MVA
Lump27
0 MVA
Lump28
0 MVA
Lump29
0 MVA
Lump30
0 MVA
Lump31
0 MVA
Lump32
0 MVA
Lump33
0 MVA
Lump34
0 MVA Lump35
0 MVA
Lump36
0 MVA
Lump37
0 MVA
Lump38
0 MVA
Lump39
0 MVA
Lump40
0 MVA
Lump41
0 MVA
Lump133
0 MVA
D0.48 kV
E0.48 kV
D6
0.48 kV
E10.48 kV
E2
0.48 kV
E3
0.48 kV
E5
0.48 kV
E6
0.48 kV
E7
0.48 kV
E8
0.48 kV
A13.8 kV
B
13.8 kV
C
13.8 kV
D1
0.48 kV
D2 0.48 kV
D3
0.48 kV
D4
0.48 kV
D7
0.48 kV
D5
0.48 kV
D8
0.48 kV
D32
0.48 kV
D9
0.48 kV
D10
0.208 kV
D19
0.48 kV
D16A
0.208 kV
D17
0.208 kV
D16
0.208 kV
D15
0.208 kV
D14
0.208 kV
D13
0.208 kV
D12
0.208 kV
D11
0.208 kV
D20
0.48 kV
D21
0.208 kV
D26
0.208 kV
D22
0.208 kV
D23
0.208 kV
D24
0.208 kV
D25
0.208 kV
D27
0.48 kV
D30
0.208 kV
D28
0.208 kV
D29
0.208 kV
D31
0.48 kV
D35
0.208 kV
D33
0.208 kV
D36
0.208 kV
D37
0.208 kV
D38
0.208 kV
D39
0.208 kV
D34
0.208 kV
D40
0.208 kV
D41
0.48 kV
D42
0.208 kV
D43
0.48 kV
D45
0.208 kV
D46 0.208 kV
D44
0.48 kV
D49
0.208 kV
D47
0.208 kV
D48
0.208 kV
E4 0.48 kV
D66
0.48 kV
D65
0.48 kV
D52
0.48 kV
D57
0.48 kV
D53
0.208 kV
D54
0.208 kV
D58
0.208 kV
D59
0.48 kV
D60
0.208 kV
D55
0.208 kV
D56
0.208 kV
0.48 kV
D61
0.208 kV
D62
0.208 kV
D63
0.208 kV
D64
0.208 kV
D50
0.48 kV
D51
69
as much as the non-arcing fault and it could take longer to clear the fault depending on the
estimated settings and the equipment installed. The setting of protection relays of circuit breakers
and low voltage fuses must be adjusted to reduce the incident energy level to the minimum
probable caloric value without threatening selectivity.
Emergency Mode: Diesel generators supply electricity in the case of utility failure. This can be
considered as a perfect way to protect against all potential interruptions of the main supply. In
the case studied here, three generators with output of 3000 KVA (each 1000 KVA) provide
electricity for the critical loads; e.g. water pumps and elevators.
Maintenance Mode: when workers implement electrical switching processes to disconnect
loads or to recover power to previously disconnected equipment which was being maintained or
repaired, it is said that the equipment is in switching operation mode, during which setting
protection relays of low voltage breakers and fuses merge to define the fault clearing time and
the level of incident energy produced in the case of an arcing fault occurrence. In the course of
switching processes of the power system, there are risks of an arcing fault for the workers; hence
the workers’ safety and protection is superior to the selectivity of the protection device. The
protective device must be adjusted to assure the decline of incident energy levels by rapidly
tripping the up-stream breakers in order to decrease the fault clearing time.
4.11.1 Circuit breakers configurations
Having defined the operating modes, it is crucial to know what operating condition is supposed
to be normal for a power system. The following situations were considered as being normal for
this commercial building:
70
1. The tie circuit breakers are normally open in the power system, except for the
maintenance operation, during which the tie breakers are closed to create a higher arc
flash level.
2. In the case that the normal power does not exists (emergency), diesel generators supply
all buses and panels. Throughout maintenance operation, the tie breakers are closed to
create a higher arc flash level.
Four configurations are defined in ETAP software: A) Normal, B) Emergency Ties Closed
(EMTC), C) Normal Ties Closed, and D) Emergency.
In the normal mode, the automatic transfer switches (ATS) are in position A. But in the case of
utility failure, they switch to position B and the loads are supplied by emergency generators.
At both normal and emergency modes when the tie breakers are open, the main breakers are
closed. At EMTC and “normal ties closed modes” when the ties are closed, the main circuit
breakers are open. The summary of circuit breakers configurations which are defined for arc
flash analysis can be found in tables 4.23.
71
Table 4.23: Configuration of breakers at normal, emergency, normal ties closed and EMTC
Configuration list of circuit breakers
ID NORMAL EMTC Normal TIES CLOSED
EMERGENCY (EM)
ATS-D1 POSITION A POSITION B POSITION A POSITION B ATSG01 POSITION A POSITION B POSITION A POSITION B
ATSG02 POSITION A POSITION B POSITION A POSITION B ATSG03 POSITION A POSITION B POSITION A POSITION B ATSS01 POSITION A POSITION B POSITION A POSITION B
BM1-ATSF01
POSITION A POSITION B POSITION A POSITION B
BM1-ATSS01
POSITION A POSITION B POSITION A POSITION B
BM1 TIE OPEN CLOSED CLOSED OPEN BM2-ATSS01 POSITION A POSITION B POSITION A POSITION B
BM2 TIE OPEN CLOSED CLOSED OPEN BM TIE OPEN CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CB115A CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED
CB-1 CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CB-246 CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED
F1A POSITION A POSITION B POSITION A POSITION B MTSG01 POSITION A POSITION B POSITION A POSITION B
4.11.2 Short circuit study and related scenarios
The existing three-phase fault current at the 13.8 kV service entrance is 16800 amps with an
X/R=3.0. It is 5700 amps for a single phase with an X/R=1.0. The utility information was
acquired from NStar.
The highest fault current does not essentially mean the highest probable arc flash energy level,
since the incident energy is a function of arcing time, which can be an inversely proportional
function of the arcing current. The three-phase bolted fault current is calculated in RMS
symmetrical amperes for each bus and all operating mode such as normal, emergency and
maintenance.
72
Four case studies are defined in order to determine the worst one:
1) Arc flash Least, with the pre-fault voltage of 95% and a three-phase fault current decay.
2) Arc flash Min, with the pre-fault voltage of 100% and a three-phase fault current decay.
3) Short circuit, with the pre-fault voltage of 100% and a three-phase symmetrical ½ cycle.
4) Arc flash Max, with the pre-fault voltage of 104% and a three-phase symmetrical ½ cycle.
The above mentioned short circuit scenarios are listed briefly in table 4.24.
Table 4.24: Short circuit study scenario
Case Type Prefault Voltage AF Method Bus Fault Current AF Least 95 IEEE-1584 3 Phase-Fault Current decay AF MIN 100 IEEE-1584 3 Phase-Fault Current decay
Short Circuit
100 IEEE-1584 3 Phase-Symmetrical ½ cycle
AF MAX 104 IEEE-1584 3 Phase-Symmetrical ½ cycle
A short circuit/arc flash case is established for each operating mode. ETAP scenario manager
offers an easy method for documentation and analysis of each operating mode to be used for
rapid repeatable studies. Sixteen scenarios were developed to find out the worst case arc flash for
panels and buses, which are shown in table 4.25.
