Animal Law – Tier und Rechtkorsgaar/CMK.Animal.Rights.pdf · Animal Law – Tier und Recht Developments and Perspectives in the 21st Century ... human beings have the kind of direct

Sonderdruck / Offprint:

Zürich/St. Gallen 2012

Animal Law – Tier und RechtDevelopments and Perspectives in the 21st Century

Entwicklungen und Perspektiven im 21. Jahrhundert

Herausgegeben von / Edited by

Margot MichelDaniela KühneJulia Hänni

3

A Kantian Case for Animal Rights

Christine M. Korsgaard *

Table of Contents

I. Introduction 3II. WhyWeMustRegardAnimalsasEndsinThemselves 6III. WhyWeHaveMoralDutiestoAnimals 14IV. WhyAnimalsShouldHaveLegalRights 18V. Conclusion 25

I. Introduction

Kantianmoralphilosophy isusuallyconsidered inimicalboth to themoralclaims and to the legal rights of non-human animals.Kant himself assertsbaldlythatanimalsare«meremeans»and«instruments»andassuchmaybeusedforhumanpurposes.Intheargumentleadinguptothesecondformula-tionofthecategoricalimperative,theFormulaofHumanityasanendinitself,Kantsays:

Beingstheexistenceofwhichrestsnotonourwillbutonnature,iftheyarebeingswithoutreason,haveonlyarelativeworth,asmeans,andarethereforecalledthings,whereasrationalbeingsarecalledpersonsbecausetheirnaturealreadymarksthemoutasanendinitself,thatis,assomethingthatmaynotbeusedmerelyasameans[…](G4:428)1.

* ArthurKingsleyPorterProfessorofPhilosophy,DepartmentofPhilosophy,HarvardUniversity.

1 Kant’sworksarecitedinthetraditionalway,bythevolumeandpagenumberofthestandardGermanedition,KantsGesammelteSchriften(editedbytheRoyalPrussian[laterGerman]AcademyofSciences[Berlin:GeorgeReimer, laterWalterdeGru-yter&Co.,1900],whicharefoundinthemarginsofmosttranslations.Theabbrevia-tionsIhaveusedareasfollows;forthetranslationsused,pleaseseethebibliography).C3=CritiqueofJudgment C2=CritiqueofPracticalReason CBHH=«ConjecturesontheBeginningsofHumanHistory» G=GroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals LE=LecturesonEthics MM=TheMetaphysicsofMorals.

ChristineM.Korsgaard

4

Inhisessay«ConjecturesontheBeginningsofHumanHistory»,aspeculativeaccountoftheoriginofreasoninhumanbeings,Kantexplicitlylinksthemo-mentwhenhumanbeingsfirstrealizedthatwemusttreatoneanotherasendsinourselveswiththemomentwhenwerealizedthatwedonothavetotreattheotheranimalsthatway.Hesays:

When[thehumanbeing]firstsaidtothesheep,«thepeltwhichyouwearwasgiventoyoubynaturenotforyourownuse,butformine»andtookitfromthesheeptowearithimself,hebecameawareofaprerogativewhich,byhisnature,heenjoyedoveralltheanimals;andhenownolongerregardedthemasfellowcreatures,butasmeansandinstrumentstobeusedatwillfortheattainmentofwhateverendshepleased(CBHH8:114)2.

Inhisaccountoflegalrights,Kantintroducesafurtherdifficultyforthecauseofanimalrights.ForKant,thepointoflegalrightsisnot,asmanyphiloso-phershavesupposed,toprotectourmoreimportantinterests.Rather,itistodefineandupholdamaximaldomainofindividualfreedomforeachcitizen,withinwhichthecitizencanactasseemsjustandgoodtohim.InJohnRawls’slanguage,itistocreateadomaininwhicheachpersoncanpursuehisown«conceptionofthegood»3.Kantbelievedthateachofushasaninnaterighttofreedom,whichhedefinedas«independencefrombeingconstrainedbyan-other’schoice»(MM6:237).Hearguedthatwithouttheinstitutionofenforce-ablelegalrights,ourrelationshipswitheachothermustbecharacterizedbytheunilateraldominationofsomeindividualsoverothers.Theproblemisnot,ornotmerely,thatthestrongarelikelytotyrannizeovertheweak.Evenifthestrongwerescrupulousaboutnotinterferingwiththeactionsortheposses-sionsoftheweak,still,withoutrights,theweakwouldbeabletoactontheirownjudgmentandretaintheirownpossessionsonlyonthesufferanceofthestrong(MM6:312).Sinceherinnaterighttofreedomisviolatedwhenonepersonisdependentonsomeotherperson’sgoodwill,Kantthinksitisaduty,andnot justaconvenience, forhumanbeings to live inapolitical state inwhicheveryperson’srightsareenforcedandupheld(MM6:307–8)4.Nomat-terhowwell-intentionedweare,wecanberightlyrelatedtoeachotheronly

2 IhavechangedNisbet’srenderingoftheGerman«Pelz»from«fleece»to«pelt»al-though theGermancanbe renderedeitherway,because I think that the rendering«fleece»softensKant’sharshpoint.

3 Rawls,TheoryofJustice,firstusedonxii.4 ThecontrasthereiswithLockeandHobbes,whosupposedthatweleavethe«stateof

nature»asaremedyforits«inconveniences»(thewordisLocke’s)andthereforefrommotivesofprudencerather thanbecauseit ismorallyrequired.SeelocKe,SecondTreatiseandHobbes,Leviathan.

AKantianCaseforAnimalRights

5

ifweliveinapoliticalstatewithalegalsystemthatguaranteestherightsofeveryone.

Butnon-rationalanimalsapparentlydonothavethekindoffreedomthatrights,on thisaccount, are intended toprotect. It isbecausehumanbeingsare ra-tionalbeingsthatweareabletochooseourownwayoflife.Rationality,forKant,isnotthesamethingasintelligence.Itisanormativecapacity,groundedinwhatKanttooktobetheuniquehumanabilitytoreflectonthereasonsforourbeliefsandactions,anddecidewhethertheyaregoodreasonsorbadones.Asrationalbeings,wereflectaboutwhatcountsasagoodlife,decidetheques-tionforourselves,andliveaccordingly.Intheliberaltradition,withitsstrongemphasisontolerationanditsantagonismtopaternalism,thiskindofautono-myhasoftenbeenregardedasthebasisofatleastsomeofourrights.Wehavethebasicrightsofpersonalliberty,libertyofconscience,andthefreedomofspeechandassociation,becauseeachofushasageneralrighttodetermineforourselveswhatcountsasaworthwhilelife,andtolivethatlife,solongasthewayweactisconsistentwithupholdingthesamerightforeveryoneelse.

ButKantextendsthisaccounttoallofourrights.Hethinksthatwemusthavepropertyrights,forexample,becauseifwedidnot,noonecouldusenaturalobjects–apieceoflandtogrowcropson,forexample–topursuehisownprojectswithoutbeingdependentonthewillingnessofothersnottointerferewiththatuse.Ourrighttopropertyisthereforenotgroundeddirectlyinourinterests,butratherisseenasanextensionofourfreedomofaction.OfcourseKantthoughtthatoneofthethingsinwhichwecouldclaimpropertyistheother animals.Their legal status asproperty is thedirect correlateof theirmoralstatusasmeremeans.

GroundingallofourrightsinfreedomisimportanttoKant,becauseonKant’saccount,rights,bytheirverynature,arecoercivelyenforceable.Itisthees-senceofhavingarightthatyoumaylegitimatelyuseforcetoprotectthattowhichyouhavetheright,orthestatemaydosoonyourbehalf.Thatishowrightssecureourfreedomagainstthedominationofothers.Kantbelievedthattheprotectionoffreedomistheonlythingthatjustifiestheuseofcoercion,becausetheprotectionoffreedomistheuseofcoercionagainstcoercionitself.AccordingtoKant,peopledonotgettopusheachotheraroundinthenameofwhatoneoranotherofus,orthemajorityofus,orforthatmatter,evenallofus,considerstobegood.Theonlythingthatjustifiesusinpreventingsome-onefromactingasshechoosesisthatheractionisahindrancetosomeoneelse’sfreedom.


6

Buttheotheranimalsarenotautonomousanddonotchoosetheirownwayoflife.ThisseemstoimplythatinKant’slegalphilosophy,questionsabouttherightsofnon-rationalanimalscannotevencomeup.Andofcourse,thosewhochampionrightsforanimalsarenotusuallyinterestedinsecuringtheirfree-domofaction,butratherinsecuringthemprotectionfromharm.ThisseemstosuggestthatKant’sphilosophyisnottheplacetolookforaphilosophicalfoundationforanimalrights.

Nevertheless,inthispaperIwillarguethatacaseforboththemoralclaimsandthelegalrightsofnon-humananimalscanbemadeonthebasisofKant’sownmoralandpoliticalarguments.Kant’sviewsaboutthehumanplaceintheworld–hisresistancetothepretensionsthathumanbeingshavemetaphysicalknowledgeofthewaytheworldisinitself,andtheargumentsheusestoshowthatwecanconstructanobjectivemoralsystemwithoutsuchknowledge–requireustoacknowledgeourfellowshipwiththeotheranimals.

