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Antiochos III in ThraceAuthor(s): John D. GraingerSource:
Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Vol. 45, No. 3 (3rd Qtr.,
1996), pp. 329-343Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436430Accessed: 23/08/2010 09:50
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ANTIOCHOS III IN THRACE
In 197 BC Antiochos III's campaign along the coast of Asia
Minor, part of his war with Ptolemaic Egypt which had begun in 202,
was completed when his fleet reached Ephesos'. His main field army
had been sent on ahead by land to Sardis2. He thus had on hand a
fleet of 100 warships and 200 other vessels, and an army of about
35,000 men. During the winter a detachment of the army occupied
Abydos, on the Hellespont3; in the spring the rest of the army
marched to Abydos and Antiochos himself sailed with the fleet to
the Thracian Cherson- ese; the army was transported from Abydos on
the Asian side to Madytos on the European4. Antiochos III was
invading 'Europe'.
This was the beginning of a major series of campaigns, and it
also marked a major step onwards in the relationship between the
Seleukid and Roman em- pires. Attention has been focussed
overwhelmingly on the latter of these, which of course led to a
major war, but this attention has not always been fruitful5. The
collision of the empires was the culmination of the first Roman
eastern adven- ture, but in the process of arguing about the
negotiations which began at Lysimacheia in 196, and which led to
war in 192, the activities of Antiochos in Thrace have been very
largely ignored. The apparent lack of source material is some
excuse for this, but in fact I hope to show that there are enough
indications in the sources to enable the outlines of Antiochos'
work in Thrace to be discerned, at least tentatively. Detail is
mostly unobtainable, but the broad outlines can be drawn. Once his
achievement in Thrace is understood, then the context of the
negotiations which began in the autumn of 195 at Lysimacheia can be
better appreciated. So the object here is to discover just what
Antiochos did in Thrace.
I He used it as his winter quarters (Livy 33.38.1); for its
importance, see Pol. 1 8.40a. 2 Livy 33.19.9-10. 3 Seleukid troops
at Abydos while Antiochos was still wintering at Ephesos: Livy
33.38.4:
they will have reached it by land from Sardis. 4 Livy 33.38.8-9:
by the time Antiochos had sailed from Ephesos to Madytos, the army
had
already reached Abydos. 5 The most influential recent discussion
has been E. Badian, "Rome and Antiochos the
Great: a Study in Cold War", in id., Studies in Greek and Roman
History (Oxford 1968), 112-139, which contains full references to
1959: for later references see CAH VIII2, bibliography; the account
of the Roman-Seleukid collision in that volume (by R. M. Errington,
pp. 274-289) is essentially based on Badian's version; I intend to
consider the whole matter again, and this article may be considered
a preliminary study.
Historia, Band XLV/3 (1996) C) Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden
GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart
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330 JOHN D. GRAINGER
As Antiochos pointed out later to the Roman negotiators, his
dynasty had a long connection with Thrace6. The founder Seleukos I
had been murdered in the Chersonese on his way to Lysimacheia7; he
was travelling to take up the kingship of Macedon at the time,
having defeated and killed his predecessor Lysimachos at
Koroupedion. Seleukos's son Antiochos I made an initial at- tempt
to break into Thrace and continue his father's work by making
himself king in Macedon, but he was foiled by a local alliance of
naval powers and never got another chance8. The irruption of the
Galatians into Asia Minor and the distracting war with Ptolemy II
prevented further Seleukid work in Thrace, and he effectively
resigned any claims to Macedon by allying with Antigonos Gonatas.
Antiochos II, however, had campaigned in Thrace with some success
in the 250s, only for his Thracian possessions to be lost to
Ptolemy III after his death in 2469. The Seleukid usurper Antiochos
Hierax had been killed in Thrace in a final attempt to retrieve his
lost fortunes'0. All this was sufficient evidence of Seleukid
interest in the area, and demonstrated a continuing claim to rule
there. It also, of course, constituted a series of clear warnings
of the dangers and difficulties and frustrations involved in
attempting to campaign in Thrace.
When Antiochos III arrived at the Hellespont, moreover, besides
his hered- itary interest, he could have made a powerful argument
that the area was masterless and anarchic, and that it required a
strong hand to calm things. In the past twenty years several
regimes had come and gone. The Keltic kingdom of Tylis, centred
somewhere in Thrace inland of Byzantion, had collapsed about twenty
years before, releasing the suppressed ambitions of Thracian
tribes'". The feeble Ptolemaic control of the Chersonese and
several other nearby cities had been overthrown by the violent
campaign along the coast and into the Propontis by Philip V of
Macedon in 20312. In turn, Philip's defeat at Kynoskephalai in 197
had forced him to withdraw and so had left no-one in control. The
Aitolian League had had influence in some of the cities3, Bithynia
had gained control of others14, and the Attalid monarchy had
advanced else-
6 Livy 33.40.-5; Antiochos, in fact, is said only to have cited
Seleukos I, not the later kings; this weakens his argument, though
it may be Livy's editorial hand at work.
