Anarchist Themes in the Work of Elinor Ostrom

8/11/2019 Anarchist Themes in the Work of Elinor Ostrom

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Governance, Agency andAutonomy:Anarchist Themesin the Work of Elinor Ostrom

Kevin Carson


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Center for a Stateless Society

Center for a Stateless Society Paper No. 16 (Second Half 2013)


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INTR!"CTIN

This !a!er is intended as one in a series, to "e read along #ith my !reviousone on $ames C% Scott&, on anarchist and decentralist thinkers #hose affectionfor the !articularity of local, human'scale institutions overrides any doctrinaireideological la"els%

T#e $o%ernance of Co&&on Pool Reso'rces. Ostrom "egins "y notingthe !ro"lem of natural resource de!letion(#hat she calls )common !oolresources*(and then goes on to survey three largely com!lementary+)closely related conce!ts* ma-or theories that attem!t to e.!lain )the many!ro"lems that individuals face #hen attem!ting to achieve collective"enefits*: /ardin0s )tragedy of the commons,* the !risoner0s dilemma, andOlson0s )logic of collective action%*

1nfortunately, these models +or this model ossified into a dogma, servingmore often as a su"stitute for thought than a starting !oint% Even more thant#enty years after Ostrom0s seminal #ork, it0s still common to state as atruism("acked only "y a !assing allusion to /ardin or the !risoner0s dilemma(that the actual users of resources #ill inevita"ly de!lete them in thea"sence of governance "y some higher authority or other% Ostrom cites one"lithe assertion, in an article on fisheries in The Economist: )left to their o#ndevices, fishermen #ill overe.!loit stocks%%%% 2T3o avoid disaster, managers

must have effective hegemony over them%*4

This last 5uote e.em!lifies !erfectly the common a!!roach to the governanceof common !ool resources taken "y advocates "oth of state regulation andcor!orate !rivati6ation% Garrett /ardin himself, later revisiting his article onthe tragedy of the commons, argued that the !ro"lem of resource de!letion#ould have to "e addressed either "y )a !rivate enter!rise system* +i%e%o#nershi! "y for'!rofit "usiness firms or )socialism* +i%e% o#nershi! andregulation "y the state%7 +The assum!tion that )!rivate enter!rise* and)socialism* "oth re5uire managerial hierarchies of one sort or another, andare incom!ati"le #ith hori6ontal, self'organi6ed institutions, s!eaks volumes

a"out the internali6ed values of the intellectual stratum%

1 Kevin Carson,Legibility & Control: Themes in the Work of James C. Scott. Center for a Stateless Society Paper No. 12

(Winter/Spring 2011)


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Ostrom goes on to consider the unsatisfactory !erformance of "oth the stateand the market8in addressing the !ro"lem%

9t should "e noted right off that the -u.ta!osition "et#een )common !ro!erty*and )!rivate !ro!erty* !ut for#ard "y mainstream ca!italist li"ertarians is -ust!lain silly% 9n cases #here !arceling out a common resource to individuals is "ythe nature of the case im!ossi"le, Ostrom says, one is hard'!ressed tounderstand -ust #hat is meant "y )!rivate%* O!en fields or common !asturecan "e divided u! into se!arate !lots and distri"uted to individuals "utfisheries;oth the conventional )!rivati6ation* and )state regulation* a!!roachesamount, #hen all the legal fictions are stri!!ed a#ay, to su"stituting the

-udgment of managers #orking for some a"sentee central authority +!erha!sonly in theory, #orking in fact for their o#n interests for that of users% So #emight e.!ect it to result in the same kno#ledge and incentive !ro"lems that

al#ays result from e.ternali6ing costs and "enefits, #hen o#nershi! andcontrol are divorced from direct kno#ledge of the situation%

On the other hand, #e might e.!ect that !lacing control directly in the handsof those #ith /ayekian local kno#ledge of a situation results in outcomes far!refera"le to either of the other t#o a!!roaches "ased on verticality anda"sentee control%

And Ostrom0s findings "ear out that e.!ectation%

?ather than starting from the assum!tion that the users of common resourcesare hel!less #ithout an outside authority intervening to !rotect them from

themselves, she assumes that )the ca!acity of individuals to e.tricatethemselves from various ty!es of dilemma situations variesfrom situation to

' stro consistently %ses te ter 3ar4et5 in te sense of 3cas ne6%s5 or 3for$profit -%siness sector,5 rater tan a

general legal regie of vol%ntary contract an& enforcea-le property rigts. nless specifie& oter#ise, 7 #ill -e %sing teter in er sense.

8 bi"., p. 1.

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situation,* and then ado!ts the em!irical a!!roach of surveying )"othsuccessful and unsuccessful efforts to esca!e tragic outcomes%*@

To the t#o orthodo. models of state and cor!orate o#nershi!, Ostrom-u.ta!oses the administration of a commons "y a "inding contract among thecommoners themselves, )to commit themselves to a coo!erative strategythat they themselves #ill #ork out%*

Of course there are #ays they could go #rong livestock o#ners )canoverestimate or underestimate the carrying ca!acity of the meado#,* or theirmonitoring system can "reak do#n% >ut even so, these !otential !oints offailure argua"ly e.ist in stronger form in the case of a"sentee governance "ya central institution% The monitoring system is "ased on the users themselves,#ho are neigh"ors and #ho as users have a strong incentive to !reventdefection "y the others, o"serving each other directly(considera"ly more

effective, one #ould think, than the ty!ical ins!ection regime of a stateregulatory authority +my mother, #ho #orked in a !oultry !rocessing !lantand came into daily contact #ith 1SA ins!ectors, could have told you that%And their calculations of carrying ca!acity and sustaina"le yield, #hile falli"le,at least )are not de!endent on the accuracy of the information o"tained "y adistant government official 2or cor!orate home office, 9 might add3 regardingtheir strategies%*B

Ostrom0s em!irical survey casts light not so much on #hether such hori6ontalgovernance of a commons "y the commoners themselves #orks(o"viouslysometimes it does("ut on #hat !articular governance rules !roduce o!timal

results%

?eally, it stands to reason that coo!erative governance of common !oolresources, all other things "eing e5ual, #ill "e more effective in formulatingand enforcing rules than governance "y either a government agency or acor!oration% )>ecause the individuals involved gain a ma-or !art of theireconomic return from the C?s, they are strongly motivated to try to solvecommon !ro"lems to enhance their o#n !roductivity over time%*D

So #hat remains, in the course of Ostrom0s investigation, is )to identify theunderlying design !rinci!les of the institutions used "y those #ho have

successfully managed their o#n C?s over e.tended !eriods of time%%%%*&

What measures, in !articular, did they take to address the real !ro"lems!resented "y )tem!tations to free'ride, shirk, or other#ise act

bi"., p. 1".

bi"., pp. 1'$1. bi"., p. 28.