II. Why We Must Regard Animals as Ends in Themselves

IntheargumentleadingtotheFormulaofHumanity,asImentionedearlier,Kantclaimsthatthenatureofrationalbeingsor«persons»«marksusout»asendsinourselves.Assomepeoplereadthisargument,Kantissimplymakingametaphysicalclaimaboutacertainformofvalue.Rationalityorautonomyisapropertythatconfersakindofintrinsicvalueordignityonthebeingswhohaveit,andthereforetheyaretoberespectedincertainways.Lackingthisproperty,theotheranimalslackthisdignityorvalue.

ThereareseveralproblemswithunderstandingKant’sargumentthisway.Oneisthatitdoesnothingtoexplaintheparticularkindofvaluethatrationalbeingsaresupposedtohave.«Value»isnotaunivocalnotion–differentthingsarevaluedindifferentways.ThekindofvaluethatKantthinksattachestopersonsisoneinresponsetowhichwerespecttheirchoices,bothinthesensethatweleavepeoplefreetodeterminetheirownactions,andinthesensethatwere-gardtheirchosenendsasthingsthataregoodandsoworthyofpursuit.ThisismadeclearbythenatureofthedutiesthatKantthinksfollowfromthein-junctiontorespectpersonsasendsinthemselves(G4:429–31).Weareobli-gatednottousurpotherpeople’scontrolovertheirownactionsbyforcingortrickingthemintodoingwhatwewantorthinkwouldbebest–thatis,wearenotallowedtouseotherpeopleasmeremeanstoourends.Wealsohaveadutytopromotetheendsofothers.Apersoncouldcertainlyhavesomekinds


7

ofvalue–evensomekindsofvalueasanend–withoutitfollowingthathischoicesoughttoberespected.Aprince,orsomeoneheldbysomereligioustraditiontobetheembodimentoftheirgod,mightbevaluedthewayapre-ciousobjectisvalued–preservedandprotectedandcherished–withouteverbeingallowedtodoanythingthathechooses.

Butthemoreimportantproblemisthattheproposedclaimabouttheintrinsicvalueofrationalbeingsisexactlythesortofmetaphysicalclaimwhosepreten-sionsKant’sphilosophy isdesigned todebunk.Kantdoesnotbelieve thathumanbeingshavethekindofdirectrationalinsightintothenatureofthingsthatmighttellusthatcertainentitiesorobjectsare,asamatterofmetaphysi-calfact,intrinsicallyvaluable.Speakingabitroughly,Kantthinksthatclaimsthatgobeyondtherealmofempiricalorscientificknowledgemustbeestab-lishedasnecessarypresuppositionsofrationalactivity–thatis,aspresupposi-tionsofthinkingingeneral,orofconstructingatheoreticalunderstandingoftheworld,orofmakingrationalchoices.Hisphilosophicalstrategyistoiden-tifythepresuppositionsofrationalactivityandthentotrytovalidatethosepresuppositionsthroughwhathecalled«critique»5.

InhisargumentfortheFormulaofHumanity,Kantaspirestoshowusthatthevalueofpeopleasendsinthemselvesisapresuppositionofrationalchoice.Theargument,asIunderstandit,itgoeslikethis6.Becausewearerational,wecannotdecidetopursueanendunlesswetakeittobegood.Thisrequire-

5 ThisroughdescriptionofKant’smethodskatesoveragreatmanycomplexitiesandcontroversiesinKantinterpretation.WhatIamcalling«presuppositions»areofvari-ouskinds–constitutiveprinciples,regulativeprinciples,andpostulates,forinstance;andtheargumentsKantgivestovalidatethemarealsoofvariouskinds–thespecialkindofargumenthecalls«deduction»,forone;inthecaseoftheargumentforthemor-allawintheSecondCritique,theestablishmentofa«credential»(C25:48)foranother,andothersaswell.Inaddition,thereisphilosophicalcontroversyoverthenatureofthespecificvalidationKantultimatelyproposedforthemorallaw,andKanthimselfchangedhismindaboutthisoverthecourseofhiscareer.Despitethesecomplications,IthinkthattheroughdescriptionofKant’smethodgenerallyfitsallthesecases. Inthispapermyfocusisonthepresuppositionsthemselves,notontheirvalidation.IwillarguethatincertainwaysKantmisidentifiedthepresuppositionsofpracticallyrationalactivity.Thatleavesitopen,Isuppose,thattherevisedpresuppositionscannotbevalidated.Becauseof thegreatobscurityofKant’smethodsofvalidation,espe-ciallyinmoralphilosophy,itisalittledifficultformetoaddressthisworryingeneralterms,butIdonotbelieveitisaproblem.IthinkKantwasrightinconcludingthatthepresuppositionsofrationalactiondonotneedadeductioninthesamesensethatthepresuppositionsoftheoreticalunderstandingdo.

6 Ifirst presentedaversionof this interpretationofKant’s argument inKoRsgaaRd,FormulaofHumanity.


8

mentisessentiallybuiltintothenatureofthekindofself-consciousnessthatgrounds rational choice.A rational being is one who is conscious of thegroundsonwhichsheistemptedtobelievesomethingortodosomething–thepurportedreasonsthatmovehertoadoptabelieforanintention.Becauseweareconsciousofthegroundsofourbeliefsandactions,wecannoteitherholdabelieforperformanactionwithoutendorsing itsgroundsasadequate tojustifyit7.Tosaythatthepursuitofanendisjustifiedisthesameastosaythattheendisgood(C25:60).Importantly,Kanttakesthejudgmentthattheendisgoodtoimplythatthereisreasonforanyrationalbeingtopromoteit.AshesaysintheCritique of Practical Reason:

Whatwearetocallgoodmustbeanobjectofthefacultyofdesireinthejudg-mentofeveryreasonablehumanbeing,andevilanobjectofaversionintheeyesofeveryone[…](C25:61)8.

WhathemeansisnotthateveryonemustcareaboutthesamethingsthatIdo,butrather,thatifmycaringaboutanendgivesmeagenuinereasonfortryingtomakesurethatIachieveit,theneveryoneelsehasareason,althoughofcoursenotnecessarilyanoverridingone,totrytomakesurethatIachieveitaswell.

Consequently,Kantenvisionstheactofmakingachoiceastheadoptionofacertain«maxim»orprincipleasauniversallaw,alawthatgovernsbothmyownconductandthatofothers.Mychoosingsomethingismakingalawinthesensethatitinvolvesconferringakindofobjective–ormoreproperlyspeaking intersubjective–valueonsomestateofaffairs,avalue towhicheveryrationalbeingmustthenberesponsive.ItisimportanttoKant’sownunderstanding of the implications of this argument that it is only rationalchoicesthathavethisnormativecharacter.Onlyrationalchoicesaremadeonthebasisofanassessmentofthegroundsorreasonsforthem,andsoonly

7 This isnot tosaythatweaknessof thewillandmoralweaknessare impossible,ofcourse,butitimpliesthattheymustbeexplainedintermsofself-deception.

8 SomeonemightofcoursechallengeKant’sclaimthattheadequacyofone’sreasonim-pliesthatone’sendisanendforeveryone.Kant’sassumptionisthatreasonsarewhatIhaveelsewherecalled«public»,orwhataresometimescalled«agent-neutral»,reasons–reasonswhosenormativeforceextendstoallrationalbeings.Ihavedefendedthisassumptioninvariousplaces,includingKoRsgaaRd,SourcesofNormativity,Lecture4, andKoRsgaaRd,Self-Constitution,Chapter9. Itwould takeme too far afield todiscussthiscomplexissuehere.Iassumethattheprimaryaudiencefortheargumentofthispaperispeoplewhoarepreparedtograntthathumanbeingsorrationalbeingshavelegitimatemoralandlegalclaimsoneachother,andwhothereforearepreparedtograntthatinsomesensewearelawstoeachother,eveniftheyareunsurewhethertheotheranimalsalsohavesuchclaimsonus.


9

rational choices represent decisions aboutwhat should be done.Theotheranimalsdonotmakechoicesinthesamesensethatrationalbeingsdo,andsuchchoicesastheydomakedonothavethecharacteroflaws.

Mostoftheendswechoose,however,aresimplytheobjectsofourinclina-tions,andtheobjectsofourinclinationsarenot,consideredjustassuch,in-trinsicallyvaluable.AsKantputsit:

Theendsthatarationalbeingproposesathisdiscretionaseffectsofhisactions(materialends)areallonlyrelative;foronlytheirmererelationtoaspeciallyconstitutedfacultyofdesiregivesthemtheirworth[…](G4:428).

