Apn 6 1 (print, pages)

INSIDE THIS ISSUE:Local Filmmaker Wins Best Documentary

Compassionate Plate: Greening NCCU

Thailand’s Military-Controlled Democracy

Integrating China into the Global Political Economy

Transitional Justice and Indigenous Land Rights

India-Taiwan’s “Win-Win” Situation

China’s Rights Defense Movement

Impact of Cross-Strait Economic Integration

Economic Interest vs. National Identity

Shonenko: Taiwanese Child Workers in Japan during WWII

The Perfect T-Bone

VOLUME 6 / ISSUE 1 / FALL 2014

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFLeon van Jaarsveldt

GRAPHIC DESIGNERJonathan Spangler

COORDINATORAngel Li

CONTRIBUTORSDavid BlundellMatthias Franziskus DurrerDharndhanate HansuksanulPiotr KurczewskiWojciech KusakBasak KutahyaJoseph Ventrelli LandgrebeKevin Wee LinMatthew PalJanet Tan

This issue’s cover photographs were taken by Piotr Kurczewski (top), the Taiwan Presidential Office (middle), and Yaoleilei (bottom, CC BY-SA 3.0). All other photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, attributed appropriately, and licensed as indicated. The text of the Asia-Pacific Newsletter is licensed as Creative Commons BY-NC-SA.

The Asia-Pacific Newsletter is a publication by the student body of the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan. It is purely amateur and informal collaboration, and it is a strictly non-commercial publication that is not for sale under any circumstances. We do not derive advertising or sales revenue, or donations of any kind.

Call for PapersThe Asia-Pacific Newsletter publishes a diversity of content created by IDAS/IMAS students and faculty as well as others interested in regional affairs. This content includes original research, opinion and editorial columns, book reviews, conference reports, alumni experiences, current events briefs, blurbs, photography, graphics, and other creative work. Submissions, including text and images, must not have been previously published in other media, either in print or online.

Text submissions should be sent in an editable format (not .pdf). Endnotes and bibliography should be kept to a minimum and follow the Chicago Manual of Style’s “Notes and Bibliography” system. Please include the citations in brackets directly in the text (i.e., [1]), and do not use the software-based footnote tools. Please also include a brief biosketch and portrait photo.

Submissions, questions, and other ideas for inclusion should be sent to [email protected] and CCed to the current editors: Jonathan Spangler ([email protected]) and Leon van Jaarsveldt ([email protected]).

For complete and updated Submission Guidelines, please visit:

goo.gl/eoVNz2

1 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

Contents

LETTERS

3 DAVID HOLMIDAS Director’s Welcome

4 TSOYU CALVIN LINIMAS Director’s Welcome

6 LEON VAN JAARSVELDTLetter from the Editor

PRESS RELEASE

7 DAVID BLUNDELLLocal Filmmaker Wins Best Documentary

CALL FOR ACTION

9 PIOTR KURCZEWSKI Compassionate Plate

PHOTO SERIES

13 PIOTR KURCZEWSKIGreen Taiwan

FEATURED ARTICLES

15 DHARNDHANATE HANSUKSANULThailand’s Military-Controlled Democracy

23 MATTHEW PALIntegrating China

27 JOSEPH VENTRELLI LANDGREBETransitional Justice and Indigenous Land Rights

33 KEVIN WEE LINIndia-Taiwan’s “Win-Win” Situation

35 MATTHEW PALChina’s Rights Defense Movement

41 MATTHIAS FRANZISKUS DURRERImpact of Cross-Strait Economic Integration

45 WOJCIECH KUSAKEconomic Interest vs. National Identity

51 BASAK KUTAHYAShonenko: Taiwanese Child Workers in WWII

ASAP COOKBOOK

53 JANET TANThe Perfect T-Bone

VOLUME 6 | NUMBER 1 | FALL 2014 • 2

The new academic year is nearly upon us, and we are looking forward to meeting new students, seeing old students again, and getting back into the swing of academic life in Muzha. It should be a busy and productive year. Vari-ous aspects of the current international situation give us ample material for live-ly discussion and debate. This is putting it mildly. At NCCU, we can tap into a lot of high-level expertise on a wide range of con-temporary problems, and in this we are very fortu-nate.

I would like to extend a particularly warm welcome to new students. You will find much here to delight you, as well as many things that you will find initially confusing or puzzling. As you have probably already

discovered, your best source of quick advice for navigating NCCU is Angel Li in the IDAS/IMAS Office. The OIC (Office for In-ternational Cooperation) is also

full of helpful people. Your fellow students are also a good source of advice.

The persistent summer heat will soon dissipate, and the weather will turn slightly cooler, though the high humidity will persist. This means it will soon become more comfortable to go out exploring the Taipei environment, which combines traditional and moder-nity in intriguing ways. It is no exaggeration to say that there is a surprise around every corner.

You will find Taipei a very safe place by all international indica-tors, though of course you should still make it a habit to check with fellow students, office staff or lo-cal people before you go wander-ing too far off the beaten track.

I wish everyone a happy and productive 2014 academic year.

David Holm

IDA

S D

irec

tor’s

Wel

com

e

Dr. David HolmDIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES

It should be a busy and

productive year. Various aspects

of the current international

situation give us ample material for

lively discussion and debate.


Dear IMAS students,

Welcome aboard!

The International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IMAS) at Na-tional Chengchi Univer-sity (NCCU) is a great big family formed by students from over 20 countries. As the world is getting flat, no matter in informa-tion, capital or talent, your decision to select IMAS will certainly enhance your horizon in international vision. While the Asia-Pacific region has increas-ingly attracted world-wide focus, the expertise and experience you gain in the IMAS program will even-tually become the precious niche in your professional career.

Besides the broad base of the student sources,

most of the faculty in our Asia-Pa-cific Studies received international education. Professors’ academic backgrounds range from political sciences, sociology, environmental issues to economic analysis, finan-

cial and housing markets in inter-national and Asia-Pacific perspec-tives. Students are free to select courses and thesis topics accord-ing to their own research interests.

In order to encourage our stu-dents to gain more international experiences, and expose them-selves to international academic society, our program provides scholarships for students to at-tend international conferences to present their research findings. Through the direct contact with the international academics and professionals, we have success-fully bridged our IMAS students with the future opportunity in both professional career and con-tinuing education.

Your choice to select IMAS is definitely a wise decision. I truly believe that your study journey in NCCU, Taiwan will be one of the most valuable and memorable ex-periences in your life. Cherish the moment and make the best while you are in IMAS!

Prof Tsoyu Calvin Lin, PhD

IMA

S D

irec

tor’s

Wel

com

e

Dr. Tsoyu Calvin LinDIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL MASTER’S PROGRAM IN ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES

The International Master’s Program

in Asia-Pacific Studies (IMAS) at

National Chengchi University (NCCU)

is a great big family formed by students

from over 20 countries.


The Asia-Pacific Newsletter is a student publication of the International Doctoral/Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS/IMAS) at

National Chengchi University.

To learn more about IDAS, IMAS, admissions, and the scholarships available, visit:

asiapacific.nccu.edu.tw


Dear all,

I would like to start here by first handing a warm welcome to all the new IDAS and IMAS students. We realise that the start-ing phase may at times by stressful, and we would thus invite you to contact any of the senior students, the staff in the IDAS of-fice, or Director Holm (IDAS) and Director Tsoyu Calvin Lin (IMAS). We all stand ready to help and advise, and thus wel-come you to contact any of us.

Once more, we have received many excellent articles for publication in the newsletter, both by former and current IDAS and IMAS students. We

would like to extend a heartfelt thanks for all those who contrib-uted, and we would like to encour-age you continual participation.

As mentioned before, we hope to increase the frequency of publica-tion, and can do so only with you help. We would like to welcome all our fellow students to participate, both as editors and authors, and by submitting any essays, photo essays, term-papers, recipes, and anything other submissions you think fellow students may be inter-ested in. For more information on submission guidelines, please refer to the ‘call for papers’.

As always, we hope that you will enjoy this edition of the ASAP newsletter, and we thank everyone for their participation and contri-bution: most notably the authors, and a special thanks to Jonathan Spangler for his excellent design-ing and layout skills. For more in-formation on current events, you can also refer to Jonathan’s weekly newsletters, and to the frequently updated conference postings by Dharndhanate.

All the best,Leon

Lette

r fro

m th

e Ed

itor

Leon van JaarsveldtEDITOR-IN-CHIEF, APN

PHD CANDIDATE, INTERNATIONAL DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES

Jonathan SpanglerGRAPHIC DESIGNER, APN

PHD CANDIDATE, INTERNATIONAL DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES


THE FILM

Arising Light tells the story of Dr B R Ambedkar (1891-1956), who rose from the community of the untouchable (dalit) in In-dia to educate himself in the United States and England. He became a national leader in India’s struggle for equality and justice. He framed the constitution that made India a secular state and gave inspiration for the dharma wheel emblem on the national flag. After independence in 1947, Dr Ambedkar became India’s first Minister of Law. In Oc-tober, 1956, at Nagpur, in the center of In-dia, with a multitude joining in, he embraced Buddhism.

This current life history film project is the story of this man, equal in stature in India to Gandhi and Nehru, yet not well known elsewhere. The film looks at the his-

torical implications of Dr Ambedkar’s social transformation vis-à-vis the legendary Saky-amuni Buddha’s own revolution 2,500 years ago regarding social and caste limitations and the quest for personal liberation.

THE UN VESAK FILM FESTIVAL

The United Nations International Film Fes-tival was just one of many Buddhist-themed activities held around Vietnam to com-memorate the United Nations Day of Vesak 2014, the major Buddhist festival of the year celebrating the birth, awakening, and passing away of the Buddha on one single day – sur-rounding the first full moon day in May.

The international film festival aims to ed-ucate as well as entertain the audiences in an engaging manner. The range of themes for

the festival is wide including films on social, contemporary, historical issues, and aspects related to Buddhism around the globe.

The organizing board and 2,500 volun-teers received around 10,000 participants, including 1,500 guests from 100 countries and 8,500 local Buddhists and visitors. Ac-tivities focused on numerous matters, the most prominent of which were Buddhist responses to sustainable development and social issues, including global warming and environmental protection, wholesome life-style, peacekeeping, and post-conflict recov-ery. APN

Professor David Blundell received his Ph.D. in Anthropology from the University of California. Dr. Blundell is the publisher of numerous ar-ticles and book regarding Buddhism in Asia and is currently a teacher at National Chengchi University in Tai-pei. Dr. Blundell received this year’s Best Documentary Film Award at the United Nations Vesak 2014 Film Fes-tival, which was held on May 8th in Vietnam.

Local Documentary Filmmaker Wins at United Nations Vesak 2014 Film FestivalBest Documentary Film Award goes to Arising Light

Dr David Blundell, Ph.DArising Light: Dr B R Ambedkar and a New Era in India, a film by David Blundell, Ph.D. Anthropology (University of California) and teaching at National Chengchi University, Taipei, received this year’s Best Doc-umentary Film Award at the United Nations Vesak 2014 Film Festival, 8th May in Vietnam. 47 countries submitted films related to Buddhist themes; the catego-ries were feature films, documentaries, short films, animated films, and TV series; each category short-listed 5 films for final competion. Sri Siddhartha Gautama (Sri Lanka) was judged the best film in the category of Feature Films. Other awards for Best Actress and Best Photogra-phy were given to Four Seasons (South Korea). The Best Animated Film award went to Monkey Hunter (South Korea). Thailand carried away the Best Art Direction award for its films Mindfulness and Murder. Best Short Film award went to The Void (Japan). The best TV Series was awarded to the Path to Enlightenment (Vietnam).

The film is the story of a

man, equal in stature in India to Gandhi and Nehru, yet not

well known elsewhere.


The film looks at the historical

implications of Dr Ambedkar’s social transformation vis-à-vis the legendary

Sakyamuni Buddha’s own

revolution 2,500 years ago regarding

social and caste limitations and the quest for personal

liberation.

Professor David Blundell receives the Best Documentary Film Award at the

United Nations Vesak 2014 Film Festival in Vietnam.

Photo: Jeanette Zerneke

PRESS RELEASE


INDUSTRIALIZED LIVESTOCKLivestock suppliers are no longer small farm owners who provide animal products for the local market, but have long been replaced by powerful industrial corporations that have turned the production of meat and dairy products into huge business empires that encompass the globe. These changes in the structure of food production mirror the growing appetite for animal products. The natural dynamic has always been that when people become wealthier, they tend to con-sume more expensive types of food. At the turn of the century the continuous increase in global meat consumption has been mainly due to the developing countries, especially

China and India, which have been witness-ing an explosion in terms of rapid economic growth. An analysis published in 2011 by Environmental Working Group, titled the Meat Eater’s Guide to Climate Change and Health, suggested that if the current worldwide trend continues, the global production of meat will double by 2050-- based on the data showing that in 2010 worldwide production of meat was three times higher than in 1971, while at the same time global population grew by 81 percent. The associated problem of GHG emissions is therefore expected to follow suit.

These livestock contributions to global warming have two facets. First, raising ani-

mals on an industrial scale results in exten-sive production of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), which trap solar energy in the atmosphere thus warming the earth’s surface. Second, since intensive farming re-quires further deforestation, the entire pro-cess reduces the number of trees that exhibit natural ability of absorbing CO2 through photosynthesis.

But what is actually the exact link between the process of raising the farming animals and emission of greenhouse gases? Most im-portantly, it has to do with the physiological processes inside the animal’s gastrointestinal tract. When a cow eats food, her digestive track produces certain amount of methane (a greenhouse gas 23 times more powerful than CO2), as a by-product of the microbial fer-mentation that breaks down carbohydrates into simple molecules that can be digested by the animals. Methane is released into the atmosphere whenever the cow excretes. The process of enteric fermentation is charac-teristic to ruminants, which include cows, buffaloes, sheep and goats, and is the single largest source of emission, contributing al-most 40 percent of the total of greenhouse gases in the livestock sector. Other farming animals are monogastric and either produce marginal amounts of methane, like pigs, or don’t produce it at all, like chickens and other poultry. It has been estimated that every day one dairy cow, which generates slightly lower amounts of GHG than beef cattle, produces 700 liters of methane, as reported by David Davis interviewed in the documentary Meat the Truth in 2008. This is comparable to the emission of CO2 produced by a 4x4 car cov-ering a 45-mile distance. During just one year the environmental impact of one cow is the equivalent of a 70,000-kilometer car trip; to put things in a local scale, a car trip that would circle around the island of Taiwan over 44 times, based on the length of the island’s coastline. Globally, 81 percent of livestock GHG emissions is attributed to ruminants, with the highest share going to beef cattle, followed closely by dairy cattle, while the rest go to monogastric animals. This means that eating steak, cheese or drinking cow milk leaves a statistically greater footprint on the environment and climate than eating eggs, chicken drumsticks or pork sausage.

Furthermore, raising any kind of live-stock creates the necessity of storing and processing the animal manure. Methane and N2O, which has 300 times greater warming effect than carbon dioxide, emissions from manure represent about 10 percent of the

Compassionate PlateSmall changes at NCCU could make a big impact on the environment.

Piotr KurczewskiThe majority of the population, when asked about the causes of global warming, will most likely point to the cars we drive, the planes we fly in, the factories that produce our various goods, or the power plants that supply keep our refrigerators working 24/7. Certainly, these are some of the main causes behind the emission of greenhouse gasses (GHG), but one very essential determinant of the current environmen-tal crisis is often forgotten, and interestingly not mentioned in the fa-mous Davis Guggenheim’s movie An Inconvenient Truth (2006). This of-ten forgotten factor is livestock farming, which has been shown by the widely-cited FAO report, Livestock’s Long Shadow, to emit 18 percent of the global greenhouse gases, overshadowing that of the transportation sector which amounts to “only” 13 percent. The more recent publica-tion, the 2009 Livestock and Climate Change, authored by R. Goodland and J. Anhang, estimates that livestock account for 51 percent of all human-caused GHG emissions. Both reports, although essential for bringing the issue of food production to the public attention in the context of battling the global warming, have received some alarming criticism in being too conservative in their calculations. In 2013, the FAO pub-lished a new assessment based on “improved data sets” and attributed 14.5 percent of all human-induced GHG emissions to livestock supply chains. Clearly, scientists hold different views on what is the exact pro-portion of livestock’s contribution to global warming. Nevertheless, it has been already widely acknowledged that it is possible, and advis-able, to cut down on the consumption of animal-based food in order to avert the environmental damage inflicted on Planet Earth by humans.


sector’s emissions, as reported by the FAO. But regardless of their ability, or inability, to produce methane, all farming animals share one common characteristic – they need to be fed with feed crops. When calculated en masse, all elements (including fertilizer, feed and land-use change) associated with pro-duction, processing and transport of feed, account for about 45 percent of the sector’s emissions.

FEED PRODUCTION

Feed production raises another problem that is indirectly associated with global warming – deforestation. Cutting down the trees on a massive scale is carried out for the purpose of land cultivation and the production of feed crops, as well as for providing animals with pasture. These forests have an essential function in purifying water, regulating the climate and mitigating the effects of natural disasters. Rainforests play an especially im-portant role in curbing global warming as they absorb and store large amounts of CO2 discharged into the atmosphere. Yet, they are also the most vulnerable of all the forests on the planet. Brazil, which houses the biggest rainforest area on Earth, is at the same time the second biggest world producer of soy-bean, the production of which skyrocketed from 1 million tons in 1969 to 63 million

tons in 2009 as discussed in An overview of the Brazil-China soybean trade and its strategic impli-cations for conservation, published by The Na-ture Conservancy in 2010. Every year tens of thousands of hectares of forests are re-moved and replaced with soy fields. In 2000, the biggest importer of Brazilian soybean was the European Union at 64%, while Chi-na accounted for 15%; by 2009 China ranked as the first destination with 56%, while the share of EU’s import dropped to 30%.

Apart from deepening the severity of global warming, there are several other in-credibly important aspects of livestock production that take a toll on the natural environment. While considering these as-pects, one easily comes to the conclusion that the sustainability of a livestock-based diet is much lower than of that pursued by vegetarians. First of all, production of ani-mal products leads to depletion of natural resources such as drinking water. Robert Goodland, in “Environmental sustainability in agriculture: diet matters”, estimated that it takes on average over 22,000 liters of wa-ter to produce 1kg of meat. To match this, one person would have to drink one 1.5 L bottle of water per day continuously for 40 years! In comparison, the production of 1 kg of grain and vegetables consumes less than 1700 and 850 liters of water, respectively. In this context, it is important to remember

During just one year the

environmental impact of one

cow is the equivalent

of a 70,000- kilometer car

trip.

Livestock farming is a leading cause of carbon emissions.

Photo: Fernando de Sousa / CC BY-SA 2.0

CALL FOR ACTION


that according to IPCC, by 2100 about 2.5 billion people will suffer from a scarcity of fresh water.

SOIL EROSION

Another important problem linked to pro-duction of meat and dairy, is that of soil erosion. When we compare production of proteins based on meat and plants, it turns out that the land requirements for the lat-ter are on average 10 times smaller than for the former, as discussed by C. Leitzmann in “Nutrition ecology: the contribution to vegetarian diets.” Livestock production uses 70 percent of all agricultural land on Earth, which accounts for nearly one third of the land surface of the planet. Excessive use of land for crops production, to, for instance, supply the Americans’ demand for animal protein-- which exceeds 9 billion livestock yearly, requires nearly 150 million acres of cropland, which is an area twice the size of Italy (almost 17 times that of Taiwan!). This leads to rapid loss of soil, which in many countries advances at a rate several times above the sustainable rate. This is a serious concern, as it takes approximately 500 years to replace 25 mm of soil.

