APPLICATION OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW EXPLAINEDIn the case
of People vs. Gabres, the Court has had occasion to so state that
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense. The penalty next lower
should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the
minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court
and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.The
fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed
P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of
the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken
as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This
interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws
should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the
penalty next lower would then be prision correccional minimum to
medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should
be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months . . . (People v. Saley; GR 121179, July 2,
98)INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; APPLICABLE ALSO IN DRUG CASES: The
final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since
drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any
act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the
penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death,
provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will
exceed one year of imprisonment. The more important aspect,
however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained. It
is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code,
states that if the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same We hold that this quoted portion of the
section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law
wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without
reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding
illustrations, such that it may be said that the offense is
punished under that law. There can be no sensible debate that the
aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under
special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type
of penalties under said laws which were not included or
contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code,
hence there could be no minimum within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense, as is
the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of
penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied,
and would still apply, only to the first and last examples.
Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier
noted, this holding is but an application and is justified under
the rule of contemporanea expositio. Republic Act No. 6425, as now
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the
penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms,
hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for
purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we have
applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to
arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose
the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for
in a special law, is now in the effect punished by and under the
Revised Penal Code. (People v Martin Simon)WHEN THE BENEFITS OF
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW IS NOT APPLICABLE;a. Offenses punished
by death or life imprisonment.b. Those convicted of treason (Art.
114), conspiracy or proposal to commit treason (Art. 115).c. Those
convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art.
134), sedition (Art. 139), or espionage (Art. 117).d. Those
convicted of piracy (Art. 122).e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62,
par. 5).f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded
sentence.g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the
terms of the same (Art. 159). (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).h.
Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one
year.i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the
approval of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.j. those offenses or
crimes not punishable by imprisonment such as distierro and
suspension. RECIDIVISTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCERecidivists are entitled to an indeterminate
sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547, Feb. 22, 1974). Offender
is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the
crime is committed while he is on parole. (People v. Clareon, CA 78
O.G. 6701, Nov. 19, 1982). (Bacar v. De Guzman)NATURE OF PENALTY OF
RECLUSION PERPETUAIn People -vs- Conrado Lucas, 240 SCRA 66, the
Supreme Court declared that despite the amendment of Article 27 of
the Revised Penal Code, reclusion perpetua remained an indivisible
penalty. Hence, the penalty does not have any minimum, medium and
maximum period. Hence, there is no such penalty of medium period of
reclusion perpetua. (People versus Tiburcio Baculi, 246
SCRA)IMPOSITION OF WRONG PENALTY: IT DOES NOT OBTAIN
FINALITYSuppose the court imposed a penalty of 25 years of
reclusion perpetua for the crime of rape and the accused did not
appeal, does the judgment become final and executory? No, such
judgment is null and void because it imposed a non-existent
penalty. Hence, the court may nevertheless correct the penalty
imposed on the accused, that is, reclusion perpetua, it is merely
performing a duty inherent in the court. (People versus Nigel
Gatward, GR No. 119772-73, February 7, 1997)DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
RECLUSION PERPETUA AND LIFE IMPRISONMENTThe penalty of reclusion
perpetua is different from life imprisonment. The former carries
with it accessory penalties, whereas life imprisonment does not
carry with it any accessory penalties; reclusion perpetua is that
provided for under the Revised Penal Code and under crimes defined
by special laws using the nomenclature under the Revised Penal Code
; life imprisonment is that provided for violations of the Revised
Penal Code. Reclusion Perpetua may be reduced by one or two degrees
while life imprisonment cannot be so reduced. (People -vs- Rolnando
Madriaga, GR No. 82293, July 23, 1992.)WHICH IS MORE BURDENSOME
LIFE IMPRISONMENT OF RECLUSION PERPETUAReclusion perpetua has
accessory penalties while life imprisonment does not. However, life
imprisonment does not have a fixed duration or extent while
reclusion perpetua has a duration of from twenty years and one day
to forty years. life imprisonment may span the natural life of the
convict. (People -versus- Rallagan, 247 SCRA 537)RECLUSION PERPETUA
AND LIFE IMPRISONMENT CANNOT BE INTER-CHANGE WHEN IMPOSED AS
PENALTYWhere the law violated provides for the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, impose the said penalty and not the penalty of life
imprisonment. Where the law imposes the penalty of life
imprisonment, do not impose reclusion perpetua. (People -vs-
Rolando Madriaga, 211 SCRA 698)THE REASON WHY RECLUSION PERPETUA
HAS A RANGE DESPITE THE SAME BEING INDIVISIBLEThere we also said
that if reclusion perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty,
then Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and
basis for existence. The imputed duration of thirty (30) years of
reclusion perpetua, therefore, only serves as the basis for
determining the convicts eligibility for pardon or for the
application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple
penalties. (People -vs- Aspolinar Raganas, et al., GR No. 101188,
October 12, 1999)RARE CASE OF APPLICATION OF RPC IN A SUPPLETORY
CHARACTER DESPITE THE PENALTY BEING LIFE IMPRISONMENT Where the
accused committed qualified violation of PD 704 (fishing with the
use of explosives), the imposable penalty for which is life
imprisonment to death. If the accused is entitled to a mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the court should impose life
imprisonment applying, in a suppletory character, Articles 13 and
63 of the Revised Penal Code. (People -vs- Priscilla Balasa, GR No.
106357, September 3, 1998)ACCUSED WHO IS SENTENCED TO RECLUSION
PERPETUA IS STILL ENTITLED TO EITHER FULL OR OF HIS PREVENTIVE
IMPRISONMENT If, during the trial, the accused was detained but,
after trial, he was meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he is
still entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment
because Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code does not distinguish
between divisible and indivisible penalties. (People -vs- Rolando
Corpuz, 231 SCRA 480)QUALIFIED THEFTQUALIFIED THEFT IS PENALIZED BY
RECLUSION PERPETUA IF AMOUNT INVOLVED IS OVER P22,000.00Under
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum of the penalty
for qualified theft is prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
for the crime shall be two (2) degrees higher than the specified in
Article 309 of the Code. Under Article 74 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty higher by one degree than another given penalty,
and if such higher penalty is death, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua of forty (40) years with the accessory penalties of death
under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused shall not
be entitled to pardon before the lapse of forty (40) years. (People
-vs- Fernando Canales, 297 SCRA 667)THE PROBATION LAW (P.D. 968)
AND ITS AMENDMENTSPROBATION, ITS MEANING A disposition under which
a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is subject to
conditions imposed by the Court and under the supervision of a
probation officer.PURPOSES OF PROBATION:1. to promote the
correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
personalized community based treatment;2. to provide an opportunity
for his reformation and reintegration into the community3. to
prevent the commission of offenses.SUBMISSION OF PETITION AND TIME
OF FILING OFPETITION
The petition or application for probation must be filed directly
with the Court which sentenced the accused within 15 days from date
of promulgation of the decision convicting the accused, or in short
within the period to appeal otherwise the judgment shall become
final and the accused shall be deemed to have waived his right to
probation.