For example, in scenario 1 the arc flash current is calculated based on the normal configuration
(ties open) where the utility supplies the loads. The case type for the short circuit study is “AF
MAX” with the pre-fault voltage of 104% and the bus fault current of three-phase symmetrical ½
cycle. As another example, in scenario 16 the arc flash current is calculated based on the
situation where the utility does not exist and the electricity is supplied by the emergency diesel
generators (ties open). The case study type for the short circuit study is “AF Least” with the pre-
fault voltage of 95% and the bus fault current of three-phase fault current decay.
73
Table 4.25: Definition of scenarios for worst case arc flash
Scenario Config. Status Study Case Output report Remarks
Scenario 1 Normal AF MAX NAFMAX Normal Config with 104%,1/2 cycle with motors
Scenario 2 Ties Closed AF MAX TCAFMAX Ties closed with 104% V,1/2 cycle with motors
Scenario 3 EMTC AF MAX EMTCAFMAX ATS in EM,Ties Closed with 104% V,1/2 cycle with motors
Scenario 4 EM AF MAX EMAFMAX ATS in EM, Normal Config. With 104%,1/2 cycle with motors
Scenario 5 Normal AF MIN NAFMIN Normal Config with 100%,1/2 cycle with motors
Scenario 6 Ties Closed AF MIN TCAFMIN Ties closed with 100% V,1/2 cycle with motors
Scenario 7 EMTC AF MIN EMTCAFMIN ATS in EM,Ties Closed with 100% V,1/2 cycle with motors
Scenario 8 EM AF MIN EMAFMIN ATS in EM, Normal Config. With 100%,1/2 cycle with motors
Scenario 9 Normal SC NAFSC Normal Config with 100%,Fault Current Decay
Scenario 10 Ties Closed SC TCAFSC Ties closed with 100% V, Fault Current Decay
Scenario 11 EMTC SC EMTCAFSC ATS in EM, Ties Closed with 100% V, Fault Current Decay
Scenario 12 EM SC EMAFSC ATS in EM, Normal Config. With 100%,Fault Current Decay
Scenario 13 Normal AF Least NAFLEAST Normal Config with 95%,Fault Current Decay
Scenario 14 Ties Closed AF Least TCAFLEAST Ties closed with 95% V, Fault Current Decay
Scenario 15 EMTC AF Least EMTCAFLEAST ATS in EM, Normal Config. With 95%,Fault Current Decay
Scenario 16 EM AF Least EMAFLEAST ATS in EM, Normal Config. With 95%,Fault Current Decay
All 271 devices locations were assessed in terms of capability to interrupt or withstand the
maximum three-phase. Annex C includes the summary of short circuit study for the pre-fault
voltage of 100 volt with a three-phase symmetrical ½ cycle. The short circuit analysis shows
that the interruption rate of 37 circuit breaker is less than that of the short circuit current, the
reason is that these circuit breakers are series rated [45] protection. When a short circuit happens
74
it will be designated to connection of two or more circuit breakers that are series. Available fault
current for downstream device is more than interrupting rating of that circuit breaker and
available fault current is less than interrupting rating of upstream circuit breaker.
4.11.3 Protective device coordination study
A protective device coordination study is conducted with the purpose of attaining the most
effective and consistent coordination for the existing equipment. The aim of the study is to
describe the best device settings to achieve selective coordination, in a way that the nearest
device to the fault tries to operate first, and interrupt the fault current and clear the downstream
fault. Additionally, these protective devices must operate in the least probable time to avoid or
reduce damages to equipment, cables, or other protective devices, and also the interruption of
service caused by loss of power.
Besides, the setting has been examined for the case study. The coordination of the main circuit
breaker for the equipment with main circuit breakers has been evaluated with the biggest branch
feeder circuit breaker to the upstream feeder breaker in the upstream switchgear.
The coordination study demonstrates that on the whole, the appropriate coordination between the
various circuit breakers is achievable. Annex D displays the coordination curves for five buses of
D3, F55, F76A, I21 and F70A together with their upstream and downstream equipment as an
example. Coordination for three circuit breakers CB-200, CB-201 and CB-211 are shown in
figure 4.21.
75
Figure 4.21: Coordination curve for bus D3
4.11.4 Arc flash results
Two hundred and seventy one (271) buses were studied to calculate the worst arc flash incident
energy level that might endanger a worker during an arc flash event. The premier category for
applying the personal protective equipment is category 4. Working live for equipment with the
76
‘Over 40 cal./cm2 is not recommended. Figure 4.22 illustrates the arc flash energy level
occurrence.
Figure 4.22: Arc flash category occurrence
Table 4.26 includes the worst case study for arc flash energy levels based on the sixteen (16)
scenarios defined previously in section 4.11.2. Note the following dimensions of the analysis for
each configuration as an instance. The results for buses E to F9 are displayed in the following
table, while the complete analysis of the result is presented in annex B.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level>4
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level>4
77
Table 4.26: Result of worst case analysis
Emergency Mode (EM): The total energy and the arc flash boundary for Bus “F8” at the
emergency configuration are 30.87 cal/cm2 and 10.9 feet respectively. According to NFPA, its
energy level is 4, which is considered a dangerous category. Here, the fault clearing time is 6.614
seconds, the arc flash current at the fault clearing time (FCT) is 1.602 kA, and the main protection
device affects FCT is CB-119.
Normal with closed ties: The total energy and the arc flash boundary for bus “E” at the normal
configuration with closed ties are 75.25 cal/cm2 and 11.9 feet respectively. Based on NFPA, the
energy level is greater than 4, i.e. dangerous. Here, the fault clearing time is 0.657 seconds, the
arc flash current is 29.366 kA, and the main protection device affects FCT is CB-2.
ID kV (kV
)
Output Rpt.
Configuration
Total Energy (cal/cm2)
AFB (ft)
Energy Levels
Final FCT (sec)
Ia at FCT (kA)
Source PD ID
E 0.48
TCAFMAX
Ties Closed
75.25 11.9 > Level 4 0.657 29.366 CB-2
E2 0.48
TCAFMAX
Ties Closed
9.29 5.2 Level 3 0.2 13.639 CB-77
F 0.48
EMAFMAX
EM 1392.24 51.1 > Level 4 57.882 6.935 CB-
GEN1
F1 0.48
NAFMIN
Normal 56.07 10.3 > Level 4 0.668 21.64 CB115A
F1E
0.48
EMAFMIN
EM 221.94 20.4 > Level 4 31.79 2.195 CB-107
F2 0.48
EMAFMIN
EM 115.91 14.7 > Level 4 17.132 2.084 CB-102
F4 0.48
EMAFMIN
EM 129.98 15.6 > Level 4 22.107 1.848 CB-102
F5 0.48
EMAFMIN
EM 218.53 35.8 > Level 4 36.025 2.064 CB-107
F6 0.48
EMAFMIN
EM 29.93 10.6 Level 4 6.136 1.664 CB-119
F7 0.208
EMAFMIN
EM 24.85 9.5 Level 3 7.674 1.157 CB-116
F8 0.48
EMAFMIN
EM 30.87 10.9 Level 4 6.614 1.602 CB-119
F9 0.208
EMAFMIN
EM 18.12 7.8 Level 3 8.86 0.758 CB-120
78
Normal with open ties: The total energy and the arc flash boundary for Bus “F1” at normal
configuration with open ties are 56.07 cal/cm2 and 10.3 feet respectively. As reported by to
NFPA, the energy level is regarded dangerous. Fault clearing time is 0.688 seconds and the arc
flash current is 21.64 kA, while the main protection device affects FCT is CB115A.