To regain some portion of nutrients washed away from soil within a shorter time, farmers turn to using commercial fertilizers. Application of fertilizers, however, increases pollution of groundwater, rivers, lakes and

oceans, and is additionally accelerated by leaking facilities designed to store animal manure, as is also the case when too much of the manure is spread on farm fields as a natural fertilizer. Management of animal ma-nure also affects air quality, which is degrad-ed by dust, smog odors and toxic gases, such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, which is released during the process of decomposing waste.

It has been estimated that 30 percent of the earth’s land surface used today for the purpose of raising livestock, served in the past as habitat for wildlife. Most of the world’s endangered species are threatened with habitat loss in the areas where livestock is a factor. Depletion of biodiversity by live-stock sector occurs due to deforestation, land degradation, water and air pollution, cli-mate change, overfishing, and sedimentation of coastal areas and facilitation of invasions by alien species. Deforestation is the major driver of biodiversity erosion, which has to do with the fact that producing 1 kg of meat leads to removal of 50 square meters of rain-forest.

SUSTAINABLE LIVING

To sustain the growing human population, it is imperative to provide every human being with a sufficient amount of nutrients. Tra-ditionally, meat has been considered as the most important source of valuable proteins,

Although Taiwan is famous for its extensive vegetarian buffets and high population of vegetarians, the NCCU campus does not have one.

Photo: Takoradee / CC BY-SA 3.0

75% of the global soybean crops and 40-50% of cereals, currently used to feed the livestock, and half of the grain fed to animals would be more than enough to feed all the hungry people on the planet.11 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

but recently this belief has come into conflict with the realization that emission of green-house gases attributed to food production had made it unsustainable in comparison to the much lower CO2 outputs of vegetable-based products. For example, is has been found that the production of 1 kg of beef generates 27 kgs of CO2e, which is equiva-lent to 13.5 kgs cheese, 12.1 kgs of pork, 6.9 kgs of chicken, 6.1 kgs of canned tuna, and 4.8 kgs of eggs-- all calculated in terms of CO2e, which is a weighed measurement of their impact on global warming. By contrast, it takes only 2.9 kgs of CO2e to produce 1 kg of potatoes and 2 kgs of CO2e to produce 1 kg of tofu/broccoli/dry beans, a much more sustainable number-- as calculated by the Envi-ronmental Working Group in 2011.

Another way of looking at it, a grain-fed cow needs to consume 7 kg of grain to produce a single kilo-gram of live weight. To produce the same amount of meat from a pig, it needs to consume 4 kg of grain, and for a kg of cheese a dairy cow needs to consume 3 kg of grain. This shows that conversion of grain into food derived from animals is a highly inefficient way of producing calories and utilizing the natural re-sources. 75% of the global soybean crops and 40-50% of cereals, cur-rently used to feed the livestock, and half of the grain fed to animals, would be more than enough to feed all the hungry people on the planet, making an even stronger case for changing our dietary habits.

Scientists from Global Footprint Net-work, an independent multinational think tank, estimated that on August 19th (the so-called ‘Earth Overshoot Day’) humans have exhausted nature’s budget (i.e., the area of land and water available to produce renew-able resources and absorb CO2 emissions) for the entire year of 2014. This means that right now we are living on credit. Thus tak-ing the above data in a broader perspective, we would need the capacity of more than 1.5 Earths to satisfy our appetite for renewable ecological resources.

CONCLUSION

Adequate and prompt addressing of the re-source scarcity shall not only help to eradi-cate hunger, but also maintain social stability of the world countries, as well as lower the

probability of war between them. In fact, the problem of ecological deficit is becoming in-creasingly interrelated with political stability and national security. This relationship is well understood by more and more politicians. As was noticed by Carter Roberts, the president and CEO of World Wildlife Fund and the author of On Borrowed Time, the choice faced today by global policy makers in the context of the environmental crises is twofold – they

can embrace either a proactive or reactive approach. The former focuses on pursuing sustainability through smart management, and the latter centers around responding to conflicts that have already broken out.

But our growing dependence on Earth’s natural resources, including water, soil, air and fossil-fuels (and, ultimately, food as a fi-nal product of them all) should be candidly reconsidered individually by every Earth dweller. We can no longer rely on develop-ment as a remedy to an emerging environ-mental crisis. Neither can we expect that solutions designed by the governments or international organizations will suffice to tackle the issues at hand and reverse this calamitous trend. I believe that we need to start pursuing our own private sustainabil-ity much more mindfully and wholeheart-edly than ever before. The time has come to think about others. About those who suffer

from hunger, but would not have to if we quit eating animal products. This statement goes as well for those who will come after us, for our children and grandchildren; provid-ing to them also a hope of living their lives at the level we enjoy today in the better-off countries, and saving animals who could and should be saved from mass-scale slaughter. Compassionate love towards those we nor-mally do not care about is necessary to real-

ize that what we put on our plate has a colossal impact on our and their futures. Such enlightening realization should be followed by concrete actions rather than short-lived declarations.

There is at least one “concrete action” that we, students of Na-tional Chengchi University, can pursue. To mobilize the school au-thorities to set up a vegetarian buf-fet on campus, taking a small step in the right direction. By achiev-ing this goal we would instill green spirit into school life. Taking a step to empowering everyone willing to reduce her/his ecological footprint. Granting also to the university a gain in reputation as a green Uni-versity, one that takes care of its students’ health. APN

Piotr Kurczewski is a third-year PhD student with the International Doctoral Pro-gram in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University. His research fo-cuses on the motivation for

environmental volunteering. In June he initiated an Internet campaign called “NCCU Goes Green” aimed at convincing NCCU authorities to es-tablish a veggie buffet on campus. He turned vegetarian in September 2013. More recently he has started a blog (greentonio.com) where he will be discussing the advantages of a vege-tarian lifestyle and the need of treat-ing Mother Earth with respect. In the meantime he indulges by spending time outdoors, photographing the beauty of Taiwan, its nature and peo-ple.

Taiwanese vegetarian buffets offer nutritious foods for people of all tastes.

Photo: Piotr Kurczewski

CALL FOR ACTION


Green TaiwanPiotr Kurczewski


Clockwise, from top left: (1) Nails are driven into the heart of a tree in Taipei.

(2) The veins of a banana leaf provide it with an organized structure. (3) Palm

leaves team up tightly to absorb energy from the rays of the sun. (4) Raindrops bead up on leaves. (5) Foliage protects

a lizard from the sun and the eyes of passers-by.

Photos: Piotr Kurczewski


FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1938–44 AND 1948–57)After the 1932 revolution, Thailand’s mili-tary asserted the rightfulness of its political and economic dominance. It depicted itself as unifying the nation, largely by uphold-ing royal authority. Accordingly, the Gener-als have historically occupied or controlled both directly, and indirectly, the premierships of defense, finance, and interior. However, the culmination of one’s successful military career is not the supreme commander posi-tion in the army; it is to be Thailand’s Prime Minister, including business positions, as re-ported by William Case in his article “Thai-land: An Unconsolidated Democracy.” Thi-tinan Pongsudirak stated that the military is one of the “non-elected holy trinity”, where the remaining are the monarchy and the bu-reaucracy.

After the Siamese Revolution, Field Mar-shal Phibunsongkhram emerged as the po-litical leader. He forced the group to reward him with the post of Minister of Defence. In his first major speech as Minister, he ar-gued that Siam possessed four basic politi-cal institutions – monarchy, Assembly, bu-reaucracy, and military – of which only the military was “abiding and permanent”. Lat-er, Phibunsongkhram’s ministry produced a propaganda film “Luat Thahan Thai” (The Blood of the Thai Military) to popularize the idea of the military’s central role in the state. Thailand was never officially colonized by Western powers, among its Southeast Asian counterparts, so the Thai Military has always been rather distinctive because Thai army could not claim credit for having freed the nation from colonization. As a result, the Thai army tried to play a particularly strong role in nation building and the institutional development of the state. After 1932’s over-throw of the absolute monarchy, the military has perceived itself as the guardian of the nation and concentrates mainly on domestic enemies, claiming to protect the state and, at the same time, extending its power networks in Thai politics, as reported by Pasuk Phong-paichit and Chris Baker in their article “Thai-land: Economy and Politics.”

In October 1933, the Minister of De-fense argued that “keeping the peace” had become the “single most important prob-lem” and hence soldiers “who existed for the nation alone” had to be at the center of poli-tics. Despite the persistence of budget prob-lems, the military demanded and secured a large rise in the military allocation. From 1933 to 1937, the military consumed 26 per

From Révolution Française to Siamese RevolutionThe Development of Underdevelopment of Thailand under Military-Controlled Democracy

Dharndhanate Hansuksanul

“To learn who rules over you, simply find out who you are not allowed to criticise.”

— Voltaire

This short article examines the democratic development of the King-dom of Thailand after the termination of absolute Monarchy in 1932. Most articles study purely economic or political development dimen-sions and conclude simply that the political instability of Thailand oc-curred because of the power struggles or power conflicts between oust-ed ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the Royalist opposition. This article argues reversely that the political instability in Thailand has occurred because the democratic development has been abused by the military since 1932 till the present day. Thailand’s democractic development is underdeveloped and should be correctly named “Mil-itary-Controlled Democracy”. To this purpose, the theory “Develop-ment of Underdevelopment” will be applied and secondary resources such as articles in journals and newspapers will be used to support its application. This Theory proposes that the core, Bangkok, tends to be developed and the periphery, the North, Northeast and Deep South areas, tend to be underdeveloped. This article then argues that this disparity eventually leads to conflict between two groups: the Core, Royalist Network and the Periphery, pro-democracy majority. The sig-nificant goal is to propose a new explanation to the existing arguments that the political instability and economic recession of Thailand are the products of the development of underdevelopment under “Mili-tary-Controlled Democracy”. The French Revolution has given birth to liberty, equality, fraternity and democracy in France, but the Siamese Revolution has established military-controlled democracy that causes the development of underdevelopment in the Kingdom.


cent of the total national budget. Three years later, the total number of military personnel almost doubled. The military also possessed the new mass media of radio. It used these stations to broadcast a political ideology, in which the military as the indispensable in-stitution of the state. In December 1938, Phibunsongkhram removed the senior mili-tary officers and occupied position of Prime

Minister. He took over not only as Premier, but also the key Ministries of Defence and the Interior, including as leader of the army. Twenty members of his Cabinet were from his military coup group. The proportion of the national budget transferred to the mili-tary rose to 33 per cent.

By the early 1940s, Pridi Phanomyong had emerged as the key figure to oppose

the military domination. Pridi saw the 1932 revolution as more than the obliteration of royalist elites. He studied law and political economy and earned a doctorate in Law from Paris, France in 1927. In his manifes-to, which he distributed on the day of the revolution, he thought that the overthrow of ancien régime would open the door for wider participation in economic progress and in politics of the people. He supported the idea of egalitarianism and social justice against

royal privilege, and economic development against economic exploitation. He supported the socialization of agricultural land. In his 1932 manifesto, he severely criticized the ab-solute monarchy of exploitation of people through excessive taxation, denied them ac-cess to education in order to maintain their subservience, and treated them “as slaves…as animals…not as human beings… the king carries of many millions for personal use

Despite the persistence

of budget problems,

the military demanded

and secured a large rise in

funding. From 1933 to 1937,

the military consumed 26

per cent of the total national

budget.

Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (1938–44, 1948–57)

Photo: U.S. Government

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each year. As for the people, they have to sweat blood in order to find just a little mon-ey.” Pridi went on to assert that “our country belongs to the people, not to the king, as has been deceitfully claimed. Everyone will have equal rights and freedom from being serfs and slaves of royalty. The time has ended when those of royal blood farm on the backs of the people.”

In mid-1944, six days after the fall of To-jo’s militarist Cabinet in Japan, other mem-bers of the 1932 coup group maneuvered Phibunsongkram out of the Prime Minis-ter seat and formed a new government. In March 1946 Pridi became the first popularly elected Prime Minister. After King Rama VIII was found dead from gun wounds on 9 June 1946, Pridi was unjustly held re-sponsible because of his earlier radicalism and reputed republican sympathies. Conse-quently, in August he was forced to resign. Phibunsongkhram returned to the political arena. After the army staged a coup d’état on 8 November 1947, the coup ousted Pridi and his supporters and that put an end to the People’s Party era in Thai politics. Pridi remained exile in Paris, France until the end of his life.

Phibunsongkram repealed Pridi’s Consti-tution and wrote another to limit the power of the elected Assembly. It reintroduced a nominated Senate, allowed military and bu-reaucrats to sit in Parliament and the Cabi-net, and increased the constitutional power of the King. In April 1948, Phibunsongkram retuned as Prime Minister. One year later, the north-eastern MPs organized demon-strations demanding better economic treat-ment for their region and petitioned Phi-bunsongkram to provide 202 million baht of development funds for the region. They protested against the centralization of pow-er and wealth in Bangkok. In the past, the Bangkok rulers had treated the north-east as conquered provinces and looked down on them. On 29 November 1951, the Phi-bunsongkhram’s group announced over the radio that it had sacked the civilian Cabinet, abrogated the constitution, dissolved the Parliament, banned political parties, and out-lawed political meetings. They explained that the military coup was necessary to defend the nation, religion, monarch and constitu-tion from the threat of communism. They restored the 1932 constitution, which al-lowed the military junta to occupy Cabinet posts and to appoint the members of the As-sembly. The new Cabinet consisted mostly of military officers.

FIELD MARSHAL SARIT THANARAT (1958-1963)

Phibunsongkram’s political supremacy came to an end in September 1957 when Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the army command-er in chief, launched a military putsch to overthrow the Phibunsongkhram’s govern-ment. Sarit then launched another military coup in 1958 to establish absolute military rule; in particular to restore the monarchy’s role. After Sarit’s death in December 1963, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn became Prime Minister (1958, 1963–71, 1972–73) and Field Marshal Prapas Charusathien, the army commander in chief, was appointed as deputy prime minister. Thailand was ab-solutely controlled by these two powerful military leaders. By the early 1970s, there was growing opposition to Thanom’s rule amid allegations of human rights violations,

rampant corruption, and nepotism. Key fig-ures in his regime included his son, Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, and Narong’s father-in-law, Praphas Charusathien; these men be-came known as the “Three Tyrants” in Thai history.

In early October 1973, students led a popular mass uprising against the military dictators. This uprising is seen as the be-ginning of “true democracy”. More than 500,000 pro-democracy protesters marched toward the military’s headquarters, pressing Thanom and Prapas to resign, the military government used force to suppress the pro-testers, which resulted in the deaths of over 100 students. Several government buildings were burnt in the process. Finally, the cur-rent King appeared on state-run television on 14 October 1973, informing the public that Thanom had resigned as Premier, and fled the country. The King appointed Sanya

Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1958 -1963)


Thammasak as Prime Minister (1973-1975). The 14th October 1973 uprising incident put an end to two decades of military dictator-ship. Still, the military prepared to reassert control by force. Rendering the democrati-zation process after the 14 October incident fragile and short-lived.

On 19 September 1976, Thanom re-turned to Thailand. Myriads of students from various universities gathered to dem-onstrate against the former military dictator. Another military coup occurred shortly, on the morning of 6 October 1976, which fol-lowed the most brutal massacre of students (shooting, lynching, and beatings) in Thai history at Thammasat University, ending three year of civilian government. Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryu appeared on television and announced that the military leaders did not want power and would “lead the coun-try toward a form of democracy under the king...in the future.” The admiral said the need for a military takeover was brought about by a group of university students who insulted Thailand’s royal family and occupied heavy, destructive weapons used in war. The police said that they found several “Viet-namese looking” youths among the 4,000 to 5,000 students. In addition, the national con-stitution, Thailand’s first democratic charter, adopted in 1974, was abolished.

After Sarit’s death, he was found to have assets of over 2.8 billion Baht. The courts eventually ruled that he had stolen 394 mil-lion Baht from the Prime Minister’s secret fund, 240 million Baht from the Lottery Bu-reau and 100 million Baht from a percent-age of lottery sales revenue earmarked for the army. He had interests in 45 companies and occupied over 20,000 rai of land. Much of this laid along the new roads which Sarit’s government built across the Northeast with US funding. Some of the golf courses re-cently built in areas, which ought to be pro-tected forest, are owned by heirs, as reported by Chang Noi in “A Basic Course in Sarit Studies.”

GENERAL PREM TINSULANONDA (1980-1988)

From 1980 onwards, General Prem Tin-sulanonda, selected by the King as army commander and later Prime Minister from 1980-1988, had established a new system of government in which the military shared power with parliament through the media-tion of the monarchy. The royal family trust-ed Prem absolutely. Prem is the Statesman and the President of the King’s Privy Coun-

cil. He served as effectively as Thailand’s director of human resource. At each criti-cal juncture in 1980, 1983, and 1986 – royal support was the key to Prem’s securing the Premier position. Significantly, he is the ar-chitect of royalist networks. Duncan McCa-rgo, in “Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand,” shows how he has gen-erated personal ties with a number of large conglomerates, such as Bangkok Bank, one of the largest Bank’s in Southeast Asia, and the Charoen Pokphand Group (CP), one the largest agribusiness, retailing, and telecom-munication companies in Asia.

Prem’s royalist network has emerged as a club for the rich and powerful, implying that the prevalent practice of nepotism sig-nificantly predated the Thaksin era. The long intimate relations between the palace and the military were not a new phenomenon. The military had for long time claimed as its main responsibility the safeguarding the one of the ultimate symbols of the Thai na-tion – the monarchy. Before 1932 Siamese Revolution, the kings needed the military to support their reforms and to defeat their en-emies, but the post-1932 era monarchy has been indispensable for the military to ratify its missions in politics. In fact, they needed one another. Paul Handley, author of The King never smiles: a Biography of Thailand’s Bhu-mibol Adulyadej, interpreted that Prem’s inti-mate relations with the conglomerates were in fact born out of the royalist elites’ desire to co-opt the kingdom’s wealthiest family for their power and interests.

It is widely known that he, Prem, is the honorary chairman of the Bangkok Bank and was invited to join the CP Group’s ex-ecutive board. Later, Prem was accused of playing a role in the coup against Thaksin and helping to arrange financing through the Bangkok Bank for a golf course on the Khao Soi Dao Wildlife Sanctuary in southeastern Thailand. Many of these allegations of il-legal business involved both Prem and the Bank. Chatri Sophonpanich, the Bangkok Bank chairman and owner, is a close friend of Prem. After 8 years in power, Prem faced both popular pressure to resign and a coup attempt.

Democracy seemed to start again after General Chartichai Choonhavan became the first civilian elected Prime Minister (1988-1991) since 1976. During his reign, Char-tichai tried to dismantle the machine Prem and the royalist network had built. He used the policy of turning the battlefields in In-dochina into “marketplaces” for Thailand, which reduced the military’s influence on

During his reign,

Chartichai tried to dismantle the machine

Prem and the royalist network

had built. He used the policy

of turning the battlefields in

Indochina into “marketplaces”

for Thailand, which reduced

the military’s influence on

foreign policy and economic

interests. For the first time,

the military and royalist’s power networks were

under threat.