Theobjectsofyourowninclinationsareonly–orratheratmost–good foryou,thatis,goodrelativetothe«specialconstitution»ofyourfacultyofde-sire9.AsKantthinksofit,theyare,usually,thingsthatyoulikeandthatyouthinkwouldmakeyouhappy.Nowitdoesnotgenerallyfollowfromthefactthatsomethingisgoodforsomeoneinparticularthatitisgoodabsolutely,andthatanyonehasreasontopromoteit.AsIhavealreadymentioned,Kantsup-posesthatarationalbeingpursuesanendonlyifshethinksitisgoodabso-lutely,sohethinkswedonotpursuetheobjectsofourinclinationsmerelybecausewethinkthoseendsaregoodforus.Yetwedopursuetheobjectsofourinclinations,andweoftenexpectotherstohelpusinsmallways,oratleastnottointerferewithoutsomeimportantreasonfordoingso.Thatsuggeststhatwetakeittobeabsolutelygoodthatweshouldactaswechooseandgetthethingsthataregoodforus.Whydowedothat?

ThatisthequestionfromwhichtheargumentfortheFormulaofHumanitytakesoff,andKant’sansweristhatwedoitbecausewetakeourselvestobeendsinourselves.Hesays:

[…]rational nature exists as an end in itself.Thehumanbeingnecessarilyrepresentshisownexistencethisway;sofaritisthusasubjectiveprincipleofhumanactions(G4:429).

We«represent»ourselvesasendsinourselvesinsofaraswetakewhatisgoodforustobegoodabsolutely.Itisasifwheneveryoumakeachoice,yousaid,«Itakethethingsthatareimportanttometobeimportant,period,importantabsolutely,becauseItakemyselftobeimportant».Soinpursuingwhatyouthinkisgoodforyouasifitweregoodabsolutely,youshowthatyouregardyourselfasanendinitself,orperhapstoputitinabetterway,youclaimthatstanding.Kantthencontinues:

9 Isay«oratmost»becauseofcoursewemightdesirethingsthatarebadforus,thatareinconsistentwithourhappiness,andthatarenotrationaltochooseonthatground.


10

Buteveryotherrationalbeingalsorepresentshisexistenceinthiswayconse-quentonjustthesamerationalgroundthatalsoholdsforme;thusitisatthesametimeanobjectiveprinciple[…](G4:429).

Kanttellsusthatatthispointintheargumentthatisjusta«postulate»,whichhewillprovelaterinthebook,initsfinalsection.Inthefinalsectionofthebook,Kantsetsoutthegroundsthathethinksvalidateourconceptionofour-selves,consideredasrationalbeings,asmembersofwhathecallsaKingdomofEnds,acommunityinwhichallrationalbeingsasendsinthemselvesto-gethermake lawsfor themselvesandforoneanotherwhenever theymakechoices.

Sowheneveryoumakearationalchoice,then,youpresupposethatyou,andbyimplication,everyotherrationalbeing,haveakindofnormativestanding,thestandingofalegislatorintheKingdomofEnds,whosechoicesarelawstoallrationalbeings.ItisinthissensethatKantthinksyourrationalnature«marksyouout»asanendinitself.Ofcourse,inthemoralrealm,yourrighttoconferobjectivevalueonyourendsandactionsislimitedbyeveryoneelse’srighttoconferobjectivevalueonhisendsandactionsinthesameway.(Thisisanalogoustothewaythat,inthepoliticalrealm,yourfreedomislimitedbythelikefreedomofeveryoneelse.)Soonlyifyourprincipleormaximismor-allypermissibledoesitreallycountasalaw.InKant’sownlanguage,yourmaximmustconformtothecategoricalimperative:youmustbeabletowillitasauniversallaw.Kanttakesthattomeansthatultimatelyitisarationalbeing’scapacityformoralchoicethat«markshimout»asanendinhimself.AsKantsays:

Nowmoralityistheconditionunderwhichalonearationalbeingcanbeanendinitself,sinceonlythroughthisisitpossibletobealawmakingmemberinthekingdomofends.(G4:435).

Whilerecountingthesearguments,Ihaveswitchedbackandforthbetweentalkingaboutourstandingaslawmakers,andtalkingaboutourstandingasbeingswhoseendsandactionsshouldberegardedasgood,andsoasnorma-tiveforeveryone.Thatreflects thefact that thereare twoslightlydifferentsensesof«endinitself»atworkinKant’sargument,whichwemightthinkofasanactiveandapassivesense.ImustregardyouasanendinitselfintheactivesenseifIregardyouascapableoflegislatingforme,andsoasplacingmeunderanobligationtorespectyourchoicesortohelpyoutopursueyourends.ImustregardyouasanendinitselfinthepassivesenseifIamobli-gatedtotreatyourends,oratleastthethingsthataregood for you,asgoodabsolutely.Kantevidently thought that these twosensescome to thesame


11

thing.Forinhismostexplicitstatementaboutwhywehavedutiesonlytorationalbeings,Kantsays:

Asfarasreasonalonecanjudge,ahumanbeinghasdutiesonlytohumanbe-ings(himselfandothers),sincehisdutytoanysubjectismoralconstraintbythatsubject’swill.(MM6:442)10.

Butthatdoesnotobviouslyfollow.Theideathatrationalchoiceinvolvesapresuppositionthatweareendsinourselvesisnotthesameastheideathatrational choice involves a presupposition that rational beings are ends inthemselves,forwearenotmerelyrationalbeings.Thecontentofthepresup-positionisnotautomaticallygivenbythefactthatitisrationalbeingswhomakeit.Dowepresupposeourvalueonlyinsofaraswearebeingswhoarecapableofwillingourprinciplesaslaws?Ordopresupposeourvalueasbe-ingsfor whomthingscanbegoodorbad?Infact,Kant’sargumentactuallyshowsthatwepresupposeourvalueasbeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad–aswemightputitforshort,asbeingswhohaveinterests.Letmeexplainwhy.

SupposeIchoosetopursuesomeordinaryobjectofinclination,somethingthatIwant.AccordingtoKant’sargument,thischoicepresupposesanattitudeIhavetowardsmyself,avaluethatIsetonmyself,orastandingthatIclaim.Isitmyvalueasanautonomousbeingcapableofmakinglawsformyselfaswellasotherpeople?Orisitmyvalueasabeingforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad?

IfitisthevaluethatIsetonmyselfasanautonomousbeing,thenwhenImakeachoiceIshouldbemotivatedbyrespectformyownautonomy,mycapacity

10 ThepointofthecaveatinthefirstclauseistoleaveroomfordutiesowedtoGod,andgroundedinfaith.SinceKantthinkswecannotprovethereisaGodwhoisarationalbeingwithawill,orhavetheoreticalknowledgewhatGod’swillis,wecannotowedu-tiestoGod«asfarasreasonalonecanjudge».ThisisnotinconsistentwithKant’soc-casionalsuggestionthatweshouldviewGodasthesovereignoftheKingdomofEnds(G4:433,4:439).ThereisasenseinwhichKanthimselfthinksfaithitselfisgroundedin reason,but it isnot theusual sense:Kantdoesnot think that therearesuccess-fultheoreticalargumentsfortheexistenceofGodandthepossibilityofafuturelife.Rather,hethinksourmoralcommitmentsrequireustohopethatafullymoralstateoftheworldcanbeachieved,andthe«postulates»ofGodandImmortality,theobjectsof«practicalfaith»,giveusapictureoftheconditionsunderwhichamorallyperfectworldcouldbeachieved.Sadly,Kantdidnotenvisionthatmorallyperfectworldasin-cludingeternalhappinessfortheotheranimals.Rather,hetellsthatwithoutsuchfaith,allthateventhebestpersoncanexpectis«deprivation,disease,anduntimelydeath,justlikealltheotheranimalsoftheearth».(C35:452)ForfurtherreflectionsonthisaspectofKant’smoralphilosophy,seeKoRsgaaRd,JustLikeAlltheOtherAnimals.


