Appeasement DA 2 - Michigan7 2013

8/13/2019 Appeasement DA 2 - Michigan7 2013

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APPEASEMENT DISADVANTAGE MICHIGAN 2013

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Appeasement Disadvantage 2.0 –

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The plan appeases violent Latin American regimes – spills over and

destabilizes every global hotspotFarah ‗12 [Doug. Senior Fellow at the Intl Assessment and Strategy Center. President of IBI Consultants. ―Transnational Organized Crime,Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority‖ 2012, Strategic StudiesInstitute Publication. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117]

Latin America, while not generally viewed as part of the stateless regions phenomenon, or part of the failed state discussion,

presents multiple threats that center on criminalized states, their hybrid

alliance with extra-regional sponsors of terrorism, and nonstate TOCactors. The groups within this hybrid threat—often rivals, but willing to work in temporary alliances—are part of the recombinant criminal/terrorist pipeline, and their violenceis often aimed at gaining control of specific territory or parts of thatpipeline, either from state forces or other nonstate groups.¶ In areas outside effective

government control, the state is either absent or ineffective , contributing to the governance problem through

corruption and negligence. Only Colombia has made significant progress in recouping internal space for the government, and that progress is fragileand in danger of being reversed.126 While the basic model of the pipeline holds up well, the emerging situation can be likened to new branches of the

pipeline being built in regions where it previously had no access. ¶ The combination of ungoverned spaces,criminalized states, and TOC groups poses a growing, dangerous, andimmediate threat to the security of the United States. The traffic in drugs,

weapons, and humans from Latin American northward relies on the same basic pipeline structures to move. The same recombinant chains also move bulk cash, stolen cars, and weapons from the United States southward. Thisdemonstrates that these groups can successfully cross our border, and do, multiple times each day, in both directions. The pipelines are seldomdisrupted for more than a minimal amount of time, in part because the critical human nodes in the chain, and key chokepoints in the pipelines, are notidentified, and the relationships among the different actors and groups are not understood adequately. As noted, pipelines are adaptable and versatileas to product—the epitome of modern management systems—often intersecting with formal commercial institutions (banks, commodity exchanges,legitimate companies, etc.), both in a physical and virtual/cyber manner, in ways difficult to determine, collect intelligence on, or disaggregate from

protected commercial activities which may be both domestic and international in nature, with built-in legal and secrecy protections.¶ While the

situation is already critical , it is likely to get worse quickly . There is growing

evidence of Russian and Chinese organized crime penetration of the region,

particularly in Mexico and Central America, greatly strengthening the criminalorganizations and allowing them to diversify their portfolios and supply routes —a particular example being precursor chemicals for themanufacture of methamphetamines and cocaine. The Chinese efforts to acquire ports, resources, and intelligence-gathering capacity in the regiondemonstrate just how quickly the situation can develop, given that China was not a major player in the region 5 years ago. Iranian, Russian, andChinese banks operating in the region all offer new ways to move money into unregulated channels that benefit ¶ 65¶ both terrorist and criminal

organizations, along with corrupt officials.¶ At the same time, there is strong evidence that states of the Bolivarian Axis, led

by Venezuela and including Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, not only tolerate increased criminal activities in their territories,

but also sponsor nonstate armed groups designated as terrorist entities by the United States, including the FARC in

Colombia, and Hezbollah. These states appear to allow their stateless areas to be franchised out to these groups in order for the nonstate actors to bothfund their activities and spread unrest throughout the region.¶ Of particular concern is the relationship ofthese Bolivarian states, which support nonstate actors in the hemisphere, with Iran, a state that has for many years funded,

trained, and protected Hezbollah, one of the most effective and efficient nonstate (or quasi-state) terrorist actors in the world. The growingpresence of Hezbollah in the Latin American drug trade— both directly and through its proxies in West Africa and Southern

Eurasia—presents a new and important threat to U.S. security .¶ The only thing the Bolivarian nations proclaiming―21st-century socialism‖ and the reactionary theocratic regime in Iran, have in common is a stated hatred for the United States and the desire to inflictdamage on the nation they view as the ―Evil Empire‖ or the ―Great Satan.‖ This is a new type of alliance of secular (self -proclaimed socialist andMarxist) and radical Islamist organizations with a common goal directly aimed at challenging and undermining the security of the United States and its

primary allies in the region (Colombia, Chile, Peru, Panama, and Guatemala). This represents a fundamental





change because both¶ 66¶ primary state allies in the alliance (the governments of Venezuela and Iran)

host and support nonstate actors, allowing the nonstate actors to thrive in ways that would be impossible without state

protection.¶ Given this reality, it is imperative that U.S. intelligence community, military,

and law enforcement agencies develop a much deeper and more nuanced

understanding of how the criminalized state/TOC/terrorist groups and foreign hostile state and nonstate foreign actors exploit the

ungoverned or stateless spaces in areas of close proximity to U.S. borders —and the dangers they represent both in their current configuration, and theirfuture iterations. Understanding how these groups develop, and how they relate to each other and to groups from outside the region, is vital —particularly given the rapid pace with which they are expanding their control across the continent, across the hemisphere, and beyond. Developing apredictive capacity can be done based only on a more realistic understanding of the shifting networks of actors exploiting the pipelines; the nature andlocation of the geographic space in which they operate; the critical nodes where these groups are most vulnerable; and their behaviors in adapting tonew political and economic developments, market opportunities and setbacks, internal competition, and the countering actions of governments. ¶ In

turn, an effective strategy for combating TOC must rest on a solid foundation of regional

intelligence which, while cognizant of the overarching transnational connections, remains sensitive to unique local realities behind

seemingly ubiquitous behaviors. A one-size-fits-all policy will not suffice . It is not a

problem that is only , or primarily, a matter of state or regional security, narcotics, money laundering, ter67 ¶ rorism, human

smuggling, weakening governance, democracy reversal, trade and energy, counterfeiting and contraband, immigration and refugees, hostile

states seeking advantage, or alterations in the military balance and alliances. It is increasingly a combination of all of

these. It is a comprehensive threat that requires analysis and management within a

comprehensive, integrated whole-of-government approach . At the same time, however

expansive in global terms, a strategy based on geopolitics —the fundamental understanding of how human behavior relates to geographic space —mustalways be rooted in the local.

The signal of appeasement ignites a host of conflicts and collapseshegemonyCohen 3-19[Eliot. Director of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins. ―Eliot Cohen: American Withdrawal and Global Disorder‖ The Wall StreetJournal, 3/19/13 ln] In Mr. Obama's second term the limits of such withdrawal from conventional military commitmentsabroad will be tested. In East Asia, an assertive China has bullied the

Philippines (with which the U.S. has a 61-year-old defense pact) over theSpratly islands , and China has pressed its claims on Japan (a 53-year-old defense pact) over the Senkaku Islands. At

stake are territorial waters and mineral resources—symbols of China's drive for

hegemony and an outburst of national egotism. Yet when Shinzo Abe, the new prime minister of an understandably anxiousJapan, traveled to Washington in February, he didn't get the unambiguous White House backing of Japan's sovereignty that an allyof long standing deserves and needs. In Europe, an oil-rich Russia is rebuilding its conventional arsenal while modernizing (as have

China and Pakistan) its nuclear arsenal . Russia has been menacing its East European

neighbors, including those, like Poland, that have offered to host elements

of a NATO missile-defense system to protect Europe. In 2012, Russia's then-chief of generalstaff, Gen. Nikolai Makarov, declared: "A decision to use destructive force pre-emptively will be taken if the situation worsens." This would be the same Russia that has attempted to dismember its neighbor Georgia and now has a docile Russophile billionaire, Prime

Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, to supplant the balky, independence-minded government loyal to President Mikhail Saakashvili. Inthe Persian Gulf , American policy was laid down by Jimmy Carter in his 1980 State of the Union address with what became the Carter Doctrine: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as anassault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including

military force." America's Gulf allies may not have treaties to rely upon— but they do

have decades of promises and the evidence of two wars that the U.S. wouldstand by them. Today they wait for the long-promised (by Presidents Obama and George W. Bush)

nuclear disarmament of a revolutionary Iranian government that has been relentless

in its efforts to intimidate and subvert Iran's neighbors. They may wait in vain. Americans take for





granted the world in which they grew up—a world in which, for better or

worse, the U.S. was the ultimate security guarantor of scores of states, and

in many ways the entire international system. Today we are informed by many politicians and

commentators that we are weary of those burdens—though what we should be weary of , given that our children

aren't conscripted and our taxes aren't being raised in order to pay for those wars, is unclear. The truth is that defense

spending at the rate of 4% of gross domestic product (less than that sustained with ease by Singapore) is eminentlyaffordable. The arguments against far-flung American strategic commitments take many forms. So-called foreign policy realists,

particularly in the academic world, believe that the competing interests of states tendautomatically toward balance and require no statesmanlike action by theU.S. To them, the old language of force in international politics has become as obsolete as that of the "code duello," whichregulated individual honor fights through the early 19th century. We hear that international institutions and agreements can replacenational strength. It is also said—covertly but significantly —that the U.S. is too dumb and inept to play the role of security guarantor.Perhaps the clever political scientists, complacent humanists, Spenglerian declinists, right and left neo-isolationists, and simpledoubters that the U.S. can do anything right are correct. Perhaps the president should concentrate on nation-building at home whilepressing abroad only for climate-change agreements, nuclear disarmament and an unfettered right to pick off bad guys (including

Americans) as he sees fit. But if history is any guide, foreign policy as a political-science field

experiment or what-me-worryism will yield some ugly results. Syria is a harbinger of

things to come . In that case, the dislocation, torture and death have first afflicted the locals. But it will not end there, as

incidents on Syria's borders and rumors of the movement of chemical weapons suggest. A world in which the U.S.abnegates its leadership will be a world of unrestricted self-help in which

China sets the rules of politics and trade in Asia, mayhem and chaos is the

order of the day in the Middle East , and timidity and appeasement paralyze

the free European states. A world, in short, where the strong do what they

will, the weak suffer what they must, and those with an option hurry up

and get nuclear weapons .

South China Sea conflict goes nuclear Wesley ‗12 [Michael Wesley, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and an Adjunct Professor at Griffith University and TheUniversity of Sydney, former Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, former Professor of InternationalRelations and Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University, and Senior Lecturer in International Relations at theUniversity of New South Wales, July 2012, ―What‘s at stake in the South China Sea?‖http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/wesley_whats_at_stake_snapshot11.pdf]

The South China Sea is enclosed by the west coast of mainland Southeast Asia, Borneo and the Philippine

archipelago. Rich in hydrocarbons and fish stocks, it is traversed by over one-thirdof global shipping. Its waters and seabed are subject to six opposing territorial claims

– by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines – but these

confrontations are generally not regarded as seriously as the Taiwan Straits and the Korean peninsula standoffs. But theSouth China Sea is more unpredictable, and certainly warrants much closer and

more sustained attention by strategists and policy-makers. It is in the South China Sea that thecomponents of Asia‘s changing power dynamics are most concentrated andon display: China‘s growing strategic heft and paranoid sense of entitlement; its Southeast

Asian neighbours‘ hopes and misgivings about China‘s regional dominance; and the United States‘

compulsion to meet China‘s strategic challenge. The South China Sea is atangle of competing and mutually complicating claims over territory,resources and navigation rights. Geopolitically, it is like the Bermuda triangle, reversing expectedalignments and suspending normal rules of the game. It pits Asia‘s two most significant Communist countries, China and Vietnam,against each other, unites usually bitter enemies China and Taiwan, and is drawing the United States back to a partnership with

Vietnam a generation after the fall of Saigon. The South China Sea is the flashpoint in the





Pacific where conflict is most likely to break out through miscalculation . It

is a crowded maritime environment contested by some inexperiencedmaritime forces with underdeveloped naval doctrine, among whom thereare no established and accepted rules for managing maritime incidents. And

the combination of the claimant states‘ power asymmetries, overlapping

prerogatives, and growing nationalism mean that incidents, once they occur, arelikely to escalate. There are four reasons why finding solutions to the South China Sea disputes should be given the

highest priority by strategic policy-makers. 1. For China it‘s about security – and respect The South China Seasymbolises Beijing‘s larger maritime dilemma. The country‘s major population and productive

centres cluster along China‘s coastline, and are therefore vulnerable to major attack from the sea. Naval strategists see China ashemmed in along its sea coast by a chain of states or territories hosti le to Beijing: Japan, Korea, the Ryuku Islands, Taiwan, and the

Philippines. The overriding goal of Chinese naval strategy is to establishdominance over the waters within this ‗first island chain‘. At the southern end of the first

island chain, the South China Sea is crucial to China‘s commercial shipping, energy

flows, and the access of its Hainan island-based submarines to the Pacific. But the South China Sea‘ssouthern and western access points – the Sunda, Lombok, Luzon and Malacca Straits – arecontrolled by allies or partners of the United States. The best way to offset

this vulnerability is to control the South China Sea itself – and therebyloosen the American position in Southeast Asia. Influential elites in China view the South ChinaSea as ‗blue territory‘ – that is, as much a part of China‘s sovereign territory as Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan. To this line of thinking,any surrender of its claims in the South China Sea would signal a weakening of its rights to Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan – and istherefore unthinkable. China‘s 1992 Territorial Law classified the South China Sea as China‘s internal waters, meaning foreign naval vessels and aircraft must first gain Beijing‘s permission before transiting, submarines must surface, and that China retains the rightto evict other countries‘ shipping at any time. Beijing‘s willingness to enforce this law has been growing apace with its nav al power inthe western Pacific. In recent weeks, Beijing has placed the Spratly and Paracel Islands and the Macclesfield Bank under prefectural-level administration, established a 45-member legislature to administer the 1100 people who live on the islands, and approved the

deployment of a People‘s Liberation Army garrison to the islands. 2. Southeast Asia – avoiding the bad old days Ifunaddressed, the dynamics in the South China Sea could return Southeast

Asia to the bad old days of inter-state divisions , domestic instability and

competitive great-power interventions. On no other issue have the

disagreements and rivalries between ASEAN member states been sosustained and obvious. The Philippines and Vietnam demand that the organisation supports them in standing up to Beijing.On the other side are Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, with no direct stake in the conflict and which refuse to endorse the Philippines‘and Vietnam‘s confrontational stance. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are concerned about the dispute, but believe that avoiding

confrontation with China will improve the prospects for productive negotiations. The stand-off over the SouthChina Sea exposes the hollowness of Asian institutions‘ reliance on the principle of

unanimity – which means that any member‘s objection can keep an issue, no matter how pressing, off the agenda. Beijing‘s

refusal to discuss the South China Sea in any regional meeting, and its implicit threat to withdraw from any organisation that doesn‘trespect this wish, shows Southeast Asia‘s confidence that it could ‗socialise‘ China by welcoming it into regional institutions wasmisplaced. Asian institutions allow Beijing to make apparent concessions, such as its 2002 agreement with ASEAN to a Declarationof Conduct on the South China Sea, without actually surrendering any part of its position. As China and the United States increase

the stakes in the South China Sea, ASEAN‘s cardinal principle of neutrality is threatened.The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are tightening their strategic relationships with the United States, justas Cambodia, Laos and Thailand deepen their links to China. And there are signs that the disputes have become entangled in

domestic politics in the Philippines and Vietnam, making their stances even more uncompromising. In Manila, following allegationsthat Beijing used corrupt payments to soften the former Arroyo administration‘s stance on the South China Sea, the current Aquinoadministration and its Parliamentary opposition are vying for the most uncompromising policies on the issue. To counter rumourscirculating around Hanoi that Beijing has ‗bought‘ the Vietnam‘s senior leadership, the Vietnamese government has passed a la wclaiming sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. 3. For the United States it‘s about Credibility – within limits It is in theSouth China Sea that Southeast Asia‘s anxieties about China overlap with American anxieties about Beijing‘s naval buildup. Ov er thepast two years, the United States has taken an active interest and position in what had formerly been a dispute between China andthe other claimants. This means there are now in effect two layers to this dispute: a basic stand-off between the territorial claimants;

and an overarching strategic contest between Beijing and Washington. For the United States, what‘s atstake in the South China Sea is the viability of its entire presence in the





western Pacific. The US Navy‘s access to the South China Sea is contested byBeijing. China claims it will respect the freedom of passage of ships and aircraft through the area, on the condition that they areen route to another destination, and do not conduct military exercises or collect intelligence or militarily useful data.

Washington is adamant that the South China Sea‘s sea lanes areinternational waters, and are therefore subject to freedom of navigation, which in

international law allows the conduct of military exercises and the collection of intelligence and militarily useful data. If

Washington surrenders its ability to navigate the South China Sea on itsown terms, it will lose a major foothold in the western Pacific. The South China Sea ineffect pits a Chinese expansive claim (sovereignty based on historical usage) against an American expansive claim, that freedom ofnavigation allows the collection of intelligence and military data. The American claim is contested in other waters by Malaysia,Indonesia and India, though supported by other regional countries. China accuses the US of ‗hyping‘ the freedom of navigation question, arguing that it hides an intention to use the issue to build a coalition against China. For the Southeast Asian statescontesting China‘s South China Sea claims, the United States‘ presence and interest in the issue is a prerequisite for their position.

Washington is acutely aware that it needs to be seen as a reliable ally and partner inthe Pacific. It realises that its arms-length response to the Asian Financial Crisis eroded its position in Asia and set China onits path towards building soft po wer in the region. For Southeast Asians worried that Washington‘s attention or will to stay in the

region may erode, there is virtue in keeping the South China Sea on the agenda. But Washington can‘t give itsallies and partners a blank cheque which allows them to confront, and even

provoke, China from the comfort of the assumption that the United States will back them up. And some in

Southeast Asia are watching Washington‘s moves very closely, sensitive thatany concession could signal its acceptance of China‘s claims in the SouthChina Sea. 4. Solutions are Part of the Problem Either multilateral mediation orinternational law is most often used to resolve disputes of this sort – but inthe South China Sea they act to exacerbate the situation. Beijing refuses todiscuss the dispute in any multilateral context, fearing that it will facilitate the formation of a

front against China. The Southeast Asian claimants, however, are adamant that theymust deal with China as a coalition, with Manila particularly insistent that ASEAN must negotiate a

common position before negotiating with China. The result is a stand-off : the Philippines insists that ASEAN mustfind a common position before negotiating with China, while China will only negotiate if ASEAN abandons the search for a common

position. International law also intensifies the dispute. The United Nations Convention on

the Law of the Sea does not recognise China‘s historical claims, and therefore cannot serve as the

basis for an adjudication of the dispute. Worse, because international law relies on unbrokenlongevity of claims as the basis for adjudication, none of the parties to theSouth China Sea dispute can allow others‘ claims to pass uncontested, incase this is taken as evidence of its relinquishing of its claim. The result is asteady drum beat of hydrocarbon prospecting, fishing, the occupation of islets, and maritimeclashes. Policy Implications There is a great deal at stake in the South China Sea. Thedynamics of this issue will impact on China‘s evolving international personality, the response of its neighbours to its rising power,and the longevity of the United States‘ position in the western Pacific. With the growth of trade and investment around Asia‘sIndoPacific coast, the South China Sea will become ever more crowded with shipping and commerce.

Russian aggression causes extinctionCorcoran ‗9

[PhD, Senior Fellow @ Global Security, Frmr. Strategic Analyst at the US Army War College where he chaired studies for the Officeof the Deputy Chief of Operations and member of the National Advisory Board for the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues, we win the qualification game, 4/21, http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/090421301-strategic-nuclear-targets.htm]That brings us to Russia, our former main adversary, now a competitive partner and still a potential future adversary, particularly as

relations have gradually soured in recent years. Russia is the only other nation with aformidable arsenal of some three thousand strategic weapons. Our opposing arsenals were built up in the period when Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was the underlying strategic concept -- each side deterredfrom striking the other by the prospect of assured retaliatory destruction. The situation became even madder as both sides worked todevelop a capability to destroy the other's strike force with a crippling first strike. This resulted in further large increases in the sizesof the arsenals, as well as early warning systems and hair-trigger launch-on-warning alert procedures. The final result was an overallsystem in which each side could destroy the other in a matter of minutes. And it also raised another chilling specter, Nuclear Winter,





in which the atmospheric dust raised from a major nuclear exchange would block sunlight for an extended period and essentially

destroy human civilization globally. The collapse of the Soviet Union collapsed this threat, but did not eliminate it. US andRussian nuclear forces remained frozen in adversarial positions. The May 2002

Moscow Treaty began to address this legacy and is leading to a reduction in strategic nuclear forces down to levels

of about two thousand on each side by 2012. These levels are still sufficient to destroy not only bothnations but also human civilization. It is hard to even construct scenarios

where the use of even a few strategic nuclear weapons does not risk a totalescalation. Strikes on Russian warning facilities or strike forces wouldalmost certainly bring a wave of retaliatory strikes. Strikes on hardenedcommand centers would be of questionable effectiveness and also risk totalescalation. In addition, successful elimination of Russian leaders couldgreatly complicate any efforts to stop escalation short of a total nuclearexchange.





Uniqueness





No Engagement Now – General

Hardline against rogue states nowBoyle 6-24professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law (Francis, ―Obama Prepares to Wage Offensive, Firs t-strike

Strategic Nuclear Warfare against Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and Syria‖, Global Research, 6/24,http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-prepares-to-wage-offensive-first-strike-strategic-nuclear-warfare-against-russia-china-iran-north-korea-and-syria/5340299) ¶ Since ―nuclear deterrence‖ is not now and has never been the Obama administration‘s nuclear weapons po licy from the get-go, then

by default this means that offensive first-strike strategic nuclear war fighting is nowand has always been the Obama administration‘s nuclear weapons policy.¶ This policy will

also be pursued and augmented by means of ―integrated non-nuclear strike options.‖ (Ibid).¶ Therefore the entire 2013

NPR and Obama‘s recent nuclear arms ―reduction‖ proposals must beunderstood within this context of the United States pursuing an offensive,strategic first-strike nuclear war-fighting capability as augmented by non-nuclear strike forces:¶ ―After a comprehensiv e review of our nuclear forces, the President hasdetermined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our

Allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weaponsfrom the level established in the New START Treaty.‖ Id. at 6.¶ And we know now for sure

that all the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems that Obama is currently in theprocess of deploying in Europe, Asia, and the United States , on land, at sea and perhaps

in Outer Space are designed to provide the United States with a strategic,offensive, first strike nuclear war fighting capability against Russia andChina and Iran and North Korea and Syria for starters. The latter three becausethe United States has taken the position that they are not in compliance

with their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty : ―…the UnitedStates has relied increasingly on non-nuclear elements to strengthen regional security architectures, including a forward U.S.

conventional presence and effective theater ballistic missile defenses…‖ Id. at 9.¶ So the United States

government is currently preparing to launch, wage and win an offensive,first-strike strategic nuclear war against Russia, China, Iran, North Koreaand Syria.¶ All the rest is just palaver. Including by our Dissembler-in-Chief. An ―honors‖ graduate of Harvard Law School.

Snowden proves US engagement with Latin America‘s low AP 7-13(Associated Press, The Blade, July 13 2013, Snowden affair dampens already cool U.S.-Latin America ties,http://www.toledoblade.com/World/2013/07/13/Snowden-affair-dampens-already-cool-U-S-Latin-America-ties.html,PS) WASHINGTON — America is pivoting to Asia, focused on the Mideast, yet the "backyard," as Secretary of State John Kerry oncereferred to Latin America, is sprouting angry weeds as the scandal involving intelligence leaker Edward Snowden lays bare alreadythorny U.S. relations with Latin America.¶ Taking the opportunity to snub their noses at the U.S., Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaraguahave already said they'd be willing to grant asylum for Snowden, who is wanted on espionage charges in the United States forrevealing the scope of National Security Agency surveillance programs that spy on Americans and foreigners. Ecuador has said it

would consider any request from him.¶ Relations between the US and these countries werealready testy, but the Snowden affair also stunned the Obamaadministration's effort to improve ties with friendlier nations in the regionlike Mexico and Brazil.¶ Snowden hasn't been the only recent setback. Leaders inthe region harshly criticized the U.S. earlier this week when a newspaper in Brazil,

which was privy to some documents released by Snowden, reported that a U.S. spy program was widely targeting data in emails and telephone calls across Latin America. Thatrevelation came just days after an uproar in Latin America over the rerouting of Bolivian President Evo Morales' plane over Europeamid suspicions, later proven untrue, that Snowden was aboard.¶ And all this comes right after President Barack Obama, Vice

http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-prepares-to-wage-offensive-first-strike-strategic-nuclear-warfare-against-russia-china-iran-north-korea-and-syria/5340299








President Joe Biden and Kerry have all made recent treks to the region to bolster U.S. engagement in Latin America.¶ " Whatthe Snowden affair has done to the reinvigorated effort to re-engage withLatin America is to dump a pail of cold water on it ," said Carl Meacham, a former senior Latin America adviser on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "It won't stop trade deals, cooperation on energy, but it's going to be

harder for the president to portray the image that 'We are here to work with you.' It's a step back ."¶ The U.S. has sought todownplay the fallout from the disclosure of information about its intelligence activities. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki

acknowledged that the United States does gather foreign intelligence just like other nations.¶ "I can tell you that we have spoken withBrazilian officials regarding these allegations," she said this week. "We plan to continue our dialogue with the Brazilians throughnormal diplomatic channels, but those are conversations that, of course, we would keep private."¶ Psaki has also said that anycountry granting asylum to Snowden would create "grave difficulties in our bilateral relationship."¶ While other nations may spy ontheir friends, the allegations have fueled anti-American sentiment already simmering in the region. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Boliviaand Ecuador are led by populist leaders who have balked at any dominance by the U.S. in the Americas and pursued policies that

often run counter to Washington's wishes. Venezuela refers to the United States simply as "The Empire."¶ " What they'resaying is 'See, the U.S. hasn't changed. It doesn't matter who is in the WhiteHouse, the U.S. is the same. The U.S. is the big imperial power ... they arenot treating us as equals. Look, they are even spying on us,'" said Meacham, who directsthe Americas program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.¶





No Engagement Now – Cuba

Hardline toward Cuba nowKovalik 6-28[Dan. Senior Associate with the AFL-CIO. Citing Lamrani, a US-Cuba relations expert. ―Trying to Destroy the Danger of a Good

Example: The Unrelenting Economic War on Cuba‖ 6/28/13 http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/28/the-unrelenting-economic-war-on-cuba/]

Imagine then, what Cuba could do if the U.S. blockade were lifted. It is clear that the

rulers of the U.S. have imagined this, and with terror in their hearts.¶ Indeed, Lamrani quotes former CubanMinister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, as quite rightly asserting:¶ Why doesthe U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba? I will answer: because it isafraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cuba‘seconomic and social development would be dizzying. It knows that we woulddemonstrate even more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism, all

the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice andhuman rights for all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the governmentof a great and powerful empire, but it fears the example of this small

insurgent island.¶ The next critical question is how can those of good will help and support the good example of Cubain the face of the U.S. blockade. Obviously, the first answer is to organize and agitate for an end the blockade. As a young Senator,

Barack Obama said that the blockade was obsolete and should end, and yet, while

loosening the screws just a bit, President Obama has continued to aggressively enforce the blockade. He must be called to task on this. In addition, Congress must be lobbied to end thelegal regime which keeps the embargo in place.¶ In addition, we must support Venezuela and its

new President, Nicolas Maduro, as Venezuela has been quite critical in supporting Cuba in

its international medical mission. And indeed, one of the first things President Maduro didonce elected in April was to travel to Cuba to reaffirm his support for theseefforts. It should be noted that Maduro‘s electoral rival, Henrique Capriles – who led an attack against the Cuban Embassy inCaracas during the 2002 coup — vowed to end support for, and joint work, with Cuba.

No rapprochement – appeasement is fundamentally incompatible with thepolitical landscapeHanson and Lee 13(Stephanie Hanson, and Brianna Lee, Senior Production Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S.-Cuba Relations" January 31,2013 http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113, RLA)

Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say a long process would precederesumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though

" you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to

counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to

see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term.¶ Many recent

policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba. The

removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process ofnormalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heatedcongressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to ease travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill.

"Whatever we call it--normalization, détente, rapproachement--it is clear that the

policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig. A

fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of

improving U.S.-Cuban relations , experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change,

http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113

http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113





" the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in

power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research

Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and BolivianPresident Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region.

No U.S. Cuba engagement in the status quo

Cuba Confidential 13 (Cuba Confidential, ―Pastors For Peace‖ Ramps Up Media Coverage" July 29, 2013

http://cubaconfidential.wordpress.com/2013/07/29/pastors-for-peace-ramps-up-media-coverage/, RLA)

What are the major barriers? The U.S. government still sees Cuba as a state sponsor ofterrorism and remains firmly entrenched in policies driven by a Cold Waropposition to government‘s alignment with the Soviet Union. There are major barriersregarding the release of political prisoners on both sides, including a group of Cubans known as the ―Cuban 5.‖ Five Cubanintelligence officers thwarted a terrorist plot hatched in Cuba against their country. They were arrested and charged with espionageand conspiracy to commit murder in 1998. Cuba sees their incarceration as an unacceptable, politically motivated move and has

demanded their immediate release.¶ Conversely, Cuba continues to hold Alan Gross, a USAIDcontractor who was arrested for espionage in 2009 and charged with ―acts against the

independence or the territorial integrity of the state‖ in March 2011. He is currently serving a 15-year sentence.¶ The U.S.maintains a section in the Swiss embassy to Cuba but has not had formal diplomatic relations with

the island nation for over 50 years. During a public address last year, Cuban President Raul Castro saidthat he is willing to sit at the table with Washington to discuss any issue, as long as ―it is a conversation between equals.‖ ―Any daythey want, the table is set,‖ Castro said.

Travel scandal provesCBS 7-22(CBS News, ―American Express Settles With U.S. Treasury Dept. Over Cuba Travel‖ July 22, 2013http://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/07/22/american-express-settles-with-u-s-treasury-dept-over-cuba-travel/, RLA)

American Express will pay the U.S. Treasury Department millions to settlepotential civil liability for the more than 14,000 tickets that were issued fortravel to Cuba and countries outside the U.S.¶ Officials announced Monday that American ExpressTravel Related Services, Inc. has agreed to pay $5.2 million after the Treasury Department found that foreign branch offices andsubsidiaries of American Express issued about 14,487 tickets for travel to and from the island between December 2005 and

November 2011.¶ Those bookings were an apparent violation of the Cuban AssetsControl Regulations. The rules issuedin 1963 prohibit financial transactions by banking institutions under U.S.

jurisdiction in which Cuba or its citizens have an interest.¶ ― We voluntarily self-disclosedthese bookings to OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control), and put in place robust controls to ensure it would not recur,‖ AmericanExpress spokeswoman Diana Postemsky said in a written statement.¶ American Express can provide travel service arrangements forauthorized trips to the island, but the bookings in question were never approved by the federal government.¶ It‘s not the first time American Express has come under federal scrutiny for its handling of Cuba-related travel. The company was investigated in 1995and 1996 for similar violations committed by a subsidiary that had recently been acquired, according to the Treasury Department.¶

Federal officials said American Express showed ―reckless disregard‖ for theregulations.¶ ―The apparent violations caused significant harm to U.S.sanctions program objectives regarding Cuba,‖ the Treasury Department said in announcing thesettlement.¶ The Treasury Department said American Express continued to book travel to and from Cuba for many of its corporateclients following the 2010 disclosure of the violations. The department said the company also never implemented the remedial

measures it pledged to implement after the 1995 and 1996 investigation.¶ American Express is one of the

largest travel service providers for authorized Cuba travel, according to the TreasuryDepartment.¶ U.S. citizens are prohibited from traveling to Cuba as tourists, though

they can travel for religious, educational or cultural visits if granted a specific license by the Treasury Department. So called―people-to-people‖ travel was reinstated by the Obama administration in2011.

Asset control regulations prove no rapprochement nowHamm ‗13

http://cubaconfidential.wordpress.com/2013/07/29/pastors-for-peace-ramps-up-media-coverage/

http://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/07/22/american-express-settles-with-u-s-treasury-dept-over-cuba-travel/

http://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/07/22/american-express-settles-with-u-s-treasury-dept-over-cuba-travel/

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(Catharine Hamm, The Los Angeles Times, "Travel to Cuba? Probably not worth the risk" March 31, 2013http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/31/travel/la-tr-spot-20130331, RLA)

Treasury Department regulations say this: "The Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 515 (the'Regulations'), were issued by the U.S. Government on July 8, 1963, under the Trading With the Enemy Act in response to certain

hostile actions by the Cuban Government. They apply to all persons (individuals and entities)subject to U.S. jurisdiction …as well as all persons engaging in transactions

that involve property in or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."¶ Its website goes on to say:

"Criminal penalties for violating the Regulations range up to 10 years inprison, $1,000,000 in corporate fines, and $250,000 in individual fines. Civilpenalties up to $65,000 per violation may also be imposed."¶ In Morrison's case, complying with Treasury Department regulations isa good idea. She was inquiring on behalf of her 87-year-old father, who wants to make the trip. He is neither of Cuban descent norqualified under one of the other categories that Treasury deems as worthy of receiving a license. He just wants to go.¶ Would youexpose your older parent to such risks by flouting the law? There may be those who believe the restrictions are wrong. They may bethinking that an octogenarian who gets caught may make a sympathetic test case.¶ Given that neither Morrison nor her father knewabout the restrictions, I don't think they intended to become part of a crusade. When I spoke with her, I recommended that they joina group that is licensed to travel to Cuba for people-to-people trips that are supposed to be more than Cuban cocktails and soaking

up the atmosphere. Check with college or university alumni groups or with Insight Cuba, among others.¶ Even if you want to travel independently to Cuba (with or without a license), justgetting there may present problems. When I tried to view Tijuana to Havana on Kayak.com, I got this

message: "Due to United States travel restrictions, we are unable to display

travel itineraries that include Cuba." Riverside travel agent Sonia Robledo told me last week that shetried to search for fares (at my behest), and she was also denied access.¶ Janet Moore, owner of Distant Horizons in Long Beach, cansee flights because the company works with groups that are licensed to travel to Cuba. She said she is approached daily byindividuals who want to try to travel to Cuba without a license. "We say no," she said.¶ The interest in Cuba, she said, stems partlyfrom the theory of "forbidden fruit." But, she added, "Americans are genuinely interested in what's going on in Cuba. It is a fabulousdestination."¶ Zachary Sanders may have thought so. USA Today's Laura Bly reported in July the outcome of his trip to Cuba fromMexico. He was ultimately fined $6,500 for his visit. In this case, it wasn't the fine as much as it was the time it took to reach thisconclusion: He traveled to Cuba in 1998.

Cigars proveDOT ‗13 (U.S. Department of Treasury, ―CUBAN CIGAR UPDATE‖ 4/19/13 http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/ccigar2.pdf, RLA)

There is now an across the board ban on the importation¶ into the United

States of Cuban-origin cigars and other¶

Cuban-origin tobacco products, as well

as most other ¶ products of Cuban origin. This prohibition extends to such ¶ products acquired in Cuba, irrespective of whether a ¶

traveler is licensed by OFAC to engage in Cuba travelrelated transactions, and to such products acquired in ¶ third countries by any

U.S. traveler, including purchases ¶ at duty free shops. Importation of these Cuban goods is¶

prohibited whether the goods are purchased directly by the ¶ importer orgiven to the importer as a gift. Similarly, ¶ the import ban extends to Cuban-origin tobacco products ¶ offered for sale over the Internet or through thecatalog ¶ mail purchases. Prior to August 1, 2004, persons returning ¶ to the United States who were licensedunder the ¶ Regulations to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions ¶ were authorized by general license to import up to $100 ¶

worth of Cuban merchandise as accompanied baggage. Cuban ¶ tobacco and alcohol products were included in that general ¶ license.

That general license was removed from the ¶ Regulations. Criminal penalties for violation of theRegulations range ¶ up to $1,000,000 in fines for corporations, $250,000for ¶ individuals and up to 10 years in prison. Civil penalties¶ of up to $65,000 per violation may be

imposed by OFAC.

http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/31/travel/la-tr-spot-20130331

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http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/31/travel/la-tr-spot-20130331





AT//US-Cuba Diplomatic Talks

Barriers overwhelmHaven 6-21[Paul. Staffer for the AP. ―Cuba, US try Talking, but Face Many Obstacles‖ The Miami Times Herald, 6/21/13 ln]

To be sure, there is still far more that separates the long-time antagonists thanunites them. The State Department has kept Cuba on a list of state sponsors ofterrorism and another that calls into question Havana‘s commitment tofighting human trafficking. The O bama administration continues to demanddemocratic change on an island ruled for more than a half century by Castro and his brother Fidel. For its part,

Cuba continues to denounce Washington‘s 51-year-old economic embargo. And then there is Gross, the 64-year-old Maryland native who was arrestedin 2009 and is serving a 15-year jail sentence for bringing communications equipment to the island illegally. His casehas scuttled efforts at engagement in the past, and could do so again, U.S. officialssay privately. Cuba has indicated it wants to trade Gross for four Cuban agents serving long jail terms in the United States,something Washington has said it won‘t consider. Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College in New York who helped organize a recent U.S. tour by Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, said the Obama administration is too concerned with upsetting Cuban- American politicians and has missed opportunities to engage with Cuba at a crucial time in its history. ―I

think that a lot more would have to happen for this to amount to momentumleading to any kind of major diplomatic breakthrough,‖ he said. ―Obama should be bolder

and more audacious.‖ Even these limited moves have sparked fierce criticism by those long opposed to engagement. Cuban- American congressman Mario Diaz Balart, a Florida Republican, called the recent overtures ―disturbing.‖

Substantive cooperation outweighs posturing – no tangible cooperationTaylor 6-18(Guy Taylor, State Department correspondent, ―U.S.-Cuba mail talks spark speculation of wider outreach‖ The Washington Times,http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/18/us-cuba-mail-talks-spark-speculation-wider-outreac/)

The announcement that U.S. and Cuban officials will hold landmark talksthis week toward restarting direct mail service between the two nations prompted a mix of reactions onMonday on whether the Obama administration plans a broader outreach to the Castro regime in the president‘s second term.¶

Veteran Cuba watchers agreed that the development is unlikely to trigger a wider normalization in relations any time soon. But the notion that the talks — slated for

Thursday and Friday — could pull Washington and Havana closer than they‘ve been in

more than half a century prompted a harsh reaction from at least one Republican on Capitol Hill.¶ Rep.

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida Republican, said that the White House is caving to pressure from Cuban leaders desperate to

end trade restrictions frozen since the 1960s.¶ ―The regime is once again manipulating the U.S.

administration in this game because it wants us to lift the embargo and make furtherconcessions,‖ said Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen, a former chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee and a staunchopponent of easing the stand-off that has defined bilateral relations since Cuban leader Fidel Castro agreed to house Soviet ballisticmissiles in 1961.¶ Mr. Castro, 86, stepped down in 2008, and the top post is now held by his 82-year-old brother Raul.¶ The State

Department said Monday that the postal talks will occur well within policy boundaries set long ago by Congress.¶ The talks will be led by R. Cabanas Rodriguez, the chief of mission at the Cuban Interests Section in

Washington, and Lea Emerson, the U.S. Postal Service‘s director of internationalpostal affairs.¶ Similar negotiations in 2009 failed to produce an agreement. Separatenegotiations on issues such as immigration have been on hold during recent years amid tensions simmering between the U.S. andCuba over the trade embargo and Washington‘s unwillingness to remove Cuba from its official list of state sponsors of terrorism.¶

Washington has also demanded that Cuba release jailed American subcontractor AlanGross, who was arrested in December 2009 while working for a U.S. Agency for International Development-funded program.

Cuban authorities gave a 15-year prison sentence to Mr. Gross and accused him ofillegally delivering satellite phones to individuals in the nation ‘s Jewish community .

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/18/us-cuba-mail-talks-spark-speculation-wider-outreac/

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No Engagement Now – Venezuela

Venezuela has cut off ties with the USBBC 7-20(BBC News, July 20 2013, Venezuela 'ends' bid to restore full US ties,http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_65833.shtml,PS)

Venezuela says it has "ended" steps towards restoring diplomatic ties withthe US, after comments by the woman nominated as the next envoy to the UN.¶ Samantha Power said this weekshe would seek to combat what she called the "crackdown on civil society"in countries including Venezuela.¶ She was speaking at a US Senate confirmation hearing on Wednesday.¶

The remarks prompted an angry response from Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro.¶ "The Bolivarian Republicof Venezuela hereby ends the process... of finally normalising ourdiplomatic relations," said Venezuela's foreign ministry in a statement.¶ Itobjected to Ms Power's "interventionist agenda", noting that her "disrespectful opinions" were later endorsed by the statedepartment, "contradicting in tone and in content" earlier statements by Secretary of State John Kerry.¶ Poor relations¶

Relations between the US and Venezuela have been strained in recent years. They last had ambassadors in each other's capitals in 2010.¶

Washington angered Caracas by backing the Venezuelan opposition's

demand for a full recount of the presidential election in April to replaceHugo Chavez, who died in March.¶ Mr Chavez's anointed successor, Nicolas Maduro, won the vote by less than twopercentage points.¶

No diplomatic relations with VenezuelaRosenberg 7/28(Matt Rosenberg, master's degree in geography from California State University, Northridge and a bachelor's degree in geography from the University of California, Davis. "Could U.S.-Venezuela Relations Be Worse?" July 28, 2013http://geography.about.com/b/2013/07/28/could-u-s-venezuela-relations-be-worse.htm, RLA)

Venezuela has announced that they will not longer even attempt tonormalize diplomatic relations with the United States, following negative comments about

Venezuela made by President Obama's nominee for envoy to the United Nations Samantha Power. A statement from Venezuela's foreign ministry read, "The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelahereby ends the process... of finally normalising our diplomatic relations."