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foreign policy and economic interests. For the first time, the military and royalist’s pow-er networks were under threat. Nonetheless, the vicious circle came back, and Chartichai was criticized for rampant corruption. A military coup followed to smash the demo-cratic government. Again, the military junta claimed that their objective was to demolish the corrupted government but the major-ity believed that the junta was motivated by political and economic interests. The mili-tary junta appointed Anand Punyarachun, a former diplomat and the chairman of the Board and Director of Siam Commercial Bank (SCB) since 1984 till the present day, as Prime Minister (1991-1992).

ROYALIST HEGEMONY

Jim Glassman, in “Cracking Hegemony in Thailand: Gramsci, Bourdieu and the Dia-lectics of Rebellion,” indicates that the Roy-alist Hegemony relates to the royalist elites and their role in politics and economy of Thailand, while the royalist elites encompass members of the palace, and more extended Royalist Networks, containing the King’s Privy Council, the Crown Property Bureau, the royalist military elites, and key figures in the bureaucracy, judiciary and amongst the Democrats. The King’s Privy Council con-sisted mostly of retired military leaders and members of the royal family. The Crown Property Bureau (CPB) is an investment arm of the palace. As reported by Forbes and by the PTT Natural Gas Distribution Company Limited, CPB is the major shareholder of the Siam Commercial Bank (SCB), the Siam Cement Group (SCG), the German hotel group Kempinski AG, The Petroleum Au-thority of Thailand (PTT), and the owner of the most incalculable commercial land in the Kingdom, which dominates the country’s political economy. The Crown Property Bu-reau is one of the most powerful business groups in Thailand. In 2008, Forbes unveiled that the Crown Property Bureau Hold-ings was estimated at US$ 35 billion. So, as Forbes concluded: “The value of the crown property is considerable, but putting an exact figure on it is difficult,”

Another salient royalist network was the “Dusit 99”. It was the business com-munity, holding regular meeting at the Dusit Thani Hotel. This group had a “big capital-ist”, beginning in 1974. “Dusit 99” was led by Kasem Chatikavanij, an uncle of former Democrat Party Finance Minister Korn Cha-tikavanij and a supporter of the Yellow Shirt movement. The network’s secretary was Air

General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988)

Photo: Government of Thailand / CC BY 2.0


Chief Marshall Kamthon Sindhavananda, who became the King’s Privy Councillor. Other members of Dusit 99 was Nissai Vej-jajiva who was a diplomat and uncle of ex-Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011) who has been accused of ordering troops to commit the bloody assaults against the unarmed pro-democracy protesters in April 2009 and May 2010. Bancha Lamsam, father of Bantoon Lamsam, is current CEO of Kasikorn Bank. Thanpuying Chanat Piyaoui, Honorary Chairman of Dusit International Group (the Princess, Dusit and the Lemp-inkski Hotel Chains), was a long-time joint investor with the Crown Property Bureau. And the last one was General Thianchai Sirisamphan, a deputy Prime Minister under Prem. The Dusit 99 had a clear mission to influence political and economic issues of the time. As Pridiyathorn Devakula, former Governor of the Bank of Thailand (2001-2006), wrote in 2009:

“A circle of 99 crème de la crème from government offices and the business com-munity, holding regular meetings at the Dusit Thani Hotel. They would discuss the country’s problems and publicise their sug-gestions for the interest of the community and the country’s leaders at large.”

THAKSIN SHINAWATRA (2001-2006)

More recently, Thailand encountered two military coups: the eighteenth on 19 Septem-ber 2006 and the nineteenth on 22 May 2014. The coup d’états were to overthrow the elect-ed governments of Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra. Although Thailand adopted a democratic model of governance to replace the ancien régime, the military had imposingly colonized the Thai political arena through-out the past eighty years. Military coups had become a tool to sabotage a strong civilian government, particularly democracy. The former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra won two indisputable landslide elections in 2001 and 2005, becoming the only Prime Minister who had ever served a full four-year term in Thai history.

Thaksin’s Party had gained mass support from the poor because it believed that the poor were not a burden. It argued that the poor should be “state-stakeholders”. Thak-sin’s party committed to free market policies at a Macro and Global level, and Keynesian policies at villages. The party’s slogan was “Think new, act new for every Thai” and “to bring happiness to the majority of the country”. Thaksin said “I am determined to

devote myself to politics in order to lead the Thai People out of poverty.” It exhibited a “new social contract”, as Pasuk Phongpaich-it and Chris Baker argue in “Thaksin’s popu-lism.” Thaksin’s party launched the gov-ernment’s first ever Universal Health Care scheme and many pro-poor measures such as agrarian debt relief, village funds, cheap housing, scholarships for the poor, OTOP, ending the IMF loans of 1997 Asian Finan-cial Crisis. These practical policies made the people feel empowered, which no Thai gov-ernment had ever done before. The poor and villagers benefited extensively from Thak-sin’s populist policies and programs.

In the past, royal elites and people in Bangkok controlled policies, but today the poor do. Thaksin had threatened the politi-cal influence and economic interests of the royalist network. His network obviously challenged the present royalist network. In 2002, Thaksin dismantled the existing Army-led security structures in the Deep Southern Thailand, which were created by Prem and his allies in the early 1980s. Thaksin asserted that the Deep South Thailand had standard development problems. His intensifying po-litical strength gravely distressed the royalist network. They perceived him as a threat to their political influence and economic inter-ests in the medium- and long-term. The roy-alist network banished the Thaksin and Yin-gluck regimes with the classic royalist tools: judicial and military coups. At first, they ac-cused Thaksin of displaying disrespect for the King and of committing corruption. Lat-er, the royalist opposition and military lead-ers exerted a strategy of discrediting elec-tions and democracy. They alleged that the poor did not understand Democracy. They have produced discourse that elections are not equal to democracy. Democracy is itself a problem. People in rural areas are mostly less educated, poor and lack the proper un-derstanding of democracy. Thongchai Win-ichakul argues, in “Toppling democracy,” that these annihilated electoral and demo-cratic legitimacy and helped to open the door for non-democratic intervention.

Subsequently, on June 26 of 2006, Thak-sin stated in a meeting of top bureaucrats from all ministries that:

“Today, an organization beyond the con-stitution, not the constitution, that is, an individual that appears to have charismatic power outside the constitution, is creating excessive turmoil for organization within the constitution, without any respect for the law. Somebody thinks that he is more important than the majority.”

Thaksin’s party gained

mass support from the poor

because it believed that

the poor were not a burden. It argued that the

poor should be “state-

stakeholders”. Thaksin’s party

was committed to free market

policies at a macro and

global level, and Keynesian policies in the

villages.

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Thereafter, on 14 July 2006, Prem deliv-ered an address to the cadets of the military academy that the soldiers should be loyal to the King and not to the government:

“In horse-racing, horse owners hire jockeys to ride their horses. The jockeys do not own the horses. They just ride them. A government is like a jockey. It supervises soldiers, but the real owners are the country, and the King… some jockeys ride well, and other don’t. Government are the same.”

Eventually, on the night of 19 September 2006, while Thaksin was in New York to ad-dress the UN, the army launched a putsch. The coup claimed that Thaksin’ government had committed lèse majesté, rampant cor-ruption and tax evasion allegations, espe-

cially the controversial sale of Shin Corpora-tion to Singapore-government run Temasek Holdings in January 2006. In fact, the Crown Property Bureau (CPB) also has longstand-ing relations with Singapore and Temasek because Temasek owned a stake in Siam Commercial Bank (SCB).

POST-THAKSIN (2006-PRESENT)

During the interim, the non-elected Prime Minister General, Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008), the junta leaders, appointed them-selves and their associates to the Board of Directors of several key state enterprises such as the Airport of Thailand, Thai Air-

ways International, the Port Authority of Thailand and the Telephone organization of Thailand. Furthermore, as Chairat Cha-roensin-o-larn reports in “Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand,” the Surayud cabi-net approved substantial salary increases for the coup leaders and their groups. The main objective of the 2006 military coup was to eradicate Thaksin’s influence and popularity from the Thai political arena, all tough mea-sures that had been taken against Thaksin and his network, such as the dissolution of Thaksin’s party, the freezing of assets, and the weakening of the politicians, have so far failed.

Needless to say, the development of un-derdevelopment of Thailand will exist due to the military controlled democracy. The dominance of the military in Thai politics in the long-term is guaranteed by the new charter. The controversial article 309, which is the very last article in the new constitution, awarded de facto amnesty not only for the military junta’s past deeds, but also for their future actions. This article guaranteed that anything compliant with the 2006 interim charter, issued shortly after the coup, should be regarded as legal afterwards. Article 309 licensed the military to declare a “state of exception” whenever it considered neces-sary and appropriate. As Marcus Tullius Ci-cero (106 BC-43 BC), the Ancient Roman Scholar, said: “Inter arma enim silent leges” or “Law stands mute in the midst of arms.”

Significantly, the less noticed article 77 of the new charter specified that it was the state’s duty to provide the armed forces with “modern”, “necessary”, and “adequate” per-sonnel, weapons, and technologies to protect national independence, national sovereignty, national security, the Monarchy, the national interest, and the democratic form of gov-ernment with the King as the head of the state. These three disputed adjectives did not appear in the abrogated 1997 constitution, and would certainly bring about a huge in-crease in the military budget in the future. Three months after the military coup, it was reported in the newspapers that the junta had exploited 1.5 billion Baht from its “se-cret funds” to stage the military coup against Thaksin.

In late December 2006, the Surayud cabi-net approved 556 million Baht for the for-mation of a 14000 strong special operations force with a mandate to control anti-junta protests. Prior to the coup, the armed forces were working with a budget of 86 billion Baht. However, in the proposed budget for fiscal year 2008, they have asked for 143 bil-

Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006)

Photo: Kremlin / CC BY 3.0


lion Baht. This figure rose from 115 billion Baht for fiscal year 2007. In less than two years, the military has multiplied spending by 66 per cent, raising the question of the idea of “Sufficiency Economy”, which the mili-tary junta has always strongly promoted and supported. The poor must be happy in their poverty, though.

Duncan McCargo, in Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict, indicates that the military has received a huge budget allocation to security and “development” ac-tivities in the Deep South Thailand, the total budget for the period 2004-2008 was 81,748 million Thai Baht (US$ = 2,292,000,000), with a further 27,547 million Baht (US$ = 772,284,000) allocated for 2009. The people in the areas thought that despite these im-mense budgets, they received little benefit locally in terms of enhanced security and economic assistance. It is widely suspected that these budgetary increases might cause the military a significant stake in the conflict, and may reduce its incentive to support con-flict solutions that might further diminish or discontinue the violence, particularly their involvement in illegal business activities. These, pointed out by Pavin Chachavalpong-pun in “Thailand’s Crooked Army,” include a 350 million Baht (US$11.4 million) purchase of a leaky surveillance airship and more than 700 UK-made GT200 bomb detectors (US$30 million) that turned out to be a fake; they are lumps of plastic with no working mechanical parts.

On 22 May 2014, the military staged a nineteenth putsch against the first elected fe-male Prime Minister of Thailand, Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014). The military pro-mulgated that they would create a “genuine democracy with the King as the Head of State appropriate to the Thai society”. In the meantime, the military junta and authorities have arrested and detained pro-democracy protestors and arrested peaceful anti-coup protestors, including students for holding anti-coup signs, staging silent readings of George Orwell’s novel “1984”, wearing T-shirts calling for peace or elections, doing a three-finger salute, and eating sandwich pro-tests, as reported by the FIDH - Worldwide Human Rights Movement.

After the coup, there was strong interna-tional condemnation from France, the Euro-pean Union and the United Nations human rights office. Japan said the military coup was regrettable and Australia said it was “gravely concerned”, banning Thai generals from traveling to the country. The U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said “there was no jus-

tification for the coup”, which would have negative implications for ties, especially mili-tary ones. In addition, all of these nations de-manded that power be return to the people by early election. Amy Lefevre of Reuters, in “Thai junta boosts spending on defence, education in draft budget,” reported that the 2015 Defence spending, which typically increases in Thailand after military coup, will grow 5 percent from the previous fiscal year’s budget, to 193.07 billion Baht ($6.07 billion), which has already grown 135 per cent over the last 10 years. Remarkably, there is no provision in the current interim con-stitution demanding the military-dominated National Legislative Assembly (NLA) mem-bers to declare their assets and liabilities. And not surprisingly, on 21 August 2014 the coup leader, Army Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha, was installed as Premier by the army-run legisla-ture. Power will hence remain solidly in the junta’s hands. This makes Thai people in the Deep South concerned about the expansion of militarisation.

CONCLUSION

Edward Knuth argues that the Kingdom was facing a vicious political cycle: dictatorship followed by a paper democracy and then a period of actual democracy followed by a political crisis, which finally leads to a mili-tary coup. The military manipulated the po-tential of an escalation in violence as the rea-son behind the putsch. It periodically staged coups when it confronted a threat that was imminent and which challenged its power and interests. It legitimized the coup as the only way to save democracy, cleanse the dirt in Thai politics, eliminate corrupt politicians, and restore peace and stability. In fact, the military is far from being the nation’s moral compass, as the political history of Thailand since the 1932 revolution has obviously dem-onstrated that military interventions through coup d’état were purely of self-interest and suspended democratization, discussed in more detail by Pavin Chachavalpongpun in “Thaksin, the Military and Thailand’s Pro-tracted Political Crisis.”

As long as there is a huge disparity, es-pecially the enormous economic and politi-cal inequalities, a disproportionate share of resources and wealth between the royalist elites, and the privileged social groups in Bangkok, and the oppressed majority in the Thailand’s countryside, the political instabil-ity and violence of Thailand will continue and exacerbate. It is because the people in the countryside feel that the economic re-

sources have been depleted to fuel Bangkok-centred growth; in the meantime, they are under intense repression and violence. The royalist elites and middle class in Bangkok bear hardly any responsibility; while, social, economic and political problems are simply blamed on the corrupt politicians and socio-political underdevelopment of Thai rural society and its people, as discussed by Jim Glassman in “Thailand in the Era of the Cold War and Rama IX.” Seriously, both pol-itics and economy have long been under the control of the royalist elites and the wealthi-est Thais, including leading Thai-Chinese business groups, and it will remain a closed shop. Nidhi Eawsriwong, a prominent Thai scholar, specifies that “Thailand was harm-ing the people” by marginalizing the major-ity from politics and economy and creating great social injustices.

Although Thaksin was alleged to have committed corruption, he hugely helped the process of eye-opening of the poor and villagers to realize their power and rights in democracy by using democratic means. And even though Thaksin seems defeated in the game of power; in reality, he has conquered overwhelmingly the hearts of the vast ma-jority of the Kingdom: THOSE IN POV-ERTY. APN

Dharndhanate Hansuksanul is a PhD Student with the International Doc-toral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi Univer-sity in Taipei, Taiwan. He received his MA in International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science in Chul-alongkorn University, Thailand. His research interests include Compara-tive Political Economy and Interna-tional Relations in East Asia. He can be reached at [email protected].

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POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Always hanging over China’s economic progress is the spectre of its volatile political conditions. China is “poor, significantly non-marketized, and authoritarian”—making it highly unstable, as Bergsten points out. This is a unique situation for the post-war liberal order, which has always enjoyed the ben-efit of political stability among its foremost members. Ever-deepening integration could be pursued without pause because there was never the risk that a key player might collapse

in on itself and destabilize the entire system. In the case of China, however, integration and interdependence are problematic for two reasons. First, due to globalization and the rise of global value chains, China’s economy is interwoven with those of the rest of the world to an unprecedented degree. Second, and more worryingly, as McNally points, China is the first major capitalist power in history to be so internally volatile. The eco-nomic order is thus unprepared for the pos-sibility of political fragmentation in China.

The sources of China’s instability are

widely known: political repression, lack of human rights, sharpening social stratifica-tion, endemic corruption, environmental degradation, and fractious minority groups. While some scholars are unperturbed by China’s internal contradictions, believing the CCP’s rule to be absolute, Susan Shirk has shown how fragile the rule of China’s leader-ship truly is and how its efforts to ease unrest are fostering the very forces that might one day lead to its demise. Similarly, the CCP has trapped itself in a Faustian bargain whereby it maintains fragile order through the prom-ise of growth; yet that growth is often the very source of social instability because its rewards are unevenly dispersed. This in-equality then goes on to jeopardize the stable conditions necessary for growth, leading to a vicious circle of instability.

If the forces of unrest prove to be so powerful that they upset the present politi-cal order, what might be the outcome? Al-though unlikely, mass protests leading to a power vacuum (cf. Tunisia, Egypt) are not unthinkable. This would open up the possi-bility of a military coup, regional fragmen-tation, or even transition to a multi-party democracy, with all the attendant risks. In contrast, as McNally points out, building social unrest could instead lead to increased repression and a concentrated form of crony capitalism stemming from the CCP’s refusal to modernize. In any of these situa-tions the effect on the world economy would be enormous and devastating: tremendous amounts of foreign direct investment would be jeopardized; global production would be destabilized due to China’s centrality in manufacturing; and the many countries of the Asia-Pacific that depend on China in one way or another would be greatly weakened.

Yet these extreme scenarios obscure what is the most likely option: that China’s leaders will be forced to liberalize the coun-try’s institutions in order to maintain stabil-ity. The Chinese themselves have described “peaceful evolution” (heping yanbian) as the most-desired outcome for China’s develop-ment. Such a path would involve a strength-ening of the rule of law, further-developed channels for voicing dissatisfaction, a more independent press, and the incorporation of emerging political interests. Evidence of such a shift is already underway: the weiquan (“rights-defence”) movement, a loose con-stellation of lawyers and human rights ad-vocates, has been allowed to operate mostly unmolested and has successfully challenged the government in a number of high-profile cases concerning the civil rights enshrined

Integrating China into the Global Political EconomyChina is only as much of a threat to the world system as the West chooses to make it.

Matthew PalA recent viral internet video, found by searching “Chinese Professor” on youtube.com, exemplifies what has come to be the prevailing atti-tude in the press and among the public toward China’s economic and political rise. The year is 2030, and a professor in Beijing is lecturing on the fall of great empires to a group of affluent-looking Chinese students using futuristic technology. Among these fallen empires is the United States, which according to the professor succumbed to its debt load and is now forced, he notes with a smirk, to “work for us.” The hall erupts in sinister laughter.

However crassly expressed, many of the anxieties articulated in this video are shared by economists. China’s development over the last three decades constitutes what is arguably the most rapid, volatile, and certainly largest capitalist transformation in human history, and the challenges posed by China’s incorporation into the global political economy are as complex and colossal as China itself. This essay ana-lyzes the debate sparked by such challenges as well as implications for the world economy. In doing so, it groups concerns over China’s rise into three broad headings: political instability, economic dominance, and threats to global institutions. It argues that fears over China’s prominence in the global economy are for the most part misplaced and that ensuing changes will be less radical than many expect and perhaps even salutary. The essay concludes by suggesting that a recasting of perceptions in the West is a critical element in smoothing China’s tran-sition into the world economy.


within China’s own constitution. Further-more, Wendy Dobson has suggested that as China’s labour surplus shrinks due to demo-graphic changes, manufacturing will move inland to soak up any excess rural labour, raising rural living standards in the process. Such a development would neutralize the inequality represented by the rural/urban di-vide as well as help mollify restive minorities, most of which are found in China’s underde-veloped west and which have not yet shared in China’s economic miracle. Shifts of this nature do not safeguard entirely against po-litical instability, but they indicate that liber-alization is already underway and that it will be brought about—as is true of so much in China’s development—carefully, deliber-ately, and with an eye to securing continued growth. Such pragmatism should assuage fears that the world economy is imperilled by China’s domestic conditions.