12

tomakelaws.ThenaturalwaytounderstandtheideathatIrespectmyownautonomyistosupposethatIconformtoalawsimplybecauseImyselfhavemadeit.KantcertainlythinksthatwheneverImakeachoiceImakeakindoflawformyself,aswellasforotherpeople,andtheideaisnotwithoutcontent:itistheessentialdifferencebetweenchoosingsomethingandmerelywantingit.Wantingsomething,whichisjustapassivestate,doesnotincludeacom-mitmenttocontinuingtowantit,butwillingsomething,whichisanactivestate, does include a commitment to continuing towill it, everything elseequal.Forexample,ifIchoose(orwill,inKant’slanguage)togrowvegeta-blesinmygarden,knowingthatthiswillrequiremetoweeditonaregularbasis,thenIcommitmyselftoweedingmygardenatcertainintervalsinthefutureevenshouldithappenthatIdonotfeellikedoingso.ThisisnottosaythatIdecidethatIwillweedmygardennomatterwhat–thoughtheheavensfall,asitwere.ButitistosaythatwhenItakesomethingastheobjectofmywillorchoice,itfollowsthatanygoodreasonIhaveforabandoningthisob-jectmustcomefromotherlawsthatIhavemadeorothercommitmentsthatIhaveundertaken,andnotmerelyfromachangeinmydesires.Havingwilledtogrowvegetablesinmygarden,IcandecidenottoweeditifIneedtorushtothebedsideofanailingfriend,forinstance.ButIhavenotreallydecided,orwilled,togrowvegetablesinmygardenifIleaveitopenthatIwillnotweedmygardenifIjustdonothappentofeellikeit.ForifallthatIhavedecidedwhenIdecideIwillkeepmygardenweededisthatIwillweeditifIhappentofeel likeit, thenIhavenotactuallydecidedanythingatall11.SowhenIchoosetogrowvegetablesasmyend,Ibindmyfutureselftoaprojectofregularweedingbyalawthatisnotconditionalonmyfutureself’sdesires.Inthatsense,Ihavelegislatedacategoricalimperativeformyself.Butmyfutureselfinturnalsobindsme,foritisessentialthatifsheisgoingtodothenecessaryweeding,Inowbuysomepadstoprotectherknees,andthetoolsforhertoweedwith–andImustalsodothatwhetherIfeellikeitornot.Inthissimplesense,whenImakeachoice,Iimposeobligationsonmyself–Icreatereasonsformyself.WhenIactonthosereasons,youcansaythatIamrespectingmyownautonomy,byobeyingthelawthatImyselfhavemade.

Whensomeoneelserespectsmychoice,heisalsogovernedinthiswaybyrespectformyautonomy:hetakesmychoicetobelaw.Butmyownoriginaldecisiontochooseorwillsomedesiredendisnotmotivatedbyrespectformyownautonomyinthatsense.IcannotrespectmyownchoiceordowhatisnecessarytocarryitoutuntilafterIhavemadethatchoice.Sothesensein

11 SeeKoRsgaaRd,Self-Constitution,§4.5forafullerversionofthisargument.


13

whichI«representmyself»asanendinitselfwhenImaketheoriginalchoiceisnotcapturedbytheideathatIrespectmyownautonomy,inthesenseoftakingmychoice tobea law.WhenImake theoriginalchoice, Ihavenootherreasonfortakingmyendtobeabsolutelygood,thanthatitisgoodfor me.ThissuggeststhatthepertinentfactaboutmeissimplythatIamthesortofbeingforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad,abeingwithinterests.

Ofcourse,someonemightinsistthatIrespectmyownautonomyinadifferentsense:notinthesensethatItreatachoiceofmyownasalaw,butinthesensethatIpresupposethatwhatisgoodforautonomousrationalbeings,andonlyforautonomousrationalbeings,shouldbetreatedasgoodabsolutely.Butthatconclusionisnotdrivenbytheargument:thereisnoreasontothinkthatbe-cause it isonlyautonomous rationalbeingswhomustmake thenormativepresupposition, thenormativepresuppositionisonlyaboutautonomousra-tionalbeings.Notice,too,thatmanyofthethingsthatItaketobegoodformearenotgoodformemerely insofaras Iamanautonomousrationalbeing.Food,sex,comfort,freedomfrompainandfear,areallthingsthataregoodformeinsofarasIamananimatebeing.Soitismorenaturaltothinkthatthepresuppositionbehindrationalchoiceisthatthethingsthataregoodforbeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbadaretobetreatedasgoodorbadabso-lutely.Butofcoursethingscanbegoodorbad,intherelevantway,foranysensatebeing,thatis,foranybeingwhocanlikeanddislikethings,behappyorsuffer12.Thatsuggeststhatthepresuppositionbehindrationalchoiceisthat

12 Thereisasenseinwhichthingscanbegoodorbadforanyfunctionallyorganizedbeing–namely,thingscanhelporhinderitsfunctioning.«Ridingthebrakesisbadforyourcar»,wesayinthatsense.Thecar,however,ismadeforahumanpurpose,andthewayinwhichthingscanbegoodorbadforitisderivativefromthatpurpose:ultimately,whathappenstothecarisgoodorbadforpeople,notreallyforthecar.Thingscanalsobegoodorbadforplants,andthiskindofgoodnessandbadnessisnotderivativefromhumanpurposes(«Theweedsarereallyflourishinginmygarden;allthisrainisgoodforthem.»).Rather,itisgoodfortheplantconsideredasalivingor-ganism,functioningsoastosurviveandreproduce.Thewayinwhichthingsaregoodorbadforpeopleandanimalsincludesthis,butaddsanewdimension,forananimalhasapointofviewonwhichthethingsthataregoodorbadforithaveanimpact–theyarealsogoodorbadfromtheanimal’spointofview.Insayingthis,Iamnotendorsingthehedonisticconclusionthatonlyexperiencesthemselvescanbegoodorbad,insofarastheyarepleasantorpainful.Iamonlysuggestingthatthereisasenseof«goodfor»inwhichgood-forandbad-forarerelativetotheevaluativeattitudesofthebeingforwhomthingsaregoodorbad.By«evaluativeattitudes»Imeandesires,pains,plea-sures,fears,loves,hates,ambitions,projects,andprinciples,andsoon,someofwhichareexperiencedbyeverysensatebeing.Thisisthesenseof«goodfor»thatItaketoberelevanttotheargument.ForfurtherreflectionsseeKoRsgaaRd,OriginoftheGood.


14

animals,consideredasbeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad–asbeingswithinterests–areendsinthemselves.

Wemightputthepointthisway.Asrationalbeings,weneedtojustifyouractions,tothinktherearereasonsforthem.Thatrequiresustosupposethatsome ends areworth pursuing, are absolutely good.Withoutmetaphysicalinsightintoarealmofintrinsicvalues,allwehavetogoonisthatsomethingsarecertainlygoodorbadforus.Thatthenisthestartingpointfromwhichwebuildupoursystemofvalues–wetakethosethingstobegoodorbadabso-lutely–andindoingthatwearetakingourselvestobeendsinourselves.Butwearenot theonlybeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad; theotheranimalsarenodifferentfromusinthatrespect.Soweshouldregardallani-malsasendsinthemselves13.

III. Why We Have Moral Duties to Animals

But there is anotherway tounderstandKant’s argument against themoralclaimsofanimals.InapassageIquotedearlier,Kantsays:

Asfarasreasonalonecanjudge,ahumanbeinghasdutiesonlytohumanbe-ings(himselfandothers),sincehisdutytoanysubjectismoralconstraintbythatsubject’swill(MM6:442).

Onemightplacetheemphasishereontheideaofowingadutytosomeone,andtakeKanttobeclaimingthatitisimpossibleforustooweadutytoananimal.Itis,afterall,notoriousthatKantclaimedthatalthoughwedohavedutiestotreatanimalshumanely,wedonotowethosedutiestotheanimals,butrathertoourselves(MM6:442;LE27:459)14.Thisclaimgoesrighttotheheartoftheissueaboutlegalrightsforanimals,sincethedutyofrespectinga

13 Themainargumentof thissectionwasfirstadvanced inKoRsgaaRd,FellowCrea-tures.

14 InfactKant’sviewswereratheradvancedforhisday.Kantthoughtanimalsshouldnotbehurtorkilledunnecessarily,andcertainlynotforsport(LE27:460).If theymustbekilled,itshouldbequicklyandwithoutpain(MM6:443).Weshouldneverperformpainfulexperimentsonthemformerelyspeculativepurposes,orifthereisanyotherwaytoachievethepurposeoftheexperiment(MM6:443).Weshouldnotrequireharderworkofthemthanwewouldrequireofourselves(MM6:443).Whentheydoworkforusweshouldwetreatthemasmembersofthehousehold(MM6:443),andwhentheynolongercanworkforus,theyareentitledtoacomfortableretirementatourexpense(LE27:459).Non-humananimals,accordingtoKant,aretheproperobjectsoflove,gratitude,andcompassion,andfailingtotreatanimalsinaccordancewiththeseattitudesis«demeaningtoourselves»(MM6:443;LE27:710).


15

legalrightissomethingthatissupposedtobeowedtotherightholder.Ifwecannotowedutiestoanimals,thenitseemsthattheycannothaverights.

InthepassageIjustquoted,Kantclaimsthattoowesomethingtosomeoneistobeconstrainedbyhiswill.Toseewhatthismeans,consider,first,whathap-penswhenyoumakeapromise,andsoincuranobligation.AsKantunder-stoodpromises,whathappenswhenyoumakeapromiseisthatyoutransferthe right tomake a certaindecision,which is naturallyyourown right, tosomeoneelse,inratherthesamewayyoumighttransferapieceofpropertytosomeoneelse.IfIpromisetomeetyouforlunchatthecafeteriatomorrow,Itransfermyrighttodecidewhethertogotoyou,andInownolongerhavetherighttodecidethatIwillnotgounlessyouabsolvemefrommypromise.Somydecisionnowbelongstoyou–itisamatterforyourwilltodetermine,notformine.Soyouareinapositiontoconstrainmetogotothecafeteriabyyourwill.Youcanobligateme.