10 bi"., p. 2.

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o!!ortunistically*;&&The middle !art of her "ook is accordingly devoted to asurvey of

field settings in #hich +& a!!ro!riators have devised, a!!lied,and monitored their o#n rules to control the use of their C?s and+ the resource systems, as #ell as the institutions, havesurvived for long !eriods of time% The youngest set of institutionsto "e analy6ed%%% is already more than & years old% The historyof the oldest system to "e e.amined e.ceeds &, years%&

The rules for governing common !ool resources, in the instances Ostrome.amined, #orked in situations #here game theory #ould have !redictedincentives to defect #ere strong and negative conse5uences of defection#ere #eak +as in common governance systems for irrigation #ater in theS!anish hili!!ines, #here monitoring #as relatively #eak and fines #ere lo#

com!ared to the "enefits of defection, and stealing #ater in a drought mightsave an entire season0s cro!%&4

And far from reflecting )an anachronistic holdover from the !ast,* governancesystems for common !ool resources have ty!ically reflected close em!iricalreasoning from historical e.!erience% 9n the case of communal for !astoralmountain land,

for at least five centuries these S#iss villagers have "eenintimately familiar #ith the advantages and disadvantages of"oth !rivate and communal tenure systems and have carefullymatched !articular ty!es of land tenure to !articular ty!es of landuse%&7

>ased on her survey, Ostrom distilled this list of common design !rinci!lesfrom the e.!erience of successful governance institutions:

&% Clearly defined "oundaries% 9ndividuals or households #hohave rights to #ithdra# resource units from the C? must "eclearly defined, as must the "oundaries of the C? itself%

% Congruence "et#een a!!ro!riation and !rovision rules andlocal conditions% A!!ro!riation rules restricting time, !lace,technology, andFor 5uantity of resource units are related to localconditions and to !rovision rules re5uiring la"our, material, andFormoney%

11 bi"., p. 2.

12 bi"., p. '.1 bi"., p. '

1" bi"., p. 8.


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4% Collective'choice arrangements% ost individuals affected "ythe o!erational rules can !artici!ate in modifying the o!erationalrules%

7% onitoring% onitors, #ho actively audit C? conditions anda!!ro!riator "ehaviour, are accounta"le to the a!!ro!riators orare the a!!ro!riators%

8% Graduated sanctions% A!!ro!riators #ho violate o!erationalrules are likely to "e assessed graduated sanctions +de!ending onthe seriousness and conte.t of the offence "y othera!!ro!riators, "y officials accounta"le to these a!!ro!riators, or"y "oth%


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ali5uot share of machinery(under the terms of the charter o#ned solely "ythe cor!oration as a single !erson(from assem"ly lines% 9magine ho# that#ould disru!t !roduction !lanning #ithin a factory% That0s #hat Stoly!in0s!olicies did to land'use !lanning "y the Mir for those lands remaining #ithin

the o!en'fields%

=o% 4, the right of those affected "y the rules to have a say in devising them,is(normative theories of !artici!atory democracy aside(a !rere5uisite for anefficiently functioning institution% As Ostrom says:

C? institutions that use this !rinci!le are "etter a"le to tailortheir rules to local circumstances, "ecause the individuals #hodirectly interact #ith one another and #ith the !hysical #orld canmodify the rules over time so as to "etter fit them to the s!ecificcharacteristics of their setting%&ecause the su"ordinate has a fundamental conflict ofinterest #ith the su!erior, and does not internali6e the "enefits of a!!lyingher intelligence, she cannot "e trusted to use her intelligence for the "enefitof the organi6ation% 9n such a 6ero'sum relationshi!, any discretion can "ea"used%

On the other hand, su"ordinates cannot afford to contri"ute the kno#ledgenecessary to design an efficient #ork !rocess% ?%A% Wilson0s analogy of the!erson in authority confronting the su"ordinate as a )high#ayman* is a goodone% The !arty #ith residual claimancy in any economic institution(like a

"usiness firm(#ill use the !o#ers associated #ith o#nershi! to o"tain adis!ro!ortionate share of the sur!lus% Those #ho lack o#nershi! stakes #illhave a corres!onding incentive to under'invest their kno#ledge and skills inthe !erformance of the enter!rise% /ence, the most rational a!!roach toma.imi6ing !roductivity is to assign residual claimancy or o#nershi! rights tostakeholders in accordance #ith their contri"ution to !roductivity%&@

This almost never ha!!ens, "ecause it0s in management0s !erceived self'interest to engage in self'dealing even at the e.!ense of the overall!roductivity of the firm% So #orkers instead hoard kno#ledge and minimi6etheir legi"ility +in $ames Scott0s terms to management and minimi6e thechance that the increased !roductivity resulting from their hidden kno#ledge#ill "e used against them or e.!ro!riated% /ence, hierarchies are a veryinefficient #ay of organi6ing activity, from the stand!oint of harnessing thefull ca!a"ilities and kno#ledge of the #orkforce%

1 Sanfor& . 9rossan an& liver :. ;art, 3e Costs an& =enefits of #nersip! > eory of ?ertical an& @ateral

7ntegration,5 Journal of #olitical Economy "!" (18), pp. 18$1.