EFFECT OF FILING OF PETITION FOR PROBATION
Upon filing of petition for probation, the court shall suspend
the execution of sentence.Likewise, the filing of a petition for
probation shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal and in
case an appeal is made immediately after conviction, a filing of
petition for probation still within the period to appeal, that is
within fifteen days from date of promulgation shall be deemed a
withdrawal of the appeal.
PENDING RESOLUTION OF PETITION, WHAT ARE THE PRIVILEDGE THAT
MAYBE GIVEN TO THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER?
If the accused, prior to the promulgation of decision of
conviction is out on bail, he may be allowed on temporary liberty
under his bail filed in said case;If he is under detention, upon
motion, he may be allowed temporary liberty, if he cannot post a
bond, on recognizance of a responsible member of a community who
shall guarantee his appearance whenever required by the court.
IN CASE THE APPLICANT FOR PROBATION CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY THE
CUSTODIAN ON RECOGNIZANCE, WHAT HAPPENS?
The custodian must be asked to explain why he should not be
cited for contempt for failing to produce the probationer when
required by the court; Summary hearing will be held for indirect
contempt, and if custodian cannot produce the petitioner, nor to
explain his failure to produce the petitioner, the custodian on
recognizance shall be held in contempt of court.
WHAT IS A POST SENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT?
It is a report of the Parole and Probation Officer after
conducting post sentence investigation and interviews containing
the circumstances surrounding the offense for which the petitioner
was convicted. The findings should be drawn from the court records,
police records, statement of defendants, the aggrieved party and
other persons who may know the petitioner and all other matters
material to the petition.
It will also include the psychological and social information
regarding the probationer; evaluation of the petitioner;
suitability for probation; his potential for rehabilitation; and
may include the program for supervision and suggested terms of
conditions of probation and a recommendation either to deny or
grant the probation.
WHAT ARE THE MANDATORY CONDITIONS OF PROBATION?
To present himself to the probation officer concerned for
supervision within 72 hours from receipt of said order and to
report to the probation officer at least once a month during the
period of probation.
WHAT ARE THE OTHER CONDITIONS OF PROBATION?
1. cooperate with a program of supervision;2. meet his family
responsibilities;3. devote himself to a specific employment and not
to charge said employment without prior written approval of the
probation officer;4. comply with a program of payment of civil
liability to the victim of his heirs;5. undergo medical,
psychological or psychiatric examination and treatment and/or enter
and remain in a specific institution, when required for that
purposes;6. pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational
training;7. attend or reside in a facility established for
instruction or recreation of persons on probation;8. refrain from
visiting houses of ill-repute;9. abstain from drinking intoxicating
beverages to excess;10. permit the probation officer or an
authorized social worker to visit his home and place of work;11.
reside at premises approved by the court and not to change his
residence w/o prior written approval; and12. satisfy any other
condition related to the rehabilitation of the probationer and not
unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom
of conscience.RULES ON OUTSIDE TRAVEL OF PROBATIONER
A probationer who desires to travel outside the jurisdiction of
the city or provincial probation officer for not more than 30 days,
the permission of the parole and probation officer must be sought.
If for more than thirty (30) days, aside from the permission of the
parole and probation officer, the permission of the court must
likewise be sought.
EFFECT OF APPEAL BY THE ACCUSED OF HIS CONVICTION
If the accused appeals his conviction for the purpose of totally
reversing his conviction, he is deemed to have waived his right to
probation.
The rule that if the accused appeals his conviction only with
respect to the penalty, as he believes the penalty is excessive or
wrong, as the penalty is probationable, and the appellate court
sustains the accused may still apply for probation, has already
been abandoned. An appeal therefore, irrespective of its purpose,
to overturn the entire decision or only with respect to penalty is
a waiver to probation, has already been abandoned. An appeal
therefore, irrespective of its purpose, to overturn the entire
decision or only with respect to penalty is a waiver to
probation.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS OF PROBATION
The investigation report and the supervision and history of a
probationer obtained under PD No. 968 and under these rules shall
be privileged and shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to
anyone other than the probation administration or the court
concerned the court which granted the probation or where the
probation was transferred may allow the probationer to inspect the
aforesaid documents or his lawyer, whenever such disclosure may be
desirable or helpful to them. Any government office may ask for the
records of probation from the court for its official use or from
the administrator.
Sec. 29, PD 968: VIOLATION OF CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF PROBATION
RECORDS. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months and
one day to six years and a fine ranging from hundred to six
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who violates
Section 17 hereof.
MODIFICATION OF CONDITION OR PERIOD OF PROBATION
The court, on motion, or motu propio may modify the conditions
of probation or modify the period of probation as circumstances may
warrant.
WHO ARE DISQUALIFIED TO UNDERGO PROBATION Those sentenced to
serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years. Those
convicted of any offense against the security of the state; Those
who have been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one moth and one day
and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; Those who have been once on
probation under the provisions of this decree. Those convicted of
RA 9156. Those convicted of violation of election laws. PERIOD OF
PROBATION If the probationer has been sentenced to an imprisonment
of not more than one year, the probation shall not exceed two
years; In all other cases, not to exceed six years; In case the
penalty is fine, the probation shall not be less than the period of
subsidiary imprisonment nor more than twice of the subsidiary
imprisonment.AMENDMENT TO SECTION 4 OF PD 968:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best;
Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction. Probation may be granted whether the sentence
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. An
order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. Thus,
a person who was sentenced to destierro cannot apply for probation.
Reason: it does not involved imprisonment or fine. (PD
1990)JURISPRUDENCEUNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY OF PROBATIONThe underlying
philosophy of probation is indeed one of liberality towards the
accused. It is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation
of the statutory provisions. Probation is a major step taken by our
Government towards the deterrence and minimizing of crime and the
humanization of criminal justice. In line with the public policy
behind probation, the right of appeal should not be irrevocably
lost from the moment a convicted accused files an application for
probation. Appeal and probation spring from the same policy
considerations of justice, humanity, and compassion. (Yusi v
Morales, 4/28/83)PROBATION IS NOT A RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE
Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon
the discretion of the court. As aptly noted in U.S. vs. Durken,
this discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused. (Tolentino v. Alconcel, G.R. No. 63400, 3/18/83). Even if
a convicted person is not included in the list of offenders
disqualified from the benefits of a decree, the grant of probation
is nevertheless not automatic or ministerial, (Pablo Bernardo v.