ECONOMIC DOMINANCE

For many, the most troubling aspect of Chi-na’s rise is its growing economic clout, and more specifically, the tools it uses to enhance its position. The most persistent issue is the yuan’s exchange rate: rather than floating, as is the case with most major world currencies, Navaroo points out that the yuan is pegged to the U.S. dollar at a rate that undervalues it by 15-40%, which China maintains by in-tervening in world currency markets. More recently, China has allowed the yuan to ap-preciate by up to 7%, but this has not been enough to quell strident criticism from the US and Europe, the largest importers of Chinese goods and those most affected by the value of the yuan. Critics claim that Chi-na’s currency manipulation is unfair because it effectively subsidizes Chinese exports, which are subsequently cheaper on the world market, and depresses domestic demand for imported goods. However, despite the mis-givings of its trading partners, and the rules of the IMF, Bergsten points out that China insists that determining its exchange rate is its sovereign right.

A corollary to the undervaluation of the yuan and China’s imbalanced terms of trade is the resulting current account surplus, which China chooses to invest mostly in US treasury bonds, both for security and in or-der to finance the US deficit and keep US in-terest rates low, thereby ensuring that credit is easily available in the US domestic market, which is the chief consumer of China’s ex-ports. However, China’s increasing share of US debt is frequently perceived as its gain-

ing undue control over US interests rates and hence its monetary policy, with the ultimate threat being that China could choose to un-load its US bonds at any time, precipitating a crash of the dollar, a fear echoed by Clegg.

Such fears are unwarranted, however, due to the interdependence of the Chinese and American economies. The US needs Chinese capital just as China needs the US market; the two are locked in a relationship that makes them “mutual hostages”, pointed out by Clegg. Were China to ever attempt to liquidate any substantial amount of its US assets, it would watch the value of its remain-ing assets plummet in the ensuing free-for-all as traders tried to ditch their dollars—to say nothing of the fact that this would destroy the American economy and in the process China’s own as well. In short, there is no conceivable situation in which China’s ad-mittedly large share of the US’s debt actually constitutes a threat. The symbiotic relation-ship between China and the US serves, then, to promote stability in the international sys-tem, both in terms of economic matters like currency wars, and in the geopolitical space, where the threat of real war (over Taiwan or Japan) is perennially cited as a possible threat. Here we have the concept of mutual assured destruction updated for the age of complex interdependence; both parties are deterred from doing anything rash, and the world economy settles into equilibrium.

As for the yuan’s undervaluation, the West’s obstreperousness is unnecessary. In the first place, an undervalued yuan is good for American importers and good for American consumers. Furthermore, there are many indications that China will need to gradually raise the value of the yuan on its own accord. An omnipresent danger that attends China’s growth is the risk of the economy overheating and inflation ravaging the population’s substantial savings, nearly all of which is trapped, due to capital controls, in state-owned banks with low interest rates. Dumas points out that rather than letting these savings erode, China will be forced to let the yuan appreciate. Likewise, the eco-nomic crisis of 2008 and the global delever-aging that has been ongoing since spelled out for China’s leadership the necessity of boost-ing domestic demand, something that might be achieved by upping the value of the yuan and thereby increasing domestic purchasing power. China is sure to take these steps grad-ually, although Dobson predicts the yuan will be a floating currency as early as 2020.

While financial frictions between the US/Euro zone and China are unlikely to

Extreme scenarios

obscure what is the most likely

option: that China’s leaders

will be forced to liberalize

the country’s institutions in order to

maintain stability. The

Chinese themselves

have described “peaceful

evolution” as the most-

desired outcome

for China’s development.

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abate any time soon, it is important to re-alize that these tensions do not constitute a credible threat to the stability of the world economy, nor do the unequal terms of trade represent an imbalance in need of redress. In any case, market forces will gradually render these issues moot.

THREATS TO GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS

Despite its newly minted superpower status, many accuse China of failing to become a “responsible stakeholder” and living up to the responsibilities expected of a major power. In the same vein, scholars are wor-ried by China’s resource-motivated activities, especially in Africa, which are carried on out-side the ambit of the liberal institutions— such as the IMF, WTO, World Bank and the UN— normally responsible for global development. Increasingly, forging global agreements has been dependent on China’s participation, which is often withheld.

To be sure, China has at times been con-trary, using its UN Security Council veto to stymie sanctions against Iran and North Ko-rea. The Doha Round of WTO negotiations had stalled due in large part to China’s re-fusal to open up its market and its insistence that it continue to be granted the special and differential treatment accorded to least-de-veloped countries. Bergsten points out that it has spearheaded a move toward a regional Asian bloc and low-quality bilateral trade ar-rangements that undermine the progress of trade liberalization embodied in the WTO. And the breakdown of the 2009 UN climate change summit in Copenhagen has been laid at China’s feet as well; by refusing from the outset to make any concrete commitments, China doomed the effort to failure.

Lest one think China is rapidly overturn-ing the global order and vitiating its institu-tions, John Ikenberry reminds us that this is too daunting a task even for China, and that the Western order is “hard to overturn and easy to join.” The liberal order is deep, wide, and specifically designed to accommodate the incorporation of rising powers. Besides, eschewing these institutions is not in China’s interest. Its growth has been predicated upon the very openness and liberalization that is fostered by the liberal order—China really has no other alternative if it wishes to continue growing. Perhaps it is best, then, to see China as suffering from a temporary bout of “growing pains” as it adjusts to its new role. For every failure like that of Co-penhagen, there are instances of coopera-

tion, such as the G20’s coordinated stimulus response to the financial crisis. The outcome of the Doha round is still uncertain, but re-marks by the Chinese minister of commerce in January 2011 indicates that China is ready to support the roadmap proposed by WTO director-general Pascale Lamy. And the in-stitutions themselves are adapting as well; in

November 2010 the IMF increased China’s voting share to third largest. As China is given more say in the direction of these in-stitutions, it will become more invested in them. In the final analysis, China is so deeply integrated into the workings of the global political economy and its institutions that it cannot extricate itself—this is good both for

China’s booming economy and resulting rise in economic and political power has raised worries in other countries.

Photo: Yhz1221 / CC BY-SA 3.0


China and the world.If so many of the challenges China poses

to the global economy are in fact overem-phasized and misunderstood, why then does China continue to be perceived as a threat? In his January 2011 State of the Union Ad-dress, President Obama referred to China’s rise as a “Sputnik moment” for the US, pos-iting China as an adversary to be overcome. Such rhetoric betrays the distinctly neo-realist perspective that continues to colour the US’s, and indeed most of the developed

world’s, relationship with China. As Cicc-antell points out, realists presume that any rising country will inevitably clash with the dominant powers of the day in an effort to remake the world system; the historical anal-ogy of early twentieth century Germany is often invoked when discussing the China of today. Yet this logic is nowhere to be found in China’s behaviour or its own self-concep-tion. On the contrary, the prevailing view in China of the international system is that it has been critical to China’s development

and that it is absolutely in China’s interest to maintain the stability of that system. One needs look no further than the Talmudic at-tention paid by China’s leadership to the op-tics of “peaceful rise”—China is both acute-ly aware of external perceptions that see it as a threat and eager to counter those views by affirming its commitment to stability in the global order, as Glaser points out. What this all suggests is that China is only as much

of a threat to the world system as the West chooses to make it. Relations with China becomes a zero-sum game if actors elect to view them through a neo-realist lens—but it is clear that China’s leadership does not see things this way. Looking ahead, it is critical that Western policymakers, and economists, develop a more nuanced understanding of China’s internal conditions, economic logic, and perspective on the international order. This change in thinking will do more toward easing China’s transition into the world econ-omy than anything else. APN

Matthew Pal holds an MA from the Norman Paterson School of Interna-tional Affairs and was an exchange student at National Chengchi Univer-sity. His primary research interests are in China’s economic policy and financial system. He can be reached at [email protected].

There is no conceivable

situation in which China’s

admittedly large share

of the US debt actually constitutes a

threat.

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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICEHuntington introduces three main types of transition from authoritarian rule. The first type is “transformation,” where the leaders of an authoritarian regime play the primary role in ending that regime and democratizing the state. Among the pre-1989 transitions, Spain and Brazil are the clearest examples of transformations, and in Eastern Europe

Bulgaria and Hungary also fit this type. The second transition type is “replacement,” which occurs when the authoritarian regime is dominated by staunch opponents to de-mocracy. In such cases, the transition takes place when opposition to the regime gains strength and the government weakens to the point that “the government collapses or is overthrown.” Argentina and Greece are the

best pre-1989 examples, and East Germany and Romania are East European examples. Finally, there are “transplacements,” in which neither the regime nor the opposition is powerful enough to enforce its vision alone and so democracy is brought about through negotiations. Huntington classifies South Korea, Uruguay, and more recently, Poland and Czechoslovakia as transplacements.

Democratic transitions have been fer-tile ground for attitudes that are more or less radical in relation to the elimination of authoritarian legacies, and in particular the political punishment of elites and dissolu-tion of the institutions with which they are associated. Samuel Huntington argues that the emergence, or non-emergence, of ‘tran-sitional justice’ is less a moral question, and more one relating to the ‘distribution of power during and after the transition. Does the recovery of victims depend on political factors including democratic transition and consolidation, the establishment of the rule of law, and trust in the new state apparatus? Many transitional justice scholars believe so. Forgiveness has entered the political domain where there is a need to ameliorate historical injustices, overcome political scandals, and facilitate democratic transition. The ultimate objective is to assess whether truth and rec-onciliation processes can have an indepen-dent influence on reconciliation and espe-cially on the likelihood of consolidating an attempted democratic transition. Legal and political theorists have long struggled to rec-oncile Transitional Justice with the principles of rule of law.

Following Elster, we divide transitional justice into endogenous and exogenous. In the endogenous case the procedures are administered by the society itself without external intervention, while Exogenous transitional justice is administered from the outside, typically by agents who were not engaged in the conflict, and often under the auspices of an ongoing institution. Cases where retribution is administered externally, without regard to the wishes of the citizens of the state in transition, such as some war-crime trials, are “victor’s justice”, falling outside the definition because they lack ac-cepted legitimacy. Elster has also termed en-dogenous transitional justice. Its key features are that it is implemented by the country in transition, and not by any foreign power or court, and more specifically by the legisla-tive or executive branches of government, rather than nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or individuals. Thirdly, it occurs shortly after a transition, rather than decades

Transitional Justice of Democratic Transition in Taiwan Indigenous Land RightsGovernment policies do not reflect the needs of local indigenous communities

Joseph Ventrelli LandgrebeTransitional justice refers to a range of approaches that includes criminal prosecution, truth commissions, reparation programs, gen-der justice, security system reform, and memorialization effort, used to address past human rights violations. This framework was originally devised to facilitate reconciliation during the transition of a country from authoritarianism to a democracy, and is increasingly used to re-spond to certain types of human rights violations against indigenous peoples. According to Kuan, from 1650 to 2008 indigenous land owner-ship decreased from 80% to 2%. When Taiwan became a democracy, the rights of indigenous people, and land access became a serious transitional issue as a result of the many squatter tribes in the New Taipei City Government after a failed public housing approach by government. Here transitional justice becomes an important tool to increase the legitimacy of democracy, and tribes now cooperate with the government to execute reconstruction projects. It seems that the indigenous tribes have new approaches to gain more land. This essay explores the transitional justice system during the democratic transi-tion of Taiwan, and the impact on land rights of indigenous tribes in the context of the reconstruction policy in new Taipei City. This study reviews the literature about democratic transition and transitional jus-tice. The case in this study is the policy of Indigenous Tribe Recon-struction in New Taipei City.


later. Lastly, it targets the violations of rights that occurred before or during the transition, not after it is over.

To implement transitional justice, society has to take a stand on how to treat the rep-resentatives and beneficiaries of the preced-ing dictatorship, how to deal with unjustly acquired economic advantages, as well as human rights violations and crimes commit-ted during the old regime that had remained unpunished for political reasons. There were those who thought that the best course of action would be to move on without recrimi-nations and focus all energies on the creation of a well-functioning democratic system.

IMPLEMENTING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

According to David and Choi, the three methods of implementing transitional jus-tice are as follows.

First, the empowerment of victims. Forgiveness requires improvement of the victims’ lowered status and regaining their confidence and their own worth, despite the immoral action challenging it. Individual em-powerment, van Boven and Bassiouni argue, requires reparation to victims in post-conflict countries that can only be achieved through the mechanisms of restitution, compensa-tion, and rehabilitation. Restitution restores victims to their original situation before the violations occurred, such as restoration of their liberty, legal rights, social status, em-ployment, and property. Rehabilitation in-cludes medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services, while compensa-tion addresses any economically assessable damage.

Second, is social empowerment. Accord-ing to Murphy it is the nature of human be-ings that others validate our worth. The self-perception of our value is derived from how others value us. Therefore, the sympathy of society is necessary for victims to overcome their feelings of isolation and stigmatization. Moreover, suffering that results from po-litical contexts is often not confined to the events of persecution, but extends to the suppression of victims’ experiences of vic-timization. Thus, the damage done involves not just the persecution of victims but also the suppression of their experiences of vic-timization.

Third, is political empowerment. Suffer-ing that result from political contexts often carries a symbolic dimension that tends to divide people between those who count and those who do not. Moreover, political trans-

formation is often entwined with the identity of victims, many who have been involved in political projects to end the oppressive system. Successful institutional reform and a sustained process of democratization vin-dicates the value of their convictions and rebuild the part of the self that the repres-sive regime destroyed. The establishment of equality before law, universal suffrage, and equal rights unequivocally demonstrates the end of divisive practices. This represents the fourth dimension of van Boven’s and Bassiouni’s principles, satisfaction and guar-antees of non-repetition that requires chang-es at the institutional level.

In summary, when a state implements democratic transition, the new government should face the issue of injustice policy

made by former government in the past. The compensated measures, such as tran-sitional justice, can improve the consolida-tion of democracy for state. To implement a well-functioning democratic system, endog-enous transition can consider three ways of implementation including empowerment of victims, social empowerment, and political empowerment.

TAIWAN’S TRANSITION

Taiwan’s democratic transition occurred in the 1980s, at which time the Kuo Ming Tang nationalist party (KMT) ceased the implementation of Martial Law, permit-ting citizens to organize political parties, elect congressional representatives by 1992,

and directly elect the president in 1996. In 2000, the opposition party, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), won the presidential election. It was the landmark in the transi-tion from authoritarianism to the two-party democratic regime and cultural pluralism that emerged in Taiwan society.

Taiwan indigenous people had been engaged with the democratic transition through three major historical movements: cultural self-representation, political partici-pation, and the recognition of indigenous land rights. However, there is an enormous gap in the realization of indigenous people land rights. Indigenous people in Taiwan had lived independently for thousands of years, until Dutch and Spanish, the earliest foreign forces, colonized during the 17th century.

Both colonies started a local fur business to trade with Japan, and engaged in trade with South East Asia and China. In 1662 Jieng, a rebel army claiming itself as the successor of the Ming Dynasty, defeated the Dutch and took over the West plain area as a base to fight against the Ching Dynasty in China. In 1683, the Ching Dynasty controlled the Western plain area of Taiwan for 212 years. In the late years of its control they tried to invade the lands in the mountain area, but were repelled in highland battles. During its governance the Ching Dynasty labeled the Austronesian speaking peoples as “barbar-ian” and their living space, where the dynasty was unable to exert its control, “barbarian land”. In 1894 the expanding Japanese Em-pire won the battle against the Chinese Navy

Democratic transitions have been fertile ground for attitudes

that are more or less radical in relation to the elimination

of authoritarian legacies, and in particular the political

punishment of elites and dissolution of the institutions

with which they are associated.

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over the East China Sea, and China ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895. Even though the Ching Dynasty was never able to govern the central mountain area for even one day, un-der the Japanese imperial logic this area and its peoples were ceded as imperial property. The Japanese General Government in Tai-wan followed the terminology of “barbar-ian” and “barbarian land”. In 1945, when the R.O.C. (Republic of China) took over the governance of Taiwan, after the surrender of Japan to Allied-Forces, the new government changed the official appellation of Austrone-sian languages speaking peoples from “bar-barian” to “mountain compatriot”. In 1994 the appellation was changed to “indigenous people”, during the National Assembly held for the revision of the Constitution.

Through immigration, the Han-Chinese people became the dominant population in Taiwan. Data from diverse literature sources illustrate the demographic transition: Ac-cording to the population estimation made by the Dutch colonial government in 1650, the population of Austronesian speaking peoples in the Taiwan plain area was about 60,000 (not including those in mountain area that the Dutch colonial government could not reach), and the population of Han-

Chinese settlers was about 15,000. Follow-ing the immigration in the Jieng and Ching Dynasty, the population of Han Chinese in-creased to 2,900,000, and the population of the “barbarian” group was 110,000, accord-ing to Japanese colonial government’s census in 1905. By December 2008, the population of “indigenous people” in Taiwan was about 490,000, which is only about 2% of the total population in Taiwan.

Indigenous peoples in Taiwan lost their own land to several colonial governments: As mentioned above the plains in Eastern Taiwan and the central mountains, which are home to indigenous tribes, were not gov-erned by foreign governments until 1895 at the beginning of the Japanese colonial era. The Japanese colonial government imple-mented a land survey in 1898, and then in 1910 initiated a five-year military project to conquer indigenous peoples in Taiwan. The mountainous areas, previously “owned” by different indigenous communities, were then nationalized. In 1925 the National Forestry Survey Project confined indigenous commu-nities to Reserved Lands, which were small and fragmentary land parcels in the moun-tains. At the same time many communities were forced to migrate to low mountainous

areas and change from traditional hunting and gathering, to agricultural production. In 1945 the KMT government replaced the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan and retained the Reserved Lands Policy.

NEW TAIPEI CITY SQUATTER TRIBES

Thus, indigenous peoples lost much land through the transition of governments. As a result the land return movement for indig-enous communities has become the main transitional justice issue in Taiwan. It has subsequently been hard for them to make a good living using the resource from what land they still have. If they stay in rural tribal areas or in the mountains they can’t afford their family’s basic economic needs. There-fore many indigenous communities go to metropolitan areas to seek better paying jobs. However, while it’s easier to find em-ployment in the big city, it’s also harder to maintain basic living standards due to higher commodity prices.

Because many indigenous communi-ties in the city participate in infrastructure construction projects, or large building construction projects, they have good skills

Members of the San-Ying Tribe look on as homes are demolished.

Photo: Wang Hao-zhong / CC BY-NC-SA 2.0


in constructing simple houses, like a block-house. Since many of them can’t afford to rent a house, they squat near the riverside. In New Taipei City there are five major indige-nous squatter tribes near the river, San-Ying, Si-Jou, Nan-Jing, Siou-Bi-Tan, and Bei-Er-Gou and have existed for at least 20 years. According to the water Act these squatter tribes hinder river safety and are in violation of the law. As a result the Bureau of Water Resources has dismantled their houses sever-al times in the past. Squatter tribes that have gone through this have turned to protesting action, of these San-Ying tribe is the most well-known.

The San-Ying tribe is situated below the San-Ying Bridge, at Ying-Ge district in New Taipei City. In 1984 an explosion at Taiwan’s second largest coal mine, Hai-San coal mine, killed 74 mineworkers of which 72 were in-digenous people. The family member of the dead gathered at San-Ying Bridge, building their simple houses beside the river, and formed the San-Ying tribe. The Bureau of Water Resources dismantled their houses seven times; however they simply recon-structed their houses again since they cant afford to live elsewhere. It is therefore most ridiculous that the mayor made the comment after San-Ying’s dismantlement in 1996, where he stated that these people should re-turn to where they came from. The mayor presented the rude nature of politics behind the narrow-minded law formulated by the ruling elite, while people from the lowest class can’t satisfy basic living requirements.

