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AnyID AnyID : Security Point of View Narudom Roongsiriwong, CISSP Narudom Roongsiriwong, CISSP
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AnyID: Security Point of View

Feb 19, 2017

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Page 1: AnyID: Security Point of View

AnyID

AnyID : Security Point of ViewNarudom Roongsiriwong, CISSPNarudom Roongsiriwong, CISSP

Page 2: AnyID: Security Point of View

AnyID

WhoAmIWhoAmI

Lazy Blogger– Japan, Security, FOSS, Politics, Christian

– http://narudomr.blogspot.com

Food Lover– Steak, Yakiniku, BBQ

– Sushi (especially Otoro)

– All Kinds of Noodle (Spaghetti, Ramen, Kanomjean)

Head of IT Security, Kiatnakin Bank PLC (KKP) Working Team for Adviser to the Finance

Ministry's National e-Payment project

Page 3: AnyID: Security Point of View

AnyID

DisclaimerDisclaimer

This presentation primarily expresses from Ministry of Finance requirement.

Final project may be different from this presentation.

Words in this presentation are simplified for non-financial audience.

Whenever you see a phrase like {this} between curly bracket, it means my opinion.

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National E-Payment InitiativeNational E-Payment Initiative5 Strategic Projects5 Strategic Projects

Payment Infrastructure “AnyID” Expansion of Card Acceptance (via EDC) Electronics Taxation Document Government e-Payment Public Education and Awareness on Electronics

Transactions

EDC: Electronics Data Capture

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AnyID

AnyID: Basic TransactionAnyID: Basic Transaction

Payment Switch

Bank 1

Acc1Cust1

Bank 2

Acc2Cust2

Cust1

Registry:ID2 → Bank2, Acc2

TR toID2

TR toID2, Acc2

Cust2

Optional Interaction

Page 6: AnyID: Security Point of View

AnyID

AnyID: Example P2P PaymentAnyID: Example P2P Payment

Payment Switch

Bank 1

Acc1Cust1

Bank 2

Acc2Cust2

Cust1

Registry:Mobile#2 → Bank2, Acc2

TR toMobile#2

TR toMobile#2, Acc2

Cust2

With Mobile P2P payments for retail buying food at food stalls, or for taxi fares, are all possible.

Page 7: AnyID: Security Point of View

AnyID

AnyID: Example E-Wallet RefillAnyID: Example E-Wallet Refill

Payment Switch

Bank 1

Acc1Cust1

Bank 2

Acc2Issuer2

Cust1

Registry:eWallet#2 → Bank2, Issuer2

TR toeWallet#2

TR toeWallet#2,

Acc2

Cust2

Refills of e-money wallets using e-Wallet IDs can be handled easily and similarly

Issuer 2

eWallet#2Cust2

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AnyID

AnyID: Other FeaturesAnyID: Other Features

Transfer with e-Witholding Tax & VAT Information Interbank Bill Payment with Amount Inquiry Interbank Bill Payment with e-Witholding Tax &

VAT & Receipt Request to Pay Request to Pay with One-Time Authorization

Code (OTA)

Page 9: AnyID: Security Point of View

AnyID

AnyID: Request to PayAnyID: Request to Pay

Payment Switch

Bank 1

Acc1Cust1

Bank 2

Acc2Cust2

Cust1

Registry:ID2 → Bank2, Acc2

RTP toID2

RTP toID2, Acc2

Cust2

TR toAcc1

TR toAcc1

Depending on Bank1’s

innovation in channels,

Banks1 may interact with

Cust1

Page 10: AnyID: Security Point of View

AnyID

AnyID: Request to PayAnyID: Request to PayImplementation ExampleImplementation Example

Payment Switch

Bank 1

Acc1Cust1

Bank 2

Acc2Cust2

Cust1

Registry:ID2 → Bank2, Acc2

RTP toID2

RTP toID2, Acc2

Cust2

TR toAcc1

TR toAcc1

Merchant e-Commerce Website

Page 11: AnyID: Security Point of View

AnyID

AnyID: PortabilityAnyID: Portability

Payment Switch

Bank 1

Acc1Cust1

Bank 2

Acc2Cust2

Cust1

Registry:ID2 → Bank2, Acc2ID2 → Bank3, Acc3

TR toID2

TR toID2, Acc2

Cust2

Optional Interaction

Bank 3

Acc3Cust2

TR to

ID2, Acc3

Cust1 does not have to keep track of the changes in account numbers of Cust2.