Balagot, 215 SCRA 526) therefore a petition for probation may be
denied by the Court.MAIN CRITERION FOR DETERMINING WHO MAY BE
GRANTED PROBATION. The main criterion laid down by the Probation
law in determining who may be granted probation is based on the
penalty imposed and not on the nature of the crime. By the relative
lightness of the offense, as measured by the penalty imposed, more
than by its nature, as the law so ordains the offender is not such
a serious menace to society as to be wrested away therefrom, as the
more dangerous type of criminals should be. Hence, in the case at
bar, the first reason given by the respondent judge for his denial
of the petition for probation that, probation will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed would thus be writing into the
law a new ground for disqualifying a first-offender from the
benefits of probation. (Santos v. Cruz-Pano, 1/17/83)TIMELINESS OF
FILING APPLICATION FOR PROBATIONThe accused must file a Petition
for Probation within the period for appeal. If the decision of
conviction has become final and executory, the accused is barred
from filing a Petition for Probation (Pablo Francisco v. C.A.,
4/6/95).ORDER DENYING PROBATION NOT APPEALABLE, REMEDY
CERTIORARIAlthough an order denying probation is not appealable,
the accused may file a motion for Certiorari from said order (Heirs
of Francisco Abueg v. C.A., 219 SCRA 78) EFFECT OF FILING PETITION
FOR PROBATION, WAIVER OF RIGHT TO APPEAL AND FINALITY OF JUDGEMENTA
judgment of conviction becomes final when the accused files a
petition for probation. However, the judgement is not executory
until the petition for probation is resolved. The filing of the
petition for probation is a waiver by the accused of his right to
appeal the judgement of conviction (Heirs of Francisco Abueg v.
C.A., supra).MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS IN SEVERAL CASES PROBATIONABLE IF
PENALTY FOR EACH CONVICTION IS PROBATIONABLE. Evidently, the law
does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each
penalty, separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently,
even if petitioner was supposed to have served his prison term of
one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to
serve the prison term for each crime committed on each date of each
case, as alleged in the information(s), and in each of the four (4)
informations, he was charged with having defamed the four (4)
private complainants on four (4) different, separate days, he was
still eligible for probation, as each prison term imposed on
petitioner was probationable. (Francisco v. CA; 4/16/95)REASON FOR
FIXING CUT OFF POINT AT A MAXIMUM OF SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR
PROBATION. Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6)
years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that
those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to
society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for
serious wrongdoing but because of the gravity and serious
consequences of the offense they might further commit. The
Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been
convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to
Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily those who
have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who
are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the
disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense
committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those
sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not
generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may
avail of probationVIOLATION OF RA 6425, A VALID CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL
IN SERVICE IN THE GOVERNMENT DESPITE PROBATIONDrug-pushing, as a
crime, has been variously condemned as an especially vicious crime,
one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our
society. For those who become addicted to it not only slide into
the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave
menace to the safety of law-abiding members of society, while
peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction. The deserve
no less than the maximum penalty [of death]. There is no doubt that
drug-pushing is a crime which involves moral turpitude and implies
every thing which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals including acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or
to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and
duty between man and man. Indeed nothing is more depraved than for
anyone to be a merchant of death by selling prohibited drugs, an
act which, as this Court said in one case,often breeds other
crimes. It is not what we might call a contained crime whose
consequences are limited to that crime alone, like swindling and
bigamy. Court and police records show that a significant number of
murders, rapes, and similar offenses have been committed by persons
under the influence of dangerous drugs, or while they are high.
While spreading such drugs, the drug-pusher is also abetting,
through his agreed and irresponsibility, the commission of other
crimes. The image of the judiciary is tarnished by conduct, which
involves moral turpitude. While indeed the purpose of the Probation
Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended) is to save valuable human material,
it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon probation does not
obliterate the crime of which the person under probation has been
convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannot
justify his retention in the government service. He may seek to
reenter government service, but only after he has shown that he is
fit to serve once again. It cannot be repeated too often that a
public office is a public trust, which demands of those in its
service the highest degree of morality. (OCA v. Librado 260 SCRA
624, 8/22/96)PETITIONER MAY STILL EXHORT OFFENDER TO PERFORM
CERTAIN ACTS DESPITE DISCHARGE FROM PROBATION IN CERTAIN
CASESPetitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.s discharge from probation
without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the
various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and
civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to
purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for
the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared
to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating. Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the
lawyers oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in
the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select
witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond
reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr.
Justice Padillas comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al
Argosino To Take The Lawyers Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19,
1997, [t]he Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Cuevas, Jr., will
continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community.
As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and
other services to the more unfortunate members of society. (In Re:
Cuevas, Jr.; 1/27/98)EXPIRATION OF PERIOD OF PROBATION IS NOT
TERMINATION, ORDER OF COURT REQUIREDThe mere expiration of the
period for probation does not, ipso facto, terminate the probation.
Probation is not co-terminus with its period, there must be an
order from the Court of final discharge, terminating the probation.
If the accused violates the condition of the probation before the
issuance of said order, the probation may be revoked by the Court
(Manuel Bala v. Martinez, 181 SCRA 459).ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979
(PD NO. 1612)DEFINITIONFencing as defined in Sec. 2 of PD No. 1612
(Anti-Fencing Law) is the act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in
any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows or should be known to him, or to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
(Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People, GR 111426, 11 July 94).BRIEF HISTORY
OF PD 1612 OR THE ANTI-FENCING LAWPresidential Decree No. 1612 or
commonly known as the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 was enacted under
the authority of therein President Ferdinand Marcos. The law took
effect on March 2, 1979. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Anti-Fencing Law were subsequently formulated and it took
effect on June 15, 1979.THE PURPOSE OF ENACTING PD 1612The
Anti-Fencing Law was made to curtail and put an end to the rampant
robbery of government and private properties. With the existence of
ready buyers, the business of robbing and stealing have become
profitable. Hence, a law was enacted to also punish those who buy
stolen properties. For if there are no buyers then the malefactors
could not profit from their wrong doings.WHAT IS FENCING LAW AND
HOW IT CAN BE COMMITTEDFencing is the act of any person who, with
intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft. A Fence includes any person, firm, association corporation
or partnership or other organization who/ which commits the act of
fencing.WHO ARE LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF FENCING; AND ITS
PENALTIES:The person liable is the one buying, keeping, concealing
and selling the stolen items. If the fence is a corporation,
partnership, association or firm, the one liable is the president
or the manager or the officer who knows or should have know the
fact that the offense was committed.The law provide for penalty
range for persons convicted of the crime of fencing. Their penalty
depends on the value of the goods or items stolen or bought:A. The
penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is
more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value
of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the
penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory
penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall
also be imposed.B. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, if the value of the property robbed or
stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12, 000 pesos;C.
The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the property involved is more than 200
pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos;D. The penalty of arresto mayor
in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period,
if the value of the property involved is over 50 but not exceeding
200 pesos;E. The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if
such value is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos.F. The
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does
not exceed 5 pesos.RULES REGARDING BUY AND SELL OF GOODS
PARTICULARLY SECOND HAND GOODSThe law requires the establishment
engaged in the buy and sell of goods to obtain a clearance or
permit to sell used second hand items, to give effect to the
purpose of the law in putting an end to buying and selling stolen
items. Failure of which makes the owner or manager liable as a
fence.The Implementing Rules provides for the guidelines of
issuance of clearances or permits to sell used or secondhand items.
