Angola - ReliefWeb · 2 The first war – the war for independence (1957–75) 3 The second war – the ‘War of the Bush’ (1975–91) 4 The third war – the ‘War of the Cities’

A report by World Vision UK, produced on behalf of the World Vision partnership.

Angolaa tangled web:many players in acomplex war

July 2000

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Abbreviations

Executive summary

Introduction Anne Mesopir

1 Angola in perspective Ben Campbell & Siobhan O’Reilly-Calthrop

1 Colonial Angola

2 The first war – the war for independence (1957–75)

3 The second war – the ‘War of the Bush’ (1975–91)

4 The third war – the ‘War of the Cities’ (1992–94)

5 ‘Peace’ under the Lusaka Protocol

6 The fourth war – 1998 to present

7 Conclusion

2 …meanwhile the children suffer Randini Wanduragala

1 Introduction

2 Focusing on children

2.1 Landmines

2.2 Violence and forced recruitment

2.3 Psycho-social stress

2.4 Health

2.5 Food

2.6 Education

3 Angola’s children and human rights

4 Conclusions

3 The economics of conflict Kelly Currah

1 Growth with inequity

2 The stake of the international community

3 Corporate social responsibility?

3.1 Disclosure

3.2 Crude credit (or creditors with interest)

3.3 Illegal trading

3.4 Social investment

4 Economic measures for peace

4.1 Sanctions

4.2 Certification

4.3 IMF

4.4 OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises

5 Conclusion

4 The quest for peace Siobhan O’Reilly-Calthrop

1 The United Nations

1.1 Historical role

1.2 Problems and obstacles

1.3 Recent improvements

1.4 Future role?

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contents

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2 Role of African regional bodies

3 Angolan civil society

3.1 Growing years

3.2 The Church – an emerging actor

4 Conclusion

5 Recommendations

1 Humanitarian need

2 Children

3 Corporate actors

4 Peace process

4.1 United Nations – a new approach for a critical player

4.2 Sanctions – the need for a multi-pronged approach

4.3 Regional actors – a gap needing to be filled

4.4 Civil society – urgent support needed for the most promising actor

Bibliography

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Ben Campbell Programme Officer for Southern Africa, World Vision US

Kelly Currah Macro Issues Officer, World Vision UK

Anne Mesopir National Director, World Vision Angola

Siobhan O’Reilly-Calthrop Conflict and Reconciliation Officer, Policy and Research Department, World Vision UK

Randini Wanduragala Child Rights Officer, Policy and Research Department,World Vision UK

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contributors

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abbreviationsADRA Action for Rural Development and the Environment

AEA Evangelical Association in Angola

CICA Christian Council of Angola

CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child

FAA Angolan Armed Forces

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FONGA Forum of Angolan Non-Governmental Organisations

FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola

GAP Angolan Group for the Promotion of the Culture of Peace

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GEIPA Inter-Church Group for Peace in Angola

GARP Angolan Reflection Group for Peace

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IMF International Monetary Fund

LDC Least Developed Countries

MONUA United Nations Angola Observation Mission

MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

OAU Organisation for African Unity

OCHA Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance (United Nations)

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development

SADC Southern Africa Development Community

TNC Transnational Corporation

UCAH Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit

UNAVEM III United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNOA United Nations Office in Angola

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade, Aid and Development

UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UNSC United Nations Security Council

WFP World Food Programme

WHO World Health Organisations

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executivesummaryWar has ravaged Angola and its people for over 40 years. As a result, humanitarian

need within Angola has reached staggering proportions, whilst two wholegenerations of Angolans have never known what it is to live in peace.

Social development indicators identify Angola as one of the world’s poorest countries(see box 1). One third of the population is displaced or destitute due to war. Thirty percent of Angola’s children die before they reach their fifth birthday. Tens of thousands ofchildren have been forced to fight in armies and commit atrocities. Many more have beendenied basic rights to food, education and health.

Since 1989, World Vision Angola has responded by seeking to address the immediate and medium term needs of war-affected populations in northern Angola through multi-sectoral, developmental relief and rehabilitation programs. Yet this in itself can only havelimited impact whilst the war rages on. This report was birthed out of a desire to see theroot causes of this humanitarian crisis addressed. It is based on World Vision’s experienceand knowledge gained from working in Angola over the last 10–15 years. By identifyingthe ‘tangled web’ of actors involved in the crisis, both directly and indirectly, we hope tohighlight the action that needs to be taken by governments, civil society and the businesscommunity world-wide to see an end to this war and the suffering it is causing.

The conflict in Angola cannot be neatly defined as one single war but rather a series offour distinguishable cycles of fighting which began in 1957 with the war for independenceand has since been punctuated by periods of negotiations and fragile peace. After severalyears of re-arming and poor implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords by bothwarring parties, the latest period of ‘peace’ ended in December 1998 when fighting brokeout between the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and UNITA. This war continues today.

The 1990s has been the most violent decade and the worst in terms of humanitariansuffering. The fighting this decade has targeted civilian populations through town sieges,laying of landmines, harassment of local communities, and the obstruction of aid deliveries.As a result, Angolans experience daily trauma, dispossession, powerlessness, vulnerabilityand abject poverty.

The latest period of fighting has further deteriorated the situation. By April 2000, a totalof 2.5 million people were estimated to be internally displaced (IDPs). In November lastyear, the UN estimated 3.7 million to be ‘war affected’, defined as ‘those who depend onemergency humanitarian assistance due to war and the resultant loss of assets andearning opportunities’. As a result, more people than in the past 4 decades of war aresuffering homelessness and destitution, hunger and disease. Yet the war shows no sign ofabating in the near future. Landmines continue to be laid and atrocities committed.

Delivery of humanitarian assistance has been difficult and highly dangerous due to insecurityand access being denied to many UNITA and government-controlled areas. This situationis ongoing and humanitarianagencies continue to facemany obstacles: a lack ofsafe, regular access to fieldoperations, a lack ofconsistent funding forlonger-term rehabilitationand development work,difficulties in obtaining visasand getting non-food itemscleared at customs.

the ongoing war

humanitarianneed withinAngola hasreachedstaggeringproportions

Box 1

Per capita income US$674

Life expectancy at birth 46.5 years (1997)

Under-five mortality rate 292 out of 1,000 live births

Population without access to safe water 69%

Population without access to health services 76%

Enrolment rate – primary 31.9% (of relevant age group)

Statistics taken from 1999 UNDP Human Development Report

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Despite the shocking statement by UNICEF that Angola is the worst place for a child togrow up, the international community appears to be paralysed in its attempts to find asuitable response which will alleviate the suffering of Angola’s children.

Almost half of Angola’s population are children. Sixty five per cent of the 2.5 milliondisplaced are children. Yet their needs have been given little priority in the last threedecades of political manoeuvring and they have been ignored by policymakers seekingsolutions. Direct impacts on children include violence, abuse, forced recruitment andpsycho-social trauma, whilst the indirect impacts have contributed to problems of health,education and malnutrition.

Although Angola is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) andthe African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the government has not yetfiled any reports to detail precisely how Angola’s children are faring or what they aredoing to safeguard and protect the rights of children during this time of conflict.

Angola’s economy is booming. Inward investment in the oil industry and exports of oiland diamonds make it one of the fastest growing African economies. Despite having someof the largest oil reserves and diamond resources in Africa, the Angolan people are worseoff today than they were before the large off-shore oil fields were discovered in 1995.The disparity between the enormous profits made from mineral resources in Angola byforeign corporations and the social and economic state of the country is a damningindictment of the role of foreign actors working in the country. It also reveals theinternational community’s inability to take responsibility for the problems of a countryfrom which it is profiting economically. The improvement of society via inward investmenthas not occurred, or led to equality of growth, social development or investment in theinfrastructure of the country.

Corruption, lack of transparency and the purchase of military equipment by both sides ofthe conflict undermine the ability of the people of Angola to build their own stablecommunities. The Financial Times commented on this fact:“Government [Angolan] officialshave for years blamed this poverty on the civil war, but a series of army offensives sincelast September has severely diminished the rebel threat, exposing the war as an excuse tohide economic mismanagement”.

Corporate social responsibility

Although most of the companies working in Angola have established corporate socialresponsibility strategies, there is little evidence that they are implementing these policies.This is because peace is not a necessary condition for corporations to operate in Angola.As a recent article in The Economist pointed out, it is profitable to work in conflict countries. Itstates:“For brave business folk, there are thus rich pickings from grim places.” Corporate social responsibility is failing Angola and yet, in these days of globalisation, the internationalcommunity and transnational corporations are in a pivotal position to help end the war.

Crude credit

The Global Witness report, A Crude Awakening, in its investigation of the Angolan oilrevenues, revealed the high level of interest repayments on lending by global banks to thestate-owned oil companies. Not only is the debt load of the country increasing as awhole, but the loans are incurring heavy interest rates. It is a vicious cycle where loansare repaid using oil receipts against which new loans can be made. If lending continuesthis way, any downturn in the oil market will have serious repercussions on the economy.A new government may not stand by any such loan agreements and foreign lenderstherefore, have an interest in ensuring that the battle between the government andUNITA is won by the present government.

Economic measures for peace

The greatest steps forward in controlling the illicit diamond trade did not come from De Beers or other businesses working in the diamond industry, but from threats of actionand action taken by the international community. The role of equity in growth and the

the economics of conflict

corporatesocialresponsibilityis failingAngola

meanwhile the children suffer

economic empowerment of the Angolan people is critical in ending the conflict.Therefore, the international community must take a positive role in regulating andmonitoring the economic resources of Angola to ensure ‘leakage’ of all types are prevented.

Further initiatives at the international level are continuing to impact on the diamondtrade.The UK government’s efforts to spearhead the diamond certification scheme arepart of a broader effort to curb illicit diamond trading worldwide. The agreement fromthe G8 in December 1999 for an international project to embark on a diamondcertification scheme marks the first attempt for states to consider vetting the origin ofdiamonds for sale. Certification is being presented as a conflict prevention tool.

Elusive, long and arduous efforts of the ‘international community’ to find peace through the United Nations have not borne fruit. Political stalling and manoeuvring, duplicity, slow orpartial implementation of the accords, and violations of humanitarian and human rights lawhave characterised the approaches of both UNITA, and to a lesser degree, the government.Added to this were ineffective monitoring of the accords by the UN, a narrow group ofstates with vested interests directing the peace process (the ‘Troika’ – USA, Russia,Portugal) and an agenda that sought military peace without involving the Angolan people.

The role of the UN

Since the end of the Cold War the United Nations has been the main peace broker, makingrepeated efforts to steer Angola toward peace. Up until recently the UN’s efforts havebeen conspicuous for their failure. The UN’s inability to fulfil its mandate satisfactorily hasbeen documented by human rights NGOs, criticising the UN for its failure to act onviolations of the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords, human rights abuses and sanctions-busting.

Responsibility, however, cannot fall entirely on the UN’s shoulders. Serious constraintswere placed on UNAVEM III and MONUA by the Government of Angola and by theenvironment in which the UN missions worked. Responsibility must also be attributed tothe Troika for providing inadequate resources and pressure on warring parties to complywith the Accords. Ultimately, however, responsibility for the failure of the peace processmust rest with UNITA, which failed to meet various obligations agreed in the Protocoland consistently violated UN sanctions.

Since early 1999, the UN has adopted a more aggressive approach to the violation ofsanctions placed against UNITA through the appointment of Canadian Ambassador Fowlerto the chair of the UN Sanctions Committee. With a panel of experts, Fowler directed asix-month investigation culminating in a controversial report which found several Africanand European countries guilty of assisting UNITA in accessing fuel and arms and of actingas conduits for diamond sales. Although the report is weak on recommending actionagainst international oil companies and government officials who are alleged to beviolating sanctions, the Fowler report has succeeded in pushing this issue further up thepolitical agenda of international governments and has raised the profile of theneed for stricter international regulations on arms and diamond sales. TheUNSC has, somewhat disappointingly, responded by setting up anothermonitoring committee to conduct further investigations before takingaction in the autumn of 2000.

In spite of the UN’s past difficulties, there are several areas in which it has a unique and important role to play inbuilding peace, particularly as it is the only bodywith an official mandate for this work in Angola.Civil society is keen that it remains, continuingthe valuable human rights training and civiceducation programmes for NGOs,government officials and security forces.However, the war in Angola is too complexand multi-dimensional to be ‘solved’ by the UN alone, and a different, multi-trackapproach is vital and urgent.

the war inAngola is too complexand multi-dimensional tobe ‘solved’ bythe UN alone,and a different,multi-trackapproach isvital andurgent

the quest for peace

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Role of African regional bodies

The call for ‘African solutions to African problems’ cannot be ignored. The necessity forAfrican nations to be centrally involved in seeking peace in Angola is clear. However, thishas all too often been difficult to realise due to the very complicity of most Africannations in each others’ wars.The UN Sanctions Committee Report (the Fowler Report)demonstrated this with regard to the war in Angola.

The South Africa Development Community’s (SADC) peace building role has historicallybeen paralysed by internal political disagreements amongst its members which makes itdifficult for SADC to address crises within its region. In the area of peace brokering, theOrganisation of African Unity would, therefore, be a more appropriate body than SADCas the majority of its members have fewer vested interests in Angola. However, the recentspotlight placed on three member countries for violating sanctions in the Fowler reportdemonstrates the care that would need to be taken by the OAU in approaching negotiations.

Positive signs are emerging that certain African states, particularly Angola’s neighbours, arebeginning to take a more proactive role in seeking peace. In February 2000, South Africacalled for dialogue between the two warring parties stating their belief that a militarysolution no longer exists, which is a radical departure from past South African policy.

Angolan civil society

Civil society in Angola has historically been excluded from the peace process but hasrecently begun to emerge as a crucial player. The unfavourable environment within Angolahas historically restricted the growth of local NGOs, women’s groups, trade unions,churches and community groups since independence. As a result, ‘civil society’ hastraditionally been weak. Yet in the last few years, particularly 1999, Angola has witnessed a marked growth in this sector, not only in numbers of civic groups formed but in thevision, goals and unity of its members.

With the majority of the Angolan population professing to be Christian, and a 5% annualgrowth rate in membership, the church is a very significant part of civil society. The factthat the church straddles both warring parties also gives it a unique ability to potentiallybridge divides. Since the resumption of fighting in December 1998, the churches haveincreased in boldness in speaking out against the continuation of war. The CatholicChurch, traditionally pro-government, sent strongly worded pastoral letters and publicstatements in 1999 calling on the government and UNITA to negotiate, decrying violationsof human rights and calling the nation to reconciliation.

Angolan civil society is for the first time this century beginning to grow and emerge as acredible player not only in facilitating negotiations, but in building a culture of peace at thegrass-roots level which will be owned by Angolans themselves.This is a crucial ingredientfor the sustainability of any official peace process that is re-started. However, thisemerging constituency is young, fragile and vulnerable, and requires strong moral, political,financial and spiritual support from international civil society if it is to have any success.

What is most important about this move toward civic education and strengthening civilsociety is the fact that it is helping to build a democratic culture, albeit slowly. Withpresidential and parliamentary elections due to be held in 2001 (for the first time since1992) this is a crucial moment for such education to be supported and accelerated.

The battle against the war in Angola is at a critical juncture. A window of opportunity exists toact decisively. Without each of these actors working innovatively, imaginatively, responsibly, andabove all, in solidarity, any future peace negotiations will only be another brief reprieve in thecycle of violence and war in Angola.

Humanitarian need: urgent and long-term support required

• The Government of Angola and the international community must respond as swiftly as possible to the immediate humanitarian needs of the 3.6 million ‘war affected’, byreleasing funds for the UN Consolidated Appeal and NGO operations.

• Increased pressure must be applied on the Government of Angola and UNITA toprovide safe access for the humanitarian community to the IDPs and affected

the battleagainst thewar in Angolais at a criticaljuncture – awindow ofopportunityexists to actdecisively

recommendations

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populations and to cease all military activity that targets civilians. Corridors oftranquillity and days of peace ought to be introduced to allow safe humanitarianaccess.

• The laying of landmines must be stopped immediately by both sides in accordancewith the Ottawa Treaty and legal measures threatened against those who continue.Landmines awareness programmes, de-mining and victim assistance require continued funding.

• Family re-unification programmes must be introduced particularly for unaccompaniedchildren in IDP camps.

• The education and health infrastructure require urgent attention, as do the roadnetworks and airstrips. Pressure must be brought to bear on the government ofAngola to invest in these areas.