7 App. Syr. 62; Memnon, FGrH 434 F 8; Pausanias 1.10.2. 8
Memnon, FGrH 434 F 9-10; W. W. Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas (Oxford
1911), 162-164. 9 Polyainos 4.16; E. T. Newell, Coinage of the
Western Seleucid Mints (New York 1941),
337; E. R. Bevan, The House of Seleucus (London 1902), vol. II
176. 10 Justin 27.3.9-11 and Trogus, Prol. 27; Porphyry, FGrH 32 F
8; Polyainos 4.17. 1 1 Pol. 4.46.4 and 8.22.1. 1 2 Pol. 15.21-24;
F. W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge 1940), 112-117. 13
Aitolian alliances existed with Lysimacheia, Calchedon and Kios
(Pol. 15.23.8); Kios
even had an Aitolian as commander (ibid. 4). 14 Prusias gained
Kios after Philip sacked it: Pol. 15.23.10.
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Antiochos III in Thrace 331
where'5, but all these had concentrated on the Chersonese and
the Asian side. In Thrace itself the Greek cities of the coast had
long suffered from the attentions of both the Kelts and the
Thracians. Byzantion had had to pay protection money to the Kelts
of Tylis, to the value of eighty talents annually towards the
end'6, and by recouping itself by taxing the trade passing through
the Bosporos it had provoked a naval war with Rhodes and others'7.
The city of Lysimacheia, at the root of the Chersonese, had been
sacked by Thracians only a year or two before Antiochos' arrival'8.
The powers involved - Rome added itself to the others within a few
weeks of Antiochos' invasion - and their successive failures to
establish any sort of permanent control over any part of Thrace,
demonstrated not merely the difficulties, but also the attractions
and the overall and wide- ranging sensitivity of the whole
area.
The south, Asian, coast of the Propontis was the less
troublesome when Antiochos arrived, but even that was bad enough.
Prusias of Bithynia, the city of Kyzikos, and the Attalid monarch
had established their power over most of the coast and the inland
territories. Antiochos himself had inserted his power at Abydos but
his forces had been repelled from Lampsakos'9, though their attack
there had been no more than a tentative probe. No doubt Antiochos'
plans included the incorporation of Lampsakos, but the matter was
not urgent, and for the moment the city was left alone20.
The north, European, Thracian, coast was a much greater problem,
and was the one which Antiochos addressed straight away. He landed
at the small city of Madytos, directly across from Abydos, from
which he brought over his army21. There was some initial resistance
from the Madytenes, but the approach of Antiochos' siege machines
swiftly persuaded the defenders to surrender. All the neighbouring
cities of the Chersonese then gave in quickly, without waiting to
be attacked. The citizens clearly preferred Antiochos' rule when
the only real alternative was the Thracians. The movement to
surrender was general through-
15 In the Troad especially, where Alexandria Troas, Ilion, and
Lampsakos were independent but allied to the Attalids: R. E. Allen,
The Attalid Kingdom, a Constitutional History (Oxford 1983), 58,
61, and 169-170. Antiochos' attack on Lampsakos took place after
the death of Attalos II and so in a time when the city's alliance
with the Attalids had been disrupted.
16 Pol. 4.46.3-4. 17 Ibid. 46.5-47.5. 18 Livy 33.38.10-12. 19
Ibid. 4. 20 It was not under active attack as is sometimes claimed
(e.g., Errington in CAH V1112, 271:
the city was 'invested'). The lack of urgency at the situation
is shown by the unwilling- ness of leading Lampsakenes to undertake
the embassy to Massalia and Rome: Syll.3 591.
21 Livy 33.38.9.
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332 JOHN D. GRAINGER
out the peninsula, though only the city of Sestos is named by
Livy, apart from Madytos; no community in the Chersonese
resisted22.
Antiochos decided to rebuild and repopulate ruined Lysimacheia.
This city comrnanded the narrow neck of the peninsula, and its
destruction by the Thracians had left the whole peninsula exposed
to their raids - no doubt one of the main reasons for the rapid
acceptance of Antiochos' authority by the vulnerable communities.
Antiochos used his own soldiers for the task of re- building the
city, by which process we must understand a refortification of the
walls and the acropolis and a rehabilitation of the main public
buildings, and he set about finding and freeing the former
inhabitants. Some of these had been scattered and enslaved by the
Thracians and these were to be ransomed and returned; others were
living in the cities of the Chersonese as refugees and were to be
collected and reinstated; also, new citizens were to be
recruited23. Until the city was defensible, Antiochos left half his
army there, together with 'all the naval allies' - presumably naval
contingents from the Greek cities of Asia Minor and from Phoenicia
- as simultaneous garrison and builder's labourers, and took the
other half into Thrace on a combined reprisal raid and preliminary
campaign of conquest24.
The reconstituted city was linked to Antiochos by a new
treaty25. This envisaged Lysimacheia being a base for further
operations by the king and his army, and at the same time ensured
local self-government and defined the areas of competence of the
two contracting parties. The treaty is clearly a document specific
to Lysimacheia, that is, it is not a 'charter' of a type supplied
by the Seleukid chancellery to all the cities who became allies of
Antiochos. Indeed, those students who have studied the inscription
recording the treaty in detail have been at a loss to find close
parallels, and one suggestion has been that the nearest is a treaty
between Pharnakos I of Pontos and Chersonesus Taurika, with a
second possibility that 'the ultimate model may perhaps be ... a
treaty [of Lysimacheial with Ptolemy'26. Neither of these
suggestions is in any way convincing. Some confusion has also been
caused by the lettering of the inscription, which has seemed to
some to be typical of the time of Antiochos II rather than his
grandson27, but is perhaps best explained as a local peculiarity,
or perhaps as a provincialism28.