Page 12: AnyID: Security Point of View

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Which ID Can be Used?Which ID Can be Used?

Bank+Account (for compatibility) National ID (13-Digit Citizen ID & Tax Payer ID) Mobile Number E-Wallet ID (Phase 3) E-Mail (Still be in consideration)

Page 13: AnyID: Security Point of View

AnyID

AnyID RegistrationAnyID Registration

National ID:– Banks will validate the registration/deregistration through KYC

(Know Your Customer) process

Mobile Number:– Phase 1, Banks must validate number possession by their own

processes

– The next phase, NBTC & Telcos will help on-line validation and daily sending revocation list via ITMX

E-Wallet ID (Phase 3):– Registered by E-Wallet issuers via their banks.

Portability:– Customer must deregister the existing bank account before

register to a new bank account.

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Security Design & Implementation

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Security vs. UsabilitySecurity vs. Usability

Security

Usability

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IT Security ArchitectureIT Security ArchitectureITMX ImplementationITMX Implementation Only Member Bank can sent/receive data with ITMX. Member bank connect to ITMX with existing Extranet (via MPLS) Member bank access to ITMX Extranet DMZ Zone only. ITMX separate Zone for DMZ Zone, Application Zone , Database

Zone and other critical zone. All Zone are protected by Firewall and IPS. ITMX data center , all devices are protected as PCI/DSS

standard requirement (Physical Security, Network access control, Data security, VA, patching, Logging and Monitoring, BCP).

All process to access to server complied with ISO27001 standard and BOT best practice.

Important data will be encrypted in transit and store.

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Network Security & CryptographyNetwork Security & CryptographyITMX ImplementationITMX Implementation

Single Registration: REST/HTTP TLS 1.2 with Message Signing (PKCS#7 & SHA-1)

Bulk Registration: SFTP with Hardware Token Financial Transaction: Protocol ISO8583 over TLS

1.2– PIN Block encryption using 3DES or DES

– Message in PIN Block could be OTA (One-Time Authorization Code), Any ID or Destination Account, type of message defined in field 48.13

– {Even DES algorithm is easily breakable, but data are not significant and in TLS 1.2 tunnel}

All keys and certificates kept on HSM

Page 18: AnyID: Security Point of View

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Registration Security & PrivacyRegistration Security & PrivacyITMX ImplementationITMX Implementation

ID Validation– National ID: Use existing KYC process

– Mobile Number:● Phase 1: Validate by banks' processes● Next: Validate with NBTC & Telcos via ITMX

Only registered ID and bank account will be kept at ITMX, no other information

Banks can use a dummy account register to ITMX Destination bank will send the name of the account

that mapped to ID per request for verification

Page 19: AnyID: Security Point of View

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Error PreventionError Prevention

Transfer to unregistered ID– MOF require banks to implement dangling account

– In ITMX specification, sender bank must reject (As of April 26, 2016)

– {Dangling account is good for National ID and accelerate adoption of Mobile Number}

Transfer to wrong ID– {Sender banks should send destination account name

to their customers for verification}

Page 20: AnyID: Security Point of View

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Dangling AccountDangling Account

Payee (receiving customer) is not required to have a bank account. Linking AnyID to a bank account can be after transaction sent.

Payment Switch

Bank 1

Acc1Cust1

Bank 2

Acc2Cust2

Cust1

Registry:ID2 → ??????

TR to ID2

Cust2

Please dangling

Please register ID2 to Acc2

I send money to your ID2

Add registryID2 → Acc2

Page 21: AnyID: Security Point of View

AnyID

Dangling AccountDangling Account

Payee (receiving customer) is not required to have a bank account. Linking AnyID to a bank account can be after transaction sent.

Payment Switch

Bank 1

Acc1Cust1

Bank 2

Acc2Cust2

Cust1

Registry:ID2 → Bank2, Acc2

TR to ID2

Cust2

Please dangling

Please register ID2 to Acc2

Add registryID2 → Acc2

Please resolve dangling of ID2

Resend TR to ID2 TR to ID2. Acc2

I send money to your ID2

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About FraudAbout Fraud

AnyID does not intend to reduce the existing electronics fund transfer frauds but some flows will reduce frauds by design.– Example: Request to pay flow.

New innovation always introduces new frauds.

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