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>ut #hen given a choice "et#een efficiency and control("et#een a larger !ieand a larger slice of a smaller !ie(management usually !refers to ma.imi6ethe si6e of their slice rather than the si6e of the !ie% /ierarchy is a #ay oforgani6ing human activity so as to facilitate the e.traction of rents from it,

even at the e.!ense of a severe degradation in efficiency%

onitoring systems, =o% 7, are "est designed #hen )actors most concerned#ith cheating 2are !laced3 in direct contact #ith one another%* Hor e.am!le, inan irrigation rotation system the actor #hose turn it currently is is !reventedfrom e.tending their turn !ast its scheduled end "y the !resence of the actors#hose turn is ne.t, eagerly #aiting to take over%&B Grandma0s !ractice ofletting one child cut the cake in half and the other take first !ick is the classice.am!le of this !rinci!le% 9n many cases monitoring others0 use of a commonsis )a natural "y'!roduct of using the commons%* And successful monitoring isfurther encouraged "y informal sanctions and re#ards, sometimes as sim!leas the social a!!roval or disa!!roval of one0s neigh"ors%&D

The cost of front'line su!ervision is generally a"out a 5uarter as much in the!ly#ood coo!eratives of the acific =orth#est as in conventional ca!italisto!erations, "ecause of em!loyee self'monitoring%

1nder graduated sanctions, the modest !enalties actually serve as a mutualconfidence'"uilding regime% 1sers #ho enter into a governance systemsus!icious their neigh"ors #ill violate the rules and thus having an incentiveto defect themselves, #ill, on "eing detected and !aying a modest !enalty, "ereassured that enforcement is credi"le, com!liance is #ides!read, and they

can e.!ect to "enefit rather than "eing taken advantage of "y !artici!ating inthe system%

There #ill al#ays "e a small minority, of course, #ho are immune to suchmoral sanctions% >ut the ma-ority on #hom such sanctions do #ork #ill reducethe cost of monitoring those #ho need closer surveillance%

Ostrom also considers the o!timal conditions for overcoming the transactioncosts of incrementally im!roving on a C? governance system% She starts #iththe assum!tion that a!!ro!riators are )in a remote location under a !oliticalregime that is "asically indifferent to #hat ha!!ens #ith regard to C?s of this

ty!e,* and therefore unlikely to interfere either to !romote or im!ede localgovernance decisions% 1nder such conditions, )the likelihood of C?a!!ro!riators ado!ting a series of incremental changes in o!erational rules to

1 stro, Governing the Commons, p. '.

1 bi"., p. 8.20 +ar& S. 9reen-erg, 3Pro&%cer Cooperatives an& :eocratic eory5 in ac4all an& @evin, e&s., Worker

Coo$eratives in !merica(niversity of California Press, 18), p. 1.

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im!rove -oint #elfare #ill "e !ositively related to the follo#ing internalcharacteristics:

&% ost a!!ro!riators share a common -udgment that they #ill "eharmed if they do not ado!t an alternative rule%

% ost a!!ro!riators #ill "e affected in similar #ays "y the!ro!osed rule changes%

4% ost a!!ro!riators highly value the continuation activities fromthis C?%%%%

7% A!!ro!riators face relatively lo# information, transformation,and enforcement costs%

8% ost a!!ro!riators share generali6ed norms of reci!rocity andtrust that can "e used as initial social ca!ital%


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Centraliation *to&iation and S'staina+ility. Ostrom, surveying thevalue of self'organi6ed governance institutions, #rites:

%%%#e #ill all "e the !oorer if local, self'organi6ed institutions arenot a su"stantial !ortion of the institutional !ortfolio of thet#enty'first century% any indigenous institutions develo!ed togovern and manage local common'!ool resources have !roventhemselves ca!a"le of ena"ling individuals to make intensive useof these resources over the long run(centuries or even millennia(#ithout destroying the delicate resource "ase on #hichindividuals and their future offs!ring de!end for their livelihood%%%%

1nder "anners associated #ith conserving the environment forfuture generations, international donors, national governments,international nongovernmental organi6ations, national charities,

and others have, in many cases, un#ittingly destroyed the verysocial ca!ital(the shared relationshi!s, norms, kno#ledge, andunderstanding(that has "een used "y resource users to sustainthe !roductivity of natural ca!ital over the ages%

These institutions are most in -eo!ardy #hen central governmentofficials !resume they do not e.ist +or are not effective%7

1nfortunately, the conventional ideological frame#ork for understandinggovernance institutions !resumes that the natural state of affairs a"sent rulesintroduced from a"ove is a /o""esian #ar of all against all the !ro!er5uestion, it follo#s from this starting !oint, is #hat !olicies governmentsshould formulate to im!ose order on the chaos of voluntary interaction%

This mindset re!resents centuries #orth of ingrained ha"its of thought,resulting from a shift from social organi6ations !rimarily +to $ames Scott0sterminology in Seeing Like a State )legi"le* or trans!arent to the !eo!le oflocal communities organi6ed hori6ontally and o!a5ue to the state, to socialorgani6ations that are !rimarily )legi"le* to the state from a"ove%8

The former kind of architecture, as descri"ed "y yotr Kro!otkin, #as #hat!revailed in the net#orked free to#ns of late medieval Euro!e% The !rimary!attern of social organi6ation #as hori6ontal +guilds, etc%, #ith 5uality

certification and re!utational functions aimed mainly at making individuals0relia"ility trans!arent to one another% To the state, such local formations #ereo!a5ue%

2" stro, ANeiter Bar4et Nor State! 9overnance of Coon$Pool eso%rces in te #enty$first Cent%ry,A @ect%represente& %ne 2, 1" at te 7nternational Doo& Policy esearc 7nstit%te, Wasington, :.C., p. 2.

2' aes Scott, Seeing Like a State (Ne# ;aven an& @on&on! Eale niversity Press, 1).

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With the rise of the a"solute state, the !rimary focus "ecame making societytrans!arent +or )legi"le* from a"ove% Things like the systematic ado!tion offamily surnames that !ersisted from one generation to the ne.t +and the thcentury follo#'u! of Social Security =um"ers and other citi6en 9 num"ers,

the systematic ma!!ing of ur"an addresses for !ostal or D&& service, etc%,#ere all for the !ur!ose of making society legi"le to the state% Iike us, thestate #ants to kee! track of #here its stuff is(and guess #hat #e are;

>efore this transformation, for e.am!le, surnames e.isted mainly for theconvenience of !eo!le in local communities, so they could tell each othera!art% Surnames #ere ado!ted on an ad hoc "asis for clarification, #hen there#as some danger of confusion, and rarely continued from one generation tothe ne.t% 9f there #ere multi!le $ohns in a village, they might "e distinguishedat any !articular time "y trade +J$ohn the illerJ, location +J$ohn on the /illJ,!atronymic +J$ohn ?ichard0s SonJ, etc% >y contrast, every#here there have"een family surnames #ith cross'generational continuity, they have "eenim!osed "y centrali6ed states as a #ay of cataloguing and tracking the!o!ulation(making it legi"le to the state, in Scott0s terminology%y the end of thelast century, the kings on the Continent, the arliament in theseisles, and the revolutionary Convention in Hrance, although they#ere at #ar #ith each other, agreed in asserting that no se!arateunions "et#een citi6ens must e.ist #ithin the State%%%% )=o state

28 bi"., pp. 8"$.