• Innovative humanitarian programmes are required which provide relief andrehabilitation whilst investing in the longer-term needs of the community, includinginvesting in civil society.

• In both the immediate and longer term, the psycho-social needs of the population,particularly the children, urgently require attention for any future peace to besustainable.

Children

• Both sides to the conflict must, as a matter of urgency, make a strong and publiccommitment to putting the needs and interests of Angolan children before any otherconsideration and provide all necessary assistance to ensure their well-being andsafety. They should also provide appropriate and safe access for humanitarian agenciesso that a proper assessment can be made as to how children’s lives are and havebeen affected by the conflict.

• Both warring parties must respect the Geneva Conventions and Protocols regardingthe international laws of war and protect Angolan civilians. They must take allmeasures, in addition to the protection from landmines, to protect Angolan childrenfrom the effects of armed conflict.

• The Government of Angola must, in accordance with its international obligations,submit a report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the status ofchildren in Angola or alternatively and in the absence of such a report, theCommittee on the Rights of the Child should make its own findings and providerecommendations on the situation of children in Angola.

• African states charged with selecting a Committee of Experts under the AfricanCharter must provide adequate resources for the Committee to carry out its work,and when elected, the Committee of Experts must make the situation of children inAngola its first priority.

• Children are also important actors in achieving a solution to the conflict and mustalso be included in the peace process from its very inception and not just atimplementation.

Corporate actors

• The international community needs to continue to push for greater regulation of thediamond industry. A certification scheme will help ensure that conflict diamonds donot make their way onto the international markets. The US and EU need to strictlymonitor the origins of diamonds entering their markets.

• International regulations need to be extended to the oil industry. In the absence of avoluntary industry-wide standard, the international community needs to establishregulations regarding transparency of financial exchanges between the corporationsand governments. Regulations should also ensure that oil companies are signed up tothe human rights agreements and follow codes of conduct concerning theiroperations in conflict countries.

• The international banking industry should consider the recommendations made bythe pressure group Global Witness and fully publish all loan arrangements includingpayments made to recipients. Loans should go through a centralised system ratherthan the current multi-channel routes.

• The IMF needs to continue its monitoring of the Angolan economy and set socialconditions to the use of any money it may lend the country. The IMF and the WorldBank should continue to pressure the government to use international accountingstandards and reform current financial structures.

• The international community must support and encourage all governments toimplement the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises. Individual corporationsshould sign up to the guidelines as well as the UN declaration of human rights. Incountries where they operate, corporations must publish their corporate socialresponsibility commitments, their codes of conduct and the UN conventions to whichthey are a signatory.

Peace process

The war in Angola is complex and multi-dimensional. A multi-track approach which drawson the strengths of Angolan civil society, regional bodies, corporations and the internationalcommunity is needed. The co-ordinating role of the UN is essential but needs a morerobust mandate to be effective.

United Nations – a new approach for a critical player

• A radical re-assessment of how the UN oversees the implementation of future peaceaccords is crucial. This must include a clear mandate to proactively monitor andpublicly report human rights abuses, and to call violators of accords to account.

• Pressure should be put on the Troika (USA, Russia, Portugal) to allow the broader-based ‘committee of friends’ to oversee any future peace process. Countries whichactively armed the various factions as part of their respective Cold War struggles inthe past have an obligation to ensure that a state of peace is returned to the peopleof Angola.

• The UN should consider co-ordinating meetings by SADC, the OAU and otherregional bodies which presently are fumbling for direction.Their role is currently verysmall and requires strengthening if the local and regional dimensions of the war areto be factored in.

• If peace is to be maintained, it must be owned by the people. Meaningful participationof Angolan civil society in the peace process is, therefore, a critical area to which theUN ought to give due attention.

• The UN could also play a vital role in creating a platform for the co-ordination ofadvocacy initiatives by Angolan and international civil society. Children also have muchto contribute as peace-builders and deserve a helping hand in expressing their views.

• The UN has a unique role to play in facilitating forums between the humanitariancommunity and the protagonists, to discuss humanitarian and human rights issues. Inaddition, the valuable civic education training for government officials, local leadersand other parties to the conflict, needs to be continued and expanded.

United Nations sanctions – the need for a multi-pronged approach

• The latest efforts by the UN to combat sanctions-busting have succeeded in placingthis issue high on the political agenda. However, Ambassador Fowler’s recommendationsmust be acted upon. The second expert committee, ordered by UN Resolution 1295,must be formed without further delay if it is to produce an authoritative report inOctober 2000. Governments throughout the world must do all they can to complywith the recommendations of the report. The ongoing accession negotiations ofseveral Eastern European countries to the European Union, as well as the expansionof NATO into Eastern Europe, ought to take into account these states’ compliancewith the UN sanctions.

• Tougher legislation on arms brokering and end-use certification, and more stringent

theinternationalcommunitymust supportand implementthe OECD

guidelines formultinationalenterprises

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accountability in legal arms sales are essential if arms exporter states are to play theirpart in restricting the supply of weapons to UNITA.

Regional actors – a gap needing to be filled

• The responsibility facing many African states to acknowledge their role in the conflictand to pursue an alternative strategy is stronger than ever. Compliance withsanctions against UNITA is critical, as is providing information and assistance whereavailable on contravention of sanctions. The international community could encouragethis by offering technical and financial assistance.

• The vested interests of SADC and its members in Angola make it an inappropriatebody to broker peace. However, it holds the potential to play a crucial role inmonitoring borders and strengthening controls on arms, oil and diamond flows andits members would do well to pursue the recommendations of the Fowler report inorder to strengthen controls. The OAU presents a more viable option for brokeringpeace and ought to be encouraged, although mechanisms would need to be put inplace to ensure member states which continue to violate the sanctions are excluded.

Civil society – urgent support needed for the most promising actor

• Angolan civil society is the most promising new actor in the quest for peace, yet it is young, fragile and vulnerable. The government and UNITA must comply withinternational human rights law and respect the rights of Angolans, particularly thefreedom of association and speech.

• The church throughout the world needs to express urgent, practical solidarity withthe Angolan churches which are beginning to work together for the first time indecades. Their ability to connect with communities loyal to both warring sides hasenormous peace-building potential.

• Women and children have a powerful role in advocating peace and in contributingtheir ideas for peace-building, and their participation ought to be taken into accountmore seriously by all actors.

• Building a democratic culture is the key to long-term peace, and support for this is ofparticular need in the run up to the country’s second ever elections, to be held in2001. An organised, united and supported opposition to the war is critical for anykind of end to the fighting.

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wholegenerations of Angolanshave neverknown what it is to live in peace

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introduction

Many who read this report soon realise that the full extent and complexity of thefactors that have shaped modern day Angola is far greater than they had first

understood. One hopes that by reading it, many will take up the challenge of making apositive difference in reshaping a nation torn asunder by numerous contradictions.

Whole generations of Angolans have never known what it is to live in peace anddetermine their own destiny. For more than five hundred years the people of Angola havesuffered invasion, imposition, infringement and subjugation in all aspects of their cultural,political, socio-economical and spiritual life. Periods of slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism have clouded Angola’s emancipation and self-determination. These periodshave been dominated by various wars, worsened and perpetuated by ethnicity, slavetrading, colonialism, and, most recently, the scramble for diamonds and oil.

In Chapter One, the form that the war has taken since 1975 up to the present day isexplained. It also explains that the net effect of this constant bombardment on manyordinary Angolans has been characterised by trauma, dispossession, powerlessness,vulnerability and abject poverty. One third of the population are displaced or destitutedue to war, 65 per cent of whom are children under 14 years. As Chapter Two explains,tens of thousands of children have been forced to fight in armies which violate human

rights and commit atrocities. Many more have been denied basic rights tofood, education, and health. 30 per cent of children die before theyreach the age of five years. The children and their parents (about 12million) face the daily danger of landmines planted in fields, roads andtowns that are estimated to number in the region of 6–15 million.

Since 1989,World Vision Angola has sought to address immediateand medium term needs of war-affected populations in fourprovinces in northern Angola through multi-sectoral,developmental, relief and rehabilitation programmes.Withsubstantial private and government donor support,World VisionAngola has played a significant role in facilitating resettlement andrehabilitation of returnees and vulnerable populations. Yet, this initself can only have limited impact whilst the war rages on. Thisreport was birthed out of a desire to see the root causes of thishumanitarian crisis effectively dealt with. It is based on ourexperience and knowledge gained from working in Angola over the last 10–15 years.

The irony is that Angola is potentially one of the richestcountries in Africa. Chapter Three explains how Angola’seconomy is one of the fastest growing with the largest rates ofForeign Direct Investment. Yet Angola ranks as one of the least

developed countries in the world with the largest number of poorchildren. Paradoxically, the cause of this poverty is the country’swealth in oil and diamonds. Instead of being a blessing, the riches ofAngola have become a curse to its people. Oil and diamonds arefuelling conflict, prompting the loss of millions of lives and creatingwidespread poverty. Major players that have been and areresponsible for facilitating this situation are powerful institutionsand individuals both within and outside Angola. Putting self-interestabove everything else, these collaborators ignore the impact oftheir actions on millions of ordinary Angolans.

Angolathe tangled web

And so, havoc reigns and the bloodshed Angolans have witnessed for many yearscontinues. The big questions are, who will stop this brutal war? And while the war rageson, who will mitigate the suffering of the displaced and other war-affected Angolans,especially the children?

Chapter Four outlines efforts made by world and regional organizations and governmentsto bring about an end to the war. The United Nations in particular has madecommendable efforts. There is no doubt that great strides have been made yet muchmore remains to be done by the world. Most importantly, it is the Angolan peoplethemselves who have a crucial role in finding solutions to their problems. In the past fewyears, civil society, including the church, has begun to bravely speak out for an end to warand is educating its constituents about how to work toward peace. This is potentially verypowerful, yet civil society is young and will require support from both within and outsideAngola to succeed in this area.

The complexities that the Angolan situation presents are beyond the reach of one singleorganisation or government. The international, African and Angolan communities all have a responsibility and a role to play in ending the war. The first thing to do is to understandthe various factors at play. The second is to take action. This paper contributessignificantly to understanding the ‘tangled web’ of actors involved in this war and itsimpact, and provides recommendations for action by policy makers, civil society, and thebusiness community worldwide. If Angola is to have any hope of a bright future, theserecommendations must not be ignored. Indeed, in this age of globalisation, responsibilityfor addressing this crisis must be shared by all actors if peace is ever to become a reality.

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“Angolans areexperiencinga level ofdespair thatexists virtuallynowhere elsein the worldtoday” Catherine Bertini,Executive Director of WFP, August 1999

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In a recent series of articles, the BBC referred to Angola as “the longest and mostmiserable civil war in Africa”.1 Although an apt description, the conflict in Angola cannot

be neatly defined as one single war but rather a series of four distinguishable cycles offighting with periods of peace negotiations and fragile peace in between. It is currently inthe midst of what many refer to as the ‘Fourth War’.

There is little doubt that this has been one of the most miserable civil wars in Africa.Indeed, the depth and extent of human suffering that the accumulation of these wars haswaged on Angola’s long-suffering people is difficult to describe. By April 2000, a total of 2.5million people were estimated to be internally displaced (IDPs). In November 1999, theUN estimated 3.7 million to be ‘war affected’, defined as “those who depend onemergency humanitarian assistance due to war and the resultant loss of assets and earningopportunities”.2 This amounts to one third of the total population of Angola. Three-quartersof IDPs are women and children.3 150,000 people are estimated to have either been killedor permanently maimed due to landmine accidents.4 Two-thirds of the population live inabsolute poverty. 30 per cent of children die before they reach their fifth birthday.5

This chapter will attempt to briefly explain the history of this conflict, and how it hascome to impact the inhabitants of this beleaguered nation in such a cruel fashion.

Angola is a former Portuguese colony situated on the southwest of the continent ofAfrica.The Portuguese involvement in Angola dates back to 1483 when their ships started exploring the coastal areas. Rich in agricultural and mineral resources, Angola held attractive prospects and for many years it enjoyed a strong agricultural economy,exporting coffee, cotton, rice and tobacco. Up until the eve of the 19th century however,Portugal’s rule was characterised by plunder and destruction, drawing on Angola as asource of slaves.

Angola was home to three major tribal groups making up 75 per cent of the population:the Ovimbundo, Kimbundo and the Bakango. Other smaller groups were scatteredthroughout the country.

It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the Portuguese finallyconquered the three major tribes. However, each of those tribes continued to resistPortuguese rule. Some, like the Omvibundo, resisted to a greater extent than the Mbundotribe.The Portuguese played ethnic groups off against each other and used legaldistinctions between whites, assimilated and blacks to keep the population divided andrepressed. Economic development under colonial rule was unequal as parts of thecountry with resources were developed while other areas were virtually ignored.

Eventually, an elite group emerged whose frustration with colonial rule fostered theindependence movements of the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1957, the Portugueserulers established the secret police or PIDE (Policia International de Defensa de Estado)that brutally cracked down on the young groups, infiltrating them and fostering inter-grouprivalry. Two specific massacres in Uige and Malange provinces prompted the start of theFirst War, the ‘War for Independence’.

oneAngola

in perspectivean historical overview of the conflict and its humanitarian impact

colonial Angola

the first war – the war for independence (1957-75)

From this elite group arose the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola) mainlyfrom the Mbundo tribe, Portuguese communists and mestiços, and the FNLA (FrenteNacional de Liberação de Angola) representing mainly the Bakango tribe lead by HoldenRoberto. In 1966, these rebel movements were joined by UNITA (União Nacional para aIndependência Total de Angola) whose members principally came from the Ovibundotribe of the central highlands and under the charismatic leadership of Jonas Savimbi.Whennot fighting the Portuguese armed forces, these three groups fought each other overterritory, fighting which many believe was fostered by PIDE. Militarily, the MPLA and FNLAwere the most powerful of the rebel movements. UNITA, instead, dedicated its efforts tohit-and-run attacks and the development of a rural support for their cause.

By 1975, the armed forces in Portugal, who were tired of the various wars in thecolonies, led a coup and in a short period all of Portugal’s colonies were granted theirindependence.6 A subsequent scramble for power took place in Angola and the conflictswiftly became a proxy Cold War struggle. The MPLA received substantial backing fromthe Soviet Union and Cuba, UNITA from South Africa and the USA, and the FNLA fromZaire and the USA.

With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, international support for a militarysolution waned. As a result, MPLA’s President dos Santos made an offer to UNITA’sSavimbi to enter into peace talks which were brokered by 18 African nations. Although acease-fire was signed in 1989, it quickly disintegrated and a period of fierce fightingcommenced. In response, a serious effort to secure peace through diplomacy wasinitiated. Rounds of talks were organised by the UN, mediated by Portugal and observedby the USA and Soviet Union. In May 1991 the Bicesse Accords were signed. The ceasefireprohibited both sides from purchasing new supplies of weapons, and authorised the MPLAto continue acting as the legitimate government until the elections. The ceasefire wasmonitored by UNAVEM (UN Angola Verification Mission) and was the start of a long andexpensive involvement by the UN.7

What is important to note here is that it was around this time that military tacticschanged – the fighting began to target civilians and violate the laws of war. The battle forCuito Cuanavale in 1987 is seen as the watershed. By the time the Bicesse Accords weresigned, it is estimated that between100,000 and 300,000 had died due to the fighting. Itwas also during this period that humanitarian agencies began to operate. World Visionfirst arrived in 1984, but due to insecurity was forced to leave the country twice (first in1986, returning 1989, and then in 1991, returning in 1993).

With the Bicesse Accords, there was hope for a final peace settlement. Elections werescheduled for September 29–30, 1992, the first nationwide elections in the country’shistory. However, Savimbi refused to assist with the organisation of the elections andcontinued to amass weapons. Hence, when UNITA lost the presidential election by 9 percent, they rejected the results and returned the country to civil war.