In order to resolve the problems of squatter tribes, the New Taipei City govern-ment plans to build “San-Sia Long-En-Pu Indigenous temporary settlement houses”. The original plan was to settle down the tribes of San-Ying, Siou-Bi-Tan, Si-Jou, Bei-Er-Gou, and Ching-Tan, a total of 150 families. However, problems with this pub-lic housing policy included far distances, a high rent burden, and incorrect cultural identification. Therefore, only one fifth of families moved to the public housing. An-other serious problem was the restricted qualification of application. From this arose a contradictory situation where people who fit the qualification criteria had no desire to move in, while those who did want to move in did not fit the desired qualifications. The Mayor at that time expressed the situation by noting that the Lon-En-Pu public housing policy was made by the former mayor, and if this plan can’t satisfy indigenous commu-nity needs, they should not be compelled to move in.

PROBLEMATIC GOVERNMENT APPROACHThe Mayor’s speech revealed the error of the existing policy, so what problems occurred during the policy formulation? Since1990, the Bureau of Water Resources has been dismantling San-Ying tribe houses, causing many powerful state representatives to plead the case to government. In 1998 President Lee visited San-Ying and proposed the “set-tle down first before dismantle” approach. In 2001 government held several meetings with indigenous communities and planned to build Long-En-Pu public housing in 2002. The Long-En-Pu public housing finished construction in 2007, however only one fifth of the capacity was filled by 2008. Peopo Citizen News made several reports, finding problems such as:

The meaning of structure did not cor-responding to traditional culture. Cement and bricks houses were different within the traditional culture, all of which was disliked by the tribal community, who wanted to re-produce their our own traditional tribe in the metropolitan area.

Secondly, the unemployment problem in-fluenced their ability to pay rent. It’s hard for them to find jobs, and even those who have jobs did not receive enough money. San-Sia Long-En-Pu public housing required the in-habitants to pay rent. Their opinions are that a house with one bedroom and one living room can’t satisfy our needs, and if I live in bigger house, I need to pay more rent. Since my family members don’t have jobs and an income it’s hard to afford a basic life, not to mention rent. In addition, if my children are sick, and I ask for leave, the boss replies that I am fired.

Thirdly, the housing was too far from the original circle of life. The public housing in San-Sia district is too far for the tribes in Sin-Dian district. The distance is about one hour driving. The opinions of the inhabitants are: my children need to go to school and my job is near my original house. This public hous-ing is too far away for me to move in.

A fourth issue is that the life style did not correspond to the original. Squatter tribes maintained the original life style, relation-ships, and living operations. These needs could not be satisfied by public housing. The opinions of inhabitants were that hous-ing has long corridors, but no place where I can light a fire. I can’t drink tea, chat, and cook with my neighbors. A tribe is a full-functioning community, these functions are destroyed if we move into public houses.

The fifth issue is that the policy can’t re-

solve, is that it can’t really take care of low-income indigenous people. The former and the latter executive often shirk responsibility and shift the blame onto others. The policy didn’t have mid-term and long-term coor-dinated measures. The capacity of public housing could not be fulfilled, so it wasted public funds.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Long-En-Pu public housing had many prob-lems that led to only a few indigenous people moving in. The Bureau of Water Resources, in order to avoid the problem of non-fulfill-ment of public housing, adopted the mea-sure to dismantle squatter camps since 2007. The first objective is the San-Ying tribe. On 21 February 2008, the San-Ying tribe suf-

Indigenous peoples lost

much land through the transition of

governments. As a result, the

“land return movement”

for indigenous communities has become

the main transitional

justice issue in Taiwan.

FEATURED ARTICLE


fered seven incidents where their homes were forcibly dismantled. This date was an important holiday in Chinese society, Yuan-Siou (Lantern Festival) holiday. The San-Ying tribe was caught completely unaware and a lot of furniture was not moved out in time and was buried in the ruins. Helpless inhabitant then built simple tents beside the ruins, where they stayed without water and electricity. This attracted the attention of so-cial movements and on 5 November 2008, when San-Ying got a dismantlement notifi-cation from the Bureau of Water Resources, the social movement representatives led the tribe into a campaign of serial protest action:

1. 2008/11/5, San-Ying Tribe Saving-Self Association was established. Govern-ment posted another dismantlement no-tification.

2. 2008/11/12, San-Ying Tribe went to New Taipei City government and proceeded with a shaved-head protest.

3. 2008/11/20, San-Ying Tribe went to Ex-ecutive Yuan to protest and plead.

4. 2008/11/23, San-Ying Tribe went to Na-tional Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall had a shaved-head protest.

5. 2008/12/9, New Taipei City government went to San-Ying Tribe and posted an-other dismantlement notification.

6. 2008/12/17, San-Ying Tribe held a ‘guard-ing-home’ meeting with social movement practitioners.

7. 2008/12/18, San-Ying Tribe held ‘guard-ing-home’ meeting with famous cultural professionals.

8. 2008/12/19, San-Ying Tribe went to Pres-

idency to have another shaved-head pro-test with Taiwan’s international famous director, Siou-Sian Ho. New Taipei City Government posts a suspend dismantle-ment order.

PeoPo Citizen News made a special re-port on 20 December 2008, stating that af-ter eight dismantlement attempts, and three shaved-head protests, the tribe finally got the attention of the Presidency. In this report, director Ho made the following discourse: “Why our society and our government can’t have a different style of thinking? Just con-sider economics? Can’t we give these people another life style? Why do we give them our regulations and order them to obey? Can’t we just give them one piece of land and let them build their own community with their tribe? If they can’t own land, how to accumulate culture? How to grow up if they don’t have body? Owning land will mean that they have a place to settle down and get on with life. Why can’t our government think it over? Why can only head-shaving attract attention? Why did they have to do this so many times to attract the media?”

The report also interviewed the consul-tant of San-Ying Tribe: “The chief of gov-ernment visited our tribe 17 times. However, he just pushed everybody to move into pub-lic housing. If inhabitants didn’t coordinate, the original houses were dismantled and the chances of moving to public houses were lost.”

Director Ho proposed the Indigenous land problem, resulting in civil society in Tai-wan beginning to pay close attention to the issue of San-Ying Tribe. Since 2009 the San-Ying Tribe started to implement self-gover-nance. It held tribal meetings periodically, participated in social movements for mi-norities, and formed strong powers to have dialogue with government. On 29 July 2010, the San-Ying Tribe visited the Mayor and presented the concept of “rent public land to build tribe’s own houses”. This is the rudi-mental model of the policy of “tribe recon-struction”. This principle was also approved by the Ministry of Finance, which manages Taiwan’s public land. On 26 December, the new Mayor visited the San-Ying Tribe along with the Vice Mayor, to communicate with inhabitants directly. Several different Gov-ernment organizations provided resources to help the tribe find adequate land and look at other cities’ reconstruction plans. Non-Government Organization also engages in projects of tribe reconstruction. The Mayor publicly expressed his hope that this project

can be a model for an indigenous innovative social housing policy in Taiwan.

San-Ying Tribe’s advocating is that “Land is not merchandise”. If government only considers the economic effect on everything, indigenous people have no space to live, even though they have the right to access land, use land, and inhabit it. The San-Ying Tribe’s problem also got the attention of President Ma who ordered the project to be monitored weekly for achievement rates. The United Daily News report on the New Taipei City Government’s Tribal Reconstruction Policy on 6 March, 2011: “In order to pay esteem for indigenous tribe in metropolitan, New Taipei City will adopt participated style to reconstruct new tribe with hardware (build-ings) and software (culture). The principle is that government cooperates with tribes. The purpose of tribe reconstruction is to achieve the first indigenous social housing in Taiwan. The approach is to consult tribes to institute a juridical association for public welfare, and the association rent public land to build its own house.”

San-Ying tribe already decided its own reconstruction location, on non-urban land (rural land). Another famous squatter tribe in Sin-Dian district, Si-Jou tribe, also put for-ward its own reconstruction plan. National Taiwan University used school resources to help Si-Jou tribe design their new tribe in 2009. The target land of Si-Jou tribe’s re-construction has also been selected. It is dif-ferent to San-Ying tribe due to the location being an urban area. Through the hard work and lobbying of professionals’ since 2009, the Minister of Interior (the manager of Tai-wan’s urban land plan) passed the urban land plan modification for Si-Jou tribe’s recon-struction land on 27 December 2011. It’s an epoch-making event because the committee in Minister of Interior created a new special purpose of land planning for Si-Jou tribe. This purpose of land never existed in Tai-wan before. In this article, this author thinks this has a symbolic meaning for transitional justice for indigenous people rights to land use, even in metropolitan areas, and no lon-ger to ‘reserved zones’ in the mountains.

ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION

According to the literature review, the key features to the achievement of successful transitional justice are: (1) by the country in transition itself, not by any foreign power or court; (2) by the legislative or executive branches of the government, rather than

From 1650 to 2008, indigenous peoples’ land was reduced from 80% to 2% of the total area of the island.


nongovernmental organizations or individu-als; (3) shortly after the transition rather than decades later; (4) that it targets the viola-tions of rights that occurred before or dur-ing the transition, not after it is over. This study made the analysis of Indigenous Tribe Reconstruction Policy in New Taipei City through the application of these key fea-tures of endogenous transitional justice, and found: (1) Reconstruction was attempted by the country itself starting from the tribes and through cooperation; (2) The project is executed by government, with active tribal participation; (3) Taiwan began the transition in 1980s and started with transitional justice shortly afterwards. The project of public housing failed in 2007, and a new project began in 2008. The first special purpose for indigenous land was produced in 2011; (4) When reviewing history of indigenous lost land from 1650 to 2008, the percentage of indigenous people land was reduced from 80% to 2%. The project of tribal reconstruc-tion can potentially increase this land hold percentage, and therefore targets previous injustices. Thus, significantly, the Indigenous Tribe Reconstruction Policy in New Taipei City corresponds to key features to achieve

transitional justice. According to the literature review, the

methods of implementing transitional jus-tice are as follows: (1) Empowerment of victims. Forgiveness requires improvement of victims’ lowered status and regaining their confidence in their own worth despite the immoral action challenging it; (2) Social empowerment. The sympathy of society is necessary for victims to overcome their feel-ings of isolation and stigmatization; (3) Po-litical empowerment. Successful institutional reform and a sustained process of democra-tization vindicate the value of their convic-tions and rebuild the part of the self that the repressive regime destroyed. This study ana-lyzed the Indigenous Tribe Reconstruction Policy in New Taipei City through the stan-dards of implementing transitional justice and found that: (1) Taking San-Ying tribe as an example, many victims can be taken care of by the Indigenous Tribe Reconstruction Policy, thus victims are empowered; (2) Di-rector Ho’s effort made Taiwan society sym-pathize with indigenous peoples’ and focus on the land problem; (3) San-Ying tribe and Si-Jou tribes were politically empowered, be-ing permitted democratic self-governance,

the power to purchase their right to access land, and the New Taipei City Government ordered the establishment of the Indigenous Peoples Bureau to be responsible for them.

Thus, significantly, the Indigenous Tribe Reconstruction Policy in New Taipei City corresponds to the methods of implement-ing transitional justice. The International Center for Transitional Justice also identifies potential alternatives to achieving transition-al justice: (1) Establishing the truth about the past; (2) Prosecution of the perpetrators; (3) Reparation of the victims; (4) Memory and memorials; (5) Reconciliation initiatives; (6) Reforming institutions; (7) Vetting and removing abusive public employees. The foregoing projects do indicate also support these. This project thus creates hope that it is possible to make land available for not only housing purposes, but that in the future that land may be regained by indigenous peoples for other purposes. Transitional justice on issue of indigenous land will make Taiwan more democratic, and have a more consoli-dated democracy. APN

Indigenous Amis protest in Taipei.

Photo: Rick Yi / CC BY 2.5

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INDIA’S TREMENDOUS POTENTIAL FOR GROWTH MATTERS TO TAIWANToday regional leaders and academics in Asia agree that India will be the region’s economic driving force to lead the way to a pan-Asian regional integration through the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). This sense of op-timism is premised mainly on India’s poten-tial for maintaining an average of 8-9% eco-nomic growth for the next ten years despite a drop to 6.7% during the global downturn of 2008/09 as reported by Feigenbaum. At this rate, India’s GDP will surpass that of the U.S. before 2050, making it the world’s sec-ond largest economy. Furthermore, based on present demographic trends, India will prob-ably overtake China to be the world’s largest country by 2025.

Economists point out that India’s growth acceleration since 2003 represents a structur-al increase, rather than a cyclical return, as it is based on continued productivity growth in especially the manufacturing sector, favour-able demographic factors and abundant op-

portunities for educational excellence. India’s geographical location in bordering all South Asian economies, coupled with its experi-ence in managing the consequences of po-rous borders, can also convince its smaller neighbouring economies about the benefits of regional cooperation.

Like ASEAN economies, South Asian economies too have their political differenc-es. And like ASEAN, South Asia has started to give precedence to economics over poli-tics, e.g. India-Pakistan dispute. With India taking the lead in the South Asian economy, South Asian finance ministers are even think-ing of establishing a South Asian Associa-tion for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) + 4 finance ministers (FMs) process -including China, Japan, Korea, and ASEAN- similar to the ASEAN + 3 finance ministers process.

Presently China and Japan are observers in SAARC. Korea and ASEAN will come on board very soon. As cooperation progresses from trade in goods to trade in services, in-vestment, monetary and exchange rate coop-eration, regional cooperation in South Asia

will get an even bigger boost if it is undertak-en as part of a bolder and broader pan-Asian economic cooperation. It is only a matter of time before such a cross regional, pan-Asian economic integration happens.

AREAS OF MUTUAL BENEFIT FOR INDIA AND TAIWAN

After establishing representative offices in India and Taiwan, the two-way trade has in-creased from US$930 million to a projected US$5 billion this year. But this bilateral trade relation fades in comparison with Taiwan’s trade of US$70 billion with Southeast Asia and US$200 billion with Mainland China.

Considering India’s strong potential for development, Taiwan would surely want to tap into this market, cognisant of the reper-cussions of an over-dependence on Main-land China for trade in the near future. There are possibly more reasons, other than eco-nomic ones, for Taiwan and India to improve their working relationship.

First, Taiwan and India share the same democratic goals and the same cultural-reli-gious values that originate from Buddhism. Also they share the same unenviable task of juggling long-term strategic goals with short-term domestic challenges since both are mutadis mutandis, in the words of Ciorciari ‘‘constrained by myriad short-term political pressures and the need to respond to peri-odic crises.’’

Secondly, Taiwan and India agree that China will play an important part in their foreign policies. India stands to benefit from closer interaction with Taiwanese scholars who are considered the best in the world in terms of understanding China’s economic, security, and foreign policies. Taiwan claims to possess Chinese culture in an ‘‘unadulter-ated’’ form, different from that found in Chi-na. India has a reputation for hosting some of the world’s oldest Oriental languages, e.g. Sanskrit, and its great facility at acquiring flu-ency in Western languages is also recognised internationally, e.g. the first Nobel Prize win-ner for literature came from India; Microsoft worldwide 24-hour, help-desk call-centre is staffed primarily by Indian IT specialists and is located in India. A request for 10,000 Mandarin teachers can allow Taiwan to de-velop its soft-power of initiating India into the world of Chinese wisdom, thought, and culture. Conversely, by understanding the dynamics behind China-Taiwan relations, In-dia, a democratic state like Taiwan, may be in a better position to deal with China.

Thirdly, Taiwan and India can cooperate

India-Taiwan’s “Win-Win” SituationBeyond the Need for Mandarin Teachers

Kevin Wee LinToday India recognises only the People’s Republic of China, or Main-land China, and not the ROC’s claim to be the legitimate government of territorial China. But ever since the two countries set up representa-tive offices in each other’s capitals in 1995, the relations between them, especially in terms of trade, has grown significantly. Yet, there seems to be a fear amongst the leaders of India of closer interactions with Taiwan because of the ‘‘one-China policy.’’ While the Indian repre-sentative can meet any political and official functionary at any level, his Taiwanese counterpart can only operate through the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) channel.

Last year, India asked Taiwan for 10,000 Mandarin teachers, who could teach in Indian high schools that offers Chinese as a second lan-guage. India foresees that its growing trade relations with China would require an equally growing population of Indians conversant in Chi-nese. But is the working relationship between India and Taiwan to be limited only to the educational sphere?


in the areas of information and experience sharing exchanges for military purposes. A concrete case would be to delve into the extent of China’s adventurist desires in the Indian Ocean. Taiwan has, after all, expe-rienced real threats from China when the cross-Straits elevated to international crisis level after having been designated as the staging area for a full-blown amphibious op-eration supported by artillery fire. Bilateral observer-type military exchanges in the Indi-an Ocean and cross-Straits contingency plan operations can be of immense help to India and Taiwan, especially in proposing more creative solutions to political stalemates, e.g. the hitherto unsettled China-India border dispute and the controversial ‘‘One country, two zones’’ proposal.

Fourthly, India can tap into Taiwan’s rich experience in small and medium enter-prises (SMEs). This is especially true in the case of the nonprofit Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), a private-public joint venture, and the Electronics Research Service Organisation. These two organisa-tions have created Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, which currently has some of the world’s most sophisticated foundries. Pres-ently, India has plans to establish software technology parks in 19 of its 28 states. It can shorten its technology-policy learning curve by collaborating with Taiwan scientists and engineers. There are around 500 Indian students doing science-related PhD pro-grammes in Taiwanese universities. A similar figure can also be aimed for Taiwanese stu-dents to gather technical know-how in the universities surrounding the Silicon Valley of India in Bangalore. The success of Taiwan-ese businessmen in Mainland China can also be studied to detect similar patterns for Paki-stani businessmen working in India.

Lastly, in terms of trilateral consultations, India is being courted by countries other than the U.S. Japan is one such suitor. Early last month, the two countries had one of the widest-ranging discussions ever to discuss economic, political, and strategic matters. Among them was the issue of how to tackle China’s dominance in the field of rare-earth metals. Japan and India are now stepping up bilateral ties while separately develop-ing a trilateral dialogue with the U.S. Also in May 2012, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hill-ary Clinton, visited India after discussions in China and Bangladesh. Her trip clearly un-derscored the emerging dimensions of the U.S approach towards India and East Asia with the former projected to take on a col-laborative and more active role. Surely on its own merits Taiwan would like to be a part of the interesting web of economic and trade possibilities that has spun off with India as a catalyst. APN

Kevin Wee Lin is a Former engineer at the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) in Singapore with experience in IT operations and support, crisis man-agement, and strategic planning. He is also the former regional manager in Taipei directing education-related NGO projects. He is presently work-ing as a corporate trainer in Singa-pore. His research interests include IPE and security in East Asia, conflict management, gaming and training strategies.

NoteThis article was previously presented as a discussion paper at AMDaS’ 3rd reunion session on 16 Jun 2012 and later compiled in their magazine.

India stands to benefit

from closer interaction

with Taiwanese scholars who

are considered the best in the world

in terms of understanding

China’s economic,

security, and foreign policies.

Taiwan claims to possess

Chinese culture in an

‘‘unadulterated’’ form different

from that found in China.

Indian high school students study in a classroom in Assam. Taiwanese

mandarin teachers may be heading in large numbers to teach in Indian high

schools.