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#ithin the State* The State alone%%% must take care of matters ofgeneral interest, #hile the su"-ects must re!resent looseaggregations of individuals, connected "y no !articular "onds,"ound to a!!eal to the Government each time that they feel a

common need%%%%

The a"sor!tion of all social functions "y the State necessarilyfavoured the develo!ment of an un"ridled, narro#'mindedindividualism% 9n !ro!ortion as the o"ligations to#ards the stategre# in num"ers the citi6ens #ere evidently relieved from theiro"ligations to#ards each other%@

Iike#ise, the !reem!tion and a"sor!tion(or su!!ression(of all regulatoryfunctions "y the state favored the develo!ment of a mindset "y #hich!roviders of goods and services #ere relieved of their o"ligations to !rovide

relia"le certifications of the 5uality of their #ares to consumers, andconsumers #ere relieved of their o"ligations to scrutini6e their 5uality and there!utations of the vendors% 9t #as the state0s -o" to take care of that "usinessfor us, and #e needn0t "other our heads a"out it%

To accom!lish a shift "ack to hori6ontal trans!arency, it #ill "e necessary toovercome a !o#erful residual cultural ha"it, among the general !u"lic, ofthinking of such things through the mind0s eye of the state: i%e, if J#eJ didn0thave some #ay of verifying com!liance #ith this regulation or that, some"usiness some#here might "e a"le to get a#ay #ith something or other% Wemust overcome si. hundred years or so of almost in"red ha"its of thought, in

#hich the state is the all'seeing guardian of society !rotecting us from the!ossi"ility that someone, some#here might do something #rong if JtheauthoritiesJ don0t !revent it%

9n !lace of this ha"it of thought, #e must think instead of ourselvescreatingmechanisms on a net#orked "asis, to make us as trans!arent as !ossi"le toeach otheras !roviders of goods and services, to !revent "usinesses fromgetting a#ay #ith !oor "ehavior "y informing each other, to !revent eachother from selling defective merchandise, to !rotect ourselves from fraud, etc%

The state has attem!ted to coo!t the rhetoric of hori6ontality +e%g% )We arethe government%*% >ut in fact, the creation of such mechanisms(far frommaking us transparent to the regulatory state(may #ell re5uire activemeasures to render us opaueto the state +e%g% encry!tion, darknets, etc% for!rotection against attem!ts to su!!ress such local economic self'organi6ationagainst the interests of cor!orate actors%

2 Pyotr Kropot4in,%utual !i": ! actor of Evolution (Ne# Eor4! :o%-le&ay, Page F Copany, 10), pp. 228$22.

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We need to lose the centuries'long ha"it of thinking of JsocietyJ as a hu"'and's!oke mechanism and vie#ing the #orld vicariously from the imagined!ers!ective of the hu", and instead think of it as a hori6ontal net#ork andvisuali6e things from the !ers!ective of the individual nodes #hich #e occu!y%

We need to lose the ha"it of thought "y #hich trans!arency from a"ove even"ecame !erceived as an issue in the first !lace% >ecause the !eo!le #ho areseeing things )from a"ove,* in reality, do not re!resent us or have anything incommon #ith us%

Such a shift in !ers!ective #ill re5uire, in !articular, overcoming the hostilityof conventional li"erals #ho are in the ha"it of reacting viscerally andnegatively, and on !rinci!le, to anything not "eing done "y J5ualified!rofessionalsJ or Jthe !ro!er authorities%J

Argua"ly conventional li"erals, #ith their thought system originating as it did

as the ideology of the managers and engineers #ho ran the cor!orations,government agencies, and other giant organi6ations of the late &Dthand earlythcentury, have !layed the same role for the cor!orate'state ne.us that the

politiuesdid for the a"solute states of the early modern !eriod%

On his old S=>C !rogram, Keith Ol"ermann routinely mocked e.hortationsto charity and self'hel!, reaching for shitkicking imagery of the nineteenthcentury "arn'raiser for #ant of any other com!arision sufficient to get across

-ust ho# "ack#ard and ridiculous that kind of thing really #as% 9n Ol"ermann0s#orld, of course, such ideas come only from conservatives% The onlyideological choice is "et#een !lain, vanilla flavored managerialist li"eralism

and the ?ight% 9n Ol"ermann0s #orld, the decentralist Ieft of 9van 9llich, aulGoodman, and Colin Ward()the Lrecessive IeftM of anarchists, uto!ians andvisionaries, #hich tends only to manifest itself #hen dominant genes likeIenin or /arold Wilson are off doing something else,* as one of the editors ofRadical Technology!ut it(doesn0t even e.ist%

/el!ing your neigh"or out directly, or !artici!ating in a local self'organi6edfriendly society or mutual, is all right in its o#n #ay, of course(if nothing elseis availa"le% >ut it carries the inesca!a"le taint, not only of the 5uaint, "ut ofthe !rovincial and the !icayune(very much like the stigmati6ation ofhomemade "read and home'gro#n veggies in cor!orate advertising in theearly t#entieth century, come to think of it% eo!le #ho hel! each other out,or organi6e voluntarily to !ool risks and costs, are to "e !raised(#ith -ust theslightest hint of condescension(for heroically doing the "est they can in anera of relentlessly do#nscaled social services% >ut that !eo!le are forced toresort to such e.!edients, rather than meeting all their social safety net needsthrough one'sto! sho!!ing at the inistry of Central Services office in a giant

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monumental "uilding #ith a statue of #inged victory in the lo""y, a la !ra"il,is a damning indictment of any civili6ed society% The !rogressive society is oneof comforta"le and #ell'fed citi6ens, com!etently managed "y !ro!erlycredentialed authorities, contentedly milling a"out like ants in the shado#s of

miles'high "uildings that look like they #ere designed "y Al"ert S!eer% Andthat kind of /%G% Wells uto!ia sim!ly has no room for atavisms like the "arn'raiser or the sick "enefit society%

=ot only does Ostrom challenge the authoritarian assum!tions of the receivedvie#, "ut the focus of her #ork is almost entirely on the factors that fosterhori6ontal legi"ility in forming trust net#orks%

