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Epstein Research Symposium April 4, 2012 HEC, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Complexity and Water Management Regimes: Ostrom’s IAD Framework Applied to South Florida
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and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

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Page 1: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Epstein Research Symposium

April 4, 2012

HEC, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

Complexity and Water Management Regimes: Ostrom’s IAD Framework Applied to South Florida

Page 3: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Institutional Configurations (Settings & Attributes)

Outcomes

The Basic Question

Page 4: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Social-Ecological-Political Systems

Water Management Regimes

Action Situation

Provision v. Production (Co-Production)

Outcomes & Evaluative Criteria

Polycentric Governance

Some Key Words and Concepts

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Nobel Prize in Economics, 2009

Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived)

Institutional (Public Choice) Approach to Public Policy missing at FAU

Implementation is “in” the Institutions

Recent work on agent-based models (complexity theory) to model rule configurations in institutional settings

Direct inclusion of empirically verifiable outcomes

The Workshop in Political Theory at Indiana University provided the conceptual basis for my PhD dissertation in the late 1970s (I was a student in one of Ostrom’s courses)

Why Ostrom’s Framework?

Page 6: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Introduction & The Ostrom Oeuvre David C. Prosperi, Henry D. Epstein Professor

Applying the IAD Framework to the South Florida Water Management Regime

John Bradford (w/ P. Calvaresi & A. Scotti)

Unpacking the Biophysical and Institutional “Exogenous” Contexts

Marianne Quinn (w/ A. Alvarez & J. Hsu)

Efficiency in Water Service Delivery: Questions and Methods

Claudia Hasbun (w/ A. Davis & R. Madan)

Equity in Water Service Delivery: Questions and Methods

Rasheed Shoyuto (w/ M. LaFrance & J. Root)

Reactions Don Norris, Professor of Public Policy, UMBC

Based on work in Seminar in Urban Planning (URP 6310), Spring, 2012

A more rigorous definition of implementation

A common language

Our Symposium

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Meta-Methodological Questions

The IAD Framework

Meaning

The Ostrom Oeuvre: An Overview

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Ostrom, E. 2011. Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. Policy Studies Journal, 39(1): 7-27.

Ostrom, E. 2010. Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems. American Economic Review, 100(June), 1-33.

Anderson, K.P. & E. Ostrom. 2008. Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes from a Polycentric Perspective, Policy Science, 41:71 -93.

Ostrom, E. 2007. A Diagnostic Tool for Going Beyond Panaceas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104 (30):15181-87.

Ostrom, E. 2007. Challenges and Growth: The Development of the Interdisciplinary Field of Institutional Analysis. Journal of Institutional Economics, 3(3): 249-264.

Van Laerhoven F. & E. Ostrom, 2007. Tradition and Trends in the Study of the Commons. International Journal of the Commons, 1:3-28.

Ostrom, E. 2005. UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY. Princeton University Press.

Ostrom, E. & V. Ostrom, 2004. The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 63(1): 105-147.

Anderies, J.M., M.A. Janssen & E. Ostrom. 2004. A Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective. Ecology and Society, 9(1): 18-

Ostrom, E. 1990. GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLECTIVE ACTION. Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, V. & E. Ostrom, 1971. Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration. Public Administration Review, 13(March/April): 203-216.

Ostrom, V., Tiebout, & R. Warren. 1961. The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry. American Political Science Review, 55(4): 831-42.

McGinnis, M.D. 2011. Networks of Adjacent Action Situations in Polycentric Governance. Policy Studies Journal, 39(1): 45-72.

A Short Bibliography

Page 9: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

The Problem of the Commons & “Public Goods”

Institutional Analysis

Frameworks-Theories-Models

Meta Methodological Questions

Page 10: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

1950 2010

Externalities (Overconsumption and/or Underprovision of Common Pool Resources)

“Polycentric” Governance Arrangements

Common Pool, Public Goods, Private Goods, Toll Goods

Hom0 Bestus (Publicly Minded)

Dominant effort is to design institutional

arrangements to produce better outcomes

Externalities (Overconsumption and/or Underprovision of Public Goods)

Two “solutions”: Government & Market

“Private” v. “Public” Goods

Homo Economicus

Dominant effort was to fit the world into simple models and to identify gaps between reality and model formulation

The World in …

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Public Choice Approach

• (1960s, 1970s)

The Tragedy of the Commons

• (Hardin, 1968)

“New” Institutional Economics

• (1970s, 1980s)

Behavioral Game Theory

• (1960s)

Institutional Analysis: A General Analysis/Design Framework

Page 12: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Frameworks

How to Structure

Our Thinking About a System (overall and its parts)

Theories

How System

Elements are

(Causally) Related to Each Other

Models

Measurement of Specific Relationships

Frameworks-Theories-Models

Page 13: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Why, What Is It?

Schematic Form

Action Arena at Core, Five Points of Entry

Unpacking

Parsing / Identifying Relationships / Multi -scalar

The Components: A Brief Description

The IAD Framework

Page 14: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Why Builds on Theoretical Developments in

Transaction theory

The Logic of the Situation

Collective Structures

Frames

Scripts

“Colleagues Associated with the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis ... to develop the IAD framework … contains a nested set of building blocks that …can use … to understand human interactions and outcomes across diverse settings” (Ostrom, 2010, p. 6-7)

The Framework was designed to enable analysis of systems that are composed of clusters of variables, each of which can be unpacked multiple times

The Development of a Common Language!

Why, What is it?