Photo: Wahabdr / CC BY-SA 3.0

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In spite of this tendency, a movement has arisen in China that explicitly challenges the CCP, if in an unconventional fashion, and which stems from an unlikely source: law-yers. A loose constellation of legal academ-ics, professionally trained lawyers, and even self-trained “barefoot” lawyers, this move-ment calls itself weiquan yundong or “rights defense movement” in reference to the sort of cases its members use as a platform for pursuing their political objectives. Rights Defense is unique among Chinese dissident movements in a number of respects, most importantly in that it does not question the CCP’s overall legitimacy, but—as Hualing Fu and Richard Cullen point out in their article “Weiquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering in an Authoritarian State: Building a Culture of Public-Interest Lawyering”—instead chooses to work within the strictures of the law and existing political system in order to achieve change. Yet as the movement has de-veloped, a schism has arisen between mod-erate and radical lawyers. Ye, in “The Need for a United Front on Rights Defense,” point out that proponents of the moderate school argue that a targeted, non-confrontational approach will be most effective. Radical lawyers insist that a moral standard must be brought to bear on any case worth defend-ing, whether the case can be won or not.

Although scholars have made some ef-forts to sketch the contours of the rights defense movement, less attention has been paid to the concrete political ramifications

of the movement. This essay builds on exist-ing work by offering an analysis of the rights defense movement that focuses specifically on its actual, as opposed to potential, politi-cal impact, and by trying to ascertain wheth-er the radical school or the moderate school is more effective in manufacturing change. The focus is on three hypotheses, the first investigating the claim that radical cases will produce the greatest policy impact, the sec-ond investigating the claim that only radical cases will pose a significant challenge to the Party and the third whether radical cases will articulate a clear vision of China’s future.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA AND THE RIGHTS DEFENSE MOVEMENTSince Deng Xiaoping’s ascension and the es-tablishment of China’s first legal code, there has been a rapid expansion of legal practice and jurisprudence, such that the law is of ever-increasing importance in Chinese po-litical life, a point argued at length by Hu-man Rights Watch in “Walking on Thin Ice: Control, Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in China.” Moreover, the people of China have ostensibly enjoyed many rights that would be grouped under the rubric of human rights. In spite of this, Western gov-ernments have long criticized the CCP’s hu-man rights record, criticism that the leader-ship was once happy to ignore. China’s move into the global spotlight, however, has neces-

sitated a change in approach; for China to be seen as a responsible global stakeholder, and for it to enjoy greater prominence in world bodies such as the WTO, it has had to move towards convergence with global norms on the issue of human rights, as pointed out by Feng Chongyi. The most significant action was taken in 2001 and 2004, when human rights-oriented modifications were made to the constitution, enshrined in which are vir-tually all the basic human rights accorded to citizens of liberal democracies: freedom of religious worship; freedom of speech, press, and assembly; the right to strike; even own-ership of private property. In 2008, the gov-ernment went so far as to produce a “Hu-man Rights Action Plan” and chart further goals for the development of human rights policy.

Yet as anyone with a passing familiarity with China knows, the rights guaranteed by the constitution are rarely upheld in practice. Why might this be? According to Qin Hui, low standards of human rights act as a com-petitive advantage for China; investors are lured in by artificially low prices on human capital, land, credits and non-renewable re-sources, prices that are kept low because of political repression. Consequently, China’s elite has a vested interest in simultaneously minimizing the real application of human rights—which would be costly to China’s de-velopment—and paying lip service to human rights to ensure China’s global prestige and satisfy its commitments to world bodies like the WTO and the UN, membership in which is a precondition for further development. The system that has emerged is a charac-teristically Chinese version of doublespeak, where the country does not abide by the rule of law, but rather is “ruled by law,” phraseol-ogy used by the government itself and which has antecedents in Chinese legalism. Accord-ing to Li Shuguang, the difference between the Western concept of rule of law and Chi-na’s rule by law “is that, under the rule of law, the law is preeminent and can serve as a check against the abuse of power. Under rule by law, the law is a mere tool for a govern-ment, that suppresses in a legalistic fashion.” This distinction has been codified in official policy under Hu Jintao. Largely in response to pressure over rights, the government for-mulated in 2007 the “Three Supremes”: the supremacy of the business of the CCP; the supremacy of the interests of the people; and the supremacy of constitutional law. In this way, the law is configured as an element inextricably linked to the interests of the Party, not a judicially independent, inviolable

Parameters of ProtestModerate and Radical Approaches Within China’s Rights Defense Movement

Matthew PalMarxists often comment that capitalism’s greatest strength is its ability to co-opt and neutralize anything that threatens it. Ironically, the very same might be said about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The same groups and forces that scholars once predicted might weaken the CCP’s dominance have for the most part been skillfully embedded within the Party’s power structures; business elites, students, and bur-geoning civil society all depend on the Party’s largesse, and are thus increasingly less likely to question the very force that sustains them.


universal standard. Given this context, the law in China, and particularly the law as it pertains to human rights, is a selectively ap-plied concept that is frequently distorted to benefit ruling elites. This environment has led to the development of the rights defense movement.

The rights defense movement’s over-arching goal is to hold the government ac-countable to the rights guaranteed in the constitution. Since the movement’s incep-tion, the majority of rights defense lawyers have avoided questioning the legitimacy of the CCP itself or the existing political frame-work, instead advancing cases solely within the confines of the legal system. This ap-proach is emblematic of what O’Brien and Li have identified as “rightful resistance”, a tactic adopted by ordinary citizens that uses the central government’s legal obligations to contest unjust behaviour by local politicians and others in positions of power. O’Brien and Li identify rightful resistance as a power-ful vein for political progress within in Chi-na, and note that the rights defense move-ment plays an important role in the broader spectrum of rights resistance.

The differences among issues and be-

tween cases are indicative of the fact that the movement remains somewhat informal and diffuse, without an acknowledged leader or program. Nevertheless, there are substan-tial linkages between rights defense lawyers, many of whom find themselves having run afoul of the government and needing repre-sentation, a role that is usually filled by fellow members of the movement. The blind, bare-foot lawyer, Chen Guangcheng, for example, has been represented at various points by Teng Biao and Li Jinsong, themselves both prominent rights defense lawyers. Often-times, freshly graduated lawyers come into contact with rights defense lawyers and sub-sequently begin pursuing their own rights defense cases. Lines of communication exist throughout the movement, especially, as Jo-seph Kahn indicates, among the dispropor-tionately high number of Christian lawyers. Legal academics publish scholarly articles on rights defense issues, lending more co-hesion to the movement, and connection to the broader dissident culture within China and overseas provide further unification. Thus while there is undoubtedly variety and indeed disagreement among proponents of rights defense, it does constitute a movement

The Rights Defense

Movement’s overarching

goal is to hold the

government accountable to the rights guaranteed

in the constitution.

Chen Guangcheng (center) is greeted by U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor

Koh (left) and former U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke (right).

Photo: U.S. Department of State

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with shared objectives and strategies.In recent years, there has been growing

friction between moderate and radical rights defense lawyers. When Fu and Cullen began their survey of the movement in 2006, they found a pyramid of radicalism, with the ma-jority of lawyers at the bottom, taking more moderate stances, critical lawyers occupying a smaller middle segment, and finally a small number of radical lawyers at the top pursu-ing the most politically sensitive cases, and on a number of occasions questioning the government as a whole. Yet when they re-visited the movement in 2011, they discov-ered an increase in the amount of radical lawyers questioning the CCP’s legitimacy as a whole. Similarly, prominent rights defense lawyer Li Jianqiang wrote recently that China needs “systemic change” and that in a “one-party dictatorship, the law is little more than an ornament.” Other members, as indicated in by Tao, have cited “inability to agree on fundamental questions of values…and blind risk-taking based on misguided idealism,” clearly a jab at more radical lawyers, as the fundamental problems facing the movement. While the outcome of this schism remains unclear, it is apparent that the rights defense movement has matured in unforeseen ways. It is critical to a fuller understanding of the movement that we distinguish between the moderate and radical schools and analyze the different outcomes brought about by both approaches.

GAO ZHISHENG AND FALUN GONG

The first case discussed here, that of Gao Zhisheng, represents the radical school. Gao Zhisheng is noted for being one of the first lawyers to adopt a radical approach, and also the most single-minded in his refusal to compromise with the authorities. In the mid-2000s, Gao Zhisheng rose to prominence as one of the rights defense movement’s most visible and controversial figures. His early ca-reer was emblematic of the moderate rights defense approach. Gao successfully prose-cuted a number of cases over victims’ rights in malpractice suits and was widely acknowl-edged as one of China’s best lawyers. Dur-ing this stage, Gao worked entirely within the strictures of the system. Soon, however, he began gravitating towards “unwinnable” cases designed to highlight systemic injus-tice. In 2004, Gao embarked upon a case that would define his career and act as a seminal moment for what would become the radical approach to rights defense. He took up the case of Huang Wei, a member of the pseu-do-religious Falun Gong sect that had been repressed by the central government since 1999. Huang Wei had been found distribut-ing Falun Gong promotional materials and was sentenced to three years in a “Re-Educa-tion Through Labour” camp and was denied the opportunity to appeal the decision.

Although Gao filed the case on nominally constitutional grounds, in practice there was

no way the case would ever be brought to lit-igation. This is because lower-level laws such as the act on Re-Education Through Labour, even when in contravention of upper-level legislation such as the constitution, cannot be struck down by the courts; instead, as dic-tated by the doctrine of democratic central-ism, the original law-making body is respon-sible for viewing the low-level law it enacted. Thus Gao, under Chinese law, had no case. Instead, he went outside the system, appeal-ing to a moral principle. Part of his strategy was to gain attention from the public, which he did by breaking the news of mass torture of Falun Gong detainees, renouncing his Party membership, and staging a mass hun-ger strike in protest of the authorities’ ac-tions. Despite success in garnering attention from domestic and international press, the case was never brought to court. Further-more, surveillance was stepped up on Gao and his family and his law practice was forced by the authorities to shut down over a tech-nicality. Just as Gao’s actions were igniting a debate among rights defense activists on the future of the movement, Gao was abducted from his sister’s home in August 2006, turn-ing up a month later in government custody, where he was convicted of subversion and sentenced to three years in prison.

The ensuing years have brought Gao little respite. Repeated disappearances fol-lowed by brief emergences culminated in an absence of over 20 months, a period dur-ing which Gao’s family, who was forced to

Falun Gong practitioners gather in Guangzhou in the mid-1990s.

Photo: © Falun Dafa Information Center


flee to the United States, had no idea of his whereabouts. In December 2011, the author-ities announced that Gao would be required to fulfill his original three-year sentence. As for the mission Gao initiated in 2004, seek-ing justice for Falun Gong detainees and ad-vocating for religious freedom, little progress has been made in the time since. Although other rights defense lawyers attempted to continue Gao’s work, they too faced gov-ernment pressure; most notably, Tang Jitian and Liu Wei had their legal licenses revoked. Falun Gong is still prohibited in China as an illegal organization, and while systematic state repression is muted in comparison to the period from 1999-2006, abductions and coercive re-education campaigns continue.

In the first hypotheses, Gao Zhisheng’s case, emblematic of a radical rights defense position, has not had a noticeable impact on CCP policy. Not only has the CCP not al-tered its policy on Falun Gong, nor on the Re-Education Through Labour policy, the case was not even brought to court and Gao found himself imprisoned and unable to pursue additional rights defense cases.

In accordance with second hypothesis, Gao’s case did however pose a significant challenge to the CCP. His tactics focused on rallying public support not just against a pol-icy, but against the very nature of a political system that detains, tortures, and disappears people with impunity. By initiating hunger strikes, a strategy that evokes not only non-violent resistance in the tradition of Ghandi but also the 1989 democracy movement in Tiananmen Square, Gao situated himself in a broader context of resistance that ques-tions the legitimacy of authoritarian power. The government’s reaction, to swiftly silence Gao, indicates that they took this threat se-riously. Moreover, by going up against the central government itself, which had dictated the policy on Falun Gong, rather than local level government, Gao orchestrated a con-frontation with the system as a whole. Few other rights defense cases can be said to be this far-reaching in scope.

The third hypothesis states that radical cases will articulate a clear vision of Chi-na’s future. Because rights defense lawyers do not produce manifestos to go alongside their cases and describe their vision, the con-tent of cases and their objectives is the best guideline for evaluating this hypothesis. In this regard, by focusing on “big-picture” is-sues like freedom of belief, protection from illegal detention, torture, and the unjust prac-tices of the authoritarian state, Gao posited a vision of a China free from the routine abuse

of power. The message of the case extended beyond a single policy and encompassed the system as a whole; implicitly, it envisioned a China without fear of arbitrary arrest, where citizens are free to believe in what they wish and live their lives free from the Party’s inter-ference. More than the majority of rights de-fense cases, Gao’s highlights a well-defined, if extremely ambitious, vision of China’s fu-ture that transcends mere legal maneuvering and becomes closer to a fully-fledged Chi-nese political movement, akin to Charter 08. Therefore the third hypothesis is supported by Gao’s case.

THE SUN ZHIGANG INCIDENT

In contrast to the above case, the Sun Zhi-gang case was conducted by moderate law-yers entirely within the system, and marks the first real achievement of the original rights defense approach—which was characterized by its embeddedness within the Chinese le-gal system. Sun Zhigang was a 27-year-old college graduate from Hubei who had found work at a clothing company in Guangzhou, when one night in 2003 he was stopped by police outside of an internet café. Sun had not obtained a temporary residence permit and had forgotten his identification card at home. Suspecting Sun to be an illegal mi-grant, the police detained him and refused to release him when Sun’s roommate arrived with his identification. The police were en-forcing China’s hukou system, a policy de-signed for urban control that gives the police the power to detain and forcibly return to their registered province anyone suspected of vagrancy. By 2003, the system faced many accusations of abuse, beatings, and rape at the hands of enforcers. When Sun Zhigang’s family was told days later that he had died suddenly of heart complications, they com-missioned a private autopsy that revealed blunt trauma injuries as the cause of death. The family then alerted the Southern Metropol-itan Daily, a leading liberal newspaper, which published an exposé that criticized local au-thorities.

Soon after, a group of legal scholars led by Teng Biao filed a petition with the Na-tional People’s Congress (NPC) that chal-lenged the legal basis of the hukou system. Further media coverage elicited massive pub-lic response that pressured the central lead-ership to take action and investigate Sun’s death. Justice was swiftly meted out to those responsible, but more importantly, Premier Wen Jiabao soon chaired a committee that dispensed with the existing hukou system and

established aid stations designed to protect the rights of migrants. Amazingly, this policy change came just two months after Sun’s death. This victory heralded the first major achievement of the rights defense move-ment and increased the visibility of rights defense legal scholars such as Teng Biao.

Yet amidst widespread elation over the petition’s success, signs emerged that the government did not look kindly on the tac-tics used by the rights defense advocates. A number of editors at the Southern Metropolitan Daily were charged with economic crimes, a blatant reprisal by the authorities for report-ing too freely on rights defense issues. When rights defense lawyers attempted, several weeks later, to challenge the Re-Education

Through Labour policy by a similar petition to the NPC, they were ignored and media coverage suppressed. Furthermore, the de-gree of the victory was likely overstated. Eva Pils has noted that the Sun Zhigang case was a “symbolic success” but that “its actual ef-fect on detention practices remains doubt-ful.” Although Chan and Buckingham admit that further research must be conducted on the impact of the Sun case, they also argue that there continues to be a divide between the legal status of urban migrants and city-dwellers and that the hukou system continues to exist, albeit in an altered form. Never-theless, the Sun Zhigang case stands as the rights defense movement’s most substantive achievement in terms of large-scale policy change. While the reasons for success are many—ranging from the leaders’ existing de-sire to modify the hukou system to the use of the media to mobilize public support—most

In recent years, there has been

growing friction between

moderate and radical

rights defense lawyers.

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credit the victory to the lawyers’ restrained approach and insistence on working within the confines of the law.

The Sun Zhigang case contradicts the first hypothesis. Although scholars have de-bated the significance of its long-term im-pacts, it is the most salient example of the central government changing its policy as a direct result of a rights defense case. Signifi-cantly, the case was escalated to the highest levels of government and received attention not only from the NPC but also from the Politburo Standing Committee. In contrast to the first hypothesis, which reasons that moderate tactics will not be potent enough to force policy change, hukou reforms stem-ming from the Sun case were brought about through moderate tactics that operated with-in the system. Furthermore, the case did not prompt the same level of reprisals seen in the Gao Zhisheng case; the lawyers involved retained their academic positions and have continued to advocate on rights defense is-sues. In this sense, the handling of the Sun case was particularly effective both from a policy standpoint and for strategically ensur-ing the survival of the movement.

The second hypothesis is confirmed by the case. At no time during the case did rights defense lawyers, the media reporting on the issue, or the general public frame the issue as a challenge to CCP authority. On the contrary, befitting the moderate approach, advocates were careful to situate their case as a petition to the leadership—rather than a critique or challenge, as was the case with Gao Zhisheng. Although this approach of appeal was certainly effective, Li Jianqiang’s comment that it recalls a “peasant mental-ity” of servants petitioning the emperor is apposite. “The strategy of submitting peti-tions and using legal actions to draw the em-peror’s attention is a proven failure”. Indeed, the authorities were quick to recast the policy change in their own favour; state media or-gans wrote editorials that interpreted the Sun decision as evidence that the Chinese “gov-ernment [is] a responsible one and a highly efficient government in the service of the people.” Thus the proposition that moder-ate rights defense is more easily co-opted by the authorities is borne out by the Sun Zhigang case. As much as it was a victory for the rights defense movement, it was also a public relations coup for the CCP that al-lowed it to project an aura of reform and progress without requiring major change on policy issues that reflect on the Party itself. Hand also points out there is evidence that the leadership had been thinking about mak-

The Sun Zhigang case was conducted by moderate lawyers entirely within the system, and marks the first real achievement of the original rights defense approach—which was characterized by its embeddedness within the Chinese legal system.

The Sun Zhigang headline appears on the front page of the Southern Metropolitan Daily.

Photo: © Southern Metropolitan Daily


ing changes to the hukou system prior to the case, and that activism functioned as only one of a number of causes. And in any case, the changes to the system were less pro-nounced than was originally hoped. It can be concluded, then, that the government will more readily support rights defense cases that align with its own objectives and which do not call into question the Party’s overall power and mechanisms of authority. In this respect, moderate rights defense cases such as that of Sun Zhigang may constitute ulti-mately hollow victories.

The third hypothesis is given further sup-port by Sun’s case. The scope of the case was quite limited and focused only on the abuse of the hukou system by local authorities. The lawyers did not attempt to link the issue to larger questions regarding China’s political system, nor did they advocate for broader reforms to freedom of movement for rural citizens, an end to arbitrary detention in non-hukou related offenses (e.g. Falun Gong), or curtailing of the state’s authoritarian power. The case represented a single issue at a spe-cific moment in time rather than an attempt to foment wider political change. Moderate rights defense activists might argue that the Sun case was only an important first step in incremental change toward a China that is freer and more just. However, given the gov-ernment’s co-opting of the policy changes, the minimal level of real progress made in dismantling the hukou system, and the lack of subsequent rights defense victories of a similarly high visibility, even the incremental nature of the case must be called into ques-tion. Moreover, incremental change is insuf-ficient material for providing an independent vision of China’s future; indeed, incremental change and gradualism is the approach to re-form taken by the CCP itself. If the rights defense movement is to offer a meaningful alternative to the present system, it must ar-ticulate larger and more ambitious goals than those seen in the Sun Zhigang case. Thus the third hypothesis is confirmed: moderate rights defense cases are less likely to offer a platform for broader change in China’s fu-ture.