%%%refocus the analysis from an assum!tion that individuals areho!elessly tra!!ed in a situation from #hich they cannot e.tractthemselves #ithout an e.ternal authority deciding #hat should "e

done and im!osing that decision on !artici!ants% Asking #hat)the* government should do assumes that e.ternal actors #illal#ays come u! #ith #ise decisions and im!lement themeffectively and fairly% The !ers!ective of this cha!ter leads theanalyst to in5uire ho# individuals facing commons !ro"lems cangain trust that others are trust#orthy and that a coo!erator #illnot "e a sucker #ho contri"utes #hile others continue to freeride%B

We should "e asking ho# different institutions su!!ort orundermine norms of reci!rocity instead of sim!ly !resuming that

central authority is necessary to enforce rules related tocoo!eration on !artici!ants%%%%D

She lists a num"er of factors that facilitate the creation of an assurancecommons:

When the structure of a situation includes re!eated interactions,the level of coo!eration achieved is likely to increase in thoseconte.ts in #hich the follo#ing attri"utes occur

7% 9nformation a"out !ast actions is made availa"le

8% ?e!eated interactions occur #ith the same set of !artici!ants


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@% rescri!tions are ado!ted and enforced that #hen follo#ed dolead to higher outcomes

B% artici!ants are a"le to engage in full communication +via#riting or )chat room* #ithout kno#ing the identity of the othersinvolved

D% artici!ants are a"le to engage in full communication #ithkno#n others +via face'to'face discussions or othermechanisms9n addition to communication, !artici!ants cansanction +or re#ard each other for the !ast actions they havetaken and

&% artici!ants can design their o#n rules related to levels ofcoo!eration and sanctions that are to "e assigned to those #hodo not follo# agreed'u!on rules%4

Communication is central to Ostrom0s model for formulating via"legovernance systems% The )!ure theory* "ehind the risoner0s ilemma game,she #rites,

is a"out individuals #ho do not kno# one another, do not share acommon history, and cannot communicate #ith one another% 9nthis model, game theory !redicts that individuals -ointly using acommons #ill overharvest, leading to /ardinMs +&D


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%%%Hurther, #hen given an o!!ortunity to devise their o#nsanctioning rules, those #ho ado!t their o#n rules tend to follo#these rules closely, achieve higher -oint returns, and the use of!unishment dro!s to almost 6ero +Ostrom et al% &DD% arallel to

la"oratory findings, field researchers have recorded a largenum"er of em!irical settings #here those directly involved in acommons have themselves devised, ado!ted, and monitoredrules over time that have led to ro"ust common'!ool resourceinstitutions%%%%4&

9t0s interesting that not only do !athological outcomes in the risoner0silemma game de!end on !reventing hori6ontal communication, "ut theilgram E.!eriment0s results de!ended on totally isolating each su"-ect in theface of authority(essentially the strategy of Jindividuali6ationJ that Houcaultdescri"ed in #iscipline and Punish% ro'social, coo!erative "ehavior de!endson !eo!le "eing in ongoing situations #ith hori6ontal communicationchannels, in #hich they kno# they0re going to "e dealing #ith each other inthe future, and have an incentive not to shit #here they eat%

Else#here, shared norms figure !rominently in Ostrom0s list of the attri"utesof community that are relevant for sustaina"le local systems of rules forgoverning common resources:

the values of "ehavior generally acce!ted in the community thelevel of common understanding that !otential !artici!antsshare%%% a"out the structure of !articular ty!es of action arenas

the e.tent of homogeneity in the !references of those living in acommunity the si6e and com!osition of the relevant communityand the e.tent of ine5uality of "asic assets among thoseaffected%4

Shared local cultural norms and cognitive tem!lates for inter!reting others0"ehavior are im!ortant for a sustaina"le system of rules%44When !artici!antsshare cultural norms against defection, they are likely to "ehave morecoo!eratively than game theory "ased on !urely utility'ma.imi6ingconsiderations #ould !redict%47

1 +linor stro. A=%il&ing r%st to Solve Coons :ileas! a4ing Sall Steps to est an +volving eory of

Collective >ctionA Wor4sop in Political eory an& Policy >nalysis. 7n&iana niversity. Center for te St%&y of

7nstit%tional :iversity (>riGona State niversity, 200), pp. 2$.

2 stro, 'n"erstan"ing nstitutional (iversity (Princeton an& 6for&! Princeton niversity Press, 200'), pp. 28$2.bi"., pp. 108$10.

"bi"., p. 122.

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Of course, individuals start out #ith more innate inclination to#ardcoo!eration than game theory #ould !redict% Ostrom echoes Kro!otkin0scoo!erative take on evolutionary !sychology in this regard:

/uman evolution occurred mostly during the long leistocene erathat lasted for a"out 4 million years to a"out &, years ago%uring this era, humans roamed the earth in small "ands ofhunter'gatherers #ho #ere de!endent on each other for mutual!rotection, sharing food, and !roviding for the young% Survival#as de!endent not only on aggressively seeking individualreturns "ut also on solving many day'to'day collective action!ro"lems% Those of our ancestors #ho solved these !ro"lemsmost effectively and learned ho# to recogni6e #ho #as deceitfuland #ho #as a trust#orthy reci!rocator had a selectiveadvantage over those #ho did not%%%% /umans have ac5uired #ell'honed skills at facial recognition and strong a"ilities to detectcheating% ?esearch !rovides evidence that humans kee! roughinternal accounts("oth in regard to good#ill%%% and threats%%%%48

On to! of this, "ehavior also evolves on a Iamarckian !attern, #ith successfulstrategies 5uickly catching on and "eing !ro!agated culturally%4ardhan + Nnds that the 5uality of maintenance ofirrigation canals is signiNcantly lo#er on those systems#here farmers !erceive the rules to have "een made"y a local elite% On the other hand, those farmers +of the 7B

inter'vie#ed #ho res!onded that the rules for theirsystem have "een crafted "y most of the farmers, ascontrasted to the elite or the government, have a mo re!osit ive att i tude a"out the #ater al locat ion rules andthe rule c o m ! l i a n c e o f o t h e r f a r m e r s %H u r t h e r , i n a l l o f t h e v i l l a g e s # h e r e ag o v e r n ment agency decides ho# #ater is to "e allocatedand distri"uted, fre5uent rule violations are re!orted, andfarmers tend to contri"ute less to the local village fund%Consistent #ith this is the Nnding "y ?ay and Williams +&DDD

that the dead #eight loss from u!stream farmers stealing#ater on government'o#ned irrigat ion systems inaharashtra, 9ndia, a!!roaches one' four th o f therevenues that could "e earned in an ef f ic ient #aterallocation and !ricing regime%

"bi"., pp. 2""$2"'.


