'Another failed empire builder in the Middle East' Do you agree with this statement in regards to US foreign policy since 1990?

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STUDENT NUMBER: 100173510

MODULE TITLE &

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POLM043 International Relations of the

Middle East: Islam, Imperialism and state

formationPROGRAMME: MA International Relations

NUMBER OF WORDS: 3,290DATE

SUBMITTED:26/03/2014

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“The latest in a long line of failed empire builders in the Middle East”. Do you agree with this assessment of USforeign policy in the region since 1990?

The end of the Cold War ushered in a unipolar moment. The

US was the sole superpower, unchallenged ideologically,

militarily and economically. This awarded it the ability

to act with increased assertiveness wherever its

interests saw fit, and the Middle East was no exception.

The question is was the US acting imperially, or was it

inevitably assuming the role of hegemon? For the sake of

this essay, we must distinguish between Empire/Imperial

behaviour and Hegemony. Michael Doyle’s definition of

Empire will be the point of analysis. He posits that

empire is a “relationship, formal or informal, in which

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one state controls the effective political sovereignty of

another political society” (Doyle: 1986: p.45). This, he

says, can be achieved through dependence (whether

economic, social or cultural), through political

collaboration or the use of force (Doyle: 1986: p.45).

During this essay, Empire will mean formal or informal

control over a states foreign and domestic policy, with

Imperialism being the act of attempting to establish such

control. Hegemony, on the other hand, will mean a state’s

ability to effectively influence another state’s foreign

policy whilst the influenced state is still able to

direct its own domestic policy. Duration of US policy

will also reveal whether their motives were imperial or

hegemonic i.e. were they temporary and designed to alter

foreign policy, or were they permanent until empire was

achieved (or failed)?

This essay will argue that throughout the 1990’s, US

imperialism was restrained by realpolitik, and a

realization that it countered US interests. In the early

2000’s and under the tutelage of George W.Bush however,

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the US was imperial, characterized by regime change and

democracy promotion. This attempt at empire will be shown

as a failure, with a final discussion on the Obama

administration, which has highlighted the negative

impacts of imperial overstretch.

Throughout the 1990’s the US sought with more vigor its

primary goals of Persian-Gulf security and the Arab-

Israeli peace process. The US sponsored a regional order

of stability that maintained the flow of oil whilst

containing quests for regional hegemony i.e. Iraq and

Iran. The US intervention in Kuwait to halt Saddam

Hussein’s offensive invasion in 1991 highlighted its

hegemony, owing to the swift and inexpensive victory,

which enhanced the security of its Gulf allies,

particularly Saudi Arabia (Hudson: 1996: p.340). The

invasion was successful in shutting down the aggressive

foreign policy of Saddam Hussein. However the US did not

enforce regime change and allowed for Saddam to maintain

his “homicidal regime” (Ferry: 2013). This was because

any thirst for imperialism was “restrained by the

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realpolitik of the Middle Eastern and American domestic

politics” (Hadar: 1998: p.51). There was a clear decision

(despite advocacy from the neo-cons), to abstain from a

full invasion of Iraq, as given its “contentious ethnic

and religious composition and fragile territorial unity”,

the costs would outweigh the benefits (Hadar: 1998:

p.51). The US feared blowback for them and their pro-

Western counterparts in the region, whilst the

disintegration of Iraq would threaten the security of its

allies such as Saudi Arabia (Hadar: 1998: p.51).

The scale of military involvement from the US, however,

was something that was not seen throughout the Cold War.

Operation Desert Storm and Shield involved 500,000 troops

for example. But more importantly, military bases that

had been established in Gulf States such as Oman, the

UAE, Kuwait and Qatar all remained after the conflict.

This is because these states felt threatened by

aggressive neighbours such as Iraq and did not have

strong enough militaries to deter external aggressors.

The existence of these bases arguably infringed upon the

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sovereignty of the state, as their role of protecting

their people from outside aggression was dependent on an

external power. Yet despite being dependent on US arms,

the US in no way sought to alter the authoritarian

regimes of its gulf states who had their own host of

human rights violations and modes of political

repression. The US, having a monopoly on these states’

security, could have pushed for internal reform or

dictated they reevaluate their human rights records, but

realpolitik again restrained the desire for such imperial

action. Much like the Cold War, as long as the oil

exporting states are maintaining stability and not

threatening the status quo, the US will support them and

not be involved in their domestic realm.