Emergency with closed ties (EMTC): The total energy and the arc flash boundary for Bus “I50”
(Annex B) at emergency configuration with closed ties are 54.24 cal/cm2 and 10.1 feet
respectively. According to NFPA, the energy level is considered dangerous. The fault clearing
time is 0.529 seconds, the arc flash current is 26.536 kA, and the main protection device affects
FCT is CB-247. In next chapter different optimization techniques will be investigated to reduce
arc flash energy level and also related cost analysis will be considered.
79
5. Arc flash optimization methods and cost analysis
Arc flash accidents can be decreased by following the procedures in an appropriate manner,
using suitable tools, applying proper preventive maintenance, coordinating protection devices as
well as developing skills and practical experience. Additionally, the mental and physical status of
the workers is equally important, so that the events like dropping the tools, accidental touch, and
etc. can be avoided. The key strategy to avoid exposure is to watch for the sources or reasons of
arc flash.
The approach of changing work methods for optimizing arc flash energy level is based on the
current calculations and modifications of the environment to reduce arc flash energy level.
Approaches that decrease incident energy level by changing work methods include changing
work procedures, adjusting existing settings, and increasing work distances [35].
There are numerous work procedures that can be applied to decrease arc flash energy level, the
best of which is to work in the de-energized state [36]. A complete section of NFPA 70E is
devoted to de-energizing or the process of developing a condition that is electrically safe.
Nonetheless, this is not normally possible in mission critical facilities, since in these places, life
support equipment depends on a continuous power supply. Energized work might be acceptable
in the case the employer is convinced that deenergizing leads to additional or greater hazards,
such as the disruption of life support equipment, deactivation of emergency alarms, and power
failure in hazardous location ventilating equipment [37].
In spite of precautions taken to avoid hazards, accidents are probable to happen. Therefore, it is
logical to keep the incident energy level in the lowest level possible, and to equip the workers for
the worst by means of proper personnel protection equipment (PPE).
80
This chapter is dedicated to various methods of decreasing the arc flash energy level. The
methods presented in sections 5.5 to 5.8 are proposed by Curtis Thomas Latzo in 2011 [38].
These methods are applied for a low voltage power system with 271 buses. Moreover, an
analysis is conducted to compare the cost of using optimization techniques to decrease the arc
flash energy level with the general costs of damage to equipment, injury of workers and down
time of the system.
5.1. Operation of electrical system with a lack of selective coordination
The purpose of protective device coordination is to separate the faulted section of the electrical
system and to prevent the interruption of proximate or parallel feeders. To this end, protective
devices are organized as illustrated in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, while protecting the system for
arc flash, the faulted section must be separated immediately in order to avoid any harm to
electrical equipment and maintenance workers. In case that a protective device system is
selectively coordinated with the aim of isolating faults, the optimal arc flash protection might not
exist.
If it is made possible for the electrical system to operate with a lack of selective coordination, the
arcing current interruption time and consequently the incident energy level might also be
Description BUS03 Incident Energy (IE) 318.62 cal/cm2 1.16 cal/cm2
PPE DANGEROUS LEVEL 0 AFB 24.44 ft 1.47 ft Arcing Current 8.45 kA 8.45 kA
82
This solution must be applied cautiously, since protective device coordination may be influenced
by decreasing the clearing time of protective devices [36]. Besides, no devices must be
downstream, needing sudden in-rush of current that could trip the lowered instantaneous setting.
Starting a motor or energizing a transformer may possibly draw up to six times the operating
amps for that device and consequently lead to a circuit breaker trip in the instantaneous time
domain.
5.3 Arc flash resistant switchgear
Arc flash hazard properties can be included when selecting and specifying the electrical
equipment. Nonetheless, purchasing the equipment requires careful revision of the design and
manufacturing specifications. Low voltage switchgear and control gear assemblies are examined
for short time and short circuit withstand based on IEEE C.37.20 [39]. Manufacturers produce
various new designs to decrease the arc flash energy level [40]. One of the new manufacturing
procedures to optimize incident energy level is arc flash resistant switchgear. In this method, the
arc resistant switchgear is examined in terms of withstanding an internal arc to ensure the safety
of the person operating the switch or working on the equipment against hazard [41]. To do so,
the energy is usually ventilated out of the top of the switchgear or some direction away from the
worker. While it is an excellent way to protect personnel when the equipment is closed, the
worker usually works on the devices when the enclosure is open.
5.4 Increasing the working distance
The calculations from IEEE-1584 for incident energy include a number of unknowns which
need to be collected to attain an accurate result. But the most important variables are the distance
83
from the arc and the time to interrupt the fault. As the incident energy is proportional to the
square of the distance (in open air), increasing the working distance will considerably decrease
the incident energy [42]. However, this solution must be implemented cautiously and carefully,
as increasing the distance might hamper a person’s ability to work on the equipment [36]. The
ways to easily increase working distance include using devices which have remote racking
capability, remote operating equipment, and extension tools. If possible, depending on the
equipment design, it will be favorable to accomplish all switching operations remotely; i.e. away
from the switch gear [37]. Racking and switching of a low voltage power circuit breaker can be
assumed as the highest exposure which can happen in industrial facilities [43]. One solution for
decreasing the exposure is to extend the tool which is used to rack the breaker, or to apply
remote racking/switching equipment which can be obtained from manufacturers or other
suppliers [43]. The effectiveness of increasing the working distance is illustrated in one-line
diagrams in figure 5.2.
84
Figure 5.2: Increasing the working distance at bus03 (one Line)
Table 5.3 shows that the working distance increase from 18 inches to 13.3 feet through the use
of a remote racking device at bus03 results in the incident energy reduction from 381.36 cal/cm2
to 4.82 cal/cm2 and energy level reduction from dangerous to level 2.
Table 5.3: Decreasing incident energy of bus 03
Description BUS03 Incident Energy (IE) 381.364 cal/cm^2 4.827 cal/cm^2 PPE DANGEROUS LEVEL 2 AFB 26.73 ft 26.73 ft Arcing Current 7.18 kA 7.18 kA Working Distance 18 160
85
5.5 Applying a single main circuit breaker for building shutdown
The main distribution panel in mission critical facilities must be appropriately maintained, since
arc flash energy level at these locations is important. According to the national electrical code, an
electrical service may shut down using a maximum of six grouped devices, which can include
circuit breakers, fused switches, or disconnect switches. It is frequently performed by having a
main panel with no main circuit breaker and a maximum of six feeder breakers. Figure 5.3
illustrates one line diagram of this scenario. This installation is acceptable by the NEC and is
typically found in 480 volt electrical distribution systems.
Figure 5.3: Building without single main circuit breaker for shutdown (one line)
The simulation displays a utility serving a main distribution panel ‘Panel A’. Panel A is
constructed without any main circuit breakers and four feeder breakers represented as CB1-4. In
86
this situation, the four feeder breakers are acceptable for being applied as the building
disconnecting means based on NEC 230.
As it is indicated in the simulation in figure 5.3, the fault current of the panel A is calculated
38.9kA, which can be considered a moderate level. The arcing current is illustrated to be 10.8 kA
which is assumed a reasonable level for this type of facility.