No rapprochement – trade is maintained for strategic interestsRivera 13(Michael Rivera, Intelligent Analysis on the Americas, "Calling it Quits?: How Strategic Interest OutweighsPolitical Rivalry Among Nations" 7/28/13 http://riveragroupinternational.wordpress.com/2013/07/28/calling-it-quits-how-strategic-interest-outweighs-political-rivalry-among-nations/, RLA)

Relations between the US and Venezuela reached a boiling point on several occasions during the presidency of Hugo Chavez. Thetwo countries have been in conflict on a variety of issues over the past 14 years, including humanrights, freedom of media, capitalism, and ideology. Although some analysts were guardedlyoptimistic about the possibility of normalized relations between the US and Venezuela after the death of Chavez earlier this year,

diplomatic fallout over the Edward Snowden affair has reminded observersthat the process of thawing such deep-rooted trust will not occur over night.

There may be little hope for an improvement in political relations in the near future, but how much do poor diplomatic ties affectcommercial relations between countries in conflict?¶ One would expect trade levels between the US and Venezuela to havediminished in recent years considering the fiery anti-imperialist rhetoric Chavez employed as president. U.S. Census data shows that bilateral trade levels have continued to increase since Chavez first took office in 1999. The annual total of American exports to Venezuela more than doubled from 1998 to 2012, while imports have quadrupled during that time frame to $38 billion. The UnitedStates has been a critical market for Venezuelan goods, as exports to the US accounted for over 39% of the country‘s total exports in

2012. This has not been dispelled by the fact that these two countries mutuallyexpelled their respective ambassadors in 2008.¶ Domestic and foreign investors are guaranteed

the same legal protections under the current Venezuelan constitution. The same article of protection alsostates that exceptions are made for ―strategic interests‖, including oil and

http://geography.about.com/b/2013/07/28/could-u-s-venezuela-relations-be-worse.htm

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other goods for public benefit. This exception obviously creates the legal pathway for nationalization. Although Maduro has yet to invoke this policy during his time in office, his predecessor frequently nationalized firms to assert

governmental control. American firms were not the only ones subject to having theirassets seized during Chavez‘s time in office. Foreign oil companies have

been frequently targeted; but to say that Exxon Mobil and Conoco Phillips were singled out for being North American firms would an incomplete explanation at best. Oil was, and continues to be, the crux of the chavista economic program.

In addition to being its primary revenue stream, it is often used as a source of repayment for loans from China. It is also used tosupport its alliances with countries like Belarus, Cuba, Iran, and Syria. Thus, a firm of any national origin with a controlling interestin a key asset like energy, is far more likely to be nationalized than an American company with no assets of strategic value for the Venezuelan government.¶ Recent attempts to thaw relations have been thwarted by new obstacles, such as the ongoing Snowdensaga referred to earlier, as well as Venezuelan officials‘ anger over Samantha Powers‘ comments to the UN regarding human rights inthe South American country. However, with over 500 American firms operating or represented in Venezuela, it is unlikely the freeze

in relations between the two countries will have an impact on commercial ties. Venezuela, despite previousthreats to cut off supply to the United States, remains one of the top oilsuppliers to the United States. There is a degree of interdependence that even

heated rhetoric by public officials cannot break.

Venezuela and US ties strained- Snowden and Samantha PowerMunoz 7-23(Boris Munoz, The New Yorker, July 23 2013, Venezuela‘s View of the Snowden Affair,

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/07/venezuelas-view-of-the-snowden-affair.html,PS) The fragile truce was broken when Obama‘s nominee for United Nations ambassador, Samantha Power,promised before a Senate committee last Wednesday that she would standup against ―repressive regimes‖ and ―the crackdown on civil society being carried out in countries likeCuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela.‖¶ The remarks infuriated Maduro, who, in a full bravado, responded, ―As president, mypolicy is zero tolerance for any attacks the Gringos make on Venezuela. I‘mnot going to tolerate any sort of aggression against Venezuela— verbal, political, or

diplomatic. That‘s enough! You there with your empire. No more meddling with Venezuela.‖

Venezuela, he said, was suspending ongoing talks to improve relations with

the U.S . He also reaffirmed his willingness to give asylum to Snowden, since

―the right to asylum is an international humanitarian right, and Venezuela

has always respected it.‖¶ Maduro,

that is to say,found it more convenient to step back to the previous status quo than to move forward and regularize the

relations. By doing so, he can claim that he cares enough about the nationalistic valuesChávez so firmly defended. As of Friday night, a source close to the Maduro government said that it was highlyunlikely that Snowden would go to Venezuela—―He‘s not coming here.‖¶

No appeasement nowBercovitch 7-21(Sascha Bercovitch, With ―Zero Tolerance to Gringo Aggression,‖ Maduro Cuts Off Venezuela-U.S. Talks,July 21 2013, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/9872,PS) Caracas, July 21st 2013 (Venezuelanalysis.com) – The conversations that were started a month

and a half ago between Venezuela and the United States have definitively

ended , Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced yesterday at an event of the Strategic Regions of

Integral Defense (REDI) in Cojedes state.¶ ―My policy is zero tolerance to gringo aggressionagainst Venezuela. I'm not going to accept any aggression, whether it be verbal, political, or diplomatic. Enough is

enough. Stay over there with your empire, don't involve yourselves anymore in Venezuela,‖ he said.¶ The announcement comes after controversial statementsfrom Samantha Powers, President Barack Obama‘s nominee for U.S. envoy to the United Nations, who testified to

the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Wednesday that she would fight against what she called a―crackdown on civil society being carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran,Russia, and Venezuela.‖¶ In a statement written on Friday that marks the last





communication between the two countries, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua wrote, ―The

preoccupation expressed by the U.S. government regarding the supposed repression of civil society in Venezuela is unacceptable andunfounded. To the contrary, Venezuela has amply demonstrated that it possesses a robust system of constitutional guarantees topreserve the unrestricted practice and the respect of fundamental human rights, as the UN has recognized on multiple occasions.‖¶

Snowden has already killed US-Venezuela coop AP 7-13(Associated Press, The Blade, July 13 2013, Snowden affair dampens already cool U.S.-Latin America ties,

http://www.toledoblade.com/World/2013/07/13/Snowden-affair-dampens-already-cool-U-S-Latin-America-ties.html,PS) WASHINGTON — America is pivoting to Asia, focused on the Mideast, yet the ―backyard,‖ as Secretary of State John Kerry oncereferred to Latin America, is sprouting angry weeds as the scandal involving intelligence leaker Edward Snowden lays bare already

thorny U.S. relations with Latin America.¶ Taking the opportunity to snub their noses at the U.S., Venezuela, Bolivia and

Nicaragua have already said they‘d be willing to grant asylum for Snowden, who is wanted on espionage charges in the United States for revealing the scope of National Security Agency surveillance programs that spyon Americans and foreigners. Ecuador has said it would consider any request from him.¶ Relations between the U.S. and these

countries were already testy, but the Snowden affair also has acted as a stun gun to theObama administration‘s effort to improve ties with f riendlier nations in theregion like Mexico and Brazil.¶ Snowden hasn‘t been the only recent setback.Leaders in the region harshly criticized the U.S. earlier this week when anewspaper in Brazil, which was privy to some documents released by Snowden, reported that a U.S.spy program was widely targeting data in emails and telephone calls acrossLatin America. That revelation came just days after an uproar in Latin America over the rerouting of Bolivian PresidentEvo Morales‘ plane over Europe amid suspicions, later proven untrue, that Snowden was aboard.¶ And all this comes right afterPresident Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and Kerry have all made recent treks to the region to bolster U.S. engagement in

Latin America.¶ ― What the Snowden affair has done to the reinvigorated effort to re-engage with Latin America is to dump a pail of cold water on it, ‖ said Carl Meacham,

a former senior Latin America adviser on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. ―It won‘t stop trade deals,cooperation on energy , but it‘s going to be harder for the president toportray the image that ‗We are here to work with you.‘ It‘s a step back

Relations between Venezuela strainedNTD 7-24(NTD Television, July 24 2013, Venezuela's Maduro Conditions U.S. Relations on End to "Imperialism‖,

http://www.ntd.tv/en/news/world/south-america/20130724/81817-venezuela39s-maduro-conditions-us-relations-on-end-to-

imperialism.html,PS) Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro told supporters on Tuesday (July 23) that better relations with Washington was only possible if the United States changed its tacttowards Latin America.¶ ¶ [Nicolas Maduro, President of Venezuela]:¶ "Do you want to have good relations withthe United States? This does not depend on just us, it depends on the U.S.. If they can rectify their policy and are able to, which I

doubt, there will be another position, we will renew dialogue. The government of the United Statesshould reconsider its imperialistic attitude on Latin America and theCaribbean and its aggression towards Venezuela. When they rectify this, here we will wait with

our hands stretched and as usual a smile.‖¶ ¶ In a further strain to relations, Maduro becamethe first to offer asylum to American fugitive Edward Snowden earlier thismonth.

US foreign policy has not worked relations are low now- Samantha Powerand Maduro‘s election

AFP 7-24(Agence France Press, Global Post, July 24 2013, US still up for warming Venezuela ties after fresh row,http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130724/us-still-warming-venezuela-ties-after-fresh-row#1,PS) The United States said Wednesday it is still open to improving ties with Venezuelaafter Caracas called off the rapprochement, accusing Washington of meddling in its internal affairs. ¶ The two nations -- which were often at odds during the 14-year rule of the recently deceased Hugo Chavez -- had hinted at warmer

ties after a meeting of top diplomats last month.¶ But then Venezuela reacted angrily to astatement by Samantha Power -- tapped to be the next US ambassador to the United Nations -- who





vowed to stand up to "repressive regimes" and challenge the "crackdown on civil society being

carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela."¶ President Nicolas Maduro -- the handpickedsuccessor to the leftist Chavez -- then accused Washington of meddling in Venezuela's affairs, condemning its "imperialist attitude."¶

Washington has yet to recognize Maduro's victory in a disputed Aprilelection to replace Chavez.¶

US-Venezuela relations low-4 warrantsPress TV 7-24(Press TV, July 24 2013, No dialogue unless US changes imperialistic stance: Venezuela,http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/07/24/315416/us-must-end-imperialistic-stance-maduro/,PS) Improv ed relations with the United States ―does not depend on just us, it depends on them (US). If they can rectify (this) and areable to, which I doubt, there will be another position; we will renew dialogue,‖ Maduro told a cheering audience in the Carib beanstate of Monagas on Tuesday.¶ On Friday, Venezuela said it was ending efforts to improve ties with Washington that started in earlyJune.¶ The decision followed remarks by US President Barack Obama‘s nominee for US ambassador to the United Nations.¶ Duringher confirmation hearing before a US Senate committee on July 17, Samantha Power pledged to oppose what she called a crackdown

on civil society in a number of countries, including Venezuela.¶ On July 18, Maduro denounced Power‘sremarks as ―outrageous‖ and demanded ―an immediate correction by theUS government.‖¶ Venezuela and the United States have not exchangedambassadors since 2010.¶ But on the sidelines of a regional summit in Guatemala in June, US Secretary of StateJohn Kerry and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua agreed that officials would ―soon‖ meet for talks that could lead to an

exchange of envoys.¶ But the strain in relations between the two nations haveintensified following the US support for Venezuelan opposition leaderHenrique Capriles, who disputed the results of the April presidential election, in which Maduro won the race with

nearly 51 percent of the vote against 49 percent for Capriles.¶ In March, Caracas expelled two US militaryattaches on charges of making attempts to foment instability in Venezuela.¶

Recently , Venezuela has offered asylum to Edward Snowden, a former technical contractor for

the US National Security Agency (NSA) who is wanted in the United States for leaking detailsof Washington‘s secret surveillance programs.

Strong stance against Venezuela now – demonstrates resolveCardenas ‗13 (José Cárdenas, assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development under Bush Administration, ―Obama must stand firm on Venezuela‖ Friday, April 19, 2013 - 12:14 PM,

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/taxonomy/term/4784) After an ill-advised overture to Hugo Chávez's government last November, the Obama administration hasregained its footing with a strong, principled stance on Venezuela'scontested election. Based on the razor-thin margin and opposition protests of irregularities, the

administration has yet to recognize as the winner Vice President Nicolas Maduro, Chávez's anointed

successor, and has instead supported a review of the vote count. ¶ In appearances before

both the House and Senate in recent days, Secretary of State John Kerry re-affirmed that position "so that thepeople of Venezuela who participated in such a closely divided and important election can have the confidence that they have the

legitimacy that is necessary in the government going forward." ¶ He said, "I don't know whether it's going to happen. ... [But]

obviously, if there are huge irregularities, we are going to have seriousquestions about the viability of that government."¶ Kerry's statements brought the predictablehowls of protest from Venezuela. "It's obscene, the U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Venezuela," Mr. Maduro said. "Take

your eyes off Venezuela, John Kerry! Get out of here! Enough interventionism!"¶ But no one should be intimidated by such false bravado.¶ Maduro is in a panic. He knows he cannot handle declining socio-economicconditions in the face of a reinvigorated opposition, dissension in his own ranks, and anengaged U.S. government standing firm on principle regarding the legitimacy of his election.¶ Of

course, the administration will face a vociferous public campaign by chavistasympathizers pressuring it to accept Sunday's disputed result. Already, the feckless Organization of American States SecretaryGeneral José Miguel Insulza has backtracked from the organization's initial strong statement on behalf of a recount and now has

accepted the result.¶ Recognition proponents will tell us the United States faces"isolation" in the region if the administration doesn't recognize Maduro (only Panama and Paraguay have joined the call for





a recount) and that its supposed intransigence plays right into Maduro's hands, allowing him to whip up nationalist sentiment.¶

Nonsense. Those proposing such arguments fail to recognize thatgovernments are pursuing interests. Certain countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and even Russia andChina, have benefited greatly from economic ties with Venezuela under Chávez and their short-sighted view is to try and keep that

spigot open. ¶ Most citizens throughout the region, however, tend to be more appreciative of principles, such as the security

and integrity of one's vote. One can be sure that, in case of a disputed election in their own country, they would hope to

count on external support for an honest accounting in their own electoral processes. ¶Secondly, as the election just demonstrated, Maduro is not Chávez, and his capacity to whip up anything but official

violence against Venezuelans protesting in the streets is extremely doubtful (Warning: graphic photos here). In short, no oneshould be misled by the noisemakers.¶ A continued firm stand on behalf ofa clean election will resonate positively throughout the region, sending astrong signal to all democrats that the United States does indeed care and that

intimidation and violence have no place in any democracy . It is not likely that such

sentiments will sway Maduro and his Cuban advisors to accept any sort of recount, but it will certainly place theUnited States on the right side of the debates and confrontations to come.

More ev – no rapprochement Villarreal ‗13 (Ryan Villarreal, journalist based in New York City – Specializes in Latin America, ―Diplomacy War Or Political Theater? MaduroRamps Up Anti-US Rhetoric As V enezuelan Elections Approach‖, March 12 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/diplomacy-war-or-political-theater-maduro-ramps-anti-us-rhetoric-venezuelan-elections-approach )

The U.S. and Venezuela have both expelled diplomats from each other‘scountries amid high political tensions in the South American nation following the death of President Hugo Chávez last week,ahead of new elections.

Hours before the Venezuelan government announced Chávez‘s passing last

Tuesday, Caracas expelled two U.S. Air Force attachés. The U.S. followed in kind, dismissing two Venezuelan diplomats on Sunday.

―Around the world, when our people are thrown out unjustly, we‘re going to takereciprocal action,‖ Victoria Nuland, the State Department spokeswoman, said in astatement on Monday. ―And we need to do that to protect our own people.‖

The Venezuelan government justified its action, saying that the attachés were engaged in efforts to destabilize the country during a time of political vulnerability.

It has been suggested that V enezuela‘s acting president and the socialist presidential candidate Nicolas Maduro expelledthe attachés to appease supporters of his predecessor in preparation for elections scheduled

for April 14. Maduro also recently accused the U.S. government of giving Chávezcancer, from which he died after a two-year battle.―Maduro is shoring up political support within Chavismo,‖ said Carl Meacham, Americas Director of the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies in Washington, the Miami Herald reported.

http://www.ibtimes.com/diplomacy-war-or-political-theater-maduro-ramps-anti-us-rhetoric-venezuelan-elections-approach









Links: General





2NC Link Run

The thesis of the DA is true – best studiesCrescenzi ‗7 [Mark. Prof Poli Sci at UNC. ―Reputation and Interstate Conflict‖ American Journal of Political Science, Vol 51 N2. April 2007.

Ebsco]Finally, the concept of reputation, learning, and adaptation has a long-standingpresence in the study of international relations (e.g., Dixon 1983; Farkas 1998; Huth 1988; Jervis1976; Leng 1983, 1988, 1993, 2000; Levy 1994; Maoz 1990, 1996; Mercer 1996; Press 2005; Reiter 1996; Snyder 1991). Learning is a

key component of the theory presented below. Specifically, learning is assumed to be experiential in

that states learn from the experiences and behavior of other states ;

diagnostic in that states use the experiences of others to update their

beliefs about the intentions of others; and vicarious, or diffuse, in that

states learn from experiences in which they are not directly involved (Jervis

1976; Leng 1983; Levy 1994).

Best studies of credibility prove it influences international relationsGibler ‗8 [Douglas M. Gibler Department of Political Science University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa ―The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jun., 2008), pp. 426-454]

I argue above that alliance formation provides an excellent alternative for testingthe effects of state reputation. More isolated from the strategic selection ofdeterrence situations, with a public signal that remains relatively constant

across time, region, and even perhaps situation, state reputations formed

by honoring or violating alliance commitments offer many advantages for

testing a seemingly intangible quality like reputation . Thus, using a relatively

simple research design, this article¶ was able to establish what

international theorists have suspected, but empirical tests have thus far been unable to prove: reputations have important consequences for state

behavior .





Link: Flip Flop

Hardline toward Latin America now – that‘s a 1AC claim – the plan reversesthe trend, which devastates US credibility and resolveEtzioni ‘11[Amitai. Prof IR at George Washington. ―The Coming Test of US Credibility‖ Military Reviewhttp://icps.gwu.edu/files/2011/03/credibility.pdf 2011] THE RELATIVE POWER of the United States is declining— both because other nations are increasing their power and because the

U. S. economic challenges and taxing overseas commitments are weakening it. In this context, the credibility of U.S.commitments and the perception that the United States will back up itsthreats and promises with appropriate action is growing in importance. In

popular terms, high credibility allows a nation to get more mileage out of arelatively small amount of power, while low credibility leads to burning up much greater amounts of p ower. The Theory ofCredibility One definition of power is the ability of A to make B follow a course of action that A prefers. The term ―make‖ is highly relevant. When A convinces B of the merit ofthe course A prefers, and B voluntarily follows it, we can refer to this change of course as an application of ―persuasive power‖ or ―soft power.‖ However, most applications ofpower are based either on coercion (if you park in front of a fire hydrant, your car is towed) or economic incentives and disincentives (you are fined to the point where you would

be disinclined to park there). In these applications of power, B maintains his original preferences but is either prevented f rom following them or is pained to a point where he will suspend resistance. Every time A calls on B to change course, A is tested twice. First, if B does not follow A‘s call, A will fail to achieve its goals (Nazi Germany annexes Austria, despite protests by the United Kingdom and France). Second, A loses some credibility, making B less likely to heed A‘s future demands (Nazi Germany becomes morelikely to invade Poland). On the other hand, if B heeds A‘s demand, A wins twice: it achieves its goal (e.g., the United States dismantles the regime of Saddam Hussein andestablishes that there are no WMDs in Iraq), and it increases the likelihood that future demands will be heeded without power actually being exercised (e.g. Libya voluntarily

dismantles its WMD program following the invasion of Iraq). In short , the higher a nation‘s credibility, the more it will be able to achieve without actually employing its power or by employingless of it when it must exercise its power. Political scientists have qualified this basic version of the power/credibilitytheory. In his detailed examination of three historical cases, Daryl G. Press shows that in each instance, the Bs made decisions based upon their perception of the currentintentions and capabilities of A, rather than on the extent to which A followed up on previous threats. Thus, if A does not have the needed forces or if A‘s i nterests in the issue athand are marginal, its threats will not carry much weight no matter how ―credible‖ A was in the past. For example, if the United States had announced that it would invadeBurma unless it released opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest (she was eventually released in November 2010), such a threat would not have carried much

weight—regardless of past U.S. actions— because the issue did not seem reason enough for the United States to invade Burma, and becau se the U.S. Army was largely committedelsewhere. Another political scientist, Kathleen Cunningham, has shown that the credibility of promises —as opposed to the credibility of threats—is much more difficult tomaintain because the implementation of promises is often stretched over long periods of time. 1 The bulk of this essay focuses on dealing with threats, rather than promises.Declining U.S. Power and Credibility Over the last few years, much attention has been paid to the relative decline of U.S. power, but much less has been said of changes in U.S.credibility. While there has been some erosion in the relative power of the United States measured since 1945 or 1990), the swings in the level of its credibility have been muchmore pronounced. When the United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam in 1973, its credibility suffered so much that many observers doubted whether the United States

would ever deploy its military overseas unless it faced a much greater and direct threat than it faced in Southeast Asia. Additional setbacks over the next decades followed,including the failed rescue of American hostages in Iran during the last year of the Carter administration and President R eagan‘s withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Lebanon afterthe October 1983 Hezbollah bombing of U.S. barracks in Beirut. The bombing killed 241 American servicemen, but it elicited no punitive response—the administrationabandoned a plan to assault the training camp where Hezbollah had planned the attack. 2 Operation Desert Storm drastically increased U.S. military credibility. The UnitedStates and the UN demanded that Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait. When he refused, U.S. and Allied forces quickly overwhelmed his military with a low level of

American causalities, contrary to expectations. Saddam‘s forces were defeated with less than 400 American casualties. 3 The total cost of defeating Saddam was $61 billion —almost 90 percent of which was borne by U.S. allies. 4 When Serbia ignored the demands of the United States and other Western nations to withdraw its hostile forces and haltethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO forces defe ated the Serbs with little effort, losing only two troops in a helicopter trainin g accident. 5 U.S. credibility reached a high mark in2003, when the United States, employing a much smaller force than in 1991, overthrew Saddam Hussein‘s regime swiftly and with a low level of American casualties, againdespite expectations to the contrary. In the first phase of the war—up to 1 May 2003, when the Saddam regime was removed and no WMDs were found—there had been only 172

American casualties. 6 Only $56 billion had been appropriated for Iraq operations. 7 Those who hold that credibility matterslittle should pay mind to the side effects of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Afterthe U.S. invasion of Iraq, Libya did not merely stop developing WMDs orallow inspections, it allowed the United States to pack cargo In short, the highera nation‘s credibility, the more it will be able to achieve without actuallyemploying its power …4 March-April 2011 MILITARY REVIEW planes with several tons of nuclear equipment and airlift it from the country. 8 The country surrendered

centrifuges, mustard gas tanks, and SCUD missiles. It sent 13 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to Russia for blending down, destroyed chemical weapons, and has assisted the United States in cracking downon the global black market for nuclear arms technology. 9 The reasons are complex, and experts point out that Mu ammar al-Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, was u nder considerable domestic pressure to ease hiscountry‘s economic and political isolation. 10 Gaddafi also believed he was next in line for a forced regime change. In a pri vate conversation with Silvio Berlusconi, Italy‘s prime minister, in 2003, Gaddafi isreported to have said, ―I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.‖ 11 Iran‘s best offer by far regarding its nuclear program occurred in 2003, at a time when U .S.credibility reached its apex. In a fax transmitted to the State Department through the Swiss ambassador, who confirmed that it had come from ―key power centers‖ in Iran, Iran asked for ―a broad dialogue with theUnited States.‖ The fax ―suggested everything was on the table—including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups.‖ 12(The Bush administration, however, considered the Iranian regime to be on the verge of collapse at the time, and, according to reports, it ―belittled the initiative.‖) 13 Richard Haass, who at the time was serving asdirector of policy planning at the State Department, stated that the offer was spurned because ―the bias [in the Bush administration] was toward a policy of regime change.‖ 14 Still, in 2004, Britain, France, andGermany secured a temporary susp ension of uranium enrichment in Iran. 15 It lasted until 2006, when American credibility began to decline. 16 Als

o in 2004, Iran offered to make the ―European Three‖ aguarantee that its nuclear program would be used ―exclusively for peaceful purposes,‖ as long as the West would provide ―firm commitments on security issues.‖ 17 In 2005, as U.S. difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan mounted and its level of casualties—as well as those of its allies and of the local populations—increased without a victory in sight, U.S. credibility was gradually undermined. Since 2005, more than4,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died, and the direct cost of military operations in the country has exceeded $650 billion. 18 The same holds true in Afghanistan—only more strongly —already the longest war in which the United States has ever engaged, with rising casualties and costs. Both credibility-undermining developments were the result of a great expansion of the goals of the mission. InIraq, the mission was initially to overthrow the regime and ensure that it has no WMDs. In Afghanistan, the mission was initially to eradicate Al-Qaeda. But in both countries, the mission morphed into the costlytask of nation building—although other terms were used, such as reconstruction and COIN (counterinsurgency)— which includes building an effective and legitimate government composed of the nativepopulation. In popular terms, the United States won the wars but has been losing the peace. The distinction between the pure military phase (which was very successful in both countries) and the troublednationbuilding phase that followed has eluded the Nation‘s adversaries, who have focused on the fact that the United States seems to have great difficulties in making progress toward its expanded goals. Thus,even if the United States achieves its extended goals Saddam Hussein is seen in this image from video broadcast on Iraqi television, 2003. in these two nations, it will have done so only with great efforts and at

high costs. And many observers are very doubtful that these nations will be turned into stable governments allied with the United States—let alone that they will be truly democratic. The factthat the United States is withdrawing from Iraq (and is on a timeline, however disputed, to begin

withdrawal from Afghanistan)—regardless of whether its goals are fully accomplished—

further feeds into the significant decline in its credibility. This stands out especially when

http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2011/03/credibility.pdf%202011

http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2011/03/credibility.pdf%202011





compared to the credibility it enjoyed in 2003 and 2004. The fact that the United States has, on several occasions, made specific and very public demands of various countries, only to have these demands roundly ignored— without any consequences— has not addedto its credibility. On several occasions, the United States demanded Israel extend the freeze on settlement construction in the WestBank and cease building in East Jerusalem. While one can question whether such a call for a total freeze was justified, especially asno concessions were demanded from the Palestinians, one cannot deny that, as Israel ignored these demands and faced noconsequences, U.S. credibility was diminished. The same has occurred in Afghanistan. The United States voiced strong demands,only to be rebuffed very publicly by a government that would collapse were it not for American support. Moreover, the United States was forced to court President Hamid Karzai when he threatened to make peace on his own with the Taliban and was courted by Iran.

A particularly telling example took place on 28 March 2010, when President Obama flew to Kabul and ―delivered pointed criticism toHamid Karzai‖ over pervasive corruption in the Afghan government. 19 Then-National Security Advisor James Jones voiced thepresident‘s concerns, stating that Karzai ―needs to be seized with how important‖ the issue of corruption is for American eff orts inthe country. 20 But Karzai was ―angered and offended‖ by the visit.‖ 21 Only days later, he made a series of inflammatory remarksabout Western interference in his country, accused foreigners of a ―vast fraud‖ in the Afghan presidential election, and threatened toally himself with the Taliban. 22 A few weeks after these statements, Karzai was in Washington as a guest of the White House, where

he was wellreceived, and all seemed forgiven. The Next Test As I will show shortly, in recent years a large and

growing number of U.S. allies and adversaries— especially in the Middle East—

have questioned American commitment to back up its declared goals—that is,

they question the Nation‘s credibility . Hence, the way the United States

conducts itself in the next test of its resolve will be unusually

consequential for its position as a global power. I cannot emphasize enough that I am not

arguing that the United States should seek a confrontation, let alone engage in a war, to show that it still has the capacity to back upits threats and promises by using conventional forces. (Few doubt U.S. power and ability to act as a nuclear power, but they also

realize that nuclear power is ill-suited for many foreign policy goals.) However, I am suggesting that the ways in whichthe U.S. will respond to the next challenge to its power will have strongimplications for its credibility —and for its need to employ power. One‘s mind turns to two hot spots: North

Korea and Iran. North Korea is an obvious testing ground for American resolve. While Iran is denying that it is developing a militarynuclear program, North Korea flaunts its program. While Iran is using its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, to trouble U.S. allies in theMiddle East, North Korea has openly attacked the U.S. ally South Korea, both by reportedly torpedoing a South Korean ship inMarch 2010, killing 46 sailors, and by shelling a South Korean island in November, killing two South Korean soldiers. While Iran isspewing over-the-top accusations against the West, its rhetoric is no match for North Korea‘s bellicose statements and actions. In

short, North Korea would seem to be the place where U.S. credibility is most being tested and will continue to be in the near future. At the same time, many militaryexperts agree that on the Korean peninsula, the United States will be deterred from responding effectively to North Koreanprovocations and assaults. North Korea already has nuclear arms, roughly 1,000 missiles, many of which could devastate Seoul andother South Korean targets. 23 It has between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons (including sarin and mustard gas) thatcould be mounted on missiles, a sizeable conventional army, and leaders who are difficult to deter because they are consideredirrational. 24 Hence, after the 2010 hostile acts by North Korea against a key U.S. ally, both Secretary of State 6 March-April 2011MILITARY REVIEW Clinton and President Obama called on China for help. That is, the United States—unable to act— was publicly beseeching another power to come to the rescue. At the same time, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral MichaelMullen, made a hasty trip to the region to discourage unilateral South Korean action. 25 All of these statements seem very prudent,even unavoidable. In fairness, I do not discern another course the United States could have followed. However, it does not buildcredibility or trust among allies. In short, unless the North Korean challenge grows much more severe, and arguably, even if it does,the United States is unlikely to enhance its credibility by the ways it responds to the challenges it currently faces there. Next Test:The Middle East This brings us to Iran. The president has consistently stated— both as a candidate and since taking office— that anIran with nuclear arms is ―unacceptable.‖ 26 Shortly after his election in November 2008, Obama declared that ―Iran‘s developmentof a nuclear weapon‖ is ―unacceptable.‖ 27 In February 2009, he repeated that statement, saying Iran ―continue[s] to pursue a course that would lead to [nuclear] weaponization and that is not acceptable.‖ 28 In March 2010, after a meeting with Europeanleaders, Obama stated, ―The long-term consequences of a nucleararmed Iran are unacceptable.‖ 29 When signing into law a newround of sanctions against Iran in July 2010, Obama repeated, ―There should be no doubt— the United States and the internationalcommunity are determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.‖ 30 Indeed, this has been a consistent stancethroughout different U.S. administrations. In 2007, then- Vice President Cheney said, ―We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear

weapon.‖ 31 In 2009, Secretary of State Clinton declared, ―We are going to do everything we can to prevent you [Iran] from getting anuclear weapon. Your pursuit is futile.‖ 32 Moreover, many see the acquisition of nuclear arms by Iran as a ―game changer‖ becauseit would embolden Iran to become a regional hegemon. And yet many in the Middle East doubt that the United States will use it s

military force to stop Iran from gaining nuclear arms if sanctions fail. All the nations in the Middle East,

including the United States‘ closest and strongest allies, are already indicating that they haveserious doubts about the U.S. commitment to the region, although the steps they havetaken so far in response vary a great deal. The nuclear issue is the last cause for these concerns, which stem from many sources. Theyare due, in part, to the perception that the United States is overextended. Its military is held to exhaustion and mired in Afghanistan.It still seeks to play a role in practically all international and even domestic conflicts—from Colombia to Burma and from Sudan toKosovo. It extends some form of aid to over 150 nations, including countries of rather limited global significance or relation to U.S.interests—East Timor, for instance. 33 The United States own economy is viewed as challenged, and its polity is often gridlocked.





The notion of a ―post- America‖ period of international relations is gainingcurrency . 34 Le ade r s ove r s e a s a l so not e tha t influent i a l American public intellectuals are calling on the United Statesto scale back its global activities. Michael Mandelbaum, Peter Beinart, and others argue that the next era of American foreign policy will be characterized by a much more constrained approach to the world. ―





Links: Cuba





1NC Cuba Link – General

The plan is surrender – it emboldens global regimes and collapses USinfluenceBrooks ‗9 Senior fellow for National Security Affairs in the Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation. (Peter – Heritage foundation ―Keep theEmbargo, O― April 16, 2009 http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)//EBIn another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba.Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance. Sure, it's fine to allow separated families tosee each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America. And permitting gifts toCuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent

there. In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'lldecide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And inusual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift .

Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- withoutany promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of lovefrom Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Ofcourse, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana

most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting the embargo won'tnormalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to --

Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging theLatin American Left. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash

into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at

home and bolster its communist agenda abroad . The last thing we should

do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rightssituation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly orassociation. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The

regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. We also don't need a pumped-

up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin

America, the Caribbean -- or beyond . (The likes of China, Russia and Iran

might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.) With an influx of

resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of

nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism andanti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions eversince the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally

since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam),Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. The US

embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to

Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of

it . Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from

the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage

the embargo provides.





Ext. Cuba Links – General

Removing the embargo‘s a concession to rogue regimesKaron 10- is a senior editor at TIME, where he has covered international conflicts in the Middle East, Asia, and the Balkans since 1997. (Tony

- TIME ―Do We Really Need an Embargo Against Cuba? ― Wednesday, Apr. 21, 2010http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,48773,00.html)//EB Lifting the embargo will strengthen Castro's government There's no

private sector in Cuba; its economy is predominantly state-owned, andtrading with it inevitably strengthens the state. The government in Havana has been reeling since

the collapse of its Soviet patron, but lifting the embargo would ease its financial crisis andtherefore strengthen its hand. Cuba's trade with other Western countries

hasn't eased repression Cuba has been trading normally with most of Latin America and Europe for more than a

decade now, and Castro has shown no sign of reforming his system or endingrepression. The idea that trade promotes human rights is a self-serving mythpromoted by corporate America, and there's little reason to believe that an

end to the embargo would automatically improve the political situation inCuba. Easing the embargo before Castro agrees to change sends the wrong

signal Castro continues to defy international standards on democracy and human rights, and lifting the embargo

now would be to reward that defiance . His regime rejected even the reformist communism of

Gorbachev in the '80s, but even though it has struggled to survive economically in the '90s, it has steadfastly maintained its hardline. Democracy should be the condition for li fting the embargo.

Signal of the plan‘s keyBustillo 5-9(Mitchell, ―Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo‖, International Policy Digest, 2013,http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/archives/75391)

When thinking of U.S.-Cuba relations, the trade embargo, or el bloqueo, is first and foremost on people‘s

minds . In 2009, President Barack Obama eased the travel ban, allowing Cuban-Americans to travel freely to Cuba, and again

in 2011, allowing students and religious missionaries to travel to Cuba, as recently demonstrated by American pop culture figures,

Beyoncé and her husband Jay-Z. Despite a history of hostile transgressions, the U.S. is

inconsistent with its implementation of the embargo, which sends mixed

signals to Havana and displays our weak foreign policy regarding Cuba.

Lifting the embargo empowers global anti-AmericanismFeinberg 12- is professor of international political economy at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University ofCalifornia, San Diego. Feinberg served as special assistant to President Clinton and senior director of the National Security Council‘sOffice of Inter-American Affairs. He has held positions on the State Department's policy planning staff and worked as an

international economist in the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of International Affairs. (Richard – Brookings ―The New CubanEconomy: What Roles for Foreign Investment?‖ December 2012 http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/12/cuba-economy-feinberg)//EB The Cuban revolution defined itself in large measure in terms of what it was not: not a dependency of theUnited States; not a dominion governed by global corporations; not aliberal, market-driven economy . As the guerrilla army made its triumphal entry into Havana and the infantrevolution shifted leftward, a hallmark of its anti-imperialist ethos became the loudly proclaimed nationalizations of the U.S.-basedfirms that had controlled many key sectors of the Cuban economy, including hotels and gambling casinos, public utilities, oil

refineries, and the rich sugar mills. In the strategic conflict with the United States, the

http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/archives/75391






―historic enemy,‖ the revolution consolidated its power through theexcision of the U.S. economic presence. For revolutionary Cuba, foreign investment has been aboutmore than dollars and cents. It‘s about cultural identity and national sovereignty. It‘s also about a model of social ist planning, a

hybrid of Marxist-Leninism and Fidelismo, which has jealously guarded its domination over all aspects of the economy. Duringits five decades of rule, the regime‘s political and social goals alwaysdominated economic policy; security of the revolution trumped

productivity. Fidel Castro‘s brand of anti-capitalism included a strong dose of anti-globalization. For many years, ElComandante en Jefe hosted a large international conference on globalization where he would lecture thousands of delegates with hisdenunciations of the many evils of multinational firms that spread brutal exploitation and dehumanizing inequality around the world. Not surprisingly, Cuba has received remarkably small inflows of foreign investment, even taking into account the size of itseconomy. In the 21st century, the globe is awash in transborder investments by corporations, large and small. Many developingcountries, other than those damaged by severe civil conflicts, receive shares that significantly bolster their growth prospects. The

expansion of foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries is one of the greatstories of recent decades, rising from $14 billion in 1985 to $617 billion in2010.1 While FDI2 cannot substitute for domestic savings and investment, it can add significantly to domestic efforts andsignificantly speed growth. Today‘s ailing Cuban economy, whose 11.2 million people yield the modest GNP reported officially at $64 billion3 (and possibly much less at realistic exchange rates), badly need additional external cooperation—notwithstanding heavily-

subsidized oil imports from Venezuela. As with any economy, domestic choices made athome and by Cubans will largely determine the country‘s fate. Yet, as Cubans have been well aware since the arrival of Christopher Columbus, the encroaching international economy matters greatly; it can be asource of not only harsh punishments but also great benefits. In the Brookings Institution monograph Reaching Out: Cuba‘s New Economy and the International Response, I explored the modest contributions already being made by certain bilateral and regionalcooperation agencies and the larger potential benefits awaiting Cuba if it joins the core global and regional financial institutions— namely the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Andean Development

Corporation. This sequel explores the contributions that private foreign investments have been making, and could make on a much greater scale, to propel Cuba ontoa more prosperous and sustainable growth path.

Cuba uses economic engagement against us – the plan is insufficient toalter Cuba‘s desire to crush US leadershipHolmes ‗95 Vice President and Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies (Kim R. - Heritage Foundation ―Keep the Embargo on Cuba― June23, 1995 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1995/06/keep-the-embargo-on-cuba)//EB

CUBA AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY While it is true that Castro no longer has the ability to export violent communistrevolution on a large scale throughout the Western Hemisphere and Africa, he has not renounced the use of

violence to overthrow democratically elected governments. America'sleaders would do well to remember that one of the constant and enduringcharacteristics of Fidel Castro's career has been his lifelong hatred of theUnited States and everything it stands for in the world. Some of the ways in which

Castro threatens U.S. national security include the following: X Castrocontinues to allow the operation by Russian intelligence officials of anelectronic listening post at Lourdes. The Russians argue that the post isneeded to monitor U.S. compliance with its missile treaty obligations, yet

American compliance is not a major issue in dispute between the U.S. and

Russia. In fact, Lourdes is an intelligence gathering facility at the service ofRussian spies. X Russian nuclear missiles may not be targeted at America from Cuban soil, but Castro is determined tocomplete - with Russian help - construction of a $2 billion nuclear reactor only 240 miles South of Miami. This tropical whiteelephant could easily become America's Chernobyl in the Caribbean. According to a 1992 report by the U.S. General AccountingOffice, there is evidence of shoddy construction at the facility, including bad welding, and the nuclear technology being used in theplant is dangerously outdated. A nuclear accident at the Juragua reactor in Cuba could conceivably endanger millions of American

lives in the southeastern United States. X If Castro is permitted to recapitalize his communist

regime with billions of dollars in West- ern aid, he could easily threaten

economic and democratic reforms throughout Latin Amer- ica. The region has





achieved extraordinary progress in the past decade toward economic and political reforms. Prospects for sustained economic

development and democratic stability have never been greater in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, despite theexplosive growth in trade throughout the region, popular support for free-market policies is still shallow, and the political institutions of Latin

America's emerging democracies are fragile. In the wake of the Mexican crisis, Catholic bishopsand left-wing political organizations throughout Latin America have redoubled their calls for the restoration of statist policies to

replace free-market policies with socialist policies. In this uncertain regional environment, allowing Castro back into the communityof civilized nations in the Western Hemisphere would be analogous to inviting a fox into a chicken coop. Without anydoubt, Castro would continue to press his personal war against the UnitedStates, seeking at every turn to undermine vital U.S. interests ininstitutions such as the Inter-American Devel- opment Bank and theOrganization of American States. Because of Castro's hostility to the U.S., it would be foolishto think that his favor could be bought with aid, investments, or other

American help. No one should expect that lifting the embargo wouldproduce a friendly or cooperative Fidel Castro. The Cuban dictator will takethe money Americans and others give him, but no one should expect him toembrace democracy, free 2 markets, and the American way of life. Even with the

embargo lifted, Castro's regime would likely remain very unfriendly to the U.S.and its interests. The benefits of taming Castro with aid and investments,

which would be few in any event, would be far outweighed by the long-range trouble

caused by the willful perpetuation of an anti-American authoritarian

regime in Cuba more or less indefinitely. The longer Castro's regime survives, the more opportunities there will be for him to

host and support any guerrilla or subversive movement that may arise in Latin America in the future. X Castro has notrenounced his long-established policy of promoting the spread of Marxist-socialist revolution throughout the developing world. Although he no longer has the

capability to export troops and weaponry to conflicts in Africa and Latin America, he still provides politicalsupport for extreme leftist organizations bent on the violent overthrow ofdemocratic regimes in their countries.