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“The core analytical unit … is an ‘action arena’ in which participants (e.g., individuals, families, firms, voluntary associations, governmental units) interact in a structure of incentives generated by the characteristics of the goods involved, the rules-in-use, and the attributes of the community of participants involved” (Ostrom, 2005)

The arena may be represented as a formal game, an agent-based model, a detailed case study, or an analytical narrative (Ostrom, 2007)

An action arena is affected by three clusters of variables that are treated as exogenous for any specific analysis of the incentives and likely behavior within an arena, but become endogenous variables when analyzing institutional change (Ostrom, 2007)

Action Arena at the Core of Analysis

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Five Points of “Entry”

Page 18: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Unpacking

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Example 1: Action Situations Described in Terms of External Criteria

Example 2: Outcomes Resulting from Interactions Defined by Specific Action Situation Attributes

Action Situation

Interactions

Outcomes

External Criteria

Action Situation

Parsing …

Page 20: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Delivery Systems -> Outcomes -> That Can Be Evaluated

Outcomes Are Evaluated!

Outcomes

Economic Efficiency

Fiscal Equivalence

Redistributional Equity

Accountability

Conformance to Values

Sustainability

Interaction

Outcomes

Evaluation

Page 21: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

External Components

Action Situations / Interactions

Outcomes

•Evaluated

Multi-scalar “frameworking”

Page 22: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

External Components

Action Situations

Interactions

Outcomes

Evaluative Criteria

The Components

Page 23: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

1. External Components

Page 24: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

The Environment as a System Some Fun Facts

As of 2007, there were 321 known articles about the application of IAD to water management problems (many of them about river basins)

IAD has been applied to:

Fisheries

Forestry

Irrigation

Water Management

Animal Husbandry

Ecology

Climate

Biodiversity

Etc

Biophysical Conditions

Page 25: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Basic SES attributes, which may also include history of prior interactions, internal homogeneity or heterogeneity of key attributes, and knowledge and social capital of those who may participate or be affected by others

Community Attributes

Page 26: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Rules-in-use may evolve over time as those involved in one action situation interact with others in a variety of settings or self-consciously change the rules in a collective choice or constitutional-choice setting

Common understanding of those involved related to who must, must not, or make take which actions affecting others subject to sanctions.

Rules-In-Use

Page 27: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

The number of participants, their attributes and resources, whether they can enter freely, and the conditions they face for leaving

Boundary Rules

Establishes positions in the situation Position Rules

Assign sets of actions that actors in positions may, must, or must not take Choice Rules

Delimit the potential outcomes that can be affected and, working backward, the actions linked to specific outcomes

Scope Rules

Affect the level of control that a participant in a position exercises in the selection of an action at a node

Aggregation Rules

The knowledge-contingent information sets of participants Information Rules

The benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of actions and outcomes, and THEY ESTABLISH THE INCENTIVES AND DETERRENTS FOR ACTION.

Payoff Rules

Rules

Page 28: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

2. Action Situations

Remember, This is the First Step …

Actor assumptions about four clusters of variables:

The resources that an actor brings to a situation

The valuation actors assign to states of the world and to actions

The way actors acquire, process, retain, and use knowledge contingencies and information; and

The processes actors use for selection of particular courses of action

A major portion of theoretical work here focuses on motivational and cognitive structure of the actors (as givens)

Actors …

“The first step in analyzing a problem is thus to identify a conceptual unit – called an action situation – than can be utilized to describe, analyze, predict, and explain behavior within institutional arrangements.

Action situations are the social spaces where individuals interact, exchange goods and service, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight (among the many things that individuals do in action situations)

Ostrom, 2011, p. 11

Page 29: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Internal Structure

Page 30: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Rules Affecting Action Situation

Page 31: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Production Consumption

Outputs

• Describable in terms of amounts available at certain prices

Outcomes

• Describable in terms of amount consumed!

Inputs Outputs

3. Interactions

It this best described as a two-stage linked production-consumption function?

Page 32: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

4. Outcomes

Patterns of Behavior /

Patterns of Consumption

Page 33: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

5. Evaluation Criteria

Economic Efficiency • Determined by magnitude of net benefits associated with an

allocation of resources

Fiscal Equivalence • Two principal means: (1) on the basis of the equality between

individual’s contribution to an effort and the benefit they derive; and (2) on the basis of differential ability to pay

Redistributional Equity

• Policies that redistribute resources to poorer individuals

Accountability • In regards to the development and use of public facilities and

natural resources

Conformance to Values of Local Actors

• Basically, ethics

Sustainability • The ability to respond to ever changing environments

Page 34: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional
Page 35: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

General Considerations Bottom Line: Designing Institutions

That move from “nudging” self-

interested individuals to achieve better

outcomes to facilitating the developing of

institutions that bring out the best in humans!

The World is More Complicated Than Simple Models

Single Policy Descriptions Often Fail

Government is Not Always the Answer to Ensuring [Environmental] Objectives

The Challenge is to Match Institutions to the Structure of Social-Ecological Systems

… in a Multi-Scalar Framework that includes how its “parts” interact

Humans have a complex motivational structure and more capacity to solve social dilemmas that posited by earlier rational-choice theory

Page 36: and Water Management Regimes - Florida Atlantic … Prize in Economics, 2009 Focus on Framing Questions Rather than Answers (although “answers” can of course be derived) Institutional

Let’s Now Explore the IAD Framework as it

might be applied to the South Florida Water

Management Regime

Thank you for your attention!