It provided for the definition of the following terms: Used
secondhand article shall refer to any goods, article, items, object
or anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or
supplier, regardless of whether the same has actually or in fact
been used. Unlicensed dealer/supplier shall refer to any persons,
partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other entity or
establishment not licensed by the government to engage in the
business of dealing in or of supplying the articles defined in the
preceding paragraph; Store, establishment or entity shall be
construed to include any individual dealing in the buying and
selling used secondhand articles, as defined in paragraph hereof;
Buy and Sell refer to the transaction whereby one purchases used
secondhand articles for the purpose of resale to third persons;
Station Commander shall refer to the Station Commander of the
Integrated National Police within the territorial limits of the
town or city district where the store, establishment or entity
dealing in the buying and selling of used secondhandPROCEDURE FOR
SECURING PERMIT/CLEARANCEThe Implementing Rules provided for the
method of obtaining clearance or permit. No fee will be charged for
the issuance of the clearance/permit. Failure to secure
clearance/permit shall be punished as a fence, that may result to
the cancellation of business license.1. The Station Commander shall
require the owner of a store or the President, manager or
responsible officer in having in stock used secondhand articles, to
submit an initial affidavit within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice for the purpose thereof and subsequent affidavits once every
fifteen (15) days within five (5) days after the period covered,
which shall contain:a. complete inventory of such articles
including the names and addresses from whom the articles were
acquired.b. Full list of articles to be sold or offered for sale
including the time and place of salec. Place where the articles are
presently deposited. The Station Commander may, require the
submission of an affidavit accompanied by other documents showing
proof of legitimacy of acquisition.2. Those who wish to secure the
permit/clearance, shall file an application with the Station
Commander concerned, which states:a. name, address and other
pertinent circumstancesb. article to be sold or offered for sale to
the public and the name and address of the unlicensed dealer or
supplier from whom such article was acquired.c. Include the receipt
or document showing proof of legitimacy of acquisition.3. The
Station Commander shall examine the documents attached to the
application and may require the presentation of other additional
documents, if necessary, to show satisfactory proof of the
legitimacy of acquisition of the article, subject to the following
conditions:a. if the Station Commander is not satisfied with the
proof of legitimacy of acquisition, he shall cause the publication
of the notice, at the expense of the one seeking clearance/permit,
in a newspaper of general circulation for two consecutive days,
stating: articles acquired from unlicensed dealer or supplier the
names and addresses of the persons from whom they were acquired
that such articles are to be sold or offered for sale to the public
at the address of the store, establishment or other entity seeking
the clearance/permit.4. If there are no newspapers in general
circulation, the party seeking the clearance/permit shall, post a
notice daily for one week on the bulletin board of the municipal
building of the town where the store, firm, establishment or entity
is located or, in the case of an individual, where the articles in
his possession are to be sold or offered for sale.5. If after 15
days, upon expiration of the period of publication or of the
notice, no claim is made to any of the articles enumerated in the
notice, the Station Commander shall issue the clearance or permit
sought.6. If before expiration of the same period for the
publication of the notice or its posting, it shall appear that any
of the articles in question is stolen property, the Station
Commander shall hold the article in restraint as evidence in any
appropriate case to be filed.Articles held in restraint shall kept
and disposed of as the circumstances of each case permit. In any
case it shall be the duty of the Station Commander concerned to
advise/notify the Commission on Audit of the case and comply with
such procedure as may be proper under applicable existing laws,
rules and regulations.7. The Station Commander shall, within
seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the application, act thereon
by either issuing the clearance/permit requested or denying the
same. Denial of an application shall be in writing and shall state
in brief the reason/s thereof.8. Any party not satisfied with the
decision of the Station Commander may appeal the same within 10
days to the proper INP (now PNP) District Superintendent and
further to the INP (now PNP) Director. The decision of the Director
can still be appealed top the Director-General, within 10 days,
whose decision may be appealed with the Minister (now Secretary) of
National Defense, within 15 days, which decision is
final.PRESUMPTIONMere possession of any good, article, item, object
or anything fo value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery, shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.ELEMENTSA crime
of robbery or theft has been committed;The accused, who is not a
principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possess, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells, or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in
any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;The accused knows or
should have known that the said article, item, or object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and1. There is, on the part of the accused,
intent to gain for himself or for another. (Dizon-Pamintuan vs
People, GR 111426, 11 July 94)As regards the first element, the
crime of robbery or theft should have been committed before crime
of fencing can be committed. The person committing the crime of
robbery or theft, may or may not be the same person committing the
crime of fencing. As in the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc., vs.
Esguerra, quantities of phelonic plywood were stolen and the Court
held that qualified theft had been committed. In People vs. Lucero
there was first a snatching incident, where the bag of Mrs. Maripaz
Bernard Ramolete was snatch in the public market of Carbon, Cebu
City, where she lost a Chinese Gold Necklace and pendant worth some
P4,000.00 to snatchers Manuel Elardo and Zacarias Pateras. The
snatchers sold the items to Manuel Lucero. Consequently, Lucero was
charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. However, in this
case, no eyewitness pointed to Lucero as the perpetrator and the
evidence of the prosecution was not strong enough to convict
him.The second element speaks of the overt act of keeping, buying,
receiving, possessing, acquiring, concealing, selling or disposing
or in any manner deals with stolen items. It is thus illustrated in
the case of Lim vs. Court of Appeals, where the accused, Juanito
Lim stored and kept in his bodega and subsequently bought or
disposed of the nine (9) pieces of stolen tires with rims owned by
Loui Anton Bond.The accused known or should have known that the
goods were stolen. As pointed out in the case of People vs.
Adriatico, the court in convicting Norma Adriatico, stated that it
was impossible for her to know that the jewelry were stolen because
of the fact that Crisilita was willing to part with a considerable
number of jewelry at measly sum, and this should have apprised
Norma of the possibility that they were stolen goods. The
approximate total value of the jewelry were held to be at
P20,000.00, and Norma having bought it from Crisilita for only
P2,700. The court also considered the fact that Norma engage in the
business of buying and selling gold and silver, which business is
very well exposed to the practice of fencing. This requires more
than ordinary case and caution in dealing with customers. As noted
by the trial court:. . . the Court is not inclined to accept the
accuseds theory of buying in good faith and disclaimer of ever
seeing, much more, buying the other articles. Human experience
belies her allegations as no businessman or woman at that, would
let go of such opportunities for a clean profit at the expense of
innocent owners.The Court in convicting Ernesto Dunlao Sr., noted
that the stolen articles composed of farrowing crates and G.I.
pipes were found displayed on petitioners shelves inside his
compound. (Dunalao, Sr. v. CA, 08/22/96)In the case of People v.