Link: Cuban Travel Ban

Unconditionally lifting the ban is appeasementSuchlicki 07- is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of

Miami. (Jaime - FrontPageMagazine.com ―Don't Lift the Cuba Travel Ban‖ Wednesday, April 11, 2007http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=26082)//EB Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. Lifting thetravel ban without any major concession from Cuba would send the wrongmessage ―to the enemies of the United States‖: that a foreign leader canseize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territoryfor the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United Sates; espouseterrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually theUnited States will ―forget and forgive,‖ and reward him with tourism,investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin

America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutionalgovernment. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in

Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. hasprevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. While the U.S. policy has not been

uniformly applied throughout the world, it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. A normalizationof relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrongmessage to the rest of the continent. Supporting regimes and dictators that

violate human rights and abuse their population is an ill-advised policy thatrewards and encourages further abuses.

More ev – Gross provesBustillo 5-9(Mitchell, ―Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo‖, International Policy Digest, 2013,http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/archives/75391)

One example is the case of Alan Gross, an American citizen working for USAID. He was arrested in Cuba in

2009 under the allegations of Acts against the Independence and Territorial Integrity of the State while distributingcomputers and technological equipment to Jewish communities in Cuba. He is currently serving the fourth of his fifteen- year conviction, is in poor health, and receiving little to no aid from the U.S., according to the Gross Family website. In light of this,

it is hard to believe that the U.S. would be able to protect a large number oftourists in a hostile nation, especially when they plan to ‗profess‘ political freedom. This view is further promoted

by the Ladies in White, a Cuban dissident group that supports the embargo. They fear ending it would only serve

to strengthen the current dictatorial regime because the real blockade, they claim, is within

Cuba . Allowing American travelers to visit Cuba does not help propel the cause

of Cuban democracy; it hampers it .







Link: Oil Cooperation

Oil cooperation with Cuba‘s a slippery slope – collapses into totalappeasementMiller ‗11 Author and Frequent Contributor to Global Research Reports. He frequently reports on issues of global trade, energy, andagriculture. He holds degrees in philosophy and law from the University of Auckland (Edward- Geopolitical Monitor ―Cuba'sOffshore Oil & the US Blockade‖ November 6, 2011 http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/cubas-offshore-oil-the-us-blockade-4524/)//EBThe Blockade Since 1962 the United States has enacted a near-total blockade on all trade with Cuba, as well as banning US citizensfrom travelling to Cuba. This was further reinforced by the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, which penalizes foreign companies that do business in Cuba by preventing them from operating in the US. Every year since 1992 the United Nations General Assembly hascondemned the embargo as a violation of international law (notably the Geneva Convention requirement that medical suppliesintended for civilians receive free passage), most recently on 25 October 2011, with only the United States and Israel voting against

the resolution. Despite the liberal face of the Obama administration and asoftening of travel restrictions (students and religious groups can now visit), the blockaderemains a testament to vehement US repudiation of the right to self-determination of its former colonies. Nonetheless the availability of Cubanoil gives rise to two factors which could compel a change of policy. First,

and perhaps most obvious, is the simple fact that the US Empire relies on acheap flow of oil to maintain its economic supremacy, especially in the faceof increased competition from developing economies. One might expect a policy similar tothat exercised towards the Chavez administration, balancing revulsion towards their politics with relish towards their oil. Whetherthe Cuban government would allow such a farcical double standard remains to be seen, and it could be equally likely that theheadstrong Castros would rather sell their oil directly to other developing countries in an attempt to countervail existing

impoverishment. However there is another factor which, if it registers on the American political landscape, could undermine the embargo – thepossibility of an oil spill and the potential impact to the US coastline. Unlikemost environmental issues, the Deepwater Horizon blowout is a rare eventin that it captured people‘s attention for a sustained period of time. Despite BP‘s

culture of denial, it has become clear that the spill stemmed from corporate malfeasance, and could have been prevented. Wereanother event of a similar magnitude to occur due to the US‘ ideological refusal to engage with Cuba due to an antiquated Cold War

policy, the political fallout could be even more disastrous. Drilling is currently banned off the Florida coast, and Chairman of the Senate Committee onEnergy and Natural Resources Jeff Bingaman has expressed concern thatthe continuing US-Cuba imbroglio might prevent the countries fromresponding properly in the event of a spill. It would take only a few days for an oil slick to reach theFlorida Keys, an area characterized by coral reef (almost half of which has already died) and mangroves – these shallow areas are

particularly vulnerable to oil spills. The embargo currently prevents the two containmentservices companies operating in the Gulf from dealing with such an eventand, while exemptions to the embargo are available, the urgency requiredto deal with such a spill renders this procedure impracticable. The US Department ofJustice is currently investigating whether Repsol could be held legally responsible for a spill, and Repsol have agreed to letting USinspectors examine Scarabeo 9 once it arrives in December. The US and Mexican governments have a written contingency plan

outlining procedures to deal with such an event, and many experts, including marine biologist David Guggenheim, are pushing for agovernment to government meeting to put together a similar plan for US-Cuba relations. Florida is the most populous presidentialswing state, and this issue may be relevant as presidential elections push closer. Businessmen have also expressed a desire for thegovernment to reconsider the embargo, as the discovery of oil tends to provide confidence to traders and speculators across all

commodity markets. Latin American studies expert Mark Jones from Rice University has stated that, ―[t]he greater the

drilling and production, the greater the pressure will be to engage in a

complete overhaul of the trade embargo, either getting rid of it altogether,

or watering it down substantially. I think its fairly realistic, since the





embargo is an anachronism of the Cold War sustained only by a misguidedfear of a backlach from anti-Castro Cuban Americans.‖





Link: Terror List Weissenstein and Orsi 13(MICHAEL WEISSENSTEIN AND PETER ORSI, the Associated Press, ―NKorea

arms seizure could hurt US-Cuba détente‖ Jul. 17, 2013 http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/07/17/5006020/cuba-calls-weapons-on-north-korean.html, RLA)

Cuba's admission that it was secretly sending aging weapons systems to

North Korea has turned the global spotlight on a little-known link in asecretive network of rusting freighters and charter jets that moves weapons to and from North Korea

despite U.N. sanctions.¶ The revelation that Cuba was shipping the arms, purportedly

to be repaired and returned, is certain to jeopardize slowly warming ties

between the U.S. and Havana, although the extent of the damage remains uncertain. Experts said Cuba'sparticipation in the clandestine arms network was a puzzling move that promised little military payoff for the risk of incurring U.N.penalties and imperiling detente with Washington.¶ The aging armaments, including radar system parts, missiles, and even two jetfighters, were discovered Monday buried beneath thousands of tons of raw Cuban brown sugar piled onto a North Korean freighterthat was seized by Panama as it headed for home through the Panama Canal.¶ North Korea is barred by the U.N. from buying orselling arms, missiles or components, but for years U.N. and independent arms monitors have discovered North Korean weaponryheaded to Iran, Syria and a host of nations in Africa and Asia. The U.N. says North Korea also has repeatedly tried to import bannedarms. What's more, analysts say, it maintains a thriving sideline in repairing aging Warsaw Pact gear, often in exchange for badlyneeded commodities, such as Burmese rice.¶ "They don't know how to grow rice, but they know how to repair radars," said DarylKimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a private group dedicated to promoting arms control.¶ "The North

Koreans are taking desperate measures to pursue that work. Despite the best efforts of the international community to cut off armstransfers to and from North Korea, it will continue in some form."¶ The surprise for many observers was that the latest shipment ofarms headed to North Korea comes from Cuba, which acknowledged late Tuesday that it was shipping two anti -aircraft missilesystems, nine missiles, two Mig-21 fighter jets and 15 jet engine, saying they were headed to North Korea to be repaired there.¶ Thediscovery aboard the freighter Chong Chon Gang was expected to trigger an investigation by the U.N. Security Council committeethat monitors the sanctions against North Korea, and Panamanian officials said U.N. investigators were expected in Panama onThursday. Britain's U.N. Ambassador, Mark Lyall Grant, said that "any weapons transfers, for whatever reason, to North Korea would be a violation of the sanctions regime."¶ If Cuba wanted to send the weapons for repairs and have them returned, it wouldhave needed to get a waiver from the Security Council committee monitoring the North Korea sanctions. A spokesman forLuxembourg's U.N. Mission, which chairs the North Korea sanctions committee, told The Associated Press that there had been no

such request from Cuba.¶ Democrat Robert Menendez, the Cuban-American chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, said the incident "almost certainly violated" U.N. sanctions and urged theObama administration to bring it to the Security Council for review.¶

" Weapons transfers from one communist regime to another hidden under sacks of

sugar are not accidental occurrences," Menendez said Wednesday, adding that it "reinforces thenecessity that Cuba remain on the State Department's list of countries thatsponsor state terrorism."¶

http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/07/17/5006020/cuba-calls-weapons-on-north-korean.html








Link: Conditioning Strategies

QPQ strategies make the US look weak and decreases influence – can‘tafford to negotiate with the enemyRubin 11 - overs a range of domestic and foreign policy issues and provides insight into the conservative movement and the

Republican Party Rubin practiced labor law for two decades (Jennifer - Washington Post ―Obama‘s Cuba appeasement‖ 10/18/2011http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html)//EB

The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: ―According to news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisonedU.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convictedCuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. Iftrue, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the

Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this

Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didn‘t try to engage. It seems that a rogue regimecannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration wouldabandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. Cuba is astate-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them. Wemust demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants.‖ As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didn‘t stop there. The

Associated Press reported, ―The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by seniorU.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross‘ release. He also toldCuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them wasremoving Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs likethe one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling;improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; andlicensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States.‖ Former deputy national security adviser

Elliott Abrams explained, ―It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiateover support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjustimprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant

victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes wouldthink that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American

administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made agreat mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject ofnegotiation with the Castro regime.‖ The administration‘s conduct is all themore galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness torelax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemicreforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross‘s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of thesame. Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake.He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots‘ behavior has worsened. There is simply no

downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. Whether it is Cuba or Iran, theadministration reverts to ―engagement‖ mode when its engagement efforts

are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder adiplomat on U.S. soil? We‘ll sit down and chat. Grab an Americancontractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We‘ll trade prisoners and talkabout relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison politicalopponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We‘llput the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World TradeOrganization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely

predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is





inexplicable is the Obama administration‘s willingness to throw gifts to

tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind .





AT//Link Turns

Engagement with Cuba can‘t produce success – it‘s only counter-productiveCardenas ‗12 (José R. Cárdenas, assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development under Bush Administration, ―How Not to Appease a dictatorship‖ Friday, Monday December 31, 2012,

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/31/how_not_to_appease_a_dictatorship)Do we really need another lesson on the folly of attempting to appeasedictators?¶ Apparently, Foreign Affairs thinks so -- albeit inadvertently. They recently posted a piece,

"Our Man in Havana," about the heroic efforts of some Obama administrationofficials to give the Castro regime everything it wanted for the release of

jailed development worker Alan Gross. Specifically, this meant gutting the official U.S. democracyprogram for Cuba that Gross was operating under. In the end, however, they just could not overcome the intransigence of -- not the

Castro regime -- but the "Cuban-American Lobby" in Congress.¶ Indeed, not only did they not wind up withthe long-suffering Gross's freedom, but, to boot, former Assistant Secretary of State Arturo

Valenzuela was forced to sit through a humiliating meeting with Cubanofficials ranting about all the dictatorship's grievances against the United States. As the

article puts it, " The Cubans were far less flexible than the Americans expected ." (One

doesn't know whether to laugh or cry.)¶ The central figure in this drama of high diplomacy is one Fulton Armstrong, acontroversial former CIA analyst who began a second career as a staffer for Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman JohnKerry (D-MA). (Today, he is affiliated with American University.) Armstrong was such an unabashed promoter of U.S.-Cubanormalization in the inter-agency process that he was shipped off to Europe during the Bush 43 administration, although not beforeplaying a role in trying to scuttle John Bolton's nomination to serve as U.S. representative to the United Nations.¶ Apparently,

Armstrong was enlisted by the administration to serve as a go-between withthe Castro regime, no doubt due to the fact that he was a "friendly face" in the eyes of the Cubans. Hismission: convince the Castro regime that the Obama administration agrees

with them that USAID's Cuba democracy programs "are stupid" and that, in the words of Armstrong, "we're cleaning themup. Just give us time, because politically we can't kill them."¶ The article also includes other Armstrong-sourced inanities meant to

further discredit the USAID program: that he was told by a "State Department official" that Gross's mission was"classified" and by another that Gross "likely worked for the Central Intelligence

Agency." Apparently,

Armstrong needs new sources, because such assertions arenonsense and known to be by anyone remotely associated with the program (as I was during my time with the Bush

administration.)¶ The ever-resourceful, man-on-a-mission Armstrong even enlisted his former

boss, Senator Kerry, in the appeasement effort, arranging for him to meet with Cuban officials in New York.

The article reports, "there was no quid pro quo, but the meeting seemed to reassure the Cubans that thedemocracy programs would change, and the Cubans expressed confidence that Gross would receive a humanitarian release shortly

after his trial." (That was in March 2011.)¶ Enter the villain: Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ), a memberof the nefarious "Cuban American Lobby." He supposedly called Denis McDonough, Obama's deputy national security adviser, to say basically hands off the Cuba program. According to a former government official, "McDonough was boxed in." Now, there's a tough

call: side either with a lawless dictatorship or with an influential U.S. senator from your own party ¶ In the end, the effort toappease the Castro regime ended predictably: no freedom for Alan Grossand only utter contempt from Castro regime lackeys. Indeed, is there any mystery why Grosscontinues to languish in a Cuban jail cell when, according to Armstrong, unnamed administration officials signal to the Cubans that

they think the democracy program is "stupid" as well? Moreover, offering to gut a democracy program because a dictatorship opposes it sends a terrible message to authoritarianregimes around the globe.¶ As I have written several times before, the best approach tosecuring Alan Gross's freedom is not giving in to the demands of anillegitimate regime, but by denying it things it wants and needs, such as U.S. touristsspending hard currency under currently licensed travel programs. Let's hope this Fulton Armstrong-led fiasco puts an end to anymore appeasement attempts and the issue is placed in the hands of those with a more sober understanding of the nature of theCastro regime¶

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/31/how_not_to_appease_a_dictatorship

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/31/how_not_to_appease_a_dictatorship





Links: Venezuela





1NC Venezuela Link

The plan is appeasement – that emboldens Venezuela and results ineffective anti-AmericanismChristy 3-15(Patrick Christy, senior policy analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative, US News, March 15 2013, Obama Must Stand Up forDemocracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela,PS)

Venezuela's upcoming election to replace the late Hugo Chavez gives thecountry an important opportunity to break away from over a decade's worth of strongman rule—and

move towards better governance, improved internal security and stability, astronger and more vibrant economy, and a truly constructive role inregional and global affairs. It's critical that the United States do what it can to encourage Venezuela to seize that opportunity.¶ For over a decade, Chavez led ideologically-driven efforts to erode U.S. standing in Latin America and around the globe. The populist leader expanded Venezuela's ties withrogue states such as Cuba and Iran, aided and protected terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC), and actively undermined the rule of law in Venezuela and throughout the Americas. In the Western Hemisphere alone,Chavez used record petrol prices to prop up anti-American socialist leaders, most notably in Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua.¶ Chavezleaves behind a broken economy, a deeply divided nation and a dysfunctional government, all of which will take years—if notdecades—to overcome. Venezuela is plagued with double-digit inflation, mounting budget deficits and rising levels of violence. Whilethe OPEC nation maintains one of the world's largest geological oil reserves, crude exports— which account for roughly 45 percent offederal budget revenues—have declined by nearly half since 1999. The United States imports roughly one million barrels from Venezuela per day.¶ Chavez's protégé Nicolas Maduro, the former vice president who's now acting as Venezuela's interim president,is running to succeed the late strongman, but it's not preordained that he'll win. It remains to be seen the extent to which he canproperly unite prior to the election the many competing populist factions that benefited under Chavez for so many years. What isclear is that he will drape himself in the political ideology of chavismo in the run up to April 14 elections, and use—and quite possibly

abuse—government institutions and petrodollars in attempt to woo the country's voters.¶ What's perverse is how theObama administration's move to "reset" relations with Maduro is doingmore to legitimize him as the rightful heir to Venezuela's presidency than toresuscitate relations between the two governments. The move showed itself to be even morenaive after Maduro accused the United States of plotting to poison Chavez shortly after the strongman's death.¶ Washington must

realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and

improved partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political opposition. The

Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policytowards a post-Chavez Venezuela. In particular, it should:¶ Pressure Caracas toimplement key election reforms. Venezuela's opposition faces formidable obstacles. Interim PresidentMaduro will use the government's near-monopoly control of public airwaves, its established networks of political patronage and last-

minute public spending programs to bolster his populist agenda.¶ Washington should stress publicly and

privately that any attempts to suppress or intimidate the opposition runscontrary to Venezuela's constitution and the principles defined in the Inter-American DemocraticCharter, which was adopted by Venezuela in 2001. To this point, José Cárdenas, a former USAID acting assistant administrator forLatin America, writes,¶ The Venezuelan opposition continues to insist that the constitution (which is of Chavez's own writing) befollowed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral reforms that would level the playing field and better allow the Venezuelan

people to chart their own future free of chavista and foreign interference.¶ Demand free, fair and verifiable

elections. Although Venezuela announced that a special election to replace Chavez will be held next month, it is important toremember that elections alone do not make a democracy . Indeed, Chavez long embraced the rhetoricof democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power, undermined Venezuela's previously democratic political system and

altered the outcomes of election through corruption, fraud and intimidation.¶ The Obama administration shouldmake clear that free and fair elections, properly monitored by respected international election

observers, are essential to Venezuela's future standing in the hemisphere andthe world. Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry should work with regional partners—including (but not limited to) Brazil,Canada, Colombia and Mexico—to firmly encourage Maduro's interim government. A unified regional voice would send a powerful

signal to Chavez's cronies in Caracas and longtime enablers in China, Iran and Russia.¶ Condition future







Ext. Venezuela Links – Generic

More evidence – economic strategies designed to ―win over Venezuela‖embolden the regime and wreck opposition momentumChristy 6-13(Patrick Christy, senior policy analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative, The Foreign Policy Intiative, U.S. Overtures to Maduro Hurt Venezuela‘s Democratic Opposition, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/us-overtures-maduro-hurt-venezuela%E2%80%99s-democratic-opposition,PS)On the margins of a multilateral summit in Guatemala last week, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan ForeignMinister Elias Jose Jaua, marking the Obama administration's latest attempt to reset relations with the South American nation. What's worrisome is that Secretary Kerry's enthusiasm to find, in his words, a "new way forward" with Venezuela could end uplegitimizing Chavez-successor Nicolas Maduro's quest for power and undermining the country's democratic opposition and state

institutions.¶ Since the death of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez in March, Maduro's actions have more resembled those

of a Cuban strongman than a democratically-elected official. Indeed, he has taken drastic moves topreserve his power and discredit his critics in recent months.¶ First, the Maduroregime is refusing to allow a full audit of the fraudulent April 13th presidentialelections, as opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles had requested. As the Associated Press notes a full audit"would have included not just comparing votes electronically registered by machines with the paper ballot receipts they emitted, butalso comparing those with the poll station registries that contain voter signatures and with digitally recorded fingerprints." However,

because Chavez-era appointees loyal to the current government dominate Venezuela's National Election Council and Supreme Court– the two government institutions able to challenge election results – it is unlikely either will accept the opposition's demands for a

full election recount. ¶ Second, Maduro's government is taking steps to dominateradio and television coverage of the regime. Last month, Globovision, one of Venezuela's lastremaining independent news channels, was sold to a group of investors with close ties to Maduro. Under Chavez, the independent broadcasting station faced years of pressure as government authorities frequently threatened to arrest the group's owners and journalists. To no one's surprise, the company's new ownership has banned live video coverage of opposition leader Henrique

Capriles and many of the station's prominent journalists have been fired or have resigned.¶ Third, the regime andits allies are using fear and intimidation to silence the opposition. On April 30th,pro-Maduro lawmakers physically attacked opposition legislators on the floor of Venezuela's National Assembly. Days prior, theregime arrested a former military general who was critical of Cuba's growing influence on Venezuela's armed forces. More recently,Maduro even called for the creation of "Bolivarian Militias of Workers" to "defend the sovereignty of the homeland."¶ In light of all

this, it remains unclear why the Obama administration seeks, in Secretary Kerry's words,

"an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the StateDepartment and the [Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry " – let alone believe that such engagement will lead to any substantive change in Maduro's behavior. To be sure, Caracas's recent release of jailed American filmmaker TimothyTracy is welcome and long overdue. However, it is clear that the bogus charges of espionage against Tracy were used as leverage intalks with the United States, a shameful move reminiscent of Fidel Castro's playbook.¶ While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of human rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overalltrack record in the region gives reason for concern. President Obama failed to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power duringhis weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the StateDepartment has since sent very different signals. Indeed, Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his

near 30-minute address to the plenary session of the Organization of American States in Guatemala last week.¶ For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to reviverelations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have

banned opposition lawmakers from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken criticsof the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles.

What's worse, if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to theMaduro government, that could give further cover to the regime as itsystematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions. ¶ The Obamaadministration's overtures to Maduro's government come as the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Lastmonth, Capriles met with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolutionurging a total audit of all polling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by María Corina Machado, a representativefrom the National Assembly of Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about

Maduro's illegitimate hold on power.¶ Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration shouldtake a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine thecountry's constitution or threaten the opposition will be detrimental to





bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economyis in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting, and various public scandals – especially those related to institutional corruption

– could further erode public confidence in the current government. ¶ By resetting relations with theMaduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavezprotégé's ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelandemocratic opposition efforts to sustain and expand its popular support.

It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro .

Engaging Venezuela further destabilizes the region – Chavez proves thesupport gets funneled to the FARCFarah 12(Douglas Farah, Senior Fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, Director at the Strategic StudiesInstitute, August 2012, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME,¶ TERRORISM, AND CRIMINALIZED STATES¶ IN LATIN AMERICA: AN EMERGING¶ TIER-ONE NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITY,http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117 , PS) Following the model pioneered by Iran and Hezbollah, senior Venezuelan military and political leaders have allowed the FARC totraffic cocaine through Venezuela to West Africa, sharing in the profits. Almost every major shipment of cocaine to West Africa thatU.S. law enforcement officials have been able to trace back has originated from or passed through Venezuelan territory.65¶ It is

important to note that Chávez‘s most active support for the FARC came after theFARC had already become primarily a drug trafficking organization vice

political insurgency . The FARC has also traditionally earned considerable income (and wide internationalcondemnation) from the kidnapping for ransom of hundreds of individuals, in violation of the Geneva Convention and other

international conventions governing armed conflicts. It was impossible, by the early part of the 21st century, toseparate support for the FARC from support for TOC , as these two activities were the

insurgent group‘s primary source of income. In addition, the FARC had been designated a terroristorganization by the United States in 1997, and by the EU in 2001, for its indiscriminate attacks on civilians,

ties to international drug trafficking, and massive documented human rights abuses.66¶ Despite this, Chávez hadcultivated a relationship with the FARC long before becoming president. As

one recent study of internal FARC documents noted:¶ When Chávez became president of Venezuela in February 1999, FARChad not only enjoyed a relationship with him for at least some of theprevious seven years but had also penetrated and learned how to best use

Venezuelan territory and politics, manipulating and building alliances with new and traditional Venezuelan

political sectors, traversing the Colombia-Venezuela border in areas ranging from coastal desert to Amazonian jungle and buildingcooperative relationships with the Venezuelan armed forces. Once Chávez was inaugurated,

Venezuelan border security and foreign policies shifted in the FARC‘sfavor.67¶ In this context, there is also growing evidence that the Venezuela government under Chávez is actively promoting drugtrafficking and TOC/terrorist groups, particularly the FARC and Hezbollah.68 Perhaps the strongest public evidence of theimportance of Venezuela to the FARC is the public fingering of three of Chávez‘s closest advisers and senior government of ficials bythe U.S Treasury Department‘s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).¶ OFAC said the three—Hugo Armando Carvajál, director of Venezuelan Military Intelligence; Henry de Jesus Rangél, director of the Venezuelan Directorate of Intelligence and PreventionServices; and Ramón Emilio Rodriguez Chacín, former minister of justice and former minister of interior— were responsible for―materially supporting the FARC, a narco-terrorist organization.‖ It specifically accused Carvajál and Rangél of protecting FARCcocaine shipments moving through Venezuela, and said Rodriguez Chacín, who resigned his government position just a few days before the designations, was the ―Venezuelan government‘s main weapons contact for the FARC.‖69 In November 2010, Rangél waspromoted to the overall commander of the Venezuelan armed forces70 and in January 2012 was named defense minister as part ofof Chávez‘s promotion of close associates tied to drug trafficking and the FARC.71

The plan decimates US credibility vis-à-vis VenezuelaMorrissey 10(Ed Morrissey, Hot Air, Chavez dares Obama to cut diplomatic relations after rejecting envoy,http://hotair.com/archives/2010/12/29/chavez-dares-obama-to-cut-diplomatic-relations-after-rejecting-envoy/,PS) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez dared the United States to expel his ambassador orcut off diplomatic ties in retaliation for his rejection of Washington‘s choicefor ambassador to Caracas.¶ Tensions have been growing over Chavez‘s refusal to accept American diplomatLarry Palmer and also over U.S. criticisms of a legislative offensive by the president‘s congressional allies. Lawmakers have grantedChavez expanded powers to enact laws by decree for the next year and a half, a change that opponents condemn as antidemocratic.¶

Chavez has said he will not accept Palmer to be ambassador due to





comments he made earlier this year suggesting that morale is low in Venezuela‘s military and that he is concerned Colombian rebels are findingrefuge in Venezuela. …¶ ―If the government is going to expel our ambassador there, let them do it!,‖ Chavez said in a

televised speech Tuesday night. ―If they‘re going to cut diplomatic relations, let them do it!‖¶ ―Now the U.S.government is threatening us that they‘re going to take reprisals. Well, let

them do whatever they want, but that man will not come,‖ Chavez said.¶ The Senate may

be in position to defuse the standoff, if Harry Reid is inclined to do so. Palmer has yet to be confirmed. Obama could still insist thathe will not back down from his nominee, putting the Senate in position to decline his confirmation due to the negative receptionPalmer has received in the host country. That would allow Obama to save some face while maintaining diplomatic relations with Venezuela.¶ Overall, though, the situation has become a mild embarrassment for Obama. During the presidential campaign, Obamainsisted that he could change the nature of the relationship between the US and Venezuela by personally meeting ―withoutpreconditions‖ with Chavez, along with other tinpot dictators and lunatics like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Kim Jong-il, amongothers. It came as a piece from his insistence that George Bush had done serious damage to relations with allies and foes alike due toa lack of engagement, and that his ―smart power‖ would restore that standing and dial down tensions around the world.¶ WhileObama has never had the private meeting with Chavez that he pledged, he did get some face time with the Venezuelan strongman atthe 2009 OAS meeting almost immediately after taking office. A few months later, Obama sided with Chavez and the Castro brothersin Cuba during the Honduran crisis, in which former president Manuel Zelaya was arrested and then deported for preparing aChavez-like grab at lifetime power. None of this improved Chavez‘ outlook on the US, nor did it turn Chavez away from his military

partnership with Iran, which continues apace.¶ After this season of appeasement, Obama findshimself in the position of having even worse diplomatic relations with

Venezuela than the Bush administration did, with Chavez daring him to cutties or retreat on his choice of ambassador. Those, unfortunately, have always been the wages ofappeasement with petty dictators.

The plan continues the policy of appeasement towards Venezuela- allowsChavez to always get what he wantsHarper 10(Liz Harper, Americas Quarterly, December 21 2010, Venezuela‘s Formal Rejection of Ambassador-DesignateLarry Palmer, http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058,PS) The long-running debate over how to deal with the irrational and impulsivestrongman, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, has reached feverish pitch this winter.The latest casualty in this war of words has become U.S. Ambassador Larry Palmer, the Obama administration's nomination as

ambassador to Venezuela. Worse yet, Chávez ultimately got what he wanted out of this latest battle: his choice of who will not be our next Ambassador in Venezuela. On

Monday, Venezuela formally told the U.S. to not bother sending Larry Palmeras the next ambassador since he would be asked to return the moment helanded in Caracas.¶ How did this all go down?¶ Like Cuba, any U.S. move regarding Venezuela involves egos, politicsand fortunately, some policy. Naturally, when Palmer went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the summer, thecareer diplomat—characterized by some at the U.S. Department of State as "not a Washington man"—he already faced an uphill

slog.¶ Our domestic debate over Venezuela generally falls into two camps:engagement and confrontation. There are, of course, shades of gray and nuances between the two sides—

though such voices are so often overpowered by the more extreme views.¶ On one side, you have those espousing "strategicengagement," keeping in line with the Obama administration's stated foreign policy and national security objectives. In short and broadly speaking, these proponents might argue, with an irrational state, you shouldn't turn your back. Look where that got us withNorth Korea, Iran and Syria. Instead you want a seat at the table to start a dialogue based on mutual respect and to build on areas ofmutual interest. You raise concerns discretely and express disapproval quietly or through third parties. As one person said,engagement should be ―subversive," because you seek to assert positive influence by being present and through cooperation on areassuch as business development, financial opportunities, or culture and sports. Indeed, Palmer was the right guy to carry out this

mission.¶ But, the engagement policy, as it is practiced with Venezuela, seemsmore like "appeasement," say people clamoring for a tougher approach. After all, for years now, wehave witnessed a democracy's death by a thousand cuts. This past week, Hugo Chávezgot one of his Christmas wishes with the approval of new decree powers,thereby further eroding the country's once well-established institutionalchecks and balances. Chávez threatens more than human rights anddemocratic norms; the U.S. has legitimate national security concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism and

narcotrafficking. Yet, as Chávez runs roughshod over international norms, is the U.S.





working to halt the downward spiral? ¶ Those are the broad brush strokes of the debate into whichPalmer was tossed.¶ I'm told that some sought to torpedo Palmer's nomination from the get-go, either preferring another candidate with more credentials on human rights, or not wanting an ambassador in Venezuela at all. Critics doubted that Palmer—despite hisexperience as President of the Inter- American Foundation and as the Chargé d‘Affaires in Ecuador during a time of major internalcrises—had the steel to tangle with Venezuela's strongman. To many, his soft tone and circumspect statements at his confirmation

hearing reinforced this view.¶ Because Palmer did not come out swinging a big stick athis Senate confirmation hearing, Senator Richard Lugar sent the ambassador a

set of "questions for the record" (QFRs), in attempt to strengthen support forhis nomination. Palmer sat down with folks at the State Department and answered them, discussing the low morale in Venezuela's military, the ties between members of Venezuela's government and Colombian guerrillas and allowing them refuge in Venezuelan territory, its role in narcotrafficking, Chávez' increasing control over the judicial and legislative branches, steady erosionof checks and balances, and violations of human rights and freedom of the press.¶ Palmer's responses— which he thought would beclosely held, according to several sources at the State Department, including the ambassador-designate himself — were newsworthy,especially at a time of heightened tensions between Colombia and Venezuela. The QFR ripped around town and the world, mediareports picked up Palmer's statements, thereby setting off the wildfire. So much for the State Department trying to keep a "lowprofile" on Venezuela and the sensitive situation in the Andean region. ¶ Chávez called foul and interference, telling President

Obama to find another candidate because Larry Palmer would not be welcome.¶ In August, Chávez had said on his TV

show, "How can you think I'd accept this gentleman coming here?...You'd best withdraw him, Obama. Don't insist, I'm asking you."¶ "[Palmer] disqualified himself by

breaking all the rules of diplomacy. He messed with all of us. He can't come here as ambassador,"Chávez said.¶ Indeed, after the QFR got around, it seemed almost impossible that Chávez could save face and also accept Palmer.¶ The Obama administration did not back down, continuing to press forward with Palmer's confirmation and trying to quietlypersuade the Venezuelans to accept Palmer.¶ Back home, the finger-pointing started about how the QFR got around so quickly, as Iam told by several sources in and out of government. But, as questions for the record; they are not classified by definition. They arepublic information. That said, QFRs are historically not posted on Web sites, and emailed to interested and critical observers duringa confirmation process. Usually, they come out when the committee publishes the transcript of a hearing, or often upon requestduring a hearing. Of course, as public information, it is perfectly legal to disseminate QFRs at any time as one sees fit—althoughtraditionally they are treated with more discretion, according to several expert observers.¶ Yet, in this age of the online social media,a 24-hour news cycle, hungry blogosphere and Wikipedia, it is a risk to assume that any electronic communication will be keptprivate. And all communications can be rendered electronic.¶ Furthermore, the QFR took a step toward stating official U.S. positionson Venezuela—something which many have been asking for and seeking from the State Department for years. Despite this legitimatedemand, the State Department seems to prefer to keep Venezuela on the backburner. At least until the pot boils over. Given thecostly complexities of Iraq and Afghanistan, must Venezuela be another mess in which we meddle? ¶ To note, Palmer—true to his venerable professionalism as an American Foreign Service officer - takes all responsibility for the controversy that arose from thepublication of the QFR. But I must ask: should it really be a job requirement that an ambassador knows how "questions for therecord" are handled? Of course not.¶ So, what was the understanding between the legislative and executive branches?¶ It's not clear whether some sought to use the QFR to strong arm the State Department to articulate or take tougher positions, and thereby bolsterPalmer's confirmation prospects and support on the heels of his "weak" hearing performance. Alternatively, perhaps the QFR waspublicized to thwart his prospects entirely. Who knows; at this stage, it's irrelevant.¶ What's very relevant are the unfoldingconsequences of the QFR mishandling. First and foremost, Palmer got rolled. A dedicated Foreign Service off icer was not treated with due professionalism and respect. We will not know how great he would have been in Venezuela. Second, the State Departmenton this matter appears naive, indecisive and disorganized. Third, critics who never wanted ANY ambassador—and certainly NOTPalmer—in Caracas, succeeded. As did Chávez, for the short term.¶ To take up the second point, the State Department appears tohave different and confused messages on Venezuela. The ostensible example of this is the two messages of Larry Palmer's Senatetestimony versus his answers to the QFR. What can be said publicly and on the record regarding Venezuela? Beyond talking with alow voice on the safest matters, it is not clear. Is such timidity to Chávez' bluster necessary?¶ The next step will be to see whether theState Department will go bold and call Venezuelan Ambassador to the U.S. Bernardo Alvarez a persona non grata, or take a softerapproach and cancel his visa.¶ Alvarez had been back home, and over the weekend, it was said he was not planning to return to Washington DC—already one move ahead of the anticipated reciprocation to Palmer's rejection.¶ It was in Chávez‘s best interests to welcome Palmer, as he wanted to work with Venezuelans, and help ease the growing tensions between the two countries. But now,the State Department will have to rethink this, and find another person...most likely with a stronger track record on human r ightsand democracy. Perhaps we should accept that playing nice and fair with an irrational actor like Chávez is not likely to yield positiveresults.¶ At the end of the day, we've been backed into a corner to put forward a tougher ambassador, and not Palmer, who was ourfirst pick. Does this mean likewise that our policy of engagement must be altered? Are we acting in response to Venezuela's moves?

In this context, Chávez, and some conservative critics here, are setting the terms of U.S. policy.¶ This debacle also illustrates theexpress need for the State Department to complete its review of Venezuela policy and clarify its positions. The QFR mishandling is asymptom of the bigger issue: uniting our various agencies to craft a coherent message and policy on Venezuela. ¶ What are the "redlines" of what we'll tolerate from Venezuela? When one of our career diplomats goes on record saying that Venezuela's NationalGuard is involved in narcotrafficking, provides safe haven to terrorists like the FARC, imprisons judges for ruling against Chávez, why is the State Department not publicizing those concerns?¶ Until now, the State Department had been keeping its profile too lowfor anyone's good. Ostensibly that of Ambassador Palmer. ¶ At this point, why is it a mistake to outline on record ways in which the Venezuelan government is breaking very basic standards of human rights and hemispheric security? Just some open and disquieting

questions.¶ At the least, the State Department needs to figure out what its basicmessage is, and then put it out there with a unified voice, loud and clear. This

could go far to improve its public outreach and image.¶ But while silence continues, it seems that the





Venezuelans have settled the U.S. debate: this kind of "engagement" will notget us where we want to be.¶ Chávez is antithetical to our democratic values and security concerns. He ismoving full steam down the field, while we sit on the sidelines.¶ Time toplay.

Willful ignorance allows Venezuela and Cuba to work together against theUSBalart 12(Mario Diaz-Balart, House Representative, July 11 2012, Obama's Policies Toward Cuba and Venezuela: Ignorance isNOT Bliss, http://mariodiazbalart.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/obamas-policies-toward-cuba-and-venezuela-ignorance-is-not-bliss,PS) Washington, D.C. – Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL) responds to an interview by Oscar Haza which aired last night on theprogram, ―A Mano Limpia‖ on América TeVe, in which President Barack Obama commented on his failed policies toward Cuba and

Venezuela.¶ ―President Obama clearly wants to continue his failed policy of providingunilateral concessions to the Castro dictatorship, and expects that themurderous regime will in turn ‗recognize that their system is no longer

working.‘ Yet during his three and a half years in office, the regime has responded by holdinghostage American humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross, murdering fourpolitical prisoners of conscience, and increasing its brutal oppression

against the Cuban people. That President Obama continues to reach out a hand tothe Cuban dictatorship, and ignores the brave pro-democracy movement inCuba, is an outrage. It is deeply disturbing that in the face of the regime‘s demonstrated depravity, President Obamacontinues to expect that his acts of appeasement will somehow convince theregime to ‗recognize that their system is no longer working.‘ Miraculously, the

President fails to notice that it is precisely his policies which have increased thechanneling of U.S. dollars to the Cuban dictatorship and have onlyemboldened it further. Clearly President Obama‘s policies are ‗working‘ justfine for the Castro brothers. ¶ ―As to Venezuela, President Obama said that Chavez‗has not had a serious national security impact‘ on the United States. His

willful ignorance on this matter is shocking from a U.S. president. The President

must have forgotten thathis own State Department expelled the Venezuelan consulgeneral in Miami for plotting against U.S. security interests, and that

Chavez fiercely supports the State Sponsors of Terrorism Iran, Syria, andCuba, and the terrorist organizations, the FARC and Hezbollah, with his

vast petroleum resources, safe harbor, and access to credit.¶ ―It is dangerous that

President Obama is utterly blind to the brutal nature of the Castro dictatorship, and to the grave threats posed by Hugo Chav ez‘s

committed support for terrorist states and organizations. The Castro dictatorship and Chavezactively work against U.S. interests and in coordination with other U.S.foes. In our dangerous world, it is appalling that the United States has aPresident who completely fails to appreciate serious threats within our ownhemisphere.‖

http://mariodiazbalart.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/obamas-policies-toward-cuba-and-venezuela-ignorance-is-not-bliss,PS








Link: Oil Cooperation

Oil cooperation appeases and emboldens VenezuelaKoch 10(Edward Koch, Newsmax, April 05 2010, Drilling Won't Mask Appeasement, http://www.newsmax.com/Koch/Koch-Obama-

Venezuela-Iran/2010/04/05/id/354811,PS) The president is to be commended for opening offshore areas for oilexploration. According to The Times of March 31, the president is ending ―a long-standing moratorium on oil explorationalong the east coast from the northern tip of Delaware to the central coast of Florida, covering 167 million acres of ocean.‖¶

Obviously, the action is intended to respond to the United States‘ need for oiland our dependence on foreign sources. One large foreign source currentlyis Venezuela, whose leader, Hugo Chavez, is a sworn enemy of the U.S.¶ According to The Times of April 3, ―Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin of Russia visited Venezuela on Friday to sign a series of

military and oil agreements with President Hugo Chavez, who is seeking to expand ties with Russiaas a way of countering the influence of the United States in Latin America.‖¶

The Times also reported that ―Mr. Chavez had suggested before Mr. Putin‘s arrival that the countriescould cooperate ambitiously on nuclear energy and a satellite-launching

base in Venezuela.‖¶ What would we do if Venezuela invited Russia to builda missile launch pad, or Russia provided Venezuela with the plans andmaterials for building nuclear weapons? Would there be a replay of the Cuban missile crisis of the

1960s?¶ Based on our continuing failure to confront North Korea and Iran withregard to their nuclear activities, I suspect we would do nothing. I fear that we have lost the

battle and lost our nerve. It appears that the Obama administration has decided to live withthe idea that these two rogue states — North Korea and Iran — can do asthey please on the nuclear front.¶ There is a foul whiff of Munich and

appeasement in the air.