Nevertheless, the arc flash energy level for this kind of installation is particularly high, since the
only device to protect panel A is the utility fuse located on the primary side of the transformer.
As it can be seen in table 5.4, the incident energy at panel A is 5656.32 cal/cm2, which
corresponds to the dangerous energy level (level 4) in classification.
The service entrance can be studied from the time current analysis viewpoint. Table 5.4
demonstrates the utility fuse which interrupts the arcing current beyond at 145.635 seconds, and
therefore justifies the high level of energy.
Table 5.4: without single main circuit breaker for building shutdown
ID kV
(kV) Total Energy
(cal/cm²) AFB (ft)
Final FCT (sec)
Ia at FCT (kA)
Source PD ID
% Ia Variation
Bus1 13.8 0 6.195
Bus2 0.208 5121.47 98 129.609 10.977 Fuse-Utility
15%
Panel A 0.208 5656.32 103 145.635 10.803 Fuse-Utility
If the total costs of existing transformers are subtracted from the cost of suggested transformers,
the difference would be $17,963 dollar, which seems cost effective for taking preventive action
and avoiding risk of damage to workers, equipment and related expenses.
5.9.2 Cost analysis for circuit breakers
In sum, there are 13 circuit breakers which are linked to transformers rated above 125 KVA
(optimization technique used in section 5.7) and the price will be discussed here for adding trip
units (Long, short and instantaneous). Three 200 ampere circuit breakers are connected to 150
KVA transformers, four 300 ampere circuit breakers are connected to 225 KVA transformer,
Five 400 ampere circuit breakers are connected to 300 KVA transformers and one 1000 ampere
circuit breaker are connected to 750 KVA transformers. This circuit breaker (1000 A) is
equipped to LSI trip unit. Table 5.16 demonstrates the list of related breakers.
110
Table 5.16: List of circuit breakers connected to transformers rated above 125 KVA
Item Description LSI Trip
(Unit Price $)
QTY Total
Price $
1 Circuit breaker 200 A 500 3 1500
2 Circuit Breaker 300 A 700 4 2800
3 Circuit Breaker 400 A 700 5 3500
4 Circuit Breaker 1000 A Included 1 -
Total Cost: $ 7800
The LSI trip unit costs are estimated roughly. They are obtained from different sources on the
Internet. Since twelve trip units are needed, the total cost would be $ 7800.
Comparing the result of optimization to the cost of downtimes estimates from table 5.13, it is
observed that the cost of optimization of transformers is 17,963 dollar, while the cost of
optimization of circuit breakers is 7,800 dollar, so the total cost would be 25763 dollars. It is a
reasonable investment for both optimization methods, since the arc flash level is reduced and
therefore it is safer for technicians to work on panels when they are energized. Furthermore, the
probability of downtime is reduced. Meanwhile, it is cost effective, as the minimum four hours
(lowest) downtime from table 5.13 is more than the cost of replacing transformers and circuit
breakers.
This chapter has emphasized on introducing and implementing some techniques to optimize the
arc flash energy level at specific locations in a 480 volt electrical distribution system. The last
four techniques [38] were described and simulated in locations of an electrical system where a
111
high arc flash energy level is normally present as a result of intrinsic properties of the system
design. As it can be seen in this chapter, the application of these methods made it possible to
significantly decrease the arc flash energy level. Thus electrical design engineers can use these
techniques in planning commercial buildings to develop systems with lower arc flash energy
level.
Besides, the cost analysis is accomplished for replacing the transformers and circuit breakers.
The result indicates that it is reasonable to both consider optimization techniques for reducing arc
flash energy level and to invest more at the design stage of low voltage systems, since the cost of
implementing optimization techniques is much less than the cost of retrofitting damage to
equipment, injury of workers and downtime of critical facilities.
112
6. Conclusion and future work
The thesis has focused on optimization techniques to decrease arc flash energy level in electrical
systems operating at 600 V or below. The procedures for calculating fault current, coordinating
protective devices and analyzing arc flash have been presented. A number of mainstream arc
flash optimization products and techniques have been described. A 271-bus existing facility was
used for arc flash studies involving different scenarios. Results of applying optimization
solutions have been presented.
The study conducted on short circuit shows that to achieve maximum fault currents from three
phase faults, the interrupting ratings of existing equipment are sufficient, with the exceptions
(shown in red) found in Annex C. These circuit breakers are series rated protection [45]. The
results of the study on protective device coordination demonstrate that there is a satisfactory
coordination between the circuit breakers considered in this study.
The study compared the cost of applying optimization methods with that of the arc flash
consequences. The results indicate that the cost of implementing the techniques to reduce arc
flash energy level at the design stage is much less than the downtime costs.
6.1 Conclusions
The impact of using four optimization techniques to reduce the arc flash energy level at specific
places in an electrical distribution system has been studied.
The first technique is applied at the electrical service entrance whose aim was lowering the arc
flash energy level at the main distribution panel. The simulations showed that when multiple
113
electrical disconnects are applied as allowed by NEC, the arc flash energy level can be
enormously high. When the system is designed using one main circuit breaker, the main
distribution panel needs an interrupting device to reduce the energy level of an arc flash.
Applying this optimization technique for this particular case resulted in the arc flash energy level
reduction from 5656.32 cal/cm2 to 1.39 cal/cm2. This improved the PPE category from a
dangerous level to a category 1. Therefore, a qualified technician can now accomplish
maintenance on this device with minimal arc-flash energy level.
The second technique is applied at the electrical service entrance whose aim was reducing the arc
flash energy level at the main distribution panel. The simulation revealed that when fused
disconnects are applied as allowed by NEC, the arc flash energy level can at times be particularly
high at the main distribution panel. However, when the system is designed with a low voltage
power circuit breaker with LSI modifications as the main circuit breaker, the energy level of an
arc flash is reduced.
Applying this optimization technique for this particular case analyzed, caused reduction in the
arc flash energy level from 31.43 cal /cm2 to 1.39 cal /cm2. This altered the PPE category from a
dangerous level down to a category 1. Now it is possible for a qualified technician to accomplish
maintenance on this device with minimal arc flash energy level.
The third technique is used at a feeder circuit from the main distribution panel which is serving a
step down transformer. The simulation revealed that when a transformer that is larger than 125
KVA is protected by a thermal magnetic breaker, the secondary side arc flash energy level can
be exceedingly high. However, when the feeder is designed with a low voltage circuit breaker
with LSI modifications, the arc flash energy level can be optimized to a safer (lower) level.
114
Applying this technique for this particular case caused the arc flash energy level reduction from
1209.32 cal /cm2 to 0.42 cal/cm2. This made the PPE category to change from energy level 4
down to level 0. It is now possible for a qualified technician to do maintenance on this device
with minimal arc flash energy level.
The fourth technique is applied at a feeder circuit from the main distribution panel which is
serving a step down transformer. The simulation indicated that when a transformer which is
larger than 125 KVA is protected by a thermal magnetic breaker, the secondary side arc flash
energy level can be tremendously high. Nonetheless, when the feeder is designed with two
smaller circuits with reduced KVA transformers, the arc flash energy level decreases
significantly.