Unlike the Cold War however, Bush Senior had no qualms in

confronting Israel’s Yitzhak Shamir Lukid government over

their settlements in Arab territory. By stalling Israel’s

bid for loan guarantees unless it stopped settlement

construction and by raising the issue of East Jerusalem

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as occupied territory, Bush senior’s administration was

able to construct the multinational peace conference in

Madrid in October 1991, paving the way to bring both

sides of the conflict to the table (Hadar: 1998: p.51).

Yet putting pressure on the Israeli’s economically and

diplomatically to influence its foreign policy does not

suggest an attempt at Empire. It merely represents the

hegemon’s attempt to bring stability to a region vital to

its interests. This pressure on Israel cemented the US

role as hegemon. Along with its Gulf War intervention, it

painted a picture of the US not only as a powerful

military and diplomatic force, but as a “promoter of

international law and a proponent of justice in the

Persian Gulf” (Hadar: 1998: p.51). It was this

unprecedented pressure placed upon Israel however (along

with not overthrowing Saddam), that caused the neo-cons

and right wing members of his administration to abandon

him during the 1992 election, whilst transferring to

Clinton the American-Jewish vote (Hadar: 1998: p.52).

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The Clinton administration then, returned to the norm of

favouring Israel, and increased the punishment upon

“uncooperative Arab states” such as Iraq and Iran

(Watkins: 1997: p.3).

In terms of Israel, the inability of Clinton to influence

it in any meaningful way showed how much its closest ally

directed its own policies. The peace process had

potential under Rabin, who appeared willing to take

political risks to achieve peace, yet his assassination

and succession by Benjamin Netanyahu came to undermine US

influence over the peace process. Netanyahu proved

unwilling to hand over Arab territories whilst continuing

to pursue settlement building. Clinton refused to place

any real pressure on Israel, staying committed to the

role of mediator. Indeed despite Israeli intransigence,

Washington continued to deliver copious military supplies

such as new long-range fighter-bombers (Hadar: 1998:

p.56). The fact is that despite his many attempts, the

peace process only ended in deadlock. Clinton’s inability

to pressure Israel or condemn effectively its actions

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such as the building of settlements in East Jerusalem in

1997, or its violatons of UNSC resolutions 242 and 425,

fuelled anti-American sentiment in the Arab world,

especially given its increased military support of the

Jewish state and its turning of a blind eye to its

nuclear and chemical weapons development (Hadar: 1998:

p.56). The point is that far from Empire building, the US

was struggling to even direct the foreign policies of its

closest ally in its sphere of influence; it was

constrained by its domestic politics, most notably Israel

lobbies such as AIPAC.

Clinton’s dual containment of Iraq and Iran was also

backfiring and failing to yield results. The strategy was

designed to isolate the two regional powers that had the

means and the will to upset the US-sponsored regional

order. Iraq received “draconian” full-scale economic

sanctions whilst being placed under constant surveillance

to block any attempts at nonconventional re-armament

(Rouleau: 1995: p.62). Although Clinton posited he was

only seeking compliance with post gulf-war UNSC

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resolutions, most notably regarding WMD’s, in practice it

was clear that he had “no intention” of dealing with the

regime and “seemed content to let Iraq stew indefinitely”

(Brzezinski, Murphy, Scowcroft: 1997: p.23). Even when

Saddam complied with conditions set by the UNSC to lift

the oil export embargo, the US refused and decided that

he would have to meet all UN resolutions, including those

concerning human rights and recognition of Kuwait’s

borders (Rouleau: 1995: p.66). This punitive approach was

also handed to Iran. Iran had constantly attempted to

disrupt the peace process, was an international sponsor

of terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, and was

also suspected of pursuing WMD’s. Clintons administration

was heavily influenced by AIPAC and Israel, who wanted to

see regime change in Iran. They pushed for embargos that

restricted any businesses, even foreign, from investing

more than 40 million dollars in energy resources per year

(Fayazmanesh: 2001: p.230).

This was clearly an attempt by the US to subvert the two

regional powers in a bid to not only alter their foreign

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policy but their domestic policy also, with the distant

hope of even enacting regime change. Yet despite

crippling the economy in Iraq, Saddam remained in power,

owed to the fact that the sanctions failed to impact him

and his elites, yet wreaked havoc upon the population

with countless humanitarian consequences, including the

death of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. If

they were hoping for regime change, crippling the

potential drivers of change was counterintuitive, whilst

the effects of the sanctions only worsened its image in

the region. In Iran, sanctions were eased when it was

realized, by AIPAC too, that the regime “could not be

replaced easily” and was there to stay (Fayazmanesh:

2001: p.231). It also failed due to defiance from other

powers who wished to do business in Iran. Canadian firms

planned to build oil fields, but more importantly, the

French company Total agreed to a multi-billion dollar

deal with the Iranians to develop the South Pars gas

field (Fayazmanesh: 2001: p.231). The US was also under

increasing pressure from the oil and agricultural

corporations, who were seeking contracts in Iran. Here

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again we see the restraining effect of Realpolitik,

sanctions on Iran were undermining business aswell as

relations with other powers. Indeed the defiance of

powers such as France and Russia who were growing closer

to Iran, points to this idea that by the end of the

Clinton administration, power was shifting regionally and

globally, with the unipolar moment dwindling, the window

of opportunity to establish empire was closing, or was

already gone.