Internal Link





Credibility Key

Credibility‘s key – it controls every other facet of international bargainingPress ‗5 (Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor in the Department of Government, Dartmouth College.¶ He received a Ph.D. in Political Science

from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a B.A. from the University of Chicago., Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Pg. 1-2, 2005, PS)

In international politics credibility is a prized asset. A country whose promises arecredible can build valuable alliances because potential allies will not fear

betrayal or abandonment. A country whose threats are credible can determany enemies and prevent costly wars rather than fight them. Every country strivesto make its threats and promises credible, but how is this done? What causes credibility?¶ Statesmen, scholars, and pundits believe

they know how credibility is won and lost. The conventional wisdom holds that credibilitydepends on a country‘s past behavior—its history of keeping or breakingcommitments. Like people who keep their word, countries that keep their promises will be believed when they issue newassurances. And like people who casually break their promises, countries that renege on their commitments soon discover that theirpromises carry no weight. In international politics, it seems, countries must keep their promises and carry out their threats to

preserve their credibility, even if doing so exacts serious costs in the short term.¶ This book argues that the conventional

wisdom about credibility is wrong. A country‘s credibility , at least during crises. isdriven not by its past behavior but rather by power and interests. If a country makesthreats that it has the power to carry out—and an interest in doing so—those threats will be believed even lithe country has Huffed inthe past If it makes threats that it lacks the power to carry out—or has no interest in doing 50—its credibility will be viewed with

great skepticism. When assessing credibility during crises, leaders focus on the―here and now‖ not on their adversaries past behav ior. Tragically, those countries that have

fought wars to build a reputation for resolve have wasted vast sums of money and. much worse, thousands of lives.¶ Evidenceshows that presidents. prime ministers, and dictators believe theconventional wisdom about the sources of credibility . As a result countries have paid dearlyto invest in reputation. Nowhere has this reasoning played a more influential role than in the past fifty years of U.S. foreign policy.The Cold War had just begun when the Truman administration intervened in the Korean War to protect America‘s credibility. As

Secretary of State loan Foster Dulles explaincd ‗To ist [sit] by while Korea is overrun by un provoked arnied attack.. .

would start al disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war.‖ The president clarified this reasoning in a radio address to the American public: ―if aggression were allowed to succeed in

Korea, it would be an open invitation to new acts of aggression elsewhere.9





Impact





Appeasement Bad: Hegemony / Stability – 1st Line

Appeasement crushes US leadership and emboldens global rivalsHenriksen ‗99 (Thomas H. Henriksen, U.S. foreign policy, international political and defense affairs, rogue states, and insurgencies, ―Using Power

and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States‖ February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159) At the dawn of a new millennium, the United States finds itself entering an era of neither war nor peace. Rather, it confronts an uncertain and increasingly deadly world. We face not one armsrace but many, in which weapons of mass destruction have fallen--or arefalling--into the most desperate hands. Rogue adversaries covet nuclear,chemical, or biological capabilities to obliterate ancient enemies or to terrorize their way into the circles of

the great powers. They are also rapidly acquiring the long-range missiles to deliverawesome destruction to our allies' and our own shores. A congressionally chartered Commission to Assess the Ballistic MissileThreat to the United States under the chairmanship of Donald Rumsfeld concluded in 1998 that Iran and North Korea will be able

"to inflict major destruction on the United States" within five years and Iraq within ten. How the United Stateshandles rogue states will be of decisive importance to America's well-being

and global primacy. If it is judged timorous in the use of power, it will be

open to challenge as its own vulnerability becomes apparent.¶ Clausewitz, the famous

Prussian military theorist, emphasized that war is to be understood as the continuation ofpolitics by other means. Our adoption of severe remedies short of declaredconflict must be seen as an extension of diplomatic instruments to realize our

strategic goals. Power must be employed to further diplomatic goals.¶ Sanctions

and criminal legal proceedings make up part of our arsenal . These initial

steps can build international support for more draconian measures. Offensive military operations and

other measures short of war are our best defense for peace and continued security. They represent political warfare, provided, of course, that the United States has the tenacity and wherewithal to complete them once begun.¶ By backing away from realistic

approaches we will demonstrate to our opponents that they can oppose us without cost. Our allies will take note and go their own way . This turn of events

will cause still further problems down the road. If the forces of global disordercome to dominate the world scene, the human condition will be degraded,producing fertile soil for still more extreme elements to take root. The alternative to American

leadership is growing international anarchy. Unless we restore power, and

the credibility it represents, to U.S. diplomacy, we await the dire

consequences of our feebleness .

Hegemony‘s a controlling impact – nuclear war impossible with it andinevitable if it collapsesBWI ‘13(Brooks, Wohlforth and Ikenberry. Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the AlbertG. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department ofGovernment at Dartmouth College ―Don‘t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,‖ International Security, Vol. 37,No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)¶

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of afar more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United

States‘ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking

http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159







provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states

with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure,reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The

contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with

influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the

―American Pacifier‖ is provided in the works of JohnMearsheimer

, whoforecasts dangerousmultipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear

proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-

scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit?

Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to preventdangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response isconnected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex futurecounterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia‘s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer isimpossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The firstresponse flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potentialof anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest,defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia‘smajor states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on thisscholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance ordense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, thatmight give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the netsecurity effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intensegreat power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increasedEU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable ofsecuring itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantialmilitary presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify securitydilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region‘s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity andincrease their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism‘s sanguine portrayal is all ofthe research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism‘s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquilitythroughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly interms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as

soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning

research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that coreassumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status,and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not justin terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure maynevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a beton a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences toinfluence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world‘s key regions. We have already

mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the

America n pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or

bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would

generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war ). Hence it is unsurprising that

retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world‘s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity andconflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of arenewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two mainreasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict





make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional

proxy wars and arming of client states —all of which would be concerning, in part because it would

promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferationcascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It isunlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally

for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nucleardeterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changesas the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science,however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most willovercome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue onlysecurity and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty,thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizingeffects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly

survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of ―unforeseen crisis

dynamics‖ that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally,

add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as theUnited States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stayover the horizon and ―pass the buck‖ to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The

United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be acredible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. Theproblem is that China‘s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, ―The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are notstrong enough to do it by themselves.‖ 81 Therefore, unless China‘s rise stalls, ―the United States is likely to act toward China similarto the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.‖ 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asiaas well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce

the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S.

security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of

scholarship , including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary

for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latentonshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshoreand onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the

degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep

engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers

security competition in the world‘s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouseatmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping upand also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States‘ formidable militarymachine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows,and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have sofar been careful to avoid attracting the ―focused enmity‖ of the United States. 84 All of the world‘s most modern militaries are U.S.allies (America‘s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and thegap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85





Ext. Hegemony / Stability

More evidence – appeasement devastates resolve and emboldensadversariesTunç ‗8 [Hakan Tunç, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Fall 2008, ―Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,‖ Orbis, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 657-669]

Reputation can be defined as a judgment about an actor‘s past behavior and character that is used to predict future behavior. Ininternational politics, a major component of building or maintaining a country‘sreputation involves resolve.5 Policy makers may believe that a lack of resolve in onemilitary confrontation will be seen as an indication of general weakness.6 According to Shiping Tang, this concern frequently amounts to ‗‗a cult of reputation‘‘ among foreign policy makers, which he defines

as ‗‗a belief system holding as its central premise a conviction (or fear) that backing down in a crisis will leadone‘s adversaries or allies to underestimate one‘s resolve in the next crisis .‘‘7

Of particular importance to the cult of reputation is concern about the consequencesof withdrawal from a theater of war. The major dictate of the cult of reputation is that a countryshould stand firm and refuse to withdraw from a theater of war. The underlying belief is that a

withdrawal would inflict a severe blow to a country‘s reputation and thus

‗‗embolden‘‘ the adversaries by boosting commitment and recruitment totheir cause.8¶ Since the end of World War II, a cult of reputation has evolved among certain American policy makers who

maintain that being a global power means being able to convey the image ofstrength and resolve.9 According to this perspective, a reputation for firmness and resoluteness

deters adversaries and reassures allies about U.S. commitments. Conversely,

being perceived as weak and irresolute encourages adversaries to be moreaggressive and results in allies being less supportive.¶ This logic has had two general

consequences for America‘s use of force abroad: First, exhibiting resolve has been

deemed necessary even in small and distant countries. This is because the mereperception of power generates tangible power, thereby reducing the need to use actual physical

force against every adversary.10 In the 1950s and 1960s, this logic translated into military interventions in several places, notably inKorea and Vietnam, countries whose strategic value to the United States appeared questionable to some.11¶ Second,

reputational concerns made it difficult for the United States to withdraw from atheater of war. The Vietnam War is the most prominent case, although the logic was also evident during the Koreanconflict in the early 1950s.12 As is well-documented by historians, both the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrationstook reputation seriously and argued that leaving Vietnam without an ‗‗honorable‘‘ exit would seriously hurt U.S. credibility in theeyes of allies and adversaries alike. For both Johnson and Nixon, an ‗‗honorable‘‘ exit meant creating an autonomous South Vietnam(much like independent, anti-communist South Korea after the Korean war) that was recognized by all parties involved in theconflict, particularly by the North Vietnamese government. Such an outcome would vindicate U.S. sacrifices.13

More evidence – firm, unwavering resolve is keyHenriksen ‗99 is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he focuses on American foreign policy, international political affairs, andinsurgencies. He specializes in the study of US diplomatic and military courses of action toward terrorist havens in the non-Western world and toward rogue regimes. (Thomas H. - Hoover Institution Stanford University ―Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With

Rogue States‖ February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)//EB As the remaining superpower, the United States faces a unique politicalenvironment. It is both the world's reigning hegemon and sometime villain. America's economic, military, andtechnological prowess endows it with what Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has termed indispensability. Whatever thepolitical upheaval or humanitarian crisis, other states expect the United States to solve the world's problems and to dispense gooddeeds. Those expectations arise from the fact that America has often come to the rescue in the past and that the United States is not

a traditional nation. America is the embodiment of the idea that a free people sharesovereignty, with rights and obligations, as set forth in a writtenconstitution that has strengthened over the past two hundred years. Unlike most





traditional nations, we do not share a common ancestry. Thus America seeks to advance ideals. Our nationalgoals encompass more than geopolitical ends, which is why Americans are unsettled by the slaughter of innocents in faraway lands. American foreign policy debates and interventionist decisions usually include democratic values as well as our vital overseas

interests. Overseas engagement, whether military, diplomatic or economic, hasindeed steadily become an integral part of America's external policy duringthis century. Washington's leadership and power proved decisive from

World War I to the Persian Gulf war. In each of these major conflicts, the United States fought as memberof an international coalition and its role has been pivotal. Despite domestic isolationist pulls, the United States, more

than ever, is the key international player. No other state or global body commands similar world standing.The United Nations, on which so much optimistic expectation rested following World War II, is judged ineffectual in major crises.Even after the conclusion of bipolarism, the United Nations Security Council suffers from nationalistic divisions. The anticipation ofa veto from one of the other four permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia) holds American initiatives hostage to a watered-down consensus. (Likewise, America's veto power works to constrain the ambitions of China and Russia in the Security

Council.) Hard realities, not mere altruism, mean that America must act not like a policeman butlike a sheriff in the old Western frontier towns, acting alone on occasion, relying on deputies or long-standing allies, orlooking for a posse among regional partners. Or, in some cases, it may look for another sheriff, or

regional power, to organize local forces.3 It cannot allow desperadoes to run loose withoutencouraging other outlaws to test the limits of law and order. History instructs us thatthe U.S. withdrawal from world problems, leaving Europeans and Asians to their own devices in the 1930s, led to the rise of

militarism and aggression. Aloofness from international politics is simply not a viableoption. We benefit materially from a stable and peaceful world. Oureconomic and political health depend on cross-border trade andinternational stability . The percentage of our gross domestic product (GDP) based on foreign trade has doubledsince 1970. In 1997, exports alone reached 12 percent of GDP and imports totaled 13 percent. Although exports and importscombined accounted for one-quarter of GDP, total trade accounted for more than one-third of the average U.S. national income percapita ($19,700). The United States, which accounts for about 14 percent of total world trade (exports and imports), is the world's

largest exporter of goods and services, $933 billion in 1997. It is not in our interest to stand aside while rogue behavior unravels a region's trade, economic, and humannetworks. In today's globally interconnected world, events on one side of the planet can influence actions on the other side,

meaning that how the United States responds to a regional rogue has worldwideimplications. Rogue leaders draw conclusions from weak responses to aggression. That Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein,escaped unpunished for his invasion of Kuwait no doubt emboldened the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, in his campaign to

extirpate Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina in pursuit of a greater Serbia. Deterring security threats is a valuable mechanism to maintain peace, as witnessed by the cold war, and it may afford the only

realistic option available. But in dealing with rogue states deterrence and containmentmay not be enough. Before NATO intervened in the Bosnia imbroglio in 1995, to take one example, the ethno-nationalist conflict raised the specter of a wider war, drawing in the neighboring countries of Greece, Turkey, and Russia. Politicalinaction creates vacuums, which can suck in states to fill the void. Although the United States does not want to be the world's sheriff,

living in a world without law and order is not an auspicious prospect. This said, it must be emphasized that the UnitedStates ought not intervene militarily in every conflict or humanitariancrisis. Indeed, it should pick its interventions with great care. Offering Washington'sgood offices to mediate disputes in distant corners is one thing; dispatching armed forces to far-f lung deserts, jungles, or mountainsis quite another. A global doctrine setting forth all-inclusive guidelines is difficult to cast in stone. Containment, the doctrinearticulated in response to Soviet global ambitions, offered a realistic guideline for policymakers. A similar response to rogue statescannot be easily cloned for each contingency but may require the United States to corral allies or partners into a unified policy, as

circumstances dictate. But watching rogue behavior with complacency or relying on the United Nations courts disaster in the age of weapons of mass destruction. Most incidents of civil turmoil need not engage U.S.military forces. Regrettable as the bloody civil war in Sri Lanka is, it demands no American intervention, for the ethnicconflict between the secessionist Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority is largely an internal affair. Political turmoil inCambodia is largely a domestic problem. Even the civil war in the Congo, which has drawn in small military forces from Uganda,Rwanda, Angola, and Zimbabwe, is a Central African affair. Aside from international prodding, the simmering Congolese fighting is better left to Africans to resolve than to outsiders. In the case of the decades-long slaughter in southern Sudan, the United States can

serve a humanitarian cause by calling international attention to Khartoum's genocide of Christian and animist peoples. Thesetypes of conflicts, however, do not endanger U.S. strategic interests, undermine





regional order, threaten global commercial relationships, or, realistically, call fordirect humanitarian intervention. No weapons of mass destruction menace surrounding peoples or allies.

Thus, there is no compelling reason for U.S. military deployment. Terrorist rogue states, in contrast,must be confronted with robust measures, or the world will go down thesame path as it did in the 1930s, when Europe and the United States allowed Nazi Germany to propagate itsideology across half a dozen states, to rearm for a war of conquest, and to intimidate the democracies into appeasement. Rogue

states push the world toward anarchy and away from stability. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser to PresidentCarter, cited preventing global anarchy as one of the two goals of "America's global engagement, namely, that of forging an enduringframework of global geopolitical cooperation." The other key goal is "impeding the emergence of a power rival."4 Former Secretaryof State George Shultz has cogently linked force and diplomacy in practice and in word. He persuasively argued the principle while inoffice and later in his memoir that force should be used not as a last resort but as an integral component of diplomacy. In defendingthe 1983 combat assault on the island of Grenada to rescue American hostages and halt the spread of communism in the Caribbean,for example, he wrote in Turmoil and Triumph, his personal account of his years in the Reagan administration: The use of force, andthe credible threat of the use of force, are legitimate instruments of national policy and should be viewed as such. . . . The use of forceobviously should not be taken lightly, but better to use force when you should rather than when you must; last means no other, and

by that time the level of force and the risk involved may have multiplied many times over. 5 The Clintonadministration, in contrast, severed the nexus between power anddiplomacy in dealing with rogue states, with a resulting decline in U.S.credibility . Its mishandling of crises in Iraq, North Korea, and the Balkans furnishes ample negative lessons for diplomaticrelations with rogue governments. Rather than build public support for a respected overseas policy, the poll-driven Clinton WhiteHouse pursued the lines of least resistance. It avoided shaping international policy among a disinterested electorate, devotedepisodic attention to rogue transgressions, and repeatedly vacillated on the use of military force to achieve its diplomatic ends.Rogues played off American predilections for their own goals, leaving

Washington appearing incoherent, hesitant, and ineffectual.

The weak signal of the plan dooms credibility and causes internationalconflictBolton ‗9 (John Bolton, Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, LA Times, ―The danger of Obama's dithering‖ October 18,articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/18/opinion/oe-bolton18)

Weakness in American foreign policy in one region often invites challengeselsewhere, because our adversaries carefully follow diminished Americanresolve. Similarly, presidential indecisiveness, whether because of uncertainty or internal political struggles,

signals that the U nited S tates may not respond to international challenges in clear

and coherent ways. Taken together, weakness and indecisiveness have proved historicallyto be a toxic combination for America's global interests. That is exactly the combination we now see underPresident Obama. If anything, his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize only underlines the problem. All of Obama's campaign andinaugural talk about "extending an open hand" and "engagement," especially the multilateral variety, isn't exactly unfoldingaccording to plan. Entirely predictably, we see more clearly every day that diplomacy is not a policy but only a technique. Absentpresidential leadership, which at a minimum means clear policy direction and persistence in the face of criticism and adversity,engagement simply embodies weakness and indecision. Obama is no Harry Truman. At best, he is reprising Jimmy Carter. At worst,the real precedent may be Ethelred the Unready, the turn-of the-first-millennium Anglo-Saxon king whose reputation forindecisiveness and his unsuccessful paying of Danegeld -- literally, "Danish tax" -- to buy off Viking raiders made him history'sparadigmatic weak leader. Beyond the disquiet (or outrage for some) prompted by the president's propensity to apologize for hiscountry's pre-Obama history, Americans increasingly sense that his administration is drifting from one foreign policy mistake to

another. Worse, the current is growing swifter, and the threats more pronounced, even as the administrationtries to turn its face away from the world and toward its domestic priorities. Foreign

observers, friend and foe alike, sense the same aimlessness and drift. FrenchPresident Nicolas Sarkozy had to remind Obama at a Sept. 24 U.N. Security Council meeting that "we live in the real world, not a virtual one."

Appeasement wrecks US credibility and emboldens rogue statesEnold ‗9 [Scott. US Air Force. ―Rogue States and Deterrence Strategy‖ Feb 2o09 Strategy Research Project, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498539]





To effectively engage rogue states who have proliferated nuclear weapons or¶ weapons of

mass destruction or are attempting to proliferate them, the United States¶ must

develop and implement an effective policy designed to persuade, pursue and¶punish those governments and regimes. The United States government must possess¶ extreme tacticsand measures. Preemptive targeting must be available if rogue states¶ or actors utilize nuclear terror tactics as they seek political

gains or to be recognized as¶ a key participant in the world balance of power. It is imperative that rogue

states or¶ actors cannot employ nuclear weapons. As rogue states acquire nuclear technology,¶

the United States must develop a range of policies to apply constantpressure on these¶ states. The United States must be prepared to demonstrate resiliency to attacks should¶ theyoccur. The United States government must prepare its citizens to accept the fact¶ terrorist acts will occur on the continent. The

citizens must understand that every effort¶ is made to protect the population. Actors exist who seek to harmcitizens or provide¶ evidence of weak resolve or weak policies inside theUnited States. In doing so, rouge¶ states or actors seek to secure a foothold for acontinued exploitation of the United¶ States. Presently, the United States National Security Strategydoes not lay out a direct¶ policy demonstrating a complete and unconditional strategy to stop rogue state or actor¶ nuclear weapon

employment. There must be actionable and if necessary violent steps¶ available to takeagainst rogue states and actors. They must to be aware of and¶ understand the harsh retaliation should they chose toutilize a nuclear option.





-- Perception IL

The perception of US credibility is more important than the substantiveforeign policy decisionsHirsh ‗2 [Michael. Foreign Editor of Newsweek. ―Bush and the World‖ Foreign Affairs, October 2002. ln] It is true that this is a different kind of war. In terms of hard power, the threat is smallcompared to the hegemonic challenges posed by Nazi Germany or theSoviet Union. But in ideological terms, the challenge that the Islamists pose is similar -- a

point Bush himself made when he declared in his September 20 speech that the terrorists are "the heirs ofall the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century." They may not havetanks and planes, but they do have a substantial support base in themainstream Islamic world and the "superempowerment" that globalizationhas granted to small groups of fanatics. Pakistan, one of the United States' chief allies, isalso now a chief launching pad for al Qaeda. Suicide bombing is a way of lifein the Palestinian territories, where bin Laden's picture hangs prominently on many walls. Saudi and PersianGulf oil money continues to fund Salafism, which has a nesting ground and sympathetic roosts around the world. Its message iscarried daily by al Jazeera, the pan-Arab "news" station, and even in many U.S. mosques. ¶ The hegemonists are right about one

thing: hard power is necessary to break the back of radical Islamic groups andto force the Islamic world into fundamental change. Bin Laden said it well himself:

" When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like a

strong horse." The United States must be seen as the strong horse . The

reluctant U.S. interventionism of the 1990s made no headway against thisimplacable enemy . Clinton's policy of offering his and NATO's credibility to

save Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo won Washington little goodwill in the

Islamic world .

Credibility‘s determined by signal – WWII provesPress ‗5 (Daryl G. Press, Assistant Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College, International Security, ―The Credibility ofPower; Assessing Threats during the "Appeasement" Crises of the 1930s‖ Winter, lexis)

In 1933 Adolph Hitler became chancellor of Germany and immediately began breaking his country's international

agreements. From 1933 to 1938 Germany violated its treaty commitments by rearming, remilitarizing the Rhineland, and

seizing Austria. n1 Although Britain and France complained after each German violation, they refused torespond with force. In September 1938 Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia unless Germany was given a pieceof Czech territory called the Sudetenland. Once again, the British and French acquiesced to German demands; at the infamous

Munich conference, they agreed to pressure Czechoslovakia into surrendering the Sudetenland to Germany. Finally , in 1939,

as Germany was preparing to invade Poland, Britain and France took a firm stand. They warned Hitler that if he

attacked Poland, they would declare war on Germany. By this time, however, Hitler no longer believed their threats. As the German leader told a group of assembled generals, "Our enemies are worms. I sawthem in Munich."n2 The lessons of Munich have been enshrined in international relations theory and in U.S. foreign policy. For

deterrence theorists, the history of the 1930s shows that countries must keep their commitments or

they will lose credibility . n3 U.S. leaders have internalized this lesson; the most costly and dangerous moves

undertaken by the United States during the Cold War were motivated by a desire to preserve credibility. Concerns about credibilityled the United States to fight both in Korean4 and in Vietnamn5; during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedyrisked nuclear war rather than back down and risk damaging U.S. credibility. n6 And even after the end of the Cold War, the fear of breaking commitments continues to be a powerful force in U.S. foreign policy.n7 The notion that a country's credibility depends onits history of keeping its commitments is widely accepted, but is it true? n8 Does credibility depend on a history of resoluteness?More broadly, what causes credibility in international politics? To answer these questions, this article tests two competing theoriesof credibility. The first, which I call the "past actions" theory, holds that credibility depends on one's record for keeping or breaking





commitments. I test this theory against the "current calculus" theory, which argues that decisionmakers evaluate the credibility of anadversary's threats by assessing (1) the balance of power and (2) the interests at stake in a given crisis. n9 If an adversary issues athreat that it has the power to carry out, and an interest in doing so, the threat will be believed, even if that country has bluffed in thepast. But if it makes a threat that it lacks the power to carry out, or has no interest in doing so, the credibility of that threat will be viewed with great skepticism. To test the past actions and current calculus theories, this article uses evidence from Germandecisionmaking during three crises from the 1930s: the Austrian crisis, the Sudetenland crisis, and the crisis over Poland. Thesecases offer easy tests for the past actions theory. Nevertheless the current calculus theory performs significantly better. Although theBritish and French backed down repeatedly in the 1930s, there is little evidence to support the argument that their concessions

reduced their credibility in German eyes. The credibility of Britain and France did fluctuate from one crisis to the next, but thesefluctuations are better explained by the current calculus theory. Furthermore, German discussions about the credibility of theiradversaries emphasized the balance of power, not their history of keeping or breaking commitments.n10 The past actions theory isintuitively appealing because it accurately describes how people assess credibility in their everyday interactions with friends,colleagues, and family. Parents know that if they do not keep their promises and carry out their threats, their children will learn todisregard their rules. Moreover, people quickly discover which friends are reliable and which ones frequently break their promises.But people reason differently in their daily lives than they do in high-stakes international crises. In their daily lives, people quicklyestimate the odds of friends showing up on time, and children carelessly calculate the odds that parents will punish bad behavior.But when faced with momentous decisions, leaders abandon the simple heuristics that people employ in mundane circumstances;they model the situation more carefully. n11 The intuition behind the past actions theory, however appealing, is based on a dubiousleap from behavior in daily life to decisionmaking in life-and-death crises. This article offers both good and bad news for U.S. foreign

policy. The good news is that power is a key determinant of credibility . In this age of U.S. hegemony,the United States should have little trouble establishing credibility to defend important national interests. The bad news is that

even the world's only superpower will encounter difficulty when trying to

appear credible in crises over minor issues . The United States frequently

becomes engaged in disputes that involve U.S. preferences, but not vitalU.S. interests (examples of the former include U.S. involvement in Somaliain 1993 and Kosovo in 1999). In such situations, adversaries will doubt

whether the United States will take costly actions to defend interests of secondaryor tertiary importance.





-- Spillover IL

Weakened resolve in one area of the world spills overSchoff et al ‗9 Mr. James L. Schoff, associate director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis; Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis,

executive VP of IFPA; Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Professor of International Security Studies at Tufts University; Dr. Charles M.Perry, VP and director of studies of IFPA, Februar y 2009, ―Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning,‖ online:http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf

If the notion of tailored deterrence is key to 21st century deterrenceplanning, so, too, is the recognition that while deterrence must beregionally focused, it must still have global relevance. In other words, how we deal

with North Korea will have implications and ―lessons-learned‖ for how wedeal with an Iranian leadership on the brink of crossing the nuclearthreshold. This is evident from IFPA‘s recent assessments of nuclear trends in both countries, as is the fact that U.S. partnersand potential adversaries are watching us very closely, and are derivinglessons for themselves from innovations in U.S. defense and deterrenceplanning. Indeed, there is some evidence that Iran‘s pursuit of nuclear weapons follows to

some extent from North Korea‘s defiance in the Six-Party Talks, and thatthe Iranian leadership perceives nuclear weapons as one way to deter U.S.attempts to bring down the regime in Tehran. Likewise, as Japan and the United States engage in

operational planning discussions about North Korea and Taiwan, Japanese policy elites are striving to assessthe degree to which NATO‘s extended deterrence experiences and formats—

particularly, the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil and NATO‘s nuclear consultations on an Alliance-wide level—may apply tofuture U.S.-Japanese security cooperation that might include a more explicit link to forward-deployed U.S. nuclear forces and shared nuclear decision-

making. This is occurring, as will be discussed below, at a time when the NATO alliesthemselves are about to embark on their own new assessment of defenseand deterrence planning for the new era, including the ongoing utility ofNATO nuclear forces.





AT//Fettweis

Fettweis concedes – loss of credibility devastates global stabilityFettweis ‗4 Christopher Fettweis, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, December 2004, ―Resolute Eagle or Paper Tiger? Credibility,

Reputation and the War on Terror,‖ online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147_index.html The credibility of a state forms the basis of its reputation, which is little more than an

impression of fundamental national character that serves as a guide for others trying to anticipate future actions.12 The loss

of credibility can lead to reputations for weakness, fecklessness, and

irresolution , which, the thinking goes, emboldens enemies and discourages the

loyalty of allies . Credibility can be damaged in many ways, depending on the situation

and the observer, but perhaps the surest is to fail to rise to a challenge or to pursue a

goal with sufficient resolve . By doing so, a state may earn a reputation for

irresolution, which can encourage more aggressive actions by revisionist

powers .13 Threats made by a state without credibility may not be believed,inspiring the aggressor to press his advantage, which may lead to achallenge to an interest that is truly vital making a major war unavoidable. Thus the credibility imperativeis also intimately related to the post-war American obsession with―appeasement,‖ which is of course a code word for a show of weakness that inadvertently encourages an aggressor.





Appeasement Bad: Asian War

Appeasement causes India-China-Pakistan warCoes 11(Ben Coes, former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney‘s successful campaign for

Massachusetts Governor in 2002, The Daily Caller, September 30 2011, The disease of a weak president,http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/2/,PS)The attention of the world has been riveted to Israel, Palestine and Iran in light of the Palestinians‘ decision to seek U.N. recognitionand Ahmadinejad‘s visit to New York City to once again rub America‘s nose in his war-mongering, Holocaust denials and 9/11

conspiracy theories.¶ Unfortunately, President Obama‘s weakness in his response to Israel andIran is a cause for real concern, not only for our Israeli allies, but for other American allies as well. A

weak U.S. president emboldens our enemies. A good example of this is whathappened the last time we had a weak president, namely Jimmy Carter. ¶ The

disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles‘ heel allpoliticians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to differentaudiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politicianlosing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.¶ In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least takecomfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendlyneighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is

right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn‘t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.¶ But Obama‘s weaknesscould — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anythingthat might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, Indiaand China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon atruly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envyand nuclear weapons.¶ If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one.¶

Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:¶ First, Pakistan and India have fought three warssince the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred

before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possesshundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.¶ Second,

Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radicalIslamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will

happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khameneior Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.¶ Third, China sits atthe northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategicallyaligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India‘s natural resources. Overthe years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resourcesand drawing little notice from the outside world.¶ In my book, Coup D‘Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan,India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. Inmy book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d‘état.¶ I wish it was that simple.¶ The more complicated and

difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to beunpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing

to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.¶ There aremany threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technologyespionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But

the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing Americaand our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn‘t have to be this way. President Obama could — if hechose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The statusquo is simply not an option.

http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/2/

http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/2/





ExtinctionKahn ‗9 [Jer. ―Why India fears China‖ Newsweek, 10/19/9 lexis] On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along thenorthwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China.India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game hasplayed out on the 4,057-kilometer India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon."

Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India havedominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines. China claims some90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory . And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet.Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that

paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has byextension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a

claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months. Ever since the anti-Chineseunrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. Theemergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immensedomestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourageunrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threateningChina's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past,Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet isconsidered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan. The implications for India's security--and the world's--are

ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war betweentwo nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China borderdispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two partiesinvolved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought totake notice--a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclearexchange. And it could suck the West in--either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as inthe case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.





Appeasement Bad: China

Appeasement spurs Chinese dominanceFarah 12(Douglas Farah, Senior Fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, Director at the Strategic StudiesInstitute, August 2012, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME,¶ TERRORISM, AND CRIMINALIZED STATES¶ IN LATIN

AMERICA: AN EMERGING¶ TIER-ONE NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITY,http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117 , PS) China is aggressively and successfully acquiring access to many of the region‘snatural resources, and¶ trade between Latin America and China is growingexponentially . Over the past decade, China‘s trade with Latin America has jumped from $10 billion to $179 billion.11 With

the increased presence has come a significantly enhanced Chinese intelligence capacity and access across Latin America. At the sametime, Chinese Triads—modern remnants of ancient Chinese secret societies that evolved into criminal organizations—are now

operating extensive money laundering services for drug trafficking organizations via Chinese banks.¶ China also hasshown a distinct willingness to bail out financially strapped authoritariangovernments if the price is right. For example, China lent Venezuela $20 billion,in the form of a joint venture with a company to pump crude oil that Chinathen locked up for a decade at an average price of about $18 a barrel. The moneycame as Chávez was facing a financial crisis, rolling blackouts, and a severe liquidity shortage across the economy.12 Since then,

China has extended several other significant loans to Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia.¶ The dynamics of the relationship betweenChina and the Bolivarian bloc and its nonstate proxies will be one of the key determinants of the future of Latin America and the

survival of the Bolivarian project. Without significant material support from China, theeconomic model of the Bolivarian alliance will likely collapse under its own

weight of statist inefficiency and massive corruption, despite being richly endowed with

natural resources.¶ However, Chinese leaders likely understand that any real replacementof the Bolivarian structure leadership by truly democratic forces couldresult in a significant loss of access to the region, and a cancellation of existing contracts. This,in turn, gives China an incentive to continue to support some form of the Bolivarian project going forward, even if ailing leaders suchas Chávez and Fidel Castro are no longer on the scene.

Goes nuclearHunkovic ‗9[Lee. Prof Military Studies @ American Military University. ―The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict – Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America‖ www.lampmethod.com, 2009]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to

escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war , therefore, many countries

other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, bothKoreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn intothe war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in theglobal economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant

members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists thatthey could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressiveexpansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn

create an international standoff and deployment of military forces tocontain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scaleconflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or

militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions willdetermine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

http://www.lampmethod.com/







Ext. China IL

Lack of resolve emboldens China – they‘ll throw south Henriksen ‗99 Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, senior fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University,

February 1999, ―Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States,‖ Hoover Essays in Public Policy, online:http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2846256.html?show=essay

Low points in American determination and leadership , such as the NorthKorean negotiations, did not go unnoticed. U.S. reactions encouraged Iraq'srecalcitrance in its dealings with U.N. arms inspectors, accounted for North Korea's laterface-off with Washington over demands to open its underground facilities to inspection

(while demanding $500 million to discontinue missile exports), and bolstered Serbia's reluctance, in the

face of U.S.-led NATO efforts, to halt the bloodshed first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo . A

high-ranking Chinese military officer, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of China's general staff ,reportedly declared in 1995, in response to an American's unofficial warnings that Washingtonmight react militarily to a Beijing attack on Taiwan, "No, you won't. We've

watched you in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and you don't have the will."15

Taiwan stability is a war of wills – appeasement emboldens ChinaChristensen ‗1 (Thomas – professor of politics at Princeton, Spring 2001, “Posing problems without catching up”, International Security, p. ebscohost)

On the active defense side, it appears that China is attempting to import and to build indigenously a fairly impressive layered airdefense system to counter cruise missiles and advanced aircraft. In addition to reported clandestine acquisition of Patriottechnology, China has purchased and is seeking to purchase from Russia an undisclosed number of SA-10 (S-300) and SA-15 (TOR-1) SAM systems. Some of this Russian technology might be successfully integrated into China's own domestically produced SAMsystems, such as the HQ-9. [66] China is also working to develop antistealth and antisatellite capabilities. Even if the Chineseprograms have only limited effect against more technologically advanced foes, they may still pose a future security challenge to

Taiwan and the United States. If Beijing elites believe that they are in a protracted war of wills over an issue that they care about much more than do the Americans, such as Taiwan, those elites mightstill be emboldened by the perceived capability--however limited--to increase costs to American

and Taiwanese forces and to reduce costs to mainland assets in such a struggle. This problem is onlyexacerbated by any perceptions that Chinese elites might have about

America's supposed limited willingness to fight such protracted wars and tosuffer casualties. Implications and Prescriptions for U.S. Strategy If the analysis above is correct, preventing

war across the Taiwan Strait and between the United States and China ismuch more difficult than a straightforward net assessment of relativemilitary power in the region might suggest. To deter China from launching attacks against Taiwan and

escalating crises and conflicts by attacking American assets in the region, the United States must do more thandemonstrate an ability to prevail militarily in a conflict; it must alsodemonstrate American resolve and, perhaps, the ability to protect its forces not only from defeat but alsofrom significant harm.





Appeasement Bad: Cuba

Hardline approach is driving Cuban reforms in the squo – the plan reversesthe trend and turns the caseRadosh ‗13 Ron Radosh 2013, 3/18 PJ Media columnist and Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute. ―The Time to Help Cuba‘s Brave DissidentsIs Now: Why the Embargo Must Not be Lifted,‖ PJ Media, http://pjmedia.com/ronradosh/2013/03/18/the-time-to-help-cubas- brave-dissidents-is-now-why-the-embargo-must-not-be-lifted/?singlepage=true.The presence this week in the United States of dissident Cuban blogger Yoani Sanchez, the most well-known of Cuba‘s bravedissident community, has again brought to the forefront the reality of the situation facing the Cuban people in the Castro brothers‘prison state. Last week, Sanchez spoke at both Columbia University and New York University, where she recalled how differentthings were a decade ago during what Cubans refer to as the ―Black Spring,‖ when independent journalists were given a summarytrial and large jail sentences. It was the arrest of these opponents of the regime that led to the Ladies in White, the wives

and mothers of prisoners who regularly marched in silence in front of government buildings each week. Ten years ago, Sanchez pointed out, there was no access to the internet for anyone inCuba, it barely existed, and there were no flash drives to record informationand no social networking sites to spread the word about the state‘srepression. Now, bloggers like Sanchez — who gains access to tourist hotels,

posing as a Westerner so she can use their internet facilities — havemanaged to get past the regime‘s ban on use of the internet and to freely reveal to the world thereality of life in Cuba. ―Many independent journalists and peaceful activists who began their work precariously havenow resorted to blogs, for example, as a format to circulate information about programs and initiatives to collectsignatures,‖ Sánchez said. She and others ha ve done just that, getting signatures on petitions to demand the release in particular of

one well-known Cuban journalist. In addition, Sanchez is circulating a petition known as ―theCitizens‘ Demand‖ to pressure the Cuban regime to ratify the UN politicalrights agreements signed in 2008. The signers are calling for a legal andpolitical framework for a full debate of all ideas relevant to the internalcrisis facing the Cuban people on the island. In effect, this demand fordemocracy is nothing less than a call for creation of a political democracythat would, if implemented, lead to the collapse of the edifice of the

Communist one-party state. As Sanchez put it: ―It is important to have initiatives for transforming the law anddemand concrete public spaces within the country.‖ Since a totalitarian state does not allow for such space and prohibits a real civilsociety from emerging, the actions of the dissidents are a mechanism for forcing such change from below. They are fighting what herfellow blogger Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo called a ―culture of fear over the civil society‖ that the secret police seek to enforce. Forliberals and leftists in the United States, the main demand they always raise is to ―lift the embargo.‖ According to the argument theyregularly make, the embargo has to be li fted for the following reasons: 1) it is not effective; 2) it gives the regime the excuse to argueto the Cuban people that the poverty they suffer is the result of not being able to trade with the United States and other nationshonoring the embargo; 3) lifting the embargo would hence deprive Fidel and Raul Castro from their main propaganda argument,revealing that the reasons for a collapsed economy are the regime‘s own policies; and 4) trade and travel from the United States would expose Cubans to Americans and others who live in freedom, help curb anti-Americanism, and eventually lead to slow reform

of the system. What these liberals and leftists leave out is that this demand — lifting the embargo — is also thenumber one desire of the Cuban Communists. In making it the key demand, these well-meaning (at least some of them) liberals echo precisely the propaganda of the Cuban government, thereby doing theCastro brothers‘ work for them here in the United States. And, as w e know, many of those who call for this actually

believe that the Cuban government is on the side of the people, and favor the Cuban Revolution which they see as a

positive role model for the region. They have always believed, since the 1960s of their youth, that socialism in Cubahas pointed the way forward to development and liberty based on the kind of socialist society they wish could exist inthe United States. Another brave group of Cuban opponents of the regime has actually taped a television interviewfilmed illegally in Havana. ―Young Cuban democracy leader Antonio Rodiles,‖ an American support group called Capitol HillCubans has reported, ―has just released the latest episode of his civil society project Estado de Sats (filmed within Cuba), where hediscusses the importance U.S. sanctions policy with two of Cuba‘s most renowned opposition activists and former political prisoners,Guillermo Fariñas and Jose Daniel Ferrer.‖ The argument they present is aimed directly at those on the left in the United States,some of whom think they are helping democracy in Cuba by calling for an end to the embargo. In strong and clear language, the two

dissidents say the following: If at this time, the [economic] need of the Cubangovernment is satisfied through financial credits and the lifting of theembargo, repression would increase, it would allow for a continuation of

http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/18/3292371/cuban-blogger-yoani-sanchez-recalls.html#storylink=cpy

http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/03/cuban-democracy-leaders-stress.html




http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/18/3292371/cuban-blogger-yoani-sanchez-recalls.html#storylink=cpy





the Castro‘s society, totalitarianism would strengthen its hold andphilosophically, it would just be immoral … If you did an opinion poll amongCuban opposition activists, the majority would be in favor of not lifting theembargo. Next, they nail the claim that travel without restrictions by citizens of our country to Cuba would help spread

freedom. The men respond: In a cost-benefit analysis, travel to Cuba by Americans would be of

greatest benefit to the Castro regime, while the Cuban people would be theleast to benefit. With all of the controls and the totalitarian system of thegovernment, it would be perfectly able to control such travel. We know this, as

I reported a few months ago, about how a group of Americans taking the usual state-controlledPotemkin village tour came back raving about how wonderful and free Cubais, and how Cuban socialism works. Finally , the two former prisoners made this point about lifting theembargo: To lift the embargo at this time would be very prejudicial to us. The government prioritizes all of the institutions thatguarantee its hold on power. The regime‘s political police and its jailers receive a much higher salary and privileges than a doctor orengineer, or than any other worker that benefits society. We‘ve all seen municipalities with no fuel for an ambulance, yet with 10, 15,

20, 50 cars full of fuel ready to go repress peaceful human rights activists. Indeed, just this past week, more ev idence came outsubstantiating how the secret police killed Cuba‘s leading political opponent Oswaldo Paya, and sought to blame it ona car crash for which he and those with him were responsible. Last week, the Washington Post in a tough editorialmade the point: Mr. Payá, who pioneered the Varela Project, a petition drive in 2002 seeking the guarantee ofpolitical freedom in Cuba, was killed in a car wreck July 22, along with a youth activist, Harold Cepero. The driver of

the vehicle, Ángel Carromero, a Spaniard, was convicted and imprisoned on charges of vehicular homicide; inDecember, he was released to Spain. He told us in an interview published on the opposite page last week that the carcarrying Mr. Payá was rammed from behind by a vehicle with government license plates. His recollections suggestthat Mr. Payá died not from reckless driving but from a purposeful attempt to silence him — forever. This is the kindof treatment effective opponents of the regime get from Cuba‘s secret police, measures taken upon orders of RaulCastro, whom useful idiots like Danny Glover and Sean Penn regularly visit. They fawn at his feet and those of hisailing brother, Fidel Castro. This week, Sanchez and her colleague come to testify before Congress. They will speak as

well at a public forum today, Tuesday, at the Cato Institute. You can watch on a live stream at 12:30 p.m. on theorganization‘s website. The Cuban people have suffered long enough at the hands of a regime that came into powerpromising freedom and democracy, and instead inflicted on the Cuban people a totalitarian government modeled on

that of the old Soviet Union. Cuba is finally on the verge of change, and it is time thepeople of our country give whatever support we can to those within Cuba bravely working for the creation of a real democracy in Cuba, and an end to the decades of rule by the Castro brothers.

http://http/pjmedia.com/ronradosh/2012/08/15/graduate-of-my-commie-high-school-goes-to-cuba/

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-administration-should-urge-a-probe-of-oswaldo-paya-death/2013/03/13/34f2a0fe-8b7e-11e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4_story.html

http://www.cato.org/events/future-freedom-cuba

http://www.cato.org/events/future-freedom-cuba

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-administration-should-urge-a-probe-of-oswaldo-paya-death/2013/03/13/34f2a0fe-8b7e-11e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4_story.html

http://http/pjmedia.com/ronradosh/2012/08/15/graduate-of-my-commie-high-school-goes-to-cuba/





Appeasement Bad: Hotspots

Appeasement sets ignites every global hotspotHanson ‗9 [Victor Davis. Senior Fellow at Stanford‘s Hoover Institution. ―Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama‖ December 2009

http://pjmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/]BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anythinggood result from President Obama‘s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology awayfrom a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the meaculpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons,

wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea,Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who‘s going to be the first to tryObama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads inCentral America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you

believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next

three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously itsGulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a

punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S.friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy

bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with

some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There‘s an outside shot that North Koreamight do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China willratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India‘s borders with both Pakistan andChina will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.