22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 10-13. 24 Ibid. 14. 25 P. Frisch, Die
Inschriften von Ilion (Bonn 1975), no. 45; E. Tasliklioglu and P.
Frisch,
"New Inscriptions from the Troad", ZPE 17 (1975), 101-106. 26 E.
Piejko, "The Treaty between Antiochos III and Lysimacheia",
Historia 37 (1988), 157. 27 J. L. Ferrary and P. Gauthier, "Le
trait6 entre le roi Antiochos et Lysimacheia", Journal
des Savants (1981), 327-45. 28 Piejko (as in n. 26) 161-164.
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Antiochos III in Thrace 333
These peculiarities, in fact, make the existence of an
individually negotiat- ed treaty between the king and the city a
virtual certainty, but there were other cities in the area as well,
and arrangements to regulate relations will also have had to be
made between them and the king. Madytos and Sestos are both noted
in Livy's brief account, but there were also other Greek
communities in the Chersonese which had surrendered readily to his
forces - Kallipolis, Alopokon- nesos, Elaios, for example, and
others. Each of them made its agreement with the king separately,
though in the case of these smaller cities the process was no doubt
handed over by the king to his officials. Antiochos set off into
the interior with half of his army.
Antiochos' purpose, according to Livy, was to ravage the nearby
part of Thrace29, which suggests a fairly narrow ambition, But
other evidence suggests that Antiochos achieved something of much
greater geographical import. His real intention was scarcely a mere
ravaging. In general terms he aimed at the conquest and occupation
of all Thrace. Nothing less can be expected of the conqueror of
Koile Syria and the restorer of the eastern empire of the
Seleukids.
Antiochos' method of preparation for such campaigns was by now
well established. He had, after all, been campaigning annually for
a quarter of a century, and with remarkable success. His method of
conquest shows a consist- ent pattern: having chosen his victim, he
recruited a local ally whose existence and activity could distract
the main enemy. In his great eastern campaign, an alliance with the
Indian king Sophagasenos had kept Baktria quiet while he dealt with
Parthia, and then Baktria was attacked when similarly isolated30. A
variation on this was to suborn a subject or subjects of the enemy,
used first on a small scale in the attack on Seleukeia-in-Pieria in
219, where the Ptolemaic governor of that city was paralyzed by the
defection of his subordinate offi- cers3 1, and on a larger scale
when he broke into Ptolemaic Syria the next year by bringing two
key Ptolemaic officers over to his side32, and again in 202 when he
suborned the governor of Koile Syria33. It was, of course, an
updating of Odysseus' method at Troy. In the Thracian campaign, the
Greek cities of the coast could perform this function to some
extent though their geographical positions and general weakness
made them more suitable as beachheads than as sources of
vulnerability for the Thracians. A better Trojan Horse were the
surviving remains of the Keltic inhabitants of Thrace.
29 Livy 33.38.16. 30 The key to this is the description by
Polybios of the later alliance with Sophagasenos as a
'renewal' (Pol. 1 1.39.11) which necessarily implies an earlier
alliance; Antiochos was also allied to Parthia after his war there
(Justin 41.5.3).
31 Pol. 5.60.1-2. 32 Ibid. 61.3-5. 33 D. Gera, "Ptolemy son of
Thraseas and the Fifth Syrian War", Ancient Society 18 (1987),
63-73; J. D. Grainger, Hellenistic Phoenicia (Oxford 1991),
98.
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334 JOHN D. GRAINGER
The Keltic invasion of 280 - 277 had left two Keltic communities
in the Thracian area. In the east, the kingdom of Tylis had
operated as a terrorist overlordship, living on raiding and
blackmail: a particular target, and a notably lucrative one, was
Byzantion. The rebellion of the subjugated Thracian tribes had
destroyed the kingdom as a political entity about twenty years
before Antiochos' invasion34. Polybios describes the Kelts of Tylis
as being 'annihilat- ed', but this is likely to be an exaggeration;
certainly there remained Kelts in the Balkan area even after Tylis'
destruction.
The location of Tylis is uncertain, but somewhere in the Vize
region, close to or in the Istranca mountains, is a favoured
suggestion. The one serious geographical indication is given by
Polybios, who implies that the establish- ment of the new kingdom
in the 270s was especially dangerous to the Byzan- tines35. These
Kelts were, however, by no means the only ones in the Thracian
area. There were still groups on the move for decades, like the
Aigosages who crossed the Hellespont in the 220s, to take service
with Attalos II and whom he settled in the Troad in 21836.
Within the Balkan area archaeological discoveries locate the
main centre of Keltic settlement well inland. In 278 one of the
bands of Kelts which split away from the main force had settled
near the Danube. Their descendants formed the later kingdom of the
Scordisci, who fought the Roman governors of Macedonia fifty years
after Antiochos' time. The connection is made explicit by one
source37. The archaeological evidence suggests that the centre of
the kingdom was astride the Danube, in the area later called Dacia
Malvensis on the north side, and on the south the land which
straddles the boundary of the later Roman provinces of Upper and
Lower Moesia, where there is a dense concentration of remains of
Celtic type38.