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Kno. and ein6en'ick +&, note that !ro!ertyrights )are signiNcantly more l ikely to address theinterests and needs of local !eo!le #hen they are notim!osed from the outside "ut rather are "ased on e.isting

rights and reect local values and norms%* As they !ointout, these rules take time and effort to develo!, try out,modify, and then e.!eriment #ith again% 1sers #ho have"een engaged in this !rocess for some time understandthe rules that they have crafted, agree on #hy they areusing one r ul e r at he r t han ano ther , and t end t ofol lo# their o#n rules to a greater e.tent than thosethat are im!osed on them% Sekher + con'ducte d as tudy o f v il lages i n O ri ssa, 9 nd ia , t ha t var ied i nreg ard to the e.tent of !artici!ation of local villagers in

making rules related to near"y forests that they used% /efound that the )#ider the re!resentation of thec o m m u n i t y i n t h e o r g a n i 6 a t i o n , t h e " e t t e r a r e i t sc h a n c e s o f s e c u r i ng l o c a l coo!eration and ruleconfirmation for managing and !reserving theresource*%%%%

9n a com!arative study of farmer'designed and governedirrigation systems +H9S, as contrasted to those designedand o!erated "y engineers #ithout involvement of the farmersin making rules to govern these systems, Shukla +, B4, a#ater engineer himself, is relatively critical of the )unrealistic!lanning and design, incom!lete develo!ment, a non'systematicand inade5uate maintenance !rogram, deNcit o!eration, and lackof !artici!ation of the users that characteri6ed many ofthese systems in =a!al% ra#ing on the earlier research ofant and Iohani +&DB4, Poder +&DD7, Iam +&DDB, andradhan +&DBD, Shukla identiNes the fol'lo#ing as the strengthsof the farmer'designed systems: )+& Their technical deNcienciesare com!ensated "y management in!uts + they are lo# costand "ased on local resources +4 effective irrigation

organi6ations e.ist in most H9S +7 most H9S have #ell'deNned rules and roles for #ater allocation, distri"ution,resource mo"ili6ation, and conict resolution and +8 theleaders of these systems are accounta"le to the users%%%% 7B

"bi"., pp. 28$28'.

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Conversely, they are undermined "y state !olicies that !romote(as #econsidered in the !revious section(centrali6ation, social atomi6ation andanonymity%

Ostrom argues that central government !olicy regimes are relevant mainly tothe e.tent to #hich they facilitate or hinder the !rimary local efforts toformulate governance rules% The "est central government a!!roach is sim!lyto !rovide information and a su!!ortive atmos!here #ithout activeinterference% She !uts forth, as an ideal case, the 1%S% Geological Survey:

Iet me use the e.am!le of the im!ortant role that the 1%S%Geological Survey has !layed in the develo!ment of moreeffective local ground#ater institutions in some !arts of the1nited States% What is im!ortant to stress is that the GeologicalSurvey does not construct engineering #orks or do anything

other than o"tain and disseminate accurate information a"outhydrologic and geologic structures #ithin the 1nited States% Whena local set of #ater users #ants to o"tain "etter informationa"out a local ground#ater "asin, they can contract #ith theGeological Survey to conduct an intensive study in their area%Water !roducers #ould !ay a !ortion of the cost of such a survey%

The Geological Survey #ould !ay the other !ortion% Theinformation contained in such a survey is then !u"lic informationavaila"le to all interested !arties% The Geological Survey em!loysa highly !rofessional staff #ho rely on the most recent scientific

techni5ues for determining the structure and condition ofground#ater "asins% Iocal #ater !roducers o"tain the very "estavaila"le information from an agency that is not trying to !ushany !articular future !ro-ect that the agency is interested inconducting%7 D

The interesting thing is that this function(!roviding an information commons(is a"out as close as any government function can come to the non'coercive)administration of things%* 9n considering ho# the same function might "e!rovided "y institutions altogether outside the state frame#ork,net#orkedFcro#dsourced models like amateur astronomy may "e relevant%

9n any case, the concrete kno#ledge advantages Ostrom lists for localgovernance "y common'!ool resource users are things "oth Hriedrich /ayekand $ames Scott #ould recogni6e:

"bi"., pp. 2$2.

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Iocal kno#ledge% A!!ro!riators #ho have lived and a!!ro!riatedfrom a resource system over a long !eriod of time havedevelo!ed relatively accurate mental models of ho# the"io!hysical system itself o!erates, since the very success of their

a!!ro!riation efforts de!ends on such kno#ledge% They also kno#others living in the area #ell and #hat norms of "ehavior areconsidered a!!ro!riate%

9nclusion of trust#orthy !artici!ants% A!!ro!riators can deviserules that increase the !ro"a"ility that others are trust#orthy and#ill use reci!rocity% This lo#ers the cost of relying entirely onformal sanctions and !aying for e.tensive guarding%

?eliance on disaggregated kno#ledge% Heed"ack a"out ho# theresource system res!onds to changes in actions of a!!ro!riators

is !rovided in a disaggregated #ay% Hishers are 5uite a#are, fore.am!le, if the si6e and s!ecies distri"ution of their catch ischanging over time% 9rrigators learn #hether a !articular rotationsystem allo#s most farmers to gro# the cro!s they most !refer"y e.amining the resulting !roductivity of s!ecific fields%

>etter ada!ted rules% Given the a"ove, a!!ro!riators are morelikely to craft rules over time that are "etter ada!ted toeach of the local common'!ool resources than any generalsystem of rules%

Io#er enforcement costs% Since local a!!ro!riators have to "earthe cost of monitoring, they are a!t to craft rules that makeinfractions highly o"vious so that monitoring costs are lo#er%Hurther, "y creating rules that are seen as legitimate, ruleconformance #ill tend to "e higher%

arallel autonomous systems% The !ro"a"ility of failurethroughout a large region is greatly reduced "y the esta"lishmentof !arallel systems of rule making, inter!retation, andenforcement%8

Aside from cognitive issues, one reason systems im!osed from outside "y

central authorities are so failure'!rone is they0re !erceived as illegitimate% AsOstrom notes:

9f individuals voluntarily !artici!ate in a situation, they must sharesome general sense that most of the rules governing the situationis a!!ro!riate% Other#ise, the cost of enforcement #ithin

'0bi"., pp. 21$22.