Ext. Hotspots

The signal of appeasement ignites a laundry list of powderkegsHenriksen 99is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he focuses on American foreign policy, international political affairs, and

insurgencies. He specializes in the study of US diplomatic and military courses of action toward terrorist havens in the non-Western world and toward rogue regimes. (Thomas H. - Hoover Institution Stanford University ―Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal WithRogue States‖ February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)//EB

Rogue regimes have always existed in some form or other throughout history. What has changed is the

seriousness of their potential threat in the new international disorder. The United States in itsearliest days, as one illustration, had to face assaults by the Barbary Coast powers who held U.S. shipping hostage for ransom. JamesMadison freed American commerce in the Mediterranean from the degrading practice of paying tribute by dispatching sufficient

naval forces there. The cold war also witnessed pariah states, forerunners to today's rogue nations. Because of theirextreme diplomatic isolation, questions of their legitimacy, andinternational opprobrium, these pariahs looked to their own defense,striving to obtain nuclear weapons. In the late 1970s, South Africa, Taiwan, Israel, and South Korea felt

their strategic vulnerability and moved to acquire nuclear bombs to redress their weakness. Pressed hard by Washington, Taiwan, South Africa, and South Korea came off the atomic

pariah listing when they ceased pursuing their own nuclear weaponsagendas. Other states that met some of the standards of a pariah in the previous era included Rhodesia, Chile, Uganda, andCuba. But with changing circumstances, they also slipped from this categorization, with the exception of Cuba.2 Contemporary

rogue states, like some of their cold war predecessors, receive diplomatic backing from major power patrons. China andRussia sell advanced technology and weapons to Iraq and Iran. Sudan, inturn, receives financing from Iran for terrorist activities. Serbia getsRussian support. The major players have their own ends in mind. Russia makes common cause with Iran, for example,to offset Turkish gains in Central Asia and to garner hard currency for its technology exports. France has commercial interests in

mind when it bucks U.S. resolutions on Iraq in the United Nations. So while being largely independent actors, rogue statescan still serve the agenda of greater powers. Unlike the cold war era, however, rogueregimes are now more technologically independent of the major powers as

well as politically freer. A diffusion of scientists and engineers means that advanced industrialstates no longer have exclusive capabilities in advanced weapons systems.

Third world regimes now have access to expertise from their own Western-trained scientists or from expatriates who have left post-Soviet Russia insearch of jobs. They also can readily attain the equipment and materialsneeded to manufacture weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Iran'sadvances in mid- and long-range missiles and Iraq's strides in developingnuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities bear witness to the changedglobal circumstances. Likewise, North Korea, one of the world's poorestand most isolated nations, possesses both nuclear and missile capabilitiesthat threaten its neighbors. Pyongyang raised apprehensions afresh in the summer of 1998 with its three-stagerocket launch over Japan to put a satellite into orbit.





Appeasement Bad: Iran – 1st Line

Iran wants to expand in Latin America – the plan is the necessary incentiveBerman 6-5[Ilan. VP of the American Foreign Policy Council. ―Iran on our back porch: Column‖ USA Today 6/5/13 ln]

Last week, Argentine state prosecutor Alberto Nisman dropped a bombshell when heissuedhis long-awaited indictment in the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israel Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. The 502-page report pins the blame for the attack -- which killed

85 and wounded hundreds more in what experts call Latin America's 9/11 -- squarely on the Islamic Republic of Iran. In doing so, it provides

a timely reminder that Iran's radical regime is active in the Western

Hemisphere and that its presence here is far broader than is commonly

understood.¶ Just how much is still a matter of considerable debate. Iran's activities in the Americashave exploded over the past eight years , propelled in large part by the warm personal ties between

outgoing Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and recently-deceased Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez. Using

Venezuela as a gateway into the region, Tehran succeeded in forging strategic partnerships withlike-minded governments in Bolivia and Ecuador, and expanding its contacts with Peru, Nicaragua and a number of other regional players.¶ Despitethese gains, however, some experts still tend to see Iran's efforts as little more than an "axis of annoyance." But Nisman's indictment convincingly says

otherwise.¶ Over the past three decades, the Argentine brief alleges, Iran has succeeded in quietly erecting anetwork of intelligence bases and covert centers that spans no fewer thaneight Latin American countries: Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, andSuriname. This infrastructure was instrumental in allowing Iranian proxies to carry out the AMIA bombing, as well as to plot other attacks (such as anunsuccessful 2007 attempt by Guyanese national Abdul Kadir to blow up fuel tanks at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport). ¶ Moreover, Nisman has

made clear the network enabling Iran to carry out attacks in the region, or

against the United States, isn't simply a relic of history. Rather, there's good

reason to believe that it remains both intact and functioning .¶ In fact, it could

soon get even bigger. That is because the Latin American region as a whole is in

a state of profound political flux . In Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, who succeeded Hugo Chavez as president

this past April, is presiding over an all-out implosion of the national economy, complete

with shortages on commodities such as toilet paper, sugar and flour. Next door in Colombia, the government of President Juan Manuel Santoshas embarked upon a complicated and controversial peace process with the extremist FARC militia -- one that could

result in the FARC gaining significantly in both political relevance and actual power. Even inNisman's own Argentina, a new and softer attitude toward Iran has begun to take root, manifested in growing bilateral trade ties and talks of a "truth

commission" to reexamine the AMIA case (and, ostensibly, to rewrite history in Tehran's favor). These developments couldprovide new opportunities for Iran to expand its regional influence and its

strategic capabilities.¶ America, meanwhile, is still struggling to craft a coherent

response to Iran's regional ambitions . Policymakers in Washington were jolted awake to Iran's activities south of

the border in October of 2011, when law enforcement agencies foiled a plot orchestrated by a faction of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps operating inSouth America to assassinate Adel Al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, in a Washington, D.C. restaurant. ¶ In response,

legislation authored last year by enterprising freshman Rep. Jeff Duncan, R-S.C., mandated that the State Departmentdevelop a strategy to "counter Iran in the Western Hemisphere." The bill sailed

through Congress and was signed into law by President Obama back in December. But whether that strategy , when it doesmaterialize this summer, will be broad enough to address the extent of Iran's presence in the Western

Hemisphere is still very much an open question .¶ It will need to be. As Nisman's investigation and

resulting indictment indicates, the Iranian regime's activities in Latin America areextensive -- and evolving. So is the threat that it poses, both to our allies in the region

and to the U.S. homeland itself.





Failure to contain Iranian influence causes warLondon ‗10 Herbert London is President Emeritus of Hudson Institute and Professor Emeritus of New York University June 23, 2010 ―TheComing Crisis in the Middle East‖ Hudson Institutehttp://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7101&pubType=HI_Opeds

Iran is poised to be the hegemon in the Middle East. It is increasingly

considered the ―strong horse‖ as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically,

may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran. ForSunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia regional strategic vision is acombination of deal making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage andattempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counter weight toIranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precariousstate. Should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has

long been said that the Sunni ―tent‖ must stand on two legs, if one, falls, the tentcollapses. Should that tent collapse and should Iran take advantage of thatcalamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling its oats and no longerdissuaded by an escalation scenario with nuclear weapons in tow, waragainst Israel is a distinct possibility . However, implausible it may seem at the moment, thepossible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust couldlead to a nuclear exchange. The only wild card that can change this slide into

warfare is an active United States‘ policy . Yet curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional andphysical retreat from the region. Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, it has done nothing toforestall that eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, theanticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. And despite historic linksto Israel that gave the U.S. leverage in the region and a democratic ally, the Obama administration treats Israel as a national security

albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible. As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the regionas the ―weak horse,‖ the one that is dangerous to ride. In every Middle Eastcapital the words ―unreliable and United States‖ are linked. Those seeking a moderate

course of action are now in a distinct minority. A political vacuum is emerging, one that is notsustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with imperial

exhilaration.





Ext. Iran IL

Appeasement sparks conflict with IranBerman 12[Writes about foreign policy and national security issues. (Ilan - Forbes ―Confronting Iran's Latin American Ambitions‖ 12/04/2012

http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilanberman/2012/12/04/confronting-irans-latin-american-ambitions/)//EBOver the past year, policymakers in Washington have woken up to a new threat toU.S. security . Since October of 2011, when law enforcement agencies foiled aplot by Iran‘s Revolutionary Guards to assassinate the Saudi ambassador inthe nation‘s capital, U.S. officials have begun to pay attention in earnest toIran‘s growing activities and influence in the Western Hemisphere. What they

have found has been deeply worrisome. The Islamic Republic, it turns out, has made seriousinroads into Latin America since the mid-2000s, beginning with its vibrant strategicpartnership with the regime of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez. Today,Iran enjoys warm diplomatic ties not only to Venezuela, but to similarlysympathetic governments in Bolivia and Ecuador as well. It has begun toexploit the region‘s strategic resource wealth to fuel its nuclear program.

And it is building an operational presence in the region that poses a directdanger to U.S. security. Exactly how significant this threat is represents the subject of a new study released in lateNovember by the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee. That report, entitled A Line In The Sand,documents the sinister synergies that have been created in recent years between Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand, and radicalregional regimes and actors—from Venezuela to Mexican drug cartels—on the other. Some of these contacts, the study notes, are

financial in nature, as Iran seeks to leverage Latin America‘s permissive political andfiscal environments to skirt sanctions and continue to engage ininternational commerce amid tightening Western sanctions. But thesecontacts could easily become operational as well. The report suggests that―the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of

whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into aconfrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for

retaliation.‖ The U.S. response, meanwhile, is still nascent. To date, only one piece ofCongressional legislation—the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012—has seriouslytaken up the issue of Iran‘s penetration of the Americas, and the potentiallyadverse implications for U.S. security . Fortunately, the Act has found a receptive ear among many inCongress, and is now likely to pass the Senate with only minor modifications during the current lame duck session of Congress. Yet,

in and of itself, the Act does not constitute a comprehensive strategy forcompeting with Iran in the Americas—or for diluting its influence there. To

the contrary, America‘s strategic profile in Latin America is now poised toconstrict precipitously . As a result of looming defense cuts, and with the specter of additional, and

ruinous, ―sequester‖ provisions on the horizon, the Pentagon is now actively planning amore modest global profile. To that end, back in May, General Douglas Fraser, the outgoing head of U.S.Southern Command, the combatant command responsible for the Americas, told lawmakers that it plans to retract to Central

America and focus predominantly on the threats posed by the region‘s rampant drug and arms trades. In other words, theUnited States is getting out of the business of competing for strategicinfluence in Latin America, and doing so at precisely the time that Iran isgetting serious about it. That could end up being a costly mistake. As the findings of the Homeland Security

Committee‘s study indicate, Iran‘s presence south of the U.S. border represents more than a mere annoyance. It is, rather, a

potential front for Iranian action against the United States— one that could

well be activated if and when the current cold war between Iran and the





West over the Islamic Republic‘s nuclear program heats up in earnest .

Washington needs to be prepared should that happen. Better yet, i t needs to craft a proactive

approach to confronting Iran influence and activity south of our border . That,

after all, is the surest way for us to avoid having to face Iran and its proxies here at home.

Appeasing Venezuela emboldens Iran and prompts cyberconflictIBD 12(Investor‘s Business Daily, January 9 2012, Hugo Chavez's Lawless Venezuela Grows More Lawless,

http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/010912-597200-venezuela-under-chavez-grows-even-more-lawless.htm,PS) The Americas: With U.S. attention focused elsewhere, Venezuela's dictator is at it again — breakingcontracts, pushing drugs, plotting cyberattacks and cavorting with Iran'styrant. This is what appeasement brings.¶ Well before President Obama gave President Hugo Chavez

a handshake at a 2009 summit, wiser heads at the State Department warned him against a "reset." Obama ignored them.¶ Therube-like naivete has now come to bite Obama as the craziness in Caracasspirals wildly in just the last few days. The Rumsfeld Maxim that "weakness is provocative" seems to be

operative here, setting the stage for the astonishing string of lawless acts that now demandhard sanctions. Among them:¶ • Breaking international contracts. Chavezannounced Monday he'll ignore an arbitration ruling from the World Bankthat ordered Venezuela to pay ExxonMobil $1 billion for Chavez's expropriation of its investments. Exxon had asked for $12 billion,

got $1 billion, but Chavez says he'll only pay $250 million.¶ • Naming a drug kingpin as head ofmilitary . Chavez appointed Henry Rangel Silva — identified by the U.S. Treasury as a "kingpin" — as his defense minister. Thatact not only flouts global efforts to stop organized crime, but effectively turns Venezuela into a narcostate and its army into a drug

cartel.¶ • Plotting war against the U.S. A Venezuelan diplomat was kicked out ofthe U.S. last weekend for soliciting cyberattacks on U.S. military,intelligence and nuclear targets. Her acts were clumsy, but her malevolence extended straight to Chavez's

palace, where she said she had ties. It calls for a hard response.¶ • Aiding America's enemies. Chavezdefied international sanctions by bringing Iran's tyrant, Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad, to our hemisphere in a bid to gain credibility as a rogue state.The Iranian madman got a red-carpet welcome at Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas on Monday, undercutting the U.S. efforts

to sanction Iran, which threatens the world with nuclear war.¶ With our military gutted and the long

fuse to Iran burning shorter, the last thing we need is a rogue state acrossthe Gulf of Mexico conducting acts of war.¶ It wouldn't take much to get rid of Chavez, and in light ofthe high stakes elsewhere, it should be a priority. But our president has had little more than handshakes and a scolding words for what's rapidly shaping up as the most lawless rogue state in our hemisphere.

Impossible to negotiate with Iran – must show forceGardiner ‗9 [Nile. Dir of the Center for Freedom at Heritage. ―Barack Obama must Heed the Lessons of the Holocaust‖ 6/3/9 www.heritage.org/reserach/commentary/2009/06/Barack-Obama-Must-Heed-the-Lessons-of-the-Holocaust ]

Ahmadinejad and his acolytes speak the language of Himmler and

Goebbels , and such warnings are ignored at great peril. The recent missile test by Iran of

the Sejil-2 surface to surface missile with a range of 1,200 miles, capable of striking targets across Israel, the Middle East and

southern Europe, further underscores both the conventional and nuclear threat that Iranian aggression presents. There isno sign whatsoever that Tehran is backing down from its ambition ofdominating the region, or that the Obama administration's leisurely approach is reaping dividends. The

horrors of Buchenwald are an important reminder of the failure of the

appeasement polices of the 1930s , and the danger of failing to take

genocidal threats seriously. Millions were murdered in Europe at the handsof the Third Reich after the world declined to take early action against atyrant who later acted upon his menacing words. The president's visit to the camp as well as his





discussions with German Chancellor Angela Merkel must reinforce the message that evil must be confronted and defeated. When he

travels to Germany, President Obama has a major opportunity to declare that his administration will under no circumstances

accept a nuclear-armed Iran, a regime with clearly genocidal intentions. He should make it clear that Tehran will face a dramatic escalation of international economic and politicalsanctions, the complete isolation of the Iranian government, and possible militaryaction unless it immediately halts its nuclear programme. The president must also press forward with the deployment of a global

missile defence system, including installations in eastern and central Europe. Obama should urge his German counterpart,Chancellor Angela Merkel, to end her country's massive economic investment in Iran when the two leaders meet in Dresden.German money is shamefully playing a key role in sustaining a brutal, Holocaust-denying regime that oppresses its own people andposes the biggest state-based threat to global security of this generation. Through its investments in Iran, Germany is also helpingfinance the world's biggest sponsor of international terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah and Hamas. Germany remainsEurope's biggest exporter to Iran, with nearly 4 billion euros worth of exports in 2008, a third higher than its exports to Israel. Last year, German trade and investment with Tehran actually increased 10 percent to record levels, with several thousand Germancompanies still conducting business with the rogue state. Former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has been at the forefront oflobbying efforts to advance Iranian-German trade ties, as the honorary chairman of the German Near and Middle East Association

(NUMOV). This is a time for robust U.S. leadership in the face of a grave threat,

not the adoption of the European Union's failed policy of endless

negotiation . It is also a moment for Barack Obama to rethink his flawed strategy of reaching out to dictatorial regimes in

the name of "engagement", whether in the form of Iranian Islamist fundamentalists or North Korean Stalinists. The Obama

administration's foreign policy doctrine is fraught with risk. As Jimmy Carter discovered to his cost, a United States

that looks like a soft touch will swiftly lose the respect of its allies and be

outmaneuvered by its foes and rivals . Obama's application of "smart

power" is looking increasingly like the appeasement of America's enemies,and on the Iranian nuclear question his administration has projected

weakness and confusion. There are striking parallels between the world'sinitial failure to stand up to Nazi Germany over 70 years ago and the West's

inaction today in the face of Iranian aggression. Tehran's drive towards

nuclear might can and must be stopped , but only if the United States and

its key allies across the Atlantic are willing to do what is necessary.

More ev – Iran makes calculations based on America‘s dealings with otherstatesPhillips ‗9 [Melanie. IR at the Spectator. ―The Fruits of Appeasement‖ 5/27/9 http://www.spectator.co.uk/melaniephillips/3647756/the-fruits-of-appeasement.thtml]

The result of such epic cringing is two fingers from North Korea, with yet further

threats today. Iran in particular will now be watching intently to see whether

America will once again display weakness and impotence; if the US won‘t

even act to stop North Korea from going nuclear, Iran will be reinforced in

its belief that it can develop its own nuclear weapons with impunity . So far,

Obama has ‗rushed out a special statement‘ in which he said ‗I strongly condemn [North Korea‘s] reckless action‘ and promised to

‗redouble‘ America‘s efforts to stop Pyongyang from acquiring nuclear weapons. Well, that will have them quaking in their boots, forsure. Redoubling weakness simply results in twice as much weakness.

http://www.spectator.co.uk/melaniephillips/3647756/the-fruits-of-appeasement.thtml









Appeasement Bad: Latin American Stability

Appeasement wrecks Latin American stability and turns the case – hardlineapproaches solve the harms of the 1ACCarafono 10(James Jay Carafono, Senior research fellow for national security at the Heritage Foundation, The Heritage Foundation, September12 2010,Lesson from Jimmy Carter: Weakness invites aggression, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2010/09/lesson-from- jimmy-carter-weakness-invites-aggression,PS)"Detente," Ronald Reagan once quipped, "isn't that what a farmer has with his turkey -- until Thanksgiving Day?'¶ When Reagan

took over the White House he planned to make his foreign policy everything that Jimmy Carter's was not. Carter hadtried accommodating America's enemies. He cut back on defense. He madehumility the hallmark of American diplomacy.¶ Our foes responded withaggression: Iranian revolutionaries danced in the rubble of the U.S.Embassy; the Soviets sponsored armed insurgencies and invaded

Afghanistan.¶ Later in his presidency, Carter tried to look tough. He proposed amodest increase in defense spending; pulled the United States out of the Moscow Olympics; and slapped an embargo on wheat

exports to the Soviet Union. These actions hurt high jumpers and American farmers,

but didn't faze our enemies. It was too little, too late.¶ As Reagan entered his presidency, theU.S. economy and the American spirit were low. Still, he committed to a policy of "peace through strength." And, even before he puthis plan into action, our enemies began to worry.¶ Yuri Andropov, the chief of the KGB -- the Soviet's spy network -- feared thatReagan planned to attack. "Andropov," wrote Steven Hayward, in his "Age of Reagan"ordered the KGB to organize a specialsurveillance program in the United States -- code-named Operation RYAN -- to look for signs of preparations for an attack."¶

Reagan's assertive approach to foreign policy did not spark war. Itproduced peace. The Kremlin discovered Reagan was not the cowboy they feared. But they respectedthe more muscular United States. Russia agreed to the most effective armscontrol treaty in history.¶ The benefits spread. According to the Canadian-based Human Securityproject, deaths from political violence worldwide (even accounting for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq) have declined continually

since the end of the Cold War ... until recently.¶ Reagan's opponents never understood the importance of peace throughstrength. When the Gipper went to negotiate economic strategy with House Speaker Tip O'Neil, he was told Congress would cut $35 billion in domestic spending only if Reagan pared the same amount from the Pentagon budget.¶ Reagan refused. Defense was not theproblem, he told O'Neil. Defense was less than 30 percent of spending, down from nearly half the budget when John F. Kennedy had

been president. (Today, Pentagon spending is less than one-fifth of the budget.) Keeping America safe, free, and prosperous, heconcluded, doesn't start with making the nation unsafe.¶ Small wonder that people are saying the world looks like a rerun of theCarter years. The Obama Doctrine possesses many Carteresque attributes: a heavy reliance on treaties and international institutions;a more humble (and, often, apologetic) U.S. presence around the globe, and a diminishment of U.S. hard power.¶ And the

Obama Doctrine has reaped pretty much the same results. When asked if hefeared a U.S. military strike against his country's nuclear program, theIranian president scoffed at the notion.¶ Meanwhile, after yielding to Russiancomplaints and canceling plans to build missile defenses against an Iranianattack, Obama signed an arms control treaty which, the Kremlin boasts, will furtherlimit our missile defense. Yet Moscow still complains that the more limited system the Obama administration

wants to field is too much. Once again, American concessions have only encouragedMoscow to be more aggressive.¶ Even in Iraq and Afghanistan, the White House's commitments are laced with qualifiers that encourage our nation's friends and enemies to doubt U.S. resolve.¶ Put simply, if President Obama continues to

pursue a Carteresque foreign policy -- talking softly while whittling away at the stick -- he willonly put American lives and the prospects of peace at greater jeopardy.





Appeasement Bad: Middle East

Lack of US credibility destabilizes the Middle EastKagan ‗11 Robert Kagan is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. JAN

24, 2011, VOL. 16, NO. 18 The Weekly Standard ―The Price of Power‖ http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?nopager=1

Today the international situation is also one of high risk. • The terrorists who would liketo kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American militaryactions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason whyfor almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, weincrease the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades preventedthe outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era ofgrowth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from arising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military‘s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world‘s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires

ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democraticnations in the region, worried that the United States may be losinginfluence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. securityguarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance

because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between acceptingChinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by buildingnuclear weapons. • In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nucleararsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships

in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow everyday as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the

streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapseinto anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist

course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with itthe possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too,

nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, andif they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have todecide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear

weapons to resist it. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed

to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. In the

present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which terrorismand great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and

interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless . Would we increase the risk of

strategic failure in an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so wecould tell American voters that their military had suffered its ―fair share‖ of the pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when oneconsiders the nature of the cuts that would have to be made to have even a marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many are underthe illusion, for instance, that if the United States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didn‘t intervene anywhere else fora while, this would have a significant impact on future deficits. But, in fact, projections of future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these interventions. Withdrawal from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal crisis. Nor canmeaningful reductions be achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagon— which Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun todo and which has also been factored into deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cutall the waste Gates can find, and even eliminated a few weapons programs—all this together would still not produce a 10 percentdecrease in overall defense spending. In fact, the only way to get significant savings from the defense budget—and by ―significant,‖ we are still talking about a tiny fraction of the cuts needed to bring down future deficits—is to cut force structure: fewer troops on theground; fewer airplanes in the skies; fewer ships in the water; fewer soldiers, pilots, and sailors to feed and clothe and provide benefits for. To cut the size of the force, however, requires reducing or eliminating the missions those forces have been performing.Of course, there are any number of think tank experts who insist U.S. forces can be cut by a quarter or third or even by half and stillperform those missions. But this is snake oil. Over the past two decades, the force has already been cut by a third. Yet noadministration has reduced the missions that the larger force structures of the past were designed to meet. To fulfi ll existing securitycommitments, to remain the ―world‘s power balancer of choice,‖ as Leslie Gelb puts it, to act as ―the only regional balancer againstChina in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East‖ requires at least the current force structure, and almost





certainly more than current force levels. Those who recommend doing the same with less are only proposing a policy of insufficiency, where the United States makes commitments it cannot meet except at high risk of failure. The only way to find substantial savings inthe defense budget, therefore, is to change American strategy fundamentally. The Simpson-Bowles commission suggests as much, bycalling for a reexamination of America‘s ―21st century role,‖ although it doesn‘t begin to define what that new role might be. Othershave. For decades ―realist‖ analysts have called for a strategy of ―offshore balancing.‖ Instead of the United States providing securityin East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations inthose regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militari lyuntil balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed ―passing the

mantle of regional stabilizer‖ to a consortium of ―Russia, China, Iran, and India.‖ In East Asia offshore balancing would mean lettingChina, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary,intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is importantto understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To theircredit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved inproviding security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in thoseregions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same

time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea ofrelying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly ―stabilize‖ the Middle East andPersian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition . Nor is U.S. withdrawalfrom East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula wouldincrease. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral stepsfor self-defense, which in Japan‘s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other

offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken

each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United Statesallowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open fordebate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century,

however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening withmillions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously , in the two mostdreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determinedon the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of

Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build ―situations of strength‖(Acheson‘s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a ―preponderance of power,‖ and to create an internationalsystem with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did

not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancingstrategy , and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the pastand would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was morelikely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and lessexpensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectiveson the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning thisstrategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman‘scontainment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States andexhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of ―imperial overstretch,‖ arguing that American decline was inevitable ―if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]‖ were allowed to continue

at the same time as ―massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.‖ Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though theindebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it isprecisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including thefinancial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order thatthe United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, andpromotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost ofits collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past sixdecades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted outof poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downsthroughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has beenmaintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been







Appeasement Bad: North Korea

Plan emboldens North KoreaGrey, 10-- CFO and co-founder of CapLinked, founder of Crestridge Investments and Third Wave Partners, and managingdirector of Emigrant Bank (Christopher, ―BLAME APPEASEMENT FOR NORTH KOREA'S ANTICS‖, WND Commentary, 11/29,

http://www.wnd.com/2010/11/234213/)//RGThe appeasement policy of the Obama administration, including his endlessapologies for America and his coddling of dictators such as Hugo Chavezand Ahmedinejad are the diplomatic equivalent of throwing red meat infront of North Korea‘s wild, carnivorous beast of a regime and daring themto eat it. They have not disappointed. Conventional wisdom is that this attack was caused by theinevitable turmoil resulting from the ongoing transfer of power from longstanding dictator Kim Jong-il to his young son, Kim Jong-un. Some have suggested the attack was intended to give the appearance inside heavily controlled North Korea that Kim Jong-un was responsible for a great military victory against the South. This may be true, but why do something so extreme and risk creating a

real war, as well as angering their benefactors in China, just for internal public relations reasons? People say theNorth Koreans are crazy and their behavior can‘t be explained with reason,

but I think their behavior shows a rational mind at work. They have calculatedthat the current American administration is so weak, so willing tosurrender and appease an aggressor, that they really don‘t have anysignificant risk of paying the price for this attack. The North Koreans may have miscalculatedthough. South Korea was shaken to its core by what happened. Up until this attack, the South Koreans have been moving away froma close alliance with America‘s military. They have been pushing for U.S. troops to leave. They have been objecting to the economicand political costs of a perceived military and diplomatic dependency on America. They generally have been conciliatory with NorthKorea and have bent over backwards to avoid confrontation and hostility. They have supported the Chinese approach to engagingNorth Korea, which basically involves treating them as equals. Even after the incident earlier this year in which North Korea sank a

South Korean ship, killing 46 sailors, the South exercised restraint. ¶ This time is different. South Korea‘s peopleand government are enraged by this attack. The rhetoric coming fromSouth Korea towards the North is now the most hostile that it has beensince the two countries were at war nearly 60 years ago. For South Korea,this attack seems to feel[s] like Pearl Harbor. Their national identity has been violated. Any kinship they

have felt with the North seems to be gone. High level government officials in the South arecalling for military retaliation and not ruling out the possibility of war withthe North. Suddenly, South Korea is begging to get closer to America‘s military. They requested one of our carrier groups be

sent immediately to conduct war games with them. Of course, we have accommodated them. We have no choice but to help them notonly by treaty but also because we cannot afford to turn our back on an ally. If we don‘t support our allies, especially those allies ofover 60 years, we won‘t have any allies in the world. China is in a similar mess. They cannot back down from their support of NorthKorea even as this situation is exactly what they don‘t want for both diplomatic and economic reasons. There is no upside for theChinese to get dragged into a war on the Korean Peninsula. They want to keep North Korea, which is basically their violent stepchild,in a controlled box. Unfortunately, North Korea is making it clear that they want more. They want to flex their muscles. That‘s whatthis attack was really trying to demonstrate. North Korea wanted to show that they could blatantly attack the South at will, killcivilians, and get away with it because both the South Koreans and the Americans don‘t have the guts to do anything about it.

North Korea further has threatened to use nuclear weapons both on SouthKorea and even on the United States, Japan or any country supportingSouth Korea if war does occur. They have moved surface to surface missiles

into position. This provocation cannot be taken lightly. We know that NorthKorea has nuclear warheads as well as the necessary long range surface tosurface missiles on which to send them. They probably don‘t have the technology to reach themainland of the United States, but they could possibly reach Hawaii. Defense analysts have feared something like this for years. Ofcourse, any such attack logically would be suicide. The United States easily could annihilate the entire country of North Korea. In all

likelihood, these are empty threats. However, the risk of a severe and disastrousmiscalculation by the North Koreans grows with every sign of weakness bythe United States.¶ During the Cuban missile crisis decades ago, the only

way we prevailed was by convincing the Soviets that we would annihilate

http://www.caplinked.com/

http://www.caplinked.com/





them if they attacked us. We and our allies need similar resolve, rather thanhalf measures and conciliation, right now. North Korea is a bully. They viewany attempts to help them as weak. They view negotiation and diplomacy as

weak. They view civilized behavior as weak. The only thing they understandis strength. They need to believe that we will destroy them if they do not

stop their aggression.The Chinese can help deliver this message to the North Koreans, but first the Chinese have to

believe it themselves. The Chinese have been pushing us around economically for years. They violate trade and currency agreementsat will. Every time we raise an objection to their human rights abuses or aggressive behavior towards Taiwan, Tibet, or Japan, they

tell us shut up and stay out of their affairs. We have a credibility problem with them as well. To be fair to theObama administration, this appeasement of North Korea has been going onfor decades. No administration has been willing to step up and get rid of this rogue state that is a danger to the entire

world. The difference now is that we have circumstances inside North Korea that are more volatile than they have been in decades combined and an Americanadministration that is perceived as the weakest on national security sinceJimmy Carter. This is an extremely dangerous mixture. Hopefully Obama and his team can,like John Kennedy and his team did during the Cuban crisis, rise to theoccasion and get the North Koreans to back down. War can be prevented,

but the possibility of war is real. This situation could spin out of control and lead to a catastrophe if it is nothandled properly. Let‘s hope that this administration is up to daunting job at hand. Potentially millions of lives depend on it.

North Korean aggression risks extinctionHayes and Green ‗10 *Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND ** Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act

Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, ―The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,‖http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)

The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing

humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asiaare instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear usearguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projectionagainst the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea‘s nuclear weapons programme,the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted SixParty Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China‘s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (―nuclear umbrella‖) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection.

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed bythe North Korea developments, and related political and economicissues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole internationalcommunity. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether byintention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumptionof Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The

whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and

Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust ofunprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even alimited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effectsof even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys

warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicatethat the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in globaltemperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg‘s view: That is not global winter, but thenuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at anytime during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average.

A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will causemuch greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continuefor many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make

matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere wouldcause a huge reduction in the Earth‘s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only





consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem anddownwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruinleft by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and thefollow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and foodinsecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by

comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in

response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be manyunanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, withsubsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, includingpossible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos ofnuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving otherpotential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priorityconsideration from the international community.





Ext. North Korea IL

Appeasement emboldens North KoreaPhillips ‗9 [Melanie. IR at the Spectator. ―The Fruits of Appeasement‖ 5/27/9 http://www.spectator.co.uk/melaniephillips/3647756/the-fruits-

of-appeasement.thtml] So now we can see once again the fruits of appeasement. North Korea hastested a second set of nuclear bombs and the west throws up its hands inhorror. What did it expect? Once the Bush administration cravenly decidedto give up on North Korea (following the similarly short-sighted approach taken by Bill Clinton), KimJong-il duly took the opportunity to press full steam ahead with his nuclearprogramme. Now the same ‗new realists‘ who came to power at the tail-end of the Bush presidency and decided to ‗live

with‘ a North Korean bomb – just as they have apparently decided the US could ‗live with‘ an Iranian bomb – are serving in the

Obama administration, which of course has taken such imbecility to unprecedented depths. Obama has beenabasing himself to every despot on the planet, proclaiming America‘s

weakness through his ‗hand of friendship‘ and infantile belief that talking totyrants is the route to peace.










-- North Korean Weapons IL

Specifically, appeasement facilitates weapons sales to North KoreaCordero 13(Yoani María Sánchez Cordero, Cuban blogger who has achieved international fame and multiple international awards for her

critical portrayal of life in Cuba under its current government, "Cuban Missiles to North Korea: Did Raul Castro Want to GetCaught?" 7/24/ 13 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yoani-sanchez/cuban-missiles-to-north-k_b_3642709.html, RLA)

Evidently the relations between old ideological allies are still placed abovepragmatic diplomatic strategies. Old comrades are still prioritized, although to the eyes of the world they areseen as a family dynasty, a recalcitrant violator of the human rights of their citizens, constantly threatening the rest of the planet

with nuclear conflict. The fellow travelers support each other, so they have to violate the same UN resolutions to achieve it.¶ Nowthat the boxes of missiles are discovered -- the MIG-21 airplanes and the rocket batteries -- it remains

to be known how Raul Castro will get out of such a delicate situation. An apology would not be enough, because the government would still have to comply with some diplomaticsanction resulting from its actions. Acting the fool and reaffirming their "sovereign right" to send arms to be "repaired" in North Korea, will further isolate the island's authorities at a time when economic support from abroad is urgently

needed.¶ The insolence will also conspire against a possible loosening of theEuropean Common Position, and against the easing of the Americanembargo. To reply with a barrage of government attacks against the president of Panama won't accomplish much, becausethis problem involves other nations who don't appear willing to forget so easily.¶ So, then, how does the Castro regime turn the page,

minimize what happened, and present the world with a real posture of mea culpa and peaceful engagement? The onlysolution that remains is to announce political change, the opening so oftendemanded by its citizens and by international agencies and governments.

That causes extinctionMaloof 7-21(F. Michael Maloof, a former senior security policy analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‖U.S. FACES BRAND-NEWCUBAN MISSILE CRISIS‖ 7/21/13 http://www.wnd.com/2013/07/u-s-faces-brand-new-cuban-missile-crisis/, RLA)The SA-2 and its radar is ―still in use in a lot of countries,‖ said James Hardy, Asia-Pacific editor of IHS Jane‘s Defense Weekly, ―andprogressive upgrades to the radars and the missiles means it is not completely useless.‖¶ Because the Soviet radar system remains inuse, the U.S. and other countries have come up with the ability to jam its radar. However, the radar has been modified over the years

to undertake ―counter-counter-electronic measures (that) have been fitted to later, post-Soviet models of this radar,‖ Hardy said.¶In looking at the potential military relationship between Pyongyang andHavana, other national security sources say that Cuba could be used as apotential base from which the North Koreans could move a freighter alongthe U.S. East coast to launch the missile to explode a small, high-altitudenuclear device above the highly populated region stretching from New York to Richmond, Va.¶ ―The SA -2 is asurface-to-air anti-aircraft missile that could be used for an EMP attack, if armed with a nuclear warhead and launched from a shipnear the U.S. Coast,‖ according to Peter Vincent Pry, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst who was staff director of acongressionally mandated commission to look at the impact of an EMP event on the Nation‘s critical infrastructures.¶ Pry today isexecutive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security.¶ In an exclusive interview with WND, Pry pointed out thatthe ceiling of the SA-2 is up to 35 kilometers, which goes beyond the minimum optimal height for an EMP burst.¶ Pry said the SA-2could achieve this ceiling with an ―HE (high explosive) warhead weighing, depending on warhead type, 200-295 kilograms, or 440-650 pounds.‖¶ ―The U.S. Cold War-era W-84 neutron warhead weighed less than 50 kilograms and could be used as an enhancedEMP weapon,‖ Pry said. ―So, armed with a much lighter warhead for EMP attack, any of the SAM (surface-to-air missiles) variants would have a much higher operational ceiling. Indeed, the Soviets designed the SA-2 to carry a 15 kiloton nuclear warhead (weighing

650 pounds) to high altitude.‖¶ If the SA-2 were to be used in an EMP attack on the U.S., Pry said that it ―would belaunched from a freighter against a big coastal city, like New York or Washington, which

would probably collapse the entire Eastern grid that provides 70 percent ofthe nation‘s electricity.‖¶ The Nation‘s missile defense system, Pry said, would not be able to intercept the SA -2 if it were launched from a ship, since the flight time to altitude is so short. The SA-2 travels at a speed of Mach 3.5, or three times thespeed of sound.¶ In a May 31, 2013, Pry joined former CIA Director R. James Woolsey in writing an article for The Wall Street

Journal outlining how North Korea could cripple the U.S. with an EMP attack.¶ In the article, they said that North

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yoani-sanchez/cuban-missiles-to-north-k_b_3642709.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yoani-sanchez/cuban-missiles-to-north-k_b_3642709.html





Korea needs only a single nuclear warhead ―in order to pose an existential

threat to the U.S. … Detonating a nuclear weapon high above any part of theU.S. mainland would generate a catastrophic electromagnetic pulse.‖ ¶ ―AnEMP attack,‖ they said, ― would collapse the electric grid and other infrastructurethat depends on it – communications, transportation, banking and finance,

food and water – necessary to sustain modern civilization and the lives of300 million Americans.‖¶ They pointed out that EMP effects could be even ―more powerful and

more catastrophic by using an Enhanced Radiation Warhead,‖ they wrote. ―This is alow-yield nuclear weapon designed not to create a devastating explosion, but toemit large amounts of radiation including the gamma rays that generate theEMP effect that fries electronics.‖¶ Following a nuclear test last December and a successful missile testearlier this year, North Korea began making public threats to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the U.S.¶ To underscorethis threat, Pyongyang issued highly publicized videos showing a nuclear detonation over New York City and Washington, D.C.¶ ASeptember 2007 study by The Sage Policy Group estimated that the financial cost of an EMP event just from Baltimore, Md., Washington, D.C., to Richmond, VA, would approach $800 billion. In today‘s dollars, the cost could surpass a trillion dollars.¶―Various government reports, such as the one by the U.S. Congressional EMP Commission and the Congressional Research Service,

have confirmed the growing likelihood of EMP events of various kinds,‖ thereport said.¶ ―These reports and related Congressional testimony support the contention that relatively available and inexpensiveSCUD type missiles are capable of carrying the required payload that could be launched from a small ship 200 or more miles off the

East Coast of the United States and detonated between 30 and 80 miles high,‖ the report said.¶ ― Any EMP-inflicteddamage delivered from this altitude would extend out hundreds of miles

beyond the region considered in this study , significantly complicating the recovery process and therestoration of economic activity while producing economic consequences roughly 10 times greater than those impacting theBaltimore-Washington-Richmond region,‖ the study said at the time.