34 Pol. 5.46,4: a brief history of Tylis (all that is possible
at present) is in M. Domaradzki, "L'Etat des Keltes en Thrace avec
capitale Tylis et en Asie Mineure-Galatia", Pulpudeva 3 (1980 for
1978), 52-56.
35 Pol. 5.46.2-3. 36 Pol. 5.78.5-6; they were settled in the
Troad, where they made nuisances of themselves
and were destroyed by Prusias of Bithynia; Attalos, having
settled them, abandoned them. 37 Athenaios, 6.234b: the Scordisci
are claimed by the former Yugoslavia; J. Todorovic,
Kelti u jugoistocnoj Evropi (Belgrade 1968), English summary at
161-90, and B. Jo- vanovic, "The Scordisci and their Art", Alba
Regia 14 (1975), 167-71, but it is clear that only modern
international boundaries separate this territory from those
identified by Zirra and Papazoglu (next note).
38 V. Zirra, "Le probleme des Celtes dans l'espace du
Bas-Danube", Thraco-Dacia 1 (1976), 175-82, especially the map, p.
179; F. Papazoglu, The Central Balkan Tribes in pre-Roman Times
(tr. M. Stansfield-Pohovic, Amsterdam 1978), 271-391, on the
Scordis- ci; J. Collis, The European Iron Age (London 1984),
23-5.
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Antiochos III in Thrace 335
The reason for discussing a defunct kingdom and a future power,
neither of which can have had relations with Antiochos, is to show
that Kelts did not vanish from the Thracian scene with the
destruction of the Tylis kingdom. There were Keltic communities in
Thrace before and after Antiochos' cam- paigns, and hence they were
there during them as well. And it is these Kelts who are the prime
candidates to be the ally of Antiochos III in these Thracian
campaigns. The source for this is Appian. He is, one must admit,
never the most reliable of witnesses, but in this case his words
are worth taking into account39. He gives a summary of Antiochos'
activity in Thrace, emphasising his connec- tion with the Greek
cities, and he also describes his alliance with the Galatians,
which he acquired 'by gifts and fear', and from whom he also
recruited soldiers. The context makes it quite clear that Appian is
referring to Thracian Galatians, not to the more familiar Galatians
of Asia Minor. These can only be either the survivors of the
defunct Tylis, or the predecessors of the Scordisci in the central
Balkans. Either would be ideally placed to be Antiochos' ally
against the intervening Thracians. Antiochos had already employed
Galatian mercenaries. They formed a regiment in his army in the
battle against Molon in 22140, and were also present at Magnesia in
19041. The presumption must be that most of these soldiers were
recruited from the Galatians of Asia Minor, though the remnants of
the Tylians would also provide a ready source of manpower. Such men
would be useful sources of information about conditions in Thrace,
even useful as envoys. He also employed Thracians, at Raphia42 and
later at Magne- sia43. Other sources, of a less useful sort
perhaps, were the Greek cities, whose opinions of both Kelts and
Thracians might well have interfered with the accuracy of their
information.
Whether or not the Kelts of Thrace were Antiochos' allies from
the begin- ning, the Greek cities certainly were. He already
controlled the cities of the Chersonese. At the other end of the
Straits, on the Bosporos, Byzantion had long had to buy off
Thracian and Keltic raids. The city controlled the Bosporos -
whence the resources for such a massive tribute. Appian also notes
Antio- chos' alliance with the Byzantines, in words which suggest
that their geograph- ical position on the Straits was decisive45.
The only reason for this mention of the Bosporos is the access the
strait gave to the Euxine, which creates a presumption that
Antiochos used that access, once an agreement had been reached with
Byzantion. Antiochos' fleet is not mentioned after it was used
to
39 App. Syr. 6. 40 Pol. 5.53.2. 41 Livy 37.40.5 and 13. 42 Pol.
5.39.6. 43 Livy 57.40.8 and 11 ('Trallians'). 44 Pol. 4.46.4. 45
App. Syr. 6.
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336 JOHN D. GRAINGER
transport his army across the Hellespont and some of its men
used to help rebuild Lysimacheia, but it surely did not sit at the
Hellespont for the whole campaigning season doing nothing. At the
very least his ships provided Antio- chos with a means of
communication with the coastal Greek cities; more enterprisingly,
they could transport units of the army to make landings in the
enemy rear, or to install garrisons in the cities, or bring
supplies to the land forces. Antiochos had used his ships in all
these roles in past campaigns: there is no reason to suppose he
ignored the maritime possibilities at the Straits.
All this, including Appian's words, implies the negotiation of
an alliance between Antiochos and the Byzantines and with other
Greek cities. Byzantion was a notoriously independent city46, and
the achievement of an agreement by Antiochos is a tribute to his
diplomatic skills - and as much, perhaps, to the Byzantines'
perception of the locus of real power. This will have been another
individually negotiated treaty, in which the Byzantines no doubt
safeguarded as much of their independence as they could in the face
of the implied threat of the lord of Asia. It may also, as one
phrase in Appian suggests, have provided for the extension of
Byzantion's city territory at the expense of the nearby Thrac-
ians47.