The unpopular sanctions and the return to favouring

Israel boosted anti-American sentiment in the region, and

saw US influence wane at the expense of Iran and Iraq.

The US had failed to change Iran and Iraq’s policies

through informal methods, and realpolitik was restraining

them from being able to pursue formal methods i.e. regime

change through force. There was no will amongst the

American public, and it ran the risk of destabilizing the

whole region. Up to this point, the US had no doubt been

hegemonic, striving to deter aggressive foreign policies

of Iran, Iraq and to a lesser extent Israel, but to claim

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they were failed empire builders is missing the point,

given that even if they wanted to pursue an empire in the

region, it was restrained by realist considerations.

Although dual containment involved criticizing small

parts of domestic policy, this was window dressing to

justify their punitive nature, the sanctions were

temporary and designed to deter and change their foreign

policy, and given that Doyle’s definition of empire is

the point of analysis, this would not categorize the US

as ‘empire builders’.

If imperial urges had been restrained throughout the

1990’s, the restraints were lifted after 9/11 and the

inauguration of President George W. Bush (Bush Junior)

and his neo-con dominated administration. The attacks of

September 11th 2001 in New York legitimized an increase in

US military presence on a global scale, and provided the

context for the Bush doctrine: the right to pre-emptive

attack to prevent future terrorist “outrages” (a ‘war on

terror’)(Robins: 2013: p.307). Bush, who still perceived

the world to be unipolar and US power unchallenged, was

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soon on a mission to spread democracy throughout the

region. Iraq would serve as a model and encourage

neighbouring states to follow suit, most importantly

there was the belief that it would “fundamentally affect

the regime in Iran” (Murray: 2010: p.125). Under the

cloak of providing ‘freedom’ and liberation to the Iraqi

people, and by linking Saddam to WMD’s and Al-Qaeda

falsely, the US invaded in an attempt to construct a

“paragon of domestic virtue in a region of power

politics” (Robins: 2013: p.315).

There is no denying the imperial ambitions of Bush

Junior. Once defeated militarily and occupied, any

remaining institutions were dissolved by the US, most

importantly, its army. The US now had total control over

the monopoly of force within Iraq, with the goal of

maintaining it until the state replicated a liberal

democratic society that would inevitably be dictated to

by the US. Indeed several efforts were made to build

institutions and legitimize them via elections, yet they

provided little success and only in certain areas (Iraq’s

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green zones) (Robins: 2013). In line with Neo-Marxist

thought, economic exploitation, resembling empires of the

past, can also be seen as a motivation. Iraq’s huge oil

reserves (which were now worth more thanks to the

invasion) were now under US control, indeed US big

business such as Halliburton and Washington Group

International received a combined 18 billion dollar boost

in revenues directly from Iraq, most of which came from

the oil fields (Ryan: 2008). Such businesses were also

designated with rebuilding infrastructure such as

watering systems and schools, as well as the maintenance

of such facilities. This was clearly an attempt to

rebuild Iraq in its own image, with the hope of it

spreading across the region (highlighted, much like the

British, by the promise of withdrawal when Iraq was

‘ready’ to govern itself i.e. an easily influenced

newfound democracy).

By 2011 however, US withdrawal without even the

installation of a friendly government has shown Bush’s

imperial policies to have been in vain. If the US’s pro-

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Israel stance since Clinton and moreso under Bush, along

with its continuing military presence in the region had

not exacerbated Anti-American sentiment enough, Bush’s

imperial and unilateral approach in Iraq undoubtedly

caused it to sore. From the offset, the US occupation

proved to be an “inviting prospect” for rejectionists,

ranging from “alienated Sunni Arab communities” to the

ranks of global Jihad, to “launch an asymmetric war of

resistance” (Robins: 2013: p.310). It soon became clear

that the US, despite their military advantage, was not

cut out to fight such a conflict. The goal of these

rejectionists was to block the creation of a US-friendly

order, make Iraq ungovernable and to ignite a sectarian

civil war between a Sunni and Shia divide. On all

accounts, they appear to have been successful. Iraq today

is as unstable as ever, with sectarian violence on the

climb, whilst its government continues to grow closer

ties with Iran, its axis-of-evil counterpart. Indeed the

indirect result of Bush’s actions has caused Iran to

emerge as an ever more defiant and powerful actor in the

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region by eliminating its rival for regional hegemony:

Iraq.