North Korea would proliferate wmds in Latin AmericaGertz 13(Bill Gertz, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnistfor 27 years at the Washington Times. B"Military Cooperation Between Cuba, North Korea Revealed" July 16, 2013http://freebeacon.com/military-cooperation-between-cuba-north-korea-revealed/, RLA)

Richard Fisher, a military affairs specialist, said the seizure of the shipment should be a major

concern for the United States.¶ ―North Korea, a country soon to be in a position to export

nuclear warhead armed ballistic missiles, now has a missile relationship with Cuba,‖ said Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center.¶ ―So in Latin America there is the prospect that North Korea, already a major missile technology partner for

Iran, may become a competitor or partner for Iran in aiding the proliferation of missileand potentially nuclear weapons technology among the leftist, anti-

American grouping of Latin state for which Cuba is a major leader,‖ he said.

Proliferation causes extinctionPoblete 13(Jason Poblete¶ Attorney, Federal Government Law & Strategy, Policy Analyst , ―Proliferation of Nuclear

Technology in Latin America Continues‖ February 26, 2008 http://jasonpoblete.com/2008/02/26/proliferation-of-nuclear-technology-in-latin-america-continues/, RLA)

As clearly demonstrated by the cases of North Korea, Pakistan, and India, the U.S. cannot always take at

face value the many promises made by developing countries that civilian nuclear programsare being used solely for civilian purposes. A nuclear weaponized country inLatin America is clearly not in the U.S. interest, just think of the CubanMissile Crisis minus the Soviets, except this time the weapons would be there tostay. Recently, even Venezuela‘s Hugo Chavez has hinted that Venezuela may begin to pursue a civilian nuclear program of itsown.

http://freebeacon.com/military-cooperation-between-cuba-north-korea-revealed/

http://jasonpoblete.com/2008/02/26/proliferation-of-nuclear-technology-in-latin-america-continues/





http://freebeacon.com/military-cooperation-between-cuba-north-korea-revealed/





Appeasement Bad: Syria

Appeasement toward Latin America emboldens SyriaCarone ‗13 Mauricio Claver-Carone is a director of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC. He is an attorney, served as an attorney-advisor with the U.S.

Treasury Department, and was a member of the law faculty at the Catholic University of America and George WashingtonUniversity. (Mauricio Claver, ―Cuba sees an opening‖, American Enterprise Institute, 4/2,http://www.american.com/archive/2013/april/cuba-should-remain-designated-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism)//RS It would be an insult to the American people if Cuba were to be removedfrom the list of state sponsors of terrorism based solely on assurances ofchange by a dictatorship that brutally represses its population, defies therule of law, routinely foments anti-Americanism around the world withprovocative anti-democratic rhetoric, and is holding in its prisons an

American aid worker, Alan P. Gross. Arrested in December 2009, Gross‘s ―crime‖ was helping members

of Cuba‘s Jewish community connect to the Internet.¶ The last time the United States relied on adictator‘s ―assurances‖ to justify removing a country from the sponsors list

was in 2008, when President George W. Bush accepted the assurances of the Kim family

that North Korea would not provide support for or engage in internationalterrorism. That obviously has not worked out well.¶ The Castro brothers‘lack of credibility alone is legally sufficient to prohibit changing Cuba'sdesignation. Cuba should also be disqualified because it continues to promoteand support international terrorism. The State Department‘s 2011 Country Reports on Terrorism lays outa three-point rationale for Cuba‘s designation as a sponsor of terrorism:¶ First, ―current and former members of Basque Fatherlandand Liberty (ETA) continue to reside in Cuba … Press reporting indicated that the Cuban government provided medical care andpolitical assistance to the FARC. There was no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary training foreither ETA or the FARC.‖¶ The United States designates ETA and the FARC as foreign terrorist organizations and Cuba continues toprovide support for both groups. The favorite new argument of those seeking Cuba‘s removal from the list is to note that peacenegotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC are taking place in Havana. But the United States would need torescind its designation of ETA and the FARC as foreign terrorist organizations before it could remove Cuba from the terrorismsponsor list. More importantly, there is no peace agreement or peace in Colombia and ETA continues to threaten Spain.¶ Testifyingon Colombia before the House Armed Services Committee, General John F. Kelly, head of the U.S. Southern Command, providedsome perspective:¶ Terrorist groups represent a persistent challenge that has plagued the region for decades. The FARC is theregion‘s oldest, largest, most capable, and best equipped insurgency. The government of Colombia is currently in peace negotiations with the FARC, but the fight is far from over and a successful peace accord is not guaranteed. Although weakened, the FARCcontinues to confront the Colombian state by employing improvised explosive devices and attacking energy infrastructure and oilpipelines.¶ Second, the State Department country report says that ―the Cuban government continued to permit fugitives wanted inthe United States to reside in Cuba and also provided support such as housing, food ration books, and medical care for theseindividuals.‖¶ That has not changed either. The FBI estimates that Cuba has provided safe harbor to more than 70 fugitives from U.S. justice who live on the island under the protection of the Castro regime. Some of these fugitives are charged with or have beenconvicted of murder, kidnapping, and hijacking, and they include notorious killers of police officers in New Jersey and New Mexico.¶

Warranting special mention are the outstanding U.S. indictments against Cuban Air Force pilots Lorenzo Alberto Pérez-Pérez andFrancisco Pérez-Pérez and General Rubén Martínez Puente, the head of the Cuban Air Force, who in 1996 ordered the pilots to shootdown two civilian American aircraft over international waters in the Florida Straits. That act of terrorism killed four men, three ofthem American citizens.¶ Third, the State Department report says that the Financial Action Task Force has identified Cuba as having

deficiencies in combatting money laundering and terrorism financing. In February, the Castro regime made ―ahigh-level political commitment‖ to work with the FATF to address moneylaundering and the flow of money through Cuba to terrorists. There has

been no discernible effort since to criminalize money laundering or toestablish procedures to identify and freeze the assets of terrorists.¶ The StateDepartment‘s previous rationale for continuing to list Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism stands and now new justifications can beadded:¶ Terrorism is defined in U.S. law as ―the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate orcoerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.‖ The arrest andarbitrary imprisonment of Alan P. Gross for actions internationally protected under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory, is an act of terrorism. Moreover, the Castro regime has now made it clear that Gross will be held hostage until the United States releases five Cuban spies convicted in U.S. federal courts.¶ In addition, thousands ofCuban soldiers and intelligence officials are stationed in Venezuela. Cuba‘s presence and control over the highest levels of Venezuela‘s military, police, and intelligence services not only threatens to subvert democracy in that nation, but it allows those Venezuelan authorities to be Cuba‘s proxies in trafficking drugs and weapons, and in providing support to such extremist

http://www.american.com/archive/2013/april/cuba-should-remain-designated-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism

http://www.american.com/archive/2013/april/cuba-should-remain-designated-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism





organizations as Hezbollah and Iran‘s al-Quds.¶ Cuba‘s close political ties with other state

sponsors of terrorism – particularly Iran and Syria – and its history of

sharing intelligence with rogue regimes are of serious concern and,according to former U.S. intelligence officials, pose a risk to U.S.counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Further instability destabilizes the entire Middle EastBaroud ‗11 [R. Internationally-Renowned Syndicated Columnist. ―High Stakes for US in Syira‖ 4/26/11 Gulf News, ln//GBS-JV]

Although now largely governed by a military leadership, Egypt, the most populous and influential country in the Arab world,

has, for now, escaped the US sphere of influence. It is also showing clear signs that it may fall intoa foreboding trajectory involving Iran, Syria and other such ‗radicals'. This

scenario has made the current turmoil in Syria highly significant for the US. The protests that gripped Syria,

starting January 26, presented the US with an inconvenient challenge — and also a potentially golden

opportunity. The abruptness of Arab revolutions has pushed Washington intoexercising a truly unprecedented level of two-facedness. From a US foreign policyperspective, what was good for Tunisia was not deemed good for Egypt. Then, what was good for both countries was not applicable

to Yemen. Finally, when it was time for Libya's Muammar Gaddafi and Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh to go, the departure ofother close US allies remained out of the question. Events in Syria have further complicated an already confusing scene. The US hadpreviously spared no efforts to undermine Syria's internal security and regional position. On April 18, the Washington Post disclosed

the WikiLeaks cables detailing US funding of a London-based Syrian opposition umbrella group. US pressure onSyria had never actually ceased, despite the latter's withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005. "The Syria Accountability and Liberation Act" — an early version of which was ratified by former President George W. Bush in 2003 — is still being fervently pushed in US Congress, mostly by ardent pro-Israeli members. The purpose of the act, as introduced to the 111thCongress (2009-10) is "to strengthen sanctions against the Government of Syria … [and] to establish a programme to support atransition to a democratically-elected government in Syria". Overt and clandestine efforts point to a US intention to undercut theregime in Damascus. These efforts are older than the US invasion of Iraq, as detailed by Richard Perle in a policy paper prepared forIsrael's Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996. The paper recommended that "it is both natural and moral that Israel abandon the slogan‗comprehensive peace' and move to contain Syria, drawing attention to its weapons of mass destruction programme, and rejecting‗land for peace' deals on the Golan Heights". The neo-conservatives have been on hiatus since their Israel-centric recommendations

greatly undermined the political, military and economic status of the US. But now the Arab popularawakening is enlivening all sorts of sinister possibilities. A stalemate in Libya presented

an opening for the US and its allies. Syria could be an opportunity, although the stakes here are much higher. US policyregarding Syria has been largely defined by soft coercion, aimed at erodingSyria's strong alliance with Iran, its support of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its hosting of various Palestinian

resistance groups, including Hamas. But a complete regime change has not necessarily been a top US priority. Chaos in Syria, without a clear and stabilising alternative force, couldsignificantly complicate the US mission in Iraq . The shared border betweenSyria and Iraq has been a somewhat contentious issue between Syria andthe US, although the US has also seemed increasingly satisfied with Damascus' monitoring of the long-drawn-out border.However, several lethal messages were sent to Syria — from both the US and Israel — to remind the government of who was really incontrol. The loudest of these reminders was the so-called Operation Orchard, an Israeli air strike on Syrian territories on September6, 2007. Defending the Israeli action, the US claimed the bombed site was a nuclear facility, an allegation that remains unconfirmed by independent sources. Another strike against Syria was launched late October 2008, this time by the US. The strike reportedly

killed civilians. Its purpose, as emphasised by a US official, and quoted by The Times on October 29, 2008: " You have toclean up the global threat that is in your backyard". Damascus did very little by way of

responding. However, the unrest in Syria, which seems to be largely independent of US and Israeli influence, hascaught Washington by surprise. The US wants to see a weaker Syria, but theprospect of a post-Al Assad regime that is not assembled in Washingtoncould pose a greater challenge to US-Israeli policies. Consequently, the US position regarding the turmoil inSyria is unclear. US officials seem to be expending more energy chastising Iran for alleged involvement in quelling Syria's proteststhan in showing clear support for the protesters. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that her country was "watching veryclosely what Iran is doing in the region," according to Voice of America online (April 21). "We hear Iran praising the uprisings in theMiddle East and North Africa, except it doesn't praise what happens inside Iran, and it doesn't praise what is happening in Syria."





Taking on Iran might not suffice as a long-term distraction from having to answer urgent questions regarding the US' own positionaround Syria. After much reluctance, the US was forced to concede on Egypt, comforted perhaps by subtle assurances that the Camp

David agreement with Israel would be honoured. But there are no guarantees regarding futurescenarios in Syria. What started as a genuine call for reforms and change inSyria could become much more complicated, leading to nightmarishscenarios and protracted conflict.

Only existential threatOren ‗9 [Mike. Prof Foreign Policy/Service @ G-Town. ―Seven Existential Threats‖ Commentary , May 09 www.commentarymagazine.com May 09 //GBS-JV]

Rarely in modern history have nations faced genuine existential threats. Wars are waged to change regimes, alter borders, acquire resources, and impose ideologies, but almost neverto eliminate another state and its people. This was certainly the case during

World War II, in which the Allies sought to achieve the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan and to oust theirodious leaders, but never to destroy the German and Japanese states or to annihilate their populations. In the infrequent cases in

which modern states were threatened with their survival, the experience proved to be

traumatic in the extreme. Military coups, popular uprisings, and civil strife are

typical by-products of a state‘s encounter with even a single existentialthreat. The State of Israel copes not only with one but with at least seven existentialthreats on a daily basis. These threats are extraordinary not only for their number but also for their diversity. In

addition to external military dangers from hostile regimes and organizations, the Jewish State is endangered by domestic opposition, demographic trends, and the erosion of core values. Indeed, it is difficult if not impossible to find an example of another state inthe modern epic that has faced such a multiplicity and variety of concurrentexistential threats.

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Ext. Syria

Appeasement and a lack of punishment enforced on other countries such asSyria emboldens them to pursue their ambitionsSilverberg ‗12 Mark Silverberg is a former member of the Canadian Justice Department, a past Director of the Canadian Jewish Congress (WesternOffice) based in Vancouver, and served as a Consultant to the Secretary General of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem during the firstPalestinian intifada. (Mark, ―Power and the Perception of Weakness‖, Mark Silverberg.com, Decemberhttp://www.marksilverberg.com/article/ForeignPolicy/Appeasement/157/)//RS Israel should not have been surprised when, in return for its withdrawalsfrom southern Lebanon (2000) and Gaza (2005), it saw a dramatic increase in thenumber of Palestinian suicide bombings and missile attacks on its civilianpopulation. Nor, for that matter, should President Obama have beensurprised when his many overtures to our enemies (especially thoseenunciated in his Cairo speech that sought reconciliation with the Muslim

world) fell on deaf ears. The reality is that our enemies are not prepared to"negotiate" until after they have achieved their objectives at which point

they need only dictate terms rather than negotiate them.¶ Understandingthis mindset explains...¶ · why Hamas and Hezbollah are not prepared to compromise or negotiate any settlement with Israel short of its destruction;¶ · why Ahmedinejad, despite numerous U.S. attempts at accommodation, continues to feel securein threatening the Sunni regimes of the region, continues Iran‘s quest for nuclear weapons despite global censure and sanctions,openly assists those killing Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, funds terrorist organizations throughout the Middle East, preventedthe pro-American faction that won the elections in Iraq from forming a government; had no qualms in stating before the UN hisintention to wipe Israel off the face of the earth, and felt confident in repressing thousands of his own people who rallied in thestreets of Tehran against his fraudulent election;¶ · why Hamas maintains in its charter that its war against the Jews will continueuntil they are returned to d‘himmitude (official second-class subject status) in the new Arab state of Palestine that will replace it;¶ · why Hezbollah, in defiance of UN Resolutions, is now stronger and better armed in southern Lebanon than they were prior to the

2006 Second Lebanon War;¶ · why Syria continues to subvert Lebanese democracy,murders its political and religious leaders, arms Hezbollah, facilitates thetransfer of terrorists across its borders, provides offices for them inDamascus, has banned all IAEA access to the destroyed al-Kibar reactor

since 2008, and has strengthened its military ties with Iran (to which theU.S. has responded by rewarding Syrian aggression with the appointmentof the first American ambassador in five years);¶ · why Hamas and Hezbollah, without fear ofconsequences, continue to commit war crimes by firing missiles into Israeli towns and cities, use civilians, schools, ambulances andmosques as shields and are convinced that Israel and the Western powers lack the resolve to stop them;¶ · why Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,Turkey, Qatar, Gaza, Oman, Yemen and Afghanistan are now seeking more extensive diplomatic relations with Tehran;¶ · why PAPresident Mahmoud Abbas has successfully convinced many South American countries to recognize a Palestinian state despiteIsraeli and U.S. objections;¶ · why most of the European nations are upgrading the diplomatic status of PA offices in their capitalsdespite U.S. and Israeli opposition;¶ · why Mahmoud Abbas feels free to resist any negotiations with Israel yet continues to demand(on the one hand) that both east Jerusalem and the West Bank be Judenrein (Jew-free) but that seven million Palestinians musthave an absolute right to return to Israel (on the other); and¶ · why Fatah, the power behind the PA, feels free to name streets,marketplaces and tournaments after Palestinian suicide bombers, continues to violate the provisions of the Oslo Accords and theRoadmap by not curbing anti-Israeli/anti-Semitic hatred and incitement in its media and educational system, sponsors the globalBDS Movement, publishes a‗Travel Palestine‘ advertisement in a recent issue of National Geographic magazine which appears to blotout the existence of the State of Israel, and holds a Congress in Bethlehem that openly proclaims its intention to pursue "resistance"(terrorism) as a strategy until Israel has been vanquished (while the U.S. and EU continue to pour billions of dollars and Euros intoPA and Hamas coffers in the name of "humanitarian aid", and the U.S. State Department announced its intention to upgrade thePalestinian Authority/PLO Mission in the United States from a "bureau" to that of a "general delegation" allowing it to fly the PLOflag at its entrance).¶

http://www.marksilverberg.com/article/ForeignPolicy/Appeasement/157/)/RS







Impact Filter

Lack of credibility is a controlling impact – it makes every conflict morelikely and much worse – a strong signal of credibility can de-escalate anyglobal hotspotTang ‗5 Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy ofSocial Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, ―Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,‖ Security Studies, Vol.14, No. 1, p. 34-62

Second, the cult adds still another ingredient for escalation: it exacerbateshostilities between two adversaries in a conflict and makes them less willingto compromise, thus prolonging the rivalry . Indeed, the fear of losing reputationhas been a major factor behind states' reluctance to end conflicts.50 Israel'sunwillingness to stop its bleeding in southern Lebanon sooner, like the earlier US. reluctance to cut its losses in Vietnam, was inlarge part due to its fear of losing "the deterrent image," prestige, reputation, and credibility.51 The same holds true for the SovietUnion's reluctance to pull out of Afghanistan's mountains and Vietnam's reluctance to get out of Cambodia's jungle.52¶

Furthermore, prolonging a crisis or rivalry can cause a state to believe that it hasalready invested too much reputation to back down. When a second crisis

erupts between two previous foes, both sides will be even less willing to compromise, whatever the outcome of the previous conflict might have been. If the previous conflict ended in a draw, both sides now have evenmore reason to avoid losing. If the previous round ended in one side's defeat, the antagonism may become even more severe: theside that won is unwilling to lose its supposedly hard-won reputation, while the side that lost may stand firm in an attempt to regain

its "lost" reputation. Each additional round makes both sides feel that they havemore and more reputation at stake in the confrontation, so they are even more reluctant to compromise.Hence, the "lock-in effect" is far more serious in rivalries than in random conflicts.53¶ The arrival of the second conflict also makes

both sides believe that the conflict between them is unresolvable and will remain so

for the foreseeable future. This will lead both sides to fear that the other side will deemany slight concession as a sign of weakness, and the fear induces states to

believe that even the tiniest compromise at the least significant place mighthave far-reaching consequences.54 The result is a "paradox of credibility": "in order to buttress itscredibility, a nation should intervene in the least significant, the least compelling, and the least rewarding cases, and its reaction

should be disproportionate to the immediate provocation or the particular interest at stake."55





Turn Shield

Appeasement fails – only security-focused policies solve Walser ‗12 [Ray. IR at Heritage Foundation. ―Iran: A Strategy for the Threat Closer to Home‖ 9/18/12

http://blog.heritage.org/2012/09/18/iran-a-strategy-for-the-threat-closer-to-home/]The House of Representatives will soon take floor action on a piece of legislation know as the Countering Iran in the WesternHemisphere Act, aimed at protecting American citizens from Iran and defending American interests and assets in the WesternHemisphere. Introduced last March, the legislation requires the Secretary of State to assess, report on, and develop a strategy for

countering the presence of Iran and its allies such as Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere. Such a requirement is

timely .¶ Debate and likely passage comes at an opportune moment: when the Obama

Administration inclines to minimize threats closer to home posed by Iran,

Hezbollah, and anti-Americans like Venezuela‘s Hugo Chavez.¶ Yet, the facts on the ground

remain troublesome . Just this month, Brazilian journal Veja and others reported on a police seizure in La Paz,

Bolivia, of two tons of minerals believed initially to contain uranium but more likely tantalum. The mineral is in demand for, amongother things, nuclear reactors and missile parts. Export of this mineral to Iran is prohibited by current sanction regimes. It is believed that the plan was to send secretly the mineral cargo to Iran via Venezuela.¶ In Mexico, Rafic Mohammad Labbon Allaboun was arrested earlier this month and extradited to the U.S. He is believed to have engaged in money laundering for Hezbollah and was carrying false documents obtained in Belize. Also, reports of a Hezbollah training camp in remote northern Nicaragua have

surfaced and invite investigation.¶ Critical U.S. security thinking is required to probe

increasing linkages between anti-American states like Venezuela and Bolivia,transnational criminal organizations, foreign terrorist organizations, andstate sponsors of terrorism like Iran. This troublesome combination, as Douglas Farah reports, is

increasingly becoming a ―tier 1‖ national security priority.¶ In short, acting systematically with a modest investment

to counter Iran in the Western Hemisphere makes imminent security

sense .

Appeasement fails – examples of success misunderstand the theory

Dueck 06(Colin Dueck, associate professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, Orbis, Volume50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223–241, Strategies for Managing Rogue States,http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0030438706000056#,PS) The strategy of appeasement, while seemingly discredited after 1938, has recently attracted surprising and favorable attention fromscholars of international relations.2 Part of the problem surrounding the term has been a failure to agree on its meaning. Properly

speaking, appeasement is not synonymous with diplomatic negotiations or

diplomatic concessions, but refers only to those cases where one country

attempts to alter or satiate the aggressive intentions of another through

unilateral political, economic, and/or military concessions .3¶ It is sometimes argued

that appeasement can work under certain circumstances, and that Neville Chamberlain's performance at Munich in 1938 was simply

a case of appeasement badly handled.4 The drawbacks of appeasement, however, are inherent.

They lie in the fact that concrete concessions are made by one side only, while the other side is trusted to shift its intentions from hostile to benign.

With this strategy, there is nothing to stop the appeased state from pocketing itsgains and moving on to the next aggression.5 Britain's rapprochement withthe United States in the 1890s is often described as a successful case ofappeasement.6 Skillful British diplomacy indeed played a part in significantly improving relations between the two over

the course of that decade, but that case does not deserve the term. The United States was notparticularly hostile to Great Britain in the first place, and no vital conflicts





of interest existed between the two powers. The Anglo-Americanrapprochement was more the result than the cause of that commonality of

interests.7 In sum, appeasement—strictly defined— is a strategy best avoided . Realistic

bargaining or negotiations involving mutual compromise and presumably fixed intentions is another matter entirely, however, andshould not be confused with appeasement.





AT//Appeasement Good – General

The offense goes our direction – in the context of rogue nationsappeasement can only be counterproductive - prefer empirical examplesHenriksen ‗99 (Thomas H. Henriksen, U.S. foreign policy, international political and defense affairs, rogue states, and insurgencies, ―Using Powerand Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States‖ February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159 )

Rogue regimes, by their very nature, are less persuaded by appeals to the fine points of

international law and customary diplomatic practices than by armed force.Coercive diplomacy is initiated after, or in response to, a hostile action, whereas

deterring a foe dissuades him from undertaking an activity by threatening retaliation.

But the principle is similar. Strong displays of force can contribute to persuasion as well as deterrence. Tyrants traditionally treat conciliatory actions in response to egregious behavior with contempt:

Hitler interpreted Chamberlain's appeasement over Czechoslovakia atMunich as weakness, America's cruise missile retaliation for an Iraqi attempt on former President Bush's life duringhis 1993 visit to Kuwait did not discourage Baghdad from dispatching army units right up to the border of the oil-rich kingdom in

1994. To resist the Iraqi aggression, Washington had to deploy American

troops to Kuwait.¶ Showing the flag aggressively should not be perceived asan end in itself. Or the target may call the showman's bluff. During the 1962 Cubanmissile crisis, Washington demonstrated enough political resolve and military power that Moscow backed down and withdrew itsmissile batteries from Cuban soil. This standoff became a classic case of a superpower using force to prevent a fundamental change

in the balance of power in a vital region.¶ The exercise of power must not be undercut by ill-advised concessions. For instance, in May 1998 the Clinton administration promptedNATO to display its air power close to Serbia's borders to persuade Milosevic to curb his

forces in the province of Kosovo. But the Clinton administration then offered to lift therecently imposed investment bans on Serbia, hoping to facilitate U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke's

peace negotiations with Belgrade. Subsequent American and NATO policy failed to make up forthe misstep, and the situation worsened as special Serb police and army units committed a wave of well-publicized atrocities against Kosovo Albanians during the succeeding five months.¶ During the Soviet era, deterrence was a

mainstay of U.S. policy toward Moscow's nuclear threat. In the post=ncold war period, deterrence may also dissuade rogue regimesfrom spreading biological agents or launching nuclear-armed missiles. But if rogue players persist in deadly actions, then a

preemptive strike or counterassault may be in order. Iraq, as an illustration, ignored the U.N.Security Council ultimatum in November 1990 to withdraw from Kuwaitduring the course of the American-led military buildup in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Conflict became theonly effective option. Hostilities broke out weeks later as coalition forces counterattacked to drive the Iraqis from

Kuwait.¶ The 1980s witnessed more-accomplished uses of military power fordiplomatic motives. In a dramatic exercise, Ronald Reagan ordered the invasion andtemporary occupation of Grenada in October 1983. During the two preceding

years, Washington had looked with deepening concern at the hundreds of Cuban soldiers who were working on Grenadan construction projects, especially the airport. It soon became apparent that the airport's expansion was intended for military use, not tourism as was officially announced. Reagan's hand was forced when a radical Marxist Soviet-Cuban putsch endangered several hundred American medical students studying on the small Caribbean island, alarming Barbados,

Antigua, Dominica, and other tiny states of the region. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) urged the UnitedStates to bring order to Grenada and restore democratic government.¶ A series of reports from Grenada heightened the Reaganadministration's fears for the safety of the medical students. Those anxieties deepened when the Grenadan government imposed

brutal martial law to suppress legitimate opposition and closed the airport to international landings. After an urgentpublic appeal from the OECS for U.S. military intervention, the ensuing airand sea invasion encountered some stiff but isolated resistance from the twenty-five hundred Cuban and Grenadan

troops. But it soon rescued the students without their suffering any fatalities,repatriated the Cuban contingent, and restored American credibility

worldwide. The large-scale military deployment raised American standing after the decline it had suffered with the loss of








241 U.S. Marines in a terrorist bombing in Beirut, followed by the precipitous American departure from Lebanon. The rippling effectof Reagan's projection of power in the Caribbean also had an immediate and proximate reaction. Suriname, located not far fromGrenada, reversed its political course and expelled a large Cuban garrison in the wake of the U.S. assault.¶ President Reagan alsostruck at Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in retribution for a series of state-sponsored terrorist incidents occurring over several years

that culminated in the bombing of a West German discotheque in which two U.S. servicemen died. Long frustrated by being unable to build a coalition among European allies that would imposeeffective sanctions, the United States retaliated days later with air strikes.

Bombs hit Qaddafi's residence and military installations, nearly killing the Libyan dictator. After the bombardment, Libya appearedpolitically subdued, and some believed that it had been deterred from future terrorism. That judgment was only partially correct;during the balance of the 1980s Qaddafi used violence but sought to disguise his hand in it.13 For its part, the United States incurred

world opprobrium when the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the American raid on Libya.¶ Fightingsubversion can invite terrorist reprisals. Reagan's air strikes on Libyaprobably resulted in the downing of Pan American flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,

in December 1988, which killed 259 people aboard the jumbo jet and 11 others on the ground. Evidence pointed to twoLibyan agents as having placed the bomb aboard the U.S.-bound flight. The Bush administration responded by getting U.N.sanctions against Libya and insisting that Qaddafi surrender the two suspects for trial either in the United States or in Scotland. To

date, Qaddafi has refused to comply but seems open to holding the trial in an unnamed third country.¶ As the Libyan casedemonstrates, counterterrorism--whether punishment or preemptive assaults--can breed a cycle of violence for which

the American people must be prepared. A chain reaction of terrorism hasalready unfolded in the wake of the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. If the

future reflects the past, terrorists will certainly avenge President Clinton's firing of cruise missiles at a pharmaceutical plantsuspected of producing nerve gas in Sudan and at the paramilitary training camps in Afghanistan. Neither the administration'sunconvincing one-shot, remote-control counterattacks nor its bank pincers on the financial assets of Osama bin Laden will win the

"war on terrorism." It will take a determined and sustained campaign. A riskless, terrorist-free

world is simply beyond realistic attainment, just as is a crime-free society. But a hollow reaction will inviteevermore subversion and casualties.¶ History teaches that a massive application of power issometimes the only method to deal with a rogue. For example, General Manuel Noriega's corruptmilitary dictatorship in Panama had bedeviled U.S. drug interdiction efforts for years. Grand juries in Tampa and Miami indicted

Noriega for drug trafficking and racketeering in February 1988. Washington's economic sanctionsfailed to change Noriega's behavior. No opposition movement existed that

was capable of wresting power from him, for he enjoyed the backing of the Panama Defense Forces.He put down an attempted coup in March and spurned offers of amnesty in return for going into exile.¶ America's initial reluctanceto employ military force only steeled Noriega's determination to holdout against U.S. economic pressure. His fraudulent claim to

reelection in May 1989 deepened skepticism in Bush administration circles that Noriega could be deposed by internal opponents.Panamanian military thugs had also assaulted and killed two Americanservicemen and attacked members of their families stationed in the Canal Zone. Believing that Noriega's presence

endangered the smooth transfer of the canal to Panamanian authority, Bush opted for militaryintervention. In December 1989 a U.S. airborne invasion--the largest deployed since the Vietnam

War--dismantled the PDF, captured Noriega, transported him to a Miami jail to

await federal trial and eventual conviction, and restored democracy to Panama.¶ Finally, Bush ledthe largest military coalition since World War II to expel Iraq from Kuwait in1990. He mobilized a 500,000-strong U.S.-led force, convinced a reluctant Congress to back a war against Baghdad, and organized a

thirty-nation coalition, many of them Arab countries, to repulse Iraq. His achievement represented a

post=ncold war high-watermark in U.S. leadership resolved to back Americandiplomacy with real power.¶ The Grenada, Panama, and Iraq expeditionary operations shared salientsimilarities despite their geographic and political differences. Each concentrated massive martialforce for limited and achievable strategic objectives. Each succeeded in periods measured in

months rather than years. Each saw an American president reach out for internationalsupport but fail to win universal consensus. Each witnessed a determined

Washington push ahead in the face of domestic and foreign opposition.Each thus represents a milestone in the deployment of forceful measuresfor national purposes. Reagan and Bush relished foreign affairs. Clinton shirks them. Their records reflect theiremphases.





AT//Appeasement Good – Reforms

Rogue regimes respond to consequences, not engagementHenriksen 99is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he focuses on American foreign policy, international political affairs, and

insurgencies. He specializes in the study of US diplomatic and military courses of action toward terrorist havens in the non-Western world and toward rogue regimes. (Thomas H. - Hoover Institution Stanford University ―Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States‖ February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)//EB

Three central concepts undergird the available instruments that serve U.S.foreign policymakers confronting a renegade regime: law, diplomacy, andpower. Law stands at one end of the policy spectrum and power at the other,

with diplomacy in the middle, thus representing a "response ramp" fromthe least severe to the most severe tool. Legal remedies constitute thecheapest and least aggressive reaction; power, in its various forms, is themost drastic weapon in a nation's arsenal. Diplomatic means encompass a wide range of options,from recalling ambassadors to closing embassies. Moving steadily from one end of the spectrum to the other is ineffective againstrogues, however, failing to capture the complexity of dealing effectively with outlaws. To deal with outlaws, the tools should beapplied as nearly simultaneously as feasible. Thus, at the same time that the United States imposes sanctions, it should, for instance,

establish a credible force and bolster internal movements opposed to the despotic leader. We must implementthese options together because they each, of necessity, depend on the otherin extreme cases. Careful diplomacy is required to fashion a consensus oninternational law and build support for strong action. Law is enforceableonly within a structure that delivers consequences. Likewise, acceptedinternational codes serve to justify resorting to force or other hostilediplomatic instruments. Thus, law, diplomacy, and power are logically interconnected to, and reinforce the effects

of, one another. Unfortunately, rogue regimes reject the underlying concepts of normalinternational laws and established diplomacy. They assert their ownsovereignty even when punitive political or military intervention is

justified. But the right of self-protection assures the United States of

legitimacy. It is acknowledged that international law is a key factor inforeign policy. Diplomacy is most effective when it accords with the normsof international law. Although the United States must be prepared to act alone in confronting rogue states, it isimportant to avoid acting outside established international standards, lest it be considered no better than the terrorist regimes it wishes to condemn.





Misc





Net Benefit to Conditions Strategies

Removing the embargo unconditionally sends a signal of weakness andhypocrisy – we should only lift the embargo after Cuba has met ourdemandsPerales 10 is executive director of the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA) and a lecturer at the ElliottSchool of International Affairs at The George Washington University. The expressions and opinions contained in the text are theauthor‘s alone and do not represent the official position of AACCLA or the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. (José Raúl - WOODROW WILSON CENTER LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM ―The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship‖ August2010 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)//EB

The U.S. embargo may need to be changed; however Sánchez vehemently opposed its complete elimination.

The Helms-Burton Act created a clear roadmap stipulating the conditions by which the embargo could be suspended and ended. These include:legalization of political activity, the release of all political prisoners,dissolution of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior‘s Department of StateSecurity, establishment of an independent judiciary, and a government thatdoes not include the Castro brothers. Only when these conditions are met and democracy is reestablished should

the embargo be scrapped. Elimination of the embargo prior to meeting these conditions

will rightly be perceived as weakness in the face of political pressure. For

instance, the Obama administration has little intention of signing a free trade agreement with Colombia —a staunch ally with whom the United States

has a very positive economic relationship—because of concern over the country‘s inadequate labor rights. Imagine the hypocrisyof U.S. foreign policy were it to punish a consolidated democracy withstrong, albeit imperfect, labor rights, yet capitulate and reward the Cubangovernment for systematically abusing labor rights. What sort of message

would that send to the world?

More evidence – can‘t lift the embargo until Cuba makes internal changes – solves the link

Sadowski ‗11 Hofstra University School of Law University of Delaware - Lerner College of Business and Economics (Richard - SustainableDevelopment Law & Policy ―Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework of the United States‘Embargo‖ Volume 12 Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource Conflicts Article 10http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp)//EB

the emBargo is still Necessary Despite calls for its revocation, the embargo‘s purpose is as importantnow as when it was enacted. Cuba is still an oppressive country .59 Cubansmay not leave the country without permission and still lack fundamentalfreedoms of expression.60 José Miguel Vivanco, the director of Americas division at Human Rights Watch, notes

that as ―Cuba‘s draconian laws and sham trials remain in place, [the country]continue[s] to restock the prison cells with new generations of innocentCubans who dare to exercise their basic rights.‖61 Moreover, a recent proposal by the Cuban

Communist Party makes clear that there will be no change in the country‘s oppressive one-party political system.62 In doing so, the

lengthy document declares ―[o]nly socialism is capable of overcoming the currentdifficulties and preserving the victories of the revolution.‖63 Cuba‘streatment of its own citizens is a situation the United States cannot ignore.The embargo‘s twin goals of backing democracy and ending oppressive rulehave not been met. Until they are, the embargo must remain in place.

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf





Aff





Appeasement Now – General

America‘s international credibility‘s shotRobbins ‗13 [James. Senior Fellow Ntl Security at American Foreign Policy Council. ―Rogue Nations Shrug Off Obama‘s Threats‖ USA Today,

2/3/13 ln]In his State of the Union Address, President Obama pledged that "America will continueto lead the effort to prevent the spread of the world's most dangerous

weapons." Strong words. But then again, he says that every year, and therogue states don't seem to take notice. Obama keeps talking, and theproliferaters keep proliferating. On Tuesday, North Korea conducted itsthird nuclear test, prompting Obama to threaten that the United States

would "lead the world in taking firm action in response to these threats." But

the White House has issued no specific threats, and has no action plan. Pyongyang knows it can act withimpunity because Obama's threats are not credible. In the 2010 State of theUnion address, Obama warned North Korea that it "faces increasedisolation, and stronger sanctions." In 2011, he said that we "insist thatNorth Korea keeps its commitment to abandon nuclear weapons." And in2012, he chose not to mention Pyongyang's nuclear program at all. Obamaalso lectured Iran, demanding that "they meet their obligations," andpledged the U.S. will "do what is necessary to prevent (Tehran) from gettinga nuclear weapon." But we heard this before, too, in 2012, 2011 and 2010,

when Obama threatened Iran "will face growing consequences. That is apromise." Yet Iran's nuclear weapons program has continued apace. Andsolid evidence exists that Iran and North Korea are collaborating onnuclear weapons development. Iran might even be inspired by NorthKorea's example. Pyongyang has proved that even a country as poor and dysfunctional as North Korea can not onlydevelop and test nuclear weapons, but also can do so without significant consequences. Iran is wealthier than North Korea, more

technologically advanced and governed by a committed, revolutionary government. If North Korea can defy Obama's empty threats,Iran can, too. Despite his annual bluster, Obama has failed to formulate aneffective, credible strategy to deal with the growing danger of rogue statenuclear programs. An Iranian nuclear weapon is only a matter of time.

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/02/11/earthquake-north-korea-nuclear-test/1911587/

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/02/11/earthquake-north-korea-nuclear-test/1911587/





Appeasement Now – Cuba

Appeasement now – and the plan makes it effectiveCave ‗12 [Damien. Foreign Correspondent for the New York Times. ―Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo‖ 11/19/12

The New York Times ln]The longstanding logic has been that broad sanctions are necessary tosuffocate the totalitarian government of Fidel and Raúl Castro. Now, especially for many Cubans who had

previously stayed on the sidelines in the battle over Cuba policy, a new argument against the embargo isgaining currency — that the tentative move toward capitalism by the Cuban

government could be sped up with more assistance from Americans .¶ Even

as defenders of the embargo warn against providing the Cuban government with ―economic lifelines,‖ some Cubans and exiles are advocating a fresh approach. The Obama administration

already showed an openness to engagement with Cuba in 2009 by removing restrictions on travel and

remittances for Cuban Americans. But with Fidel Castro, 86, retired and President Raúl Castro, 81, leading a bureaucracy that is divided on the pace

and scope of change, many have begun urging President Obama to go further and update

American policy by putting a priority on assistance for Cubans seekingmore economic independence from the government.¶ ―Maintaining this

embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hard-

liners ,‖ said Carlos Saladrigas, a Cuban exile and co-chairman of the Cuba Study Group in Washington, which advocates engagement with Cuba.