Thereisanotherwaytounderstandthissametransaction,whichisagainintermsofthemakingofalaw.Aswewillseelater,Kantenvisionstheoriginalacquisitionofapieceofpropertyasthemakingofakindoflawthatbindseveryone.Forexample,whenIclaimapieceoflandasmyown,Iineffectsay:noonemayusethislandwithoutmypermission,everyoneisboundbymywillabouthowthislandmaybeused.ButKantthinksthatIcannotmakelawsforeveryoneelseunilaterally,sinceotherpeoplearefreeandnotboundbymywill.SoifIamabletomakelawsofthiskind,toclaimthingsformyown,itcanonlybebyspeakinginthenameofwhatRousseaucalledtheGen-eralWill,thatis,inthenameofthelawswewilltogether15.SowhenImakeapromise,andsotransfermyrighttomakeadecisiontoyou,wecanunder-standthatasourmakingalawtogether:whenIpromisetomeetyouandyouacceptmypromise,wemakealawtogetherthatmydecisionwhethertomeetyoushouldbelongtoyouandnottome.Ifourpromisesaremutual–ifwepromisetomeeteachotherforlunchtomorrow–webothwillthelawthatbothofusshouldshowupatthecafeteriatomorrow,andnowneitherofuscanrescindtheplanunilaterally.IfIwanttodosomethingelse,Ihavetogetyourpermission,andifyouwanttodosomethingelse,youhavetogetmine.Hav-ingjoinedourwillsundercommonlaw,wecanonlychangethingsbymakinganewlawtogether.

Thisgivesusawaytounderstandthoserightsthatarenotincurredbypar-ticularactions,likethestandingrightnottobeusedasameremeanstosome-

15 Rousseau,SocialContract.ThetermisfirstusedinchapterVII,26.


16

oneelse’sends.Aswehaveseen,Kantsupposesthatallofuswillthatra-tionalbeingsshouldbetreatedasendsin themselves,since(hethinks) thepresupposition that rational beings should be treated as ends is built intoeveryactofrationalchoice.Sothisisalawthat,insofaraswearerationalbeings,wewilltogether.Thefactthatwewillittogetheriswhatmakesitpos-sibleforustomakeclaimsoneachotherinitsname:wecanbindonean-otherthroughourwills.Buttheotheranimalsneitherparticipateinmakingmoral laws,norare theyunder theauthorityof those laws.They thereforecannot obligate us in the name ofmoral laws, and so cannotmakemoralclaimsonus.

Sounderstood,Kant’sargumentisaversionofwhatIcalla«reciprocityargu-ment».Areciprocityargumentholdsthathumanbeingshaveeithernodutiesatall,ornodutiesofjustice(i.e.,dutiesassociatedwithrights),totheotheranimals, because such duties depend on relations of reciprocity.There arevariousversionsoftheargument.Oneisacrudepictureofmoralityasakindofsocialcontractorbargain,whosecontentissomethinglike:«Iwillactwithacertainkindofrestrainttowardsyou,ifyouwillactwithasimilarrestrainttowardsme.»Thisversionpromptstheobviousquestionhowwearetoex-plainourdutytokeepthesocialcontractitself.Thatdutycannotbegroundedinthecontract.

AnotherversionisassociatedwithDavidHume’sargumentthattherequire-mentsofjusticeonlyholdincertainconditions,conditionswhichJohnRawlslater called«the circumstancesof justice»16.Humemakes the argument inordertoprovethattherequirementsofjusticearegroundedinconsiderationsofutility.Weexpectpeople toconformto therequirementsof justiceonlyundercertainconditions,heargues,andthoseconditionsareexactlytheonesinwhichconformingtotherequirementsofjusticeisusefultoallconcerned.Thereforeitmustbetheutilitythatgroundstherequirements.Oneoftheseconditionsisanapproximateequalityofpowerbetweenthepartiestotheso-cialcontract,whichrendersitintheinterestofallpartiestomakeandmaintainthecontract.Onthesegrounds,Humearguesthatwedonothavedutiesofjusticetotheotheranimals.Hesays:

Werethereaspeciesofcreaturesintermingledwithmen,which,thoughra-tional,werepossessedofsuchinferiorstrength,bothofbodyandmind,thattheywereincapableofallresistance,andcouldnever,uponthehighestprovo-cation,makeusfeeltheeffectsoftheirresentment;thenecessaryconsequence,Ithink,isthatweshouldbeboundbythelawsofhumanitytogivegentleus-

16 Rawls,TheoryofJustice,§22.


17

agetothesecreatures,butshouldnot,properlyspeaking,lieunderanyrestraintofjusticewithregardtothem…Ourintercoursewiththemcouldnotbecalledsociety,whichsupposesadegreeofequality;butabsolutecommandontheoneside,andservileobedienceon theother.Whateverwecovet, theymust in-stantly resign:Ourpermission is theonly tenure,bywhich theyhold theirpossessions:Ourcompassionandkindnesstheonlycheck,bywhichtheycurbourlawlesswill:Andasnoinconvenienceeverresultsfromtheexerciseofapower,sofirmlyestablishedinnature,therestraintsofjusticeandproperty,beingtotallyuseless,wouldneverhaveplaceinsounequalaconfederacy.

Thisisplainlythesituationofmen,withregardtoanimals;andhowfarthesemaybesaidtopossessreason,Ileaveittootherstodetermine17.

Hume’sversionoftheargumentseemssubjecttotheobjectionthatifsomegroupofpeopleacquiredsufficientpowerovertherestofus,theywouldceasetooweusjustice.Suppose,forexample,thatasmallcoterieofpeopleobtainsjointcontrolovertheonlyweaponcapableofblowingupcertainmajorcities,andusesthethreatofdoingsotoblackmailtherestofusintosubmissiontotheirwill.Sinceitisnotintheirinteresttocooperatewithus,byHume’sargu-ment,theyarenotobligatedtoactjustlytowardstherestofus.Humeseemseventoinvitethatobjection,forheemphasizesthatinordertohavethekindofsuperiorpowerthatfreespeoplefromtheobligationtoconcederightstoothers, it isnotenoughthat themembersofonegrouptobestrongerindi-viduallythanthemembersoftheother:theymustalsobesufficientlyorgan-ized among themselves tomaintain their force against themembersof theweakergroup.Hesays:

Inmanynations,thefemalesexarereducedto[…]slavery,andarerenderedincapableofallproperty,inoppositiontotheirlordlymasters.Butthoughthemales,whenunited,haveinallcountriesbodilyforcesufficienttomaintainthisseveretyranny,yetsucharetheinsinuation,address,andcharmsoftheirfaircompanions,thatwomenarecommonlyabletobreaktheconfederacy,andsharewiththeothersexinalltherightsandprivilegesofsociety18.

Iwillcomebacktothispointlater,becauseitbringsoutsomethingimportantabout our relationship to the other animals.Meanwhile, notice thatKant’sargumentmaybeseenasaversionofthereciprocityargument,forhethinksitisonlythosewhostandinacertainkindofreciprocalrelationwitheachotherwhocanbindeachotherbylaw19.

17 Hume,SecondEnquiry,190–91.18 Hume,SecondEnquiry,191.19 ForamoredetailedaccountofKant’sargumentasareciprocityargument,seeKoRs-

gaaRd,InteractingwithAnimals.Notice,however,thatKant’sversionoftheargumentdoesnotfallpreytotheobjectionIhavejustmadetoHume.InKant’sargument,it


18

Ifthereciprocityargumentworks,itcapturessomethingrightaboutKant’sthought that thehumane treatmentofanimals issomething thatweowetoourselves.Atleast,insofarasthepartyto whomweoweadutyistheonewhoissuesthelawthatgivesustheduty,itisabovealltoourselvesthatweoweittotreattheotheranimalshumanely20.Butthetroublewiththisthought,atleastasfarasmoralobligationisconcerned,isthatKantthinksthattheultimatefoundationofmoralobligation in general isautonomy,therationalbeing’scapacity for issuing laws tohimself.EvenonKant’sownaccount,we areboundbythemorallawbecauseweourselveswillthatrationalbeingsshouldbetreatedincertainways.Morallyspeaking,youhavethecapacitytoobligatemethroughyourwillonlybecauseitisthelawofmyownwillthatIshouldrespectyourchoices.Supposemyearlierargument iscorrect,andweour-selvesarecommittedtotheprinciplethatallbeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad,allbeingswithinterests,shouldbetreatedasendsinthemselves.Thenevenifanimalscannotobligateusthroughtheirwills,theycanobligateusthroughtheirnatures,asbeingsofthatkind.Foraccordingtothatargument,everyactofourownwillcommitsustheviewthatsuchbeingsareendsinthemselves,andassucharelawstous.