The results of these case studies offer important insight into the critical questions currently facing the rights defense move-ment. To review, the first hypothesis did not receive any support. The radical case did not have greater policy impact than the moderate case; in fact, the reverse was true. The sec-ond and third hypotheses, however, received strong support. The radical case posed a significant challenge to CCP power and ar-

ticulated a powerful vision for China’s future, whereas the moderate case was co-opted by the Party and had little to say on broader po-litical goals. The results also shed light on the respective merits and drawbacks of moder-ate and radical approaches. If, as seems pos-sible given the detention of so many radical lawyers, the radical approach is incapable of producing specific policy change on China’s most pressing issues, then it is of limited utility in realizing the larger changes it seeks. Likewise, the moderate approach, while ef-fective from a policy perspective, is hindered by its embeddedness within the system and hamstrung by an inability to tackle the big issues of the day. Is the only choice then be-tween the pyrrhic victory of a Gao Zhish-eng, defiant but silenced, or a symbolic vic-tory like that of the Sun Zhigang incident? Perhaps the lesson is that radical and moder-ate approaches should not be mutually exclu-sive. Ultimately, it may be necessary to find a balance between moderate lawyers gradually winning small battles in the court system and radical lawyers drawing attention to broader issues while advocating an ambitious pro-gram of political change. So long as there remains a stream of radical lawyers willing to risk everything for their principles, the move-ment may reap rewards from such a division of labour. However, should the CCP’s re-pressive tactics prove effective at staunching the flow of radical lawyers, then the rights defense movement may need to reconsider its direction. APN

Matthew Pal holds an MA from the Norman Paterson School of Interna-tional Affairs and was an exchange student at National Chengchi Univer-sity. His primary research interests are in China’s economic policy and financial system. He can be reached at [email protected].

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-STRAIT INVESTMENT

Trade, let alone investment, had long been suspended across the Taiwan Strait. It was not until Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy advocated in 1978 that China reformed and opened up economically to the world and Taiwan, to attract the foreign capital and technologies that it strongly needed for con-tinued economic expansion. And On Janu-ary 1 1979, the “5th N.P.C. Standing Com-mittee’s Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” stated, that “[t]here is every reason for us to develop trade between us, each making up what the other lacks and create economic interflow.” This shift in direction towards Taiwan not only paved the way for the three links of direct trade, postal and transporta-tion links, but together with the adoption of

the law on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures on legally allowing and protecting foreign investment, the Chinese side was open for Taiwanese funding.

However, from the Taiwan side general outward investment did not really take off until 1987, when the foreign exchange con-trols on capital account transactions became deregulated, leading to a rapid increase in outward investment by Taiwan’s enterprises. China-specific, the abolishment of martial law in 1987 allowed Taiwanese to visit their relatives in the mainland for the first time since 1949, who subsequently found it a good place for investment due to its cheap production factors, abundant labor and the shared language and customs. In addition, Taiwan’s currency, the New Taiwan Dollar (NTD), appreciated about 30 percent be-tween 1986 and 1988, and Taiwanese real

wages had been raising 7 to 8 percent per year during the 1980s leading to Taiwan’s la-bor-intensive industries losing their compar-ative advantage. Indirect investment through third-party states grew as direct investment into China was still prohibited, and thereaf-ter when the Taiwanese government enacted the Act Governing Relations between Peo-ples of the Taiwan Area and China in 1992, legally permitting direct investment and technological cooperation with China for the first time. This formalization also brought about several regulations, for example the limitation of outward investment to 40 per-cent of its net worth. Yet, as the process of approval for direct investment through the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) re-mained cumbersome, Taiwanese investors would often elude the requirements by sim-ply registering the FDI’s destination as Hong Kong, Singapore and, later, the Caribbean tax havens of the British Virgin and Cayman Islands. The Consensus of 1992 saw further rapprochement between China and Taiwan, even though just on a semi-official basis. (See Figure 1.)

From the Chinese side, primarily known for being a major recipient of FDI, FDI out-flow began increasing from zero after open-ing up in 1979, and by 1996 its total outflow of 18 billion US dollars had already exceeded South Korea, but still lagged behind the oth-er developing nations of Hong Kong, Sin-gapore and Taiwan. Cross-Strait investment between China and Taiwan has however been a rather recent phenomenon, having been prohibited by Taiwanese authorities. Whereas on the one hand Article 35 of the 1992 Act Governing Relations Between Peo-ples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area permits “[a]ny individual, juristic per-son, organization, or other institution of the Taiwan Area” to engage in “any investment or technology cooperation in the Mainland Area” approved by the MOEA, Article 73 prohibits any of the Mainland Area counter-parts to “engage in any investment activity in the Taiwan Area”, also explicitly ruling out investment into Taiwan Area through third parties. As at the time China’s outward FDI was still rather small and highly restrained by the government, China’s firms that actu-ally invested abroad were hardly interested, nor strongly affected by, Taiwan and its re-strictions, with most investment aimed at resource rich countries. In order to comply with its WTO commitments, Taiwan had amended its inward FDI regulations by 2002, which was henceforth decided upon from case to case. Yet, it was not until the

Impact of Economic Integration in Terms of Cross-strait InvestmentTaiwan’s investment in mainland China has been a key factor in the development of cross-strait relations.

Matthias Franziskus DurrerBeing the second largest investor after Hong Kong, Taiwan’s cross-Strait investment in mainland China has not only become a crucial factor in aspects of economic growth and relations between the two states, but has also induced spillover effects on the domestic level in China. While Taiwan has been investing the bigger share of its out-ward foreign direct investment (FDI) in China for more than two de-cades, due to constraints by the Taiwanese authorities China has not been investing into Taiwan until recently. Thanks to the relaxation of regulations on both sides of the Strait, Taiwanese China-bound FDI has been growing quickly since the 1990s, and has led to an increasing financial interdependence between the two states. In the wake of en-hanced relations and growing economic importance of China, invest-ment from China into Taiwan has been stepped up since 2009. In the wake of this economic integration, this essay discusses two spillovers.


election of Ma Ying-Jeou in 2008, that Chi-nese investment into Taiwan significantly in-creased. As a result, several policies in favor of Chinese investment were adopted, such as the normalization of direct transport links across the Taiwan Strait in 2008 and an agreement to open 192 sectors in Taiwan to Chinese investors in 2009.

SPILLOVERS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BY FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTAs As the current cross-strait relations can be described as “political alienation with economic integration”, I will shortly put forward the fundamentals of Wu’s analytical approach in “Integration Theory: Its Impli-

cation to Taiwan-China Relations” to de-scribe the relations across the Taiwan Strait as depicted in his “Theorizing on Relations across the Taiwan Strait: Nine Contend-ing Approaches.” The integration theory focuses on the crucial role of the economy with the mutual “desire to achieve maximum economic efficiency and prosperity” among the parties of a once unified state. Wu’s idea is that the two parties first have to undergo several stages of economic integration to an extent that there will be spillovers to other functional areas.

Such a spillover effect has been seen in the case of Taiwanese investment in China. There are several motivations for develop-ing countries like China to encourage inward FDI. Thanks to its economic openness and comparative advantages, especially in labor-intensive manufacturing processes, China was able to become the largest recipient of FDI among the developing nations. China’s structural weaknesses can be found especial-ly in the supply of capital and technology,

Taiwanese general outward

investment did not take

off until 1987, when the foreign

exchange controls on

capital account transactions

became deregulated.

Figure 1: Taiwanese FDI into mainland China in millions of US$, 1991-2011. Note: 2011 data are from January to November.

Source: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs Taiwan, http://www.moeaic.gov.tw

Figure 2: China’s outward FDI flows into Taiwan in millions of US$, 2004-2011.

Source: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs Taiwan, http://www.moeaic.gov.tw

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which stand in contrast to the factor endow-ments of China’s major trading partners, in-cluding Taiwan. At the abundance of FDI spillovers, I focus on the two major ones that China can obtain through contracting inward FDI. First, FDI in China has been playing a crucial role for China’s domestic capital for-mation, which accounted tremendously to China’s fast growing economic development and aggregate income, visible in the OECD Working Papers on International Investment titled “Main Determinants and Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on China’s Economy.” Second, for China with its large population and abundant labor, job creation through employment in FDI firms has in-creased significantly, especially in the eastern regions where FDI firms have been respon-sible for a huge share of urban employ-ment. Taiwan’s, the second-largest investor of China-bound FDI, accounts for 6 to 15 percent, definitely significant for the sustain-ment of the Chinese economy. Besides sup-plying advanced technology and knowhow strongly needed by the developing economy of China, capital formation and employment play an important role as spillovers of for-eign direct investment, and displays a high degree of economic integration between the two states.

It can be concluded that China and Tai-wan have undergone a strong economic in-tegration in terms of cross-Strait investment in the last two decades. Not only have the two countries reached a stage of interde-pendence, this is possible despite the two countries’ contested historical past and mu-tually imposed legal impediments. As the measured numbers by the MOFCOM for Taiwanese FDI into China do not under-estimate the actual amount as much as the Taiwanese numbers do, it has to be assumed that the Chinese authorities know very well about the economic importance of Taiwan’s outward FDI for mainland China. Thus, the impact on China in the case of a future war with Taiwan would not only damage China’s economy physically, as mentioned in Scobell in The Costs of Conflict: The Impact on China of a Future War, but also economically through its financial dependence resulting from this economic integration. Apart from all other consequences that war might bring, the dry-ing up of Taiwanese FDI into China would not only stop the technology transfer, but also reduce China’s domestic capital forma-tion and employment and have further spill-over effects. Also, with the emergence of Chinese outward FDI into Taiwan in 2009, the growing interdependence and economic

integration have reached a new dimension in the cross Strait relations, which is expected to rise. This new development implies an additional deterrent for Chinese aggression, and as Reid and Rigger point out in their chapter in Turning Point: Institution, Identity and Democracy, an additional context for peace, since no country would “bomb” its own in-vestment. On the other hand, with the ex-pected rise of Chinese FDI into Taiwan, this would also create an economic leverage for China on Taiwan, especially as the techno-logical capabilities become more equal. As a result, Taiwan would need to remain flexible but cautious about its future FDI in Main-land China. APN

Matthias Franziskus Durrer is a graduate of National Chengchi Uni-versity in Taipei (International Mas-ter’s Program in Asia-Pacific Stud-ies) and the University of Berne (BA, Economics). Since finishing his de-gree with an in-depth study of Chi-nese outbound tourism to Taiwan, he interned at the cultural section of the Swiss Consulate in Hong Kong and currently works as an officer in investment promotion at the Swiss Embassy based in Beijing, China, pro-moting Switzerland as an investment destination to Chinese companies.

China’s FDI outflow began increasing from zero after opening up in 1979. By 1996, its total outflow of 18 billion US dollars had already exceeded that of South Korea but still lagged behind Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan.


Four months after the first official meeting in February

2014 between the Beijing and Taipei governments, Wang Yu-

chi, Minister of Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of the Republic of

China (ROC), and Zhang Zhijun, Director of the Taiwan Affairs

Office (TAO) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), shake

hands on June 25, 2014 in Taoyuan, Taiwan.

Photo: Voice of America

Since the inauguration of President Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, economic and political

exchanges between mainland China and Taiwan have accelerated.

Photo: Taiwan Presidential Office


TAIWANESE IDENTITYTaiwan is often not seen as a country, but as a nation that lacks an agreed upon national identity. Among the reasons for that is a di-verse society, where Taiwanese citizens can be divided into two major ethnic groups, namely the Han Chinese, which make up 97.8% of population, and Aborigines, which are an Austronesian people that have lived on Taiwan Islands long before they were dis-covered by the western world and who make up about 2% of the population. Among Han

Chinese, a strong identity can be found es-pecially amongst the Hakka people, which make up about 18.1% of the population and who are an ethnic group that came to Penghu and Taiwan Islands mainly from the south of China. Also amongst the Han are the Hoklo people, living mainly in the central southern parts of Taiwan. Further historical divisions can also be found in the form of Taiwan-ese, who are Chinese that came to Taiwan from the 14th century onward and make up about 84% of the population. There is also

the Mainland Chinese and their descendants who relocated to Taiwan together with the KMT army in 1949, who make up about 14% of the population.

In addition to the above, cleavages are also found along political lines. According to research by Lay, Yap and Chen in “The Tran-sition of Taiwan’s Political Geography,” there are three social cleavages connected with the two major political parties: Taiwanese versus Chinese national identities, democratic ver-sus authoritarian ideologies and Taiwanese ethnic consciousness versus Chinese ethnic consciousness. National identity is closely connected with this partisan affiliation. People who identify themselves as Hoklo or Hakka, for example, are more likely to have a Taiwanese identity and therefore tend to support a pan-green coalition (mainly DPP). One the other hand, Mainlanders are more likely to have Chinese identity and therefore they tend to support the pan-blue coalition, mainly the KMT.

With such a variety of races and ethnic groups, it is hard to find a commonly accept-ed national identity. According to the recent poll published by National Chengchi Uni-versity Election Study Center the number of Taiwan citizens that consider themselves Taiwanese increased form 17.3% in 1992, when Taiwan begun its democratization, to 54.2% in 2011. During the same time-period, the number of citizens that consider them-selves Chinese dropped from 25.5% in 1992 to 4.1% in 2011, a trend that is expected to continue.

This change has also reflected in nation-al politics. When asked what they preferred if given a free choice, 74% of Taiwanese citizens replied that they would prefer inde-pendence, and 81.7% refused acceptance of the “one country, two systems” solution of-fered by China. This is further visible in lo-

Economic Interest vs. National IdentityCross-strait cooperation and ethnic division in Taiwan

Wojciech KusakTaiwan serves as a successful example of both a developmental state and democracy. With its unique status in the international environ-ment, and its connection with China, there has however arisen an in-teresting conflict between the economic interest of Taiwanese busi-nesses and the identity of its citizens. Among commonly researched questions we find the level of economic interdependence in the Taiwan Strait, and the possibility of future unification and economic absorp-tion of Taiwan by China, but in recent years ethnic identity has shown that the number of people who consider themselves Taiwanese has in-creased. This has occurred alongside increased economic cooperation between the sides of the Taiwan Strait. While the independence notion is still high in Taiwan, more often people put their economic ambitions in front of national identity, leaving identity not agreed upon.

Figure 1: Changes in identity of Taiwan citizens (1992-2011/06; % of population)

Source: NCCU Election Research Center, 2011


cal elections. Data regarding Taiwan citizens’ identity, and particularly contemporary trend in Taiwanese identity can be associated with elections, as the clear changes can be seen in the election campaign year, especially be-fore the political turnovers in 1999-2000 and 2007-2008. The recent rise in the share of people with a Taiwanese identity and drop in both Chinese-Taiwanese and Chinese identity is caused — from the opposition’s perspective — by the “China friendly policy” of President Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT administration. The most influential to the identity issue is the cross-strait economic re-lations that directly involve the “sentiments” of Taiwanese towards China. Therefore to gain a full understanding of changes in the domestic socio-economic situation and de-velopments in political and social culture of Taiwanese, it is worth analyzing the cross-strait economic relationship both on the market and government level.

HISTORICAL SCHEME OF CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC RELATIONSAfter the lifting of martial law in 1987, the decision of Taiwan administration to allow indirect investments and economic coop-eration between Taiwan and China evolved dynamically. Due to the increasing level of economic cooperation, Chinese authorities aimed to create a friendly environment for the Taiwanese business. The goals of those actions were to increase the momentum of economic cooperation, which in the longer perspective would bring the desired unifica-tion and limit the independence ambitions of the ROC government. The first signs of such a policy towards Taiwan were enclosed in the Temporary Rules Regarding Trade

with Taiwan, discussed in detail by Denny Roy in “Cross-Strait economic relations: Opportunities outweigh risks.” Taiwanese authorities, in the first years after lifting the martial law, seemed to be aware of the Chi-nese side’s aim in creating a stronger eco-nomic interdependence. This was the major reason for the Taipei imposing high levels of control over transportation, trade and com-munications.

However, in 1990 the Taipei government began allowing indirect investments from China with the adaptation of Measures on Indirect Investment and Technical Coopera-tion with the Mainland. The practical aspect of the new regulations meant that each party needed to acquire government permission before any investments were made. How-ever, this was permitted only for labor-in-tensive industries where Taiwan had lost its competitive advantage. Furthermore, to dis-courage these Taiwanese investments, goods

manufactured in China, even if funded by Taiwanese capital, were forbidden from be-ing imported into Taiwan.

In 1991, the Taiwanese government be-gan dialogue on the “official” level through the Taiwanese side’s Strait Exchange Foun-dation (SEF) and the Chinese side’s As-sociation for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). The resulting regulations influenced mostly investments made in the coastal areas, like Xiamen, Shenzhen and Shanghai, with investments in infrastruc-ture, high-technology industries and oth-ers amounting to more the 50m USD, were forbidden. The higher control over the in-vestments, however, remained ineffective. The looser regulations regarding the foreign exchange and trade liberalization allowed Taiwanese enterprises to invest in China via

Looser regulations

regarding foreign

exchange and trade

liberalization allowed

Taiwanese enterprises to

invest in China via British Territories in Central

America (in the case of SMEs)

and “daughter companies”

in third countries (in

the case of big corporations).

Figure 2: Taiwanese exports to China, 1987–2011

Source: Author’s own evaluation based on data from the Bureau of Foreign Trade (MOAS) (for Taiwanese data) and Ministry of Commerce, PRC (for Chinese data)

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British Territories in Central America (in case of small and medium enterprises) and “daughter companies” in third countries (in case of big corporations). Taiwanese in-vestment stock in the 1990’s underlined the desired direction of economic cooperation, despite the situation of cross-strait relations.

The year 2000 saw the start of the new policy of Taiwan towards China. Chen Shui-bian, a candidate for the DPP, won the sec-ond democratic presidential elections, mak-ing Cross-Strait relations tenser. Lack of coherent economic policy and hard rhetoric from Taiwanese authorities towards China caused the biggest recession in Taiwan’s economy. Both the trade volume, which in 2001 amounted to a 14.38% decrease in ex-ports and 22.88% decrease in imports, and GDP growth, which decreased to 1.7% from 5.8% in 2000, fell dramatically. The situation on the labor market also worsened. How-ever, by 2002 China had still become the major trading partner of Taiwan, accounting for 24,68% of total Taiwanese exports, ac-cording to data from the Bureau of Foreign Trade (MOEA). This resulted in a revision of the law regarding the economic coopera-

tion in the Taiwan Strait, which permitted investments in less advanced technology like GSM phones and DVD players’ and also increasing the investment limit while allow-ing Taiwanese banks to open agencies (not branches) on Chinese territory. However, new regulations still didn’t permit invest-ments in high-tech.

New quality in Taiwanese economic policy came together with the transition in administrative power in 2008. After Ma Ying-jeou was elected for president, a series of reforms and shifts in policy directions were introduced. During Ma’s presidency, 15 agreements were signed between Taiwan and China. Active dialogue between Taipei and Beijing became a practical answer to the demands of the Taiwan market. The most significant achievement, was the June 2011 signing of the ECFA agreement, which in the opinion of Taiwanese authorities ended the period “of political isolation” of Taiwan. This also regulated some important issues regarding bilateral trade. The agreement in-cluded, as of June 2012, 557 categories of goods exported to China, accounting for some 16% of total Taiwanese exports to

China, for which the tariffs were reduced or completely eliminated. According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), ECFA will increase the annual GDP growth by 1.75% and will contribute greatly to the level of employment in the upcoming years. It is also expected, which is often underlined by the opposition, that ECFA will further increase the dependence of Taiwan on the Chinese economy. The “China friendly” policy was a major argument of DPP party in regaining public support during their 2012 election campaign.