Muere (G.R.12902, 10/18/94), the third element was not proven. This
case involves the selling of alleged stolen Kenwood Stereo Unit in
the store Danvir Trading, owned by the spouses Muere. The store is
engaged in buying and selling of second hand merchandise located at
Pasay Road, Makati. The said stereo was bought from Wynns Audio, an
existing establishment. The court held that there is no proof that
the spouses Muere, had knowledge of the fact that the stereo was
stolen. The spouses Muere purchased the stereo from a known
merchant and the unit is displayed for sale in their store. These
actions are not indicative of a conduct of a guilty person.On the
same vein, the third element did not exist in the case of D.M.
Consunji, Inc. (Consunji v. Esguerra, 07/30/96) where the subject
of the court action are the alleged stolen phelonic plywood owned
by D.M. Consunji, Inc., later found to be in the premises of MC
Industrial Sales and Seato trading Company, owned respectively by
Eduardo Ching and the spouses Sy. Respondents presented sales
receipts covering their purchase of the items from Paramount
Industrial, which is a known hardware store in Caloocan, thus they
had no reason to suspect that the said items were products of
theft.The last element is that there is intent to gain for himself
or for another. However, intent to gain need not be proven in
crimes punishable by a special law such as the Anti-Fencing Law.
The crimes punishable by special laws are called acts mala
prohibita. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala prohibita,
the only inquiry is that, has the law been violated? (in Gatdner v.
People, as cited in US v. Go Chico, 14 Phils. 134) When the act is
prohibited by law, intent is immaterial.Likewise, dolo or deceit is
immaterial in crimes punishable by special statute like the
Anti-Fencing Law. It is the act itself which constitutes the
offense and not the motive or intent. Intent to gain is a mental
state, the existence if which is demonstrated by the overt acts of
the person. The mental state is presumed from the commission of an
unlawful act. (Dunlao v. CA) again, intent to gain is a mental
state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of
person, as the keeping of stolen items for subsequent selling.A
FENCE MAY BE PROSECUTED UNDER THE RPC OR PD 1612The state may thus
choose to prosecute him either under the RPC or PD NO. 1612
although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable
considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD No. 1612
creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty
based on the value of the property. (supra)MERE POSSESSION OF
STOLEN ARTICLE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF FENCINGSince Sec. 5 of PD
NO. 1612 expressly provides that mere possession of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of
fencing it follows that the accused is presumed to have knowledge
of the fact that the items found in her possession were the
proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption does not offend the
presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN FENCING AND ROBBERYThe law on fencing does not
require the accused to have participation in the criminal design to
commit or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of
the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or
theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order that it can be
consummated. (People v De Guzman, GR 77368).Robbery is the taking
of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using
force upon anything.On the other hand, fencing is the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article,
item, object or anything of value which he knows, or shall be known
to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft.FENCING AS A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.In
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, actual knowledge by the fence of
the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree
of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which by their very nature are crimes
of moral turpitude. (Dela Torre v. COMELEC 07/05/96)Moral turpitude
can be derived from the third element accused knows or should have
known that the items were stolen. Participation of each felon, one
being the robber or the thief or the actual perpetrators, and the
other as the fence, differs in point in time and degree but both
invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain. (Supra) Both crimes
negated the principle of each persons duty to his fellowmen not to
appropriate things that they do not own or return something
acquired by mistake or with malice. This signifies moral turpitude
with moral unfitness.In the case of Dela Torre, he was declared
disqualified from running the position of Mayor in Cavinti, Laguna
in the last May 8, 1995 elections because of the fact of the
disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, of
persons running for elective position -Sec. 40 Disqualifications
(a) Those sentenced by final judgement for an offense involving
moral turpitudeDela Torre was disqualified because of his prior
conviction of the crime of fencing wherein he admitted all the
elements of the crime of fencing. ESSENCE OF VIOLATION OF PD 1612,
SEC. 2 OR ANTI-FENCINGPD 1612, Section 2 thereof requires that the
offender buys or otherwise acquires and then sells or disposes of
any object of value which he knows or should he known to him to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft. (Caoili v CA; GR 128369, 12/22/97)PROOF OF PURCHASE WHEN
GOODS ARE IN POSSESSION OF OFFENDER NOT NECESSARY IN
ANTI-FENCINGThe law does not require proof of purchase of the
stolen articles by petitioner, as mere possession thereof is enough
to give rise to a presumption of fencing.It was incumbent upon
petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and
convincing evidence. (Caoili v. CA; GR 128369, 12/22/97)BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22 BOUNCING CHECKS LAWACTS PUNISHABLE:1. any person
who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds, or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawee, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.2. Any person who having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to
cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of
ninety days from date appearing thereon, for which reason, it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.HOW TO ESTABLISH GUILT OF ACCUSED IN
BP 22To establish her guilt, it is indispensable that the checks
she issued for which she was subsequently charged, be offered in
evidence because the gravamen of the offense charged is the act of
knowingly issuing a check with insufficient funds. Clearly, it was
error to convict complainant on the basis of her letter alone.
Nevertheless, despite this incorrect interpretation of a rule on
evidence, we do not find the same as sufficiently constitutive of
the charges of gross ignorance of the law and of knowingly
rendering an unjust decision. Rather, it is at most an error in
judgment, for which, as a general rule, he cannot be held
administratively liable. In this regard, we reiterate the
prevailing rule in our jurisdiction as established by current
jurisprudence. (Gutierrez v Pallatao; 8/8/98)NOTICE, AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE FOR PROSECUTIONSection 3 of BP 22 requires
that the holder of the check or the drawee bank, must notify the
drawer of the check that the same was dishonored, if the same is
presented within ninety days from date of issuance, and upon notice
the drawer has five days within which to make arrangements for the
payment of the check or pay the same in full.DUTY OF THE DRAWEE
BANKThe drawee bank has the duty to cause to be written, printed or
stamped in plain language thereon, or attached thereto the reason
for the drawees dishonor or refusal to pay the same. If the drawee
bank fails to do so, prosecution for violation of BP 22 may not
prosper.RULE IN CASE OF DISHONOR DUE TO STOP PAYMENTThe drawee bank
has not only the duty to indicate that the drawer stopped the
payment and the reason for the stop payment. The drawee bank is
further obligated to state whether the drawer of the check has
sufficient funds in the bank or not.AGREEMENT OF PARTIES REGARDING
THE CHECK IS NOT A DEFENSEIn the case of People vs Nitafan, 215
SCRA, the agreement of the parties in respect to the issuance of
the check is inconsequential or will not affect the violation of BP
22, if the check is presented to the bank and the same was
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.CHECKS ISSUED IN PAYMENT
OF INSTALLMENTChecks issued in payment for installment covered by
promissory note and said checks bounced, the drawer is liable if
the checks were drawn against insufficient funds, especially that
the drawer, upon signing of the promissory note, closed his
account. Said check is still with consideration. (Caram Resources
v. Contreras)In this case, the Judge was even held administratively
liable.CHECK DRAWN AGAINST A DOLLAR ACCOUNT. RULE:A check drawn
against a dollar account in a foreign country is still violative of
the provisions of BP 22 so long as the check is issued, delivered
or uttered in the Philippines, even if the same is payable outside
of the Philippines (De Villa v. CA)GUARANTEE CHECKS, DRAWER, STILL
LIABLEThe mere act of issuing a worthless check is punishable.