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voluntary activities "ecomes high enough that it is difficult, if notim!ossi"le, to maintain !redicta"ility in an ongoing voluntaryactivity%8&

eo!le are instinctively alienated "y rules'systems in #hich they feel!o#erless, and 5uestion the legitimacy of rules im!osed "y an authority over#hom they have no control%

!sychological research !rovides evidence that !ositive intrinsicmotivation is increased #hen individuals feel that their o#n self'determination or self'esteem is enhanced%%%% This leads to the!ossi"ility that intrinsic motivation can "e )cro#ded out* insituations #here individuals do not !erceive themselves to havesufficient self'control over the actions they take%8

Ostrom goes on to cite a num"er of e.!eriments !roviding )strong evidence

for the cro#ding out of reci!rocity "y the im!osition of e.ternal sanctions,*5uoting the findings of one that:

&% E.ternal interventions cro%d out intrinsic motivation if the individualsaffected !erceive them to "e controlling% 9n that case, "oth self'determination and self'esteem suffer, and the individuals react "yreducing their intrinsic motivation in the activity controlled%

% E.ternal interventions cro%d in intrinsic motivation if the individualsconcerned !erceive it as supportive% 9n that case, self'esteem isfostered, and the individuals feel that they are given more freedom to

act, #hich enlarges self'determination%84

This is closely associated #ith the tendency of e.ternal im!osed rules to)0cro#d out0 endogenous coo!erative "ehavior%* 9n one e.!eriment, !layers ofa risoner0s game on #hom e.ternal incentives for coo!eration #ere im!osed#ere less coo!erative after the incentives #ere #ithdra#n than #ere the!layers in a control grou! #ho !layed the regular game #ithout incentives forcoo!eration and s!ontaneously evolved their o#n strategies%87

a social norm, es!ecially in a setting #here there iscommunication "et#een !arties, can #ork as #ell or nearly as#ell at generating coo!erative "ehavior as an e.ternally im!osedset of rules and system of monitoring and sanctioning% oreover,norms seem to have a certain staying !o#er in encouraging a

'1bi"., p. 21.

'2bi"., p. 112.'bi"., pp. 112$11.

'"bi"., p. 10.

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gro#th of the desire for coo!erative "ehavior over time, #hilecoo!eration that is !rimarily there due to e.ternally im!osed andenforced rules can disa!!ear very 5uickly%88

T#ird orld !e%elop&ent and Infrastr'ct're Policy and t#e issin-Class !i&ension. 9t0s hard to kno# ho# much of the argument of&nstitutional &ncentives and Sustaina'le #evelopment8ut considering her namea!!ears first on the "yline, and it0s a direct develo!ment of her a!!roach in$overning the Commons, 9 think it0s safe to treat it as s!eaking largely #ithher voice%

Ostrom is great, in her analysis of Third World develo!ment !olicy(and mores!ecifically of infrastructure !ro-ects(at treating the #ay multilateral

develo!ment agencies and national governments tend to ado!t $ames Scott0s)authoritarian high modernist* a!!roach, and ignore local, distri"utedkno#ledge% Western develo!ment e.!erts, for the most !art, sa# local socialinfrastructures in Third World countries as atavistic, and conflated them #ithtri"alism, corru!tion, ne!otism, ine5uality and authoritarianism%

When massive amounts of !hysical ca!ital #ere introduced "ydonor countries into the countries of Africa, Asia, and IatinAmerica, that had "een through long !eriods of coloni6ation, littleattention #as !aid to the massive destruction of social ca!italthat had occurred under coloni6ation% Tri"al communities in 9ndia,for e.am!le, had organi6ed themselves for centuries to derivetheir food, fodder, tools, and "uilding materials in a sustaina"lemanner from forest lands that they governed and managed ascommon !ro!erty% The >ritish government did not recogni6ecommunity o#nershi! and, in fact, !assed legislation during the&By the time ofinde!endence, the government of 9ndia e.erted full control overmore than 7 !ercent of the total forested area of 9ndia% Similarstri!!ing a#ay of the legitimacy of local institutions occurredthroughout Africa, Asia, and Iatin America%

To the e.tent that attention #as !aid to the earlier social ca!italof the !eo!le living in these areas, it #as assumed that the

''bi"., p. 10.'8 +linor stro, @arry Scroe&er an& S%san Wynne.nstitutional ncentives an" Sustainable (evelo$ment: nfrastructure

#olicies in #ers$ective (=o%l&er, San Drancisco, 6for&! Westvie# Press, 1).

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former !atterns of relationshi!s #ere J!rimitiveJ and not #orthsaving% any colonial and !ostcolonial officials felt that !riorinstitutions had to "e destroyed "efore develo!ment could reallyoccur% The diversity of different #ays of life #as seen as an

o"stacle to "e re!laced "y modern, centrali6ed institutions thatcould energi6e economic activity from the ca!ital%8@

9nstead, %%%donors from the Eastern and Western "locs !roceeded,or as #as the case #ith the former im!erial !o#ers, continued tosu!!ort the destruction of indigenous institutional infrastructurein ICs and the re!lacement of this social infrastructure #ithinstitutional arrangements that #ere familiar to the donors% Theyfound #illing accom!lices in the ne# national leaders of ICs#ho ho!ed to su!!ress any organi6ational activity outside theircontrol in order to !revent the emergence of via"le !oliticalcom!etitors%%%%

The one institutional feature of ICs that all donors found!otentially useful as a foundation for develo!ment #as the highlycentrali6ed national governments, #hich #ere !rimarily thelegacy of the colonial !eriod% =ational governments #ere vie#edas the instruments through #hich change and economicdevelo!ment #ould "e accom!lished% They #ere considered socrucial, in fact, that develo!ment efforts #ere s!ecially fashioned,for most of the !ast half century, to enhance the ca!acity and

authority of these national governments at the e.!ense ofsu"national !u"lic agencies and !rivate sector institutions% 9n themost recent )structural ad-ustment* !hase, this tendency toreinforce national institutions has "een accelerated% a-or !olicyreforms have "een devised "y small teams com!osed almoste.clusively of re!resentatives from ministries of finance andcentral "anks #orking #ith consultants engaged "y the World>ank and 9H%8B

Ostrom !roduces considera"le evidence from case studies to sho# thatinfrastructure !ro-ects undertaken in such an atmos!here of disregard for

local kno#ledge tend to have less than o!timal results(a finding that shouldcome as no sur!rise to readers of her larger "ody of #ork%

Ostrom is 5uite right in assuming that )9ndividuals, #ho are e.!ected to investresources%%% in sustaining rural infrastructure, must !erceive that the "enefits

' stro, 3Neiter Bar4et nor State,5 pp. 21$22.