Thus started the bloodiest period of fighting to date in Angola. In what has becomeknown as the ‘War of the Cities’, UNITA besieged and bombarded provincial capitalsthroughout the country. Cities and infrastructure that had not been touched until thenwere destroyed. Roads, railways and bridges were blown up or mined. For the civilianpopulation this represented the first time that many of them were displaced. Most fled to MPLA-held areas such as Luanda to escape the fighting. A humanitarian crisis wasunderway with camps for the displaced set up, such as Viana on the outskirts of Luandawhich remains to this day. It is estimated that 300,000 people, 3 per cent of thepopulation, were killed by the fighting between October 1992 and late 1994 – more thanin the preceding 16 years.8

In November 1994, the fighting came to an end when, after a period of talks, Savimbiagreed to a ceasefire and reconciliation process known as the Lusaka Protocol.Thisperiod of ‘peace’ lasted longer than the Bicesse Accords – approximately four years.

with the end of theCold War in the late1980s,internationalsupport for a militarysolutionwaned

20

the second war – the ‘War of the Bush’ (1975-91)

the third war – the ‘War of the Cities’ (1992-94)

‘peace’ under the Lusaka Protocol

delivery ofhumanitarianassistance was slow and highlydangerousdue toinsecurity

21

However, it was characterised by brinkmanship and ‘foot-dragging’ over the implementationof the Protocol, coupled with sporadic fighting, continued insecurity for the civilianpopulation and preparation for future war.9

It is widely acknowledged that although UNITA had gained control of 70 per cent of theterritory, the military gains of the government forces (FAA) in 1994 prompted Savimbi tocall a halt to the fighting. The fact that he did not attend the signing ceremony himselfdemonstrated his attitude toward the Accords. This explains what Kofi Annan referred toas the ‘foot-dragging’10 that UNITA displayed in complying with the Accords, particularly in disarmament, demobilisation and the setting up of a Government of NationalReconciliation(GURN) which was not established until 1997.11 Others, however, cite thepoor incentives given to UNITA leaders to work in the GURN.12 Landmines continued tobe laid by both sides,13 UNITA continued to control its territory with fear campaigns andboth sides were guilty of re-arming during this period.

The Lusaka Protocol did, however, provide a window for the humanitarian community(UN agencies, NGOs) to begin repatriating IDPs to their home areas or to thecountryside where they could return to farming. Food aid distribution and provision of agricultural inputs and training was the top priority, followed by health, water andsanitation programmes. Mines awareness, which included the training of children inidentifying mines, and de-mining programmes began in earnest. Under the co-ordination of the UN agency UCAH, NGOs were assigned specific areas of the country to work in. The humanitarian community also established demobilization camps for UNITAsoldiers. World Vision, along with other international NGOs, actively participated byproviding food aid, and health and civic education programmes to the soldiers and their families.

Box 1: World Vision’s response

Since 1989, World Vision has sought to address immediate and medium term needs ofwar-affected populations in northern Angola through multi-sectoral, developmentalrelief and rehabilitation programmes. Luanda, Malange, Kwanza Norte and Cabindaprovinces have been our primary focus. The effectiveness of World Vision’sinterventions is now evident as communities have reduced their dependency onexternal food sources. Harvest yields have increased, access to basic health andnutrition services and clean water has increased, and there is heightened awareness ofthe danger of land mines and how to deal with them. However, the current conflictmakes any sustained development initiative difficult.

To illustrate the impact of World Vision’s work, in just the last two years,World VisionAngola (WVA) has distributed over 10,000 tonnes of food aid commodities toapproximately 890,000 vulnerable people in its target areas. WVA has also distributed700 tonnes of seed and 300,000 agricultural tools to over 170,000 people. WVAtrained over 59,000 farmers (at least 40,000 of these being women) and held 32agriculture courses to train over 242 government and NGO staff. In the health sector,WVA maintained 20 health clinics and provided basic health care to over 500,000people. In addition, it admitted over 20,000 peopleinto 14 feeding centres and assisted over 130,000people to recover from malnutrition. WVAprovided growth monitoring to over 49,000children and pre- and post-natal care to over19,000 mothers. World Vision also held 1,900health training sessions to train over 200,000community members. WVA also made its impact inthe water sector by providing over 200,000 peoplewith access to clean water through the constructionand rehabilitation of over 190 wells and theconstruction of five gravity fed systems. WorldVision continues to work amongst vulnerablepeople to address their needs, despite the war.

22

However, delivery of humanitarian assistance was slow and highly dangerous due toinsecurity and access being denied to many UNITA and government-controlled areas. Ingeneral, the civilian population remained skeptical of the peace process and reluctant tomove back to their areas of origin. During this entire period, whole populations becamedependent on the international community for their well-being.

Despite a range of sanctions imposed by the United Nations on UNITA to restrict itsability to wage war14, UNITA continued to re-arm through illicit diamond sales. During1998, tensions continued to increase along with insecurity. By July, nearly two-thirds of the provinces were declared unsafe and large numbers of people were displaced.

In December 1998, full-blown war broke out when the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)attacked UNITA headquarters. UNITA responded by surrounding and bombing the maincities in a repeat of its tactics in 1993. However, this time the suffering of the civilianpopulation has arguably been more severe – the bombing of cities has been more intenseand the number of internally displaced people greater.

Rural populations flooded into the major cities to seek refuge from attacks in the villages.This placed an incredible strain on the coping mechanisms of urban communitiesand services which were already on their knees as a result of so many years of wardeprivation.15 Some observers believe this was a deliberate UNITA tactic to overwhelmthe government who were in control of these cities.

Box 2: Malange city

Malange city, one of the cities assigned to World Vision for relief, was one of the worstaffected. According to humanitarian workers familiar with both periods, UNITA’sbombardment of Malange city between December 1998 and August 1999 wasindiscriminate and with a greater intensity than during 1992–94. The road connectingit to the capital, Luanda, was also highly insecure. As a result, humanitarian agencies wereforced to abandon or reduce their programmes.World Vision was forced to reduce itspresence in Malange at the end of March 1999. As a result, the residents and IDPsreceived no aid deliveries for four months until 4 August when WFP managed todeliver food aid. A total of 211,000 IDPs sought refuge in Malange, many coming fromas far as 300kms away but were put in camps outside Malange city, and as a resultwere (and still are) without basic sanitation and health facilities. Malnutrition ratesincreased alarmingly in early 1999 and although these have since stabilised, remain athigh levels. World Vision continues to assist the camp residents, most of whom remain,through emergency feeding, health and sanitation, and agricultural programmes.

By the summer, the humanitarian situation had reached crisis point with 1.6 millionpeople having fled their homes and 200 people dying each day.16 Some two million were in need of assistance but only 600,000 were receiving aid.17 In spite of this, internationaldonor aid commitments were relatively low. Other international crises, particularlyKosovo, and donor fatigue with yet another Angolan war, forced the Secretary General,Kofi Annan, to personally appeal to the donor community for funds in June 1999.

After September 1999, when the FAA captured UNITA headquarters and dislodgedUNITA from its strongholds in the central highlands, the humanitarian situation eased. Thesieges were lifted from the cities and some displaced populations began to return to theirhomes, though slowly. Many problems remained, however, and new problems aroseassociated with the cumulative effect of these wars.

First, the number of displaced actually increased as a result of the fighting in September1999, raising the number of IDPs since January 1998 to an estimated 1,732,284 by the endof 1999.18 This figure does not include those who have fled across the borders intoNamibia, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, estimated to be over 40,000and to whom access is extremely difficult.19 Secondly, the timing of the offensive, whichwas during the planting season, meant that little was planted and there will be no harvestin the summer of 2000. This entails the need for food aid up to March 2001. Thirdly,

the fourth war – 1998 to present

by thesummer, thehumanitariansituation hadreached crisispoint with 1.6 millionpeople havingfled theirhomes and200 peopledying eachday

thehumanitariansituationremains bleakindeed

23

Constraints for aid delivery are much the same: a lack of safe, regular access to fields of operation in government and UNITA areas, forcing the regular postponement or cancellation of aid deliveries, and a lack of consistent funding for longer-termrehabilitation and development work. Humanitarian agencies are also facing difficultiesobtaining visas and getting non-food items cleared at customs.23 Add to this the impact of soaring inflation, associated price rises and the continuous peril of landmines, and thehumanitarian situation remains bleak indeed.

Donor commitments have increased but the need is even greater.24 Moreover, the fightingis far from over. In fact, civilians continue to be displaced, particularly on the southernborders as neighbouring countries become involved, and there are fears that UNITAand the FAA are re-organizing for a protracted guerilla war.

Events change on a weekly basis in Angola and it is difficult to forecast which directionthe war will take. Fluctuations in oil prices directly affect the government’s capacity tofight. However, for the people of Angola, it is clear that the situation is changing at an ever-deteriorating rate. More people than in the past three decades of war are sufferinghomelessness and destitution, hunger and disease. The war shows no sign of abating inthe near future, landmines continue to be laid and atrocities committed.

To say Angola has reached crisis point is an understatement – it is in a permanent state of crisis. What is peculiar about the current situation is that it has reached a state of‘cumulative crisis’ and the capacity of the people to cope has been stretched beyond thelimit. Many are literally ‘on the edge of an abyss’.25 This calls not only for immediate actionto address the current immense needs, but also to do everything possible to bring an endto this war.

Box 3: OCHA report

OCHA released a revealing report in April this year which details the extent of thesuffering amongst the one million registered IDPs in camps and the precarioussituation that exists in many provinces.22 Conducted in early April and including areasthat were previously inaccessible, OCHA says that the majority of displaced personsare completely dependent on food assistance, do not own essential items to survive(eg blankets, clothing), have inadequate shelter and have no access to safe drinkingwater. The situation for the rest of the population is not much better – food suppliesare limited, none of the hospitals visited had sufficient medicines and more childrenare malnourished than at any time during the three decades of war. It describes thesituation as ‘alarming’ and, although it is the first phase of a two-part assessment, urgesimmediate action by the international community and the government.

conclusion

there exists a large proportion of the population who were not displaced but who havebecome aid-dependent due to the hang-over of the sieges last summer which ran theirreserves dry.

Since January, the situation has deteriorated further. According to the OCHA IDPmonitor, Jean Luc Tonglet,“Since the beginning of the year, there are at least 200,000newly displaced IDPs in various provinces of the country.”20 This brings the total numberof IDPs created since December 1998 to an estimated 2.5 million, one million of whomare officially registered.21 He went on to say that with the new government offensive,Operation Restore, starting soon, OCHA are planning for that number to increase withthe renewed fighting in the eastern and southern region of the country.

1 Goldman, A (1999) Angola:The Roots of Conflict, 28th January 1999, see BBC website:news.bbc.co..uk/hi/english/special_report/1999/01/99/angola/newsid_263000/263954.stm

2 UN Consolidated Appeal for Angola for Jan-Dec 2000, November 19993 IRIN (2000a)4 ibid5 UN Secretary General’s report to UN Security Council, 23 November 1998.6 From 1970 to 1973 Portugal maintained 150,000 troops in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola.

Approximately 11,000 Portuguese were killed and 30,000 wounded.7 See Ch. 4 The Quest for Peace for more details on the UN’s role in Angola.8 Vines, A (1998), pg 39 See footnote 5 in Ch. 4 The Quest for Peace for more details on the contravention of the Lusaka Accords.10 In his report to the UNSC, 14 April 1997, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, expressed concern over

UNITA’s ‘foot-dragging’ in implementing the provisions of the Protocol.11 The GURN was inaugurated on 11 April 1997, a few days after the Angola National Assembly swore in 63

UNITA deputies. UNITA Renovado formed after the failure of Savimbi to meet the 31 August 1998 deadline for extending the State administration to UNITA-held areas.

12 According to some observers, UNITA parliamentarians were given inferior salaries and benefits compared with those of the MPLA.

13 For more information on the problem of landmines, see section 2.1 in Chapter Two.14 Sanctions imposed against UNITA include: Purchase of Arms and Petroleum, September 1993 (UNSC

Resolution 864),Travel abroad, August 1997 (Resolution 1127), Export or Sale of Diamonds, June 1998 (Resolution 1173), Freeze of UNITA’s financial resources and assets, June 1999 (Resolution 1173)

15 MSF reported in November that the national health service was virtually paralysed as a result of the conflict.In 1998 infant mortality rates had increased dramatically from 40 per 1000 live births in 1989 to 270 per 1000 live births in 1998.

16 According to UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit (UCAH), now called OCHA. (See IRIN (1999) Weekly Round-up). In August 1999, the estimated number of IDPs in Luanda was 600,000, and in Cuito, Huambo and Malange provinces combined was 460,000.

17 ibid18 OCHA IDP Fact Sheet, (1999)19 The UN reported in May that there were 22,000–25,000 refugees in Zambia, 10–15,000 in Namibia (IRIN

18 May, 2000)20 Interview, in IRIN report 24 May 200021 UN OCHA Humanitarian Update, 23 May 200022 UN OCHA, Angola: Report on Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs, 25 April 2000,23 ibid24 70 per cent of the UN Consolidated Appeal for 1999 was pledged by October (US$82 million). But this year,

the amount being requested by the UN is more than double last year’s at US$258 million.25 See 22

24

endnotes

25

Despite the shocking statement by UNICEF that Angola is the worst place for a childto grow up in, the international community appears to be paralysed in its attempts

to find a suitable response which will alleviate the suffering of children in Angola. As theprevious chapter reveals, the cumulative impact of the war on the ordinary people hasbecome critical, prompted by the latest resumption of hostilities. Whilst the internationalcommunity dithers in gathering the necessary momentum to initiate an appropriateresponse, every day children in Angola are severely affected.

Almost half of Angola’s population are children. Of the people displaced by the conflict,65 per cent are children.1 Yet their needs have been given little priority in the last threedecades of political manoeuvring and they have been ignored when formulating policy tofind a solution. Whilst both sides to the conflict can afford to arm themselves through thesale of diamonds or oil, one in three children dies before the age of five due to lack ofadequate food or healthcare.2 Most are denied basic human rights and casualties havereached such high proportions that they are no longer being recorded.3 As commentatorshave observed, many children have only known conflict and are growing up withoutknowing what it is like to have normal lives. The legacy for the next generation ofchildren is bleak as, due to the conflict, those responsible for their upbringing anddevelopment have themselves never had any structure or stability in their own lives.4

These children have no aspirations and little or no hope for the future unless the politicalwill and commitment can be found to break through the inertia and to find a lastingsolution. This should include involving children in the peace building process.

This chapter looks at how this intractable and apparently interminable conflict hasaffected the lives of the children. It examines the direct impacts (violence, abuse, forcedrecruitment and psycho-social trauma) and the indirect impacts (health, education andmalnutrition). It will also discuss the ways in which the international community needs tofocus on the rights of the children and the imaginative approaches they will need to adoptto ensure that children in Angola are not forgotten. Whilst theinitial focus for most local communities and governments willtend to be more concerned with physical and economicproblems of food, water, shelter, medicines, jobs and money, it isalso necessary to keep in mind and address the trauma that thechildren have faced throughout the hostilities and the impact itis likely to have on post-conflict reconciliation in Angola.

Children make up more than half the population of Angola yet theyare the forgotten people in this conflict. It is estimated that up to4,000 children died every month during the war of 1992–94 andthat 65 per cent of the one million displaced persons registeredby the UN are estimated to be 14 years and under.5 Tens ofthousands of children have been forced to fight. They have losttheir homes, families, friends and possessions and theirdevelopment has been impoverished. Attempts by the ICRC(International Committee of the Red Cross) to obtain access toboth sides involved in the conflict have been rebuffed or only partial access has been granted. This has made it extremelydifficult to give a clear assessment of the humanitarian situation

1 introduction

2 focusing on children

two…meanwhile

the children suffer

“Angola is theworst place inthe world tobe a child” UNICEF, June 1999

although thenumber ofmine-relatedincidents hasdecreased, theproportion of childrenaffected by theseincidents hasincreased

26

facing children. Some information is available from international organisations like UNICEFand NGOs working in Angola. These portray a sorry state of affairs for Angola’s children.The Child Risk Measure compiled by UNICEF places Angola as the highest risk country inthe world for children.6 A further factor, which has added to the economic and socialinstability, is Angola’s external debt repayment which, as a percentage of its GNP, is amassive 232 per cent measured against a regional average of 69 per cent7 This means thatas war continues to eat up Angola’s wealth, even8 fewer resources are used for thewelfare of children.

direct affects

2.1 Landmines

The three decades of war have caused widespread social and economic upheaval anddisruption and one of the most potent weapons used to wreak this destruction is landmines.Angola is reported to have the highest number of landmines of any country in the world –15 to 20 million landmines in this country of 12 million people9 – more than one destructivelandmine for each man, woman and child. Despite the Government of Angola’s signing upto the Ottawa Convention banning the use or stockpiling of landmines, it maintains itsstockpiles. The widespread use of landmines by both the government and UNITA isreported to be part of a strategy on the part of UNITA to destabilise the government,10 tomake normal life as difficult as possible and, on the government’s side, to prevent civiliansfrom entering rebel held areas. Recently, both sides have begun laying new landmines.