To summarize, these indications show that Antiochos cast his
diplomatic net wide: he was solidly based in Lysimacheia and the
Chersonese, and allied with Byzantion at the other end of the
Straits; the alliance here suggested with the inland Kelts meant
that the Thracian tribes of the interior were thus sur-
rounded.
There are other indications of the extent and scale of the
campaigns Antio- chos conducted. One of the Roman envoys sent to
interview Antiochos was L. Cornelius Lentulus, who arrived in the
area whilst Antiochos was still on his first campaign in 196.
Unwilling to wait, perhaps intent on being the first on the scene -
he had been sent to the king by the Senate, whereas the other
envoys had other tasks as well - or maybe aiming to discover just
what the king was up to, he went on to Selymbria on the
Propontis48. There he failed to contact Antio- chos, and eventually
returned to Lysimacheia. But he clearly went to Selymbria in the
first place because he believed the king to be nearby, no doubt on
information from Seleukid officers at Lysimacheia. Since Lentulus
apparently made no effort to move from Selymbria inland in order to
reach the king, the latter was clearly a long way off. Antiochos in
fact returned to Lysimacheia by
46 It retained libertas and immunitas for some time in the Roman
period: H. B. Mattingly, "Rome's Earliest Relations with Byzantium,
Heraclea Pontica and Callatis", in A. G. Poulter (ed.), Ancient
Bulgaria (Nottingham 1983), 239-252; it defied Severus four
centuries later, to its destruction.
47 This is suggested by Walbank, Philip V (as in n. 12), in the
form of a question, p. 190, note 5.
48 Livy 33.39. 1.
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Antiochos III in Thrace 337
land, that is, through Thrace, reaching the city about the same
time as Lentulus on his return from Selymbria49. Given the relative
speed of sea and land travel, this puts Antiochos on the march
somewhere between Selymbria and the Chersonese when Lentulus missed
him, but also so far inland that it was not worth Lentulus' while
trying to reach him. The campaign was therefore some- where in
central Thrace in its late phase. But if Selymbria was a reasonable
place for Lentulus to go, the earlier part of the campaign had been
somewhere to the north of that city, and this points to the
territory of the Astai, inland of Byzantion, which city in turn was
clearly more distant from the king on his campaign than was
Selymbria, otherwise Lentulus would have gone there. Further, for a
campaign in central Thrace, Perinthos (or even Lysimacheia) would
have been a more suitable destination. This all points to a
campaign in the Hebros basin or towards the Istranca mountains.
On the other hand, another Roman commissioner, L. Stertinius,
freed the cities of Ainos and Maroneia from control by garrisons of
King Philip during the summer50. He made no effort to contact
Antiochos, nor did he come into conflict with any Seleukid soldiers
or administrators. We can conclude there- fore that Antiochos
stayed well clear of that part of Thrace, and kept his people away
as well. Since he was deliberately contacting the Greek cities of
Thrace this omission is clearly deliberate and can best be
accounted for by presuming that Antiochos knew full well that the
Romans were involved there. It was not lack of ambition for control
of those cities, for he seized them and garrisoned them both later.
Antiochos' range of activity in the summer of 196 was there- fore
from the Chersonese along the northern shore of the Propontis as
far as Byzantion, and inland to the Hebros basin and the territory
of the Astai.
The situation within Thrace which Antiochos faced was of a
Thracian community which was both divided and impoverished. The
terrorist overlord- ship of Tylis had extracted substantial wealth
from the Thracians, as it had from the Greeks, and this wealth
appears to have completely vanished. The incipient urbanization of
the early third century - Seuthopolis, Kabyle, Kypsela - had been
either destroyed or stunted5l. The periodic centralizations of
power into a substantial kingdom based on the Odrysai of the Hebros
basin had also been aborted once more52. Out of the wreckage
emerged four tribes - the Astai,
49 Ibid. 2. 50 Ibid. 35.2. 51 A. Fol, "Le ddveloppement de la
vie urbaine dans les pays entre le Danube et la mer Egde
jusqu'A la conquete romaine", Etudes Balkaniques 2-3, 1966; M.
Chichikova, "The Thracian City of Seuthopolis", and V. Velkov, "The
Thracian City of Cabyle", in Poulter (ed.), Ancient Bulgaria (as in
n. 46), 289-303 and 233-238; D. P. Dimitrov and M. Chichikova, The
Thracian City of Seuthopolis, BAR Supplementary Series S 38 (Oxford
1978).
52 L. Ghetov, "Sur I'histoire politique de la Thrace a la haute
6poque hellenistique", Dritter Internationaler Thracologischer
Congress, vol. II (Sofia 1984), 134-136.
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338 JOHN D. GRAINGER
whose territory extended west and north of Byzantion to Kabyle
and the hinterland of Apollonia on the Gulf of Burgas on the Euxine
coast; the Kaeni, apparently situated to the north of the Thracian
Chersonese, and presumably the perpetrators of the destruction of
Lysimacheia; the Koreles or Korpiles, perhaps inland and north of
Ainos and Maroneia, and with the city of Kypsela in their
territory; and the Maudatenes, unlocated, but by process of
elimination perhaps in the middle Hebros valley, the old centre of
Odrysian power. These tribes are not the ones which were dominant
earlier, but are presumably the clans which emerged as local
overlords after the overthrow of the Tylians. Of these tribes it
would seem to be the Kaeni and the Astai who were Antiochos' early
targets, since his main political objectives were both to extend
his kingdom and to cement his alliance with the Greek cities who
were threatened by the Thracian tribes53.