Using this optimization technique for this case study resulted in the arc flash incident energy
reduction from 31.46 cal /cm2 to 0.27 cal/cm2. This made the PPE category to change from level
4 level down to 0. Thus a qualified technician can implement maintenance on this device with
minimal arc-flash energy level. In all four cases, the application of the recommended design
technique has caused a significant reduction in the energy level.
For the case study, the settings of 11 circuit breakers which were connected to transformers
above 125 KVA has changed. The result demonstrates that arc flash energy has changed from
Level 4 to Levels 0, 1 and 2. This makes it possible for the technicians to work on energized
panels.
Moreover, cost analysis is conducted for replacement of transformers and circuit breakers. The
result reveals that it is reasonable to apply optimization techniques for reducing arc flash energy
level and to invest more at design stage of low voltage systems, since the cost of executing
115
optimization techniques is much less than that of retrofitting, damage to equipment, injury of
workers and downtime of system.
The result of optimization of case study is compared to the cost of downtimes estimations from
table 5.13. It is found that the optimization of transformers costs 17,963 dollar and the
optimization of circuit breakers costs 7,800 dollar and total cost is 25,763 dollars. It is a
reasonable investment for both optimization methods, since the cost of investment is less than
that of the downtime and the arc flash energy level is reduced, so it is safer for technicians to
work on panels when they are energized, while the probability of downtime is also reduced. As it
is mentioned earlier, it is cost-effective, as the minimum cost of a four-hour downtime (lowest) is
more than the cost of replacing transformers and circuit breakers.
6.2 Future Work
Future efforts on arc flash analysis should focus on additional development of time domain
models of system faults. New models should yield better estimates of incident energy values,
which will offer better protection to workers, without needing excessive PPE.
Designing industrial power systems for arc flash safety is the least costly method of following
current safety standards. Constant development of innovative low cost protective devices results
in less expensive alternatives for retrofitting existing systems to comply with the standards. So,
the performance of new devices should be analyzed.
Additional detailed cost analyses should be conducted for various low voltage systems and for
the related optimization methods using different alternatives, so that the most cost effective
strategy can be selected for optimization methods.
116
117
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Annex B Result of arc flash study (worst case) for 271 bus system
ID kV
(kV) Output
Rpt. Configuration
Total Energy
(cal/cm²)
AFB (ft)
Energy Levels
Final FCT (sec)
Ia at FCT (kA)
Source PD ID
A 13.8 NAFMA
X Normal 5.26 3.1 Level 2 0.12 17.556
NORM SERV
B 13.8 NAFMA
X Normal 3.37 2.5 Level 1 0.077 17.529 FUSE1
BM2D52
0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 1.79 1.8 Level 1 0.15 3.618 CB-104
C 13.8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 3.43 2.5 Level 1 0.079 17.483 FUSE2
D 0.48 NAFMA
X Normal 58.28 10.5
> Level 4
0.625 24.271 CB-1
D1 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 867.6 82.9 > Level
4 162.127 1.842 CB-101
D1A 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 874.32 40.5 > Level
4 140.571 1.978 CB-101
D1B 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 3.36 2.5 Level 1 0.026 33.398 CB-3
D1C 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 874.32 40.5 > Level
4 140.571 1.978 CB-101
D2 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.489097 1 Level 0 0.012 11.203 CB-7
D3 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.303614 0.6 Level 0 0.011 8.615 CB-8
D4 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.801793 1.2 Level 0 0.008 26.582 CB-4
D5 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 0.275931 0.6 Level 0 0.015 5.735 CB-5
D6 0.48 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 8.46 4 Level 3 30.279 FUSE5
D7 0.48 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 10.12 4.4 Level 3 24.952 FUSE5
D8 0.48 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 10.4 4.4 Level 3 24.822 FUSE5
D9 0.48 EMTCAFMAX
EMTC 0.25 0.6 Level 0 21.754 FUSE 6
D10 0.20
8 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 31.46 7.7 Level 4 3.319 FUSE7
D11 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 24.56 9.4 Level 3 2.772 2.94 CB-28
D12 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.144963 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.793 CB-26
D13 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.148789 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.89 CB-24
D14 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.171397 0.5 Level 0 0.016 3.536 CB-22
123
D15 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 32.24 11.1 Level 4 5.362 2.057 CB-20
D16 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.136216 0.4 Level 0 0.018 2.513 CB-18
D16A
0.208
TCAFMIN
Ties Closed
32.24 11.1 Level 4 5.362 2.057 CB-13
D17 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.123088 0.4 Level 0 0.02 2.109 CB-16
D19 0.48 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 10.95 4.5 Level 3 24.562 FUSE5
D20 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.25 0.6 Level 0 20.869 FUSE 8
D21 0.20
8 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 31.52 11 Level 4 3.119 FUSE9
D22 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.173073 0.5 Level 0 0.016 3.534 CB-32
D23 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 0.135164 0.4 Level 0 0.027 1.736 CB-34
D24 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.123071 0.4 Level 0 0.02 2.108 CB-36
D25 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 32.25 11.1 Level 4 5.366 2.056 CB-38
D26 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 32.25 11.1 Level 4 5.366 2.056 CB-41
D27 0.48 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 11.5 4.6 Level 3 24.305 FUSE5
D28 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.041196 0.2 Level 0 0.008 1.724 CB-46
D29 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.024183 0.1 Level 0 0.008 1.053 CB-47
D30 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 27.12 10 Level 4 6.185 1.536 FUSE10
D31 0.48 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 22.23 8.9 Level 3 15.248 FUSE5
D32 0.48 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 10.67 4.5 Level 3 24.692 FUSE5
D33 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 50.92 14.7
> Level 4
6.135 2.771 FUSE11
D34 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.157773 0.4 Level 0 0.017 3.147 CB-51
D35 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.157773 0.4 Level 0 0.017 3.147 CB-52
D36 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 0.242876 0.6 Level 0 0.06 1.425 CB-53
D37 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.121254 0.4 Level 0 0.021 2.022 CB-54
D38 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 4.39 3.3 Level 2 1.582 1.006 CB-55
D39 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.110472 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.187 CB-56
124
D40 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 0.141175 0.4 Level 0 0.034 1.455 CB-57
D41 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.327483 0.7 Level 0 0.004 22.19 FUSE12
D42 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 117.37 14.8
> Level 4
16.162 2.29 FUSE13
D43 0.48 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 11.22 4.6 Level 3 24.433 FUSE5
D44 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.230074 0.5 Level 0 0.004 16.007 FUSE14
D45 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 77.25 19
> Level 4
11.994 2.193 RL2-FS02
D46 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 26.77 7.1 Level 4 3.879 2.183 CB-67