In 1997 UNICEF and the Government of Angola undertook a Plan of Action for aprogramme of co-operation which included the issue of landmines. Although the numberof mine-related incidents has decreased, the proportion of children affected by theseincidents has increased and is higher than expected. The overall level of decrease hasbeen attributed to NGO efforts in running mine awareness programmes,11 includingWorld Vision’s well-respected programme, which has contributed to a change in the ‘risk taking behaviour’ of the local population. Unfortunately,World Vision’s programmehas had to stop due to a lack of funding. The Angolan government has gone some waytowards taking up the issue of mine-related incidents by including a mines awarenesscomponent in the national school curriculum.12 NGOs also work closely with thegovernment agency responsible for mine clearance (INARROE) but there has been a reluctance on the part of donors to fund de-mining programmes.

2.2 Violence and forced recruitment

There have been alleged abuses of children by both government and rebel forces.Children have also been the targets of forced recruitment and brutal andindiscriminate acts of violence.13 They have been murdered, beaten, raped and enslaved for sexual purposes and forced to work. Reports of mass burial grounds containingchildren’s bones have been publicised.14 Girls have become primary targets of widespread rape, sexual slavery and violence.

The impact of these atrocities on children is overwhelming and these abusesshould be denounced under international humanitarian law. Forexample, the Geneva Conventions and Protocols prohibit rape inboth international and internal conflicts. In addition, both theConvention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the AfricanCharter, to which Angola is signatory, have no derogation clauses intimes of war or internal conflict and their protective rights extend tochildren in times of conflict as they do in times of peace.

An analysis of child recruitment and participation in Angola showed that whilstthe government denied that minors were being recruited, international agenciesconfirmed that particularly in the suburbs and rural areas, forced recruitment ofminors was common with children as young as 14 being forced to enlist.15 In 1998 theAngolan government lowered the minimum age of conscription from 18 to 17. Currentestimates are that there are more than 3,000 child soldiers in the Angolan armed forces.16

UNITA pledged not to recruit child soldiers after the partial demobilisation in 1996 but ithas continued to recruit minors and current estimates are of 3,000 child soldiers with UNITA.17

healingchildren’semotionalwounds ofwar is asimportant apriority asensuring theirphysical wellbeing

27

While both sides continue to deny the recruitment and participation of children, theInterAfrican Network for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch and the US Department ofState have reported that forced recruitment and participation still takes place includingthat of minors throughout all of the country’s disputed territory and that abductions ofchildren were still taking place.18 Recruits are taken to isolated camps and subjected topsychological stress and extreme hardship and any who attempt to desert are executed.Girls as young as 13 were recruited forcibly to serve as porters and camp followers andreports of sexual assault and brutality are widespread.19 Children as young as eight yearsold are reported to be fighting for armed opposition groups like the FLEC-FAC, a breakawaygroup who are reported to have forces which comprise 30–40 per cent girls.20

2.3 Psycho-social stress

Both the protracted nature of the conflict and the danger from landmines mean thatpsycho-social stress is a very real problem for children, yet it is one that is given littleattention.21

A study carried out on the psycho-social impact of war on Angola’s children showed thatof the sample studied, 91 per cent displayed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorderincluding flashbacks, sleep disorder, suppressed memories and psychosomatic illnesses.22

Large numbers of children were found to have witnessed torture, suffered starvation andwitnessed landmine explosions.23

Psychological stress on this scale is a significant source of suffering and is a severeimpediment to post-conflict reconstruction, national reconciliation and violenceprevention, particularly as research carried out shows that children exposed to violence,or those who are direct victims of violence, are at risk of future involvement in violence.

Healing children’s emotional wounds of war is as important a priority as ensuring theirphysical well being. These must be addressed to avoid an ongoing cycle of violence and poverty.

indirect affects

2.4 Health

As the previous chapter discussed, the conflict has prompted large numbers of people toflock to urban locations which has placed a severe burden on urban services that werealready overstretched.24 The national health system is virtually paralysed as a result of theconflict. Most births take place without trained birth attendants and this is reflected inthe infant mortality rate, which has increased dramatically from 40 per 1,000 live births in1989 to 270 per 1,000 live births in 1998.25 Very few drugs are provided by the state andpatients have to pay to be treated. Where the GNP is $700 and the average monthlywage between $5 and $10, the cost of medical care is prohibitive and this has also been afurther factor in the huge increase in the infant mortality rate with internally displacedpeople facing even worse situations.

Angola has one of the lowest rates of immunisation for children.26 In 1995, Angola had one of the worst rankings for progress in eradicating polio, due in large part to thedilapidated health infrastructure.27 Angola is only one of 15 countries in this category.One of the first steps for eradicating polio is a high level of immunisation during days ofnational immunisation, which can push the virus to the edge of extinction. However, apartfrom some days of tranquillity, which allowed children to be immunised, the coverage ratein Angola is patchy.

Angola was ranked low in a league table of progress the country is making towardsadequate vitamin A intake for children.28 Severe deficiency can cause blindness and death.Less severe deficiency impairs the immune system, making common diseases more likelyto be fatal. This ranking means that Vitamin A deficiency exists as a public health problem.Programmes are being implemented but present coverage is inadequate. Significantacceleration would be required to reach the goal of 80 per cent of children under tworeceiving Vitamin A but the current conflict makes this coverage virtually impossible.In 1999 an emergency vaccination programme was carried out, when 66,625 childrenbetween the ages of nine months and five years were vaccinated against measles, 45,014children up to the age of five were vaccinated against polio and Vitamin A was administered.29

Angola has no national plan or programme to counter pneumonia/acute respiratoryinfections, which account for half of all deaths in children and malnutrition oftenexacerbates such illnesses. The under five mortality rate is one of the worst in the worldwith one in three children not surviving to the age of five.

In addition, only 32 per cent of the population have access to clean water and sanitationwhich makes the chances of catching various diseases a real possibility.

A complicating factor is that the number of children under 14 infected with HIV/AIDS hasdoubled from 1994 to 1997.30

The recent resumption of fighting has resulted in the displacement of even more people.The re-mining of areas that were considered either safe or previously cleared of mines,and the huge shifts of population to the urban centres has led to fears of the risk ofepidemics like malaria. In 1999 the World Health Organisation reported outbreaks ofpolio, malaria and meningitis.31

2.5 Food

UNICEF estimates that 42 per cent of children in Angola are moderately or severelyunderweight.32 Malnutrition is a huge problem and in a country where children are at themercy of a number of diseases, malnutrition weakens their ability to survive. The WorldFood Programme estimates that the population growth rate is 12.7 per cent and it hasexpanded food aid to target children. The food situation has been described as ‘extremelyfragile’33 with large numbers at risk of starvation. UN Agencies have access to only 14 out ofthe 18 provinces. The situation in Angola continues to deteriorate and its children aresuffering.

2.6 Education

Angola ranks 31 in UNICEF tables showing the country’s national performance gap inprimary education. Only 34 per cent of children are reaching grade five, when theexpected figure is 65 per cent. According to 1995 estimates, 66 per cent of all Angolanchildren have had less than five years of school attendance.34 Understandably, schoolattendance has fallen dramatically as a result of the war and will require a great deal ofeffort to return to anything like average levels for Africa. Higher education is accessibleonly to the elite and teachers pay of approximately $5 per month means that they preferto try to earn their living elsewhere. On average earnings of $5 – $10, few can afford tosend their children to school even if schools are available and accessible.35

Angola is a signatory to a number of International Human Rights Conventions.36 HumanRights monitoring in Angola, though ongoing, is restricted and it is difficult to accessdocumented evidence of abuses especially on children. Some investigative work wascarried out by the Human Rights Unit of MONUA but this was minimal and included littlemonitoring of abuses of children’s rights.37 UN Agencies like UNICEF have regularlyreported on the situation of children where they have had access to areas.The humanrights monitors in Angola (OCHA) have not made an assessment of how the children arebeing affected by the conflict save in the cases of child combatants. A number of NGOs,like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have catalogued allegations of humanrights abuses.

Angola is also a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, neither of which containderogation clauses in times of war or armed conflict. Therefore, the state is bound byinternational law to continue to safeguard and protect the rights of children even in timesof conflict. However, the situation of Angola exposes the weaknesses of the Human Rightssystem when it comes to setting standards, ensuring enforcement and the monitoring andprotection of children’s rights in situations of conflict. For example, prior to the cominginto force of the CRC, both the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and the Declarationof Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict (1974) providedthat all efforts and all necessary steps should be taken to spare women and children fromthe ravages of war and that all operations should be directed against military objectives.However, under Article 34 of the CRC, states are required only to take ‘all feasible

28

3 Angola’s children and human rights

the state isbound by lawto continue tosafeguard andprotect therights ofchildren evenin times ofconflict

29

measures’ to protect children in times of conflict which is a significant lowering of thestandard even though states parties are required to link this duty with their existingobligations under international humanitarian law.38

In addition, under the CRC, Angola is required to file state reports detailing precisely thesituation of children in the country. In Angola’s case these are well overdue39 and it isdifficult to take action to ensure that any obligations, so far as the children are concerned,are being met. At the very least, it would be beneficial if the Angolan government madesome attempt to document or report on the problems facing the children. The currentweak system of enforcement and implementation means that even though UNICEF, theICRC and other NGOs are working on the ground in Angola, they cannot file reports forconsideration by the Committee on the Rights of the Child until the Angolan governmentfiles its own report and in the absence of this, their voices are silenced so far as theCommittee on the Rights of the Child is concerned. The Committee is powerless torequest an investigation or to use NGO reports to conduct its own investigation andreport on its findings.

The African Charter does have a more radical system of implementation whereby theCommittee of Experts can receive communications from any person or group relating toany matter covered by the Charter. This appears to include communications from thirdparties. The Committee is also empowered to collect documentation, commission studiesand make recommendations and is given unfettered powers of investigation. The systemof enforcement and implementation under the Charter is, however, in its infancy. TheAfrican Committee of Experts charged with implementing the Charter is due to beelected at the OAU summit in Lome,Togo in June 200040 and it is hoped that the OAUcountries will elect a committee that has the expertise to deal with children’s rightswhilst also providing adequate resources for the Committee to carry out its work. Mostimportantly, the OAU countries should propose that when the Committee convenes, itshould give the situation of the children in Angola the highest priority.

The current assessment of the situation in Angola has been described as ‘hopeless’41

which has inhibited the international community in attempting to find solutions. What isrequired is a fresh approach that puts at its heart the rights and futures of the childrenand, in the quest for peace, their needs must not be forgotten.

Clearly the most urgent needs include the immediate halt to recruitment, conscription orabduction of children into the conflict and indiscriminate attacks on them, coupled withfree and unimpeded access by internationalagencies42 and NGOs.

Building on this, corridors of tranquillity and daysof peace must be negotiated for the movementof aid and for immunisation purposes. Theprovision of educational facilities that areinviolable must also be seen as a priority.

In the long-term, the question of meeting thepsycho-social needs of the children, equipping and training children who have suffered fromlandmine explosions coupled with effectivelandmine clearance programmes must beimplemented.

Finally, children also have a part to play in thepeace building process. They make up almost half of Angola’s population and if peace is to bemeaningful, their voices must also be heard andtaken into account in shaping Angola’s future. In considering the position of children it isimportant to move beyond the rhetoric and to find ways in which their rights are alsorespected.

children alsohave a part to play in thepeace buildingprocess

4 conclusions

30

1 UNHCR Country Paper2 The Observer 22nd August 1999. Interview with Peter Hawkins, Save the Children Fund.3 Robbins,A The Abandoned Emergency: The Civil War the World Ignores, Humanitarian Affairs Review

Review No. 8,Winter 2000, Brussels.4 Interview with Peter Hawkins, Save the Children Fund, ibid. note 2.5 UNHCR Country Paper, ibid. note 1.6 The Child Risk Measure (CRM) compiled by UNICEF considers 5 key factors, namely under 5 mortality,

percentage of underweight children, percentage of primary school aged children not attending school, a conflict security rating and HIV/AIDS prevalence. Angola is given the worst risk measurement of 96, where the world average is 30.

7 UNICEF Progress of Nations Report, 1999.8 Antara Dev Sen, Not such a Fashionable War, New Statesman,August 1999.9 Human Rights Watch World Report 1998, also see note 7.10 Richardson, A Internal Displacement in Southern Africa: Focus Angola,April 1999. Human Rights Watch Angola

Unravels:The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, Sept 1999.11 Dastoor,T and Mocellin, J Mine-related Problems in Angola, UNICEF Working Paper Series, 1997, New York.12 ibid, note 11.13 Radda Barnen Children of War, March 1999.14 Amnesty International July 1996.15 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: The Use of Children As Soldiers in Africa – A Country Analysis

of Child Recruitment and Participation in Armed Conflict, 1999, UK.16 ibid. note 15.17 ibid. note 15.18 ibid. note 15.19 ibid. note 15.20 ibid. note 15.21 Richardson, A Internal Displacement in Southern Africa: Focus Angola,April 1999.22 This study was carried out by Christian Children’s Fund (CCF) in 1999, ibid. note 13.23 In the CCF study 20 per cent had been separated from their families because of war. 55 per cent were IDPs

and 10 per cent had fought. 66 per cent had made long journeys by foot and 82 per cent had lost everything.42 per cent had witnessed land mine explosions, 88 per cent had survived artillery bombing, 85 per cent had seen dead bodies, and 54 per cent had witnessed torture, 71 per cent had to leave schools and 85 per cent suffered starvation.

24 Medecin Sans Frontieres, Angola Update, 3 November 1999.25 ibid. note 7.26 ibid. note 7.27 ibid. note 7.28 ibid. note 7.29 Report from Pan African News Agency, 1 March 1999.30 UNICEF Progress of Nations Report, 1999.31 WHO Reports, 28 April 1999.32 UNICEF and Statement from Kofi Annan reported in IRIN, 21 January 2000.33 Human Rights Watch Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, Sept 1999.34 UNHCR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Angola, April 1999, Centre for

Documentation and Research.35 Antara Dev Sen, Not such a Fashionable War, New Statesman,August 1999.36 These include the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.37 See Chapter 4, The Quest for Peace for further discussion of the problems associated with the UN’s

monitoring of human rights abuses. The report of the UN Secretary General on the UN office in Angola (April 2000) pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1268 failed to mention the impact of the conflict on children in either the human rights or humanitarian sections although in the January report it mentioned that 42 per cent of children under five are severely or moderately underweight.

38 Vanbueren, G International Law on the Rights of the Child, 1996, Kluwer.39 Angola has two reports outstanding which were due to be filed in 1993 and 1998.40 Angola has announced that it will not be attending the OAU summit. IRIN report, 17 May 2000. At the time of

writing this chapter, no information was available as to the composition of the committee41 ibid. note 10.42 ibid. note 3.

endnotes

corporatesocialresponsibilityhas failedAngola

threethe economics

of conflictFor would-be grooms looking to buy a diamond engagement ring, but do not know

how much to spend, De Beers, the international diamond cartel, has some discreteadvice:“use the two months salary guideline”.1 Presumably this advice is for people with aregular wage as it would take the average Angolan substantially more than two months toafford a diamond. Despite having some of the largest oil reserves and diamond mines inAfrica, the Angolan people are worse off today than they were before the large off-shoreoil fields were discovered in 1995. The disparity between the enormous profits madefrom mineral resources in Angola by foreign corporations, and the social and economicstate of the country is a damning indictment of the role of foreign actors working in thecountry, and reveals once again the international community’s ability to avoidresponsibility for the problems of a country that they profit from economically.

Indeed, corporate social responsibility has failed Angola. Although most of the companiesworking in Angola have established corporate social responsibility strategies and consultwidely with international NGOs and social justice groups, there is little evidence that theyare implementing these policies in the countries in which they operate.The most positiveadvancements in controlling the illegal mining of diamonds in Angola has come not fromthe internal policies of corporations, but from regulation and the threat of regulation bythe international community. A recent World Bank report2 considers the role ofeconomics in conflict as the most important element in understanding conflict, andrecommends solutions that address the inequality and corruption as the most effectiveway of ending conflicts. In these days of globalisation, the international community andtransnational corporations have a pivotal position in which to help end the war.

This chapter will examine the poor state of the Angolan economy despite recordinvestment and booming exports and consider the role of international business in theon-going conflict. It will show that, contrary to their stated ethical positions, many of thetransnational corporations working in Angola are failing torecognise their impacts on Angolan society. The chapter will conclude with recommendations for corporations and the international community which would help toaddress the social and economic crisis and put right some of the injustices.