Offender cannot claim good faith for it is malum prohibitum.In the
case of Magno vs CA, when accused issued a check as warranty
deposit for lease of certain equipment, even knowing that he has no
funds or insufficient funds in the bank is not liable, if the
lessor of the equipment pulled out the loaned equipment. The drawer
has no obligation to make good the check because there is no more
deposit to guaranty.ISSUANCE OF GUARANTEE CHECKS WHICH WAS
DISHONORED IN VIOLATION AND PURPOSE OF THE LAWThe intention of the
framers of BP 22 is to make a mere act of issuing a worthless check
malum prohibitum. In prosecutions for violation of BP 22,
therefore, prejudice or damage is not prerequisite for
conviction.The agreement surrounding the issuance of the checks
need not be first locked into, since the law has provided that the
mere issuance of any kind of check; regardless of the intent of the
parties, i.e., whether the check is intended merely to serve as
guarantee or deposit, but which checks is subsequently dishonored,
makes the person who issued the check liable. (Lazaro vs CA, et
al., GR 105461).CAN A PERSON BE HELD LIABLE FOR ISSUING A CHECK
WITH SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR VIOLATION OF BP 22?Yes. Paragraph 2 of
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:The same penalty shall be imposed upon
any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount
of the check if presented within a period of 90 days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason, it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.RULE ON RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT, IGNORANCE, ETC. BY A
JUDGEIn the case of De la Cruz vs. Concepcion this Court
declared:Mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so
gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad
faith, or of knowing rendition of an unjust decision, are
irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against
him. No one, called upon to try facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice, can be infallible in his
judgment. All that is expected of him is that he follow the rules
prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial hearing, assess the
different factors that emerge therefrom and bear on the issues
presented, and on the basis of the conclusions he finds
established, with only his conscience and knowledge of the law to
guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly. (Gutierrez v Pallatao;
Adm. Matter #RTJ-95-1326, July 8, 1998)DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ESTAFA
AND VIOLATION OF BP 22In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are
essential elements of the offense and have to be established with
satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. For violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and
damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of
B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check
to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer
knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment. (Uy v Court of Appeals, GR 119000, July 28,
1997)JURISDICTION IN BP 22 CASESIn respect of the Bouncing checks
case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is
true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its
performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the
fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing
and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II,
No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been
filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 the
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the
issuance of the check. However, it is likewise true that knowledge
on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the
offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused
be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla,
G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga.And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case,
jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegation in the
Information, which are controlling (Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil.
190, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA
235). The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the
crime was committed in San Fernando Pampanga and therefore within
the jurisdiction of the Court below. This ruling was reiterated in
the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487, where it was
held:Besides, it was held in People v. Hon. Manzanilla, supra, that
as violation of the bad checks act is committed when one makes or
draws and issues any check [sic] to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time issue that he does not have sufficient funds or
having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . .
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to
cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason
it is dishonored by the drawee bank, knowledge is an essential
ingredient of the offense charge. As defined by the statute,
knowledge, is, by itself, a continuing eventuality, whether the
accused be within one territory or another. This being the case,
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City has jurisdiction to try
Criminal Case No. 2089-R (688).Moreover, we ruled in the same case
of People v. Hon. Manzanilla, reiterated in People vs. Grospe,
supra, that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations
in the information. The allegation in the information under
consideration that the offense was committed in Baguio City is
therefore controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.In the case at bench it appears
that the three (3) checks were deposited in Lucena City. As to the
second error wherein the petitioner asserted that the checks were
issued as a guarantee only for the feeds delivered to him and that
there is no estafa if a check is issued in payment of a
pre-existing obligation, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the
petitioner obviously failed to distinguish a violation of B.P. Blg.
22 from estafa under Article 315 (2) [d] of the Revised Penal Code.
It further stressed that B.P. Blg. 22 applies even in cases where
dishonored checks were issued as a guarantee or for deposit only,
for it makes no distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to
guarantee the said obligation and the history of its enactment
evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition
all-embracing. (Ibasco vs CA, 9/5/96)ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF
INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS ESSENTIAL IN BP 22Knowledge of insufficiency
of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the payment of a check
upon its presentment is an essential element of the offense. There
is a prima facie presumption of the existence of this element from
the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of
which was subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds. It is
important to stress, however, that this is not a conclusive
presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of
evidence to the contrary. (Lim Lao v CA; 6/20/97)WHEN LACK OF
KNOWLEDGE AND LACK OF POWER TO FUND THE CHECKS IN CASES OF BP 22 A
DEFENSEAfter a thorough review of the case at bar, the Court finds
that Petitioner Lina Lim Lao did not have actual knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds in the corporate accounts at the time she
affixed her signature to the checks involved in this case, at the
time the same were issued, and even at the time the checks were
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.The scope of petitioners
duties and responsibilities did not encompass the funding of the
corporations checks; her duties were limited to the marketing
department of the Binondo branch. Under the organizational
structure of Premiere Financing Corporation, funding of checks was
the sole responsibility of the Treasury Department. (Lim Lao v CA;
6/20/97LACK OF ADEQUATE NOTICE OF DISHONOR, A DEFENSEThere can be
no prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in
the instant case because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to
or received by the petitioner.The notice of dishonor may be sent by
the offended party or the drawee bank. The trial court itself found
absent a personal notice of dishonor to Petitioner Lina Lim Lao by
the drawee bank based on the unrebutted testimony of Ocampo (t)hat
the checks bounced when presented with the drawee bank but she did
not inform anymore the Binondo branch and Lina Lim Lao as there was
no need to inform them as the corporation was in distress. The
Court of Appeals affirmed this factual finding. Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence, this finding is binding on this Court.
(Lim Lao v CA; 6/20/97)ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (RA
NO 3019)ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACTCorrupt practices of
public officers. (a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another
public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an
offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit
such violation or offense. (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law. (c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for
another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner
or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any
Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given
or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment
in a private enterprise which has pending official business with
him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its
termination. e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including
the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. ( f ) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or
request, without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in
the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for
the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage
in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest
in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which
he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which
he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interest. (i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for
personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or
act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he
is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even
if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action
of the board, committee, panel or group. Interest for personal gain
shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the
approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular
transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they
belong. ( j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit,
privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or
not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or
advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not
so qualified or entitled. (k) Divulging valuable information of a
confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account
of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such
information in advance of its authorized release date.UNEXPLAINED
WEALTH, MEANINGPrima facie evidence of and dismissal due to
unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of RA
1379, a public official has been found to have acquired during his
incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an
amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground
for dismissal or removal.Note: Unsolicited gifts or presents of
small or insignificant value shall be offered or given as a mere
ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local
customs or usage shall be exempted from the provision of this
act.MEANING OF CAUSING UNDUE INJURYThe act of giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an
indispensable element of causing any undue injury to any part,
although there may be instances where both elements concur.