D47 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.123604 0.4 Level 0 0.018 2.388 CB-69
D48 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.123604 0.4 Level 0 0.018 2.388 CB-71
D49 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.123604 0.4 Level 0 0.018 2.388 CB-73
D50 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 138.71 16.1
> Level 4
24.991 1.786 FIRE
PUMP BKR N
D51 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 141.9 16.3
> Level 4
26.196 1.746 FIRE
PUMP BKR N
D52 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 1.54 1.7 Level 1 0.15 3.384 CB-104
D53 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 22.23 8.9 Level 3 6.37 1.238 CB-85
D53A
0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.182417 0.6 Level 0 0.016 3.46 CB-85
D54 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.041958 0.2 Level 0 0.008 1.753 CB-87
D55 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 17.37 7.6 Level 3 8.181 0.784 CB-89
D55A
0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.212192 0.6 Level 0 0.015 4.164 CB-89
D56 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 8.07 4.8 Level 3 3.883 0.767 CB91
D57 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 1.51 1.7 Level 1 0.15 3.318 CB-104
D58 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 24.34 9.4 Level 3 7.414 1.171 CB-94
D59 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 1.45 1.7 Level 1 0.15 3.194 CB-104
D60 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 24.6 9.4 Level 3 7.546 1.164 CB-97
D61 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 59.39 16.2
> Level 4
19.508 1.097 CB-290
125
D62 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 60.28 16.3
> Level 4
20.064 1.083 CB-290
D63 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 60.28 16.3
> Level 4
20.064 1.083 CB-290
D64 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 61.17 16.5
> Level 4
20.627 1.07 CB-290
D65 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 1.89 1.9 Level 1 0.15 3.816 CB-106
D66 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 1.57 1.8 Level 1 0.15 3.432 CB-106
E 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 75.25 11.9
> Level 4
0.657 29.366 CB-2
E1 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.602785 1 Level 0 0.008 21.846 CB-75
E2 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 9.29 5.2 Level 3 0.2 13.639 CB-77
E3 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 5.41 3.2 Level 2 0.1 14.688 CB-79
E4 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.619691 1.1 Level 0 0.013 12.768 CB-80
E5 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 2.88 2.3 Level 1 0.051 15.275 CB-81
E6 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 2.78 2.3 Level 1 0.051 14.794 CB-82
E7 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 2.78 2.3 Level 1 0.051 14.794 CB-83
E8 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.834716 1.3 Level 0 0.053 4.687 CB-84
F 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 1392.24 51.1 > Level
4 57.882 6.935 CB-GEN1
F1 0.48 NAFMI
N Normal 56.07 10.3
> Level 4
0.668 21.64 CB115A
F1B 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 5.95 3.3 Level 2 0.1 16.031 CB-115
F1E 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 221.94 20.4 > Level
4 31.79 2.195 CB-107
F2 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 115.91 14.7 > Level
4 17.132 2.084 CB-102
F3 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.990049 1.4 Level 0 0.008 32.308 CB-113
F4 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 129.98 15.6 > Level
4 22.107 1.848 CB-102
F5 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 218.53 35.8 > Level
4 36.025 2.064 CB-107
F6 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 29.93 10.6 Level 4 6.136 1.664 CB-119
F7 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 24.85 9.5 Level 3 7.674 1.157 CB-116
F8 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 30.87 10.9 Level 4 6.614 1.602 CB-119
126
F9 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 18.12 7.8 Level 3 8.86 0.758 CB-120
F10 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.387487 0.8 Level 0 0.016 7.573 CB-123
F11 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 23.09 9.1 Level 3 6.791 1.209 CB-123A
F12 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.334838 0.7 Level 0 0.016 6.343 CB-123
F13 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 17.54 7.7 Level 3 8.334 0.778 CB-127
F14 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 18.87 8 Level 3 4.731 1.398 CB-130
F14A
0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.313544 0.8 Level 0 0.014 6.306 CB-130
F15 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 15.66 7.2 Level 3 4.075 1.35 CB-131
F16 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 24.56 9.4 Level 3 7.526 1.165 CB-134
F16A
0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 0.13312 0.5 Level 0 0.029 1.511 CB-134
F17 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 19.94 8.3 Level 3 6.287 1.134 CB-135
F18 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 20.37 8.4 Level 3 5.426 1.322 CB-138
F18A
0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.258585 0.7 Level 0 0.015 5.115 CB-138
F19 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 18.6 8 Level 3 5.557 1.191 CB-139
F20 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 20.72 8.5 Level 3 5.596 1.306 CB-142
F20A
0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.217701 0.6 Level 0 0.015 4.219 CB-142
F21 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 17.03 7.6 Level 3 7.883 0.797 CB-145
F22 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 10.02 4.3 Level 3 20.364 FUSE16
F23 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 11.98 4.7 Level 3 19.782 FUSE16
F24 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 12.62 4.9 Level 3 19.593 FUSE16
F25 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.332715 0.8 Level 0 0.004 21.044 FUSE17
F26 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.336009 0.7 Level 0 0.004 22.724 FUSE18
F27 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 203.02 34.2
> Level 4
24.453 2.774 FUSE19
F27A
0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 13.24 5 Level 3 19.406 FUSE16
F28 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 37.92 12.3 Level 4 7.904 1.67 CB-151
127
F29 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.153015 0.4 Level 0 0.017 3.009 CB-153
F30 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.289513 0.6 Level 0 0.004 19.799 FUSE20
F31 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 28.5 10.3 Level 4 4.471 2.172 FUSE21
F32 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 13.86 5.1 Level 3 19.222 FUSE16
F33 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 13.93 6.7 Level 3 5.848 0.874 FUSE22
F34 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.234352 0.6 Level 0 0.004 16.283 FUSE23
F35 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 12.93 4.9 Level 3 19.499 FUSE16
F36 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.269098 0.6 Level 0 0.004 18.504 FUSE25
F37 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.184283 0.5 Level 0 0.004 13.037 FUSE26
F39 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 86.84 20.4
> Level 4
11.677 2.505 FUSE24
F40 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.150815 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.947 CB-165
F41 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.145415 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.796 CB-166
F42 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.120826 0.4 Level 0 0.021 2.002 CB-167
F43 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 24.33 6.8 Level 3 3.064 2.487 CB-168
F44 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 13.86 5.1 Level 3 19.222 FUSE16
F45 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.154084 0.4 Level 0 0.004 11.047 FUSE27
F46 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 2224.39