')strom et al,nstitutional ncentives an" Sustainable (evelo$ment, pp. 8$.

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they o"tain%%% e.ceed the costs of the resources they devote to this effort%*8DAnd she addresses !ro"lems of rent'seeking, in #hich !ro-ects are !romoted"y interests that get more out of them than they !ut in%

>ut she considers rent'seeking mainly at the micro'level, rather than treatingrent'seeking as "uilt into the macro'structure of the system and central to itsgoals% Even the one time she s!ecifically mentions rent'seeking in the case ofinfrastructure !ro-ects that generate )dis!ro!ortionate "enefits* for )certaingrou!s of !otential users, such as large lando#ners,*


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The larger functional role of the World >ank, 9H and Western national foreignaid !ro-ects since WW99 #as #ell summed u! "y K#ame =krumah in (eo)Colonialism: foreign aid, under neo'colonialism, is #hat under colonialismused to "e called sim!ly )foreign ca!ital investment%* 2aterial from E Ch%

B on infrastructure3

9n the s!ecific case of Third World rural infrastructure, the dominant model ofrural develo!ment centers on large'scale, e.!ort'oriented cash cro!!roduction on large tracts of land(often situated on land stolen from evicted!easants #ith the hel! of colonial or !ost'colonial governments(held "ynative landed oligarchs%

So in a sense the attention Ostrom devotes to free'riders in the design of localinfrastructure systems is misleading free'riding, or rent'seeking, is the!rimary !ur!ose of "ig most large'scale rural infrastructure !ro-ects like

irrigation systems% Their !ur!ose is to !rovide su"sidi6ed in!uts to a model ofagricultural !roduction heavily de!endent on such su"sidi6ed in!uts, on stolenland held "y local landed elites%

She discusses )e5uity* in financing infrastructure in the conte.t of t#o rivala!!roaches: & "eneficiaries !ay in !ro!ortion to the marginal cost ofsu!!lying the !ortion of out!ut they consume and "eneficiaries !ay in!ro!ortion to their a"ility to !ay%ut from the !ers!ective of the !o#erfuleconomic interests served "y "ig infrastructure !ro-ects, either a!!roach#ould violate the #hole !ur!ose: to e.ternali6e their o!erating costs onsomeone else%

Ste!!ing "ack still further, ca!italism "y definition de!ends on the ine5uita"leshifting of "enefits and costs to different !arties% Ca!italism has "een defined"y more than one radical critic as the sociali6ation of cost and risk and the!rivati6ation of !rofit%

Sadly, Ostrom +andFor one or "oth of her coauthors dismiss suchconsiderations as )cons!iracy theories%* )At times, the criticism !resumescons!iratorial motivation, #ith donor agencies characteri6ed as fronts for ane# form of conscious im!erialism%*ut anyone #ho has o"served infrastructure !ro-ects in o!eration

is struck "y the num"er of e.tremely hard'#orking, highlymotivated individuals in "oth the host governments and thedonor agencies #hose !rinci!al goal is clearly to im!rove the#ell'"eing of those living in countries receiving foreign aid% Pet,

82bi"., pp. 11$11'.

8bi"., p. 1'8.

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realistic assessments of the many !ro-ects designed "y donor andhost government staff re!eatedly reveal unintended negativeoutcomes% Evaluations sho# that the !ro-ects have increased orreinforced the overcentrali6ation of reci!ient countries0

governments, #ere !oorly designed +given local circumstances,and generated ina!!ro!riately large de"t "urdens for thereci!ient countries% /o# is it !ossi"le for highly motivated, hard'#orking !eo!le #ho sincerely #ant to im!rove conditions in thesereci!ient countries to "e re!eatedly involved in the design andim!lementation of !ro-ects that do not accom!lish this goal;


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e4re *ll H'&ans Here.9n all her #ork, Ostrom never lost sight of onecentral truth: collective institutions, #hether they0re called governments,cor!orations, or commons, are all framed from the same crooked humantim"er% Advocates of government activity and criticsFske!tics of anarchism, alltoo often, sim!ly assume a level of omniscience on the !art of the state that0sdenied to the state, or hand#ave a#ay the actual !ro"lem of detecting and!unishing infractions% Hor e.am!le, those #ho are ske!tical a"out anarchismask the su!!osedly telling 5uestion of ho# a stateless society #ould !reventsomething like the ee!#ater /ori6ons oil s!ill(#ithout sto!!ing to consider#hether the EA and its regulations in our actual statist society managed to!revent it%

Giving an official name to the collectivity does nothing to alter the fact that

it0s -ust a "unch of human "eings doing stuff together% And they don0t cease to"e falli"le, limited in !ers!ective, and influenced "y self'interest -ust "ecausethey have official titles or claim to "e #orking in the name of the !u"lic or theshareholders%

O"viously, 9 do not kno# if these a!!ro!riators reached o!timalsolutions to their !ro"lems% 9 strongly dou"t it% They solved their!ro"lems the same #ay that most individuals solve difficult andcom!le. !ro"lems: as #ell as they #ere a"le, given the !ro"lemsinvolved, the information they had, the tools they had to #ork#ith, the costs of various kno#n o!tions, and the resources at

hand%


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a!!ro!riators #ho have used a !articular resource for years andkno# its characteristics in considera"le detail% Even #hen thekno#ledge "ase is similar, no guarantee e.ists that governmentofficials +or the researchers #ho advise them #ill use availa"le

information to make efficient andFor sustaina"le decisions%


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Ostrom, Iarry Schroeder and Susan Wynne% &nstitutional &ncentives andSustaina'le #evelopment: &nfrastructure Policies in Perspective +>oulder,San Hrancisco, O.ford: Westvie# ress, &DD4%

Anarchist Themes in the Work of Elinor Ostrom

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