IV. Why Animals Should Have Legal Rights

TheargumentIhavejustgiven,however,appliesonlytothemoralclaimsofanimals.In thecaseof legalorpoliticalrights, there isagainanadditionalproblem,closelytiedtotheproblemsImentionedatthebeginningofthepa-per.AccordingtoKant,thesenseinwhichotherscanobligateuslegallyisdifferentfromthesenseinwhichtheycanobligateusmorally(MM6:218-221).Thesenseinwhichotherscanobligateuslegallydoesnot«gothrough»ourownautonomyinthewayIdescribedabove.Rather,thesenseinwhichpeoplecanobligateuslegallyisthattheymaylegitimatelyusecoercionto

iseveryone’sfreedom,noteveryone’sinterest,whichisatstake,andyoucannotle-gitimatelyclaimarightwithoutupholdingeveryoneelse’sfreedom.Sothecoterieofpowerfulpeoplewouldstillowetherestofusjustice.

20 Kantalsosometimessuggeststhatthereasonweowehumanetreatmenttotheotheranimalsisthatourtreatmentofotherhumanbeingsislikelytobeinfluencedbyourtreatmentoftheanimals(MM6:443;LE27:459).Althoughitisnownotoriousthatthereisaconnectionbetweenseriouscriminalbehaviorandanimalabuse,thesugges-tionisapeculiaroneforKanttomake.Afterall,ifreasonreallydidtellustheanimalsufferingdoesnotmatter in theway thathumansufferingdoes,whywouldwebetemptedtotreathumansinthesamewaywetreatanimals?


19

enforce their rights.Coercion,asImentionedat thebeginning,maylegiti-matelybeusedonlyforthesakeofprotectingfreedom,akindoffreedomthattheotheranimals,notbeingrational,apparentlydonothave.Ifthepointofanimalrightsissimplytoprotecttheirinterests,nottoprotecttheirfreedom,thenthereseemstobenoroomforanimalrightsinaKantianaccount.

ButacloserexaminationofKant’sownargumentagainrevealsgroundsforquestioningthisconclusion.EarlierwesawhowKantgroundsourclaimtobeendsinourselvesbyshowingthatitisapresuppositionofrationalchoice–aclaimthatisinasensebuiltintoeveryactofrationalchoice.WhenIpursuethethingsthataregoodformeasiftheyweregoodabsolutely,Icommitmy-selftotheprinciplethatbeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbadareendsinthemselves.Inmuchthesameway,Kanttriestoshowthatacommitmenttoenforceablerightsforeveryone,andthereforetoapoliticalstatewithalegalsystem,isbuiltintoeveryclaimofrightthatImakeformyself.

Hereishowtheargumentgoes.Alegalorpoliticalright,asKantunderstandsit, isanauthorizationtousecoercion.Tosaythatyouhavealegalrighttosomepieceofpropertyistosaythatifsomeoneattemptstouseitwithoutyourpermission,youmaylegitimatelyuseforcetopreventhimfromdoingso.Butcoercionisonlylegitimatewhenitisusedintheserviceoffreedom.Whythenmayweuseittodefendourproperty?Likeothersinthesocialcontracttradi-tion,Kantenvisionsastateofnatureinwhichpeoplelayclaimtopartsofthecommonsfortheirownprivateuse21.Ifitwerenotpossibletoclaimobjectsasourown,Kantargues,wecouldnoteffectivelyusethemwhentheywerenotinourphysicalpossession.Orevenifwecould,ouruseofthemwouldbesubjecttothewillofothersinawaythatisinconsistentwithourfreedom.Icannoteffectivelygrowwheatonmylandifyoumightmoveinatanytimeandgrowbeansthere,andIcannotdosofreelyiftheonlywayIcandoitisineffecttogetyourpermission.InordertomakefreeuseofthelandImustbeabletoclaimarighttoit.Apieceofpropertyisakindofextensionofone’sfreedom.Todenythepossibilityofclaimingobjectsinthiswaywouldamounttoplacinganarbitraryrestrictiononfreedom(MM6:246).Thereforewemustconcedethatsuchclaims–claimsofenforceableright–arepossible.Kantcallsthis«thepostulateofpracticalreasonwithregardtorights»(MM6:246).

SoIcanmake ita lawforyou thatyoucannotuseacertainpieceof landwithoutmypermission.ButIcannotdothisunilaterally,sinceIamnotyourmaster.Rather,aswesawbefore,myclaimsofrightmustbemadeinthename

21 Iwillcomebacktotheroleoftheideaofthecommonsintheseargumentsbelow.


20

oflawsthathaveauthorityforusboth,lawsthatwemaketogether.InRous-seau’slanguage,myclaimmustbeinmadeinthenameoftheGeneralWillinorder for it tohave the forceof law.Rights,Kantargues,areonly«provi-sional»inthestateofnature,sincetheycannotbefullyrealizeduntilevery-one’srightsareprotectedbyactual,coercivelyenforcedlaws,byastatewithalegalsystem(MM6:255–257).Thisiswhyitisadutyforustoleavethestateofnatureandliveinpoliticalsociety.Kantcallsthatthe«PostulateofPublicRight»(MM6:307). Iamgoing tocallKant’s twopostulates takentogether«thePresuppositionofEnforceableRights».

Sincewemustsurvive,wehavetoclaimpiecesofpropertyforourownuse,justassincewemustact,wehavetomakerationalchoicestopursuecertainends.IftherationalpursuitofmyendsinvolvesthepresuppositionthatIhavetherighttousecertainobjectsinpursuitofmyends,andthatinturninvolvesthepresuppositionthateveryone’srightsshouldbeupheldandenforced,thenthePresuppositionofEnforceableRightsisbuiltintotherationalpursuitofmyends.Thisexactlyparallels thewaythat thepresuppositionthatbeingswithinterestsshouldbetreatedasendsinthemselvesisbuiltintotherationalpursuitofmyends.

Butwhoexactlyisthe«everyone»whoserightsshouldbeenforced?Itisonlyrationalbeingswhomustlayclaimtorights,andonlyrationalbeingswhoholdoneanothertothepresuppositionsofthoseclaims,justasitisonlyrationalbeingswhochoosetopursuetheirends,andarerationallyboundbythepre-suppositionsoftheirchoices.Beforewesawthatitdoesnotobviouslyfollowthatthepresuppositionbehindrationalchoiceisthatrational beingsareendsinthemselves,andinfactwhenwelookedmorecloselyatthecontextinwhichthepresuppositionoperatesatthemostbasiclevel–namely,inmydecisiontopursuesomethingsimplybecauseIthinkitwillbegoodforme–itdoesnotseemtofollowatall.RatherwhatfollowsisthatIamcommittedtotheideathatifIamthesortofbeingforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad,abeingwithinterests,thenIshouldbetreatedasanendinitself.Inthiscasetooweneedtolookmorecloselyatthecontextinwhichthepresuppositionofenforceablerightsfirstoperates,whichisthecontextoforiginalacquisition.

Butherewerunintoaproblem.Althoughtheproblemisageneralproblemaboutownershiprights,itwillbeusefultoposeitfirstasaproblemaboutourrights(thatis,therightsofhumanbeings)toownanimals.Thiswillenableustoaskaquestionwhichweshouldbeaskinganyway,whichisthis:evenifitwerenot thecase that theotheranimalscouldhave rightsagainstus,howexactly is it suppose to follow thatwehave rights over them?Putting the


21

problemmoregenerally,whyisitsupposedtofollowfromthefactthatweneedtoclaimobjectsasourowninordertousethemeffectivelyandfreely,thatwecanclaimanythingwefindintheworld,evenananimatebeingwithalifeofitsown,thatisnotalreadyclaimed?

In the traditionaldoctrinesof rightsdeveloped in the17thand18thcentury,especiallyinthetheoriesofLockeandKant,itisperfectlyclearwhythisissupposedtofollow.Itfollowsfromtwotheses.ThefirstisavieworiginallyderivedfromGenesisthatfounditswayintothesetheories.ThatistheviewthatGodgavetheworldandeverythinginittohumanitytoholdincommon22.Thesecondisapictureofwhatarightingeneralis,apictureassociatedwiththereciprocityargument.ToclaimthatIhavearightistomakearelationalclaim;andtherelationisnotbetweenmeandtheobjecttowhichIhavearight–itisbetweenmeandotherpeople.Whenweputthesetwoclaimstogether,wegetacertainpictureofwhatthegeneralproblemofindividualrightsis,apicturewhichisexplicitinandfamiliartousfromtheworkofLocke,butalsoimplicitly atwork in theKantianviewswehave just been reviewing.Theproblemofindividualrightsisconceivedasaproblemaboutwhatgivessome-onearighttotakesomethingoutofthecommons;or,toputitmorecarefully,abouthowIcantakesomethingoutofthecommonsinawaythatisjustifiabletoeveryoneelse.BothKant’sinsistencethatrightsmustbeestablishedinac-cordancewiththeGeneralWillandLocke’sfamousproviso–thattheonewhoclaimsarightmustleaveenoughandasgoodforothers–arebasedinpartonthispicture23.IndeedKantinsistsontheessentialroleofthisassumptioninhistheory.The«realdefinition»ofarighttoathing,Kantsays:

[…]isarighttotheprivateuseofathingofwhichIamin(originalorinsti-tuted)possessionincommonwithallothers.Forthispossessionincommonistheonlyconditionunderwhichitispossibleformetoexcludeeveryotherpossessorfromtheprivateuseofathing[…],since,unlesssuchapossessionincommonisassumed,itisinconceivablehowI,whoamnotinpossessionofthething,couldstillbewrongedbyotherswhoareinpossessionofitandareusingit(MM6:261).