147.1
> Level 4
194.529 3.73 FUSE28
F46A
0.48 NAFMI
N Normal 0.488862 1 Level 0 0.008 15.821 FUSE28
F47 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 26.69 7.1 Level 4 3.85 2.194 CB-171
F48 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.245393 0.6 Level 0 0.019 4.086 CB-172
F49 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 0.264776 0.7 Level 0 0.024 3.313 CB-173
F50 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.195124 0.5 Level 0 0.015 4.11 CB-174
F51 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 24.94 9.5 Level 3 2.864 2.899 CB-177
F52 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 23.87 9.3 Level 3 2.613 3.029 CB-179
F53 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.128589 0.4 Level 0 0.019 2.278 CB-181
128
F54 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 577.42 64.6
> Level 4
61.2 3.122 FUSE29
F55 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 56.86 10.3
> Level 4
0.532 27.563 CB-115B
F55A
0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.270585 0.7 Level 0 0.01 7.674 CB-214
F55B
0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.281695 0.7 Level 0 0.01 8.172 CB-213
F55D
0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.524466 1 Level 0 0.008 17.949 CB-184
F55E
0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 12.22 4.8 Level 3 0.2 16.425 CB-191
F55G
0.48 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 4.07 2.8 Level 2 0.066 16.451 C-196
F56 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 115.29 24.2 > Level
4 20.135 1.92 CB-103
F57 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 30.7 10.8 Level 4 6.528 1.579 CB-185
F58 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 29.99 10.7 Level 4 6.177 1.618 CB-187
F59 0.48 NAFMI
N Normal 0.289446 0.6 Level 0 0.017 5.349 CB-184
F60 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 374.79 49.7 > Level
4 63.701 2.007 CB-109
F61 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 29.91 10.6 Level 4 6.038 1.662 CB-192
F62 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 185.29 32.3 > Level
4 40.974 1.573 CB-194
F63 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 501.16 59.3 > Level
4 85.299 2.007 CB-110
F64 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 165.83 30.2 > Level
4 33.261 1.718 CB-197
F65 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 282.11 23 > Level
4 43.893 2.032 CB-198
F66 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 0.298296 0.7 Level 0 0.022 4.051 CB-108
F67 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 1.01 1.4 Level 0 0.045 6.457 CB-103
F68 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 211.25 19.9 > Level
4 30.766 2.152 CB-109
F69 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 506.14 30.8 > Level
4 74.302 2.149 CB-110
F70 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 685.12 71.7
> Level 4
57.544 3.872 CB-200
F70A
0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 3.05 2.4 Level 1 0.028 28.44 CB-200
F70B
0.208
TCAFMIN
Ties Closed
681.86 35.7 > Level
4 48.564 4.215 CB-200
F71 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 65.42 17.1
> Level 4
12.91 1.757 CB202
129
F72 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.075707 0.3 Level 0 0.018 1.504 CB-205
F73 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 105.67 23
> Level 4
10.111 3.432 CB-208
F74 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.197234 0.6 Level 0 0.018 3.435 CB-211
F75 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.214888 0.6 Level 0 0.016 4.012 CB-212
F76 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 691.39 72.1
> Level 4
58.697 3.834 CB-215
F76A
0.48 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 3.13 2.4 Level 1 0.044 19.056 CB-215
F76B
0.208
TCAFMIN
Ties Closed
688.52 35.9 > Level
4 49.604 4.17 CB-215
F77 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 17.34 7.6 Level 3 5.835 1.072 CB-243
F78 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 14.27 6.8 Level 3 4.292 1.19 CB-240
F79 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 16.44 7.4 Level 3 5.366 1.103 CB-237
F80 0.20
8 EMTCA
FMIN EMTC 0.128094 0.4 Level 0 0.024 1.814 CB-234
F81 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 13.43 6.5 Level 3 3.897 1.229 CB-231
F82 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.14387 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.765 CB-228
F83 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 13.01 6.4 Level 3 3.708 1.25 CB-225
F84 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 38.5 12.4 Level 4 8.149 1.646 CB-222
F85 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 31.31 10.9 Level 4 4.991 2.14 CB-218
F86 0.20
8 TCAFM
IN Ties
Closed 37.75 8.4 Level 4 6.6 1.836 CB-217
F87 13.8 NAFMA
X Normal 3.28 2.5 Level 1 0.08 16.573 FUSE1
F88 13.8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 3.34 2.5 Level 1 0.082 16.434 FUSE2
F89 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 115.91 14.7 > Level
4 17.132 2.084 CB-102
F90 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 221.94 20.4 > Level
4 31.79 2.195 CB-107
F91 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 0.371097 0.8 Level 0 0.021 5.201 CB-108
F92 0.48 NAFMI
N Normal 109.91 14.4
> Level 4
15.562 2.214 CB-103
F93 0.48 NAFMI
N Normal 365.18 26.2
> Level 4
51.394 2.239 CB-109
F94 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 506.14 30.8 > Level
4 74.302 2.149 CB-110
130
F95 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 1.79 1.8 Level 1 0.15 3.618 CB-104
F96 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 1.89 1.9 Level 1 0.15 3.816 CB-106
F97 0.48 EMAFMAX
EM 0.762621 1.2 Level 0 0.15 1.647 CB-105
F100 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.866543 1.3 Level 0 0.007 32.427 CB-183
G 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 1173.31 46.9 > Level
4 168.059 2.206 CB-GEN2
H 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 1198.27 47.4 > Level
4 175.658 2.158 CB-GEN3
I1 13.8 NAFMA
X Normal 3.28 2.5 Level 1 0.08 16.495 FUSE1
I2 13.8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 3.33 2.5 Level 1 0.082 16.359 FUSE2
I3 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 54.52 10.1 > Level
4 0.654 21.878 CB-246
I4 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 6.31 3.4 Level 2 21.46 FUSE 32
I5 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 8.05 3.9 Level 3 20.945 FUSE 32
I6 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 8.63 4 Level 3 20.774 FUSE 32
I7 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.259416 0.6 Level 0 0.004 17.887 FUSE 33
I8 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 13.81 6.6 Level 3 5.788 0.876 FUSE34
I9 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 9.21 4.2 Level 3 20.603 FUSE 32
I10 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.313653 0.7 Level 0 0.004 21.322 FUSE35
I11 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 1868.38
132.2
> Level 4
154.796 3.921 FUSE36
I12 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.251368 0.6 Level 0 0.019 4.267 CB-257
I13 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 29.58 10.6 Level 4 4.339 2.312 CB-258
I14 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 1.71 1.9 Level 1 0.467 1.301 CB-259
I15 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 29.58 10.6 Level 4 4.339 2.312 CB-260
I16 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.130967 0.4 Level 0 0.019 2.352 CB-261
I17 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 9.79 4.3 Level 3 20.432 FUSE 32
I18 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 22.74 9 Level 3 13.369 FUSE 32
I19 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 85.55 20.2
> Level 4
11.448 2.517 FUSE37
131
I20 0.20
8 EMAFMIN
EM 0.149084 0.4 Level 0 0.036 1.45 CB-264
I21 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.14362 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.758 CB-266
I22 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 10.36 4.4 Level 3 20.262 FUSE 32