―What we should be doing is helping the reformers .‖

Appeasement now – European Union trading partners disregard theembargoBurns 7-23(Clif Burns, Writer for Export Law, ―OFAC Fines American Express $5 Million for Doing Business in Europe‖ July 23, 2013http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/5325, RLA)

What is most interesting is OFAC‘s reference to, and treatment of, legislation passed by the European Union toprohibit companies doing business in Europe from complying with the U.S. sanctions on Cuba, legislation which OFAC oddly anduniquely calls ―antidote‖ legislation. (Everyone else in the world calls it ―blocking‖ legislation.) OFAC notes that ―many‖ of theoffending bookings occurred in countries with ―antidote‖ legislation, presumably a reference to Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96

of 22 November 1996 which prohibits companies in the E.U. from complying with theCuba sanctions. Well, duh, if you‘ll forgive my lapse into the vernacular. Of course, it was going to bedifficult to comply with the Cuba sanctions where doing so would be illegal. There really is no way to interpret this other than as a statement by OFAC that having offices in Europe is inconsistent withcomplying with OFAC sanctions and that the only way to have an adequate compliance program is simply to stop doing business inEurope.

http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/5325

http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/5325





Appeasement Now – Venezuela

Rapprochement now – despite cutting off diplomatic tiesTN 7-25(Tengri News, ―US still up for warming Venezuela ties after fresh row‖ July 25, 2013 http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/US-still-

up-for-warming-Venezuela-ties-after-fresh-row--21284/, RLA)The United States said Wednesday it is still open to improving ties with

Venezuela after Caracas called off the rapprochement, accusing Washington of meddling in

its internal affairs, AFP reports.¶ The two nations -- which were often at odds during the 14-year rule of the recently

deceased Hugo Chavez -- had hinted at warmer ties after a meeting of top diplomatslast month.¶ But then Venezuela reacted angrily to a statement by Samantha Power -- tapped to be the next US ambassadorto the United Nations -- who vowed to stand up to "repressive regimes" and challenge the "crackdown on civil society being carriedout in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela."¶ President Nicolas Maduro -- the handpicked successor to the leftist Chavez-- then accused Washington of meddling in Venezuela's affairs, condemning its "imperialist attitude."¶ Washington has yet to

recognize Maduro's victory in a disputed April election to replace Chavez.¶ State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Wednesday she was not aware of Maduro's comments, and she insisted the United States was stillcommitted to improving ties.¶ "We obviously have not interjected into anyelection," she said.¶ " We are open to having a positive relationship with

Venezuela moving forward. That's what our focus is on, and we still are leaving the door open for that."¶ Duringhis 14 years in power Chavez railed against US "imperialism" and cultivated close ties with Cuba, Iran and Syria.¶ But despite the fact

that Washington and Caracas have not exchanged ambassadors since 2010, oil-rich Venezuela still exportssome 900,000 barrels a day to the United States.¶

The US already appeased Venezuela despite actions contrary to US interestsCardenas 6-14(José R. Cárdenas, assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development under Bush Administration, ―How Not to Treat the Neighborhood Bully‖ Friday, June 14, 2013 - 3:00 PM,http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/taxonomy/term/4784)

Trying to track the course of U.S. policy toward Venezuela is enough to giveone whiplash. Where a few weeks ago Barack Obama's administration appeared to take a principledstand behind opposition protests asserting that this April's presidential election to elect Hugo Chávez's successor was stolen, today it

seems to have tossed the opposition overboard as it seeks to normalizerelations with the disputed government of Nicolás Maduro.¶ Even as opposition leader

Henrique Capriles has been traveling to regional capitals seeking support for his campaign for a clean election, someone atthe State Department evidently thought it was perfect timing for a smiling,handshaking photo op between Secretary of State John Kerry and VenezuelanForeign Minister Elías Jaua at last week's Organization of American States meeting in Guatemala.¶ Certainly it

would be understandable if a U.S.-Venezuelan rapprochement was theproduct of some identifiable change in that government's behavior -- some nod to the legitimacy of the

opposition's complaints, maybe a commitment to stop berating the United States and

friendly countries, or perhaps even a public pledge to finally cooperate on counternarcotics policy. Yet none of this has

occurred.¶ Instead, this is what we have seen from the Maduro government in the last few months:¶ ¶

Accused the United States of giving Chávez his cancer¶ Repeatedly accused theUnited States of fomenting instability in Venezuela, including alleging that former U.S. officials had

entered the country to poison him¶ Expelled two U.S. military attachés from the U.S. Embassy, accusing

them of destabilizing the country ¶ Insulted Obama as "the big boss of the devils"¶ Arrested a U.S.filmmaker (subsequently released) on spurious charges of espionage¶ Accused the United States oftrying to assassinate Capriles and make it look like it was the government¶ Accused formerColombian President Álvaro Uribe of trying to assassinate Maduro¶ Accused the opposition of

http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/US-still-up-for-warming-Venezuela-ties-after-fresh-row--21284/









purchasing 18 U.S. warplanes to be based in Colombia¶ Accused Salvadoranmercenaries of trying to kill Maduro¶ Denounced the Peruvian foreign minister for

suggesting that Latin American countries could help mediate political tensions in Venezuela (the minister wasforced to resign)¶ Accused CNN of fomenting a coup against his government¶ More closely

aligned Venezuela with the Castros' Cuba than anything ever seen under Chávez¶ ¶ Not exactly what

you would call a charm offensive.¶ Indeed,the only thing we have seen from the Madurogovernment since its tainted victory is an accelerated offensive to replace the Castro regime

as the bully in the Latin American neighborhood, using threats both explicit and implicit to intimidateanyone daring to criticize its anti-democratic actions.¶





Appeasement Good – General

Thesis of the DA is wrong – the plan is an example of productive bargaining.Chavez and Maduro aren‘t the irrational ideologues their evidence assumes Yglesias 08(Matthew Yglesias , senior editor at the Center for American Progress Action Fund,"The AppeasementParadox" May 23, 2008 http://prospect.org/article/appeasement-paradox-0, RLA)

One defining feature of appeasement-phobia, after all, is a curious

tendency to underrate the importance of objective reality in determiningthe behavior of foreign countries. In a speech Tuesday on Cuba policy, McCain derided willingness to "sitdown unconditionally for a presidential meeting with Raul Castro" on the grounds that this would "send the worst possible signal to

Cuba's dictators -- there is no need to undertake fundamental reforms; they cansimply wait for a unilateral change in U.S. policy." The idea that Cuban

decision-making would hinge on a "signal" from Washington is baffling . After

all, the past 50 years of failed American efforts to starve the Cuban people into rebelling against the Castro regime is better evidence

than any signal that Havana has no need to back down in the face of our embargo.

Similarly, Buckley worried that meeting Khruschev would signal low U.S. morale to Moscow, with unspecified dire results. And

McCain says the trouble with meeting with Iranian leaders (when he's not too busy being confused about who the leaders of Iran are)is that a meeting "is the most prestigious card we have to play" and scheduling one might give the Iranians an ego boost and "confer

both international legitimacy on the Iranian president and could strengthen him domestically."¶ That's all fine, but the

premise of the appeasement frame is that we're dealing with hardcore

irrational ideologues who'll stop at nothing to destroy us. Adolf Hitler actually was such

a man and, not coincidentally, he wasn't particularly interested in acquiring the international prestige and legitimacy associated with

a sit-down with English politicians -- he wanted a giant war. In general, the right wants us to believe that world history is littered with countries whose rulers, like Hitler, will stop atnothing short of world-domination but who also spend their evenings fondly dreaming of the chance at a

White House photo-op. But that‘s absurd. One shouldn‘t, of course, strike a bad bargain with

a foreign country just because you held a meeting, but to fear that the very

act of holding a meeting is a blow to the national interest is silly . Genuine

madmen aren‘t going to care what ―signal‖ we‘re sending, and non-crazy

people can be productively bargained with .

Best scholarship votes affTreisman 04(Daniel Treisman, Cambridge University Press, International Organization Foundation, Vol. 58, No.2 Spring 2004, pg. 345-373,―Rational Appeasement‖, JSTOR, PS)

This article argues that the common presumption against appeasement is far too¶

strong. The standard treatments leave out one factor that is crucial in international politics-resource constraints. If resourcesare limited and a state faces many potential¶ threats, appeasing one challenger may actually increase a state's ability to¶ deter others.

When conflict is costly, defenders face a trade-off: fighting may enhance¶

their reputation for resolve, but it will deplete their resources to fight-or¶

deter-future challenges.3 Often, the latter effect outweighs the former,prompting¶ a strategy I call "rational appeasement." If even highly resolved incumbents

rationally ¶ appease, observers do not impute low resolve to appeasers. Moreover, when¶ fighting depletesenforcement resources, a refusal to appease can undermine the¶ state'sdeterrent. This insight applies to actors as diverse as states facing international¶ challenges, empires fearing subjectrebellions, federations concerned about¶ possible regional tax revolts, and monopolists eager to deter entry.¶ Below, I demonstratethis point formally. First I present a benchmark model of ¶ the interaction between one "central" and two "local" actors assuming no

http://prospect.org/article/appeasement-paradox-0

http://prospect.org/article/appeasement-paradox-0





resource¶ constraint, and I show how investing in reputation can be rational (and appeasement¶ irrational) a la Kreps and Wilsonand Milgrom and Roberts. I show that a¶ deterrence equilibrium will often exist in which "weak" central actors fight to preserve¶ a

reputation for "strength." I then show how the logic changes if the central¶ actor's resources are limited. Now fighting thefirst challenger to demonstrate resolve¶ is often self-destructive: it weakensthe center so much that this actually ¶ prompts the second to attack . The conditionsfor this depend on whether the stakes¶ of conflict can be manipulated by the center or are exogenous. If they are exogenous,¶ fighting

is self-destructive when the stakes are either high or low; if endogenous,¶ this is true if fighting is very costly to the center. Bycontrast, under these¶ conditions appeasing the first challenger will

conserve resources sufficient to deter¶ the second.

More ev – your argument cherry-picks the data – engagement only fails with nations that are hardwired against the US, which isn‘t Latin America(otherwise they‘d say no to the aff, too) Record ‗05 Jeffrey Record is a professor in the Department of Strategy and International Security at the U.S. Air Force‘s Air War College inMontgomery, Alabama, (Jeffrey, ―APPEASEMENT RECONSIDERED: INVESTIGATING THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE 1930s‖,Strategic Studies Institute, August, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub622.pdf)//RS

No historical event has exerted more influence on post-World War ¶ II U.S.

use-of-force decisions than the Anglo-French appeasement of ¶ NaziGermany that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. ¶ Presidentshave repeatedly cited the great lesson of the 1930s—namely, ¶ that force should beused early and decisively against rising security ¶ threats—to justifydecisions for war and military intervention; some ¶ presidents have compared enemy leaders to

Hitler. The underlying ¶ assumption of the so-called Munich analogy is that thedemocracies ¶ could and should have stopped Hitler (thereby avoiding World War ¶ II and the

Holocaust) by moving against him militarily before 1939. ¶ This assumption, however, is easy tomake only in hindsight and ¶ ignores the political, military, economic, andpsychological contexts of ¶ Anglo-French security choices during the 1930s. Among the myriad ¶ factors constraining those choices were memories of the horrors ¶ of World War I, failure to grasp the nature ofthe Nazi regime and ¶ Hitler‘s strategic ambitions, France‘s military inflexibility, Britain‘s ¶ strategic overstretch, France‘s strategic

dependence on Britain, guilt ¶ over the Versailles Treaty of 1919, dread of strategic bombing and ¶ misjudgment of the Nazi air threat, American isolationism, and ¶ distrust of the Soviet Union and fear of Communism.¶ Appeasement failed because Hitler was unappeasable. He sought ¶ not to adjust the European balance of power in Germany‘s favor, ¶ but rather to overthrow it. He wanted a

German-ruled Europe that ¶ would have eliminated France and Britain as European powers. But ¶ Hitler was alsoundeterrable; he embraced war because he knew he ¶ could not get what he

wanted without it. There was thus little that ¶ the democracies could do todeter Hitler from war, though Hitler ¶ expected war later than 1939. There was going to be war as long as ¶ Hitler

remained in power.¶ A reassessment of the history of appeasement in the 1930s ¶ yields thefollowing conclusions: first, Hitler remains unequaled ¶ as a state threat.No post-1945 threat to the United States bears ¶ genuine comparison to the Nazi

dictatorship. Second, Anglo-French ¶ security choices in the 1930s were neithersimple nor obvious; they were shaped and constrained by factors ignored ormisunderstood ¶ by those who retrospectively have boiled them down to a simple ¶ choice between good and evil. Third,hindsight is not 20/20 vision; ¶ it distorts. We view past events through the prism of what followed. ¶ Had Hitler dropped dead before 1939, there would have been no ¶ World War II or Holocaust, and therefore no transformation of the ¶ very term

―appeasement‖ into a pejorative. Finally, invocations of ¶ the Munich analogy to justify theuse of force are almost invariably ¶ misleading because security threats tothe United States genuinely ¶ Hitlerian in scope and nature have not beenreplicated since 1945.

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Appeasement Good – Cuba

Economic engagement with Cuba is key – it is the only way to resolve rogueinfluence in Latin America because the embargo drives their motivationand legitimacyHanson et al ‗13 [Daniel. Economic Researcher at AEI. And Harrison Ealey and Dayne Batten. ―It‘s time for the US to end its Senseless Embargo ofCuba‖ Forbes 1/16/13 ln]

What‘s worse, U.S. sanctions encourage Cuba to collaborate with regional players

that are less friendly to American interests. For instance, in 2011, the country inked adeal with Venezuela for the construction of an underwater communications link, circumventing its

need to connect with US-owned networks close to its shores.¶ Repealing the embargo would fit into an

American precedent of lifting trade and travel restrictions to countries whodemonstrate progress towards democratic ideals. Romania, Czechoslovakia,and Hungary were all offered normal trade relations in the 1970s after preliminary reforms

even though they were still in clear violation of several US resolutions condemning their human rights practices. China, a

communist country and perennial human rights abuser, is the U.S.‘s second largest trading partner,

and in November, trade restrictions against Myanmar were lessened notwithstanding a fifty

year history of genocide and human trafficking propagated by its military government.¶ Which, of course, begs the question :

when will the U.S. see fit to lift the embargo? If Cuba is trending towards

democracy and free markets, what litmus test must be passed for theembargo to be rolled back ?¶ The cost of the embargo to the United States is high in both dollar and moral terms, but it is higher for the Cuban people, who are cut off from the supposed champion of liberty in their hemisphere because of anantiquated Cold War dispute. The progress being made in Cuba could be accelerated with the help of American charitable relief,

business innovation, and tourism.¶ A perpetual embargo on a developing nation that is moving towards reform

makes little sense, especially when America‘s allies are openly hostile to the

embargo . It keeps a broader discussion about smart reform in Cuba from

gaining life, and it makes no economic sense. It is time for the embargo to go.

Appeasing Cuba through economic engagement is good – it locks in reformsconsistent with US interests; now‘s keyLevy ‗11 (Arturo Lopez-Levy , lecturer and doctoral candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies of the University of Denver,―Appease Cuba? What Would Winston Churchill Say?‖ Jan 10, 2011 http://thehavananote.com/node/845, RLA)

Of course, this is delusional. The Cuban communist political system and commandeconomy might have prevented economic development of the Cuban peopleand repressed its civil and political liberties but there is little evidenceabout genocidal or expansionist tendencies in Raul Castro‘s government.The U.S. inclusion of Cuba in the terrorist list of the State department is

seen as the world paradigm of political manipulation of a core theme of American foreignpolicy for domestic political reasons.¶ So, where does a policy of engagement - or as critics would call it, ―appeasement‖ - fit in? In

fact, appeasement shouldn‘t be a bad word for U.S. policy towards Cuba sincethe island is a minor power with limited capacity to cause damage to U.S.national interests.¶ As Winston Churchill, the main opponent of appeasing Hitler, wrote in 1950: ―The world

appeasement is not popular but appeasement has its place in all policy. Make sure you put it in the right place. Appease the weak. Defy the strong‖. Cuban nationalism and its sense of victimhood havenever been a stronger conviction of the Cuban people. But the Cuban state‘s power position

versus foreign powers is the weakest since 1959. Under the weight of the Special Period, the period of crisis that began in 1989 and

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amount to forty percent of post revolutionary history, the Castros‘ regime is economicallyexhausted. This is why Raul Castro is attempting a serious reform.¶ Now is

most likely the optimal time for the United States to address appeasable

Cuban nationalism and engage Cuban post-revolutionary society. To paraphraseHenry Kissinger, the question should be whether Cuban power holders see virtue in a permanent conflict with the United States, or

there is space for accommodation of Cuba‘s national interests in a U.S. led world order.

Only throughengagement can Obama test whether Cuba‘s new leaders are rooted in aCold War opposition to the United States, or are just defending theirinterests, values and privileges against U.S. impositions.





Hardline Fails – General

Appeasement is the only strategy that can induce change – coercivediplomacy failsHenriksen ‗99 is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he focuses on American foreign policy, international political affairs, andinsurgencies. He specializes in the study of US diplomatic and military courses of action toward terrorist havens in the non-Western world and toward rogue regimes. (Thomas H. - Hoover Institution Stanford University ―Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal WithRogue States‖ February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)//EB Sanctions alone are not a fail-safe mechanism for getting rid of unsavory rulers. The record of sanctions, in fact, is quite mixed.

U.S. economic restrictions have failed to dislodge or bend communistdictators such as Fidel Castro in Cuba and Kim Il Sung (or his son Kim Jong Il) in North

Korea after decades of imposition. Slobodan Milosevic in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a more recent targetof sanctions, has survived military setbacks, along with economicquarantine and inflation, which have decimated the wealth of the country'smiddle class. Only a U.S. military invasion of Panama achieved

Washington's goal of ousting General Manuel Noriega, who withstood yearsof U.S. economic pressure. Sanction-induced governmental shipwrecks are long shots against most entrenchedstrongmen. Economic coercion cannot administer a fatal bite in the flanks of determined regimes because the teeth are not up to thetask. A state under economic siege can endure economic dislocation because other countries may not cooperate in an economic and

trade lockout; "black knights" pursue their own economic and political agendas. For example, European statescontinue to trade with Cuba, despite strict U.S. economic sanctions againstthe Castro regime. Sanctions can also motivate strong nationalisticresponses in an embattled country. Citizens rally to support theirgovernment and seek ways to circumvent commercial problems. Italians, forexample, redoubled their support of Mussolini when the League of Nations instituted sanctions in the mid-1930s for Italy's invasionof Ethiopia. Similar reactions took place over U.S. sanctions against Nicaragua in the 1980s, the United Nations' economicquarantine of Rhodesia (1965-79), and Soviet embargoes (1948-55) on Yugoslavia, following its break with Moscow. Sanctions

against even unpopular leaders, such as Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein generate anti- American sentiments and provide a plausible rationale for why Cuba's

economy is performing poorly. Citizens are persuaded to blame outsidersfor shortages instead of shortcomings in a command-and-control economy.North Korea, arguably the most repressive society on the planet, blames theUnited States and its other adversaries for its economic and agriculturalproblems rather than its own rigid autarkic practices. Economic sanctions against rogueregimes also result in limited payoffs because dictators are usually indifferent to the sufferings of their own people. One striking caseof hard-heartedness is Saddam Hussein, who builds palaces and armaments while ordinary Iraqis want for food and medicine.North Korea's Kim Jong Il and Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, like numerous other despots, manifest no feeling for their countrymen'ssuffering because of government policies, sanctions or not. Unintended consequences often flow from sanctions; instead of politicalshipwreck, they have motivated people to improvise and develop economic self-sufficiency. One classic illustration of this process is

the former Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). When first Britain and then the United Nationsplaced sanctions on the breakaway Rhodesian government, the landlocked

African state found itself almost friendless in the world community. During

the decade from 1965 to 1975, Rhodesia transformed its economy from anear-total dependence on imported manufactured goods in exchange forraw materials to a high degree of self-sufficiency. Only oil production andindustrial machinery eluded Rhodesian enterprise. Moreover, Rhodesia's economy initiallyincreased its productivity. Rhodesia was also aided by the sanction-busting South Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique, whichserved as conduits for importing petroleum products and other vital products and harbors for exporting Rhodesian goods. For morethan a decade, the European-ruled state held out. In the end, the African majority came to power because the white minoritygovernment experienced a host of other challenges, including a widespread guerrilla war in much of the countryside. By the early1970s the drastic hike in oil prices had further taxed Rhodesian resources. African rule came to Mozambique in 1975, thereby closingoff a key trade artery. Finally, South Africa abandoned Rhodesia in a calculated bid to win world approval despite its owninternationally censured racial policies toward its African majority. The economic siege of Rhodesia contributed to its defeat, but it's





doubtful if sanctions alone would have determined the outcome. It took a rural insurgency coupled with adverse internationalcircumstances.8 Even without clear-cut victories, sanctions still can be an effective, if limited, weapon in the United States'diplomatic arsenal. Sanctions, if properly enforced, raise havoc with an embattled economy. Although they are powerless to turn back fierce aggression like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, they can raise difficulties for contentious states. Securing the suspension ofsanctions on natural gas and heating oil to Serbia during the bitter winter of 1995 made Milosevic more amenable to compromise atDayton.9 Economic sanctions and political containment squeezed Libya to the point that it openly discussed having two of itscitizens stand trial in The Hague for bombing Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland in 1988. Libyan strongman Qaddafi floated the idea ofmaking a deal with the United States in return for dropping sanctions in mid-1998. Even less than watertight restrictions interfere

with normal business mechanisms, adding extra costs and economic inefficiencies to the sanctioned country. Thateconomic coercion can be effective is borne out by the evidence thatresentful embargoed countries struggle to have sanctions lifted, reviling

America for imposing them. They pay fortunes to Washington lobbyists to work the political process to

terminate economic pressure. Yet these targeted regimes at the same time insist that sanctions fail to alter their policies. Theycomplain that U.S. embargoes succeed only in starving children and hurtingthe poor. But economic sanctions do damage economies and do morallystigmatize their targets, making them popular instruments in Washington.

The plan combines coercive diplomacy with appeasement – that‘s bestHenriksen ‗99 is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he focuses on American foreign policy, international political affairs, and

insurgencies. He specializes in the study of US diplomatic and military courses of action toward terrorist havens in the non-Western world and toward rogue regimes. (Thomas H. - Hoover Institution Stanford University ―Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal WithRogue States‖ February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)//EB

Like most diplomatic tools, sanctions are sometimes effective and sometimes not. Overuse certainly dulls their efficacy .Economic pressure is most effective when combined with other policies.Sanctions should be used sparingly and only when other diplomatic optionsseem unlikely to succeed. Washington should seek internationalparticipation before promulgating unilateral sanctions. But achievingcollective action may prove impossible, as it has in most cases, and itsabsence should not deter the United States when the stakes are high. Unless weare willing to act unilaterally, our response to security threats or humanitarian outrages will be subject to another state's veto, and

we will end up striving for consensus rather than our own strategic goals. Sanctions should be designed to

spare the innocent people of a target state unnecessary hardship and toinflict pain on the regime by restricting technology transfers rather thanfood and medicine. Sanctions should exact maximum leverage on the target while minimizing the cost to Americancitizens and U.S. allies. The executive and legislative branches should subject sanctions to periodic review to determine their

effectiveness. Ineffective sanctions should be dropped or refocused. The gravestshortcoming of sanctions lies in the political cover they afford politiciansfor not adopting a more meaningful course of action. Economic embargoesfulfill the need to respond to a challenge, but they alone can rarely achievean ambitious objective. Against rogue regimes, they are only a firstresponse, not an endgame. Sanctions must not be an easy substitute for a

well-conceived strategy.





AT//Resolve / Credibility Impact

Engagement‘s not key to hegemony – international reputation isunimportantTang ‗5 Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy ofSocial Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, ―Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,‖ Security Studies, Vol.14, No. 1, p. 34-62IN HIS WELL-RECEIVED BOOK, Mercer offers an elaborate framework based on desirability in social psychology to explain why

reputation is difficult to gain in international conflicts.61 His major argument, in sum, heldthat undesirable behavior elicits dispositional explanations (that is, reputation will form) and desirable behavior elicits situational

explanations (that is, reputation may not form). According to Mercer, allies who stand firm (a desirablemove from a state's point of view) will not get a reputation for beingresolute, whereas allies who do not stand firm (an undesirable move) mayget a reputation for being irresolute. By the same token, adversaries who stand firm

(an undesirable move) may get a reputation for being resolute, whereas adversaries

who do not stand firm (a desirable move) will not get a reputation for being

irresolute . In essence, while disagreeing with the typical rational deterrence theory argument that reputation will always

form, Mercer believes that reputation is nonetheless likely to form under certain circumstances (when adversaries stand firm and when allies back down).

More evidence – credibility‘s not a thing – states have externals incentive topresume resolveTang ‗5 Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy ofSocial Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, ―Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,‖ Security Studies, Vol.14, No. 1, p. 34-62

This article goes further than Mercer and argues that reputation cannot form in conflicts because

of the anarchical nature of international politics. Because of its simplicity, parsimony,

explanatory power, and better fit with empirical findings, this explanation is superior to Mercer's. Anarchy remainsthe defining feature of international politics, so states operate within anenvironment of uncertainty . Anarchy produces "a strong sense of peril and doom"62 and

"a conservative tendency to think of the future in the worst possible or worstplausible cause terms."63 States have to consistently assume the worstpossible scenario, especially when they are engaged in conflicts.64 This "worst-case mentality"

has major implications for reputation under anarchy on at least two fronts.65¶ Foremost,

because a state's security ultimately depends on self-help, the worst-case mentality means that a

state has to assume its adversaries to be resolute and its allies to be

irresolute . Essentially, this worst-case assumption sets a baseline image for both adversaries and allies, and reputation

becomes impossible to develop under anarchy. A state cannot lose nor gain reputation amongits adversaries by either backing down or standing firm in a conflict ,

because its adversaries will always assume the state to be resolute (the baseline

image) in the next conflict. By the same token, a state cannot lose nor gain reputation among its allies by ei ther backing down or standing firm in a conflict, for its allies will always assume the state to be irresolute in the next conflict. A state isassigned its baseline image by its adversaries and allies at the beginning of a crisis, and no past behavior can change that image exante.66





No impact to credFettweis ‗8 (Christopher Fettweis, assistant professor of political science at Tulane University, ―Credibility and the War on Terror‖, PoliticalScience Quarterly, Winter 2007/2008,)The evidence seems to fall heavily on one side of the divide between scholars and practitioners over the importance of credibility.

This division is not merely of academic interest. The credibility imperative has distinct and

profound effects upon policymaking, all of which are apparent during the current war on terror. In order

to assess more accurately the true value of a healthy reputation for resolve, policymakers ought to be awareof the following general rules about how the credibility imperative shapesnational debate. Three such effects are presented below, more as arguments rather than testable hypotheses, owing tothe nature of the subject. Although the supporting evidence is by necessity somewhat anecdotal, the arguments themselves should

not be very controversial.¶ First, the credibility imperative is almost always employed to bolster themost hawkish position in a foreign policy debate. Cries of appeasement (and of the need to

maintain credibility) arise almost every time the use of force is debated in the United States. Critics warned thatU.S. credibility would be irreparably harmed if Washington failed to get involvedin Vietnam, and then if it did not stay until the war was won; if it did not use airstrikes against the Soviet missiles in Cuba; if it did not respond to Bosnian Serbprovocations with sufficient force; if it failed to attack the leaders of the military coup in

Haiti in 1994; and, of course, if i t does not "stay the course" today in Iraq. At other times, hawks have employedthe credibility imperative to urge two presidents to use military force toprevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea and to punish the recalcitrant

Saddam Hussein.55 The reputation of the United States is always endangered by inaction, not by action, no matter how

peripheral the proposed war might be to tangible national interests. The reputation for good policy judgment never seems to be as important as the reputation for belligerence.¶ The credibility imperative not only urges the use of military force, but it encourageshawkish behavior at the negotiating table as well, supporting rigidity and

decrying all compromise as demonstrations of weakness. Only victory can legitimate diplomacy; compromisedsettlements only encourage further challenges, and are synonymous with appeasement.Madeleine Albright reported a typical example in her memoirs, explaining that during Bosnia negotiations "the ordinarily hawkishJamie Rubin urged me to compromise on a particular measure. I glared and said, 'Jamie, do you think we're in Munich?'"56 After

Jimmy Carter's now-famous mission helped find common ground between Pyongyang and Washington in 1994, McCain worriedthat the deal "will have changed the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East. That it will have changed for the worse isobvious."57 Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer labeled the compromise on the same peninsula in 2003 "an abjectcave-in," which would prove to be a "threat to American credibility everywhere."58¶ This is not meant to suggest, of course, thatindividual cases of belligerence or intervention were not warranted; however, it is important to recognize that, for better or for

worse, the credibility imperative is the rhetorical instrument of the hawk . Theactors employing the imperative are not always the same, but their prescription never waivers. Many of the doves of the 1980s had become hawks by the 1990s, warning of the potential loss of credibility if strong action were not taken in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo,and Haiti. For example, the New York Times cited "United States diplomats" warning President Clinton that a failure to act in Bosniain 1993 would "badly damage U.S. credibility abroad."59 Anthony Lake told the Council on Foreign Relations that among the

reasons to act in Haiti was the need to defend American credibility in world affairs.60 In general, the more apolicymaker or strategist saw the credibility of the United States in peril,

the more willing he or she was to use force to prevent its erosion.¶ The second

observation on the use of the credibility imperative in policy debate is perhaps related to the

first: the imperative often produces astonishing hyperbole, even in otherwise sober analysts. If theUnited States were to lose credibility, the floodgates would open to a variety of catastrophes, setting off dominoes that would

eventually not only threaten vital interests and make war necessary, but perhaps even lead to the end of the Republic itself. Thecredibility imperative warns that momentum toward disaster can begin

with the smallest demonstration of irresolution, thus sustaining the vision of an interdependentsystem in which there are no inconsequential events. In the words of Dale Copeland, "It is easier to stop a snowball before it beginsto roll downhill than to intervene only after it has started to gain momentum."61 Therefore, even the smallest of slips can lead tolarge-scale disaster.¶ Thus, although Quemoy and Matsu might have seemed like irrelevant, uninhabitable rocky atolls, if they fell tothe Chinese without action from the United States, the resulting loss of credibility for the United States would enable thecommunists "to begin their objective of driving us out of the western Pacific, right back to Hawaii and even to the United States,"





according to John Foster Dulles.62 Ten years later, Dean Rusk wrote that if U.S. commitments became discredited because of a defeat in Vietnam, "the communist world would draw

conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war."63 Ronald

Reagan told Congress that if the United States failed in Central America, "our

credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland

would be put at jeopardy ."64 The examples are legion-indeed, the

tendency toward hyperboleseems almost irresistible. In a world where threats are interdependent, the loss of credibility in one area threatens

U.S. goals everywhere. The fall of Vietnam, thought Nixon, "would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain thepeace-in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere."65 Credibility is apparently the glue holding

together the international system of dominoes.¶ Audiences often seem distressingly willing toaccept such statements at face value. Rarely are policymakers or analysts asked to justify these visions, orpressed to examine the logic connecting the present decisions to such catastrophic future consequences. Could interdependence

alone set off such enormous strings of disasters? Why should anyone believe that the loss ofcredibility would result in an unprecedented string of disasters? For those under thespell of the credibility imperative, the logic behind these statements seemed less relevant than establishing the potential, howeverslim, for catastrophe. Since foreign policy is a worst-case-scenario business, the sagacious policymaker hedges against disaster, nomatter how absurdly remote the risk may seem. Who would oppose the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, if that defense might preventa "catastrophic war"? Similarly, it was difficult to argue that aid to the Contras was not in the national interest once it became linked

to the survival of NATO and the safety of "our homeland." Once policymakers accept the imperativeto remain credible, logic and reason can become casualties of fear.¶ The

third and final observation is that there is a loose inverse relationship between the rhetorical

employment of the credibility imperative and the presence of vital, more tangiblenational interests. Franklin D. Roosevelt did not make reference to the reputation ofthe United States when he asked Congress for a declaration of war against Japan in 1941.

Similarly, Winston Churchill's stirring speeches rallying his countrymen at their darkesthour did not mention the importance of maintaining the credibility of the realm. When a clearnational interest is at stake, policymakers have no need to defend (or sell) their

actions with reference to the national reputation or credibility . Simply put, the more tangible thenational interest, the smaller the role that intangible factors will play in eitherdecisions or justifications for policy. The United States was willing to use force to ensure that Korea, Lebanon, Vietnam, Grenada, El

Salvador, and Nicaragua stayed in the camp of free nations despite the fact that none had any measurable impact upon the global balance of power. "El Salvador doesn't really matter," one of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy advisers admitted in 1981, but "we have

to establish credibility because we are in very serious trouble."66¶ When credibility is the primary justification for action, the interest is usually not vital to the United States. Since Washington had no strategic interests at stake in the Balkans in the 1990s, forexample, it was forced to invent some. Rather than sell the policy based solely on what it was-predominantly a humanitarianintervention-the Clinton administration repeatedly linked the fate of the Muslims of southeastern Europe to the credibility of theUnited States and NATO. By doing so, according to Owen Harries, the administration "managed to create a serious national interestin Bosnia where none before existed: an interest, that is, in the preservation of this country's prestige and credibility."67 Thecredibility imperative rose to prominence precisely because no tangible U.S. interest in Bosnia existed.¶ In sum, when the credibilityimperative drives policy, states fearful of hyperbolic future consequences are likely to follow hawkish recommendations in order tosend messages that other states are unlikely to receive. Policymakers are thus wise to beware of the credibility imperative whendevising policy, questioning the assumptions that it contains and remaining skeptical of the catastrophes of which it warns. Theymust recognize that the imperative is typically employed when no tangible national interest exists, used as a rhetorical smoke screento win over otherwise-peaceful masses. Most importantly, it should perhaps give them pause that scholars can supply virtually no

evidence supporting the conventional wisdom about its importance.¶ It might seem blasphemous, or at least dangerously naïve, tosuggest that the blood and treasure spilled over the past six decades to preserve thecredibility of the United States has been in vain. However, history offers littleevidence to support one of the most deeply held beliefs of the makers ofU.S. foreign policy. States cannot control their reputations or theircredibility, since target adversaries and allies will ultimately form their ownperceptions, often learning incorrect lessons. Even the best efforts to bolsterthe credibility of the United States ultimately serve little purpose.





Can‘t change other nation‘s perception of credibilityFettweis 4Christopher Fettweis, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, December 2004, ―Resolute Eagle or Paper Tiger? Credibility,Reputation and the War on Terror,‖ online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147_index.htmlCredibility is a nation's greatest asset in international affairs. It is the hardest to earn and the most difficult to maintain, but oncepossessed it makes it possible to compel changes in behavior. John McCain 1 One thing is for certain, though, about me, and the world has learned this: When I say something, I mean it. And the credibility of the United States is incredibly important for keeping

world peace and freedom. George W. Bush 2 We believe that or battle against the Americans is much simpler than the war againstthe Soviet Union…the Americans are a paper tiger. Osama Bin Laden 3 Islamic fundamentalist groupsconsistently portray the United States as a feckless, effete, cowardly ―papertiger,‖ a state unwilling to use force to defend its interests. Some are said to

joke that when attacked, Americans sue – they send lawyers, not soldiers. 4 Somescholars have suggested that this perception of Western cowardice may haveemboldened Al Qaeda, even helping to explain why its attacks on the United

States have increased in number and intensity since the foundation of theorganization. 5 September 11 th may even have been prevented, so this logic goes, if Washington had responded to previous attacks with a more determined show of force. Did a lack of American ―credibility‖ lead Al

Qaeda to believe that it could strike the United States with impunity ? Does a reputation for resolve keepa country safer? Experienced practitioners and scholars of foreign policy take for granted the notion that actions taken

during crises today can affect (and perhaps prevent) the crises of tomorrow . This belief is so wide-spreadand well-established that to suggest it is wrong would seem terribly naïve,

perhaps even dangerous. But indeed it is wrong – states cannot control the

perceptions of others, suggesting that a deep concern with credibility and reputation is misguided. An ―eye toward

the future,‖ although understandable and even comforting, often creates profound myopia toward the events of the present. Thispaper is a re-examination of the credibility imperative as an independent variable in explaining state behavior. It will primarilydiscuss U.S. foreign policy, because for reasons anchored either in the nature of great power or the American cultural consciousness,the United States seems to exhibit a concern for credibility that is more intense than that of other states. The first section discussesthe concept, speculating about its origins, underlying assumptions and the kinds of policies that those obsessed with credibility tendto support. It examines how scholars have traditionally viewed the concepts of reputation and credibility, paying special attention toJonathan Mercer‘s groundbreaking and influential 1996 work, Reputation and International Politics. What do policymakers mean when they refer to credibility? From where does this imperative emerge? The section ends with an identification of a the corepropositions about reputation and credibility that scholars have proposed, adding to number of new ones that help lead to a centralpolicy recommendation: While making decisions, policymakers are ill-advised to look beyond the interests involved in the current

crisis. Although difficult to achieve in practice, a focus on the present – and a conscious effort to de-link current crises from possible but highly uncertain futures – will likely lead to policies that better serve the national interest, for two main reasons. First,

despite the best efforts of policymakers, the future is likely to be beyond thecontrol of our present efforts; and second, a focus on the future prevents fullconcentration from being focused on the interests involved in the crises athand. The second and third sections examine how the credibility imperative has affected policymakers since the end of the cold war, hoping to differentiate between the attributes that have proven to be time-specific and those more integral to the concept. Itdiscusses a number of different arguments that could be raised to help reconcile the arguments of Mercer with the challenge fromBin Laden, concluding that the former‘s theories seem to hold up just as well today as they ever did. Throughout these sections, thepaper compares the propositions developed in the first section with the evidence that has amassed since the collapse of the SovietUnion, in the hope of identifying lessons that future policymakers can learn from the six-decade national obsession with thecredibility of the United States. The Credibility Imperative in U.S. Foreign Policy If decision makers interpreted interests alongmaterial lines, then analysts of foreign policy would need to look no further in order to explain state behavior. However, time andagain nations take on tasks that appear to be counter to what a rational evaluation of interests would recommend – to borrow

Barbara Tuchman‘s memorable phrase, they engage in a ―march of folly.‖ 6 How could U.S. policymakersfail to disengage from Vietnam, for instance, when it was clear that thecosts in blood and treasure were not proportional to any potential benefitsthat could conceivably be gained from an anti-communist South Vietnam? Toprominent realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, intervention in isolated, resource-poor Vietnam was irrational,―moralistic‖ and mistaken. Only ―if developments in Vietnam might indeed tilt the world‘s balance in America‘s disfavor,‖ argued

Waltz, would the war be worthwhile. 7 They did not, of course – from a material perspective, Vietnam was next toirrelevant to U.S. national security. Clearly some other compelling forceshad to be at work. State behavior cannot be explained absent an

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understanding of the forces at work within the human mind. Intangibleinterests, ones whose roots are psychological and inherently unmeasurable,often drive decisions in directions inexplicable to the empirical analyst.





AT//Asian War Impact

No risk of Asian warMoss ‗13 (Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific

Editor at Jane‘s Defence Weekly until 2009. ―7 Reasons China and Japan Won‘t Go To War‖http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true)Rather than attempting to soothe the tensions that built between Beijing and Tokyo in 2012, Abe has struck a combative tone,

especially concerning their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – a keystone for nationalists in both countries. Eachtime fighter aircraft are scrambled or ships are sent to survey the likelyflashpoint, we hear more warnings about the approach of a war that Chinaand Japan now seem almost eager to wage. The Economist, for example,recently observed that,―China and Japan are sliding towards war,‖ while Hugh White of the Australian National University warned his readers: ―Don't betoo surprised if the U.S. and Japan go to war with China [in 2013].‖ News this week of another reckless act of escalation – Chinese

naval vessels twice training their radars on their Japanese counterparts – will only have ratcheted up their concerns.¶ Thesedoomful predictions came as Abe set out his vision of a more hard-nosedJapan that will no longer be pushed around when it comes to sovereigntyissues. In his December op-ed on Project Syndicate Abe accused Beijing of performing ―daily exercises in coercion‖ and

advocated a ―democratic security diamond‖ comprising Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. (rehashing a concept from the 2007Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). He then proposed defense spending increases – Japan‘s first in a decade – and strengthenedsecurity relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, which both share Tokyo‘s misgivings about China‘s intentions. An alliance-affirming trip to the U.S.is expected soon, and there is talk of Japan stationing F-15s on Shimojijima, close to the disputed

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.¶ However, Abe would argue that he is acting to strengthen Japanin order to balance a rising China and prevent a conflict, rather thancreating the conditions for one. And he undoubtedly has a more sanguine

view of the future of Sino-Japanese relations than those who see war as anever more likely outcome. Of course, there is a chance that Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft will clash asthe dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands rumbles on; and, if they do, there is a chance that a skirmish could snowballunpredictably into a wider conflict.¶ But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region‘s security, he is at least playing the odds. He iscalculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based onthe numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the

two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a veryunlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister runningJapan:¶ 1. Beijing‘s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat

would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its―century of humiliation‖ and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new,

avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough topersuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way

being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China‘s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down inhistory as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with theJapanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China‘s angry

nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn‘t

survive either.¶ 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flaggingeconomy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimuluspackage would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed offto Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companiespulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi

Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy wouldfurther depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of





both countries‘ new leaders.¶ 3. Question marks over the PLA‘s operational effectiveness. The People‘s

Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it wouldprove if pressed into combat today – not least within China‘s own militaryhierarchy . New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too manyPLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be

formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the

PLA to improve its readiness for ―real combat.‖ Other weaknesses within the PLA, such asendemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership‘sconfidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary.¶ 4.Unsettled politics. China‘s civil and military leaderships remain in a state offlux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the newleaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid bigforeign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the

biggest of them all.¶ 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as

Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or

any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real

enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflictincrease.¶ 6. China‘s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China hasalways said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions havetended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed oronly lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, ratherthan naval ships. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some militaryfigures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before).¶

7. China‘s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that itposes no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China- bashers‘prophecies. A lready, China‘s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. Ifit were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan – which already hasthe sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China areconcerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it furtherstill. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairsdiplomatically from within, and to realize ―win- win‖ opportunities with its international partners.¶ In light ofthese constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn‘t go too far. He was of course dealt a rottenhand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year‘s plungein relations. Noda‘s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, atleast for now, in an attempt to repair relations.¶ However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, hecan play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to therelationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China‘s. Five or ten years down theline this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget.¶ Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuingdiplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan‘s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his roleas peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new

dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly tothe Japanese olive branch.¶ In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They

will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chineseand Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additionalforces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set ofcircumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. Theescalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is





fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmisheselsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.





AT//China Impact

US influence is resilient and doesn‘t trade off with China Duddy & Mora 5-1[Patrick – US Ambassador to Venezuela until 2010 and Senior Lecturer at Duke. And Frank – Director of Latin American Center at

Florida Intl University and former Assistant Secretary of Defense – Western Hemisphere (09-13). ―Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?‖ 5/1/13 http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpy//GBS-JV]

As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, The End of Power,there has been an important change inpower distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding andincreasingly mobile set of actors that are dramatically shaping the natureand scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and

dynamic forms of engagement are occurring in a web of cross-national

relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people

contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration .¶

Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurabledimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would

justify more U.S. attention to the region. Many observers who worry about declining U.S.influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and the presence of European companies and

investors.¶ While it is true that other countries are important to the economies

of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by

far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and

trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements.¶ An area of

immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is theexponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note theenormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, afterEurope, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists

travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs.¶ From 2006-2011 U.S. non-

government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universitiesincreased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by afactor of four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from theUnited States totaled $64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America

and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product.¶ Finally, oneshould not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region . Thepower of national reputation, popular culture, values and institutions

continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to

measure and impossible to quantify . Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric

during the Chávez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including manythousands of Chávez loyalists.¶ Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second

or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests inthe region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our

ties to the region.¶ We have many individual national partners in the Americas. Wedon‘t need a new template for relations with the hemisphere as a whole oranother grand U.S.-Latin America strategy . A greater commitment to workmore intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to

them would be appropriate. The United States still has the economic and





cultural heft in the region to play a fundamental role and to advance its

own interests .