Antiochos will have gathered into his alliance the other cities
which lined that coast: Selymbria, being Lentulus' destination, may
be presumed to be in the king's power at the time, but also
Bisanthe and Perinthos as well. Beyond the Straits were the Greek
cities of the western Euxine coast. One of these, Apollonia, had an
old Seleukid connection54. It was also regarded, much later, as a
neighbour of the Astai55. The other Greek cities beyond Apollonia -
Mesembria, Odessos, Kallatis, Tomi, Istros - might also respond to
Antiochos' overtures, particularly if elements of his fleet had
passed through the Bosporos into the Euxine, but this would depend
also on the extent of Antiochos' operations, in particular if he
aimed at going north of the Haemos (Balkan) mountains. It would not
be worth while incurring obligations to these cities if they would
then involve him in ever-growing problems.
Antiochos returned to Lysimacheia in late September 196, when
the confer- ence with the Roman commissioners took place56, a time
which would also be the end of his campaigning season. So the
conference took place at Antiochos' convenience, not that of the
Romans. Antiochos had thus spent at least three or four months in
Thrace, a full summer's campaign. It was only partly successful,
for he had to campaign there for two more summers at least. Beyond
that the evidence cannot take us, but three campaigns in such an
area was a formidable
53 Strabo 7.6.1-2 and frag. 47; Livy 38.40.7; I. Venedikov, "Les
migrations en Thrace", Pulpudeva 2 (1978 for 1976), 162-180, at pp.
177-178.
54 J. Youroukova, "La pr6sence des monnaies de bronze des
premiers S61eucides en Thrace: leur importance historique", Studia
P. Naster Oblata I (Louvain 1982), 115-26, and A. Stepanova,
"Observations sur la monnaye de bronze d'Apollonie du Pont",
Thracia Pontica 2 (1985), 272-82.
55 Ptolemy, Geography 3.11.6. 56 He sailed for Syria in time to
be caught by a storm off Cyprus, but before the sailing
season closed: hence September.
-
Antiochos III in Thrace 339
commitment of time and resources. Antiochos was clearly serious
about con- trolling Thrace.
Antiochos sailed back to Ephesos after the conference with the
Roman commissioners at Lysimacheia in September, but he left most
of his army in the Chersonese, commanded by his second son
Seleukoss7. One of the suggestions he had thrown out at the
conference was that he would set up Seleukos at Lysimacheia as a
viceroy58, and Seleukos was certainly left with the task of
continuing the rebuilding of the city59. Antiochos returned next
year, with a force large enough, so Livy claims, to have frightened
the experienced consular L. Villius Tappulus. Villius had been sent
by Flamininus in Greece to Antio- chos in response to a visit by
envoys from Antiochos who had arrived at Corinth just as the Roman
forces were coming out of their winter quarters60. These envoys had
thus been sent very early in the year, well before Antiochos' own
campaign had begun. Villius was away most of the campaigning
season, and was able therefore to report on Antiochos'
progress61.
The size of the army Antiochos was using can be estimated. In
emergencies such as the great battles he fought in Syria, at Raphia
in 217 and at Panion in 200, Antiochos could field an army of
70,000 men62, but this number could only be achieved by the
conscription of the kingdom's reservists, and so at the cost of
much disruption. In extended campaigns, such as his great eastern
anabasis between 211 and 206, his army was about half that size,
say 35,000 men. These men were thus his standing army. The troops
included the royal guard (the agema), the argyraspides (a phalanx
numbering 10,000 men), and assorted mercenary units such as the
Galatians and Thracians mentioned above. The army was well balanced
and very flexible, including a pioneer unit, light infantry, nomad
cavalry, and Galatians, as well as the standard heavy infantry63.
It could tackle a mountain campaign, as in the Elburz64, an opposed
river crossing65, a large set-piece battle such as Magnesia66, or a
siege such as Sardis or Baktra67. When he set off for the Aegean in
197, it was this army which Antiochos sent off to march by land to
Sardis, and it was this army which he
57 Livy 33.41.4. 58 Pol. 18.51.8; Livy 33.40.6. 59 Livy 33.41.4.
60 Livy 34.35.1-2. 61 Livy 34.33.12. 62 Pol. 5.79.3-13. 63 Cf. B.
Bar Kochva, The Seleucid Army, Organisation and Tactics in the
Great Campaigns
(Cambridge 1976), part I. 64 Pol. 10.28-31. 65 Pol. 10.49. 66
Livy 37.50-53. 67 Sardis: Pol. 7.15-18; Baktra: Pol. 10.49.15 and
11.39.1-10.
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340 JOHN D. GRAINGER
used in Thrace in 196. He was thus campaigning with a force of
up to 35,000 men.
He left much of it behind to winter at Lysimacheia under
Seleukos, taking his fleet (and the fleet's allocation of soldiers)
with him to Syria; according to Livy's report of Villius' report to
Flamininus, a larger contingent had returned with him in the
spring68. Allowing for casualties, we may assume that an army of
between 30,000 and 35,000 was in Thrace again in 195; some of them
would be in garrisons, but most were available for the new
campaign. This was the equivalent of a Roman army of three legions
with Latin auxiliaries, rather larger than that which was
campaigning under Flamininus' command in Greece at the same
time69.