Angola’s economy is booming. Inward investment and exportsof oil and diamonds make it one of the fastest growingcountries in Africa. Angola receives some of the highest levelsof foreign direct investment in Africa. In 1998, $396m wasinvested in Angola, down from $412m the previous year. Asone of the Least Developed Countries, Angola’s level of FDIcomprises 13.4 per cent of total investment in all 44 LDCcountries, more than double the next highest country.3

The forecasted real GDP of Angola is 8 per cent for the year2000 and 10 per cent for 2001.4 This is up from GDP of just1 per cent in 1998.5 The real driver of the Angolan economyis oil. In 1998, GDP comprised 12.6 per cent from agriculture,16.3 per cent from services, 8.2 per cent from otherindustries, and 44.9 per cent from oil.6 The Economic

1 growth with inequity

31

Intelligence Unit forecasts that due to increased oil prices along with higher productionlevels, Angolan total oil receipts will be $5.6bn in 2000 and $6.3bn in 2001, leading to anincrease in government revenues of income from $2.3bn a year.7

After oil, diamonds are the next largest income earner for Angola, and look set toincrease as the government forces take back more UNITA territory where most of thediamond reserves are located. In 1998, government mines produced $188m worth ofdiamonds with another $240m from independent operators. In addition to the officialdiamond figures, the rebel group UNITA itself mined between $200m and $250m worthof diamonds in the same year.8 In 1995, UNITA is believed to have raised $553 millionthrough diamonds sales due to their control of 60–70 per cent of the diamondproduction. It is estimated that the actual total income raised through diamond sales inthe period 1992 to 1998 for UNITA is £3.7 billion.9

Yet, despite nine years of record investment and revenues, indicators show that the socialdevelopment of Angola is one of the poorest in the world. Since the beginning of the1990s, Angola’s ranking on the UN’s Human Development Indicators has dropped from74th to 160th out of 174 countries. UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan said of the plightof the children of Angola:“With a mortality rate of almost 30 per cent among childrenunder the age of five, Angola ranks among the world’s worst for this critical healthindicator.”10 The statistics speak for themselves.

theimprovementof society via inwardinvestmenthas notoccurred, orled to equalityof growth,socialdevelopmentor investmentin theinfrastructureof the country

32

Box 1: Social Development Indicators

Human Development Report Index 1999 Ranked 160th out of 174 countries

Per capita income $674

Life expectancy at birth 46.5 (1997)

Infant mortality rate 170 out of 1,000 live births

Under-five mortality rate 292 out of 1,000 live births

Disabled land mine victims 200,000

Population without access to safe water 69%

Population without access to health services 76%

Population without access to sanitation 42%

Enrolment rate – primary 31.9% (of relevant age group)

Statistics taken from 1999 UNDP Human Development Report

The government’s mismanagement of its revenues, the bypassing of proper channels bydiamond traders, expenditure on military equipment by both the government and therebel groups have all taken their toll on the social spending in the country and haveamounted to an enormous debt. According to the World Bank’s World DevelopmentIndicators 2000, in 1998, Angolan external debt amounted to $12,173m of which$10,616m is public and publicly guaranteed.11 The Angolan government pays 58 per cent ofgovernment revenue to service the debt, although the actual total debt service equalled124 per cent of government revenue.12 The improvement of society via inward investmenthas not occurred, or led to equality of growth, social development or investment in theinfrastructure of the country.

When the Angolan economy is examined, the actual actors are few in number and large inweight.The oil industry makes up over 80 per cent of the government revenue. Oil wasfirst discovered in Angola in 1955 and after a wildcat strike by Elf in 1995, there has beena dramatic acceleration in exploration resulting in the proven reserves of oil doubling toover 10 billion barrels, according to Angolan oil minister Botelho Vasconcelos.13 Forecastersare predicting that Angola will reach production levels of 1.4 million barrels per day (bpd)by 2005 and over 2.5 million bpd by 2015.14 The state owned oil company, SociedadeNacionao de Combustiveis (Sonangol) believes investment by foreign companies in the oilsector will reach $4 to $5 billion per year from 2000–20003.15 In the oil sector there are

2 the stake of the international community

transnationalcorporationscontinue todeny theirculpability in fuelling adevastatingconflict andrefute claimsthat theiroperationshavecontributedto the war

33

primarily six foreign corporations working with the government. Of those six, twocompanies control 85 per cent of the oil market, and consequently, most of thegovernment revenue. As a non-OPEC country, Angola is quickly becoming a majorsupplier of oil to North America and Europe – at current production levels, Angolaaccounts for 7 per cent of US oil imports.16

The second largest industry, diamonds, makes up 6 per cent of government revenue, yet,the largest diamond cartel, De Beers, has until recently controlled up to 65 per cent ofthe rough diamond market of which the majority are alleged to go to the Antwerpmarket that deals with over 80 per cent of the rough diamond sales. Of the total Angolanexports, 85 per cent goes to the EU and US. Much of the public debt is held by theinternational regional banks and bilateral debt, controlled by the G8 countries.Thereforethe number of large economic actors is actually very few. Clearly, the internationalcommunity has a great deal more invested economically in Angola than it is willing toshow in terms of political and civil support.

As the social indicators show, however, revenues from the oil, diamonds and loans are notreaching Angolan society. Corruption, lack of transparency, purchase of military equipmentby both sides of the conflict undermine the ability of the people of Angola to build theirown stable communities. While the triggers of the conflict are due to long standing issuesbetween the Government of Angola and UNITA (as discussed in Chapter 1), the role offinance resources generated by foreign companies plays a significant role in the longevityof the conflict. The Financial Times commented on this fact:“Government [Angolan]officials have for years blamed this poverty on the civil war, but a series of army offensivessince last September has severely diminished the rebel threat exposing the war as anexcuse to hide economic mismanagement.”17 That much of the $3.5 billion earned by Angola from oil is spent on military arms is not in doubt.The UK spokesperson onForeign and Commonwealth Affairs when asked whether oil revenue was used forpurchasing arms stated (sartorially) in the House of Lords recently, ‘Oil accounts forapproximately 80 per cent of Angolan government revenue. Defence spending forms thelargest part of the Angolan budget. There is no doubt that oil revenues are used to fundthe purchase of arms.’18

What does this have to do with the international community and transnationalcorporations? As the World Bank report states, ‘if the governments and the internationalcommunity can defuse the risks from its [a conflict country] primary commodity exports,generate rapid growth, and provide credible guarantees to minorities, then the risk ofconflict can be radically reduced.’19 Probably the largest contribution to ending the conflictcan come from the economic actors in Angola and careful regulation and monitoring oftheir activities in conflict countries.

Businesses operating in Angola, however, do not seem to recognise the wider impacts oftheir activities or accept that there are measures that they can take that would go a longway to reducing the conflict.This inability of corporations to place themselves in thepolitical, social and economic context of the country in which they are working has beenhighlighted in a recent publication by the human rights group, Amnesty International. InHuman Rights – is it any of your business? Geoffrey Chandler of Amnesty points out,“Civilconflict and human rights violations present companies with new challenges and dilemmasfor which few have shown themselves prepared”.20 Transnational corporations continue to deny their culpability in fuelling a devastating conflict and refute claims that theiroperations have contributed to the war. A BP Amoco representative has stated that thewar in Angola has nothing to do with oil or diamonds.21 It cannot be disputed, however,that the enormous revenues generated by the transnational corporations are leading to significant social disruption by funding the on-going conflict.The fact that the latestoffensive by the government came after a rise in oil prices demonstrates this. Indeed,the connection between transnational corporations, the revenue that they generate andcontinuing conflicts is no longer solely recognised by NGOs, but even the World Bank and the international press now stress the role of economics in promoting conflicts, andtransnational corporations, by their very nature, are at the heart of this problem. AsGeoffrey Chandler comments:“their influence upon the global political economy isgrowing and their [corporations’] presence affects the societies in which they operate.”22

Transnational corporations have promoted themselves over the past 10 years as ethicalactors working abroad, and many column inches in their brochures are devoted to theirmeasures for improving the societies in which they operate. One of the most ‘progressive’oil companies that works in Angola is BP Amoco, which is reputed for its forward thinkingin social issues. It supports the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and uses AmnestyInternational’s code of conduct. Chris Gibson-Smith, BP Amoco’s Managing Director forPolicy, sees BP as influential in promoting human rights and a stable society:“What we dobelieve is that by engaging in the debate and by helping establish safe, stable and peacefulsocieties, responsible business can promote good human rights behaviour. And wheresociety thrives business thrives”23 De Beers chairman, Nick Openheimer, agrees with this sentiment. In a 1997 interview discussing De Beers’ performance, he commentedspecifically on Angola that “we do have certain areas where we’re prospecting and work istaking place now but it is difficult with the uncertainty and also the dangers inherent inoperating in country… So peace would be helpful to everybody.”24

Although corporations may wish for peace, it is not a necessary condition for them tooperate in Angola. As a recent article in The Economist pointed out, it is profitable to workin conflict countries.The article quotes statistics from UNCTAD’s Least DevelopedCountries Report, 1999 that the average return on investment in Africa was higher thanany other region during the years 1991–1997, and states:“For brave business folk, thereare thus rich pickings from grim places.”25 Again and again, from Sudan to Burma, large oilcompanies continue to involve themselves in countries where there is on-going conflict,without any visible signs of helping the civil society to resolve the conflict. It is time,therefore, that corporations and the international community take action to implementcorporate social responsibility policies at the national level and codes of conduct at theinternational level.To start with, corporations need to address their role in the Angolanconflict, from a lack of transparency, avoiding international controls on exports to turninga blind eye to misuse of funds.

3.1 Disclosure

According to observers, the lack of transparency in the payments by oil companies iscontributing directly to much of the corruption within Angola.The IMF stated in adocument in 1995 that:

“The fiscal implications of the absence of a mechanism ensuring the recording ofaccounts for government operations related to all transactions, are perfectly clear in thedata uncovered, which shows that about 40 per cent of estimated expenditure up tillSeptember was carried out bypassing the Treasury’s [Angolan] purview and as suchwere not reflected in the budget execution accounts”26

The Angolan government, through complicated accounting procedures, has effectivelybypassed the Treasury for the majority of oil receipts.27 Consequently, there is little socialinvestment and equitable distribution of the wealth that the oil has generated.While theAngolan government could do much to resolve this by establishing a more straightforward system of receiving payments, oil companies themselves can promote anatmosphere of transparency through full disclosure.

The main oil companies working in Angola are BP-Amoco, MobileExxon,TotalFinaElf andChevron as well as a number of other companies.28 In order to operate in Angola thesecompanies need to agree either a joint venture or production sharing agreement with thestate oil company, Sonangol which, under Angolan law, has sole oil exploration rights.Tosecure these explorations rights, oil companies must pay an up-front signature fee whichhas become quite a significant sum given the excitement over the potential of these fields.In 1999, a signature fee of $900 million was paid to secure a 5000 sq. km block.

The small London-based pressure group, Global Witness, has examined this oil trail intheir publication A Crude Awakening and has shown that much of the money from thesefees is siphoned off into a number of trusts and corporations. The Financial Times hascommented that “Though Sonangol is usually seen as an efficient partner by foreign oilcompanies, it also lies at the heart of a complex system of extra-budgetary financing fedwith loans from foreign banks, which provide opportunities for corruption”.29

34

there is little socialinvestment,and equitabledistribution of the wealththat the oilhas generated

3 corporate social responsibility

a smallamount ofopenness by the oilcompanies to theirshareholderscould go along way inhelping toincreasetransparencyand reduce the‘opportunitiesfor corruption’

35

While transnational corporations work within Angola, they need to follow the laws andregulations of the country. However, the industry has avoided listing payments made inrelation to Angolan oil exploration and production. A small amount of openness by the oilcompanies to their shareholders could go a long way in helping increase transparency andreduce the ‘opportunities for corruption’.

3.2 Crude credit (or creditors with interest)

The international banking community has been very active in Angola.The Global Witnessreport, in its investigation of the oil revenues, revealed the high level of lending by globalbanks to the state-owned oil companies. According to Global Witness, $2.819 billion inprivately funded oil-backed loans have been provided over the past few years.30 Theseloans have come from a collection of international banks, including ING Barings, CreditLyonnais, Bank of Scotland, HSBC Equator Bank and UBS.31 This is a particularly devastatingtrend. Not only is the debt load of the country increasing as a whole, but the loans areincurring heavy interest rates. It is a vicious circle where loans are repaid using oilreceipts against which new loans can be made.This may be an effective way to use oilrevenue when the price of oil is rising but dangerous once the price falls and will make itmore difficult to meet the repayments on these private loans.The only way to repaythese loans will be to increase oil production, or release more blocks in order to raisemore signature fees. If lending continues in this way, any downturn in the oil market willhave serious repercussions on the economy.

This exposes the real problem the oil has contributed.While the revenues of the oil fieldscome in and are mortgaged, the lending banks will have a large stake in the well being andmaintenance of the status quo. Although any overthrow of, or interruption to, the workingsof the government would probably not effect the oil operations off-shore, the real losersmight be the banks and private lenders that hold the mortgages over future oil revenues.A new administration may not stand by any such loan agreements.Therefore, these foreignlenders have an interest in ensuring that the battle between the government and UNITA iswon by the government. Global Witness believes that this was the reason that internationallenders agreed to a $75 million loan which was, unusually, not for specific oil-relatedexpenditure, but could be used by the Angolan Government at their own discretion.The government must be able to fund the army in order to protect its investments.

3.3 Illegal trading

The chairman of De Beers, Nicky Oppenheimer, stated in his annual chairman’s address in1998 that all the company’s activities in Angola are undertaken in partnership with thestate-owned diamond company, Endiama. Indeed, counter to much of the literature aboutillicit mining and selling of diamonds, De Beers “continues to adhere fully to both theletter and the spirit of the UN ‘diamond sanctions’ and has offered its full co-operationand assistance on this issue to the President of Angola and to the Secretary General ofthe United Nations.”32 A year later, despite this commitment, De Beers announced thatthey would cease buying diamonds in Angola due to the uncertainty of their origin. Itwasn’t until March 2000 that De Beers could fully guarantee that its diamonds were notfrom conflict zones.

De Beers’ retraction from its 1998 statement and culpability in buying diamonds from therebel group UNITA was exposed in a 1998 report from Global Witness, A Rough Trade: TheRole of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict.33 The report successfullyrevealed the role of international diamond companies in exploiting the conflict, as well as contributing revenues from diamond sales.The report showed that De Beers’ annualreports admitted purchasing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of diamonds fromAngola during the 1990s, when UNITA was in possession of most of Angola’s diamondproducing areas.34

3.4 Social investment

Most companies operating in Angola have invested some of their profits back into thesociety, either through the government-sponsored trust fund, or through local NGOs andinternational donors. While this is welcomed, it is far from the amount needed to createthe strong, healthy societies that the corporate literature advocates. ExxonMobil is amajor oil company with global operations and is another example of a corporation investingin social programmes where its money will be most visible. Rather than invest in the

communities where the profits originated, ExxonMobil’s philanthropy is concentrated inthe marketplace where it sells its products, showing that it is focused more on marketingneeds than social inequalities. While there are no statistics relating to corporate donationto Angola particularly, the total contributions to all of Africa, Europe and the Middle Eastcame to $4.6m in 1998. This is compared to the approximately $30m donated tocharitable programmes in the US. In 1998, ExxonMobil contributed $3m alone to USthink tanks and policy research organisations.35

In 1999, to great international publicity, and as part of the World Health Organisation’s GlobalVaccine and Immunisation Partnership to eliminate polio, De Beers donated a one-offpayment of $2.7m to help inoculate the children in Angola.36 This is in addition to afurther $322,000 given to other projects in Angola. While this charity is welcomed, itpales against the $45m the corporation gave through social investment in its native SouthAfrica from 1993 to 1998. Considering that Angola has probably been one of the mostimportant countries to De Beers’ profits in the past 100 years, the rate of social spendingin the country is poor. Corporations working in Angola should reinvest more of theirprofits in the country as part of a reconciliation policy.

The greatest steps forward in controlling the illicit diamond trade did not come from DeBeers or other businesses working in the diamond industry, but from actions taken andthreats of action by the international community. The international community needs tostop separating peace from economics. While the role of the UN and civil society iscritical in ending the conflict, so too is the role of equity in growth and the economicempowerment of the people of Angola. Therefore, the international community must takea positive role in regulating and monitoring the economic resources of Angola to ensure‘leakage’ of all types is prevented.