No risk of US-China war

Citing Dibb, 4-23[Nicholson, Staffer at the Australian, Citing Paul Dibb, Prof Emeritus at the Australian National University‘s Strategic and DefenseStudies Centre. ―Talk of US-China war 'is a dangerous miscalculation'‖ The Australian, 4/23/13http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/talk-of-us-china-war-is-a-dangerous-miscalculation/story-e6frg8yo-1226626378665 //GBS-JV]

The emeritus professor at the Australian National University's Strategic and

Defence Studies Centre says a major war between China and the US is

unlikely , though a minor conflict that could be contained is possible if territorial disputes escalated. "Is China

going to be the dominant military power in our region any time in the

foreseeable future?" he will ask. " The answer to that is no ."¶ And should the US

therefore make strategic space to allow China to have a sphere of influence

in Southeast Asia?¶ " The answer to that is also no ," he will say.¶ Professor Dibb will say

analysts need to understand China's weaknesses before beating the drumabout its military power. It has been noted that China is a fragile superpower highly

dependent on trade, and " If you go to war, any guarantees of international

trade continuing vanish overnight, " he will say. " While China is developing its

military, it is not the former Soviet Union and it is not exporting revolutionand it is most unlikely to invade other countries."¶ While there may be incidentsat sea between Chinese and Japanese warships that could involve the Americans, Professor

Dibb does not believe such incidents will trigger a full scale war .¶ The

nations involved are aware that such a conflict is likely to turn nuclear and

their economies are so interlinked that they simply cannot afford to let ithappen .

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/talk-of-us-china-war-is-a-dangerous-miscalculation/story-e6frg8yo-1226626378665








AT//Iran Impact

Engagement‘s insufficient to change Iranian ambitionsKahlili ‗11 (Reza , ex-CIA spy who uses pseudonym for safety reasons, former double agent in Iran's Revolutionary Guard, Fox News Opinion,

"Six-Power Nuclear Talks With Iran End -- When Will the West Wake Up", 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/01/22/power-nuclear-talks-iran-end-west-wake//SB10001424052748704739504576067911497955494.html)

Six-power talks with Iran ended abruptly on Saturday in Istanbul. According to the Associated Press, the talks were "meant to nudge Iran toward meeting U.N. Security Council demands to stop uranium enrichment...withTehran shrugging off calls by six world powers to cease the activity that could be harnessed to make nuclear weapons." (To continue readingabout the collapse of six-power talks, click here.) The Iranian hostage crisis ended 30 years ago this week. Yet even after all this time -- and

four separate sets of U.N. sanctions -- Iran is still concealing its nuclear program andadamantly refuses to address the issue. I cannot put it more simply: The West needs to wake up or allis lost. It is time we realize that the Iranian leaders are only looking to buy time until when they are nuclear armed. For literally three

decades, the West has failed to understand the political structure of Iranand the mindset behind the radicals ruling Iran. That failure has cost hundreds of thousandsof lives of innocent Iranians aspiring for freedom and too many lives of American heroes fighting for democracy and freedom in Iraq and

Afghanistan. Every U.S. administration since the onset of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 in

Iran tried in vain to negotiate with the Iranian rulers; every one has

failed. In the last 30 years Iran‘s leaders have pursued their aggressivepolicies against the West with a focus on increasing their militarycapability . The Revolutionary Guards have expanded their missileprogram with the collaboration of North Korea and China. They now have the largestinventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, which are capable of targeting all of Israel, every U.S.

base in the Middle East and every capital in Western Europe. The Guards are also working onintercontinental ballistic missiles with the help of North Korea under the guise of their

space project. Most alarming is the Iranian nuclear program, which started in the mid-80s

with only one goal — to obtain the nuclear bomb. Today Iran is evercloser in achieving that goal. It is just a matter of time before they have the capability to

weaponize warheads on their ballistic missiles. Iran has enough enriched uranium for three

nuclear bombs. They are involved in joint research and developmenton weaponization with North Korea. The leaders of Iran continue their terrorist activities

around the world and their ongoing support of terrorist groups including Hezbollah,Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Al Qaeda and others in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Africa. If Iran acquires the nuclear bomb, proliferation will become a

nightmare and every terrorist organization in the world could be armed with such weapons of mass destruction. The idea ofchanging the behavior of the Iranian leaders is as much a fantasy as

believing that watered down sanctions will force them to negotiate.The failure of our approach is reflected in our misunderstanding theideology of the radicals ruling Iran. They literally take everything fromthe Koran, which demands the annihilation of the infidels and Islam‘sconquest of the world, with martyrdom celebrated as the greatestachievement under the rule of Allah. We have to understand that when Iranian

leaders call for the destruction of Israel, America and the West, theyreally mean what they say. Prophecies call for Islam to conquer the

world and those prophecies drive the actions of the Iranian leaders.They believe that Allah has empowered them and America will not beable to do anything about it. We cannot allow history to repeat itself. Today we are facingan evil much worse than we did in 1938. Appeasement and vacillationdo not work. World peace, global stability and millions of lives are on the line. America must stop this menace. It needs leaders who value the very principles that make our enemies despise us.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/01/22/iran-talks-turkey-focus-confidence-building/#ixzz1BmzBQkYL

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But deterrence solves the impact anywayHendrickson and Tucker 06(David, Distinguished Service Professor at Colorado College, and Robert, professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at Johns HopkinsUniversity, ―A Test of Power‖, The National Interest, Sept/Oct, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=11900,)

The consensus view that Iran could not be deterred if it did acquire nuclear weapons is also dubious in the extreme. These alarms were a regular feature

of the Cold War, and it was confidently predicted that neither the Soviet Union norChina would be susceptible to deterrence once they acquired atomic devices. Events showedotherwise. It is said today that President Ahmadinejad is different, that he

welcomes the coming of the twelfth imam that a nuclear holocaust would entail, and that a crazedreligious fanatic in control of a nuclear-armed state would represent anintolerable danger to Israel, the Gulf sheikhdoms, the United States and the rest of the world. Against these considerations,however, it may be asserted that the Iranian public did not elect their new president on the basis of the expectation that they would soon be burnt to a

crisp, but rather that he would improve their standard of living in the here and now; that Ahmadinejad's reputedcommon touch is utterly incompatible with the careless disregard for the livesof his countrymen that such an act would entail; that any decision for war byIran could not, from all we know of Iranian decision-making, beundertaken simply on the president's say so but would also require the consent

of the religious establishment; and that it is inconceivable that Iran's rulers would display such a complete disregard of Iran's true interests as to invitethe retaliation against it that would surely follow. The restraints governing the use of nuclear weapons rest on far more than the strong

likelihood of retaliation. Any regime that used nuclear weapons in a first strike "bolt from the

blue" would almost certainly be signing its death warrant. The infamy that wouldattach to any such action, both at home and abroad; the license it would give to others toretaliate or otherwise attempt to bring the regime down; the international isolationand withering contempt it would draw upon itself; the reputation for brigandage it

would entail--all this constitutes an insurance policy against the dangers of anIranian bomb. As a practical matter, it makes extremely unlikely--nay, virtually inconceivable--

what is now taken by consensus opinion in America as a sort of moral certainty.

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=11900







AT//Middle East Impact

No war and no impactFerguson ‗6 (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover

Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's whatRepublican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to

the United Nations. Such language can — for now, at least — safely be dismissed as hyperbole.This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expectit to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison withthose of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors — Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973,

Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard toimagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate theirinvolvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk afull-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this mightprecipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent

support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel'sneighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East

war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of theNixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Sovietambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes werehigh indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the

White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anythinglike that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel hasfought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks





AT//North Korea Impact

No war – all posturing – our ev cites experts and military power thumpsescalationKelley ‗13 (Robert E Kelly is an associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at PusanNational University and a Senior Analyst at Wikistrat Consulting. ―North Korea Is the Boy Who Cried Wolf: There Will Be No War‖http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/10/north-korea-is-the-boy-who-cried-wolf-there-will-be-no-war/?all=true)

The North Koreans are experts at bluster. The previous president of South Korea was so disliked, thathe was portrayed as a rat being decapitated in the Pyongyang newspapers. So when the North started saying outrageous stuff thistime around, the first response of analysts everywhere was cynicism. And in the South Korean media, although it is front-page news,the commentary borders on ridicule. No one believes they mean it. A Korean friend of mine spoke for a lot of South Koreans, I believe, when he said to me that he almost wished North Korea would pull some stunt so that South Korea would finally give North

Korea the beating it richly deserves after so many decades of provocation.¶ In fact, this is why I think thelanguage this time is so over-the-top, such as nuking the U.S. homelanddirectly. Because North Korea has such a rich history of extreme rhetoric,they must be more and more extreme in each crisis, or no one will payattention to them. North Korea is the boy who cried wolf . So many threats about a ―sea of

fire‖ in Seoul and ―merciless‖ strikes against imperialism pass with no follow -through that no one listens anymore.If you have seen any of the Korean-man-on-the-street interviews in the media, again and again South Koreans say it is no big deal,they are not really paying attention, and so on. Hence, only more and more outrageous North Korean talk will get our attention.¶ Thedanger here is that this may paint North Korea into a rhetorical corner where they must lash out – not because they actually want to, but because their credibility as a player in the region, as well as before a riled-up domestic audience, will require some follow-up totough talk. For example, the North Korea Central New Agency (KNCA) has said that North Korean teenagers are swarming intorecruitment stations in eager anticipation of smashing the Yankee Colony (South Korea). If public opinion is whipped up like this,does it not require some kind of outlet? All the nationalist hysteria stoked by Pyongyang has to go somewhere. In China, the partylets students raise havoc at Japanese facilities as steam control. What will North Korea do with its now-energized population? Aredreary ―mobilizations‖ for the coming planting season really a substitute for military action after months of tough talk? This is why Ithink some sort of provocation is likely; a missile test seems likely, but will that be enough?¶ The Kaesong closure, I believe,demonstrates this rhetorical entrapment problem. As North Korean war-talk reached a fever pitch in the last few weeks, the SouthKorean media responded with derision, saying we‘ve heard all this before, they don‘t mean it, it‘s all just talk. If the North did meanit, they would take action that showed a real willingness to incur costs for this feud, specifically, closing Kaesong. (Closing theKaesong inter-Korean industrial zone is costly, because the South Korean companies that operate there do not pay their NorthKorean employees directly, but the regime, and in dollars. So it is huge cash cow for the otherwise hard currency-poor North.) Socontemptuous was the Southern commentary, that the DPRK foreign ministry released a hyperbolic counter-statement decryingexactly this commentary and threatening to close Kaesong. A short time later, they did.¶ The point is that North Korea waseffectively goaded into upping the level of tension (closing Kaesong), even though they probably did not want to. Boy- who-cried-wolf North Korea now so lacks credibility, that they were forced to escalate just to be taken seriously. Ifone combines that perceived need to act for credibility‘s sake alone, with the ever-increasing extremism oflanguage which previous hyperbole requires, then it is easy to see Pyongyang doing something really dangerous.North Korea is painting itself into a corner and may be goaded into escalation by external cynicism, even though the elite wouldrather not do so. (For students of international relations theory, this is an excellent example of action-reaction spirals taking on a life

of their own.)¶ 2. The Analysts vs. the Media¶ In the last few weeks I have done a fair amount of media on North

Korea, and I have come away with the strong impression that the global media and the North Koreaanalyst community really differ on the crisis. If you watch CNN, BBC, Sky News, and other

major outlets, the coverage frequently leads with North Korea and takes thethreat of war very seriously . Reporters sent to Seoul or Yeonpyeong have a tendency to end their reports withlines like, ‗but these people know that their lives could be changed by a rain of missiles in a matter of minutes,‘ or ‗Korea todaystands on the brink of all-out war.‘ Easy there, cowboy – you reporters only got off the plane at Incheon two days ago. Indeed, I

mentioned during the 2010 crisis that I thought the media was flirting with alarmism then too. That may be great for ratings butonly amps up the pressure on all parties. As the goading of North Korea into the Kaesong closure suggests, the media can generate aself-fulfilling prophecy if they hype the region as ‗at the brink of 1950 all over again.‘ (Let‘s thank god there was no Fox News during

the Cuban Missile Crisis.)¶ But if you listen to the analyst community, particularly thoseof us in Korea or with genuine local expertise, there is near unanimity thatthere will be no war. I have seen lots of my friends on BBC, CNN and other outlets in the last

few weeks, and we are all saying the same thing: there will be no war.¶ My own sense that

this is pretty well-known, but it is worth repeating: Pyongyang will lose a war – completely andquickly . As lots of analysts have been noting recently, North Korea‘s military is clapped out and

http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/10/north-korea-is-the-boy-who-cried-wolf-there-will-be-no-war/?all=true

http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/10/north-korea-is-the-boy-who-cried-wolf-there-will-be-no-war/?all=true





short on everything – food, fuel, spare parts. Indeed, one obvious reason for Pyongyang to acquirenuclear weapons is to shortcut the widening military gap between it and Seoul, much less the U.S. While we hear that the North

Korean People‘s Army (KPA) is the fourth largest force in the world, that might not actually be the case. Further, there are big questions as to its combat effectiveness and willingness to fight once the war turns and command-and-control begins to break down. (Today‘s U.S. military tends

to target command & control in conflicts with airpower. It is likely to do so in a second Korean conflict.) The KPA, like other,

erstwhile communist militaries, is postured around WWII and the Korean War. Huge amounts ofinfantry, tanks, and artillery would fight in massive battles like Kursk in 1943. But that is simplynot how the hi-tech U.S. and South Korean militaries will fight. North Korea isalmost completely lacking in the ‗C4ISR‘ (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,

reconnaissance) technologies that structure today‘s ‗networked battlefield.‘ All those North Korean teens with their ‗summer of 1914‘ spirit will find their divisions pummeled bystand-off strikes they can neither defend against nor respond to. Americanairpower in particular will be so dominant and intrusive, and Korea isgeographically so narrow, that any North Korean concentrations will beeasy targets. One could easily imagine Gulf War 1-style ‗roads of death‘ allover again.¶ (The one conventional ace-in-the-hole Pyongyang has is its special forces. Estimates go as high as 200,000, andit is widely thought they will land in South Korea on mini-subs and light planes, or pour through tunnels dug under the DMZ. [Infact DMZ tours will actually take you into a few of the tunnels the South has uncovered.] We assume these spec-ops forces will create behind the lines havoc, targeting bridges, power plants, etc. Given their Korean nationality, they will not have the ‗cultural fit‘problem of German soldiers who tried this on the Americans during the Battle of the Bulge.)¶ While North Korean artillery couldindeed devastate Kyeonggi, allied air power would target those firing tubes right from the start. Worse for North Korea, tens ofthousands of dead South Korean civilians would be a humanitarian catastrophe but would not shake the constitutional and material

foundations of the South. And it would immediately cost Pyongyang any remaining global sympathy. China inparticular would have no choice after such a civilian holocaust but toabandon North Korea to its fate. If China did not, it would immediatelyconfirm the fears of every neighboring state that it is a dangeroushegemonic aspirant, and it would face a very tight containment ring withJapan, India, and ASEAN working together.¶ A similar logic applies to aNorthern nuclear strike against the South. Estimates are that North Korea has between five and ten warheads with yields between five and ten kilotons each. (Those numbers come from U.S. and South Korean intelligence, but they

are soft.) That yield – the energy released by the atomic chain reaction – is about half that of the Hiroshima bomb, which killed morethan 100,000. A Northern strike would again create a humanitarian catastrophe,

but almost certainly not knock the South out of war. With fifty million people, SouthKorea could ride out even a full North Korean first strike and still fight.¶

Worse, large questions loom about whether the warheads could actually bedelivered. North Korea‘s air force is even more dated than its army, so we assume they would use a missile – hence all the

tests. But this is still tricky. Nuclear warheads must be miniaturized to fit; theearliest U.S. bombs were enormous. Precise targeting is hard; NorthKorean rockets may simply fall in the water. (This may seem unlikely, because South Korea is notthat far away. But those who remember the ‗throw - weight‘ debate of the Cold War will recall that the USSR regularly built very largeICBMs, because their guidance technology was so primitive. It is not hard to imagine this applies to North Korea as well.) Worse,

missile defense technologies are improving, and the U.S. has begun moving

such assets to the region. And finally, as with a conventional devastation ofSeoul, a nuclear strike would immediately cost Pyongyang all globalsympathy. Indeed, China might reckon at that point that nuke-using NorthKorea is so dangerous that it should actually help the Americans and SouthKoreans invade the country.¶ Lastly, a point rarely mentioned in the media coverage is that SouthKorea still has the death penalty. After a second Korean war, particularly ifit involves enormous civilian casualties in the South, most think there

would be war crimes trials. And given how awful North Korean human rights abuses are, there will likely be a





truth and reconciliation process that will probably not offer much reconciliation. In a North Korea collapsing under U.S.-Southernairpower and a ground advance, one could easily see the Kim family running for their lives as did the Gaddifis or Ceaușescus. AngryNorth Koreans might simply lynch them as happened to Mussolini, while captured elites would almost certainly face the hangman

like Saddam did.¶ In short, most analysts think a war is extremely unlikely. Pyongyang will lose – quickly and completely. This will not be 1950 all over again. If there is a second war, Seoul will push for a final resolution to the long

nightmare of North Korean orwellianism, and the U.S. will likely support that. China will be backed into a

corner, because North Korea‘s surv ival strategy depends on civilian counter-value strikes that will be intolerable to global

opinion. And no one in the Kim family wants to wind up like Gaddifi or Milosevic. While Dennis Rodman‘s new bff, Kim Jong-un,may be too young and naïve to know this stuff, I am all but positive, as are most in the analyst community, that the generals and Kim

Jong Il loyalists who surround KJU on the National Defense Commission do know this well.¶ 3. So What is the Pointof this Crisis?¶ Which brings us to this current crisis, where the regime‘s goals are once again very unclear. They

want no war, as they will lose it, badly and quickly, and then face thehangman. Hence I would say that this is simply more brinksmanship. I seefour possible reasons, which are not mutually exclusive:¶ Attention¶ I think John Hudson at Foreign Policy

gets it right that one goal is simply attention. A long-standing element of North Koreanideology is its evolution into a ‗strong and prosperous nation‘ with globalrespect, but in reality it is ‗Turkmenistan without the oil,‘ as a friend once put it at a conference. (That was my own experience

in North Korea as well; the place is falling apart.) And it is well-known now that the regime‘s real ideology is hyper-nationalism witha nasty racial element. Or, as your North Korean tour guide will tell you, ‗everyone knows we Koreans are best!‘ So prestige – the

sense that others are talking about North Korea, are aware of it, worry about it, respect it, and so on – is very important. As Oscar Wilde once put it, "the only thing worse than being talked about, is not being talkedabout." This is why North Korea gets ‗insulted‘ so easily. Especially for KJU,

new and dilettantish, global attention is an important way to verify to himself and hispeople that he is in fact the leader of a real country and not just thegangster-in-chief of the Korean version of the Corleone family (which he is).¶ Aid¶

The South Korean Sunshine Policy (1998-2007) was the good old days of post-Cold War North Korea. Soviet aid ended,provoking a terrible famine that nearly brought down the country in thelate 1990s. Chinese aid means the increasing economic colonization of the country . The Americans and theJapanese have gotten burned too often to come back to negotiations

without real concessions. So a return to Sunshine in which Seoul extended nearly unconditional aid would be

ideal. But last year, South Korean voters once again elected a conservative president. Traditionally North Koreatests new South Korean presidents with its hijinks. In this sense, the current crisisis ‗ritualized.‘ North Korea would have preferred a left- wing president; last year‘s leftist candidate promised a return tosome version of Sunshine. So one interpretation is that this crisis is an effort to bully the new president into aid.¶

Recognition of its Nuclear Status¶ Another possibility is that a nuclear crisisdemonstrates that Pyongyang has arrived as a nuclear state. North Koreahas ginned up its own little version of the Cuban Missile Crisis, high on themomentum of its nuclear and missile tests, and complete with all thediplomatic pomp-and-circumstance and global media attention befitting anuclear power. KCNA particularly has hammered away at the theme that North Korea is now a part of an elite club;nuclear weapons are, apparently, "the nation‘s life." Conversely, the other five members of the Six Party Talks (NK, SK, China, US,Japan, Russia) all want Pyongyang to denuclearize. Hence a regional nuclear crisis may serve to re-set the negotiating table so that

North Korean nukes are considered a part of the status quo.

They will never give them up, and thiscrisis is probably meant to tell us that.¶ The KPA Defends Military First¶ Finally,

my own kremlinological guesstimate is that this crisis actually reflects regime power jockeying.Under Kim Jong Il, the military‘s role was elevated, likely to forestall a coup. While Kim Il-Sung ruled the country through a well-established network of loyalists and did in fact fight during the Pacific War, KJI did nothing of the kind. So in the mid-90s, KJIcoopted the KPA through a ‗military -first policy‘ that moved North Korea from a party dictatorship toward military cronyism. TheKPA was elevated in the constitution and had preferential access to the budget. Indeed, this militarization contributed to the famine by stripping the civilian budget of funds. North Korean defense spending is reckoned to be a staggering 25-35% of GDP. (That figuretoo is a guess based on academic conferencing and such on this issue; there is no obvious way to verify it.)¶ So if Kim Jong-un is thereformer of rumor, or if he simply wants North Korea to be less dependent on China and so less vulnerable to its domination, a

reduction in military predation would be wise. It is not hard to imagine therefore that the





generals are struggling behind the scenes to gin up reasons why the KPAcontinues to require an enormous presence in the government andeconomy. An external crisis serves perfectly to demonstrate the KPA‘snecessity to North Koreans, to explain why they are poorer than their Southern cousins (which they know nowdue to the partial marketization and informal relations that have sprung up with China since the famine), and to remind the Kimfamily who is really in charge.¶ This does not mean a coup or shooting in the streets. Given the post-unification hangman‘s noose

that awaits all DPRK elites, there are strong incentives for all players to constrain factional jockeying to prevent regime collapse.That said, it is hard to imagine a youngster with no military or party experiencetaking over a Confucian-gerontocratic, militarized, ideological system withno establishment pushback . My own sense is that this crisis is the outcome of aninternal struggle over the new pecking order under Kim III. The military does not wantits privileges rolled back or civilian authority – of the party over the military – restored.





AT//North Korean Weapons Impact

Allegations are false – Cuba had aging defense weaponryFox News Latino 13(Fox News Latino, ―Fidel Castro Accuses Cuba Foes Of Lying About Arms On North Korea-Bound Boat" July 29, 2013 http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/07/29/fidel-castro-accuses-cuba-foes-lying-about-arms-

on-north-korea-bound-boat/, RLA)In a published letter over the weekend, former President Fidel Castro said Cuba's enemies were out tosmear the island nation by mischaracterizing the Cuban armaments seizedat the Panama Canal on a boat bound for North Korea.¶ In a letter dated July 26,

Castro alluded to allegations that Cuba may have violated U.N. sanctionsagainst the Asian nation, calling them an attempt to defame his country.¶ "Inrecent days there was an attempt to slander our Revolution, trying to portray (President Raul

Castro) as tricking the United Nations and other heads of state," Castro wrote.¶ Addressed to foreign leaders who attended Friday's celebration marking the 60th anniversary of the beginning of the CubanRevolution, the letter also reaffirmed Cuba's stated opposition to nuclear weapons.¶ The Panamanian government on July 16announced the discovery of missiles and other military equipment on the North Korean-flagged freighter Chong Chon Gang,

underneath a shipment of sugar.¶ Cuba said they were aging defensive weaponry including

surface-to-air missile systems, fighter jets and engines that were being sentto North Korea for repairs.¶ State-run website Cubadebate said Castro gave the letter to Venezuelan PresidentNicolas Maduro at a meeting between the two men Friday.¶ Cubadebate published photographs this weekend of Maduro and Castro, who wore a white warm-up jacket over a plaid collared shirt.¶ Castro was forced to step aside by a near-fatal intestinal condition in2006 in favor of his younger brother Raul, and is rarely seen in public these days.

Weapons were transported legally and in need of refurbishmentGladstone 13(Rick Gladstone, New York Times, "North Korea Says Freighter Carried Legal Load of Arms" July 17, 2013http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/world/americas/north-korean-ship-cuba.html?_r=0, RLA)

North Korea broke four days of silence early Thursday over a rusty North Korean freighter impounded by

Panama for concealing a load of Cuban weapons, insisting that they were transported legally anddemanding that the Panamanian authorities immediately release the vesseland its 35 detained crew members. A statement released by North Korea‘s Foreign

Ministry described the weapons as aging armaments that neededrefurbishment under a contract with Cuba. The statement also harshly criticized Panama for what itcalled that country‘s pretext of searching the vessel for narcotics and its violent treatment of the crew.¶ It was the first time the NorthKorean authorities had said anything about the seizure of the 450-foot Chong Chon Gang this past Sunday at the north entrance tothe Panama Canal, following what the Panamanians have described as a violent standoff with the crew members, who used cudgelsto attack a boarding party of Panamanian marines as the captain claimed he was having a heart attack and tried to commit suicide.

http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/07/29/fidel-castro-accuses-cuba-foes-lying-about-arms-on-north-korea-bound-boat/


http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/world/americas/north-korean-ship-cuba.html?_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/world/americas/north-korean-ship-cuba.html?_r=0







AT//South China Sea Impact

No Asian warBitzinger and Desker, 9[Richard, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Barry, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of

International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, ― Why East Asian War is Unlikely,‖ Survival | vol. 50 no. 6 | December 2008–January 2009]

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and

strategic stability . It contains some of the world‘s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the TaiwanStrait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, theManila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/DiaoyuIslands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of

strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all thesepotential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, iscertainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatistmovements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and

Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has

been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely . Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least movingtoward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula.

Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely toerupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent KuomintangParty victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-openinformal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships

between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is

no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateralorganisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace

and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ( APEC) forum, the Proliferation SecurityInitiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia,countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation –

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and culturaldevelopment, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional

Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely . This is not to say that the region will not undergo significant changes. The rise of China constitutes perhaps the most significant challenge to regional security andstability – and, from Washington‘s vantage point, to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The United States increasingly seesChina as its key peer challenger in Asia: China was singled out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as having, among the ‗majorand emerging powers … the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States‘.1 Although the United States has been

the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Second World War, it will probably not remain so over the next 25 years. Arising China will present a critical foreign-policy challenge, in some ways more difficultthan that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.2 While the Soviet Union was a political and strategic competitor,

China will be a formidable political, strategic and economic competitor. This

development will lead to profound changes in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. Still, the rise of Chinadoes not automatically mean that conflict is more likely; the emergence of amore assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China . While Beijingis increasingly prone to push its own agenda, defend its interests, engage in more nationalistic – even chauvinistic – behaviour (witness the Olympic torch counter-protests), and seek to displace the United States as the regional

hegemon, this does not necessarily translate into an expansionist or warlikeChina. If anything, Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully)





through existing avenues and institutions of international relations, particularly by co-opting these to meet its own purposes. This ‗soft power‘ process can be described as an emerging ‗Beijing Consensus‘ in

regional international affairs. Moreover, when the Chinese military build-up is examinedclosely, it is clear that the country‘s war machine, while certainly worth taking seriously, isnot quite as threatening as some might argue.





AT//Syria Impact

Tons of appeasement in the status quo – should‘ve caused the impactHanson ‗13 Victor Davis Hanson, the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a classicist and an expert on the

history of war. (Victor Davis, ―Obama‘s Bluster Pulpit‖, Hoover institution journal, July 3rd

,http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/150931)//RS The president‘s saber-rattling in the Middle East makes America look weakand puts the world in danger.¶ At the turn of the century, Teddy Roosevelt famously advised statesmen to―speak softly and carry a big stick.‖ Roosevelt assumed that the antithesis of his advice—loud threats without commensurateconsequences—might be more attractive for politically-minded leaders than often unpopular and difficult action. Also implicit inRoosevelt‘s advice was the presumption that if bluster or impotence could be dangerous for a leader, each multiplied the other incombination.¶ We still quote Roosevelt‘s warning over a century later because, given universal human nature, most Presidents andPrime Ministers prefer bluster to concrete consequences— believing they can achieve policy objectives on the cheap through wordsrather than deeds.¶ For instance, during the 444-day Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-81, President Jimmy Carter, before both adomestic and world stage, lectured, coaxed, and appeased the Iranian theocrats. He sometimes threatened them, and sometimesruled out the use of force. All the while, he could never quite decide whether the deposed Shah had been an ally, neutral, friend,enemy, or simple embarrassment. After April 1980, when Carter had finally dispatched an undermanned, poorly planned rescuemission that failed miserably, the Ayatollah Khomeini boasted to the world, ―America can‘t do a damn thing.‖ And it apparentlycould not. By 1980, an op-ed in the liberal Boston Globe criticized a Carter speech with the headline, ―More Mush From the Wimp.‖¶

In contrast, in August 1981, Ronald Reagan, without much flamboyance, carefully warned the striking Professional Air Traffic

Controllers Organization that their union demands were unrealistic, their strike contrary to federal law, and that they would all besummarily dismissed unless they returned to the work. The union, which had endorsed Reagan in the 1980 election, thought themild-mannered new president was bluffing. Most Americans did too. But he wasn‘t. Over 11,000 union strikers were fired—and for years banned from working as government air traffic controllers. The union was decertified. Reagan was willing to face air traveldisruption and furious criticism to establish the larger principle that public unions should not bully the federal government. Here orabroad, he was rarely again thought to be bluffing.¶ Most presidents are more resolute than Jimmy Carter and less firm than Reagan.George W. Bush, for example, meant what he said about the unpopular surge of troops into Iraq, which eventually quelled the violence of 2007-08. Yet in July 2003, when he taunted jihadists with, ―Bring ‘em on‖ at the start of the Iraqi insurgency, such braggadocio was not always followed by firm consequences. For example, the April 2004 abrupt pullback from the siege of Fallujahonly fuelled greater violence.¶ Unfortunately, after nearly five years in office, both President Obama‘s foreign rivals and his domesticcritics bet that his often saber-rattling rhetoric is mostly show. The more animated it sounds, the more observers assume that

presidential tough talk will yield to American indecisiveness.¶ Take the issue of Iranian nuclear proliferation. On fiveoccasions, Obama has thundered that the Iranian effort to produce anuclear weapon was unacceptable. He had announced deadlines for Iran todesist by September 2009, again by October, and then at year‘s end in 2009.His fourth deadline for Iran to come clean was supposed to be January2010. A fifth soon followed. Since then, Obama has repeatedly stated thatIran‘s proliferation was ―unacceptable.‖ One wonders why, and to whom?¶ By early 2012, Obamamaintained that he doesn‘t bluff, yet by September 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seemed troubled enough by the emptyrhetoric to remind the world that, ―The United States of America is not setting deadlines.‖ Almost immediately after, StateDepartment spokeswoman Victoria Nuland added the qualifier that, ―it is not useful to be… setting deadlines one way or the other

[or] red lines.‖¶ The same, predictable pattern followed with the unrest in Syria.In early April 2011, a month after an uprising against the dictatorship ofBashar Assad began, Obama ordered Assad to stop the ―abhorrent violencecommitted against peaceful protesters.‖ A few days later, Obama tried again,advising Assad to ―change course now.‖¶ By July, Obama had announcedthat the Syrian president had ―lost legitimacy.‖ Later in August 2011,

Obama talked of a transition to democracy in Syria. The same month,Obama upped his rhetoric even further by now demanding that Assad leave ,―For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.‖ Then for most of the next year, Obama met with foreign leaders, and summarized his talks with demands that the Syrian government cease its violence, that Assad leave, andthat any use of chemical weapons would earn a swift American response.¶ By March 2012, Obama gathered the Group of Eight atCamp David, where they collectively announced an ultimatum for political change in Syria. In July 2012, U.S. Ambassador to theUnited Nations Susan Rice announced that the Russian and Chinese vetoes of a U.N. Security Council resolution on Syria were both―dangerous and deplorable.‖¶ The same month, Obama again threatened Assad, predicting that the dictator would be heldaccountable should he make the ―tragic mistake‖ of using chemical weapons. For much of 2012, more redlines were drawn over theSyrian use of WMD. In a December 3 speech at the National Defense University, Obama summed up, ―I want to make it absolutelyclear to Assad and those under his command, the world is watching. The use of chemical weapons is and would be totally

http://www.reuters.com/subjects/united-nations?lc=int_mb_1001

http://www.reuters.com/subjects/united-nations?lc=int_mb_1001





unacceptable. And if you make the tragic mistake of using these weapons, there will be consequences and you will be held

accountable.‖¶ But by April 2013, in response to rumors of chemical weapons use,Obama was still warning that the Syrians use of WMD would be a ―gamechanger.‖ Since then, Obama has further warned Syria about chemical

weapons while debating whether the sporadic use of them constituteddefiance of one of the redlines he drew .¶ The terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, like

the Iranian nuclear program and the Assad regime, also earns frequent presidential tough talk. In January 22, 2009, the newlyinaugurated President Obama promised to close Guantánamo Bay within one year: to ―restore the standards of due process and thecore constitutional values that have made this country great even in the midst of war, even in dealing with terrorism.‖¶ Yet in thesummer of 2009, Obama granted a six-month extension to his newly formed Guantánamo closing commission. That delay lasted fornearly two years, as the President signed various executive orders, creating new review processes for detainees, ―to establish, as adiscretionary matter, a process to review on a periodic basis the executive branch‘s continued, discretionary exercise of existingdetention authority in individual cases.‖¶ By April 2011, Obama ordered terrorist mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed back toGuantanamo. In the words ofThe Washington Post, that decision marked ―the effective abandonment of the president's promise toclose the military detention center.‖ If, in January 2013, the State Department finally closed the office of the envoy for shutting downthe prison at Guantánamo Bay, Obama nonetheless reiterated in his recent Berlin speech that he would be ―redoubling our efforts to

close the prison at Guantanamo.‖¶ After years of such bluster about Guantanamo, Iran, andSyria, few are any longer listening. Former President Bill Clinton, for example, before a supposedly privateaudience, recently complained that the president risks appearing like ―a total wuss‖ over his inaction in Syria. The presidentfrequently adds familiar emphatics like ―make no mistake about it,‖ ―in point of fact,‖ and ―let me be perfectly clear‖ that inparadoxical fashion serve as tip-offs that consequences will not follow his tough rhetoric.¶ More recently, both China and Russia feelcomfortable ignoring American requests to extradite the 29-year-old leaker Edward Snowden, who fled to their respective jurisdictions after making public the National Security Agency‘s most sensitive protocols. Apparently neither took seriouslySecretary of State John Kerry and President Obama when both blustered for his immediate return, and then, when rebuffed,downplayed Snowden‘s significance.¶ It was not Neville Chamberlain alone who earned Winston Churchill‘s disdain for empty talk.Much earlier in 1936, Churchill had found that the government of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had proven impotent. AsChurchill put it,―So they go on in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drif t, solidfor fluidity, all powerful to be impotent. So we go on preparing more months and years—precious, perhaps, vital, to the greatness ofBritain, for the locusts to eat.‖ His point was that empty bluster is worse even than silence, assuring the enemy of habitual inaction, while lulling domestic constituencies to believe that readiness is assured.¶ What accounts for the great divide between Obama‘s version of Stanley Baldwin‘s lion roars and his pussy -cat follow ups? Obama‘s teleprompted eloquence is not the culprit. JimmyCarter was a dismal speaker and yet gave the same empty moral sermons and serial threats to his perceived enemies. In contrast,Ronald Reagan was a stellar speaker who preferred action to talk.¶ Obama‘s background as a long-time student, lawyer, law lecturer,and politician has led him to live in a world of words rather than of those concrete consequences found more often in the privatesector or in the landscape of the self-employed. Obama also talks grandly of world citizenry and the primacy of the United Nations asglobal negotiator. Accordingly, his speeches do not appreciate that friction and disputes are innate to human character.¶ Nor doesthe president grasp that one party to an argument is usually more culpable than the other, and encouraged in its aggression by aperceived lack of consequences. In the world of Barack Obama, what the Nobel Committee says—awarding Obama with a PeacePrize for his good intentions rather than past diplomatic achievements —should have some currency with a Bashar Assad, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or Vladimir Putin.¶ For Obama, disagreement is a product of misunderstanding or miscommunication, and thereforeresolved when reasonable people assemble to talk out and split their differences, particularly if encouraged by a sonorousmegaphone. The president seems oblivious that the Iranian theocracy is a mostly evil regime that wishes to stockpile nuclear weapons to carve out a greater Middle East theocratic hegemony at the expense of Western allies, or that Bashar Assad assumes,perhaps rightly, that he can cling to power by killing tens of thousands of his opponents, or that foreign leaders are not so muchconcerned that Guantanamo Bay is shut down as they are observant of whether its continuance or closure follow immediately from

Obama‘s promises.¶ After five years of empty loquacity and procrastination, the world—in scary places like Iran, Syria, Russia, China, and North Korea—hascaught on that when Obama pontificates about a redline or a deadline, theseare mere suggestions for further discussion and hardly guaranteed by thepower of an unpredictable and dangerous United States.

Contingencies check

Martinez ‗13 Luis Martinez is a producer for ABC News based in the Washington, D.C. bureau. Martinez covers military and national securityissues for ABC News at the Pentagon, where he works on topics ranging from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the annualPentagon budget. Luis Martinez is a producer for ABC News based in the Washington, D.C. bureau. Prior to becoming the Pentagonproducer in 2006, Martinez covered the State Department and the U.S. Senate for ABC News. Martinez began his career at ABC in1989 as a desk assistant. Since then he has worked as an assignment editor and a producer in the D.C. bureau, covering a variety ofnational issues in Washington. Martinez graduated from Columbia College with a bachelor's degree in history, 4/17/13[Luis, ―Hagel,Dempsey Detail US-Jordan Contingency Planning on Syria's Chemical Weapons‖ ABC News, http://news.yahoo.com/hagel-dempsey-detail-us-jordan-contingency-planning-syrias-001434491--abc-news-politics.html]Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey both warned Congress on Wednesday about the

unintended consequences of a U.S. military intervention in Syria. Hagel also provided the first details of the





Pentagon's efforts in assisting Jordan's military for the possibility of

having to secure Syria's chemical weapons stockpile, including $70 million

worth of training and equipment. ｶ Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee both Hagel and

Dempsey cautioned that a U.S. military intervention in Syria could have unintended consequences and should be reserved as a "last resort."ｶ Two yearsof fighting to bring down the regime of Syrian President Basher al Assad have killed an estimated 70,000 Syrians and created a million refugees.

Both Democratic and Republican senators on the committee haveadvocated the Obama administration consider some form of U.S. militaryassistance to assist the Syrian opposition in the form of a no-fly zone or theestablishment of a humanitarian aid corridor.ｶ " We have an obligation and responsibility to thinkthrough the consequences of direct U.S. military action in Syria," said Hagel. He added that "military intervention at this point could hinderhumanitarian relief operations. It could embroil the United States in a significant, lengthy, and uncertain military commitment."ｶ More importantly he warned that it could have "the unintended consequence of bringing the United States into a broader regional conflict or proxy war. " He stressed that

"the best outcome for Syria - and the region - is a negotiated, politicaltransition to a post-Assad Syria."ｶ He later used blunter language in describing how all factors should be weighed inconsidering a U.S. military option in Syria. "You better be damn sure, as sure as you can be, before you get into something, because once you're into it,there isn't any backing out, whether it's a no-fly zone, safe zone, protect these - whatever it is. Once you're in, you can't unwind it. You can't just say, well, it's not going as well as I thought it would go, so we're going to get out.ｶ Gen. Dempsey also told the committee that " before we take action, wehave to be prepared for what comes next." He noted that the use of force in an area like Syria where the ethnic and religious divisions "dominate" is"unlikely to produce predictable outcomes." He explained that such a scenario "is not a reason to avoid intervention in conflict, rather, to emphasize

that unintended consequences are the rule with military interventions of this sort." ｶ In his opening remarks Hagel presented themost detailed outline yet of American efforts in helping Jordan prepare forthe possibility of having to secure the Assad regime's large chemical

weapons stockpile should the regime collapse. For much of the past yearPentagon officials have declined to provide details about such efforts,instead making vague references about contingency planning with regionalpartners for such a scenario.ｶ Hagel told the committee that the Pentagon"has plans in place to respond to the full range of chemical weaponsscenarios." He disclosed that the U.S. has provided $70 million in fundingto Jordan "for training and equipment to detect and stop any chemical

weapons transfers along its border with Syria, and developing Jordaniancapacity to identify and secure chemical weapons assets."ｶ However, when Sen. John McCain

asked Gen. Dempsey if he was confident that American troops would be able to secure Syria's chemical weapons, Dempsey said, "Not as I sit here today,

simply because they've been moving it and the number of sites is quite numerous." ｶ According to Hagel, the U.S. military has

also prepared for other contingencies such as " the potential spillover of

violence across Syria's borders that could threaten Allies and partners ."

Furthermore, he said, the Pentagon had "been developing options andplanning for a post-Assad Syria," though he said he was not able to providedetails in public.ｶ Hagel also announced that last week he ordered thedeployment to Jordan of a headquarters element from the 1 st ArmoredDivision based at Fort Bliss, Texas.ｶ They will replace the several hundred

American military members from various units who have been in Jordan

since last summer working with the Jordanian military in contingencyplanning related to Syria's chemical weapons, humanitarian efforts andpreventing a spillover of violence from Syria into Jordan.ｶ A Defense officialsaid the headquarters will provide "a cohesive command and controlelement with our Jordanian counterparts." The official also said that if needed its structure would enable itto "be capable of establishing a Joint Task Force headquarters that would provide command and control for Chemical Weapons response, humanitarianassistance efforts and stability operations."ｶ Hagel also referred to the other forms of assistance the U.S. is providing to Syrian refugees and oppositiongroups. That includes $385 million in assistance to help ease the humanitarian and refugee crisis in Syria, as well as $117 million in non-lethalassistance to the Syrian opposition in the form of communications and medical equipment.ｶ The Defense secretary told the committee that he would be visiting Jordan next week as part of a Middle East tour that will see him making stops in Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.