These Thracian campaigns, involving a large army and the
conquest of a strategically important land, are thus major
political and military events, and yet neither the Romans in Greece
nor Philip V in Macedon showed any apprehensions about them.
Antiochos was at pains to keep Flamininus informed as to his
intentions and his progress, for this was clearly the purpose of
the visit of the king's envoys to Flamininus at Corinth early in
195, and that early arrival was followed by the return visit of
Villius to the king, with whom he stayed for some time, rejoining
Flamininus well into the summer. It seems likely also that Philip
was being kept in the picture (though this martial activity close
to the Macedonian borders may help to explain the reluctance Philip
showed in sending military help to his new Roman ally in the fight
against Nabis). Nor did the arrival of Hannibal at Ephesos have any
noticeable effect, either on Antio- chos' conduct of affairs or on
the Romans.
It is widely assumed that Antiochos returned to Thrace for a
third campaign in 194, and indeed some authors place the events
recorded by Appian in that year, without justification70. The only
apparent evidence specific to 194 is a comment by P. Cornelius
Scipio Africanus, who is reported by Livy to have demanded
Macedonia for his consular command for that year on the grounds
that a war was threatening with Antiochos, 'who had already and
without provocation crossed into Europe'71. This, if it is not
simply an anticipation of Scipio's participation in the later war
against Antiochos, may still be only a general reference to the
previous Thracian campaigns. This is somewhat strength-
68 Livy 33.41.4 and 34.33.12. 69 Flamininus had two legions plus
Latin alae: Livy 31.8.5-6, plus reinforcements: Livy
32.8.2, minus casualties; with his Greek allies he was
assaulting Nabis of Sparta at the
time with 27,000 men (Walbank, Philip V [as in n. 12], 186). 70
E.g., Walbank, Philip V (as in n. 12), 190; Errington in CAH V1112
dismisses the whole
affair in two half sentences (on pp. 277 and 278) and puts all
the military activity in 195 and 194.
71 Livy 34.43.4.
-
Antiochos III in Thrace 341
ened by his reference to a possible war, the threat of which
scarcely existed yet. Certainly the Senate was unconvinced, if the
speech really was made.
This is not very strong evidence for a new Antiochan campaign in
Thrace, but if he was not in Thrace we do not know where he was -
an unusual problem - and it is best to assume his presence there in
default of positive indications about anywhere else. The campaign
is utterly unknown, nor can conjecture do more than produce
guesses. The reconstruction of Lysimacheia was surely more or less
complete by then, and Seleukos installed as viceroy; Antiochos will
have been completing the conquest. But it is worth pointing out
that, while this presumed third campaign was going on, Flamininus
withdrew the Roman forces from Greece. Even if the king was not in
Thrace, both his army and his son were, and so therefore was his
power. It follows that the Romans, including Flamininus,
entertained no apprehensions about the Seleukid conquest - unless
Scipio's scaremongering was really spoken.
That conquest was clearly completed by this third campaign of
194, except for one detail. In 190, when the Roman army marched
along the Thracian coastal road to attack Antiochos, it was
discovered that Seleukid garrisons held the two old Greek towns of
Ainos and Maroneia72. The Roman commanders simply ignored them. But
these garrisons had not been in place in 194, since the towns had
been freed of Macedonian rule in 196 by the Romans - which had been
the purpose of Stertinius' visit, and therefore cannot have been
taken over before Flamininus left. They were therefore occupied
later, no doubt in 192 or 191 when it became clear that war had
broken out between Rome and Antiochos and when Antiochos sent his
troops into Greece. This would seem to be his final Thracian
conquest73.
That these cities were only extras is shown by the reported
words of Antiochos' envoys at Rome in 193. They asserted quite
definitely that Antio- chos had the right, by inheritance and by
conquest, to rule in Thrace, which was defined as 'the cities of
Thrace and Chersonesus'74. Once again, the provenance of that
speech, reported by Livy as being made to a secret senatorial
committee, is such that its authenticity is highly questionable,
but it would seem to imply clearly enough that Antiochos' conquests
were both extensive and completed.
A further visit by the king to Thrace, in 192, has been
postulated75. It was a busy summer for Antiochos, with his sieges
of Alexandreia Troas, Smyrna, and
72 Livy 37.33.1 (the Romans crossed the territories of the two
cities) and 37.60.7 (Antio- chos' troops were evacuated from the
cities).
73 N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, A History of Macedonia,
vol. III (Oxford 1988), 44 (by Hammond), claims Antiochos advanced
'as far as Maroneia' in '196/5', but he cannot have taken Ainos and
Maroneia while still at peace with Rome when Rome had so recently
freed those cities.
74 Livy 37.32.1. 75 0. Leuze, "Die Feldzuge Antiochos des GroBen
nach Kleinasien und Thrakien", Hermes
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342 JOHN D. GRAINGER
Lampsakos, and with diplomatic contacts with the Aitolians and
Romans - and other Greek states also, no doubt. So any expedition
to Thrace was on a smaller scale than before (for part of his army
was involved in the sieges) and briefer. The king could not afford
to be far from the scenes of diplomatic action at such a time. The
death of his eldest son the previous year, and the consequent
promotion of his next son Seleukos to the position of heir and
principal royal lieutenant may have been the pretext for the visit,
since Seleukos had been ruling from Lysimacheia as viceroy. No
doubt other problems were dealt with at the same time. Compared
with the previous expeditions this visit was perhaps more
administrative than military; the Romans had no reason to claim
fright, other than the need to find a justification for the war
which both sides now felt was coming.