4.1 Sanctions

The UN Sanctions Committee, under the leadership of the Canadian, Robert Fowler (as discussed in Chapter 4) has made significant advances in putting pressure on theinternational diamond trade to increase transparency and reduce its use of illegaldiamonds. In March 2000, Fowler produced a hard hitting report37 that, after many monthsof investigation, condemned many of the actors in the diamonds trade, from the miningcompanies to the markets in Europe and Asia. The review of the UN sanctions concludedthat diamonds were still being smuggled out of rebel held territories in Angola and sold in the diamond markets of Europe. The UN report criticised the international marketsthrough which diamonds are bought and sold for a lack of regulatory supervision of themarket, including Antwerp, Mumbai and Tel Aviv. Antwerp is the largest market for roughdiamonds, accounting for 80 per cent of all sales and the Sanctions Committee was highlycritical of the Belgian government for its lax attitude to restrictions “largely influenced bythe often expressed fear that stricter regulation would simply cause traders to take theirbusiness elsewhere”.38 The report goes on to say that “the unwillingness or inability of thediamond industry, particularly in Antwerp, to police its own ranks is a matter of specialconcern to the Panel. Persons known within the industry to be dealing in UNITAdiamonds have as a general rule neither been exposed by the industry, nor subjected toany sanction by the industry”.39

4.2 Certification

Further initiatives at the international level are continuing to impact on the diamondtrade. US House Representative Tony Hall took steps to regulate the diamond trade aftervisiting Sierra Leone to develop other methods for implementing the sanctions.Congressman Hall has introduced a bill into the House of Representatives calling forregulation. Called the ‘Consumer Access to a Responsible Accounting of Trade Act of2000’, or the ‘Carat Act’, it calls for ‘gem-quality diamonds imported into the US marketto be accompanied by a certificate listing where they were mined.’40 He has proposedlabelling diamonds with certificates of origin as, according to the Global Witness report,diamonds can be visually distinguished even in a mixed batch. With the US buying 65 percent of the diamonds in the world, Hall means to identify the country of origin so thatAmerican consumers are aware that the diamonds they buy may be fostering wars inAfrican nations.

the greateststeps forwardin controllingthe illicitdiamondtrade… camefrom actionstaken andthreats ofaction by theinternationalcommunity

36

4 economic measures for peace

thecontradictionbetween thegrowth inrevenues and GDP andthe socio-economicreality on theground is adevastatingindictment of the lack ofresponsibilityof theinternationalcommunity

37

In the UK, Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook raised the issue at a meeting of the G8 foreignministers in December and got agreement from the Japanese government, leaders of theG8 in 2000, to investigate the issue and report back in July 2000.41 The UK government’sefforts to spear-head the diamond certification scheme are part of a broader effort tocurb illicit diamond trading worldwide.The agreement from the G8 in December 1999 foran international project to embark on a diamond certification scheme, marks the firstattempt for states to consider vetting the origin of diamondsfor sale.This will have implications not only for Angola but fora number of wars being fought in central and western Africa,and is being presented as a conflict prevention tool.

The pressure from the UN and governments has changed the way diamonds are mined and has gone a long way toreduce the revenues for the rebel groups. The role of thecorporations mining the diamonds in these actions was non-existent and despite their good intentions, companies like De Beers were brought to the table reluctantly.Regulation and monitoring at international level is critical to check the operations of corporations and increasetransparency in the market.

4.3 IMF

Recently, the International Monetary Fund has beeninstrumental in addressing the issue of transparency in theAngolan economy. In early April 2000, the Angolan government entered a nine-montheconomic monitoring agreement with the IMF which will look at the sources ofgovernment revenue and should be instrumental in highlighting discrepancy, as fiscaltransparency is one of the IMF’s major concerns.42 This is a precursor for a possible IMFprogramme in the country, which may go some way to improving the lax regulations.TheAngolan government needs to take on board World Bank and IMF recommendations toconform to international standards of accounting.

4.4 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises

The OECD is currently reviewing its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises43 to establishstandard operating procedures on a number of different issues.The guidelines includeemployment, environment, bribery, competition and taxation amongst others. Aninternational standard code of conduct is desperately needed to ensure corporationsimplement ethical guidelines in every country they work in.The international communityshould look to establish these guidelines as a mandatory international standard witheffective implementation procedures. National governments should incorporate theguidelines into their national legislation and monitor their own corporations’ use of the guidelines.

The contradiction between the growth in revenues and GDP and the socio-economicreality on the ground is a devastating indictment of the lack of responsibility of theinternational community. International actors with a stake in the country; oil companies,the diamond industry, banks, and governments must take responsibility to help end the conflict. Many of the developed countries have greater interests in Angola than theyadmit. That Angolan oil makes up 7 per cent of US oil imports shows the reliance thattheir economy has on keeping Angolan oil flowing.

Corporations have expressed their commitment to ethical and social programmes as part of their core responsibility, but are failing to deliver them in Angola.They need toimplement effective internal procedures that connect their international stance oncorporate social responsibility to their actual operations in country.The internationalbanking community must take responsibility for its lending and ensure that there is no leakage of funds.The international community has taken much-welcomed steps inbeginning to regulate the diamond trade, but for the measures to be effective they mustextend regulation to the diamond and banking industries.

5 conclusion

The international community can play a greater role in reducing the conflict throughregulation and monitoring of the monies raised through the exploitation of commodities.Corporations have shown that although they are concerned about their role in societiesin general through their social responsibility programmes, they are not willing to see theirfull implementation at the country level.Therefore, the international community must takea more serious role in regulating the workings of transnational corporations in conflictcountries. There need to be economic solutions to a conflict that is fuelled by economicconditions.

While the off-shore oil industry in Angola is largely unaffected by the conflict, and thediamond industry is allowed to work on the margins without proper certification, themain actors do not need to get involved.The oil will still flow, the private debt servicingwill still take place. However, the humanitarian crisis is enormous.Those countries thatrely on Angolan commodities to sustain the livelihoods of their industries and citizensowe Angola more than the price of a barrel of oil or a carat of a diamond.The marketrules in Angola, but the resulting social crisis will destroy the heart of the country.

38

39

1 Taken from the De Beers website at www.adiamondisforever.com/M/m4b.htm. Accessed on the 6 June 2000.2 Collier, Paul, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,World Bank, 15 June 2000.3 UNCTAD, The Least Developed Countries Report, 1999, p. 45, Geneva, 2000.4 Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report – Angola, 4rth Quarter 1999, London.5 Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report – Angola, 4rth Quarter 1999, London.6 ibid.7 ibid.8 ibid.9 Global Witness, A Rough Trade:The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict, November 1998.10 Angola Reflections of Peace Building, p3.11 The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, p. 248,Washington, 2000.12 Unfinished Business: the world’s leaders and the millennium debt challenge p. 31, Jubilee 2000, London, 1999.13 Shaxson, Nicholas, War-torn Angola on brink of great expansion of oil output as black gold starts to flow,

Financial Times, 7 January, 2000.14 ibid.15 ibid.16 ibid.17 Angolan IMF deal could lead to loan agreement, Financial Times, 6 April 2000.18 Baroness Scotland of Asthal,Written Answers, Hansard, 16 March 2000.19 Collier, Paul, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,World Bank, 15 June 2000.20 Griffin, Rob, Amnesty International sets out its better-business guide, Sunday Business, 4 June 2000.21 CNN, BP defends big Angola payment, denies fuelling the war, http://www.cnn.com, 1 June 2000.22 Griffin, Rob, Amnesty International sets out its better-business guide, Sunday Business, 4 June 2000.23 BPAmoco website, www.bpamoco.com/humanrights/article.htm. Accessed on 31 May 2000.24 Interview with Nick Openheimer as posted on De Beer’s website, www.edata.co.za/debeers/interview1.html,

22 December 1997. Accessed on 7 June 2000.25 Business in Risky Places: Risky Returns,The Economist, 20 May 2000.26 IMF Statement, 1995, taken from Global Witness, A Crude Awakening:The Role of Oil and Banking in Angola’s Civil

War and the Plunder of State Assets, London, January 2000.27 ibid.28 TotalFinaElf has a reputation for working in conflict countries which other oil companies avoid. In addition to

its work in Burma, the company is rumoured to be considering purchasing oil rights in Sudan from Talisman, a Canadian oil company.

29 War-torn Angola on brink of great expansion of oil output as black gold starts to flow, Financial Times,7 January 2000.

30 Global Witness, A Crude Awakening:The Role of Oil and Banking in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets,London, January 2000.

31 ibid.32 Chairman’s Statement, www.edata.co.za/debeers/Annual_Report/1998/chairman_statement.html. Accessed on

7 June 2000.33 Global Witness, A Rough Trade:The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict, November 1998.34 ibid.35 Information taken from the ExxonMobil website, www.mobil.com/contributions.htm. Accessed on 31 May 2000.36 De Beers gives $2.7m, Financial Times, 10 July 1999.37 United Nations Security Council, Report on of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions

against UNITA, GENERAL S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.38 ibid. paragraph 89.39 ibid. paragraph 91.40 Congressman Hall, The Carat Act, from a Floor Statement, House of Representatives,Washington DC,

1 November 1999.41 Hooper, John, Cook urges end to trade in illicit gems,The Guardian, 18 December 1999.42 Shaxson, N Angolan IMF deal could lead to loan agreement, Financial Times, 6 April 2000.43 OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Accessed at www.oecd.org.

endnotes

40

essentially atop-levelapproach, theprocess hasbeen doggedby difficulties

The search for peace in Angola to date has been conspicuous for its failure. Elusive,long and arduous, the efforts of the ‘international community’ through the United

Nations have not borne the fruits of peace. Essentially a top-level approach, the processhas been dogged by difficulties. Political stalling and manoeuvring, duplicity, slow or partialimplementation of accords, and violations of humanitarian and human rights law havecharacterised the approaches of both UNITA, and to a lesser degree, the government.Added to this were ineffective monitoring of the accords by the UN, a narrow group ofstates with vested interests directing the peace process (the ‘Troika’) and an agenda thatsought military peace without involving the Angolan people.

This chapter will give a brief overview of the main player in this peace process so far, theUN, which has attempted to broker a military peace since 1989. It will briefly look atthese attempts, past and present, their impact, and future prospects for the UN as anagent for peace in Angola. The chapter will then go on to examine the other actors thatmust be involved in this quest for peace, looking particularly at Angolan civil society.

1.1 Historical role

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been the main peace-broker,making repeated efforts to steer Angola toward peace.The first half of the decadeinvolved intense diplomatic activity, headed by the ‘Troika’ (Portugal, Russia and USA),which led to a ceasefire under the Bicesse Accords in 1991 and the first election inAngola’s history in 1992. Shortly after the MPLA were declared the winners, JonasSavimbi, the leader of UNITA, plunged the country back into a vicious war. Effortsto salvage the accords, via the Zambia-led, UN-mediated Lusaka process,succeeded in 1994 when UNITA’s military losses rendered a peace deal attractive to them.

Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was to be overseen by a jointcommission made up of UNITA and government representatives and the UN.UNAVEM III, which later became known as MONUA, was charged withpeacekeeping, demobilisation of UNITA and government soldiers, monitoringof the ceasefire and human rights abuses, training in human rights for nationalNGOs and government officials and strengthening civil society. Co-ordinationof humanitarian assistance and provision of funding was, and still continues tobe, administered under a separate UN unit, OCHA,1 which has played a veryuseful humanitarian role. Since war resumed in 1998, the role of MONUA hasbecome almost obsolete and, with the exception of its human rights division,it has closed. The new mission, renamed UNOA, was due to begin work inOctober but is being blocked by the Angolan government which objects to it having any political role.2

1.2 Problems & obstacles

The UN’s inability to fulfil its mandate satisfactorily has been well documentedby NGOs, particularly in the past few years.3 A four-year study by Human

fourthe quest for

peacethe role of the UN,African regionalbodies, and civil society

1 the United Nations

41

Rights Watch (HRW), released in September 1999, severely criticised the UN for its failureto act on violations of the accords, human rights abuses and sanctions-busting. It alsocriticised the slow deployment of peacekeepers and the decision not to impose an armsembargo on both parties. More seriously, HRW accused the UN of eroding confidenceand respect for the accords by what HRW calls a policy of “See no evil, hear no evil” forfear of upsetting the process.

It must be acknowledged that serious constraints were placed on UNAVEM III andMONUA by the Government of Angola and by the environment in which the UN missionsworked, which severely hindered their ability to carry out their mandate. Responsibilitymust also be attributed to the Troika and to the member states for providing inadequateresources.4 Ultimately, however, responsibility for the failure of the peace process mustprimarily rest with UNITA, which failed to meet various obligations agreed in theProtocol.5 However, it is interesting to note that senior UN officials have not refuted theclaims of the HRW report, and have even commended its recommendations.6 Kofi Annanhimself, the UN Secretary General, has admitted that the UN should have done more.7

1.3 Recent improvements

Since early 1999, the UN has adopted a more aggressive, robust approach. Annan’sreplacement of the narrow Troika with a wider ‘committee of friends’ was a positivemove, although pressure from Lisbon, Moscow and Luanda is believed to have renderedthis committee largely ineffective.8 Of most significance has been the appointment ofAmbassador Fowler to the chair of the UN Sanctions Committee in January 1999.Energetically committed to his mandate of catching violators of sanctions placed againstUNITA,9 Fowler directed a six-month investigation by a Panel of Experts.10 The findings ofthis panel, which were released on 15th March 2000 in a report to the UN SecurityCouncil,11 found several African and European countries guilty of assisting UNITA inaccessing fuel and arms and of acting as conduits for diamond sales.Togo, Burkina Faso,Rwanda, Belgium and Bulgaria were the main countries to receive blame.12 Controversially,the report breaks from UN Security Council tradition and names individuals and heads ofstates. It calls for sanctions against these countries and individuals which have violatedsanctions and challenges the UNSC to act or fear losing all credibility as a sanctionsenforcer. As a result, it has sparked off controversial rows between many Africancountries and the UN.13 Furthermore, its recommendations are directed not just at theviolators or at the UNSC, but at the international community by calling for tighterregulations over arms and diamond sales.

The UNSC has responded by setting up a monitoring committee made up of five expertsto conduct further investigations and to submit a report of their findings on 18 October,2000.14 However, there is great concern about how this committee will complete its workgiven the fact that in late May, the experts had yet to be appointed.

The degree to which the Fowler report will reduce UNITA’s military capability is notclear. It will undoubtedly raise the cost of military supplies, and, as the report itselfacknowledges, the efforts of the panel, sympathetic governments and NGOs have alreadymade it more difficult for UNITA to trade diamonds and arms.15 However, intelligencereports are emerging which suggest that UNITA is continuing to receive supplies.16

Furthermore, the report falls down in what is omitted. No recommendations are giventhat substantively deal with the problem of international oil companies selling fuel toUNITA, or that call to account those government officials who are allegedly facilitatingillicit oil and diamond deals.17 Neither does it provide information on alleged Israeli,Russian, Indian or American diamond dealers.

A second area in which the UN’s approach has improved has been in the area of humanrights work.The UN has become somewhat more robust and proactive in this area byconducting workshops and seminars in human rights training for NGOs, governmentofficials and the public. Since the resumption of fighting at the end of 1998, MONUA’swork has been severely curtailed. However it continues to fund small, national NGOs toengage in civic education and awareness raising. One church organisation received suchfunding for seminars which were attended by local government officials, the police,Ministry of Justice staff and lawyers throughout 1999. These were very successfulaccording to feedback from the participating groups, however the seminars had to stopdue to an end to funding. MONUA also apparently had tentative plans to organise a forum

since early1999, the UN

has adopted a moreaggressive,robustapproach

42

if it (UN)continues to take a no-nonsense,robustapproach, itsefforts couldbe pivotal

43

of churches, NGOs and donors which would engage in international advocacy work anddialogue with the government and UNITA.18

1.4 Future role

The UN is the only body with an official mandate to conduct vital peace-buildinginitiatives in Angola and therefore has an important role to play. Yet in the light of theabove findings, what kind of a role can this be?

First, the latest efforts to combat sanctions-busting under Ambassador Fowler havecertainly boosted the UN’s credibility. If it continues to take a no-nonsense, robustapproach in implementing the recommendations of the Fowler Report, its efforts couldbe pivotal in reducing the means to pursue the war.