Kant’sassumptionisslightlydifferentfromLocke’s,becausehedistinguishespossessionfromownershipproperlyspeaking,anditiscommonpossessionthatheposits.Whensomethingisinmyphysicalpossession,anyone(thatis,anyonewhoisnotitsrightfulowner)whotriestouseitwithoutmypermissionwrongsme,becausehehastouseforcetogetitawayfromme.Thismuch

22 Actually,inGenesis1:29–30,Godgivestheplantstoanimals,andtheninGenesis9:3,Godgiveseverythinglivingandmovingtohumanbeings.

23 locKe,SecondTreatiseofGovernment,ChapterV,paragraph33,21.


22

followssimplyfrommyinnaterighttofreedom,whichKantunderstandstoincludecontrolovermyownbody.WhenIownsomething,someonewhousesitwithoutmypermissionwrongsmeevenwhenIamnotinphysicalposses-sionofit.Theassumptionofcommonpossessionseemslessextravagant,forinawayitissimplytheclaimthatnoonehasapriorrightthatwouldmakeitlegitimateforthemtoexcludeusfromusingtheearthanditsresources,andthereforetoexcludeusfromdividingitupintoproperty.Eitherway,however,theroleoftheassumptionistoansweranobviousquestion:Howcouldouragreementtodividetheworldupinacertainwayhaveanyauthority,ifwehadnorighttoitinthefirstplace?

Despiteitsreligiousformulation,theclaimthatGodgaveustheworldincom-moncapturesanideathatgoesrighttotheheartofthemoraloutlook,andcanbeformulatedinsecularterms.Itistheideathatothershavejustasgoodaclaimontheresourcesoftheworldaswedo,andthatitbehoovesustolimitourownclaimswiththatinmind.Buttheideaoftheworldasownedorpos-sessedincommonby humanityalsorepresentstheworld,andeverythinginit,includingtheanimals,asonebigpieceofproperty.ThatKantwaspreparedtorepresenttheworldthiswayisimportant,becauseitshowsthatKanthadnoprincipledreasonforregardinganimalsaspossibleproperty.Hesimplyas-sumedthatthatiswhattheyare.

Atthebeginningofthispaper,IsaidthatitisinconsistentwithKant’smeth-odology simply to accept metaphysical claims about value. Claims aboutvalue,likeanyclaimsthatgobeyondtherealmofempiricalexperience,mustbeestablishedinacertainway.Theymustbeshowntobenecessarypresup-positionsofrationalactivity.Theclaimthatworldisgiven to usincommoniscertainly such a claim, not scientifically provable. Is it just a religious ormetaphysicalclaimthatreallyshouldhavenoplaceinKant’sphilosophy?Orcouldweregarditinsteadasapresuppositionofrationalactivity?Infact,initsmodifiedformasthepresuppositionofcommonpossession,Kantexplic-itlyclaimsthatwecan.Hesays:

Allhumanbeingsareoriginally(i.e.priortoanyactofchoicethatestablishesaright)inapossessionoflandthatisinconformitywithright,thatis,theyhavearighttobewherevernatureorchance(apartfromtheirwill)hasplacedthem.Thiskindofpossession […] is apossession in common because thesphericalsurfaceoftheearthunitesallplacesonitssurface[…].Theposses-sionbyallhumanbeingsontheearthwhichprecedesanyactoftheirsthatwouldestablishrights[…]isanoriginal possession in common […],thecon-ceptofwhichisnotempirical[…].Originalpossessionis,rather,apracticalrational concept which contains a priori the principle in accordance withwhichalonepeoplecanuseaplaceontheearthinaccordancewithprinciplesofright(MM6:262).


23

Beforethereareanyotherrights,beforewestartdividinguptheworldforourpurposes,eachofushasarighttobewhereheorsheis,wherever«natureorchance»hasplacedus24.Therighttobewhereyouareisanaspectofyourright tocontroloveryourownbody, since itmeans that in theabsenceofpriorclaims,noonehasarighttoforceyoutomoveon.Sincearighttotheearth,forKant,goeswitharighttouseitsresourcesforyoursupport,thatmeansthateachofushasarighttotakewhatheorsheneedsinordertolive.

Inotherwords,wearethrownintotheworld,andhavingnochoicebuttousethelandanditsresourcesinordertosupportandmaintainourselves,wehavenochoicebuttoassumeatleastthatwearedoingnothingwrongindoingthat.Butwearenottheonlycreaturesthusthrownintotheworld,withnochoicebuttousetheearthanditsresourcesinordertolive.Ifthisisthebasisofthepresumptionofcommonpossessionorownership,whynotassumethattheearthanditsresourcesarepossessedincommonbyalloftheanimals25?

Again,itistruethatrationalbeingsaretheonlyanimalswhomustconceiveoftheirsituationinthesenormativeandmoralterms,andthereforetheonlybeingswhomust presuppose thatwehave a right to use the earth for ourmaintenance.Butitdoesnotfollowthatwhatwehavetopresupposeisthatrationalbeings,andrationalbeingsalone,havethatright.Intheabsenceofapriorreligiouscommitment,itisarbitrarytomakeanyassumptionexcepttheassumptionthattheworldbelongsincommontoallofthecreatureswhode-pendonitsresources.Onlysomesortofmetaphysicalinsightintoaspecialrelationshipthathumanbeingsstandintotheuniversecouldjustifytheas-sumptionthatitbelongsonlytous,andthatisexactlythesortofmetaphysicalinsightthatKantdeniesthatwehave.Totheextentthatthekindof«freedom»thatisatstakeinrightsissimplythefreedomtouseyourownbodytocarveoutsomesortofadecentlifeintheworldwhereyoufindyourself,thenthe«freedom»oftheotheranimalsisthesortofthingthatcouldbeprotectedbyrightsafterall26.

24 ReadersofdicKensBleakHousemayrememberthepoorboyJo,whodoesnothavearighttobewhereheis–heisalwaysbeingtoldbytheconstableto«moveon»–andconsequentlyhasnorightsatall.

25 AsImentionedinnote20,intheGenesisaccounttheplantsoftheworldaregiventotheanimalsbeforetheanimalsaregiventohumanbeings.

26 OfcourseIamnotsuggestingthatthecorrectwaytoprotectthelivesofanimalsisarrangeforthemtothemownproperty.Noristhereanyhopeofdividinguptheworldinawaythatleaves«enoughandasgood»foreveryanimatecreatureswhensomeofthemmustlivebypreyingonothers.Butinthecaseofwildlife,wemightthinksomedutiesofhabitatpreservationdofollow,anddomesticanimalscertainlyhavearightnottobestarved.Themostsuggestivethoughthereisthatifanimalsdohavethiskind


24

Ofcourse,despitewhatKantplausiblysaysaboutitsnecessity,wecoulddropthepresuppositionofcommonpossessionorcommonownershipaltogether.Butifwedropthepresuppositionaltogether,wemustalsodroptheversionofitthatcomesdowntousfromGenesis.Inthatcase,theworldwasnotgiventohumanbeingsincommon,becauseitwasnotgiventoanyone.Thatmeansthatwhathumanbeingshaveovertheotheranimalsisnot,ingeneral,aformofrightfulownership.It is simply power.

NowrecallthatthestartingpointforKant’stheoryofwhywemustconceiveourselvestohaverightsisthewrongnessoftheunilateraldominationofsomeindividualsbyothers.Itisthewrongness,toputitmorecolloquially,oftheviewthatmightmakesright.Thereasonwhythepoliticalstateanditslegalapparatusexistsatall,accordingtoKant,isnotthatfightingovereverythingall thetimeisinconvenient,orthat lifeinthestateofnatureis,asHobbesfamouslyremindedus,nasty,brutish,andshort.Itistheurgencyofstandinginrelationswithothersthatwecanregardasrightfulthatpromptsustoestab-lishasystemofenforceablelegalrights.

Buthumanbeings,collectivelyspeaking,dostandinrelationsofunilateraldominationovertheotheranimals.Iamnottalkingnowaboutarelationinwhichweasaspeciesstandtothemasspecies.Iamtalkingaboutarelationinwhichhumanbeingsstandasanorganizedbodytoindividualanimalswhoarenotpartofanysuchbody.Toustheotheranimalsareasubjectpopulation,renderedalmostcompletelyatourmercybyourintelligence,power,andor-ganizationalskills27.