I23 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.273997 0.6 Level 0 0.004 18.816 FUSE38
I24 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.251125 0.6 Level 0 0.019 4.26 CB-275
I25 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.251125 0.6 Level 0 0.019 4.26 CB-274
I26 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.213309 0.5 Level 0 0.015 4.54 CB-272
I27 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.149376 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.907 CB-270
I29 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 25.19 9.6 Level 4 2.923 2.871 CB-277
I30 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 38.87 12.5 Level 4 8.308 1.632 CB-279
I31 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 25.19 9.6 Level 4 2.923 2.871 CB-282
I32 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.288542 0.6 Level 0 0.004 19.738 FUSE41
I33 0.48 EMAFMIN
EM 8.92 4.1 Level 3 20.688 FUSE 32
I34 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 13.82 6.6 Level 3 5.79 0.876 FUSE42
I35 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.258115 0.6 Level 0 0.004 17.804 FUSE43
I36 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 223.37 36.2
> Level 4
25.639 2.9 CB-287
I36A 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.300625 0.8 Level 0 0.009 9.603 CB-287
I37 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.167476 0.5 Level 0 0.016 3.388 CB-291
I38 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.157456 0.4 Level 0 0.017 3.12 CB-291
I39 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.148566 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.886 CB-291
I40 0.20
8 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 0.140999 0.4 Level 0 0.018 2.684 CB-291
I41 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 4.32 3.3 Level 2 1.546 1.013 CB-296
I42 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 4.5 3.4 Level 2 1.643 0.994 CB-296
I43 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 4.74 3.5 Level 2 1.778 0.97 CB-296
I44 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 160.93 17.4
> Level 4
1.559 26.693 FUSE31
132
I44A 0.48 TCAFM
AX Ties
Closed 138.71 16.1
> Level 4
24.991 1.786 FIRE
PUMP BKR N
I45 0.48 NAFMA
X Normal 4.87 3.5 Level 2 0.1 14.247 CB-298
I46 0.48 NAFMA
X Normal 0.642312 1.1 Level 0 0.053 3.678 CB-300
I47 0.48 NAFMA
X Normal 0.775128 1.2 Level 0 0.053 4.377 CB-301
I48 0.48 NAFMA
X Normal 0.406563 0.8 Level 0 0.008 15.122 CB-302
I49 0.48 NAFMA
X Normal 3.24 2.7 Level 1 0.1 9.783 CB-303
I50 0.48 EMTCAFMAX
EMTC 54.24 10.1 > Level
4 0.529 26.536 CB-247
I51 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 62.65 10.8
> Level 4
13.171 1.548 CB-307
I52 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 49.43 9.6
> Level 4
8.5 1.865 CB-308
I53 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 191.45 18.9
> Level 4
20.705 2.864 CB-309
I54 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 191.45 18.9
> Level 4
20.705 2.864 CB-310
I55 0.20
8 NAFMA
X Normal 0.171799 0.6 Level 0 0.018 2.99 CB-311
I56 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 144.82 16.5
> Level 4
12.116 3.631 CB-312
I57 0.20
8 NAFMA
X Normal 0.169491 0.6 Level 0 0.018 2.902 CB-313
I58 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 149.44 16.7
> Level 4
12.843 3.542 CB-314
I59 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 150.66 28.5
> Level 4
14.932 3.322 CB-315
I60 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 983.28
190.1
> Level 4
75.431 6.411 CB-305
I60A 0.48 NAFMA
X Normal 5.27 3.1 Level 2 0.051 26.92 CB-305
I60B 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 1423.97 51.7
> Level 4
53.554 7.608 CB-305
I61 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 1142.84 98
> Level 4
94.851 3.915 FUSE39
I62 0.20
8 NAFMI
N Normal 400.46 51.7
> Level 4
42.234 3.137 FUSE40
133
Appendix C: Result of short circuit study for 271 bus system
Location:
Engineer: Study Case: SC
12.0.0C Page: 1
SN:
Filename:
Project: ETAP
Contract:
Date:
Revision: Base
Config.: Normal
Momentary Duty Summary Report
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
ID kA Peak kA rms kA rms kA Peak kA rms M.F. Ratio kA rms Type ID kV Symm. X/R Asymm. Asymm. Symm. Asymm. Asymm.
Momentary Duty Device Bus Device Capability
34.036 19.828 1.128 3.2 17.572 A 13.800 A Bus 33.968 19.790 1.128 3.2 17.544 B 13.800 B Bus 15.661 10.578 1.002 1.0 10.552 BM2D52 0.480 BM2D52 Bus 33.973 19.793 1.128 3.2 17.546 C 13.800 C Bus
111.511 65.264 1.407 8.8 46.391 D 0.480 D Bus 81.100 65.000 100.554 58.361 1.328 6.5 43.954 D1 0.480 D1 Panelboard
12.468 7.234 1.324 6.4 5.465 D1A 0.480 D1A Bus 105.721 61.572 1.363 7.4 45.165 D1B 0.480 D1B Bus 105.721 61.572 1.363 7.4 45.165 D1C 0.480 D1C Bus 24.141 15.673 1.010 1.4 15.519 D2 0.480 D2 Bus
5.353 3.558 1.005 1.2 3.541 F86 0.208 F86 Bus 31.917 18.616 1.123 3.1 16.571 F87 13.800 F87 Bus 31.707 18.494 1.123 3.1 16.466 F88 13.800 F88 Bus 15.277 9.020 1.476 11.9 6.111 F89 0.480 F89 Bus 15.562 9.223 1.504 13.6 6.134 F90 0.480 F90 Bus 13.693 7.956 1.340 6.8 5.936 F91 0.480 F91 Bus 14.746 8.661 1.436 9.9 6.033 F92 0.480 F92 Bus 15.802 9.383 1.518 14.7 6.183 F93 0.480 F93 Bus 15.715 9.323 1.511 14.2 6.169 F94 0.480 F94 Bus
7.533 4.476 1.076 2.5 4.162 F95 0.480 F95 Bus 7.711 4.569 1.081 2.5 4.228 F96 0.480 F96 Bus 2.387 1.685 1.000 0.5 1.685 F97 0.480 F97 Bus
122.790 71.727 1.390 8.2 51.587 F100 0.480 F100 Bus 15.912 9.457 1.524 15.2 6.204 G 0.480 G Bus 16.551 9.888 1.561 19.0 6.335 GEN 1 BUS 0.480 GEN 1 BUS Bus 16.551 9.888 1.561 19.0 6.335 GEN 2 BUS 0.480 GEN 2 BUS Bus 16.551 9.888 1.561 19.0 6.335 GEN 3 BUS 0.480 GEN 3 BUS Bus 15.980 9.503 1.528 15.6 6.219 H 0.480 H Bus 31.752 18.521 1.123 3.1 16.493 I1 13.800 I1 Bus 31.548 18.403 1.123 3.1 16.390 I2 13.800 I2 Bus
103.982 60.899 1.413 9.0 43.112 I3 0.480 I3 Bus 99.730 58.211 1.383 8.0 42.076 I4 0.480 I4 Bus 92.573 53.651 1.310 6.1 40.944 I5 0.480 I5 Bus 90.399 52.312 1.289 5.7 40.568 I6 0.480 I6 Bus
Method: IEEE - X/R is calculated from separate R & X networks.
* Indicates a device with momentary duty exceeding the device capability
Protective device duty is calculated based on total fault current. The multiplication factors for high voltage circuit-breaker and high voltage bus momentary duty (asymmetrical and crest values) are calculated based on system X/R.
Location:
Engineer: Study Case: SC
12.0.0C Page: 9
SN:
Filename:
Project: ETAP
Contract:
Date:
Revision: Base
Config.: Normal
Interrupting Duty Summary Report
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
ID Int. PF kV kA rms M.F. Ratio kA rms Type ID kV Symm. X/R Adj. Sym. Test
GEN 1 BUS 0.480 CB-GEN1 Molded Case 6.335 19.0 1.252 7.931 0.480 20.00 85.000 85.000 GEN 2 BUS 0.480 CB-GEN2 Molded Case 6.335 19.0 1.252 7.931 0.480 20.00 85.000 85.000
GEN 3 BUS 0.480 CB-GEN3 Molded Case 6.335 19.0 1.252 7.931 0.480 20.00 85.000 85.000
H 0.480 CB-109 Molded Case 6.219 15.6 1.226 7.622 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-110 Molded Case 6.219 15.6 1.226 7.622 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000 GEN 3 MAIN InsulUnfuse 6.219 15.6 1.148 7.141 0.480 15.00 65.000 65.000
Method: IEEE - X/R is calculated from separate R & X networks. HV CB interrupting capability is adjusted based on bus nominal voltage
Generator protective device duty is calculated based on maximum through fault current. Other protective device duty is calculated based on total fault current. Short-circuit multiplying factor for LV Molded Case and Insulated Case Circuit Breakers is calculated based on asymmetrical current.
* Indicates a device with interrupting duty exceeding the device capability ** Indicates that the circuit breaker has been flagged as a generator circuit breaker. However, ETAP could not detect a single path, without a transformer, to the specified generator. Therefore, this circuit breaker is treated as a regular circuit breaker in short-circuit calculations. + The prefault voltage exceeds the rated maximum kV limit of the circuit breaker - The rated interrupting kA must be derated.