Secondly, in order to retain its role, the UN must radically re-assess its oversight of theimplementation of peace accords: a clear mandate to proactively monitor and publiclyreport human rights abuses, and to call violators of accords to account is the only wayforward.Thirdly, a broader-based ownership beyond the Troika is essential if the process isnot to be dogged by political machinations and duplicity: Annan’s ‘committee of friends’ ismore appropriate and requires strong support by the international community if oppositionfrom the Troika countries is not to succeed. A fourth step, and related to the previouspoint, would be for the UN to co-ordinate meetings by the Southern Africa DevelopmentCommunity (SADC), the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and other regional bodieswhich presently are fumbling for direction.Their role is currently very small and requiresstrengthening if the local and regional dimensions of the war are to be factored in.

Concerning facilitation, a further useful role for the UN would be to facilitate regularforums in which the NGO and donor community could discuss important issues relatingto humanitarian and human rights issues (eg access, staff security, etc) with governmentand UNITA representatives.The UN could also act as a platform for information sharingand co-ordination of advocacy work amongst Angolan and international civil society.Lastly, the valuable civic education training for government officials, local leaders, donorsand other parties to the conflict needs to be continued and expanded. Considerationought to be given to broadening funding for such training to international NGOs in orderto scale-up delivery which presently is confined to national NGOs.

The call for ‘African solutions to African problems’, although becoming a cliche, cannot beignored.The necessity for African nations to be centrally involved in seeking peace inAngola is clear. However, up until very recently this has all too often been difficult torealise due to the very complicity of most African nations in each others’ wars – thecurrent war in the Democratic Republic of Congo being the most notable example.The Fowler Report has shown the depths to which certain African states have beencomplicit in the prosecution of the Angolan war. Ambassador Fowler himself identifiedthis after his tour of Africa last year when he concluded that there was “a crisis of African solidarity”.19

This goes some way to explain the difficulties that the Southern Africa DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) have had in taking alead in pursuing peace for Angola.

SADC’s role has been paralysed by the disagreement amongst its members over howSADC should address crises within its region. Whether these disagreements areresolvable or are themselves symptomatic of a broader regional crisis is the currentquestion.The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) has extensively studied SADC’s dilemma and reports:

“When the countries of… SADC meet to discuss issues relating to politics, defence,security, conflict management and disaster relief, they are supposed to do so under theauspices of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (established in Gaboroneon 28 June 1996 to fill the gap left by the Front Line States). Unfortunately, the SADCOrgan was never made fully operational due to a difference of opinion over whether itwas meant to be a part of SADC or an independent body. …Many suspected that aMandela-Mugabe tug-of-war for sub-regional power underpinned the debate.” 20

2 role of African regional bodies

The most recent SADC summit held in Maputo, Mozambique in August 1999 directed theCouncil of Ministers to revisit SADC’s structural problems and report back within sixmonths. However, the upsurge in regional crises21 led ACCORD to report:

“The new turbulence is precisely what the SADC Organ was envisaged to stamp out…Unfortunately, with the Organ in limbo, the crises are finding SADC unprepared or lackingthe political will to react as a region. The question… is whether the Maputo directivehas the potential to unlock the deadlock and to bring vitality to the SADC Organ.” 22

Clearly, internal political disagreements amongst SADC’s members makes it unable toresolve or manage regional conflicts.Without serious attempts made to resolve thisproblem, in particular the deepening divide between the two camps,23 any role for thisregional body to engage in peace-building can only be superficial.

However, positive signs are emerging that certain African states, particularly Angola’sneighbours, are beginning to take a more proactive role in seeking peace.

First, the spilling over of the war in Angola into neighbouring territory which beganOctober 1999 has begun to stir the surrounding nations into calling for dialogue. In earlyFebruary, South Africa began urgent talks with Namibia on the build-up of tensions alongits border with Angola. Of particular note was the statement given on national televisionby the South African Defence Minister calling for dialogue between the parties and statingtheir belief that a military solution to the crisis no longer exists. “No matter who may winthe war, there will be no lasting peace, so we have to get the parties to talk”.24

The skirmishes along the border have also roused Namibian church leaders to speak outagainst their government’s decision to support the Angolan government militarily. Sayingthat they “could no longer watch the war in Angola with folded arms,” they met with thePresident and urged him to rethink his support.25

Secondly, international pressure is mounting for the region to take stronger leadership inpursuing peace, particularly relating to the implementation of sanctions against UNITA.The Fowler Report and the subsequent UNSC resolution (1295) made a clear case forSADC to play a much more central role in strengthening the control of illicit arms, oil and diamond flows. By presiding over committees and conferences on these issues,establishing monitoring procedures at the borders and information exchange mechanisms,SADC could indeed have a powerful role. If lack of technical and financial resources is anissue, there are several non-African states with strong enough commitment to sanctions-busting likely to offer assistance.

In the area of peace brokering, the OAU would be a more appropriate body consideringthe fact that its members have fewer vested interests in Angola than do SADC members.However, the recent spotlight placed on Togo, Burkina Faso and Rwanda for violation ofsanctions in the Fowler Report demonstrates the care that would need to be taken by theOAU in approaching such negotiations. For example, the OAU may need to consider ways ofpreventing offender nations from participating. It is conceded that the OAU’s role in brokeringpeace between Ethiopia and Eritrea was not entirely successful. However, observers believeit was hampered by the fact that its headquarters are located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.This does not predispose the OAU to failure in brokering peace between the Angolangovernment and UNITA; however the OAU must seriously consider action in this area.

Civil society in Angola has historically been excluded from the peace process but hasrecently begun to emerge as a crucial player. The unfavourable environment within Angolahas restricted the growth of local NGOs, women’s groups, trade unions, churches andcommunity groups since Independence. As a result, ‘civil society’ has traditionally beenweak.Yet in the last few years, particularly 1999, Angola has witnessed a marked growth inthis sector, not only in numbers of civic groups formed but in the vision, goals and unityof its members.

3.1 Growing years

The Bicesse Accords of 1991 were a quiet but significant turning point for civil society in Angola. They required the government to pass legislation allowing freedom of assemblyand association, freedom of speech, and lifting restrictions on domestic travel. Although

positive signsare emergingthat certainAfrican statesare beginningto take amoreproactive rolein seekingpeace

44

3 Angolan civil society

45

these rights have by no means always been respected, particularly the freedom of speech.26

The 1990s have seen a huge growth in the number of national non-governmental agencies(NGOs) and civil society organisations.27 Many of these are neighbourhood groups, tradeand professional organisations, environment and women’s groups, and humanitarianorganisations.With the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accords and the reduction in fighting,these latter groups began to conduct civic education initiatives in the mid-1990s toincrease knowledge amongst NGOs and the public of their civic rights andresponsibilities, and the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.These efforts have includededucation seminars, workshops and media activities, as well as capacity building work with NGO staff in conflict resolution.

ADRA (Action for Rural Development and the Environment) and FONGA (Forum ofAngolan NGOs) were amongst the earliest NGOs to engage seriously in this sort ofwork, believing that sustainable peace can only be achieved through broad understandingand ownership of human rights.28 FONGA’s members work in social assistance, humanrights, disabled rights, peacebuilding, education and health.The international NGO,Development Workshop, has tried to make rights education relevant to people’s dailystruggle to survive by, for example, educating shanty-town dwellers and market traders on laws regulating who has rights to land and trade.29

3.2 The Church – an emerging actor

No discussion of civil society in Angola is complete without reference to the Christianchurch which has become increasingly engaged in civic education, humanitarian, advocacyand peace work.With the majority of the population professing to be Christian, and a 5%annual growth rate in membership, the church is a very significant part of civil society.30

The fact that the church straddles both warring parties (for example, certain churchleaders are known to be respected by both Savimbi and Dos Santos) also gives it a unique potential to bridge divides.

Although it is very difficult to talk about ‘the church’ in Angola as a single entity – it hastraditionally suffered from deep divisions between denominations – this sector hasbenefited like other groups from the more positive environment that the peace accordshave brought.31 Not only has church membership substantially grown, but churches fromall denominations have begun to engage energetically in peace education and awarenessraising amongst their congregations and the wider community. Seminars and workshopsthat discuss the constitution, the responsibilities and rights of citizens, and peace andreconciliation issues are run by the Evangelical Association in Angola (AEA) and theChristian Council of Angola (CICA), amongst others. These workshops are not restrictedjust to church members but encourage local level government and traditional leaders toattend.32 Radio programmes on the importance of democracy and tolerance arebroadcast regularly by CICA and the Catholic church.

Since the resumption of fighting in December 1998, the churches have increased inboldness and vigour in speaking out against violence and the continuation of war. Churchleaders have publicly appealed to the warring parties to respect the Lusaka Accords and the population suffering the effects of war. The Catholic Church, traditionally pro-government, sent strongly worded pastoral letters and public statements in 1999calling on the government and UNITA to negotiate, decryingviolations of human rights and calling the nation toreconciliation.33

A commitment toward concerted and co-ordinated prayerhas also emerged, to the extent that national prayer meetingsand conventions have become regular events. In January 1999more than 1,000 women gathered in Luanda to pray forpeace and reconciliation.

These peace efforts culminated at the end of 1999 with aninternational tour by prominent Angolan church and civilsociety leaders to lobby western governments to supporttheir efforts for peace.34

Most significantly, a trend has slowly begun to emerge ofchurch unity and increased church co-operation to work

civil society in Angola hashistoricallybeen excludedfrom thepeace process

together towards peace.World Vision has contributed to this momentum through twoworkshops which it organised last year (see Box 1).

Another example of this move toward church co-operation is the recent launch of anecumenical peace movement by three leading church bodies (Episcopal, Anglican andEvangelical). The Inter-Church Group for Peace in Angola (GEIPA) is, in fact, the fourthpeace movement to be launched since beginning of 1999: The Catholic Movimento ProPaz, the secular Angolan Group for the Promotion of the Culture of Peace (GAP) and theAngolan Reflection Group for Peace (GARP) were all formed in an effort to vocalise civilsociety’s fatigue with the war. GEIPA differs from these in that it is an inter-churchmovement and plans to act as the national co-ordinating ecumenical body for thesechurches’ contribution to the peace effort. These include human rights monitoring,mediation, advocacy and training of church leaders.

The common call of each group, however, is the need to include and empower Angolancivil society in the peace process. There is a universal sense of fatigue and frustration with the war which is seen as being pursued for the sake of aggrandisement rather thanfor the good of the people. Indeed, there exists an overwhelming consensus amongst thechurches and broader civil society to pursue real, sustainable peace that is more than anend to fighting. To achieve this, a wide range of actors must be included, not just top-levelofficials and foreign diplomats. They assert that ownership of the peace by the people is essential if it is to be maintained. The marginalisation of civil society is viewed as animportant contributor to the failure of past peace processes. One member of thedelegation visiting the UK pointed out that if the Angolan people had ‘owned’ the peaceprocess or understood it, they would have sought to hold the warring parties accountablefor their abuses.

The impact of all these efforts and initiatives is difficult to assess at this early stage. Notonly are there few mechanisms to measure the impact of the civic education initiatives,but a dilapidated infrastructure and war restrictions inhibits communication flows. Thepeace groups are very new and so far lack one co-ordinating body or secretariat.Without this, they are vulnerable to competition, duplication and persecution.

However, there are some indicators of progress. Peace and reconciliation initiatives aretaking place around the country, even if small and modest, and there is an eagernessamongst many people to know about their rights.35 For example, some women in Cabindawho have attended peace education seminars given by the church are choosing not tosend their children to fight in the war.36 Above all, people are talking of a ‘current ofdemocracy’ emerging within Angolan civil society and there is a sense that the awakeningof the church is likely to add critical weight to this current.

46

Box 1: Mobilising churches to work for peace

In September and December 1999 World Vision organised two very successfulworkshops for church leaders in Angola, with the aim of encouraging and empoweringthe churches to become more engaged in working towards peace. Specifically, theworkshops aimed to foster stronger relationships across denominations and focusedvery much on prayer and reconciliation between the churches. Nearly 50representatives from Protestant, Catholic, Evangelical and independent churchesattended the first workshop which included very powerful times of confession andreconciliation. Many pastors have since commented on how this workshop led directlyto a series of inter-church prayer meetings for peace which were unprecedented.One pastor recalled how umbrella church organisations such as CICA and AEA hadnever held such prayer meetings together before.“For the first time”, he said “thechurches in Angola pray together in only one name – God”. Another commented thatbefore the initiative church division had been a serious problem, but no longercontinued to be so.

The follow-up seminar took this a step further, facilitating the church leaders toidentify how they could become more actively involved in seeking peace. Many pastorshave come away envisioned and encouraged by the potential of their church.

the fact thatthe churchstraddles bothwarringparties givesit a uniquepotential tobridge divides

the war inAngola is too complexand multi-dimensionalto be ‘solved’by the UN

alone

47

Whilst not wishing to overestimate what civil society can achieve (it is still very young),it is clear that this sector could have considerable influence not only in bringing the twosides to the table, but in shaping and upholding future accords. The energising of thechurch towards unity, prayer and action is likely to be a critical factor in this.

Training in management, conflict mediation, technological support, organisational skills andeducation in the meaning and practice of democracy are all areas of need. Improving currentprogrammes is also a need, particularly in tailoring approaches with a gender and agesensitivity.37 Churches, NGOs, consultancies, trade unions and donor agencies from aroundthe world can all contribute to this capacity-building. In particular, expertise from post-conflict civil societies whose countries have had similar experiences would be oftremendous benefit. But above all, lobbying UNSC member governments and exposing humanrights abuses internationally are vital in ensuring the success and protection of civil society’sefforts in a country where restrictions on members of this sector are still formidable.

Yet what is most important about this move toward civic education and civil societystrengthening is the fact that it is helping to build a democratic culture, even if slowly. Twomass protests have been conducted this year for the first time since 1977, indicating achange in the political climate.38 With presidential and parliamentary elections due to beheld in 2001 (for the first time since 1992) this is a crucial moment for such education tobe supported and accelerated. The lack of a democratic culture throughout Angola’smodern history has been attributed by many leading Angolans as lying at the root of notonly the cause of the war, but of the failure of the peace process. Thus it is this culturethat must be supported and built if another peace process is to begin or succeed.

Although the United Nations has been the main prosecutor for peace, the past decadehas shown that the war in Angola is too complex and multi-dimensional to be ‘solved’ by the UN alone. A top-down diplomatic approach that seeks a military solution,marginalises indigenous communities and is vulnerable to manipulation by the warringparties, can only hope to bring short-term, superficial peace. Clearly, the need for adifferent approach is vital and urgent.

Rather, the various dimensions of this long-running conflict point to the need for a multi-track approach which tackles the various political and social dimensions, as well as thefinancial and trade dimensions.39

The UN’s recognition of its past failure and its more radical, aggressive stance onsanctions is welcome and is earning it some credibility for having a continued role to playin ending the fighting. However, the release of the Fowler Report is not sufficient withoutan energetic commitment to pursuing its recommendations. Angolan civil society’ssupport for the continued presence of the UN and its recognition of the UN’s importantrole adds to the case for the UN to have a future in the peace process.The UN, indeed, plays a valuable role in co-ordination and facilitation of humanitarianassistance, funding civic education initiatives and government capacity building. Yet this canonly be the case if the UN adopts a broader understanding of the causes and solutions tothis war, thus enabling civil society and African states to assume a bigger role. In addition,a radical re-assessment of how to oversee the implementation of peace accords is critical,including a clear mandate to proactively monitor and report human rights abuses. Areformed, tougher, accountable UN that works in partnership with other actors, creatingstrategic alliances with government and civil society can be the only way forward.

The responsibility facing many African states to acknowledge their role in the conflict andto pursue an alternative is stronger than ever. Not only has the recent spilling over of thewar into neighbouring states prompted calls for dialogue, but the Fowler Report hasconfirmed suspicions of the complicity of many African states in this war. The vestedinterests of SADC and its members in Angola make it an inappropriate body to brokerpeace, however, it holds the potential to play a crucial role in monitoring borders andstrengthening controls on arms, oil and diamond flows. The OAU presents a more viableoption although mechanisms would need to be put in place to ensure sanctions violators,such as Togo, are excluded.

4 conclusion

Angolan civil society is for the first time this century beginning to grow and slowlyemerge as a credible player not only in facilitating negotiations, but in building a culture ofpeace at the grass-roots level which will be owned by Angolans themselves. This is acrucial ingredient for the sustainability of any official peace process that is re-started.However, this emerging constituency is young, fragile and vulnerable and requires strongmoral, political, financial and spiritual support from international civil society if it is to haveany success. An organised, united and supported opposition to the war is critical for anykind of end to the fighting.