(Santiago vs Garchitorena, et al., 2 Dec. 93).In Mejoroda v
Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court has ruled that the offender in
causing undue injury does not refer only to those who are in charge
of giving permits, licenses or concessions but all acts of public
officers or employees which have caused undue injury to
others.ELEMENTS OF NEGLECT OF DUTY UNDER SEC. 3 OF RA 3019 the
offender is a public officer; the said officer has neglected or has
refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or
request has been made upon him; reasonable time has elapsed from
such demand or request without the public officer having acted on
the matter pending before him; such failure to so act is for the
purpose of obtaining directly or indirectly from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage in favor of an interested party or discriminating against
another. Coronado v Sandiganbayan.PUBLIC OFFICER ACTED WITH
MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH, OR INEXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCESec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e).
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF RA 3019 REQUIRES PROOF OF
THE FOLLOWING FACTS, VIZ: the accused is a public officer
discharging administrative or official functions or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them; the public officer committed the
prohibited act during the performance of his official duty or in
relation to his public position; the public officer acted with
manifest partiality evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable
negligence; and his action caused undue injury to the government or
any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference to such parties.CAUSING UNDUE INJURY UNDER
SEC. 3, LETTER (e) OF RA 3019. MEANING.Section 3 enumerates in
eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officer
declared unlawful. Its reference to any public officer is without
distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared
unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General
that the last inclusion of officers and employees of offices or
government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of public
officer may not come within the term. It is a strained construction
of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public
officers charged with the duty of granting license or permits or
other concessions. (Mejorada v Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA
399).SUSPENSION UNDER R.A. 3019 MANDATORY BUT COURTS ARE ALLOWED TO
DETERMINE WHETHER INFORMATION IS VALID OR NOTIt is well settled
that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan
(or the Court) to suspend any public officer against whom a valid
information charging violation of this law, Book II, Title 7 of the
RPC, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
or property is filed in court. The court trying a case has neither
discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is
required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate
witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. All that is required is for the court to
make a finding that the accused stands charged under a valid
information for any of the above-described crimes for the purpose
of granting or denying the sought for suspension. (Bolastig vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503 [August 4, 1994], 235 SCRA 103).In
the same case, the Court held that as applied to criminal
prosecutions under RA 3019, preventive suspension will last for
less than ninety (90) days only if the case is decided within that
period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety (90) days. (Conducto
v. Monzon; A.M. No. MTJ-98-1147, July 2, 1998)PUBLIC OFFICER MAY BE
SUSPENDED FROM HIS PRESENT POSITION EVEN IF THE CRIME WHICH HE IS
BEING CHARGED WAS COMMITTED DURING HIS PREVIOUS TERMJudge Monzons
contention denying complainants Motion for Suspension because
offenses committed during the previous term (is) not a cause for
removal during the present term is untenable. In the case of
Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo vs. Hon. Luis Santos and Melvin Vargas, 212
SCRA 768, the Court held that the rule is that a public official
cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct committed during a
prior term, to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to
criminal cases . . . Likewise, it was specifically declared in the
case of Ingco vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-23220, 18 December 1967, 21
SCRA 1292, that The ruling, therefore, that when the people have
elected a man to office it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any
refers only to an action for removal from office and does not apply
to a criminal case Clearly, even if the alleged unlawful
appointment was committed during Maghirangs first term as barangay
chairman and the Motion for his suspension was only filed in 1995
during his second term, his re-election is not a bar to his
suspension as the suspension sought for is in connection with a
criminal case. (Conducto v. Monzon; A.M. No. MTJ-98-1147, July 2,
1998)RE-ELECTION IN PUBLIC OFFICE EXTINGUISHING ONLY HIS
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY BUT NOT HIS CRIMINAL LIABILITYAs early as
18 December 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez, 17 this Court explicitly
ruled that the re-election of a public official extinguishes only
the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him
during his previous term of office, thus:The ruling, therefore,
that when the people have elected a man to his office it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character
and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he
had been guilty of any refers only to an action for removal from
office and does not apply to criminal case, because a crime is a
public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or
malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his
duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons
but to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89
of the Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for
extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to
office as one of them, at least insofar as a public officer is
concerned. Also, under the Constitution, it is only the President
who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense. (Conducto v.
Monzon; A.M. No. MTJ-98-1147, July 2, 1998)PRE-CONDITION OF
SUSPENSION (PREVENTIVE) UNDER SEC. 13, RA 3019It is mandatory for
the court to place under preventive suspension a public officer
accused before it. Imposition of suspension, however, is not
automatic or self-operative. A pre-condition thereof is the
existence of a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension
hearing. Such a hearing is in accord with the spirit of the law,
considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of a
suspension of a public official even before his conviction, and the
demands of public interest for a speedy determination of the issues
involved in the case. The purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is
basically to determine the validity of the information and thereby
furnish the court with a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse
suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part
of the proceeding which impairs its validity. The accused should be
given adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity
of the criminal proceedings against him; e.g. that he has not been
afforded the right to due preliminary investigation; that the acts
imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime (under R.A. 3019
or the Revised Penal Code) warranting his mandatory suspension from
office under Section 13 of the Act; or that the information is
subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court. But once a proper determination of the validity of
the information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of
the court to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The court has no discretion, for instance, to hold in abeyance the
suspension of the accused official on the pretext that the order
denying the latters motion to quash is pending review before the
appellate courts. (Segovia v. Sandiganbayan; GR 124067, Mar. 27,
1998)GUIDELINES TO BE FOLLOWED IN PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION CASESIn the
leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al. (L-32950, July
30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187), we have set out the guidelines to be
followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension under Section 13 of the law, to wit:(c) By way of broad
guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid
information under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to
section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the
filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order
with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a
specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended
from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act.
Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order
of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the
information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause
order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is
indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a
hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and
thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of
suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or
withhold such suspension in the contrary case.(d) No specific rules
need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to
state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings
against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due
preliminary investigation, the act for which he stands charged do
not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which
would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13
of the Act, or he may present a motion to quash the information on
any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The
mandatory suspension decreed by the act upon determination of the
pendency in court or a criminal prosecution for violation of the
Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at
the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly
protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by
the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged
in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be
called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the
validity of the information and setting the same for trial on the
merits. (Segovia v. Sandiganbayan)WHEN MAY A PUBLIC OFFICER BE
LIABLE FOR CAUSING UNDUE INJURY UNDER SEC. 3(e) of RA 3019 Causing
any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.To hold a person
liable under this section, the concurrence of the following
elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution:(1) That the accused is a public officer or a private
person charged in conspiracy with the former;(2) That said public
officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his
or her official duties or in relation to his or her public
positions;(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party; and That the public
officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. (Llorente v. Sandiganbayan; GR
122166, Mar. 11, 1998)MEANING OF BAD FAITH UNDER SECTION 3(e) OF RA
3019Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence;
it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some
motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
(Spiegel v Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series 895, 1007). It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior
purposes (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident
bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to do wrong or cause damage. In Jacinto, evident bad faith
was not appreciated because the actions taken by the accused were
not entirely without rhyme or reason; he refused to release the
complainants salary because the latter failed to submit her daily
time record; he refused to approve her sick-leave application
because he found out that she did not suffer any illness; and he
removed her name from the plantilla because she was moonlighting
during office hours. Such actions were measures taken by a superior
against an erring employee who studiously ignored, if not defied,
his authority. (Llorente v. Sandiganbayan)
WHEN OFFENDER IS NOT LIABLE UNDER SEC. 3(e) BUT UNDER SEC. (f)
OF RA 3019It would appear that petitioners failure or refusal to
act on the complainants vouchers, or the delay in his acting on
them more properly falls under Sec. 3[f]:(f) Neglecting or
refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter
pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary
or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his
own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party. Here, the
neglect or refusal to act within a reasonable time is the criminal
act, not the causing of undue injury. Thus, its elements are:1) The
offender is a public officer;2) Said officer has neglected or has
refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or
request has been made on him;3) Reasonable time has elapsed from
such demand or request without the public officer having acted on
the matter pending before him; and4) Such failure to so act is for
the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating
against another. However, petitioner is not charged with a
violation of Sec. 3[f]. Hence, further disquisition is not proper.
Neither may this Court convict petitioner under Sec. 3[f] without
violating his constitutional right to due process. (Llorente v.
Sandiganbayan)SUSPPENSION (PREVENTIVE) OF LOCAL OFFICIALS SHALL
ONLY BE FOR 60 DAYSOn the other hand, we find merit in petitioners
second assigned error. The Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90 day
suspension upon petitioner for the single case filed against him.
Under Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code, any single
preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend
beyond sixty (60) days. (Rios v. Sandiganbayan; GR 129913, Set. 26,
1997)APPROVAL OF LEAVE OF ABSENCE NOT A BAR TO SUSPENSIONSince the
petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid
information with an offense punishable under the Constitution and
the laws (RA 3019 and PD 807), the laws command that he shall be
suspended from office pendente lite must be obeyed. His approved
leave of absence is not a bar to his preventive suspension for as
indicated by the Solicitor General, an approved leave, whether it
be for a fixed or indefinite period, may be cancelled or shortened
at will by the incumbent. (Doromal v. Sandiganbayan; GR 85468,
Sepr. 7, 1989)UNDUE DELAY IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS VIOLATIVE
OF DUE PROCESS AND A GROUND TO DISMISSAfter a careful review of the
facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold
that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases
against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view
of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other
issues raised by petitioner. (Tatad v. Sandiganbayan)DEATH PENALTY
LAW (RA 7659)PROSTITUTES CAN BE A VICTIM OF RAPEAs to the
suggestion that ANALIZA was a prostitute, that alone, even if it be
conceded, cannot absolve him of his liability for rape. First,
prostitutes can be victims of rape. (People v. Alfeche)REASON WHY
DWELLING IS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCEDwelling is considered an
aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of
privacy the law accords to human abode. The dwelling need not be
owned by the victim. Thus, in People v. Basa, dwelling was
appreciated, although the victims were killed while sleeping as
guests in the house of another. As aptly stated in People v.
Balansit: [O]ne does not lose his right of privacy where he is
offended in the house of another because as [an] invited guest [or
a housemaid as in the instant case], he, the stranger, is sheltered
by the same roof and protected by the same intimacy of life it
affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for a brief
moment, home to him. He is entitled to respect even for that short
moment. (People v. Alfeche)WHEN RELATIONSHIP IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE
CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER ART. 15 OF THE RPCClearly then, the
father-daughter relationship in rape cases, or between accused and
Relanne, in this case, has been treated by Congress in the nature
of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death
penalty mandatory. Hence, relationship as an alternative
circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code,
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, should no longer be
applied in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7659. It
may be pointed, however, that without the foregoing amendment,
relationship would still be an aggravating circumstance in the
crimes of rape (Article 335) and acts of lasciviousness (Article
336). 57 If relationship in the instant case were to be appreciated
under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable
on accused then would not be death, but merely reclusion perpetua
for, assuming that Relannes testimony in court would have confirmed
what she narrated in her sworn statement (Exhibit C), no
circumstance then attended the commission of the rape which could
bring the crime under any provision of Article 335 which imposes a
penalty higher than reclusion perpetua or of reclusion perpetua to
death. (People v. Manyuhod, Jr.)WHEN OFFENDER IS STEP GRANDPARENT,
HE IS NOT CONSIDERED AN ASCENDANT UNDER RA 8353 AND RA 7659The
trial court has thus held incorrectly in considering appellant, who
is legally married to Roxans natural grandmother, as among those
named in the enumeration. Appellant is merely a step-grandparent
who obviously is neither an ascendant nor a step-parent of the
victim. In the recent case of People vs. Atop, 24 the Court
rejected the application of the mandatory death penalty to the rape
of a 12-year old victim by the common-law husband of the girls
grandmother. The Court said:It is a basic rule of statutory
construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in
favor of the accused. Courts must not bring cases within the
provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can
be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so,
too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can
be brought within them. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of the accused. (People v. Deleverio) RECLUSION PERPETUA IS
LIGHTER THAN LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND IF ONE IS SENTENCED TO LIFE
IMPRISONMENT AND LATER IMPOSED RECLUSION PERPETUA TO SAME OFFENSE,
THE PENALTY THAT SHOULD BE IMPOSED IS RECLUSION PERPETUASince
reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect
upon the accused have, as to him, a retroactive effect, the penalty
imposable upon the accused should be reclusion perpetua and not
life imprisonment. (People v. Latura)JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTYAlthough its origins seem lost in
obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment for violation of
law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient practice. We do
know that our forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin
and that initially, the criminal law was used to compensate for a
wrong done to a private party or his family, not to punish in the
name of the state.The dawning of civilization brought with it both
the increasing sensitization throughout the later generations
against past barbarity and the institutionalization of state power
under the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an
individual person with inherent human rights recognized and
protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to serve the
common weal and defend and preserve society.One of the
indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society
against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the
legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and
punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the
executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and
sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.Although
penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the
causes of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal
punishment, our criminal laws have been perceived as relatively
stable and functional since the enforcement of the Revised Penal
Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition
to the death penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as
it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in
specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886,
though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the
old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal
Code of 1870. (People v. Echegaray)