The extent of Antiochos' Thracian dominions cannot be stated,
but the geographical indications may be set out. Along the coasts
he either controlled or was allied with every Greek city from
Maroneia to Byzantion; the cities of the western coast of the
Euxine are also probable allies, at least as far as Apollonia and
the Gulf of Burgas. This implies a conquered area comprising
essentially the basin of the Hebros, as far as the Haemos
mountains, but perhaps not as far as the abandoned Macedonian
colony of Philippopolis. Had he gone so far the threat to Macedon
would have become too strong for Philip to ignore. By not acquiring
Abdera, Antiochos had left an unclaimed space between his new
province and Macedon along the coast, and he may well have done the
same inland, where the tribe of the Bessi in the upper Hebros
valley could have been left as an inland buffer state. The bounds
were thus, in all probability, and very approximately, the Haemos
mountain range in the north, the sea to the east and south, and a
line north from Maroneia to the Haemos range on the west, an area
of over 35,000 square kilometres.
The conquest was thoroughly done. When the Roman forces marched
through in 190, on their way to eventual victory over Antiochos at
Magnesia, the Thracians did not interfere. The Romans ignored the
garrisons of Ainos and Maroneia, and there were surely other
garrisons in the inland areas - the land had only been conquered
three years before, after all, and could hardly be left
uncontrolled. These the Romans also ignored. By holding on to
Thrace, Antio- chos was paradoxically making the approach of the
Roman forces all the easier. This is good evidence, in other words,
for Antiochos' success in his conquest. The garrison and the
restored citizens of Lysimacheia were all withdrawn as the
53, 1923, 187-229 and 241-287; E. S. Gruen, The Hellenistic
Monarchies and the Coming of Rome (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1984),
630, n. 90; M. Holleaux, "L'entretien de Scipion l'Africain et
d'Hannibal", in Etudes d'etpigraphie et d'histoire grecques, 2me
partie. Rome, la Macedoine et l'Orient grec (Paris 1957), 184-207,
at p. 194, n. 1 and in CAH VIIII 206, rejected the expedition;
Walbank, Philip V (as in n. 12), p. x, accepted it.
-
Antiochos III in Thrace 343
Romans approached, in a masterly manoeuvre conducted in
secret76, but this was the only example of such a move. That is,
Antiochos was showing no inclination to give up his new conquest.
And the Ainos and Maroneia garrisons survived until after the peace
treaty was signed77. However, after they were withdrawn, when the
Roman forces marched back the way they had come under the lax
command of Cn. Manlius Vulso, they were ambushed by a Thracian
attack, in which all four of the tribes participated78. The removal
of Seleukid garrisons from the interior and the earlier removal of
the power of the kingdom of Tylis, released the Thracians to fight
for their land again, and, in this case, for the booty of Asia and
Galatia as well.
Three years later Philip of Macedon, in alliance with Byzantion,
cam- paigned through the Hebros valley, reducing the Thracian
tribes there to sub- mission79. Either then or more probably
earlier, he allied with the Bastarnae, a Keltic tribe of the Danube
valley, urging them to migrate in order to threaten his Thracian
enemies80. The parallels with Antiochos' Thracian campaign, as re-
constructed from other evidence, are quite striking. So is the
sequel, for Philip was then told to pull out of Thrace by the
Romans. His swift success may be attributed in part to the earlier
thoroughness of the Seleukid campaign, and it may be that Philip
did more than copy Antiochos' political and diplomatic techniques:
he may also have followed in his military tracks.
Middle Littleton, Evesham, Worcs John D. Grainger
76 Livy 37.31.1-2. 77 Ibid. 60.7. 78 Livy 38.40.7. 79 Livy
39.35.4; Pol. 22.14.12. 80 Livy 39.55.4, assuming, as Hammond does
(History of Macedonia, vol. III [as in n. 73],
468, n. 2) that Livy's reference to Italy is a product of 'Roman
propaganda'.
Article Contentsp. [329]p. 330p. 331p. 332p. 333p. 334p. 335p.
336p. 337p. 338p. 339p. 340p. 341p. 342p. 343
Issue Table of ContentsHistoria: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte,
Vol. 45, No. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1996), pp. 257-392Front MatterWhy Did the
Greek "Polis" Originally Need Coins? [pp. 257-283]Xenophon's Dana
and the Passage of Cyrus' Army over the Taurus Mountains [pp.
284-314]Polybius, Aetolia and the Gallic Attack on Delphi (279
B.C.) [pp. 315-328]Antiochos III in Thrace [pp. 329-343]Flamininus
and the Propaganda of Liberation [pp. 344-363]The Beginning of the
"Historia Augusta" [pp. 364-375]MiszellenThoughts on the Ceremonial
'Opening' of Secular Buildings in Early Imperial Rome [pp.
376-382]The Coinage of Otho: A Contribution to the History of His
Reign [pp. 382-385]
Back Matter [pp. 386-392]