Finally, the onus on the international community to assist is paramount. The UN SecurityCouncil must continue to pressurise both parties to a negotiated settlement and holdabusers of international humanitarian law and human rights to account.Violation of theOttawa Treaty Ban on Landmines must also be accounted for. An international war crimestribunal to try Jonas Savimbi for the crimes committed in his name ought to beconsidered. Lastly, tighter regulations and controls on arms exports is a continuingconcern which countries such as the UK and USA have particular responsibility to actupon. Strengthening the EU Code of Conduct on Arms and pressing for an InternationalCode of Conduct are important tools in the battle to reduce arms availability in the region.

The battle against the war in Angola is at a critical juncture. A window of opportunityexists to act decisively. Without each of these actors working innovatively, imaginatively,responsibly, and above all, in solidarity, any future peace negotiations will only be anotherbrief reprieve in the unending cycle of violence and war in Angola.

the battleagainst thewar in Angolais at a criticaljuncture, awindow ofopportunityexists to actdecisively

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49

1 Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which was formerly known as UCAH.2 Under Resolution 1268, the 30-member mission has a mandate that covers diplomatic, humanitarian, human

rights and capacity building activities “for restoring peace, assisting the Angolan people in the area of capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, the promotion of human rights, and coordination other activities”.

3 Angola Unravels by Human Rights Watch is the most recent (September 1999). CIIR’s Peace Postponed (1998) by Alex Vines is similarly critical. Also, see Kibble’s article, No room for peace(1999) which discusses the deep frustration felt by UK NGOs for the UN’s role.

4 MONUA comprised only1,500 rapid reaction troops, 345 civilian police and 85 military observers.5 In his report to the UN Security Council, 14 April 1997, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, expressed

concern over UNITA’s ‘foot-dragging’ in implementing the provisions, particularly in the area of demobilisation.Disarmament was equally problematic, with both sides re-arming. Landmines continued to be laid by both sides, even after the Government signed the Ottawa Treaty in 1998 (ICBL Report, pg 113–116). UNITA’s propaganda radio continued, and the government refused to allow the UN radio station to be set up.

6 Ambassador Fowler, chair of UN Sanctions Committee, is reported to have commended its recommendations:see Africa Confidential, (1999).

7 IRIN-SA report, (2000b).8 Africa Confidential, (1999).9 Sanctions imposed against UNITA include: Purchase of Arms and Petroleum, September 1993 (UNSC

Resolution 864),Travel abroad, August 1997 (Resolution 1127), Export or Sale of Diamonds, June 1998 (Resolution 1173), Freeze of UNITA’s financial resources and assets, June 1999 (Resolution 1173). UNITA’s violation of UN sanctions were only recently confirmed in the UN Sanctions Committee report this year.

10 See paragraph 7 of the final report (cited in next endnote) for full list of names and nationalities of panel members.11 Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, UN Sanctions Committee,

March 2000. Referred to in this report as the Fowler Report.12 Other countries accused of harbouring sanctions violators are Gabon, South Africa, DRC, Congo Republic,

Ivory Coast, Zambia and Namibia.13 The latest row has been over Angola’s decision to boycott the OAU annual summit in Togo in June 2000 and

to call on the OAU to prevent Togo’s president from assuming the presidency of the OAU this year.14 See UN Resolution 1295, 18 April, 2000 .15 See Conclusion of the Fowler Report (UN Sanctions Committee Report, March 2000).16 See Brittain (28 April, 2000) whose newspaper article cites intelligence reports indicating that UNITA have

received fresh supplies of weapons.17 See Global Witness report A Crude Awakening.18 A member of staff from MONUA shared these plans with a World Vision staff member in 1999.19 See paragraph 7 of UN Sanctions Committee report (1999).20 De Coning, C, (1999).21 The invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo by Rwanda/Uganda/Burundi in 1998 and the subsequent

retaliation by Zimbabwe/Namibia/Angola is the principal example.22 Tapfumaneyi, A, (1999), p. 2.23 Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the DRC on one side and Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola on the other.24 IRIN-SA report, South African warns the warring parties, (2000c)25 IRIN-SA report, Clerics meet President, (2000d).26 Rafael Marques, an outspoken Angolan journalist, has for many years exposed the serious press constraints,

prompting several arrests. He was last arrested 16 October 1999 and on 5 April was imprisoned for 6 months and heavily fined by the courts. Angola’s poor human rights record is acknowledged not just by HRW.Freedomhouse, a UK based human rights NGO, the US State Department and Coalition for a Livable World all ranked Angola as one of the worst African offenders in their 1999 reports.

27 Kibble (1997), and section XI on Civil Society and Human Rights in HRW (1999).28 HRW (1999) Section XI on Civil Society and Human Rights.29 ibid, see also Kibble (1997).30 Exact numbers of Christians are not possible to obtain. Although the majority of the population profess to be

Christian, the practice of traditional religions is widespread and ingrained in Angolan culture.31 Christians have suffered oppression for periods of time during the 25 years of official Communist rule

between 1979 and 1991.32 Discussion with Angolan church leaders, 3 Feb, 2000.33 A published collection of pastoral letters on war and peace can be found in A Igreja em Angola Entre a

Guerra e a Paz, Missionarios Espiritanos (eds) (Lisbon: Missionarios Espiritanos, 1999)34 The delegation included representatives from NGOs, all the main church denominations, trade unions and

academics.They visited the USA, Canada, Holland, Belgium and UK in December 1999.35 According to the Delegation mentioned above.36 According to a church leader who was a member of the UK Delegation.

endnotes

37 For example, according to research by USAID conducted into the role of women in Angola, the majority of Angolan women tend not to listen to the radio and yet the radio is often used to promote peace messages.(Women in Development Women’s Participation in Angola’s Reconstruction and in its Political Institutions and Processes, Volume 1, July 1997)

38 The Progressive Democratic Party, PADPA, staged a protest in February and March 2000 in response to the massive price hike in fuel by 1,600%. After the first was brutally repressed, the latter passed peacefully, to the amazement of those who took part. Many opposition politicians took part in the march, some wearing bullet proof vests. (IRIN report (2000e), and The Economist, 18 March, 2000)

39 As discussed in the previous chapter on The Economics of Conflict.

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The humanitarian need of the people of Angola is staggering. Indeed, it is greater than ithas ever been in the past 40 years of war. It is, therefore, critical that the Government ofAngola and the international community responds as swiftly as possible to the immediatehumanitarian needs of the 3.6 million ‘war affected’ by releasing funds for the UNConsolidated Appeal and NGO operations. In addition, it is crucial that increased pressurebe applied on the Government of Angola and UNITA to provide safe access for thehumanitarian community to the IDPs and affected populations and to cease all militaryactivity that targets civilians, in accordance with international humanitarian law. Immediateneeds include medical supplies, shelter, food and agricultural provisions. The laying oflandmines must be halted immediately by both sides in accordance with the OttawaTreaty and legal measures threatened against those who continue. Landmines awarenessprogrammes, de-mining and victim assistance require continued funding, despite the war, ifthe population is to be given the chance to return to agricultural self-sufficiency.

The education and health infrastructure require urgent attention, as do the roadnetworks and airstrips. With expanding government revenues accrued from oil receiptsthere are more than sufficient resources to meet these needs and pressure must bebrought to bear on the Government of Angola to invest in these areas. Innovativehumanitarian programmes are required that provide relief and rehabilitation whilstinvesting in the longer-term needs of the community, including investing in civil society. Inboth the immediate and longer term, there is an urgent need to address the psycho-socialneeds of the population, particularly the children, if the cycle of violence is to be broken.Efforts to assist street children in this area have been started by the wives of thediplomatic community. The government should emulate this example and expand it,perhaps with the participation of the wives of the top government officials.

Children’s needs both in terms of humanitarian assistance and human rights, tend to be overshadowed in times of conflict. They make up almost half the population of Angola yet they are the forgotten ones. If Angola is to have hope for the future, that hope lies with its children. All parties must, as a matter of urgency, make a strong andpublic commitment to putting the needs and interests of Angolan children before any other consideration and provide all necessary assistance to ensure their well-being andsafety. There must be an immediatecommitment by both sides to halt therecruitment, conscription or abduction ofchildren under 18 into the armed forces orrebel groups. This must be coupled with animmediate cessation of indiscriminate attackson children.

In addition they should provide appropriate and safe access for humanitarian agencies,including corridors of tranquillity and days of peace, so that a proper assessment can be made as to how children’s lives have beenaffected by the conflict. Family re-unificationprogrammes are needed, particularly forunaccompanied children in the refugee andIDP camps.

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fiverecommendations

1 humanitarian need

2 children

innovativehumanitarianprogrammesare requiredthat providerelief whilstinvesting inthe long-termneeds of thecommunity

Both warring parties must respect the Geneva Conventions and Protocols regarding theinternational laws of war and protect Angolan civilians. In particular, they must take allmeasures to protect Angolan children from the effects of armed conflict in addition to thecurrent measures to protect them from landmines.

The Government of Angola must be urged to submit a report to the Committee on theRights of the Child on the status of children in Angola and technical assistance can begiven by the international community for this purpose.The Office of the UN SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict also has a roleto play in this process.

African states charged with selecting a Committee of Experts under the African Chartermust provide adequate resources for the Committee to carry out its work. Once elected,the Committee of Experts must make the situation of children in Angola its first priority.

Finally, children can and must play a role in the search for a solution to Angola’s conflictand are important actors in this process

World Vision welcomes the efforts being made by the UN and certain governments toensure the integrity of the UN sanctions against illicit trading in diamonds.The impact ofinternational regulation and monitoring can be significant when enforced at the countrylevel.The international community needs to continue to push for greater regulation of thediamond industry, especially where the markets of Antwerp and Tel Aviv are concerned.A certification scheme will go a long way to ensure that conflict diamonds do not maketheir way onto international markets, but the US and EU need to strictly monitor theorigins of diamonds entering their markets.

International regulations need to be extended to the oil industry. Oil companies haveshown that their corporate responsibility programmes are either inoperable or notimplemented at the national level.Therefore, in the absence of a voluntary industry-widestandard, the international community needs to establish regulations regardingtransparency of financial exchanges between the corporations and the governments.Regulations should also ensure that oil companies are signed up to the human rightsagreements and follow codes of conducts concerning their operations in conflict countries.

The international banking industry should consider the recommendations made by thepressure group Global Witness and fully publish all loan arrangements including paymentsmade and recipients of those payments. Loans should go through a centralised systemrather than the current multi-channel routes.The international banking industry shouldsupport the IMF and World Bank and call on the Angolan government to use internationalaccounting standards and reform its current financial structures.

National governments should incorporate the OECD guidelines into their nationallegislation and monitor their own corporations’ use of the guidelines. Individualcorporations should sign up to the guidelines as well as the UN declaration of humanrights. Corporations should report to their national governments on their implementationof the guidelines and report any infringements. In countries where they operate,corporations must publish their corporate social responsibility commitments, their codesof conduct and the UN conventions to which they have signed up.These should betranslated into the local languages and distributed to local communities as part of thecorporation’s commitment to ensure the development of civil society.

The IMF needs to continue its monitoring of the Angolan economy and set socialconditions on the use of any money it may lend the country. The international financeinstitutions should work with the other actors, including banks and oil companies in anopen and transparent way, to push the Angolan government to increase its openness tothe Angolan people.The IMF and the World Bank should continue to pressure thegovernment to use international accounting standards.

The war in Angola is complex and multi-dimensional. A multi-track approach which draws on the strengths of Angolan civil society, regional bodies, corporations and the

nationalgovernmentsshouldincorporatethe OECD

guidelinesinto theirnationallegislation and monitortheir owncorporationsuse of theguidelines

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3 corporate actors

4 peace process

meaningfulparticipationof Angolancivil society inthe peaceprocess iscritical

international community is needed.The co-ordinating role of the UN is essential butneeds a more robust mandate to be effective.

4.1 United Nations – a new approach for a critical player

A radical re-assessment of how the UN oversees the implementation of future peaceaccords is crucial.This must include a clear mandate to proactively monitor and publiclyreport human rights abuses, and to call violators of accords to account. Responsibility lieswith the government and UNITA to allow the UN and NGOs to monitor and reporthuman rights abuses. Pressure should be put on the Troika (USA, Russia, Portugal) to allow the broader-based ‘committee of friends’ to oversee any future peace process.Countries which actively armed the various factions as part of their respective Cold Warstruggles in the past have an obligation to ensure that a state of peace is returned to thepeople of Angola.

If the peace is to be maintained, it must be owned by the people. Meaningful participationof Angolan civil society in the peace process is, therefore, a critical area to which the UNought to give due attention. This involves listening to the ideas and recommendations of the various elements of civil society, drawing on their potential as mediators, andequipping them to empower and enlighten their own communities on how to contributeto the peace process. Women, in particular, deserve empowering owing to their strongunderstanding of the impacts of the war on communities and children.The UN could alsoplay a vital role in creating a platform for the co-ordination of advocacy initiatives byAngolan and international civil society. Children also have much to contribute aspeacebuilders, as experience in other countries has shown, and deserve a helping hand in expressing their views.

The UN has a unique role to play in facilitating forums between the humanitariancommunity and the government/UNITA to discuss humanitarian and human rights issues.In addition, the valuable civic education training for government officials, local leaders andother parties to the conflict needs to be continued and expanded. Consideration oughtto be given to broadening funding for such training to international NGOs.

4.2 Sanctions – the need for a multi-pronged approach

The latest efforts by the UN to combat sanctions-busting have been very welcome andhave succeeded in placing this issue high on the political agenda. However, the work ofAmbassador Fowler will only have a minimal effect if the recommendations are not actedupon. Evidence is already emerging that UNITA is continuing to receive military supplies.Therefore, it is paramount that the UNSC follows through and acts decisively. The secondexpert committee, ordered by UN Resolution 1295, must be formed without furtherdelay if it is to produce an authoritative report in October. Governments throughout the world must do all they can to comply with the recommendations of the report, andthose who are yet to co-operate (such as Russia, Belarus) do so.The on-going accession

negotiations of several Eastern European countries to the European Union, as wellas the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, ought to take into

account these states’ compliance with the UN sanctions.

Tougher legislation on arms brokering and end-use certification andmore stringent accountability in legal arms sales are essential if arms

exporter states are to play their part in restricting the supply ofweapons to UNITA. Sharing of knowledge and expertise in curbing

corruption associated with illicit trafficking must also be a priority.The recommendations on Illicit Trafficking and Controlling Small

Arms in the NGO Agenda for Action for the G8 on ConflictPrevention ought also to be supported.

4.3 Regional actors – a gap needing to be filled

The responsibility facing many African states to acknowledge theirrole in the conflict and to pursue an alternative is stronger thanever. Not only has the recent spilling over of the war into

neighbouring states prompted calls for dialogue,but the UN Sanctions Committee report hasconfirmed suspicions of the complicity of many

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African states in this war. Compliance with UN sanctions against UNITA is critical, as isthe provision of information and assistance where available on their contravention.Theinternational community could encourage this by offering technical and financialassistance. The vested interests of SADC and its members in Angola make it aninappropriate body to broker peace. It does, however, hold the potential to play a crucialrole in monitoring borders and strengthening controls on arms, oil and diamond flows.The OAU presents a more viable option although mechanisms would need to be put inplace to ensure member states who continue to violate the sanctions are excluded. TheUN could assist in facilitating such mediation or arbitration.

4.4 Civil society – urgent support needed for the most promising actor

Angolan civil society is the most promising new actor in the quest for peace, yet it isyoung, fragile and vulnerable. For it to flourish will require a greater commitment torespect for human rights from both the government and UNITA, particularly regardingfreedom of association and speech. The various groups will also need strong, committedsupport from the international community – financial, political, logistical, moral andspiritual – in their efforts to advocate for peace and to educate the populace on theseissues. Women and children have a powerful role in advocating peace and in contributingtheir ideas for peace-building, and their participation ought to be taken into account more seriously by all actors. The church throughout the world needs to express urgent,practical solidarity with the Angolan churches which are beginning to work together forthe first time in decades. Their ability to connect with communities loyal to both warringsides has enormous peace-building potential. Their efforts in civic education needencouragement and strengthening if they are to have widespread impact. Building ademocratic culture is the key to long-term peace, and support for this is of particularneed at this time in the run up to the country’s second ever elections, to be held in 2001.An organised, united and supported opposition to the war is critical for any kind of endto the fighting.

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