TAIWANESE BUSINESSES IN CHINA

By 2011, according to data from the Taiwan Statistical Data Book, around 40% of Taiwan-ese investment is in China, where around 70 000 Taiwanese businesses have set up. The number of Taiwanese people living in China is estimated between 1 and 1.5 mil-lion, mainly in areas of Shanghai, Fujian and Guangdong provinces. Starting from 2005, the main platform of cooperation between Hu’s administration and Taiwanese business-

Taiwanese companies have become major investors in mainland China. Many companies, such as the electronics manufacturer Foxconn (also known as Hon Hai Precision Industry Co.), have opened factories there.

Photo: Steve Jurvetson / CC BY 2.0


es was the Cross-Strait Trade and Cultural Forum (CSETCF). Among the successes of the forum was the meeting between Hu Jintao and Lien Chen, then chairman of the KMT, and a significant increase in active presence of Taiwanese businesses. By 2007 around 500 representative from Taiwanese businesses and representatives of the KMT attended this forum. As an effect of these meetings, some 13 new programs promot-ing socio-economic cooperation in the Strait were designed. However, due to the DPP government none of them were implement-ed before 2008.

Contemporary participation of Tai-wanese businessman in Chinas economic development is quite significant. Industrial production designated for export is one of the important driving forces of Chinese economy today. Data from Pennsylvania State University indicate that companies re-ceiving foreign capital manufactured around 70% of ICT-products. Around 70% of the production value of these, were made by enterprises receiving Taiwanese investment, of which the 3 Taiwanese IT giants Hon Hai P.I. Ltd., Quanta and Compal accounted for 181,2b USD in 2011. The value of Taiwan-ese production in China is estimated to be the same as the GDP value of Shanghai and its surroundings, which without a doubt a major contribution to the Chinese economy.

Taiwan is also a major investor in China. According to official data from the MOEA, the total Taiwanese FDI stock in China equals 180 billion USD, of which 43 billion were invested after 2008. However, due to policies prior to 2008, FDI investment of that period is likely underreported. Accord-ing to this unofficial data, the total stock of Taiwan FDI to China may total closer to 300 billion USD. Inclusive of capital originat-ing from the British territories in Central America and Hong Kong— used by Tai-wanese corporation to bypass investment regulations prior to 2008— even this val-ue might be underre-ported.

Keng and Schubert, in “Agents of Taiwan-China Unification,” divided the possible roles of Taiwanese business-man in the cross-strait relations into

four groups. The first, a passive role, acts for China’s benefit is the usage of Taiwan-ese businessman as “economic hostages” of China during the case of a conflict. The second, a passive role acting for the benefit of Taiwan, uses businessmen for buffering, which may help Taipei authorities to achieve their political goals. The third is an active-role acting for China’s benefit, using Taiwan-ese businessmen as China’s agents. Under this argument, due to high dependence of Taiwanese corporations on China’s market, Taiwanese people, while defending their eco-nomic interest, actively support Chinese po-litical goals towards Taiwan. The fourth, an active role acting for the benefit of Taiwan, is the using of Taiwanese businessmen as lobbyists, mainly through the Taiwan Busi-ness Associations (TBA), which might in-crease effectiveness of directing of China’s policy towards Taiwan. The contemporary level of dependence of Taiwanese business in China suggests that any of the mentioned roles is potentially real. However, according to works of many scholars on this subject, the increasing ease in transportation, flow of capital, and liberalization of economic ac-tivity results in a win-win situation for both actors, and is largely the result of market ac-tions.

ECONOMIC INTEREST AND TAIWANESE IDENTITY

Based on the political support of distribu-tion and concentration of Taiwanese indus-trial clusters, it can be concluded that there is no correlation between the Taiwanese or Chinese identity and willingness of coop-eration across the Taiwan Strait. Levels of contemporary interdependence of both Chi-nese and Taiwanese economies is difficult to

estimate, and can be expected to exceed the estimates made according to official statis-tics. The real volume of Taiwanese exports to China is estimated to be equal to the total Taiwanese exports and the difference be-tween the Taiwanese export to Hong Kong, according to Taiwanese statistics, and Hong Kong’s import from Taiwan, according to Honk Kong statistics. The value of close to 70 000 Taiwanese enterprises present in Chi-na accounts for a significant number of pro-duction originating from the PRC. Although Taiwan accounts for only 2.3% of Chinese exports and is a source of 4.8% of Chinese imports, the contribution of Taiwanese busi-nesses to Chinese export plays an important part. Data listed above suggests that China has a much higher level of dependence on the Taiwanese economy than the other way around.

In spite of the risk awareness of Tai-wanese citizens, and the Taiwan business community, connected to increasing levels of Taiwanese economic dependence on the Chinese market, it still remains the most at-tractive destination for local businesses. The historical perspective confirms that the gov-ernment actions prior to 2008, which were aimed at slowing down cross-strait econom-ic cooperation, were ineffective. Worsening conditions of the Taiwanese economy and labor market was one of the main reasons be-hind political turnover in 2008, even though the KMT party identified far more with the Chinese identity. Putting the economic in-terest in front of identity issues seemed to have been economic prudence, and reason-able decision-making. The new quality of Taiwanese policy towards Beijing, after 2008, allowed for the recent advancement in eco-nomic cooperation across the Taiwan Strait. From the perspective of the Taiwanese busi-

ness community, the ECFA agreement and opening of transpor-tation links and clos-er cooperation with China benefited all Taiwanese citizens, including the south-ern areas were the notion of Taiwanese identity is considered much higher than elsewhere.

The increasing costs of labor in Chi-na resulted in a slight increase of Taiwan-Figure 3: Taiwanese outgoing investments, 2007–2011

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The unique diplomatic status of Taiwan caused it to be excluded from regional and bilateral FTAs and active participation in the ongoing regionalization of the Asia-Pacific.

The first direct flight from Taiwan to mainland China since 1949 lands in Beijing in January 2005.

Photo: Yaoleilei / CC BY-SA 3.0


ese investment in other countries, including Vietnam. In general, however, the current advancement of business environment in Taiwan Strait causes the shift in direction of Taiwanese FDI from ASEAN countries to China. Although Chinese companies slowly started to take over manufacturing markets previously dominated by Taiwanese, new potential for development of the Chinese service sector still leaves a space for Taiwan.

The market driven process advancing the interdependence between Chinese and Tai-wanese economies finds current support in the Taipei government policies, suggesting that possible shifts in the administrations of each side will not influence it strongly. The opening in the Chinese service sector ad-ditionally contribute to the level of future economic interdependence in Taiwan Strait, that already is regarded as “irreversible”. In the mid-term, the business environment in cross-strait relations is expected to further improve.

Conflict between economic interests and Taiwanese national identity has for many years been the major topic of discussion between Taiwan’s political parties and soci-ety. Although many businesses cooperating with China have a higher Chinese-Taiwanese identity, the biggest green stronghold, in-cluding Tainan, Kaohsiung and Pingtung, also plays an important role in Islands in-dustrial production. This suggests a weak correlation between the identity and eco-nomic interest. The unique diplomatic sta-tus of Taiwan has caused exclusion of from much of the mushrooming regional bilateral FTA’s and of active participation in ongoing regionalism of Asia Pacific. The choice be-tween protecting Taiwan from economic de-pendence on China, and sustaining Taiwan’s de facto independence, was the major factor at the political and market levels for the past 20 years. The process of increasing economic cooperation, even where it points against Taiwan’s independence, has caused a lack of coherency within Taiwanese identity, which is argued here to be the result of market initiative. Regardless, Taiwan’s identity, even in the shadow of economic interest, is still present in the domestic politics and plays a key role in the ownership of Taiwan’s future. The increase of economic dependence on China and rise in Taiwanese identity leaves the risk of domestic political struggles. The challenge facing Taiwan now is to define the unique characteristics of Taiwan, thereby re-ducing the confusion among Taiwanese citi-zens and politicians. APN

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NOT AS PROMISED

Livestock These boys, most graduated from elementary or junior high school, were promised that they could both study and work at the same time. As far as they had been told, it was an opportunity for them to embark on the path to becoming an airplane mechanic. [2]

The youth were not forced to leave their homes, but they were persuaded and “vol-unteered” by their most trusted teachers who had themselves been educated by the Japanese educational hierarchy. As a result, the recruits truly believed that they were un-dertaking a patriotic cause for the good of “their own country” (Japan), and the country would truly take care of their future. [3]

In any event, no one could officially ap-ply without the registered seal of a parent or guardian of the child. Although approval was required, there were many youth who stole and secretly handed over the legal seal to the teacher to complete their application.

The first contingent of child laborers, comprising about 1,800 boys around the age of 14, left Taiwan via the port of Kaohsi-ung and sailed to Yokohama on May 8, 1943. From 1943 to 1944, more than 8,400 Tai-wanese boys from age 12 to 19 were sent to Naval C Arsenal located in Koza, in the sub-urbs of Tokyo. [4]

When they arrived in Japan, they were disappointed by what they found: only grass and crudely built dormitories. Once they were led to the workers’ (not students) dor-mitory in Koza and provided with workers’ uniforms, they were confronted with the sad reality that they had been brought there as workers, not students.

The dormitories were still under con-struction. The large dormitories occupied by the Shonenko were made up of 12 sections; each section contained 20 rooms. The capac-ity of each room was eight people. [5] In the Koza dormitories, workers were afflicted by lice in the winter and by fleas in the sum-mer. They also had difficulties with the cold weather that they were not used to in Taiwan.

Food was scarce. Until April 1944, rice cakes from Taiwan reached the Shonenko. After this date, no one received any more supplies from home. It was not known whether mail from Taiwan could not be de-livered or was halted on the advice of the postal service for fear of being sunk en route. [6]

These Shonenko were given training by the retired soldiers. Besides a strict military training, they also learned technical skills for manufacturing aircraft, such as those related to assembling, maintenance and finishing. After a short period of military training, Shonenko were dispatched to other military arsenals and private air companies.

Japan planned to recruit 30,000 Sho-nenko for the aircraft production but after the last group arrived at Naval C Arsenal in 1944, the plan was abandoned in the midst of intensive US bombing.

On December 18th, 1944, Japan was hit by its biggest air raid ever, and 25 Taiwanese boys working at the Mitsubishi Nagoya Air-craft Factory were killed in the large-scale air raid on Nagoya. The bombing was so inten-sive that, the youth could still be cremated a few days after the bombing. After this raid, 2,000 Shonenko were led from Nagoya’s Mitsubishi Aircraft Company to the other arsenals in the west. Shortly thereafter, how-

ever, those arsenals were also soon heavily bombed by US forces. [7]

In the final stages of the Pacific War, more Japanese planes were lost in battle than could be produced. With ‘the more, the bet-ter’ strategy of the Japanese government and the order to increase production, Shonenko started to work 24 hours a day in three shifts. Originally promised a work-study program, they found themselves working night and day through the end of the war. In 1945, with the defeat of Japan, these children were reassigned to the cleanup of wrecked air-planes that they had produced.

RETURNING HOME TO A DIFFERENT WORLD

Starting in December 1945, Taiwanese Sho-nenko were shipped in groups back to Tai-wan, but it was no longer the Taiwan they had left behind a few years earlier. The offi-cial language, the system of government, the mentality and value system had all changed. It was unbelievable what had happened in a short period of 2-3 years. Their struggle began the moment they set foot back on Tai-wanese soil.

After Japanese colonial rule, Taiwan came under the rule of the Republic Of China (ROC). In post-war Taiwan, people oppressed in language and politics by the Kuomintang (KMT) government burst out in anger, leading to the 228 Incident. After the 228 Incident, martial law was declared in 1949. The same year, the KMT lost the civil war and retreated to Taiwan.

Conditions were rough for the Shonenko because they could not speak Mandarin and there were no jobs in Taiwan. Because grade school graduates at the time of discharge were still young, they were able to re-enter educational institutions from the middle school level although they were held back two or three grades. [8]

Some of them attempted to learn Man-darin but were accused of being dissidents because the Mandarin teachers were con-sidered as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members. Some former Shonenko were ar-rested, accused of participating in the 228 Incident and sentenced without trial or mili-tary tribunal.

The ones that thought to study in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) due to the free education became the target of rectifi-cation camps because they had worked for Taiwan and the Japanese Naval Army. Shon-enko, who had moved to Japan in search of greater educational opportunities, had been

ShonenkoTaiwanese Child Workers in Japan during WWII

Basak KutahyaAs the Pacific War was nearing an end, with most young Japanese men serving in battle zones overseas, Japan was left without a domestic la-bor force to build new aircraft for the war. To meet the demand, it re-cruited boys from Taiwan, which was then under Japanese control, to serve as laborers in aircraft factories. This is the story of Taiwanese Shonenko, shonen meaning child or youth, ko meaning laborers. [1]


disappointed in Japan and then found them-selves not welcomed in China. [9] It is bit-terly ironic that they were born into an era in which they worked for the glory and honor of Japan but were denied Japanese identity, while they simultaneously were unable to fit into the “Chinese-Mandarin” identity. [10]

These people sharing the same faith and hopes and facing the same difficulties and tragedies could not organize until after 1987 due to the political constraints in Taiwan. The Taiwan Koza Organization was estab-lished in 1988, the year after martial law was finally lifted in Taiwan. They have reunited annually to seek fellowship, reminisce and celebrate the common twist of fate their lives took half a century ago and had orga-nized themselves as a proud group of people who had demonstrated their knowledge, skills and spirit in Japan during the war. [11]

Although working in a foreign land amid the cold and hunger, they had really strong ties with Japan and are proud of their service to their adopted homeland. While they see Japan as their second homeland, Japan also appreciates the effort of these boys. Every year around the first of November, about 2,000 people gather for the Annual General Meeting of the Koza Alumni Association. Each geographical area unit of the twenty Alumni Associations takes turns hosting the General Meeting. Those attending, ranging in age from mid-60s to 85, are youthful and full of vitality.

Koza Alumni members collectively par-ticipate in the Annual General Meeting with the same orderliness in parading, singing, banqueting and listening to the speeches as if they had returned to dormitory life when they were eating together and working shoul-der to shoulder. It is not unusual to find in the rank and file of the people assembled some “prominent” alumni who had later dis-tinguished themselves as engineers, business people, public officials, university professors, bankers, presidents of companies, doctors, religious leaders, high ranking government and military officials. These people, despite their setbacks and educational handicaps, have excelled and obtained recognition in the wider society. [12]

SHONENKO TODAY

One of these “prominent” alumni that I had the opportunity to have an interview with is Professor Peng Jen Chen. Prof. Chen went to Japan in May 1944 with the encouragement of his Japanese teacher. He tells the story of their travel to Japan from Kaohsiung Harbor

with the ship named ‘Asamamaru’: “Because the ships were attacked by US submarines, two airplanes and one submarine protected the ship”. When I asked him if he felt any fear, he says “no” because he knows that there was no other choice in Taiwan.

He was dispatched to Yokosuka at the entrance of Tokyo Bay, what is now the Main Port of the US 7th Fleet, when he was 13 years old. This facility was a navy factory that was not for production but for the research and development process of warships.

They lived in a dor-mitory and went to their factory on foot, walking fifty minutes and work-ing ten hours a day. The workers were not only from Taiwan; there were also Koreans and Japa-nese girls that were stu-dents who also worked in same factories.

Prof. Chen returned to Taiwan in January 1946 via Keelung Harbor and went to his hometown of Tainan. He studied Man-darin and went to Kaoh-siung Technical School. After attending college at Taipei University, he went to Japan to study at the University of Tokyo and earned his PhD there. In 1966, he went to the US and continued his academic career at Colombia University.

After Japan severed diplomatic relations with ROC in 1972, he was assigned as the Director of Overseas Chinese Affairs for the Association of East Asian Relations in Japan. In 1987, he returned again to Taiwan and became the Deputy Chairman of the His-tory Committee of the KMT and, in 1995, was promoted to the chairmanship. In 1999, he retired from the committee and started teaching at Chinese Culture University. Cur-rently, he teaches at the Graduate Institute of Japanese Language and Literature at the same university. He has translated 160 books from Japanese into Chinese and vice versa and written two prefaces to books about Tai-wanese boys recruited to work in Japan.

The vitality of the professor, despite the struggles of a tough childhood, and the contributions he has made to society are im-pressive. While telling the story of Shonenko with more pride than sorrow, he explained his new projects at the same time. Contrary to what many expect to be told about the memories of colonial rule and the tragedy

he and his friends experienced, Prof. Chen never talked with reproach about these memories. Anyone could see the sparkling in his eyes when he mentioned their Koza meetings with friends that had shared com-mon fates during their childhood and the excitement about their next meeting. At the next one, they could again sing their song “A Thousand Miles From Home” as a tribute to those days they remained strong to over-come all the harsh winds and storms of his-tory: APN

References

1. Jonah Chang, “The Untold Story: An Overview” in Shonenko: Taiwanese Child Laborers in World War II Japan edited by Chang Liang-Tse, (Avanguard Publishing Company, 2001), pg. 1

2. Documentary by Liang-yin Kuo (2006) “Shonenko: The Untold Stories of Tai-wanese Child Laborers in WWII”

3. Ibid. Chang, pg.14. Ibid. Documentary by Liang-yin Kuo

(2006)5. Ibid Chang, pg. 116. Lin, Chin-Khun, Notes on Koza Navy

Factory in Shonenko: Taiwanese Child Laborers in World War II Japan edited by Chang Liang-Tse, (Avanguard Publishing Company, 2001), pg.15

7. Ibid. Documentary by Liang-yin Kuo (2006)

8. Ibid. Chang, pg. 49. Ibid. Documentary by Liang-yin Kuo

(2006)10. Ibid. Chang, pg. 511. Ibid. Chang, pg.2-412. Ibid. Chang, pg. 4

A thousand miles from homeSailing bravely over the wavesBound for gloryAnd the Naval C Arsenal in YamatoRain beating down on usWe face that tough training groundRaise your hammer, strike the chiselLook at our bruised and swollen handsWe got homesick for that green islandWhen can we return?Talking of the pastWe got homesick for that green island

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Ingredients

1 T-bone steak, about 1” (2.5 cm) thick

1 teaspoon of salt

1 teaspoon of pepper

1 tablespoon of oil

A dish from

Chef Tan’s Kitchen


The Perfect T-Bone

PHO

TO B

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UY

MO

NTA

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C BY

)

This delicious recipe

may well be the best

way to prepare a

classic T-bone steak.

1. Spread evenly 1 teaspoon of salt and pepper each on both sides of the T-bone steak before cooking.2. Preheat a frying pan on the stove top, and also preheat the oven to 450° F (230°C).

3. Put 1 table spoon of oil into the hot pan,4. Place the steak into the hot oiled pan, and sear it for 2 minutes on each side.5. Move the seared steak into preheated oven for 4 minutes.6. Take the steak out, and let it cool for 10 minutes before serving.

The steak should be medium rare for a one-inch thick steak.

Increase baking time by 2-4 minutes on step 5 for a medium

(slightly pink center) steak.

Try it out and send me your feedback!

[email protected].

Photo: TheBusyBrain / CC BY 2.0


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