Infact,whenHumedescribestherelationsinwhichpeoplestandtoanimals,heisdescribingexactlythesortofunilateraldominationofsomebeingsbyothersthewrongnessofwhichisthestartingpointofKant’spoliticalphiloso-phy.Andwhenhe talksabout therelations inwhichmenstand towomen,Hume,withhischaracteristicpoliticalrealism,bringsouttheimportantthingthatmakessuchunilateraldominationpossible.Itisthatthedominantgroupbeabletoorganizeitselfasagroup,whilemembersofthedominatedgroupcanonlyresistasindividuals,ifindeedtheycanresistatall.Thisisanessen-tialfeatureoftherelationshipinwhichhumanbeingsstandtotheotherani-

offreedom,wedonothavearighttotheirbodies:thosearenotourstodowithasweplease.Butthedetailsofwhatisrequiredbytheargumentsofthispaper,ofwhichrightsanimalsshouldhave,remaintobeworkedout.

27 Here it is important to remember that Iamtalkingabouthowhumanbeingsstandcollectivelytoanimalsindividually.Asspecies,manyofthemarealsosubjecttoourdomination–itisuptouswhethermanyspecieswillsurvive.Butthatcertainlyisnottrueofallofthem.Collectivelyspeaking,themosquitoesmaydefeatusyet.


25

mals.Andthewaythatweuniteandorganizeourselvesisbyconstructingourlegalsystems.

EarlierIpointedoutthattheproblemKanthasinmindwhenheconstructshisaccountofrightsdoesnotconcerntheprobabilityofbadbehavior.Hethinksitiswronginitselfforonepersontobecompletelysubjecttoanotherperson’swill.Unilateraldominationisamoralwrongwhetheritisabusedornot.ButIdidnotsaythatunilateraldominationisnotthesourceofbadbehavior–andnotoriously,it is.Youneedonlylookatwhatgoesoninsideofourfactoryfarmsandexperimentallaboratoriestoseewhatthepossibilityofsuchdomi-nation–theabilitytodowhateverwelikewithanotheranimal–canleadto.Solongasthereareprofitstobemade,andthetantalizingprospectofexpand-ing thehuman lifespanbyexperimentson theotheranimals, therewillbepeoplewhowilldoanything,nomatterhowcruelitis,toacaptiveanimal.Andwhatmakesthispossibleisthelegalstatusofanimalsasproperty.Itisnotplausibletohopethatthehumanracewillsomedayhaveacollectivehu-manitarianconversionandbringallsuchpracticestoanend,withoutanyhelpfromthelaw.Butevenifitwere,theargumentwouldstand.Nomatterhowwell-intentionedweare,wecanonlyberightlyrelatedtoourfellowcreaturesifweofferthemsomelegalprotections.

Ifwemustpresupposethattheworldandallthatisinispossessedbyuscom-mon,so thatwemayuse it rightfully, thenweshouldpresuppose that it ispossessedbyallofitscreaturesonthesameground.Theotheranimalsarenotpartofwhatweown,touseasweplease,butratherareamongthosetowhomtheworldanditsresourcesbelong.Ifwerejectthepresuppositionofcommonpossessionorownership, thenwecannotpretendthat thewaywetreat theotheranimalsisanythingbutanexerciseofarbitrarypower,thepoweroftheorganizedovertheweak.Inthatcase,Isupposeitisuptoushowwetreatthem–butthemoralargumentstillholds.Theotheranimalsare,justasmuchasweare,beingswithinterests,beingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad,andassuchtheyareendsinthemselves.Eitherway,theonlywaywecanberightlyrelatedtothemistograntthemsomerights.

V. Conclusion

Despite his own views about animals and their claims,Kant’s philosophycapturessomethingaboutourownexistentialsituationthatproclaimsourfel-lowshipwiththeotheranimals.ItisthecentralinsightofKant’sphilosophythatthelawsofreasonareourlaws,humanlaws,andthatwecannotknow


26

whethertheworldasitisinitselfconformstothemornot.Thefactthatwearerationaldoesnotrepresentaprivilegedrelationshipinwhichwestandtotheuniverse.Kantalsobelievedthatmoralityisakindofsubstituteformeta-physics, givingusgrounds tohope forwhatwecannotknow throughanymetaphysicalinsight–thattheworldcan,throughourefforts,bemadeintoaplacethatmeetsourstandards,thatisrationalandgood28.Thatmeansweshareafatewiththeotheranimals,forlikethem,wearethrownintoaworldthatgivesnoguaranteesandarefacedwiththetaskoftryingtomakeahomehere.Itisapresuppositionofourownrationalagencyandofourmoralandlegalsystemsthatthefateofeverysuchcreature,everycreatureforwhomlifeinthisworld canbegoodor bad, is something thatmatters.That iswhyweshouldconcedethemoralclaimsoftheotheranimals,andprotectthoseclaimsasamatteroflegalright29.

Bibliography

dicKens cHaRles,BleakHouse,NewYork1977(cit.dicKens,BleakHouse).Hobbes tHomas,Leviathan,in:cuRley edwin(Ed.),Indianapolis1994(cit.Hobbes,Le-

viathan).Hume david,EnquiryConcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,in:selby-bigge l. a./nidditcH

P. H.(Ed.),EnquiriesConcerningHumanUnderstandingandConcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,3rdedition,Oxford1975(cit.Hume,SecondEnquiry).

Kant immanuel,CritiqueofJudgment,Trans.PluHaR weRneR s., Indianapolis1987.Kant immanuel,CritiqueofPracticalReason,Trans.gRegoR maRy, in: gRegoR maRy

(Ed.),CambridgeTextsintheHistoryofPhilosophyseries,Cambridge1997.Kant immanuel,Groundwork of theMetaphysics ofMorals,Trans.gRegoR maRy, in:

gRegoR maRy (Ed.), CambridgeTextsintheHistoryofPhilosophyseries,Cambridge1998.

Kant immanuel,KantsGesammelteSchriften,in:RoyalPrussian,Berlin1900.Kant immanuel,LecturesonEthics,Trans.HeatH PeteR,in:HeatH PeteR/scHneewind J. b.

(Ed.),NewYork1997.Kant immanuel,TheMetaphysicsofMorals,Trans.gRegoR maRy, in: gRegoR maRy(Ed.),

CambridgeTextsintheHistoryofPhilosophyseries,Cambridge1996.

28 Seenote10.29 Anearlierversionofmanyoftheargumentsinthispaperwasdiscussedinaworkshop

onmyworkonethicsandanimalsatNewYorkUniversityinSeptember2011andbyanethicsreadinggroupatStanfordinOctober2011.IwouldliketothankCharlotteBrown,TomDoherty,LoriGruen,BeatriceLonguenesse,PeterSingerandJeremyWaldronforcomments.


27

Kant immanuel,ConjecturesontheBeginningsofHumanHistory,Trans.nisbet H. b.,in:Reiss Hans (Ed.),Kant’sPoliticalWritings,2ndedition,Cambridge1991.

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m.,FellowCreatures,KantianEthicsandOurDutiestoAnimals,in:PeteRson gRetHe b.(Ed.),TheTannerLecturesonHumanValues,Volume25(2005),SaltLakeCity2005(cit.KoRsgaaRd,FellowCreatures).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m., InteractingwithAnimals,AKantianAccount, in:beaucHamP tom/FRey R. g. (Ed.),TheOxfordHandbookofAnimalEthics,Oxford2011(cit.KoRs-gaaRd,InteractingwithAnimals).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m.,JustLikeAlltheOtherAnimalsoftheEarth,in:HarvardDivin-ityBulletinSummer2008(cit.KoRsgaaRd,JustLikeAlltheOtherAnimals).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m., Kant’sFormulaofHumanity,in:KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m. (Ed.),CreatingtheKingdomofEnds,NewYork1996(cit.KoRsgaaRd,FormulaofHumanity).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m.,TheOriginofTheGoodandOurAnimalNature,in:ReicHaRdt bastian (Ed.),ProblemsofGoodness,NewEssaysonMetaethics, forthcoming(cit.KoRsgaaRd,OriginoftheGood).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m.,Self-Constitution,Agency,Identity,andIntegrity,Oxford2009(cit.KoRsgaaRd,Self-Constitution).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m., TheSourcesofNormativity,Cambridge1996(cit.KoRsgaaRd,SourcesofNormativity).

locKe JoHn,SecondTreatiseofGovernment, in:macPHeRson c. b. (Ed.), Indianapolis1980(cit.locKe,SecondTreatise).

Rawls JoHn,ATheoryofJustice,2ndedition,Cambridge,MA1999(cit.Rawls,TheoryofJustice).

Rousseau Jean-Jacques,OntheSocialContract,in:cRess donald a.(Ed.),Indianapolis1987(cit.Rousseau,SocialContract).

Animal Law – Tier und Rechtkorsgaar/CMK.Animal.Rights.pdf · Animal Law – Tier und Recht Developments and Perspectives in the 21st Century ... human beings have the kind of direct

Documents