Bush’s failed imperial policies have undermined US

hegemony. The failure to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan

effectively, despite using overwhelming force, has

seriously undermined the effectiveness of its military

deterrent. This has been shown by the continuing defiance

on the part of Iran, who continued to act aggressively

towards Israel whilst pushing on with its uranium

enrichment programme in pursuit of nuclear weapons

capability. Given the financial crash of 2008 and the

unpopular embroilment of the US in Iraq and Afghanistan,

Iran knew the only weapon the US could inflict upon it

was sanctions, which proved to have no impact on its

behaviour as it was willing to accept the costs (although

there has been hope over very recent negotiations due to

a more moderate regime coming to power).

But it has been Obama’s reaction to the Arab spring that

has highlighted how Bush’s legacy has impacted US’s role

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in the region. Some cite Libya as an example of

Imperialism in action, yet this isn’t the case.

Intervention was only made possible due to the fact that

Gaddafi had no international friends, whilst the

unequivocal regional support for his removal proved to be

a “game changer”, persuading China and Russia to abstain

rather than veto (Bellamy: 2011: p.266). But once Gaddafi

was removed, NATO withdrew. The US “shied away” from

taking a leadership role “because of the failed

interventionist record” of Bush (as well as turning

attention more towards Asia) (Gerges: 2013: p.321).

This was highlighted by Syria. In the face of a re-

assertive and veto-wielding China and Russia, the idea of

invading without UN support now seemed laudable. After

Iraq and Afghanistan, the US could not afford to invade

Syria without seriously damaging further its image in the

Muslim world. It was also restrained by its domestic

politics as its nation had grown tired of war, and given

that a swift victory (whatever that entailed) did not

seem likely, Obama could not afford to become embroiled,

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despite the atrocities unfolding on the ground. The lack

of effective US involvement is juxtaposed with heavy

Russian and Iranian involvement, providing “elite teams

to gather intelligence and train troops”, whilst

supplying copious amounts of arms, Hezbollah troops and

military hardware (Hafezi & Saul: 2014). It shows that US

hegemony in the region has declined at the expense of

other powers’ meddling to preserve and defend their own

interests. Clearly, the US is not the only player in

region anymore.

To conclude, to brand the US as a “failed empire” in the

Middle East since 1990 is an unfair assessment because

other than Bush Junior, the US was not actually

attempting to build one. There’s no denying that the US

was unchallenged in its unipolar moment, and it was the

hegemon in the region, but to act imperial was not in its

interests, and was restricted by realist concerns. The

Gulf War did not turn into regime change for example,

because it was believed the costs would outweigh the

benefits. Additionally, although having a monopoly on

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Gulf state security, their domestic affairs were not

interfered with or discussed as the primary goal was

maintaining oil supply and security. This is proven by

the fact that the US has attempted to make Gulf States

such as Saudi Arabia less dependent on US for their

security by establishing “long-standing military training

programs supplemented by… high-value weapons sales”,

encouraging them to develop efficient militaries of their

own (Blanchard: 2014: p.10). Additionally, after Bush

senior, the return to favouring Israel showed how

domestic politics restrained the Clinton and Bush

administration from affecting Israel’s behaviour in any

meaningful way, even so, its concerns were only directed

at its foreign policy, therefore not indicative of

imperial behaviour. Only under Bush junior do we see an

attempt at empire. Naïve regarding the infallibility of

his doctrine, he tried to recreate a Pax-Americana in the

Middle East. His failures, despite all the might of the

US military, showcased to the world that the US had

reached imperial overstretch. This undermined the

perception of US threat and deterrence, and along with

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other factors, led Obama to avoid any action that would

appear imperial. The financial crash in 2008, casting

doubt on the whole liberal capitalist system, along with

the rise of regional and global powers, has shown a

return to multi-polarity. Although the US remains the

largest presence in the Middle East, it has had to make

room for outside players like Russia and France, and now

regional forces like Iran, and events in the Arab spring

have highlighted this. In sum, with the exception of Bush

Junior, the US is not a failed empire builder in the

Middle East; but it is now the challenged Hegemon.

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